Theft

FURTO. – Any unjust taking of another’s possessions, carried out for the purpose of profit, against the owner’s reasonable opposition.

SUMMARY:

I. Essential elements of theft

II. Moral evaluation of theft

III. The matter of theft

IV. Permissive or exculpatory causes of theft

V. crime.

I. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF F

The definition given, which may be called somewhat general, in the sense that it provides only the essential elements of every f., is then more precisely determined in the definition given for each individual species. It therefore immediately becomes apparent from it what is indispensable for constituting an f. of any kind: 1) there must be not merely the material taking of another’s goods, but this must occur unjustly: in this case every taking of another’s goods is to be regarded as unjust when it is done without any objective title that juridically and morally permits it; 2) the taking must be done for the purpose of gain: there would in fact be merely an unjust injury if another’s goods were taken in order to destroy or damage them; 3) this must occur against the opposition of the owner, an opposition which, in order to possess moral force, must be just, that is, properly motivated. This last element is of particular importance in all problems touching upon f. The unjustified opposition to a third party’s action directed toward taking an object or retaining it is morally and juridically nonexistent, and thus removes from that action itself the nature of f. On the other hand, it must also be remembered that, generally speaking, the owner is always entitled to renounce his property and not to oppose another’s retaining what belongs to him; in that case f. likewise ceases to exist. It is, however, necessary that this renunciation be spontaneous. Finally, it is also natural that, all conditions being equal, an f. is more serious the more reasonably the owner opposes II. For this purpose, however, it is not necessary for him to manifest by positive acts his reluctance to the actions of third parties seeking to commit f.; it is enough that he does not give positive consent. In doubtful cases, save for very rare exceptions, it is presumed that the owner is opposed to another’s taking what belongs to him.

The three essential elements of f. just mentioned—the taking of another’s things, the purpose of gain, and the owner’s opposition—are never found in isolation. They are joined now to one circumstance and now to another, especially to three. Of these circumstances, which constitute specifically different kinds of f., the first is to be regarded as connatural to it and constitutes simple f.: it consists in the fact that the f. takes place secretly. For technical precision, it is necessary to bear in mind that “secretly” here does not at all mean that the f. must occur in such a way that the owner does not notice it, but only that no physical or moral violence is to be used against the owner that would force him not to react or render him incapable of doing so. As regards its moral evaluation, in this type of f. there is an actual injustice concerning the neighbour’s goods of fortune; nothing more. The second circumstance, which may be joined to the elements described above and is absent in simple f., is violence. Here too it is appropriate to recall that this refers exclusively to physical or moral violence inflicted upon the owner, who must therefore be present at the f.; consequently, not every other violent act constitutes violence—for example, breaking gates, doors, or windows in order to steal more easily. This type of f., technically called robbery, is specifically distinct, as the moralists say, from simple f.; more precisely, it may be said that, besides being an f., it is also a personal offense against the owner. For this reason, robbery always involves two sins of injustice: one concerning the neighbour’s patrimonial goods, the other against his personal immunity. This second species of f. differs from the first only in the manner in which the f. is committed. The third circumstance, by contrast, differentiates f. from the two preceding species only in terms of its object. The so-called sacrilege f. occurs when sacred objects or objects intended for worship are stolen. Here too there are always two sins: one of injustice for the theft of another’s goods, the other of sacrilege for the offense against the virtue of religion. The preceding observation concerning the specific difference between robbery and simple f. retains its validity also with regard to the difference between sacrilege f. and the two aforementioned species. For this reason, rather than speaking of a specific difference between the former and the latter, in sacrilege f. one should speak of sacrilege in addition to f. It is then obvious that sacrilegious robbery occurs when the thief of sacred things uses violence against one who is legitimately charged with guarding them. In this case, violations of the moral laws accumulate, and there are not merely two but three sins. Consequently, in view of all that has been said thus far, the present exposition concerning f. applies not only to simple f. but also to the qualified forms of robbery and sacrilege: all three species, in fact, share the three essential elements mentioned above. It is also well known that the failure to return what has been found and belongs to another, the failure to return what was extorted by deceit, and the failure to pay debts are fully equivalent to f.

II. MORAL EVALUATION OF THEFT

In speaking of the morality of theft, all moralists, without exception, agree in classifying it among sins that are grave in themselves, although they also unanimously recognize that it may at times be only a venial sin. It will be useful on this point as well to clarify what may at first sight seem obscure. Thus, quite apart from Sacred Scripture, both the Old and the New Testament, which explicitly regards the sin of theft as grave insofar as it leads to eternal death (“thieves and robbers will not possess the Kingdom of God”: I Cor. 6:10); quite apart also from the Church’s and the Fathers’ perpetual agreement on this matter, and from the fact that theft is placed in the Decalogue among the sins that seriously offend the natural law (the seventh commandment: you shall not steal), it must be acknowledged that, if theft were not prohibited under pain of grave sin, it would not only greatly hinder peaceful coexistence and the progress of human society, diminishing and annihilating reciprocal relations of charity and justice, but would permanently make every social relationship impossible. This certainly does not mean that every individual theft always constitutes a mortal sin: the contrary is easily demonstrated by returning to the definition and considering the three essential elements of theft. It is indeed all too clear that the taking of another’s goods in a minimal amount, an illicit enrichment of the thief likewise slight in value, and finally harm to the owner so slight that it does not substantially and gravely oppose the thief’s action, cannot create a state of grave responsibility in the thief himself, nor consequently a grave sin—especially since, despite such violations, the social order and commutative justice remain sufficiently intact.

The rather serious problem, however, lies in determining concretely when theft constitutes a mortal sin and when only a venial one. Having said that theft is a sin grave in itself, one might easily be led to attribute the greater or lesser, or even the absence of, gravity in the offense exclusively to the greater or lesser value of the object stolen: nothing could be more erroneous. Certainly, the objective element in theft carries considerable weight, but it is neither the only element nor always the principal one. For this reason it is necessary once again to consider the other two essential elements of every theft, namely, the thief’s illicit enrichment and the owner’s opposition. Beginning with the latter, although it is appropriate to recall that the gravity or lack of gravity of theft is not always directly related to the owner’s greater or lesser opposition (a particularly miserly man might violently object and be deeply, even gravely, offended by thefts of minimal proportions), it nevertheless influences the gravity of the theft in some way. It is easy to understand that different persons may, and often quite justly do, be more or less unwilling to be deprived of the same object: this difference depends on the character of the person robbed, his degree of prosperity, and other circumstances. In such cases, the affront, and therefore the injustice, will obviously be more or less grave according to the differing circumstances, provided that they are in some way perceived by the thief. As for illicit enrichment, the matter is even clearer. It would indeed be strange to allow thieves to enrich themselves by considerable quantities of other people’s goods on the pretext that they do not inflict serious harm on their neighbor (which is certainly possible, for example, in minor thefts distributed among very large numbers of people), and then conclude that, by acting in this way, they commit nothing more than a venial sin. This element, therefore—that is, the prohibition against enriching oneself without a legitimate title—also has its weight in determining whether and when theft constitutes a grave sin. Nor should another circumstance be forgotten which, although outside the proper elements of theft, is nevertheless connected with them: the need to safeguard the common good at all times and to make life and its relationships possible. This means that, in the absence of the other elements, this consideration too may, and sometimes does, have a decisive bearing, especially in circumstances where theft, although involving grave matter, causes no serious harm to third parties, conflicts with no grave opposition on the part of the person robbed, and produces no considerable enrichment in the thief (one need only think of thefts amounting to several tens of thousands of lire, committed by billionaires, or against economically powerful companies, and even against the State itself, by persons who are already exceedingly wealthy). It may therefore be said that a theft will also be grave when, although slight if only its essential elements are considered, it nevertheless seriously harms the common good by making social relations difficult. Subjectively, however, this special malice must always be perceived by the agent.

III. MATTER OF THEFT

Nevertheless, although all these elements exert their influence, and sometimes each one is decisive, given the nature of theft, which is a sin of injustice toward one’s neighbor, whose patrimonial goods are violated, ordinarily the final word, as regards grave and light theft, belongs precisely to the quantity of the goods stolen, that is, as moralists say, to the matter of theft.

In reality, it is not even easy to determine with mathematical precision what matter is to be regarded as grave and what as light in theft. Moreover, this difficulty is hardly surprising. If one starts from the concept that in theft it is necessary to weigh simultaneously not only the essential elements, which themselves are not always well defined, but also many other circumstances that, although extrinsic, are nevertheless, by moral necessity, almost always joined to them; and if one keeps in mind that all or part of these elements and circumstances elude an evaluation of a mathematical order, because they are the fruit and effect of free personal participation and of physical or psychological subjective states that are extremely difficult to interpret, it will not be surprising that, in practice, when one considers only the matter of theft, it is almost impossible to state in precise figures which part of it is grave and which light. Nonetheless, since it is necessary to attempt, at least with approximate figures and in principle, to formulate rules that may serve as a reasonably secure guide in this matter, several basic propositions are set forth with greater precision, upon which each person may base his judgments in individual practical cases. These propositions begin from the consideration that, in the entire range of possible thefts, besides a matter that must always be regarded as light and a matter that must always be regarded as grave, whatever the circumstances accompanying either, there is also a matter which, when stolen from certain persons, constitutes a grave sin, but when stolen from others constitutes only a venial sin—in other words, a matter that is grave or light only relatively.

First of all, there is a matter that is absolutely and always light; objectively, it neither constitutes nor can ever constitute an object of grave injustice. Abstractly speaking, this matter consists of goods which, if stolen, do not in themselves cause either grave harm to society, or serious injury to the person robbed of them, or any notable enrichment to the thief. In practice, these goods consist of those things which people are not, or scarcely are, accustomed to look after with any anxiety. By way of example: the theft of a few lire, of a button, of an iron pin, of a few grams of food, and so forth. As everyone can see, if stolen, such goods can constitute only matter for a venial sin; indeed, given the disproportion that would result, it would be contrary to the very principles of natural law to judge the theft of such trifling things to be grave. Conversely, however, one must admit a matter that is absolutely, and therefore objectively, always grave. That is, there is a limit in theft beyond which it is no longer possible in any way to speak of light matter. This limit is imperatively required by the common good: for the latter would in fact be greatly hindered if, even after that limit had been exceeded, one still found oneself faced with merely light guilt. It is obvious that in this way the path would be opened to enormous and highly damaging thefts, both for individuals and for society, since, being only venial sins, they would receive little or no attention from the mass of men. For greater clarity, it should also be noted that the term “absolutely” here means that the sin of theft involving this matter remains equally grave, and therefore that commutative justice is seriously violated, even if the person robbed, given his enormous economic fortune, suffers no grave harm from the theft, or if the thief gains only a modest sum. Moralists determine what this matter and the equivalent sum are, although they are not in complete agreement on the point. The opinion of those who raise this figure to the equivalent of one month’s wages for a worker of average rank appears better founded. Today, by way of example, ordinarily speaking, the sum ranging from 25,000 to 30,000 Italian paper lire—that is, one month’s wages for someone earning from 800 to 1,000 lire a day—would be considered absolutely grave matter. Consequently, in practice, today it is not possible under any circumstances to steal 25,000–40,000 lire without committing a mortal sin, even if that sum should happen not to cause anyone grave harm. It must also be borne in mind that absolutely grave matter is the only matter to be calculated in thefts committed to the detriment of wealthy corporations or extraordinarily rich individuals, since even a smaller sum would not constitute for them a grave, not even a relative, loss.

It has been said that there is also matter that is grave only relatively. It is obvious, in fact, that grave theft cannot consist only in a sum reaching the threshold of absolutely grave matter. Too much disorder and too much serious harm would result—although they would nonetheless have to be considered venial sins—if one had to stop at considering only absolutely grave matter. Relatively grave matter means that sum of goods which, when stolen, in fact constitutes grave harm for the person robbed, whereas the same sum would constitute light harm if stolen from another person who was economically wealthier. Here too it is the same natural law that very clearly suggests that it is not the same thing to steal 800–1,000 lire from a modest worker as to steal them from an extremely wealthy person, and that the relatively grave sum must necessarily change as the social category to which the persons belong changes, precisely because the theft of sum a causes harm to one person, while only sum a causes harm to another. Generally, in theft, relatively grave matter is a sum corresponding to one day’s work and to what is necessary to live for one day according to one’s social position. Consequently, this matter fluctuates with the varying social positions of persons. Finally, there is relatively light matter. This consists of that sum of goods which, although it constitutes relatively grave matter for others, nevertheless, given the condition of the person from whom it is stolen, constitutes only light matter; for example, the theft of a thousand lire committed to the detriment of an extremely wealthy gentleman.

But several observations must also be made concerning the preceding propositions regarding the matter of f. First of all, the amounts indicated apply only when the f. is between unrelated persons; it will therefore be necessary at least to double them, for example, in cases of f. between spouses, and of children against their parents, etc.; indeed, it is obvious that parents toward their children, as well as one spouse toward the other, are much less opposed to the f. than they would be if the persons involved had no relationship with them: ultimately, the goods remain within the family and serve the family’s use. Secondly, the sum established for the matter to be relatively grave must likewise be doubled if the theft is not committed in a single act but at intervals and in small proportions: in this way, since the harm is spread over a longer period of time and in small amounts, it is for that very reason felt less and is therefore less grave. Indeed, if, through small f., one steals from several persons without causing relatively grave harm to any one of them in particular, moralists rightly require, in order for grave matter to be attained, double the absolutely grave sum, that is, from 50,000 to 60,000 lire, and on condition that these small f. be morally united, that is, so close to one another as to constitute a single moral action; otherwise grave matter would never be attained, but there would remain a number of f., all light. Thirdly, various mitigating circumstances must also be taken into account. For this reason, a greater sum is required for grave matter in the f. of unattended and exposed things (e.g., fruit from trees bordering the road, remnants of grain or straw in the fields); and of things produced naturally without labor (e.g., mushrooms, strawberries, shrubs); and of scraps; and of small and diverse objects (e.g., an apple, a needle) stolen from the same owner. In common usage, these things are worth less because of one or another of the circumstances mentioned above. Ordinarily, even in these cases a double sum will be needed to reach grave matter. Finally, it should be noted that the f. will always be absent in those cases in which the owner is not opposed to it, or is not substantially opposed to it, since everyone may renounce his rights.

IV. PERMISSIVE OR EXCUSING CAUSES OF F

These are so-called extreme necessity and occult compensation. Strictly speaking, there are no causes that permit theft, since, being a sin, it can never be admitted; the meaning of this statement, therefore, is that in certain circumstances (extreme necessity, occult compensation) one of the essential and constitutive elements of theft is lacking, and consequently theft itself is absent.

1. Extreme necessity

In relation to commutative justice, extreme necessity is that particular moment or state in which a person finds himself under the threat of imminent death or of an equivalent misfortune. In addition to death, it is commonly held that properly so-called slavery, the gravest infamy, the complete or almost complete ruin of one’s health, a very grave mutilation, and rape likewise constitute a state of extreme necessity. These misfortunes, in order to create extreme necessity, must be imminent and must not be avoidable in any other way than by taking the property of others. Catholic moral theology teaches that, in an already existing extreme necessity, or one that cannot be avoided by other means, everyone is permitted to appropriate the goods of any person insofar as this is indispensable for escaping II. In other words, in such cases all goods that exist and are actually indispensable for rescuing a person from death or an equivalent misfortune may be taken as though they belonged to no one, without there being theft on that account, provided that they do not exceed what is required to eliminate the said necessity. This follows from natural law: for however the distribution of goods among human beings may have taken place, since it was intended and ordered with reference to the common good, it is by its nature subject to the condition that it not produce an extreme wrong against the very person for whose greater good it was established. Thus, when a case of extreme necessity arises, this distribution is as though it had not taken place, always on the condition that only what is truly required to escape the aforesaid state is taken.

By way of example: a person on the point of starving to death may take enough food to satisfy his hunger wherever he finds it; a person pursued by murderers intent on killing him may take another’s horse, bicycle, or automobile in order to escape (without prejudice in these cases to the obligation of restitution, since the mere use of these goods suffices to eliminate the extreme necessity); a person who, in order to free himself from slavery, appropriates a large sum of another’s money does not commit theft, provided that, once the danger has passed, he returns it if he possessed the means to do so elsewhere. The same is in itself permissible on behalf of others, provided that there is no abuse. Nor may the owner positively oppose such takings, since the person in extreme necessity truly has the right to appropriate them, a right that cannot be violated. This principle may make a certain impression, but that impression is relatively easily overcome if one reflects that, ultimately, God created everything for the service of man and that this is its principal purpose.

2. Occult compensation

If two persons are mutually debtors and creditors to one another for an equal value of goods or for the same sum of money, it will not be necessary for each to charge the other in turn. Here there is already a reciprocal set-off. This set-off is called legal. Here, on the other hand, what is at issue is the extralegal set-off which, precisely for this reason, moralists customarily call occult compensation, that is, the appropriation, without the debtor’s knowledge, of things that he owes us (v. COMPENSAZIONE OCCULTA). V. IL F. COME DELITTO. - From what has been said above, it is clear that in theft there is more than sufficient matter to constitute not only a moral offense but also a crime, given the disturbance it causes in social relations. It is therefore no wonder that all legal systems have considered and continue to consider it a crime (some isolated deviation, such as the provision said to have been introduced at Sparta by Lycurgus, whereby not theft in itself was punished, but lack of skill in theft, even if historically established, does not alter the substance of the matter). It is only that in the various legal systems certain qualified forms of theft may receive greater consideration, while others escape criminal repression, which must necessarily come to a halt before a certain legal formalism, from which the cleverest can, and not infrequently do, escape. Thus it is possible that while the common highway robber is imprisoned for a few hundred lire, the person who has amassed his fortune by deriving illicit profits through embezzlement, favoritism, or other means remains completely unpunished. The State does what it can; there then remain the tribunal of conscience and that of God. Italian law includes theft under title 13, crimes against property, including therein theft

(Cod. pen. it., arts. 624-26) and certain other specifications, such as the taking of common property (art. 627), robbery (art. 628), extortion (v. arts. 629-30), usurpation (art. 631), the diversion of waters or alteration of the condition of places (art. 632), the invasion of land and buildings (art. 633), and, moving ever further from the specific figure of theft, under the same title also treats the crime of violent disturbance of possession (art. 634) and the various forms of damage to property (arts. 635-39).

In canon criminal law, conviction for theft entails for a layman the automatic exclusion (ipso iure) from valid ecclesiastical acts and removal from any office that the offender may happen to hold in the Church; moreover, it entails the legal as well as moral obligation to repair the damage (can. 2354 § 1). A cleric who commits such a crime may then be subjected to penalties of various kinds proportionate to his culpability, ranging from censures to deposition (can. 2354 § 2).