THEFT. — The unjust taking of another’s property, done with the intent of gain, against the reasonable opposition of the owner.
OUTLINE: I. Essential elements of theft — II. Moral evaluation of theft — III. Subject matter of theft — IV. Permissive causes or exchanges of theft — V. Theft as a crime.
I. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THEFT
The definition given, which may be called somewhat generic in that it provides only the essential elements common to every theft, is then more precisely determined in the definition given for each particular kind. From it, however, the indispensable elements for constituting theft of any kind are immediately apparent: 1) that there be not only the material taking of another’s goods, but that this be done unjustly: in this case, every taking of another’s goods without any juridical or moral title permitting it is to be considered unjust; 2) that this taking be done with the intent of gain: for if another’s goods were taken merely to be destroyed or damaged, there would be only an unjust injury; 3) that this occur against the opposition of the owner, opposition which, to have its moral force, must be just, i.e., justified. This last element is of particular importance in all problems touching theft. Unjustified opposition to a third party’s action aimed at taking or retaining an object is morally and juridically nonexistent, thereby removing from the same action the nature of theft. On the other hand, it must be remembered that, generally speaking, the owner is always entitled to renounce his property or to refrain from opposing another’s retention of it, in which case theft ceases. It is necessary, however, that such renunciation be voluntary. Finally, it is natural that, all else being equal, theft is all the greater insofar as the owner’s opposition is more reasonable. To this end, it is not necessary that he manifest his reluctance to theft by positive acts; it suffices that he not positively consent. In doubtful cases, barring very rare exceptions, it is presumed that the owner is opposed to others taking his property.The three essential elements of theft just mentioned (taking of another’s goods, intent of gain, opposition of the owner) are never found alone. They are joined now to one, now to another circumstance, especially three. Of these, which constitute specifically different kinds of theft, the first is to be considered as connate and constitutes simple theft: it consists in the fact that the theft occurs secretly. For technical precision, it must be noted that “secretly” here does not mean that the theft must occur in such a way that the owner will not notice it, but only that no physical or moral violence be used against the owner to prevent him from reacting or render him powerless to do so. As regards its moral evaluation, in this kind of theft there is a real injury to the temporal goods of one’s neighbor; nothing more. The second circumstance, which may be joined to the elements described above and is lacking in simple theft, is violence. Here too it is well to recall that it is exclusively a matter of violence, physical or moral, directed against the owner, which must therefore be present in the theft; breaking gates, doors, or windows to facilitate theft is not violence in this sense. This kind of theft, technically called robbery, is specifically distinct, as moralists say, from simple theft; it may better be said that in addition to being theft it is also a personal offense against the owner. For this reason, robbery always involves two injustices: one against the neighbor’s temporal goods, the other against his personal immunity. This second kind of theft differs from the first only in the manner in which the theft is committed. The third circumstance, instead, differentiates theft from the two preceding kinds only in its object. There is what is called sacrilegious theft when sacred objects or those destined for worship are stolen. Here too there are always two sins: one of injustice for the theft of another’s goods, the other of sacrilege for the offense against the virtue of religion. The foregoing observation regarding the specific difference between robbery and simple theft retains its validity with respect to the difference between sacrilegious theft and the two aforementioned kinds: for this reason, rather than speaking of a specific difference between sacrilegious theft and the others, one must speak of sacrilege in addition to theft. It is obvious, moreover, that there is sacrilegious robbery when the thief of sacred objects uses violence against one lawfully appointed to guard them. In this case, the infractions of moral law accumulate to three sins rather than two. In consequence of what has been said, the present exposition regarding theft applies not only to simple theft but also to qualified theft such as robbery and sacrilegious theft: all three of these kinds share the three essential elements mentioned above. It is well known, furthermore, that fully equivalent to theft is the failure to return what has been found and belongs to another, the failure to return what has been extorted by deceit, and the failure to pay debts.
II. MORAL EVALUATION OF THEFT
Speaking of the morality of theft, all moralists, without exception, agree in classifying it among sins that are grave in themselves, though they also unanimously recognize that it may at times be only a venial sin. It will be well to clarify what may appear obscure on this point. For this, while setting aside Sacred Scripture, both the Old and New Testaments, which expressly deem theft a grave sin inasmuch as it leads to eternal death (nor thieves nor robbers will possess the Kingdom of God: 1 Cor 6:10), and setting aside the constant consensus of the Church and the Fathers in this regard, and the fact that theft is placed in the Decalogue among sins that gravely offend natural law (the seventh commandment: You shall not steal), it must be acknowledged that if theft were not forbidden under pain of grave sin, it would not only greatly hinder peaceful coexistence and the progress of human society, diminishing or annihilating reciprocal relations of charity and justice, but would render society itself impossible. This is not to say, of course, that every single act of theft constitutes a mortal sin: the contrary is easily demonstrated by referring to the definition and considering the three essential elements of theft. It is all too clear, in fact, that the taking of another’s goods in a minimal amount, an undue enrichment of the thief likewise in a trivial matter, and finally a harm to the owner equally trivial as not to render it substantially and gravely contrary to the thief’s action, cannot create a state of grave responsibility in the thief himself, nor consequently a grave sin; all the more so since, despite these violations, social order and commutative justice remain sufficiently intact.The problem, however, is rather serious when it comes to determining in concreto when theft constitutes a mortal sin and when only a venial one. Indeed, having stated that theft is a sin grave in itself, one might easily be led to attribute the greater or greatest gravity of the fault exclusively to the greater or lesser quantity of the stolen object: nothing could be more erroneous. Certainly, the element of the object in theft has considerable weight, but it is neither the only nor always the principal factor. For this reason, it is necessary to refer again to the other two essential elements of every theft, namely, the illicit enrichment of the thief and the opposition of the owner.
Beginning with the latter, although it is well to remember that the gravity of theft is not always less when it finds direct relation to the greater or lesser opposition of the owner (a particularly miserly man might violently oppose and be gravely offended even by theft of the smallest proportions), it nonetheless influences in some way the gravity of the theft. This is also because it is easy to understand that different persons may, and often quite justly, be more or less opposed to being deprived of the same object: such diversity depends on the character of the robbed person, on his degree of fortune, and on other circumstances. In these cases, the offense—and thus the injustice—will obviously be more or less grave according to the diversity of these circumstances, provided that they are in some way perceived by the thief.
As for illicit enrichment, the matter is even more evident. It would indeed be strange to allow thieves to enrich themselves even with considerable quantities of others' goods on the pretext that they do not cause grave harm to their neighbor (which is certainly possible, e.g., in petty thefts distributed among many people), and thus conclude that, in acting thus, they commit no more than a venial sin. This element, therefore—that is, the prohibition against enriching oneself without legitimate title—also has its weight in determining when theft constitutes a grave sin.
Nor should another circumstance be forgotten, one that, although outside the proper elements of theft, is nonetheless connected to them: namely, the exigency of safeguarding the common good at all times and of rendering social life with its relations possible. This means that, in the absence of the other elements, this too can and does have a weight that is often decisive, especially in those cases where theft, though involving a grave matter, does not cause grave harm to others, does not conflict with grave opposition from the robbed party, nor produces notable enrichment for the thief (one need only think of thefts amounting to thousands of lire from millionaires, or from economically powerful companies, or even from the State itself, by persons already exceedingly wealthy). It will therefore be said that theft is grave even when it is light in matter, if, considering solely the essential elements of theft, it gravely offends the common good by rendering social relations difficult. Subjectively, however, it is always necessary that this special malice be perceived by the agent.
III. THE MATTER OF THEFT — Nevertheless, although all these elements have their influence, and at times each is determinative, given the nature of theft, which is a sin of injustice against one’s neighbor insofar as his patrimonial goods are harmed, ordinarily the final word, as regards grave and light theft, pertains precisely to the quantity of the stolen goods, that is, as moralists say, to the matter of the theft.
In reality, it is not even easy to determine with mathematical precision which matter should be considered grave and which light in theft. Moreover, this difficulty should not surprise us. If we start from the concept that in theft it is necessary to weigh simultaneously not only the essential elements—which are themselves not always well-defined—but also many other circumstances that, although extrinsic, are nonetheless morally necessary almost always joined to them; if we bear in mind that all or part of these elements and circumstances escape mathematical evaluation because they are the fruit and effect of personal free choice and of subjective physical and psychological states that are extremely difficult to interpret, it will not surprise us that, focusing solely on the matter of theft, it is nearly impossible to state in precise figures which of it is grave and which light.
Nevertheless, since it is necessary to provide at least approximate numerical rules and general principles to serve as a relatively secure guide in this problem, greater precision is achieved by positing certain basic propositions on which one may, in individual practical cases, base one’s judgments. These propositions start from the consideration that in the entire range of possible thefts, in addition to a matter that must absolutely always be considered light and a matter that must absolutely always be considered grave, whatever the accompanying circumstances, there exists a matter which, when stolen from certain persons, constitutes a grave sin, while when stolen from others it constitutes only a venial sin—that is, a matter that is grave or light only relatively.
First of all, there is a matter which is absolutely always slight: it constitutes, nor can it objectively constitute, ever a matter of grave injustice. This matter, strictly speaking, is constituted by goods which, if stolen, do not in themselves cause either grave harm to society or grave harm or offence to the person from whom they are stolen, nor a notable enrichment to the thief. In practice, these goods consist of those things which one is not accustomed, or almost not accustomed, to guard with any anxiety. To give an example: a few lire, a button, an iron pin, a few grams of food, etc. As everyone can see, these goods, if stolen, can constitute only a matter of venial sin; it would in fact be contrary to the very principles of natural law, given the disproportion that would result, to judge as grave the theft of such trifling things.
On the other hand, however, one must admit a matter which is absolutely and therefore objectively always grave. There is a limit in theft, beyond which one can no longer speak in any way of slight matter. This limit is imperatively required by the common good: this would in fact be greatly hindered if, even beyond that limit, one were still faced with only slight fault. It is obvious, in fact, that in this way enormous and most harmful thefts would be encouraged, both for individuals and for society, since, constituting only venial sin, they would be little or not at all heeded by the mass of men.
For greater clarity, moreover, it should be noted that the term "absolutely" here is meant to indicate that the sin of theft in the said matter remains equally grave, and therefore commutative justice is gravely violated even in the event that the person robbed, given his enormous wealth, does not suffer grave harm from the theft, or that the thief gains only a modest sum.
As to what this matter is, moralists are in substantial agreement, although they are not entirely unanimous. The more solid opinion seems to be that of those who set this sum at the equivalent of a month's wages of a worker of average category. Today, for example, it would normally be considered absolutely grave matter a sum ranging from 25,000 to 30,000 Italian lire in paper money, i.e., the monthly wage of one who earns from 800 to 1,000 lire a day. In practice, therefore, today it is impossible in any case to steal 25,000–40,000 lire without committing mortal sin, even if that sum should not cause grave harm to anyone.
It must also be borne in mind that absolutely grave matter is the only one to be considered in thefts perpetrated against opulent societies or extraordinarily rich individuals, since for them even a smaller sum does not constitute a grave harm, even relatively.
It has been said that there also exists a matter which is grave only relatively. It is obvious, in fact, that it cannot constitute grave theft only the sum which reaches absolutely grave matter. Too much disorder and too much grave harm would result (which should nevertheless be considered venial sins) if one were to stop at considering only absolutely grave matter. By relatively grave matter is meant that sum of goods which, when stolen, does in fact cause grave harm to the person robbed, harm which would be slight if the same sum were stolen from someone economically richer. Here again natural law clearly suggests that it is not the same to steal 800–1,000 lire from a modest worker as to steal them from a very rich person, and that relatively grave matter must vary according to the category to which persons belong, precisely because to one it causes harm a, to another only the sum y.
Generally, relatively grave matter in theft is the sum corresponding to a day's work or to what is necessary to live one day according to one's social position. Consequently, this matter fluctuates with the fluctuation of social positions of persons. Finally, there is a relatively slight matter. This is constituted by that sum of goods which, although for others it constitutes relatively grave matter, still, given the condition of the person from whom it is stolen, constitutes only slight matter; for them, a theft of a thousand lire perpetrated against a very rich man.
But even on the preceding propositions regarding the matter of theft, some observations must be made. First of all, the sums referred to hold good only if it is a question of theft between strangers; in such cases it will be necessary at least to double them, e.g., in cases of theft between spouses, of children towards parents, etc.; it is obvious, in fact, that parents towards children or one spouse towards the other are much less contrary to theft than if it were a question of persons having no relation with them: after all, the goods remain within the family and are used for the needs of the family.
Secondly, the sum defined as relatively grave matter must also be doubled if the theft is not committed in a single action but at intervals of time and in small proportions: in this way, in fact, since the harm is spread over a longer period and in small quantities, it is thereby less felt and therefore less grave. Indeed, if with small thefts one steals from several persons, without reaching relatively grave harm for any one of them in particular, moralists rightly require, in order to reach grave matter, double the sum of absolutely grave matter, therefore from 50,000 to 60,000 lire, on condition that these small thefts are morally united, i.e., so close to one another as to constitute a single moral action; otherwise grave matter would never be reached, but there would remain so many thefts, all slight.
Thirdly, one must also take into account various extenuating circumstances. For this reason a larger sum is required to reach grave matter in the theft of things which are irreplaceable or entail expense (e.g., fruit from trees in the street, remnants of grain or straw in the fields); of things produced naturally without labour (e.g., mushrooms, strawberries, shrubs); or of scraps; of small objects of various kinds (e.g., a pen, a needle) stolen from the same owner. These things, in fact, in common use are worth less for one or other of the above-mentioned reasons. Ordinarily, even in these cases, double the sum will be required to reach grave matter.
Finally, it should be noted that theft will always be excused in those cases in which the owner is not opposed or is not substantially opposed, since everyone can renounce his rights.
IV. PERMISSIVE OR EXCUSING CAUSES OF THEFT — These are the so-called extreme necessity and secret compensation. To speak properly, in fact, there are no causes which permit theft, since, being a sin, it can never be admitted; the meaning, therefore, of this statement is that in certain circumstances (extreme necessity, secret compensation) one of the essential and constitutive elements of theft is lacking, and therefore theft itself.
1. Extreme necessity
In relation to commutative justice, extreme necessity is called that particular moment or state in which a person finds himself under the threat of imminent death or an equivalent misfortune. Besides death, it is commonly admitted that the following constitute states of extreme necessity: actual slavery, very grave infamy, almost total ruin of health, very grave mutilation,**Stupor.**
These misfortunes, because they constitute extreme necessity, must be imminent and cannot be avoided in any other way than by taking another’s goods. Catholic moral teaching holds that in cases of existing or unavoidable extreme necessity, it is lawful for anyone to appropriate the goods of another to the extent necessary to free oneself from such necessity, provided that the goods taken do not exceed what is strictly required to eliminate the danger. In other words, in such cases all goods that are necessary to free a person from death or an equivalent misfortune may be taken as if they belonged to no one, without this constituting theft, provided that the amount taken does not exceed what is necessary to remove the necessity. This is grounded in natural law: for however the distribution of goods among men may have come about, since it was intended and ordered for the common good, it is by its nature subject to the condition that it must not result in extreme injustice to those for whose greater benefit it was established. Thus, in cases of extreme necessity, such distribution is as if it had not occurred, always provided that only what is truly necessary to free oneself from the aforementioned state is taken.
To illustrate: one who is on the verge of starvation may take sufficient food wherever it is found; one pursued by murderers may take another’s horse, bicycle, or automobile to escape (though in such cases there remains the obligation to restore the goods, since their mere use suffices to eliminate the extreme necessity); one who appropriates a large sum of another’s money to free oneself from slavery does not commit theft, provided one restores it after the danger has passed, if one possesses it elsewhere. The same is permissible, in itself, on behalf of others, provided no abuse is made of II. Nor may the owner reasonably oppose such taking, for in one who is in extreme necessity there exists a true right to appropriate such goods, a right that cannot be violated. This principle may at first seem surprising, but the impression is easily overcome when one considers that, in the final analysis, God created all things for the service of man, and they must primarily serve this end.
2. **Occult compensation.** — If two persons are clearly debtors and creditors to one another for the same value of goods or the same sum of money, there is no need for either to debit the other. Here there is already a mutual compensation. This is called legal compensation. The matter at hand, however, is extra-legal compensation, which for this reason moralists term *occult compensation*, namely, the appropriation, without the debtor’s knowledge, of goods owed to oneself (v. *COMANZIONE OCCULTA*).
**V. THEFT AS A CRIME.** — From what has been said above, it is clear that theft involves more than a moral wrong; it also constitutes a crime, given the disturbance it causes in social relations. It is therefore no wonder that all legal systems (with rare exceptions, such as the law attributed to Lycurgus in Sparta, which punished not theft itself but the lack of skill in committing it—though historically confirmed, this does not alter the substance of the matter) have regarded and continue to regard theft as a crime. Only in various legal systems do certain qualified forms of theft receive greater attention, while others escape penal repression, which must necessarily halt before certain legal formalities, from which the most cunning often evade. Thus, it is possible that while a common highway robber is imprisoned for a few hundred lire, one who has amassed a fortune through illicit profits, embezzlement, favoritism, or other means remains entirely unpunished. The state does what it can; the tribunal of conscience and that of God remain.
Italian law includes theft under Title XIII of crimes against property, encompassing within it such offenses as the misappropriation of common goods (art. 627), robbery (art. 628), extortion (v. arts. 629–30), usurpation (art. 631), diversion of waters and alteration of land conditions (art. 632), invasion of lands and buildings (art. 633), and, moving further from the specific figure of theft, also treats under the same title the crime of violent disturbance of possession (art. 634) and various forms of damage (arts. 635–39).
In canon law, the conviction for theft entails for a layperson the automatic exclusion (*ipso iure*) from legitimate ecclesiastical acts and removal from any office the guilty party may hold in the Church; moreover, there is a juridical, as well as moral, obligation to make restitution (can. 2354 § 1). A cleric who commits such a crime may be subject to various penalties proportionate to culpability, which may range from censures to deposition (can. 2354 § 2).
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