TERMERARY JUDGMENT
It is thinking ill of others without sufficient reason. It therefore includes two elements: a) the firm adherence of the mind to a proposition unfavorable to others; b) the lack of a reason that authorizes doing so. For the first element, it is opposed to doubt and rash suspicion; doubt, in fact (at least in the usual sense among the ancients), implies suspension of assent; suspicion implies a beginning of adherence or at most a weak adherence. For the second element, temerary judgment is distinguished from non-temerary judgment.
Psychologically, temerary judgment arises from the tendency to precipitate conclusions and to malice, which are found in every person and strongly incline one to form judgments beyond the objectively ascertained data. Both tendencies can be greatly intensified by passion and self-interest, especially when dealing with concrete and complex matters. For this reason, temerary judgments are very frequent in politics and religion. The well-known Latin expressions “ab uno disce omnes” and “post hoc ergo propter hoc” are already an expression of all this.
Both natural and Christian morality condemn temerary judgment. First of all because they generally dissuade from judging. They point out that the morality of an act depends above all on the degree of awareness and freedom with which the object was willed; since this is difficult to measure, especially by outsiders, it is necessary that these in particular refrain as much as possible from forming judgments. In this sense, Scripture also insists (cf., e.g., Mt. 7:1; Lk. 6:37; Rom. 14:4; 1 Cor. 4:5).
To this general reason they add the obligation, arising from love, to interpret the conduct of others as favorably as possible, according to 1 Cor. 13 (“charitas... non cogitat malum”), and the obligation, arising from justice, not to judge beyond what is certain. Finally, they point out that judgments tend easily to find outward expression, thus creating the danger of defamation.