Unbelievers

INFEDELI. - This name denotes adults without Baptism. From the theological point of view, the question of their salvation is important; from the juridical point of view, their position in relation to ecclesiastical laws must be noted.
I. THE SALVATION OF INFIDELS. - 1. The problem. - By salvation is meant the attainment of that everlasting happiness beyond this world which consists in the intuitive vision of God and constitutes the ultimate end of supernatural life.

The question concerning them is precisely whether all of them must be condemned en masse and irremediably to hell for lack of that indispensable requisite which is theological faith, seemingly impossible in their condition; or whether and how they too may obtain that salvation to which he who has believed and been baptized may effectively aspire (Mc., 16,16).

This extremely grave and complex problem is ultimately connected with the mysteries of predestination, Grace, and free will. More concretely, it arises from the juxtaposition of two indubitable truths: on the one hand, in the order of intention, God’s loving design, who wills all men to be saved (I Tim. 2, 4); and, on the other, in the order of execution, the absolute necessity of faith, “the beginning of human salvation, the foundation and root of all justification” (Denz-U, 801).

2. The fact. - Against the rigorism of Calvino, Baio, and the Jansenists, the Catholic Church, while rejecting the opinion of those who affirm that it lies within the power of all men to find the way of eternal salvation and to be saved in the worship of any religion whatsoever (Denz-U, 1646, 1716 ff.), nevertheless does not deny, but indeed authorizes, the belief that adult infidels, provided they are of good will, may attain salvation. There is no dogmatic definition on this matter.

Nevertheless, the thesis maintaining the aforesaid possibility is theologically certain. It is inculcated by the ecclesiastical magisterium, both through the proscription of contrary opinions (Denz-U, 1294, 1297-98), and by explicit attestations, among which those of Pio IX are famous (Denz-U, 1647, 1677). The agreement of theologians, if in the past, because of the dissent of certain notable representatives (Estio, Silvio, Gonet), it could be described as only morally unanimous, must today be described as absolute and universal. Moreover, this position necessarily follows from God’s plan of salvation, which emerges with such clarity from the whole economy of Revelation.

3. The explanation. - More than toward proving the truth of the thesis, the efforts of theologians are deliberately directed toward removing the serious obstacle arising from the fact that infidels, being deprived of the light of divine Revelation, seem incapable of possessing the required faith.

In the various positions adopted there are elements common to all theologians, and there is something particular in each individual author.

In general, agreement is noted concerning the status termini, namely supernatural salvation in the beatific vision. Consequently, the theory of Billot and others, who equated adult infidels with morally undeveloped children and therefore assigned them after death a “natural” happiness in limbo rather than in paradise, is now completely abandoned. There is likewise agreement that the necessity of faith is limited to the status viae. Thus both evangelization after death and interior illumination at the point of death, as Glorieux envisaged it, are judged ineffective solutions. In the state of wayfaring, moreover, the inquiry does not address subjective possibility—that of each and every conscience considered one by one—but is confined to objective possibility, namely that of the indispensable conditions, foremost among them supernatural faith. Theological faith is generally understood in the “strict sense”; hence the opinion advanced by Ripalda and upheld by some theologians is not considered satisfactory, according to which faith in the “broad sense” would suffice: that produced by a motive other than the authority of God revealing. Furthermore, all without exception assign as the object of this saving faith the existence of God and of God as supernatural rewarder. Not all require, at least as an indispensable means, explicit faith in Christ the mediator and in the mystery of the Blessed Trinity; implicit faith being sufficient.

The disagreement becomes more evident when it is sought to determine whether the required supernatural faith should be understood as a habit, or proximate disposition to believe what God reveals, or as an act of intellectual assent to certain revealed truths; and, in the latter case, whether the act should be understood as supernatural not only with regard to its eliciting principle (as all teach), but also with regard to its specifying object (as some maintain); and whether it is necessary as a means in re, without any substitute, or whether it is so in a disjunctive sense (in re or in voto), or whether it is necessary only by force of a precept.

Those who require faith only as a habit, or infused virtue, readily solve the problem by saying that God will not fail to grant adult infidels, provided they do what lies within their power by living uprightly, the gift of Grace and faith; nor will He ever permit one who has lived in unbelief through absolute and invincible ignorance, rather than through culpable rebellion against sufficiently known revelation, to be punished with eternal torments. Faith as an act, moreover, would not be necessary as a means, but only by precept: obligatory, therefore, not always and everywhere, but in certain circumstances (cf. J. Neveut, La nécessité de la foi, in Ephem. Theol. Lovan., 7 [1930], pp. 29-45).

The difficulty is extremely grave for those who, following the «sententia communissima» (Van Noort), and intrinsically certain (Lombardi), require supernatural faith in the adult as an act (cf. S. Harent, Infidèles, in DThC, VII, coll. 1758-1827). The crucial point in their position concerns the preambles of faith and, specifically, rational certainty regarding the fact of Revelation, at least with respect to the article of God as rewarder: is this certainty truly within everyone’s reach, so that every man of good will may attain it?

Setting aside the already mentioned opinions of those who skirt rather than confront the question (Ripalda, Billot), the principal attempts to solve this vexing problem may fundamentally be reduced to three major positions: the influence of a pseudo-revelation; the more or less manifest influence of revelation already made to mankind; recourse, as a supplementary measure, to an immediate revelation to be made occasionally to individual persons.

The first system is a bold solution proposed in favor of those who lack every direct or indirect connection with true Revelation, and in whom subjective persuasion concerning divine Revelation and its content has been formed by pure coincidence: “provided that the soul adheres to the required truths and receives them on account of divine testimony, God can excuse it if, in all sincerity, it relies upon an imaginary and supposed revelation” (H. Pinard de la Boullaye, Gesù Redentore, Italian trans., Roma 1939, p. 302).

The second system envisages the possibility of believing by having recourse to the manifold influences, direct or indirect, hidden or manifest, of true Revelation. Concretely, such influence would be possible through contact not only with the Catholic Church, but also with dissenting Christians; with the Jews, custodians of Mosaic revelation; with “believing” Muslims, indebted for not a few truths to the Bible; or finally with certain rudimentary remnants of primitive revelation which, handed down from generation to generation, would still be preserved in the various religions of mankind, although mingled with gross aberrations.

The third system, once the more common one, has recourse to extraordinary interventions of Providence, through which the adult infidel, deprived through no fault of his own of the ordinary means of preaching, would receive an immediate revelation, even by means of an angel, should this be necessary (one may think of St. Thomas’s puer nutritus in sylvis), or else an interior illumination, by which God would disclose to him, in the intimacy of his conscience, His own existence and His remunerative providence. This illumination might take place either at the beginning of moral life, when man begins to turn toward God (one may think of the puer veniens ad usum rationis), or at least at the point of death.

The solutions just enumerated do not exclude one another; indeed, they could complement one another. In any case, in this thorny problem one must never lose sight of these two extremes: that God sincerely wills the salvation of all men, and that He is so powerful that He knows how to find the most suitable means of bringing His revealed word to a soul that seeks Him with loyalty and honesty. On the other hand, we must confess that we are faced with a mystery. Various explanations of this mystery of God’s knowledge and power may usefully be proposed, but the true explanation—the one that actually joins the two extremes of the chain—is not within our power.

BIBLI: S. Harent, Infidèles, in DThC, VII, cols. 1726–1930; A. Van Hove, Gods Algemene Heilswil (the universal salvific will of God), Antwerp–Nijmegen 1932; L. Capéran, Le problème du salut des infidèles, 2nd ed., 2 vols., Toulouse 1934; R. Lombardi, La salvezza di chi non ha fede, 3rd ed., Rome 1945; R. Garrigou-Lagrange, An fides explicita de Christo Salvatore sit omnibus necessaria ad salutem necessitate medii, in Doctor communis, 1 (1948), pp. 341–54; P. Parente, La possibilità dell'atto di fede negli i., in Euntes docete, 3 (1950), pp. 161–80. Nilo di San Brocardo

II. JURIDICAL CONDITION OF THE I

the twofold aspect present in the relations between the i. and the Church. There is, first of all, an aspect that might be called negative, deriving from the principle of public law contained in can. 87: “Through Baptism a person acquires personality in the Church of Christ, with all the rights and obligations inherent in that personality”; and there is also another, positive aspect, likewise based on a further principle of public law, set forth in can. 1322 § 2: “The Church, independently of every other civil power, has the right and obligation to teach evangelical doctrine to all peoples, and, conversely, all are bound by the same divine law to learn this doctrine and to embrace the true Church of Christ.” Since they lack Baptism, the positive act that incorporates a person into ecclesiastical society, the i. therefore find themselves outside the sphere of the Church’s juridical activity; and, while on the one hand they are not subject to the authority that she legitimately exercises over her subjects in the threefold legislative, judicial, and executive sphere, on the other hand they cannot be admitted to participation in the goods left to the same Church by her Divine Founder as highly effective means (can. 726) for attaining the purpose entrusted to her by Jesus: the salvation and sanctification of souls.

It follows that the i. are not bound by merely ecclesiastical laws, as can. 12 affirms, nor may they petition for any rescript, in accordance with the provisions of can. 36. Likewise, they may not enjoy any ecclesiastical privilege (privilege here being understood in the strict sense, and not to be confused with some distinction, perhaps even with some grace of a temporal nature that the Church might grant them in particular cases, e.g., for their merits in the social sphere); nor may they receive any dispensation, which (can. 80) always presupposes an ecclesiastical law to which, as stated above, the i. are not subject.

Since Baptism constitutes the indispensable prerequisite for juridical-social relations among the faithful, as well as the inalienable foundation for the multifaceted participation in jurisdictional or governing authority (can. 196), which is the basis of the ecclesiastical hierarchy (cann. 118 and 968), it follows that the i. cannot be admitted to the system governing the rights and corresponding obligations of association, such as collegial juridical persons (can. 99), the religious state (can. 538), the Third Orders (cann. 684 and 700), confraternities, pious unions, and even pious sodalities (can. 707). Still less could they be incorporated into the hierarchical and patrimonial order, as is expressly established, with regard to the ius patronatus, by can. 1453 § 1 (a sanction which, it should immediately be observed, in no way presupposes a contrary general law from which an exception would be made in this particular case, but simply the possible transmission of the same right of patronage to a legitimate infidel successor, if such a sum of privileges (can. 1448), according to can. 1449, were hereditary, familial, gentilitial, or mixed).

With the exception of Baptism, which, precisely because it is the prerequisite of the other Sacraments (can. 737 § 1), belongs rather to the positive aspect of the reciprocal juridical relations between the i. and the Church, they likewise cannot be admitted to participation in the other Sacraments (cann. 786, 853, 870, 940, 968, and 1012), which, together with the other res, constitute the patrimony that Jesus acquired and transmitted to the Church.

The prescriptions of cann. 1239 § 1, 1172 § 1, 4ª, and 1207, together with can. 1175 and the corresponding penal provision of can. 2329, concerning the prohibition of granting ecclesiastical burial to the i. (can. 1239), the violation both of a church (can. 1172) and of a cemetery (can. 1207) if an i. were buried there, as well as the obligation to remove the body, if this can be done without serious inconvenience, before proceeding to reconciliation (cann. 1175 and 1207), should be regarded as inspired by more conventional criteria, although still founded on those set out above. Those guilty of this violation must, in accordance with can. 2329, submit to the interdict ab ingressu ecclesiae (can. 2277) and to other appropriate penalties to be determined by the Ordinary.

Finally, and always for the same reason—namely, the lack of Baptism—the i. cannot be parties in ecclesiastical trials, nor are they subject to ecclesiastical penalties (can. 2195). The former is so because they are not subject to the Church’s judicial authority and therefore could not invoke it in their own favor; the latter because such penalties are always based either on a law (can. 2195 § 1) or at least on a precept (can. 2195 § 2), both provided with a canonical penal sanction that does not concern them at all. Nevertheless, according to can. 2027 § 1, they are admitted as witnesses in causes of beatification and canonization of the servants of God, because knowledge of any disputed facts, as well as the sincerity and objectivity required, are not the exclusive preserve of the baptized; nor should it be held that infidelity alone, as such, constitutes a grave exception in the event that an i. were called to testify in other causes (can. 1756 ff.).

But Baptism, as stated above (can. 737 § 1), is the door to the other Sacraments, a door that, by the divine will, always remains open to all souls; and it is also the foundation upon which all human beings, through divine goodness and mercy, have been called to build their spiritual edifice. Hence, given that a person is guided in his acts by reason, there arises the ecclesiastical teaching office, which Jesus entrusted to the Church (can. 1322 § 1), and which she has not only the right but also the strict obligation to exercise freely throughout the world and toward all souls: toward those who are baptized, and therefore Christian, so that they may always have the nourishment necessary for their spiritual sustenance; toward those not yet baptized, who are therefore i., so that, as is their duty, they may receive the Sacrament of incorporation into Christ and return to become part of that flock which he, the true Shepherd, leads to the regions of light and peace, employing for this purpose the activity of the Church.

In obedience to this divine precept, she not only sent, and continues to send, her missionaries everywhere, but, wishing to carry out a lasting work, she formed that body of laws which constitutes missionary law. Developed, expanded, and marked by a dynamism perhaps unique in canonical legislation, it is expressed in can. 252, which outlines the competence of the Congregation of Propaganda Fide, the driving center of all missionary activity; in cann. 293–311, concerning the hierarchical organization established for those territories; in can. 1350 § 1, which may also be extended to the i. when they are found in those places; and in other canons as well.

This magisterium, which the Church is bound to exercise with regard to souls not only as individuals, but also as constituting nations or States, has, among other things, two notable qualities: universality and freedom. The Church, in fact, was constituted by Jesus as teacher and guardian not only of supernatural truths, but also of natural truths concerning the ius divinum, both natural and positive. Such, for example, is marriage, an institution pertaining predominantly to natural law. In this and similar institutions, the Church’s precepts also bind the i.; indeed, by virtue of these higher and supreme rights, the Church would certainly not exceed the limits of justice by using coercive force, if necessary, and even armed force, if indispensable, should she find herself compelled to invoke the familiar principle: vis vi repellitur. In this connection, one might ask which authority is competent to establish the impediments, conditions, formalities, etc. of the marriage contract when the i. marry one another (a case not to be confused with the others in which they marry a party baptized in the Catholic Church or converted from heresy or schism, where, under can. 1070 § 1, the diriment impediment of disparity of worship would arise, apart from that circumstance). Can. 1038 § 1 replies by establishing: “It belongs exclusively to the supreme ecclesiastical authority to declare authentically the cases in which divine law prohibits or invalidates marriage.” In other words, in the case proposed, if the impediments are matters of divine law, the sole competent authority is the Church; if, however, other impediments and other formalities are involved, the competent authority is the civil authority, the only one that remains, on the assumption that the Church has no jurisdiction over the i., except in matters regulated by divine law and to the extent that it affects them.

On the other hand, while fully aware of the gravity of the obligation incumbent upon the i. to receive Baptism in order to attain their eternal salvation, the Church, inspired by the moral and theological principles that in fact govern human activity, claims for the i. themselves the broadest freedom, establishing in can. 1351: “No one may be compelled by force to embrace the Catholic faith.” The laws concerning the conferment of Baptism upon the children of the i. (can. 750) are based on this principle. They are certainly inspired by that profound historical sense which the Church possesses to the highest degree, but they also arise from the respect she has always shown for human freedom, which must be jealously safeguarded even in indigenous parents, who, merely because they are such, are not to be considered deprived of natural law and of the corresponding paternal authority which they possess and exercise over their children, as the Angelic Doctor explains with such clarity. For the sin of infidelity, V. FEDE, peccati contro la; INCREDULITÀ).