UNBELIEVERS. — This term designates adults without Baptism. From a theological standpoint, the problem of their salvation is important; from a juridical standpoint, their position in relation to ecclesiastical laws must be noted.
I. Salvation of the Unbelievers
1. The Problem
By salvation is meant the attainment of that everlasting supernatural happiness which consists in the intuitive vision of God and constitutes the ultimate end of the supernatural life.The question precisely is whether all such persons are to be condemned en masse and irrevocably to hell for lack of that indispensable requisite which is theological faith, which in their case seems impossible; or whether, and how, they too may obtain that salvation which those who have believed and been baptized can effectively aspire to (Mk 16:16).
The problem, extremely grave and complex, ultimately relates to the mysteries of predestination, grace, and free will. In concrete terms, it arises from the juxtaposition of two indubitable truths: on the one hand, in the order of intention, God’s loving design that all men be saved (1 Tim 2:4); and on the other, in the order of execution, the absolute necessity of faith, “the beginning of human salvation, the foundation and root of all justification” (Denz-U, 80).
2. The Fact
Against the rigorism of Calvin, Baius, and the Jansenists, the Catholic Church, while condemning the opinion of those who affirm that it is within the power of all men to find the way of eternal salvation and be saved in the worship of any religion whatsoever (Denz-U, 1646, 1746, 1746), does not deny—in fact, it authorizes—the view that adults, provided they are of good will, can attain salvation. There is no dogmatic definition on this point. Nevertheless, the thesis that upholds this possibility is theologically certain. It is inculcated by the Church’s magisterium, both by the condemnation of opposing opinions (Denz-U, 1294, 1297–98) and by explicit attestations, among which those of Pius IX are famous (Denz-U, 1647, 1677). While in the past the agreement of theologians, due to the dissent of certain notable figures (Estius, Sylvius, Gonet), could be said to be only morally unanimous, today it must be considered absolute and universal. Moreover, this position necessarily follows from God’s salvific plan, which emerges with such clarity from the entire economy of Revelation.3. The Explanation
Rather than proving the truth of the thesis, the efforts of theologians are deliberately directed toward removing the serious obstacle arising from the fact that unbelievers, being deprived of the light of divine Revelation, seem incapable of possessing the faith required.In the various positions adopted, there are elements common to all theologians, and there are also particular aspects in the views of individuals.
In general, there is agreement regarding the *status termini*, which is supernatural salvation in the beatific vision. Hence, the theory of Billot and others, who equated adult unbelievers with morally undeveloped children and consequently assigned them, after death, a “natural” happiness in limbo rather than in paradise, has now been completely abandoned. There is also agreement that the necessity of faith is limited to the *status viae*. Thus, solutions such as post-mortem evangelization, or interior illumination at the moment of death, as proposed by Glorieux, are judged ineffective. In the state of the wayfarer, moreover, the inquiry does not address subjective possibility—the possibility for each individual conscience—but is confined to objective possibility, that is, the indispensable conditions, first among which is supernatural faith. Theological faith is generally understood in a “strict sense,” so that the opinion advanced by Ripalda and supported by some theologians—that faith in a “broad sense” would suffice, namely, faith motivated by something other than the authority of God revealing—does not satisfy. Furthermore, all, without exception, assign as the object of this saving faith the existence of God and of God as supernatural rewarder. Not all, however, require as an indispensable means explicit faith in Christ the Mediator and in the mystery of the Most Holy Trinity, sufficient being implicit faith.
Disagreement becomes more evident when it is asked whether the required supernatural faith is to be understood as a habit, or as the proximate disposition to believe what God reveals, or as an intellectual act of assent to certain revealed truths; and, in the latter case, whether the act is to be considered supernatural not only in its eliciting principle (as all teach) but also in its specifying object (as some advocate); and whether it is necessary as a means *in re*, without any substitute, or only in a disjunctive sense (*in re* or *in voto*), or whether it is necessary merely by precept.
Those who require faith only as a habit or infused virtue easily resolve the problem by saying that God will not fail to bestow upon adult unbelievers, provided they do what lies within their power by living uprightly, the gift of grace and faith; nor will He ever permit one who has lived in unbelief through absolute and invincible ignorance—not through culpable rebellion against sufficiently known revelation—to be punished with eternal torments. Faith, then, as an act, would not require a means but only a precept: hence it would be obligatory not always and everywhere, but under certain circumstances (cf. J. Neveu, *La nécessité de la foi*, in *Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses*, 7 [1930], pp. 29–45).
The difficulty becomes extremely grave for those who, following the *sententia communissima* (Van Noort) and in itself certain (Lombardi), require in the adult supernatural faith as an act (cf. S. Harent, *Infidèles*, in *Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique*, VII, cols. 1758–1827). The crucial point in their position concerns the preambles of faith, and precisely the rational certitude regarding the fact of Revelation, at least with respect to the article of God as rewarder: is this certitude truly within the reach of all, so that every man of good will can attain it?
Setting aside the opinions already mentioned of those who skirt rather than address the question (Ripalda, Billot), the main attempts to resolve this tormenting problem can be reduced fundamentally to three major positions: the influence of a pseudo-revelation; the more or less evident influence of the Revelation already given to the human race; and the supplementary recourse to an immediate revelation to be occasionally made to individuals.
The first system is a bold solution proposed for the benefit of those who lack any direct or indirect connection with true Revelation, and in whom the subjective conviction regarding divine Revelation and its content has formed purely by coincidence: “provided the soul adheres to the required truths and receives them because of divine testimony, God can excuse it if it relies with complete sincerity upon an imaginary and supposed revelation” (H. Pinard de la Boullaye, *Gesù Redentore*, Italian trans., Rome 1939, p. 202).
The second system envisages the possibility of believing by resorting to the manifold influences, direct or indirect, hidden or manifest, of true Revelation. Concretely, this influence could come from contact not only with the Catholic Church but also with dissident Christians; with the Jews, guardians of Mosaic revelation; with Muslims, who are indebted to the Bible for many truths; or finally with some rudimentary remnants of primitive revelation, handed down from generation to generation and still preserved in the various religions of humanity, albeit mixed with gross aberrations.
The third system, once the most common, resorts to extraordinary interventions of Providence, by means of which the adult infidel, lacking through no fault of his own the normal means of preaching, would receive an immediate revelation, even through an angel, if necessary (one may think of the *puer nutritus in sylvis* of St. Thomas), or an interior enlightenment, by which God would reveal to him in the intimacy of his conscience His own existence and His rewarding providence. This enlightenment could take place either at the beginning of moral life, when man begins to orient himself toward God (one may think of the *puer veniens ad usum rationis*), or at least at the point of death.
The solutions now enumerated are not mutually exclusive; indeed, they could complement one another. In any case, in this thorny problem one must never lose sight of these two extremes, namely, that God sincerely wills the salvation of all men, and that He is so powerful as to know how to find the most fitting means to bring His revealed word to a soul that seeks Him with sincerity and honesty. On the other hand, we must confess that we are confronted with a mystery. Of this mystery of God’s knowledge and power, various explanations may be proposed to good effect, but the true explanation, the one that truly unites the two extremes of the chain, is not within our power.
II. LEGAL STATUS OF THE INFIDELS — To determine their legal status, it is necessary to distinguish the twofold aspect present in the relationship between infidels and the Church. There is, first of all, a *negative* aspect, deriving from the principle of public law contained in can. 87: “Through Baptism man acquires personality in the Church of Christ with all the rights and obligations inherent in that personality”; and there is, secondly, a *positive* aspect, also based on another principle of public law, found in can. 1322 § 2: “The Church, independently of any civil power, has the right and duty to teach the Gospel doctrine to all nations, and, conversely, all are bound by divine law to learn this doctrine and to embrace the true Church of Christ.” Lacking Baptism, the positive act that incorporates man into the ecclesiastical society, infidels are therefore outside the sphere of the Church’s juridical activity. While on the one hand they are not subject to the power that the Church legitimately exercises in the threefold legislative, judicial, and executive spheres over her subjects, on the other hand they cannot be admitted to share in the goods that the Church’s Divine Founder has entrusted to her as most efficacious means (can. 726) to attain the end He has entrusted to her: the salvation and sanctification of souls.
From this it follows that infidels are not bound by merely ecclesiastical laws, as affirmed by can. 12, nor can they obtain any rescript, according to can. 36. Likewise, they cannot enjoy any ecclesiastical privilege (here privilege is taken in the strict sense, not to be confused with any distinction, perhaps even with some grace of a temporal nature that the Church might grant them in particular cases, e.g., for their merits in the social sphere); nor can they receive any dispensation, which (can. 80) always presupposes an ecclesiastical law, to which, as stated above, infidels are not subject.
Since Baptism is the indispensable presupposition for juridical-social relations among the faithful and the unalterable foundation for participation in the manifold exercise of jurisdictional or governing power (can. 196), the basis of the Church’s hierarchy (cann. 118 and 968), it follows that infidels cannot be admitted into the system governing rights and their attendant obligations of association, such as collegial moral persons (can. 99), religious state (can. 538), Third Orders (cann. 684 and 700), confraternities, pious unions, and even most sodalities (can. 707). Still less could they be inserted into the hierarchical or patrimonial system, as regards, for example, the *ius patronatus*, which can. 1453 § 1 expressly sanctions (this sanction, it should be noted at once, does not in any way presuppose a general contrary law from which in this particular case a derogation would be made, but simply a possible transmission of the same patronage to a legitimate infidel successor, if such a sum of privileges [can. 1448], according to can. 1449, were hereditary, familial, gentilitial, or mixed).
With the exception of Baptism, which, precisely because it is the presupposition of the other Sacraments (can. 737 § 1), rather falls within the positive aspect of the mutual juridical relations between infidels and the Church, infidels cannot be admitted to participation in the other Sacraments (cann. 786, 853, 870, 940, 968, and 1012), which, together with the other *res*, constitute the patrimony that Jesus acquired and transmitted to the Church.
More conventional criteria, though always based on the principles now expounded, must be considered to inspire the prescriptions of cann. 1239 § 1, 1172 § 1, 4°, and 1207 together with 1175 and the correlative penal can. 2329, concerning the prohibition of giving ecclesiastical burial to infidels (can. 1239), the violation of the church (can. 1172) or the cemetery (can. 1207) if an infidel were buried there, and the obligation to remove the corpse, if feasible without serious inconvenience, before proceeding to reconsecration (cann. 1175 and 1207). Those guilty of this violation shall incur, according to can. 2329, the interdict *ab ingressu ecclesiae* (cann. 2277) and other penalties to be determined by the Ordinary.
Finally, and always for the same reason—namely, the lack of Baptism—infidels cannot be parties in ecclesiastical trials nor are they subject to ecclesiastical penalties (cann. 2195). They cannot be parties because they are not subject to the Church’s judicial power and thus could not invoke it in their favor; nor can they be subject to penalties because these always presuppose either a law (can. 2195 § 1) or at least a precept (can. 2195 § 2), both of which are backed by canonical penal sanctions, which do not apply to them at all. Nevertheless, according to can. 2027 § 1, they are admitted as witnesses in causes of beatification and canonization of servants of God, since the knowledge of facts that may be in dispute does not require sincerity and objectivity that are not the exclusive patrimony of the baptized, nor should it be held that indefiniteness, as such, constitutes a serious exception in the event that some infidel were called to testify in other causes (cann. 1756 ff.).
But as Baptism, as has been said above (can. 737 § 1), is the door of the other Sacraments, a door which, by divine will, remains always open to all souls, it is also the foundation upon which all men have been called by the goodness and mercy of God to build their spiritual edifice. From this, since man is guided in his actions by reason, there arises the ecclesiastical magisterium, which Jesus entrusted to the Church (can. 1322 § 1) and which it has not only the right, but also the strict obligation to exercise freely throughout the world and toward all souls. If they are baptized, and therefore Christian, that they may always have the necessary pasture for their spiritual sustenance; if they are not yet baptized, then i. because, as is their duty, they may receive the Sacrament of incorporation into Christ and be restored to membership in that flock which He, the true Shepherd, guides to the regions of light and peace, though He makes use of the Church’s activity for this purpose.
Obedient to this divine precept, the Church has not only sent and still sends its missionaries everywhere, but desiring to accomplish lasting work, it has formed that complex of laws which constitute missionary law, which, developed, expanded, and marked by a dynamism perhaps unique in canon law, is expressed in can. 2525 where the competence of the Congregation of Propaganda Fide is outlined, this being the driving center of all missionary activity; in can. 2493 to 3111, concerning the hierarchical organization established for those territories in can. 1350 § 1, extendable also to i. whenever they find themselves in those places; and in other canons as well.
This magisterium, which the Church is bound to exercise with regard to souls not only as individuals but also as constituting national States, has, among others, two notable qualities: unity and versatility and freedom. The Church, in fact, was constituted by Jesus as teacher and guardian not only of supernatural truths, but also of natural ones concerning divine law, whether natural or positive. Such, for example, is marriage, an institution predominantly of natural law. In this and similar institutions the precepts of the Church bind even the i., and indeed, by virtue of these superior and supreme rights, the Church would not, of course, exceed the limits of justice in using coercive force, if necessary, and even armed force, if indispensable, whenever it finds itself compelled to resort to the well-known principle: *vis vim repellere licet*. One might ask, in this connection, what authority is competent to establish the impediments, conditions, formalities, etc., of the marriage contract when i. contract with one another (a case not to be confused with others in which one of the parties is baptized in the Catholic Church or converted from heresy or schism, in which, according to can. 1070 § 1, the diriment impediment of disparity of cult would arise and apart from it). Can. 1038 § 1 provides the answer when it states: “It belongs exclusively to the supreme ecclesiastical authority to declare authentically the cases in which divine law forbids or dissolves marriage.” In other words, in the case envisaged, if it concerns impediments of divine law, the only competent authority is the Church; if, however, it concerns other impediments and other formalities, the competent authority is the civil one, which remains the only authority, assuming that the Church does not have jurisdiction over the i., except in matters regulated by divine law and to the extent to which it impinges upon them.
On the other hand, while fully aware of the gravity of the obligation which the i. have to receive Baptism in order to attain their eternal salvation, the Church, inspired by the moral and theological principles which in fact govern human activity, claims for the i. themselves the widest freedom, establishing in can. 1351: “That no one be forced by force to embrace the Catholic faith.” This principle underlies the laws concerning the conferral of Baptism on the children of i. (can. 750), inspired, certainly, by that historical sense which the Church possesses to a supreme degree, but also flowing from the respect which it has always shown for human freedom, which must be jealously safeguarded even in indigenous parents, who, merely because they are such, are not to be considered as diminished in natural right and in the corresponding patria potestas which they possess and exercise over their children, as the Angelic Doctor luminously explains. For the sin of unbelief, V. FEDE, peccati contro la; INCREDULITÀ).
INFERI: I. DESCENT OF CHRIST into the: V. LIMBO; PILATE; APOCRYPHA of; II. For non-Christian religions: V. DEAD, THE UNDERWORLD of.