Unbelievers

UNBELIEVERS. - This name designates adults without Baptism. From the theological point of view, the problem of their salvation is important; from the juridical point of view, their position with respect to ecclesiastical laws is to be noted.

I. SALVATION OF UNBELIEVERS

1. The problem

By salvation is meant the attainment of that everlasting otherworldly happiness which consists in the intuitive vision of God and constitutes the ultimate end of the supernatural life.

It is precisely concerning these that the question is asked whether they are all to be condemned en masse and irremediably to hell for lack of that irreplaceable requirement which is theological faith, which in their condition seems impossible; or whether and how they too can obtain that salvation to which one who has believed and been baptized can effectively aspire (Mk. 16:16).

The problem, extremely grave and complex, is connected in the last analysis with the mysteries of predestination, of Grace and of free will. Concretely, moreover, it arises from the juxtaposition of two indubitable truths, which are on the one hand, in the order of intention, God's loving design, who wills all men to be saved (1 Tim. 2:4); and, on the other, in the order of execution, the absolute necessity of faith, "the beginning of human salvation, the foundation and root of all justification" (Denz-U, 801).

2. The fact

Against the rigorism of Calvin, of Baius and of the Jansenists, the Catholic Church, while it condemns the opinion of those who affirm that it is in the power of all men to find the way of eternal salvation and to be saved in the worship of any religion whatsoever (Denz-U, 1646, 1716 ff.), does not however deny, but rather authorizes, the holding that adult unbelievers, provided they are of good will, can attain salvation. There is no dogmatic definition on the matter.

Nevertheless the thesis that champions the aforementioned possibility is theologically certain. It is inculcated by the ecclesiastical magisterium, both through the proscription of opposing opinions (Denz-U, 1294, 1297-98), and through explicit attestations, among which those of Pius IX are famous (Denz-U, 1647, 1677). The agreement of theologians, if in the past, because of the dissent of certain notable exponents (Estius, Sylvius, Gonet), could be called only morally unanimous, today must be called absolute and universal. Moreover, this position follows necessarily from God's salvific plan, which emerges with such clarity from the whole economy of Revelation.

3. The explanation

More than to demonstrate the truth of the thesis, the efforts of theologians tend deliberately to eliminate the grave obstacle deriving from the fact that unbelievers, being deprived of the light of divine Revelation, seem incapable of having the faith required.

In the various positions taken there are elements common to all theologians, and there is something particular in individual ones.

In general, agreement is noted concerning the status termini, which is supernatural salvation, in the beatific vision. Hence the theory of Billot and others, who equated adult unbelievers with morally undeveloped children, is now completely abandoned; to these, consequently, they assigned after death a "natural" happiness, in limbo, not in paradise. There is also agreement in holding that the necessity of faith is limited to the status viae. Hence both evangelization after death and interior illumination at the point of death, as Glorieux envisaged it, are judged ineffective solutions. In the state of way, moreover, the inquiry does not address subjective possibility, that of each and every conscience taken one by one, but restricts itself to objective possibility, that of the indispensable conditions, first among them supernatural faith. And theological faith is generally understood in the "strict sense," so that the opinion advanced by Ripalda and upheld by some theologians, for whom faith in the "broad sense" would suffice — that provoked by a motive other than the authority of God revealing — does not satisfy. Furthermore all, without exception, assign, as the object of this saving faith, the existence of God and of God as supernatural rewarder. Not all require, at least as an indispensable means, explicit faith in Christ the mediator and in the mystery of the Most Holy Trinity, implicit faith being sufficient.

The disagreement becomes more evident when one seeks to determine whether the supernatural faith required is to be understood as a habit, or a disposition proximate to believing what God reveals, or as an act of intellectual adherence to certain revealed truths; and, in the latter case, whether the act is to be understood as supernatural not only as to its eliciting principle (as all teach), but also as to its specifying object (as some champion); and whether it is necessary as a means in re, without any substitute, or whether it is so in a disjunctive sense (in re or in voto), or whether it is necessary only by force of a precept.

Those who require faith only as a habit, or infused virtue, easily resolve the problem by saying that God will not fail to bestow on adult unbelievers, provided they do what is in their power by living honestly, the gift of Grace and of faith; nor will he ever permit one who has lived in unbelief through absolute and invincible ignorance, not through culpable rebellion against sufficiently known revelation, to be punished with eternal torments. Faith, moreover, as an act, would not have the necessity of a means, but only of a precept: obligatory, therefore, not always and everywhere, but in determinate circumstances (cf. J. Neveut, La nécessité de la foi, in Ephem. Theol. Lovan., 7 [1930], pp. 29-45).

The difficulty presents itself as most grave to those who, following the "sententia communissima" (Van Noort) and in itself certain (Lombardi), require in the adult supernatural faith as an act (cf. S. Harent, Infidèles, in DThC, VII, coll. 1758-1827). The crucial point in their position concerns the preambles of faith and, precisely, the rational certainty concerning the fact of Revelation, at least as regards the article of God the rewarder: is this certainty really within the reach of all, so that every man of good will can arrive at it?

Setting aside the already mentioned opinions of those who skirt, rather than confront, the question (Ripalda, Billot), the principal attempts to resolve the tormenting problem can be reduced fundamentally to three great positions: the influence of a pseudorevelation; the more or less manifest influence of the revelation already made to the human race; the supplementary recourse to an immediate revelation to be made occasionally to individual persons.

The first system is a bold solution proposed on behalf of those who lack any direct or indirect connection with the true Revelation, and in whom the subjective persuasion concerning divine Revelation and its content has been formed by pure coincidence: "provided the soul adheres to the truths required and receives them on account of the divine testimony, God can excuse it, if it relies with all sincerity on an imaginary and supposed revelation" (H. Pinard de la Boullaye, Gesù Redentore, Italian trans. Rome 1939, p. 302).

The second system envisages the possibility of believing by having recourse to the manifold influences, direct or indirect, hidden or manifest, of the true Revelation. Concretely such influence would be possible through contact, not only with the Catholic Church, but also with dissident Christians; with the Jews, guardians of the Mosaic revelation; with "believing" Muslims, debtors of not a few truths to the Bible; or finally with certain rudimentary remnants of the primitive revelation, which, handed down from generation to generation, would still be preserved in the various religions of humanity, although mixed with crude aberrations.

The third system, the one once most common, has recourse to extraordinary interventions of Providence, through which the unbaptized adult, lacking the normal means of preaching through no fault of his own, would receive an immediate revelation, even by means of an angel, should this be necessary (one may think of the puer nutritus in sylvis of St. Thomas), or else an interior illumination, with which God would reveal to him in the intimacy of his conscience His own existence and His own rewarding providence — an illumination that could take place either at the beginning of the moral life, when man begins to orient himself toward God (one may think of the puer veniens ad usum rationis), or at least at the point of death.

The solutions just enumerated are not mutually exclusive: indeed, they could complement one another. In any case, in this thorny problem one must never lose sight of these two extremes, namely that God sincerely wills the salvation of all men and that He is powerful enough to know how to find the most suitable means to bring His revealed word to a soul that seeks Him with loyalty and honesty. On the other hand, we must confess that we are faced with a mystery. Of this mystery of the knowledge and power of God various explanations can usefully be proposed, but the true explanation, the one that really joins the two extremes of the chain, is not in our power.

Nilo di San Brocardo

II. LEGAL STATUS OF UNBELIEVERS

To determine their juridical condition, one must distinguish the twofold aspect present in the relations between unbelievers and the Church. There is first of all an aspect that could be called negative, which derives from the principle of public law contained in can. 87: "By Baptism man acquires personality in the Church of Christ with all the rights and obligations inherent in that personality"; and then there is another, positive aspect, likewise based on another principle of public law, gathered in can. 1322 § 2: "The Church, independently of any other civil power, has the right and the duty to teach the evangelical doctrine to all nations, and, conversely, all are bound, by the same divine law, to learn this doctrine and to embrace the true Church of Christ." Lacking Baptism, the positive fact that incorporates man into ecclesiastical society, unbelievers therefore find themselves outside the sphere of the Church's juridical activity, and, while on the one hand they are not subject to the power that it legitimately exercises in the threefold legislative, judicial and executive field with regard to its subjects, on the other they cannot be admitted to participation in the goods left to that same Church by its Divine Founder as so many most efficacious means (can. 726) for attaining the end that Jesus entrusted to it: the salvation and sanctification of souls.

From this it follows that unbelievers are not bound by merely ecclesiastical laws, as can. 12 affirms, nor can they petition any rescript, in accordance with what is established by can. 36. Likewise they cannot enjoy any ecclesiastical privilege (this refers to privilege in the strict sense, not to be confused with some distinction, perhaps even with some favor of a temporal nature that the Church could grant them in particular cases, e.g., for their merits in the social field); they cannot have any dispensation, which (can. 80) always presupposes an ecclesiastical law, to which, as said above, unbelievers are not subject.

Since Baptism constitutes the indispensable prerequisite for the juridical-social relations among the faithful, as well as the indispensable foundation for the multiform participation of jurisdictional or governing power (can. 196), which is the basis of the ecclesiastical hierarchy (cann. 118 and 968), it follows that unbelievers cannot be admitted into the order concerning the rights and attendant obligations of association, such as collegial moral persons (can. 99), the religious state (can. 538), Third Orders (cann. 684 and 700), confraternities, pious unions and even pious sodalities (can. 707). Still less could they be inserted into the hierarchical order and the patrimonial order, as, with regard to the ius patronatus, can. 1453 § 1 expressly sanctions (a sanction which, it must immediately be observed, by no means presupposes a contrary general law, from which in this particular case exception would be made, but simply a possible transmission of that same patronage right to a legitimate unbelieving successor, if such a sum of privileges (can. 1448), according to can. 1449, were hereditary, familial, gentilician or mixed).

With the exception of Baptism, which, precisely because it is the prerequisite of the other Sacraments (can. 737 § 1), falls rather within the positive aspect of the mutual juridical relations between unbelievers and the Church, these cannot even be admitted to participation in the other Sacraments (cann. 786, 853, 870, 940, 968 and 1012), which, together with the other res, constitute the patrimony that Jesus acquired and transmitted to the Church.

The prescriptions of cann. 1239 § 1, 1172 § 1, 4th, and 1207 together with 1175 and the corresponding penal canon 2329, must be considered inspired by more conventional criteria, though always founded on those just set forth, namely concerning the prohibition of giving ecclesiastical burial to unbelievers (can. 1239), the violation both of the church (can. 1172) and of the cemetery (can. 1207) if some unbeliever were buried there, as well as the obligation of removing the corpse, if feasible without grave inconvenience, before proceeding to reconciliation (cann. 1175 and 1207). Those guilty of this violation shall be subject, in accordance with can. 2329, to the interdict ab ingressu ecclesiae (can. 2277) and to other suitable penalties to be determined by the Ordinary.

Finally, and always for the same reason, namely the lack of Baptism, unbelievers cannot be a party in ecclesiastical trials nor are they subject to ecclesiastical penalties (can. 2195). Not to the former, because they are not subject to the judicial power of the Church, nor could they therefore invoke it in their favor; not to the latter, because at their basis there is always either a law (can. 2195 § 1) or at least a precept (can. 2195 § 2), both furnished with a canonical penal sanction, which does not concern them at all. Nevertheless, according to what can. 2027 § 1 provides, they are admitted as witnesses in the causes of beatification and canonization of the servants of God, because the knowledge of the facts eventually in dispute as well as the sincerity and objectivity required are not the exclusive patrimony of the baptized, nor is it to be held that unbelief alone, as such, constitutes a grave exception in the event that some unbeliever were called to testify in other causes (can. 1756 and ff.).

But Baptism, as said above (can. 737 § 1), is the door of the other Sacraments, a door that remains always open, by the divine will, to all souls, and it is also the foundation upon which all men have been called by divine goodness and mercy to build their spiritual edifice. From this, given that man is guided in his acts by reason, is born the ecclesiastical magisterium, which Jesus entrusted to the Church (can. 1322 § 1) and which it has not only the right but also the strict duty to exercise freely throughout the world and toward all souls. If baptized, and therefore Christian, so that they may always have the necessary pasture for their spiritual sustenance; if not yet baptized, and therefore unbelievers, so that, as is their duty, they may receive the Sacrament of incorporation into Christ and return to form part of that flock which he, the true Shepherd, guides to the regions of light and peace, availing himself for this purpose of the activity of the Church.

Following this divine precept, it not only sent and still sends its missionaries everywhere, but, wishing to do lasting work, it formed that body of laws which constitute missionary law, which, developed, increased, marked by a dynamism perhaps unique in canonical legislation, is expressed in can. 252, where the competence of the Congregation of Propaganda Fide is outlined, which is the driving center of all missionary activity; in cann. 293 to 311, concerning the hierarchical organization established for those territories; in can. 1350 § 1, extendable also to unbelievers if they find themselves in those places; and in still other canons.

This magisterium, which the Church is bound to exercise with regard to souls not only as individuals but also as constituting nations or States, has, among others, two notable qualities: universality and freedom. The Church, in fact, was established by Jesus as teacher and guardian not only of supernatural truths, but also of those natural truths concerning the ius divinum, both natural and positive. Such is, for example, marriage, an institution predominantly of natural law. In this and similar institutions the dictates of the Church bind the infidels as well; indeed, by virtue of these higher and supreme rights, the Church would certainly not overstep the limits of justice in using coercive force, if necessary, and even armed force, if indispensable, should it find itself compelled to resort to the well-known principle: vis vi repellitur. One might ask, in this connection, what is the competent authority to establish the impediments, conditions, formalities, etc., of the marriage contract when infidels contract among themselves (a case not to be confused with others in which they contracted with a party baptized in the Catholic Church or converted from heresy or schism, where, according to can. 1070 § 1, the diriment impediment of disparity of cult would arise, and apart from it). Can. 1038 § 1 answers this when it establishes: "It belongs exclusively to the supreme ecclesiastical authority to declare authentically the cases in which the divine law forbids or dirimes marriage." In other words, in the case envisaged, if it is a question of impediments of divine law, the only competent authority is the Church; where, however, it is a question of other impediments and other formalities, the competent authority is the civil one, the only one that remains, granted that the Church has no jurisdiction over infidels, except in matters regulated by divine law and to the extent to which it bears upon them.

On the other hand, although aware of the gravity of the obligation that infidels have to receive Baptism in order to attain their eternal salvation, the Church, inspired by the moral and theological principles that in fact regulate human activity, claims for those same infidels the fullest freedom, establishing in can. 1351: "That no one be compelled by force to embrace the Catholic faith." On this principle are based the laws concerning the conferral of Baptism on the children of infidels (can. 750), inspired, certainly, by that fine historical sense that the Church possesses in the highest degree, but also flowing from the respect that she has always shown toward human liberty, which must be jealously respected even in native parents, who are not, by the mere fact of being such, to be considered diminished in the natural right and in the corresponding paternal power that they have and exercise over their children, as the Aquinate luminously explains. For the sin of infidelity, v. FEDE, peccati contro la; INCREDULITÀ).

Alvarez Menéndez