FAITH. — In technical usage, faith is the intellect’s assent, under the influence of grace, to a truth revealed by God, not on account of any intrinsic evidence in the truth itself, but because of the authority of the one who reveals II.
I. THEOLOGY OF FAITH
OUTLINE: I. Preliminary notions — II. Catholic notion of faith — III. Heterodox notions of religious faith and of its act — IV. The formal motive of faith — V. The necessity of faith for salvation — VI. Sins against faith
I. Preliminary notions
The word “faith” here is taken to mean belief founded on testimony that offers sufficient certainty.Thus one believes human testimony when it is evident that the witnesses know what they affirm and are truthful. It is then commonly said that they are worthy of faith, that their testimony makes faith because it is evidently credible.
Faith founded on such human testimony is inferior to vision and to science, because it does not provide the evidence of the thing itself, which is not seen or known but only believed. This faith is nevertheless superior to opinion, because it does not merely offer probability but moral certainty regarding what is believed. Thus we are certain of many historical facts that we do not know by sight but only through the testimony of trustworthy witnesses (cf. *Summa Theologiae*, II-II, q. 1, art. 4; q. 2, art. 1).
Here we are dealing with faith in the divine testimony of Revelation, but we are not discussing the way in which the existence of Revelation (v.) is confirmed by sure signs, such as miracles, fulfilled prophecies, the admirable life of the Church, the fecundity of its influence, and the fulfillment of our highest aspirations through the practice of a perfect Christian life, since this topic is treated under the entries: APOLOGETICS; CREDIBILITY (v.).
II. CATHOLIC NOTION OF FAITH
The Church, in its councils and especially in the Vatican Council (Denz-U, 1811), defined faith as a supernatural virtue by which, aided and moved by God’s grace, we believe the truths revealed by Him to be true, not because of their intrinsic evidence, which is grasped by the natural light of reason, but because of the authority of God who reveals them, who cannot deceive nor be deceived. Faith, in the words of the Apologist, is “the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen” (Heb 11:1). Consequently, supernatural or infused faith is specifically different from natural knowledge of God and moral truths. As St. Paul says (Eph 2:8): “Faith is a gift of God.” Normally it is united with charity, or the love of God above all things, and is then called “living faith,” but it also exists without charity in many Christians who are in a state of mortal sin; it remains as a principle of a salutary act, though not meritorious, by virtue of which, under the influence of actual grace, they freely believe what God has revealed (Denz-U, 1791, 1814).As for the act of faith, the Church has declared that it is a supernatural assent of the intellect, free yet absolutely certain, by which we believe the truths revealed by God on the authority of God who reveals them. This supernatural act presupposes a rational judgment, at least morally certain, regarding the evident credibility of the mysteries of faith, which is based on the divine signs of Revelation, such as miracles, fulfilled prophecies, and the admirable life of the Church (cf. Denz-U, 1791, 1794, 1637, 1814, 2025, 2106).
III. HETERODOX NOTIONS OF RELIGIOUS FAITH
The first Protestants rejected the infallible authority of the Church in proposing Revelation and substituted for it in each believer private inspiration, which later led to the principle of free examination. This doctrine has been condemned as a pseudo-supernaturalism, because, according to the Church, it diminishes the gratuitous gifts of God and the powers of our nature, as can be seen. The lowest degree of this error is found in Baianism and fideism (v.), which do not sufficiently take into account the natural powers and reason in proving the existence of God and in recognizing the certain signs of Revelation.Kantian rationalism, with its agnosticism, tends to reduce religious faith to a moral faith, by which we believe the postulates of practical reason, deduced from the categorical imperative: the existence of free will, of future life, and of God. This moral faith, according to Kant, has sufficient subjective certainty but insufficient objective certainty; its motive is no longer the authority of God revealing, but the demands of practical reason.
The influence of Kantianism appears in the theories of liberal Protestants, who reduce faith to a religious sentiment of a natural order, present in all religions but in a superior way in Christianity. Thus the modernists, with their agnosticism and immanentism, are led to deny the value of the proofs of Revelation and to confuse faith with religious experience, which is found
in all religions. For them, Catholicism is reduced merely to a higher form of the natural evolution of religious sentiment (cf. Denz-U, 2025, 2037, 2038).
According to Günther’s semi-rationalism, all the mysteries of Christian faith can be demonstrated by reason, at least after the Revelation has been given, and are thus reduced to truths of a philosophical order, which the world accepts by faith. Hermes, influenced by Kantian agnosticism, arrived at another form of semi-rationalism: for him, the motive of faith does not consist in the authority of God revealing, but in a certain demand of practical reason; by means of it philosophers can demonstrate the mysteries, yet they must still admit divine Revelation as necessary for the people, who could not understand their demonstrations.
IV. THEOLOGICAL EXPLANATION OF THE CATHOLIC NOTION OF FAITH AND OF ITS ACT
1. The object of faith includes everything that has been revealed by God, even those natural truths that are demonstrable and concern religion; but its proper object is the essentially supernatural mysteries, which are not demonstrable and concern the intimate life of God in Himself and in us: the mysteries of the Holy Trinity, the Incarnation, the Redemption, grace, the Sacraments, and eternal life. The formal motive of faith is the authority of God revealing, that is, His omniscience and veracity; and it is not merely God as Author of nature, but God as Author of grace, the germ of eternal life. According to the themes, the uncertain act by which God reveals already belongs to the motive of faith, whereas the infallible formulation of the truths proposed by the Church is only a *sine qua non* condition of faith, since it does not formally influence our intellect and will but merely applies to us the Revelation already given.2. On the part of the subject, the act of faith is an act of the intellect moved by the will to give its assent (cf. *Summa Theologiae*, II-II, q. 2, art. 1; *De Veritate*, q. 14, art. 1). An influence of the will is necessary, not only for the attention required in the scientific act of demonstration, but also to determine the intellect to affirm rather than to deny, since the object to be grasped is not seen or demonstrated but remains obscure. This object is therefore not sufficient to determine intellectual assent, but the will can and must intervene, since the obscure object proposed is revealed by God and it is presupposed that the signs of divine Revelation are certain, at least normally, to reason. Thus we have the act of faith, not doubt, nor merely opinion or probability, but certainty—not scientific certainty, but the certainty of belief, since it is reasonable and good for man to adhere firmly to an object revealed by God, who cannot deceive nor be deceived.
However, natural good will is not sufficient for this; the grace of faith is required (the infused virtue of faith is actual grace), as the Church has defined against the Pelagians and Semi-Pelagians (Denz-U, 178, 179). The reason is that the object which must be sought, at least the principal object, is essentially supernatural; it includes the mysteries of the intimate life of God, which transcend the rational order, and the very act of the infused virtue of faith is likewise essentially supernatural, whereas natural good will is insufficient to desire and produce II. The will, like the intelligence of the believer, must be proportionate to the object in order to adhere firmly to II. For this reason, the Council of Orange defined (Denz-U, 178) that the *initium fidei*, that is, the most fundamental act of belief, comes not from nature but from grace.
The act of infused faith therefore proceeds from this supernatural virtue, under the influence of actual grace, which inclines the will to move the intellect so that it may firmly adhere to the divine testimony regarding its content, despite the obscurity of the revealed mysteries.
This act remains free precisely because of the obscurity of the mysteries, especially since some may be displeasing to the sensual and proud man; yet the act of faith is firm both objectively, on account of the authority of the revealing God, and subjectively, by reason of the grace that disposes the will and, consequently, the intellect to an adherence that is not merely probable but certain.
V. THE FORMAL MOTIVE OF FAITH — According to some theologians, the believer knows only in a natural way the formal motive of faith, namely, the authority of the revealing God and the signs of Revelation. Among these are certain writers, the nominalists, L. Molina, G. Franzelin, and L. Billot.
A difficulty arises here, for most of the faithful were not witnesses to the miracles that are signs of Revelation, and many have not been able to assure themselves of their supernatural origin; thus they have only a moral certainty regarding the fact of Revelation, that is, the certainty that comes from human testimony as recorded in history. If, therefore, the certainty of Christian faith were formally based upon this moral certainty regarding the fact of Revelation confirmed by sufficient signs, it would no longer be infallible except hypothetically—assuming, that is, that it is truly God who has revealed the mysteries of the Trinity, the Incarnation, and the infallibility of the Church which proposes them, assuming further that the preaching of these mysteries does not derive from the natural evolution of religious sentiment in the subconsciousness of the prophets and of Christ, as the Modernists claim. Hence the Thomists, together with Suárez, have always maintained that the believer adheres supernaturally and infallibly (with infused faith) to the formal motive of this virtue, namely, the authority of the revealing God. According to St. Thomas, we believe in God (the revealer) and in God (the revealed) by one and the same supernatural and infallible act: *uno eodemque actu credimus Deo (revelanti) et Deum (revelatum)* (Sum. Theol. 2a-2ae, q. 2, a. 2, ad 1). Just as in the natural order, by one and the same act of vision we see light and colors, and the light makes the colors manifest. The formal motive of faith is believed together with the mysteries themselves (cf. s. Thomas, *Sum. Theol.* 2a-2ae, q. 1, a. 1, ad 2; and D. Báñez, John of St. Thomas; J. B. Gonet; C. R. Billuart). This act is not discursive but simple, supernatural, and infallible, far surpassing the preceding apologetic reasoning by which the fact of Revelation is at least morally certain in the rational order. The reasons supporting this doctrine are as follows:
1) The fact of Revelation is proposed not only by the human history of the preaching of Jesus Christ and His miracles, but by the Church, which has infallibly defined that it was due to a properly supernatural Revelation and not merely the fruit of a natural evolution of religious sentiment in the subconsciousness of the prophets and of Christ. Now what has been thus infallibly defined by the Church must be believed supernaturally by the faithful; they must believe supernaturally in the divine Revelation together with the revealed mysteries. Hence St. Thomas says: *Uno eodemque actu credimus Deo (revelanti) et Deum (revelatum)* (Sum. Theol. 2a-2ae, q. 2, a. 2, ad 1; q. 4, a. 5, ad 8). Otherwise, the certainty of faith would no longer be absolutely infallible. As St. Paul wrote: “You received the word of God, not as the word of men, but as it truly is, the word of God” (1 Thess. 2:13).
2) The formal motive of infused faith is essentially supernatural: the authority of the revealing God; it is therefore a matter of God, the author of grace, who cannot be known naturally. Now what is essentially supernatural cannot be known except supernaturally through faith. The essential supernaturality of the mysteries and of invisible grace far surpasses the supernaturality of sensible miracles that can be known naturally; in the miracle of the raising of Lazarus, the life restored to the corpse is natural life, not the supernatural life of grace.
3) Faith is a gift of God (Eph. 2:8); it is “the substance of things hoped for” (Heb. 11:1), “a virtue essentially supernatural” (Vatican Council, Denz-U, 1791). Now a supernatural virtue finds its specification in a formal object (or formal motive) of the same order, inaccessible to reason. Therefore the formal motive of faith can be attained only by this infused virtue, since if it could be attained without it, it would no longer be necessary.
Lacordaire, in his 17th conference at Notre-Dame, well emphasized the absolute and supernatural certainty of faith: “Here is a doctrine that Catholic teaching studies and repeats without cease: ‘You are fortunate to have faith; I wish I had it as you do, but I cannot.’ And he speaks the truth... And then one day this scholar kneels down, feels the wretchedness of man, raises his hands to heaven, and exclaims: ‘From the depths of my misery, O God, I cry to you!’ At that moment something happens within him; a scale falls from his eyes, a mystery is accomplished: he has conquered the truth.” This is theologically true: “a mystery is accomplished,” namely, the influence of the grace of faith, which gives a supernatural certainty far superior, despite its obscurity, to rational or scientific certainty and to all the apologetic reasoning that preceded II.
Infused faith may thus be considered a spiritual sense, a higher musical sense that enables one to perceive the harmonies of Revelation and to reach infallibly, through the letter of the Gospel, the word of God, the *verbum Dei*. Thus faith is truly “the substance of things hoped for” and the germ of eternal life: *sic fides est in nobis quaedam inchoatio vitae aeternae* (St. Thomas, *De veritate*, q. 14, a. 2). Its supernatural certainty excludes all deliberate doubt, and when illumined by the gifts of understanding and wisdom, living faith becomes penetrating and savorous and merits the name of contemplation of the revealed mysteries.
VI. THE NECESSITY OF FAITH FOR SALVATION — In the Epistle to the Hebrews (11:6) it is written that “without faith it is impossible to please God, for whoever would draw near to God must believe that he exists and that he rewards those who seek him.” Here it is not merely a question of natural belief in God, as may be had by considering the order of the universe, but of faith as “a gift of God” (Eph. 2:8), by which we know God as the author of salvation and the supreme rewarder in the order of grace.
The reason is that all men are called to a supernatural end, the immediate possession of God through the beatific vision, and they must tend toward this end without knowing it, and since it is supernatural, they can know it only through faith in divine Revelation. Infused faith is therefore necessary for salvation (cf. the Councils of Trent and the Vatican, Denz-U, Soi, 1793, c. 5; Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, 2a-2ae, q. 2, aa. 3–8). Indeed, as the Council of Trent states (Denz-U, Soi), “faith is the beginning of salvation, the foundation and the reason for justification,” for without it, one cannot have hope, nor charity, which is inseparable from the state of grace.
Faith is found as an infused virtue in the baptized child, who cannot yet perform an act of faith, which is necessary for adults for salvation (Council of Trent; Denz-U, 799); adults must believe all revealed truths that are sufficiently proposed to them. Those who have not yet learned the mysteries of the Trinity and the Incarnation must at least explicitly believe in these two “primordial” truths: that God exists and that He rewards those who seek Him (Hebrews 11:6). To explicitly believe in these two revealed truths is to implicitly believe in the others, but one must be sincerely disposed to believe explicitly in the others when they are sufficiently manifested.
The testimony of God is not lacking to adults who follow the voice of conscience; as St. Thomas and, with him, theologians commonly affirm: “If a pagan raised in the forests were to follow the dictates of natural reason in loving good and fleeing evil, God would certainly, through an interior inspiration, reveal to him the truths necessary to believe for salvation, or would send him a preacher, as He sent Peter to the centurion Cornelius” (De Veritate, q. 14, a. 2, ad 2). See also on this matter the teaching of Pius IX (Denz-U, 1647, 1677) and the cross-reference V. INFIDELS.
VII. SINS AGAINST FAITH — These are heresy (v.), apostasy (v.), and infidelity (v.); the first two cause the loss of infused faith.
II. THE ETHICS OF FAITH
What allows the act of faith to fall within the sphere of moral values is the psychological freedom inherent in it: in believing, man is not merely passively moved by grace, but is also actively self-moving; the act of faith is fundamentally a voluntary and free acceptance of the truth revealed by God and, as such, proposed by the Church; it is a free choice, an assent that man can freely give or refuse, provided he is placed in the conditions required for II. Now, the act of faith, while free from a psychological standpoint, is not, according to Catholic teaching, free from a moral standpoint: when confronted with revealed truth, man “must” determine himself to accept II. The man who believes fulfills an obligation, discharges a duty, and renders himself worthy of praise and reward; the man who freely does not believe transgresses an obligation, commits a fault liable to blame and punishment. In short: faith is a matter of conscience, a virtue.
SUMMARY: I. The obligation of faith — II. The obligation to profess faith — III. Sins against faith — IV. Rights and duties of reason in relation to faith.
I. THE OBLIGATION OF FAITH — 1. Origin — The obligation of faith has its roots in natural law, and precisely in that stratum of natural law which comprises the primordial duties of man, arising immediately from his essential relationship with God, the supreme principle and end of man.
Man is man by reason of his spirit; and the first essential activity of the spirit is the intellectual knowledge of reality and possession of the truth. Now the ultimate term toward which the natural impulse of human intelligence tends is God, infinite reality and truth. St. John, in the depths of his Gospel, conceives of man’s life as spirit as a participation in the divine Truth subsisting in the Word. Hence the first fundamental duty of man is to seek and accept God as Truth, under whatever forms He manifests Himself.
By virtue of this duty, man is bound above all to accept God’s natural manifestation, ascending by reason from effects to their ultimate cause; rational theodicy, whether in the spontaneous and elementary form of common sense or in the reflective and elaborate form of philosophical demonstration, is the first homage due from human intelligence to divine Truth. It would have been the only and exclusive homage, had God, as He might have done, confined the manifestation of Himself to man within the limits of nature and reason. But in fact, in His infinite wisdom, God has deigned to manifest Himself to man in a direct and supernatural manner, thus making man a partaker of the intimate and exclusive knowledge which He has of Himself.
This supernatural revelation of God unfolds in two successive phases: in the first, God reveals Himself to man by acting as a teacher who asserts a truth but does not demonstrate it; as a friend who confides and asks for trust in his words. Faith is the acceptance of the supernatural revelation of God in this latter phase of authoritative testimony. In the second phase, God reveals Himself to man by immediately showing him His essence in the beatific vision. The knowledge of God in His supernatural manifestation to man, first in the form of faith and then in that of vision, implies a most delicate regard for the personality of man. For if God had shown Himself with the immediacy of evidence to man, the latter would have been necessitated to recognize and accept Him as Truth; faith, on the other hand, even amid the splendor of its proofs, remains an assent that is psychologically free, being motivated not by the intrinsic evidence of the revealed truth but by the authoritative word of the revealing God.
With this, if we may be permitted to say so, faith, which in itself is an act of intellectual cognition, a cold contact with the truth, is subjected to the dominion of the will and becomes a surge of love. Indeed, it is to love that we must trace back the genius of God, in the obligation to accept Him through faith. The supernatural revelation of God, in the sources of Revelation itself, is presented not so much as a lesson imparted by a master from the height of his chair, but rather as a confidential outpouring from friend to friend, from father to child, from spouse to spouse: “God so loved the world as to give His only-begotten Son” (Jn. 3:16); “No longer do I call you servants, for the servant does not know what his master is doing; but I have called you friends, for all that I have heard from my Father I have made known to you” (Jn. 15:15). Thus, just as Revelation is a free gift that God makes of Himself as Truth to man, so faith is perfect when it is the acceptance of God as Truth in the manner of a friend, a child, a spouse toward God. Even the obligation of faith, therefore, falls within the obligation of love, which remains, as Jesus defined it, the first and greatest obligation, upon which all others depend. A faith not inspired by love is indeed true faith, but imperfect and dead.
As for the relationship between faith and charity, what has been said elsewhere regarding the relationship between charity and the other virtues applies (v. Charity). It need only be noted that in the hierarchy of the virtues, under the command and service of charity as sovereign empress, faith occupies the first place, by the very nature of things: the life of the spirit begins in silence and is vitalized in the form of knowledge, and this vitalizing spirituality, though it reaches its fullness in love, cannot surpass the degree of knowledge that initiates and frames II.
2. Gravity
From the above it follows immediately that the obligation of faith is, by its nature, grave. In the language of moral theology, those obligations are called grave which constitute the very existence of the moral order; to observe or violate them is to tend toward or renounce substantially one’s ultimate end, thereby incurring mortal guilt. Indeed, among grave obligations, that of faith is, from the objective point of view, the most grave; so much so that, objectively speaking, the gravest violation of faith is a more serious sin than sacrilege, murder, adultery, theft, etc. In Christ’s teaching, faith appears as the fundamental obligation that men must fulfill to be saved: “He who believes will be saved; he who does not believe will be condemned” (Mk. 16:16); faith, according to Christ, is equivalent to resurrection from the spiritual death of sin: “He who believes in me, even if he die, shall live; and whoever believes in me shall never die” (Jn. 11:25; 5:24; cf. 6 passim). In Christ’s eyes, the sin par excellence is the voluntary rejection of faith (Jn. 16:9), and men are therefore justified or remain sinners according as they believe or do not believe (Jn. 3:18; 8:24; cf. 1:34; 3:31).It was natural that Christ’s teaching on this point should occupy a place of primary importance in apostolic catechesis; indeed, it may be said that the first act of solemn magisterium of the Church, gathered in council at Jerusalem under the presidency of Peter, had as its object the primacy of the obligation of faith over all others (Acts 15:7 sqq.; cf. 10:34-43). St. John declares explicitly: “This is His commandment, that we should believe in the name of His Son Jesus Christ” (1 Jn. 3:23); faith is the victory over the world (ibid., 5:4 sqq.). But the strongest advocate of the absolute necessity of faith for salvation and of its justifying value is St. Paul; his preaching was a thoroughgoing struggle against Pharisaic formalism, which had even crept into the nascent Christianity, claiming to keep the conscience enslaved under the burden of a thousand external norms. It is no wonder, then, that, clashing against a widespread and deep-seated mentality upon which the entire religious life of Judaism rested, he incurred the hatred and persecution of his fellow countrymen, including the Judaizing Christians.
In his Epistle to the Romans, St. Paul, pointing to Abraham as justified before God solely by faith working through love, sets him forth as the prototype and father of all believers, of whatever race, and concludes that it is not the practice of external works that makes man just, but the submission of his spirit to God—substantially, faith in His word. He returns to the same theme with polemical accents in the Epistle to the Galatians, and again at length in the Epistle to the Hebrews, where we find the celebrated Pauline affirmations on faith: “He who would draw near to God must believe that He exists and is a rewarder of those who seek Him”; “without faith it is impossible to please God” (Heb. 11:6). As the faithful guardian and interpreter of this teaching, the Church has defined faith as the beginning, root, and foundation of Christian justice (Denz. 1,799). The total collapse of the moral conscience of an individual or a people is reached only when faith disappears: “The sin of unbelief is greater than all sins that occur in the perversion of morals” (Sum. Theol., II-II, q. 10, a. 3). Every zeal for the Christian reform of morals is blind, vain, and ruinous if it does not constantly aim at safeguarding or rebuilding faith, which by its nature takes precedence over all the virtues (ibid., q. 4, a. 7).
### 3. Extent.
#### a) From the perspective of the believing subject.
The above-stated Catholic doctrine regarding the absolute necessity of faith for salvation implies the objective obligatoriness of faith for all men of all times and places. However, this objective obligatoriness becomes subjective only if men are given the possibility of possessing faith.
It is not clear, for example, how those who are unbaptized infants can subjectively possess faith, whether as a virtue or as an act; thus arises the problem of their salvation, which is not addressed here. Among adults capable of reason, the opinions of patristic and theological thought are divided: some Fathers and theologians, starting from the principle that salvific faith means adherence to a supernatural revelation of God, and from the fact that this revelation is found only in the Hebrew-Catholic Christian religion, have denied to all men, involuntarily ignorant of Christian revelation, the possibility and therefore the subjective obligatoriness of faith; other theologians, including St. Thomas, grant to all adult men the possibility of attaining faith even outside actual contact with Christian revelation. In contemporary theology, this latter opinion is widely accepted. Yet even in this case, faith would be an implicit and virtual adherence to the truth revealed by God and proposed by the Church. It is certain, in any case, that with the Incarnation of the Son of God and the institution of the Church, all men are objectively subject to the obligation of embracing Catholic faith.
#### b) From the perspective of the object.
The Catholic Christian must believe everything that is revealed by God. Faith is an indivisible virtue, since it would be absurd to accept God’s authority on one point while rejecting it on another. It is not necessary, however, that all truths revealed by God be explicitly known and believed by each believer. Theologians declare that explicit faith in the existence of a rewarding God is absolutely necessary and therefore obligatory for all; they are not equally unanimous regarding the absolute necessity and obligatoriness of explicit faith in the mystery of the Trinity and the Incarnation. The duty to make faith explicit falls upon all believers, but its fulfillment is conditioned by their subjective possibilities, their degree of culture, the responsibilities of their position within society and the Church. It is clear, for example, that a shepherd of souls must know the content of faith explicitly to a far greater extent than a simple faithful (cf. *Summa Theologiae*, II-II, q. 2, a. 6). According to moralists, the adult believer is, in principle, gravely obliged to know explicitly the substantial content of the Apostles’ Creed and the Decalogue, the most necessary ascetical teachings, and the prayer of the Our Father. Innocent XI condemned the following statement: “A Christian is capable of sacramental absolution, regardless of his ignorance of the content of faith, and even if he ignorantly neglects the mysteries of the Most Holy Trinity and the Incarnation” (*Denzinger-Umberg*, 1214).
The obligation of faith is not restricted merely to truths revealed by God, but extends also to all those truths which, though not themselves revealed, are in any way connected with revealed data, such as, for example, truths of natural religious order and the so-called dogmatic facts (v. DOGMATIC FACT). Proposition 22 of the *Syllabus* (loc. cit., 1722) and the fifth of the decree *Lamentabili* (loc. cit., 2005), as well as the Vatican Council (loc. cit., 1708), reaffirm the extension of the obligation of faith beyond directly revealed data.
#### c) From the perspective of the proximate norm of faith.
Catholic Christian faith is, by divine positive institution, social and hierarchical; the faith of the individual believer is but a participation in the official faith of the teaching Church. To the latter belongs the determination and proposal of the content of faith, whether it concerns revealed truths or those connected with revelation. Private certainty that a given truth is revealed or necessarily connected with revealed data obliges only the individual conscience, not that of all other faithful; nor is such certainty infallible. Only the public certainty of the teaching Church represents the obligatory and infallible norm of faith for all the faithful. Where and how is the public certainty of the Church regarding the content of faith manifested? To what extent does the public certainty of the Church bind the conscience of individual faithful to faith? These questions, raised in Catholic conscience in recent times under the influence of rationalism and modernism, have received precise answers from the theology of the ecclesiastical movement. The *Code of Canon Law* (can. 1323), repeating verbatim the Vatican Council (*Denzinger-Umberg*, 1792), establishes that, with regard to truths revealed by God, whether in writing or by word of mouth, the norm of faith is the solemn and ordinary magisterium of the Church.
The former is concretized in papal and conciliar dogmatic definitions, while the latter consists in the unanimous teaching of the episcopate united with the pope. A dogmatic definition, in order to bind as such, must be certain and manifest; a doubtful definition is practically definitive in effect. A recent doctrinal papal statement of doubtful definitive value is found in the encyclical *Casti connubii*, concerning the intrinsic grave malice of contraceptive practices (cf. A. Vermeersch, *Catechism of Christian Marriage*, 3rd ed., Turin 1944, pp. 134-135). If it is not always evident whether a papal or conciliar teaching has definitive character, all the more may it be doubtful in certain cases whether a given doctrinal point is the object of the ordinary magisterium of the Church. Already St. Irenaeus noted the difficulty of ascertaining the unanimous consent of the bishops on this or that doctrinal point, and therefore pointed to the teaching of the Church of Rome as an easy and sure norm of faith (*St. Irenaeus, Adversus Haereses*, III, ch. 3: *Patrologia Graeca* 7, 848-849).
Not always, indeed in relatively rare cases, does the teaching Church express its doctrinal judgment by definitively engaging its full authority; often the ecclesiastical magisterium approves or disapproves a doctrine without definitively pronouncing on its absolute truth or falsity. Such acts of the magisterium are also issued, with papal approval, by Roman Congregations and pontifical Commissions in the form of decrees or constitutions. Even to these acts of the ecclesiastical magisterium, the Catholic believer must give in conscience not only an extremely firm but also a fully sincere assent. The duty of sincere submission to such acts of the ecclesiastical magisterium was reaffirmed by Clement XI against the Jansenists (*Denzinger-Umberg*, 1350), by Pius IX against certain semi-rationalistic currents in German theology (loc. cit., 1679), by Pius X against the modernists (loc. cit., 2008, 2113), and in the *Code of Canon Law* (can. 1324).
The obligation to render internal assent even to these acts of the ecclesiastical magisterium is founded on the principle already recalled: not the private judgment of individual faithful, but the authoritative judgment of the teaching Church is the proximate norm of certainty in matters of faith; hence the duty of faith includes the obligation to adhere to all judgments of the ecclesiastical magisterium. It is clear that the assent owed to the judgments of the teaching Church will correspond to the merit of those judgments: if they are certain and definitive, the assent will be most firm and unconditional; if, instead, they are non-definitive, the assent will be less firm and conditional. At this point, it is logical to ask: is it rational for the ecclesiastical magisterium to approve or condemn a doctrine without definitively pronouncing on its truth or falsity? Is it rational for the faithful to render internal assent to such acts of the magisterium? One must not forget that the mind
of the teaching Church in the attainment of its certainties
Subjected to the law of evolution, which is not in-
compatible with the prerogative of infallibility; infallibility
prevents the teaching Church from passing from an erroneous
absolute certainty to doubt and to the opposite certainty, but it
does not exclude the possibility that the Church may initially be
in a state of ignorance, doubt, provisional and conditional cer-
tainty, and gradually progress to a state of absolute and definitive
certainty. It is therefore no cause for wonder that the doctrinal
patrimony of the ecclesiastical magisterium comprises judgments
of unequal certainty: alongside absolutely certain and irreformable
judgments (dogmas) there stand judgments more or less opinative,
susceptible, therefore, through further reflection, of confirmation
or even of correction. The extreme caution with which the teaching
Church advances into new territory on the terrain of truth is
inspired by the law of organic coherence, to whose sovereign and
inviolable dominion both the realm of ideas and that of reality are
subject. By virtue of this law there can be no contradiction between
the doctrinal judgments that compose the thought of the Church
at any moment in its evolutionary process; if, therefore, an idea
appears to the teaching Church, at a given moment, to be incom-
patible with the absolute and definitive certainties of its doctrinal
patrimony, the Church rightly rejects it, awaiting the time when,
should the objective truth of the new idea become evident, it may
be coordinated in harmonious synthesis with the unassailable dog-
matic certainties. It might be said that the judgment of the teaching
Church in these acts of magisterium does not have as its object the
absolute truth or falsity of an idea, but rather its present relation
of compatibility or incompatibility with the immutable dogmatic
certainties; for this reason, even the assent required by these acts
of magisterium has as its object their prudential character rather
than their absolute theoretical value. In the final analysis, the
Church in these cases applies the fundamental law of “tutius est
sequendum,” which holds that where there is a certain good to be
attained or preserved, reliance must not be placed on uncertain
and perilous means. Since these acts of the ecclesiastical magisterium
are not infallible—indeed, they leave the definitive judgment on the
truth or falsity of their object in suspense—no path to critical revision
is precluded; and such revision, to be licit, must presuppose in those
who undertake it an uncommon competence in the matter under
consideration, a respectful attitude toward ecclesiastical authority,
and a disposition of mind to accept its final word.
The infallibility and indefectibility assured by Christ to His
Church render impossible any total and constant discrepancy
between the teaching Church and the learning Church; therefore
the most human certainties of the learning Church in matters of
faith have the value of public and social certainties of the entire
Church, that is, they are at the same time certainties of the ecclesi-
astical magisterium; hence even these certainties are normed by
faith. They are concretized in the unanimous consensus of the
Fathers, theologians, and faithful.
II. THE OBLIGATION TO PROFESS THE FAITH
To profess the faith generally means to manifest externally,
in any manner, the internal adhesion of one’s soul to the truths
revealed by God and the submission to the magisterial authority
of the Holy Church that proposes them. External profession of the
faith is, in principle, obligatory for all believers. The obligation
is fundamentally one of natural law, confirmed by positive divine
law and regulated, in certain cases, by ecclesiastical law.
From the standpoint of natural law, the profession of faith
is a duty for both individual and social reasons. The substantial
dualism of the human being, spirit and matter, necessarily
reflects itself in his actions; hence a faith that is never and in no
way translated into external signs is practically to be considered
nonexistent.
The profession of faith, besides being the natural complement
of faith itself, preserves and strengthens it, in accordance with the
general psychological law of the mutual genetic interdependence
between internal sentiments and external acts. Still more evident
and urgent is the obligation of professing the faith from the social
standpoint. Faith as a purely individual affair is a mere hypothesis,
perhaps even an unacceptable one. In fact, God has ordained that
supernatural Revelation should be a public and social good; and
therefore it should not be surprising that Christ and the Apostles
considered the profession of faith as necessary and obligatory to
the same degree as faith itself. Christ conceived His mission as a
public attestation, made before all men, of the Truth received from
the Father (John 12:49; 18:4–8; 18:37); the Church founded by
Him is, in His eyes, this same testimony prolonged through the
centuries and extended to all mankind, a perennial public and
social profession of faith in Him and in the Father; the apostolic
mission consists essentially in the charge to bear witness publicly
to faith in Jesus Christ (Luke 24:48; John 25:27; Acts 1:8; 3:15);
His disciples, to be saved, must profess their faith in Him before
men (Matt. 10:32), even at the risk of incurring the hatred of their
persecutors (John 15:18–21). St. Paul likewise links the apostolic
mission to the public testimony rendered to the truth by Jesus
Christ before the tribunal of Pilate (1 Tim. 6:12–14), and, while
distinguishing expressly between internal assent of faith and external
profession, declares both necessary for salvation (Rom. 10:8–10).
Admission to the Church through Baptism requires and implies an
act of profession of faith; Confirmation, by making the Christian a
soldier of Christ, obliges and enables him in a specific way to the
courageous public profession of the faith. However important the
profession of faith may be, it is not an absolute moral value in
itself; that is, it is a means for the realization of the ultimate end
of the entire moral order, which consists in the love of God and of
neighbor. It follows that the believer is bound to profess the faith
not at every moment and in every circumstance of life, but only in
those cases in which silence, equivocation, or manner of acting would
amount to a denial of the faith, contempt for religion, an insult to
God, or moral harm to one’s neighbor (CIC, can. 1325 § 1). In other
cases, however, the love of God and of neighbor may counsel or
even impose the omission of the profession of faith. It is the task
of casuistry to consider the individual concrete cases in which it is
obligatory or not to profess the faith. For example, when the lawful
civil authority, acting in accordance with legal procedure, demands
an account of one’s religious faith, the profession of faith is not
only advisable but, in principle, obligatory; this is evident from the
condemnation of the contrary assertion by Innocent XI (Denz.-U.
1168). It is not praiseworthy, however, asserts St. Thomas, to
profess the faith publicly when this would provoke the unbeliever
without any advantage to the faith of the believer (Summa Theol.,
II-II, q. 3, a. 2, ad 3). Ecclesiastical law requires the profession
of faith, according to established formulas, from certain persons in
special circumstances (v. PROFESSION OF FAITH).
### III. SINS AGAINST FAITH
Sins against faith take different forms and degrees of gravity. They may be divided into three categories: 1) sins against the obligation to believe; 2) sins against the obligation of professing the faith; 3) sins against the obligation to cultivate the faith and preserve it from danger. The brief analysis of sins against faith is conducted from an objective and general standpoint. The analysis of sins against faith from a subjective standpoint involves an assessment of the degree of responsibility, a difficult and complex evaluation that varies from case to case. We limit ourselves to noting that the subjective malice of any sin against faith depends on voluntariness; this in turn depends on awareness and free consent. Ignorance, passion, fear, and violence can suppress or limit the subjective guilt of sins against faith no less than of all other sins.
#### 3. Sins against the obligation to believe
a) Infidelity. — This term designates the state of one who has never had and does not have faith. Even today, unbaptized persons are called “infidels,” whatever their religion may be. In the present order of providence, the lack of faith is a very grave moral deficiency, which constitutes a sin only insofar as it is voluntary. From the standpoint of voluntariness, moralists usually distinguish three kinds of infidelity: purely “negative,” i.e., devoid of any voluntariness and therefore of any subjective guilt; “privative,” i.e., indirectly voluntary, inasmuch as it results from a conscious and voluntary neglect of the means necessary to attain faith; and “contrary,” i.e., directly voluntary, inasmuch as it is a conscious and voluntary refusal of a revelation sufficiently proposed. It is not always easy to determine to which of these three kinds the infidelity of this or that individual or group belongs. The assertion of Baius that “purely negative infidelity on the part of those to whom Christ has never been preached is a sin” was condemned by Pius V (Denz.-U., 1068).
Even the lack of faith among many baptized persons in large cities, who have been raised from childhood in an environment ignorant of or hostile to faith, may be considered, at least in many cases, as negative infidelity, or at most privative. On the other hand, certain attitudes of bitter opposition to faith and to the supernatural in general on the part of modern rationalism, especially of an immanentist bent, clearly resemble contrary infidelity. For a more precise evaluation of subjective responsibility in the lack of faith, it is useful to recall that the assent of faith is subjectively obligatory only if preceded by a rational certainty regarding the divine and supernatural origin of the Christian religion, i.e., by the so-called certain judgment of credibility. Doubt, which is the probability that the Christian religion is truly revealed, will oblige one to further investigation, but not yet to faith (Denz.-U., 1170, 1625-26, 1637). Since the judgment of faith and the judgment of credibility are essentially distinct in their object and motive, it is possible for a man to have certainty that the Christian religion is revealed and yet refuse to believe. But this case is very rare; usually, the lack of faith is accompanied by the lack of the judgment of credibility; a man does not believe because faith seems to him irrational or unfounded. It is therefore necessary to examine to what extent the lack of the judgment of credibility is voluntary, in order to determine how voluntary and culpable the consequent lack of faith is. This exploratory probe into the often complex psychology of the unbeliever is very difficult; faith engages the innermost depths of man, and only God, who searches the depths of the human heart, can precisely know how responsible a man is for his lack of faith.
Here the evangelical prohibition against judging and condemning one’s brother applies more than ever. While it is true on the one hand that there exist numerous, splendid, and certain objective proofs capable in themselves of convincing any man of the divine origin of the Christian faith, it is also true on the other hand that ignorance, prejudice, environmental influences, and passions of every kind can diminish or completely suppress the voluntariness of the lack of faith, as of any other moral failing.
b) Loss of faith. — The assent of Catholic faith is by its nature irrevocable, since the believer can never find objectively sufficient reasons to doubt or retract the assent once given. Therefore, the loss of faith is an objective moral disorder, which may vary in depth but is grave in itself. The first form of loss of faith is heresy. This occurs when a baptized believer doubts or denies any truth revealed by God and proposed as such by the Church, either solemnly or ordinarily. In this case, the unbeliever still retains, in principle, his adherence to Revelation and to the teaching authority of the Church, but rebels against it in relation to this or that point of doctrine (v. ERESIA).
From heresy it is but a short step to schism and apostasy (v.). Indeed, heresy implicitly and virtually contains rebellion against the very principle of submission to the teaching authority of the Church; the heretic inconsistently substitutes his private judgment for that of the Church in a particular matter, as Luther did at the outset with his novel theory of faith and justification. To escape this inconsistent position, heresy has only two possibilities: either to retract itself by submitting to the judgment of the Church’s teaching authority, or to reject in principle this very authority. At this point, heresy becomes properly schismatic. The schismatic still accepts Revelation but refuses the mediation of the magisterial power instituted by God to interpret II. Rebellion against the authority of the teaching Church contains the germ of apostasy, i.e., the explicit and formal rejection of divine Revelation itself, a rejection that can extend even to the very possibility of Revelation. Indeed, the patrimony of revealed truths, left to the fallible judgment of private examination, will sooner or later be completely dissipated.
The descending parabola of the loss of faith, outlined here in the schematic succession of its phases, is a sad historical reality that runs from the heresy of Luther to the apostasy of rationalism. The disintegrative process of faith, analyzed with metaphysical subtlety by St. Thomas (Summa Theol., II-II, q. 11, aa. 1-2; q. 12, a. 1), is reduced by him to two phases: heresy and apostasy, skipping the schismatic phase, which he considered essentially contrary to the law of unity (Summa Theol., II-II, q. 39) in charity and in the governance of the Church; for until the time of St. Thomas, no breach of the Church’s unity had displayed the character of a direct and formal denial of the authority of the Church’s magisterium, as was later the case with Protestantism. The Code of Canon Law (can. 1325 §3) also distinguishes heresy from apostasy in the sense indicated above and considers schismatic anyone who refuses to submit to the authority of the Church, which resides supremely in the Supreme Pontiff; this can well be understood as including formal rebellion against the teaching authority of the Supreme Pontiff.
While it is easy to determine the various degrees of the objective malice of the loss of faith, it is not equally easy to judge subjective guilt. The problem of the subjective responsibility of those who lose the faith is one of the most studied and debated in modern theology, which, unlike medieval theology, tends to analyze the phenomenon of faith and unbelief not only from an objective and metaphysical standpoint but also from a subjective and psychologically concrete one.
In canon law, only one who renounces the faith or doubts it in a “pertinacious” manner, that is, in bad faith, is guilty of heresy; this holds all the more in the internal forum before the eyes of God. The height of bad faith is reached in one who revokes the faith of his baptism with full awareness of trampling underfoot revealed truth, divine authority, and that of the Church—in a word, out of formal and direct hatred of the truth. The theologians of the Vatican Council could scarcely conceive of such a monstrous defection from the faith. (Coll. Lac., vol. VII, col. 531, a).
Usually the fault of one who loses the faith is only indirect, consisting in more or less voluntary carelessness in weighing the reasons why a believer gives way to real doubt or passes to the denial of his faith. “Nemo mendax, nisi probetur,” “Praesumptio stat pro veritate”: this fundamental norm of natural law forbids not only the Catholic but the believer of any religion to cast the shadow of doubt or to renounce his religious conviction without the support of motives diligently and impartially examined. The violation of this norm arises in many cases from culpable ignorance and perversion of judgment, caused by culpable indulgence toward aberrant passional impulses. It is well known how much the culpable passion of Henry VIII contributed to determining his break with the Roman Church.
Is it possible to lose the faith without any subjective fault, whether direct or indirect? For modern Catholic theology this problem is largely settled; since the Vatican Council has defined that “a believing Catholic can never have a just cause for abandoning the faith or doubting it” (Denz.-L., 1794, 1875), the question has been raised whether the Council’s statement refers to a just cause only from the objective point of view or also from the subjective. The answers diverge: according to some, the Vatican Council intended to define that a believing Catholic can never have a just cause even subjectively for doubting or rejecting his own faith; “therefore the loss of faith is always, directly or indirectly, culpable.” According to others, the Vatican Council had in view only the objective point of view. Still others hold that the mind of the Vatican embraces the subjective point of view as well, but adheres to a general principle not excluding exceptional cases and leaves open the question whether the subjective fault of one who loses the faith is always grave. Vermeersch, for example, holds that the defection from Catholic faith and the adherence of large masses to the leaders of the Reformation was free from grave subjective fault, if not from all fault. (Theol. mor., II, 1st ed., p. 27). The solution of this intricate problem will depend in large part on a thorough analysis, guided by theological principles, of the concrete psychological processes culminating in the loss of faith. Canonical sanctions against heresy and apostasy (can. 2315 § 1) presuppose pertinacity and the most extreme manifestation.
c) Disobedience to the magisterial authority of the Church. — According to can. 1323 § 1 and 1325 § 2, only one who pertinaciously doubts or denies a revealed truth “proposed as such by the solemn or ordinary magisterium of the Church” is a heretic. Therefore every other dissent from the magisterial authority of the Church, though it be a grave sin against faith, is not in itself the loss of faith. The ecclesiastical magisterium can define infallibly what is not revealed, or issue doctrinal decrees that are not definitive and hence not infallible. To dissent, even internally, from infallible doctrinal decrees in non-revealed matters is always gravely illicit and is a sin of disobedience to the Church; if moreover the dissent is publicly manifested, the aggravating factor of scandal is added. The same holds for internal and external dissent from non-infallible doctrinal decrees, except in the rare case of one who, being competent and prudent, withholds internal assent from such decrees while awaiting a definitive judgment.
4. Sins against the obligation to profess the faith
a) External denial of the faith. — It is always illicit to saywithin the context of Catholic teaching on the philosophical and historical method of theology and with the utmost prudence in ascertaining any supernatural manifestation of God, stands the principle: “Factum supernaturalis non praesumitur, sed probandum est.” To contravene this principle is to sin against faith by excess and to open the door to all superstitions. The right and duty to demonstrate rationally the fact of Revelation and the truths revealed, within the limits of possibility, does not fall only to one who is setting out toward faith, but also to one who already possesses it; the only difference between the two is that the former, while in the phase of rational inquiry, is not bound to believe—that is, as is technically said, he is permitted the “systematic” doubt regarding faith—whereas the latter, before and during the rational justification of faith, cannot actually suspend his assent of faith; his doubt can only be “methodical.” The duty to reason about one’s own faith becomes operative in individuals when their judgment of credibility threatens to crumble under the pressure of intellectual difficulties.
Against rationalism the Church has declared the obligation of reason to recognize its natural limitation, aggravated by original sin, and the consequent duty to accept divine revelation when sufficiently proposed, giving faith to its content even if absolutely mysterious (Denz.-U., 1785, 1795, 1807-1808-1809-1810). The right of absolute autonomy claimed by rationalism in favor of reason is an absurd pretension, ultimately harmful to reason itself; nor can there ever be a real conflict between the duties and rights of reason and those of faith.
V. FENE
V. J. Wys, De magisterio ecclesiastico in CIC, in Collationes Bruxellenses, 33 (1933), pp. 343-48. On certain ethical aspects of infidelity and the loss of faith: F. Hurth, De incapabili defectione a fide, in Oecumenicum, 7 (1926), pp. 2 sqq., 193 sqq.; A. Goumard, De haeresi et apostasia, in Collectanea Mechliniensia, 21 (1932), pp. 176-83; C. Baroni, È possibile perdere la cattolicità senza pericolo? (Dottrina dei teologi del sec. XVIII, VVIFI), Rome 1937; C. B. Cuzzetti, La perdita della fede nei cattolici (studio storico-dogmatico), Venice 1940; R. Lombardi, La salvezza di chi non ha fede, 2 vols., Rome 1943; A. Dal Covolo, La psicologia dell’ateo alla luce del IV Vangelo, Milan 1945; H. Decout, L’acte de foi, Paris 1947. Gaetano Corti
SUMMARY: I. The Problem
II. Outline of Historical Development
III. Catholic Doctrine
IV. F. and Science.
I. THE PROBLEM
The relationship of faith to reason corresponds to that of grace to nature, of which it expresses the first moment and the fundamental actualization inasmuch as it is through the acceptance of faith that man enters into the supernatural order, and inasmuch as faith itself is the first grace that effectively draws man to God. The act of faith therefore arises directly from the mention of grace, so that the relationship of faith and reason has an intrinsically dialectical meaning: on the one hand, it represents and operates as a condition or preparation for the acceptance of faith; on the other, it operates as a consequence of the acceptance of faith itself, which is the absolute truth that saves. In both situations, faith presupposes a precise attitude toward reason, that is, toward philosophy, inasmuch as philosophy expresses reason brought to the maturity of reflection. In the first moment of the preparation of the act of faith, the hinge of the relationship is faith itself: it must stand firm in itself for anyone who intends to be a Christian, because faith is the truth of God to man. Philosophy, on the other hand, is human reflection or invention, in the face of which two situations are possible (and the history of theology confirms this): either one sees in the multiplicity of diverse philosophical systems the inability of philosophy to lead to absolute truth, or one considers in that unceasing energy of human reflection the essential tendency of man to conclude the problem of truth within the limits of his possibilities and in the historical situation in which he lives. In the history of Christianity, both directions have been encountered: one, pessimistic, condemns all philosophy wholesale and thus conceives the relationship of faith and reason in a predominantly negative way (irrationalism, fideism, traditionalism, etc.); the other, more optimistic, admits the possibility of a positive intervention of reason (and of philosophy) within the sphere of faith. This positive relationship of faith and reason has, first of all, a historical meaning inasmuch as it recognizes in pre-Christian philosophy more or less vast and complete flashes of truth; it has, moreover, a theoretical meaning inasmuch as it assumes the concepts of philosophy to reflect upon the formulas of faith and to expand them in their fullness of truth for consciousness, whence theology is born.II. OUTLINE OF HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
The negative approach often appeals to the condemnation by St. Paul of philosophers (Rom. 1:18 ff.) and of philosophy (1 Cor. 3:19; Col. 2:8) and insists on the corruption of human nature after sin; the positive approach appeals to the fact of the presence of specifically philosophical elements in Sacred Scripture itself, both of the Old Testament (Job, Wisdom, Ecclesiastes, Maccabees) and of the New (Gospel of St. John, the very Letters of St. Paul and the Acts of the Apostles), where the more or less direct reflection of the philosophy of the environment is beyond doubt. Moreover, when examined in depth, the two approaches should not be opposed: the errors of the philosophers that the first condemns are also rejected by the second, but the latter goes further and, with a livelier sense of the gradual differences, distinguishes the various systems according to a greater or lesser incompatibility (in principles, method, and conclusions) with the foundations of faith, in order to show that the erroneousness of conclusions, or even of method, is not always solid, and that the principles can be retained even when those are abandoned. In both attitudes, all gradations can be admitted, and it is the task of the history of dogma to individuate the particular features of each within the historical and doctrinal environment in which it appeared.In early Christian literature, the negative approach seems to prevail. Hippolytus makes Greek philosophy responsible for all heresies: heretics have done nothing but plunder one or another philosopher wholesale (τοὺς ἀρετῶν γεγεννητῶν κλεφθῆναι καὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν προσεκτικῆς: Hippol., *Ref. om. her.*, 1, 11; ed. P. Wendland, Leipzig 1916, p. 4, 7; *Dox. Graeci*, ed. H. Diels, 2nd ed., Berlin 1929, p. 554, 41). Immersed in the contemplation of nature, the philosophers have lowered the idea of it: ἔστερες ἐπέχον μάκρος τῆς κτίσεως παντὸς γνῶς τῶν θεῶν τοῦτο καὶ δημιουργῶν μὴ ἐπίγνωσις (Hippol., *op. cit.*, 1, 26; ed. cit., p. 31, 19; *Dox. Graeci*, ed. cit., p. 376, 2). Herennius, in his “schema of pagan philosophers,” after quoting the Pauline text 1 Cor. 3:19, “The wisdom of this world is foolishness with God,” sees the origin of philosophy in the first apostasy of the angels, from which derives the discord among philosophers: δὴ αὐτῶν οὐκ ὀνόμασαν αὐτὸς ἐμῶν ἀλλήλοις καὶ ἀλλήλοις ἀλλήλοις ἐκείνων ἀλλήλοις (Iren., *Frag.*, 1, 12; *Dox. Graeci*, ed. cit., 6, 51, 6). The most resolute in this negation of classical thought was Tertullian. In *De praescriptione haereticorum*, condemning philosophy as “the material of secular wisdom,” he affirms that “every heresy is fomented by philosophy,” and immediately exemplifies: Valentinus was a Platonist, Marcion a Stoic, Epicurus a materialist, Zeno a Stoic who taught the fire-god of Heraclitus (ch. 7; ed. J. Martin, Bonn 1930, *Flor Patr.*, IV, p. 11, 11 ff.; cf. p. 12, 9; “Miserum Aristotelem qui illis dialecticam instituit...”). His condemnation of philosophy admits no discrimination: “What indeed has Athens to do with Jerusalem? What concord is there between the Academy and the Church? What between heretics and Christians? Our instruction comes from the portico of Solomon (...) It seems that those who have produced Stoics, Platonists, and Christians are plundering the same shop. We have no need of curiosity after Christ Jesus, nor of inquiry after the Gospel. When we believe, we desire nothing further to believe. For we believe this first, that there is nothing further that we ought to believe” (ch. 8; ed. cit., p. 13, 1 ff.). The dialectic of the act of faith is resolved entirely in faith itself: “Therefore we must seek what Christ instituted, and, if we do not find it, we must seek until we find II. But we find it when we believe, for we would not have believed if we had not found it, just as we would not have sought unless we intended to find” (ch. 10; ed. cit., 15, 6 ff.). This declared ostracism of Greek philosophy, however, did not prevent Tertullian from accepting from Stoicism the materialist conception of being, which he extended to the soul, to angels, and even to God himself (cf. W. Karpp, *Sorans vier Bücher neeß vuxn und Tertullians Schrift «De Anima»*, in *Zeitschr. f. neut. Wiss.*, 1934, pp. 31–47).
But more ancient, more continuous, and more widespread is the conviction that reason and philosophy have a positive function with respect to faith, both because the philosophers, in seeking the absolute, fought idolatry and the state religion, and because to combat heresies the instrument of theoretical reason is indispensable. This approach is fittingly inaugurated by St. Justin, who, in addressing his First Apologia to the emperors Antoninus Pius and Lucius Verus, praises them as katholikos, “born of one another and of the virtues, and attentive to the virtues” (Hippol., ed. cit., 1, 26; ed. cit., p. 31, 19; Dox. Graeci, ed. cit., p. 376, 2).
Hippolytus, in his “scheme of the pagan philosophers,” after citing the Pauline text 1 Cor 3:9, “The wisdom of this world is foolishness with God,” sees the origin of philosophy in the first apostasy of the angelic beings, from which derives the discord among the philosophers: “For they did not name it among themselves, but among themselves and among themselves among those among themselves” (Iren., Frag., 1, 12; Dox. Graeci, ed. cit., 6, 51, 6).
The most resolute in this rejection of classical thought was Tertullian. In *De praescriptione haereticorum*, condemning philosophy as “the material of secular wisdom,” he asserts that “heresies are suborned by philosophy,” and immediately exemplifies: Valentinus was a Platonist, Marcion a Stoic, Epicurus a materialist, Zeno a Stoic who taught the fire-god of Heraclitus (ch. 7; ed. J. Martin, Bonn 1930, Flor Patr., IV, p. 11, 11; cf. p. 12, 9; “Miserum Aristotelem qui illis dialecticam instituit...”). His condemnation of philosophy admits no discrimination: “What indeed have Athens and Jerusalem in common? What have the Academy and the Church? What have heretics and Christians? Our instruction comes from the porch of Solomon (...) It seems that those who have produced Stoics, Platonists, and Christians are all alike. We have no need of curiosity after Christ Jesus, nor of inquiry after the Gospel. When we believe, we desire nothing further to believe. For we believe this first: that there is nothing further that we ought to believe” (ch. 8; ed. cit., p. 13, 1; cf.). The dialectic of the act of faith is resolved entirely within faith itself: “Therefore, we must seek what Christ instituted, and as long as it is not found, we must seek until we find II. But we find it when we believe, for we would not have believed if we had not found it, just as we would not have sought unless to find” (ch. 10; ed. cit., 15, 6; cf.). This declared ostracism of Greek philosophy, however, did not prevent Tertullian from accepting from Stoicism the materialist conception of being, which he extended to the soul, the angels, and even to God himself (cf. W. Karpp, *Sorans vier Bücher neeß vuxn und Tertullians Schrift «De Anima»*, in *Zeitschr. f. neut. Wiss.*, 1934, pp. 31–47).
But more ancient, more continuous, and more widespread is the conviction that reason and philosophy have a positive function with respect to faith, both because the philosophers, in seeking the absolute, fought idolatry and the state religion, and because to combat heresies the instrument of theoretical reason is indispensable. This approach is fittingly inaugurated by St. Justin, who, in addressing his *First Apologia* to the emperors Antoninus Pius and Lucius Verus, praises them as katholikos, “born of one another and of the virtues, and attentive to the virtues” (Hippol., ed. cit., 1, 26; ed. cit., p. 31, 19; Dox. Graeci, ed. cit., p. 376, 2).
For their service to providence, Augustine judges the philosophers worthy of the divine honors they instead bestowed upon idols: “Yet if the philosophers discovered anything that could suffice for living a good life and attaining blessedness, how much more justly should such honors be decreed to them?” (*De Civ. Dei*, bk. XVII, ch. 41, n. 3; CSEL 40, p. 11). The attitude of the Fathers toward reason is therefore not absolutely negative but critical; for them, there are two revelations of the divine Word: one in the variety of nature and the unfolding of human culture, and the other in the communication of faith and the mysteries of grace for eternal life. To reject the first in principle would be to deprive oneself of the first manifestation of the Word itself. In this line stands also St. Peter Damian, at the dawn of the Middle Ages, who, despite his pronounced mystical bent, reaffirms the principle of St. Irenaeus: “The Egyptian takes the treasure from which he builds a tabernacle for God, who reads the poets and philosophers, by which he may more subtly penetrate the mysteries of celestial eloquence” (PL 145, 560).
The most energetic opponent of the application of philosophy to theology in the late Middle Ages is St. Bernard, as demonstrated by his struggle against Abelard: “Peter Abelard strives to empty the merit of the Christian faith by supposing that he can comprehend with human reason all that God is” (*Epist.*, CXCI; PL 182, 237 B). His anti-philosophism became a domestic tradition in the Cistercian school, and his formula may be seen as the *fides quaerens intellectum* of St. Anselm. Those who, before Abelard (whose orthodoxy is today almost entirely vindicated), accepted the collaboration of reason—such as Berengar of Tours and Roscellinus—bordered on rationalism, a tendency also present in John Scotus Eriugena. Under the influence of Abelard and Eriugena, thinkers like Thierry of Chartres and William of Conches leaned toward rationalism, while fideism appears in Gilbert of Poitiers. A step forward is made by the Victorines, who distinguish natural theology, the work of reason, from sacred theology, which depends on faith but does not disdain the aid of reason. In a text of decisive importance for the development of theology up to St. Thomas, Hugh of St. Victor distinguishes three classes of objects: “Some are from reason, some according to reason, some above reason”—and a fourth, which does not count—“and beyond these are those which are against reason.” Here is their varying epistemic value: “Those from reason are necessary, those according to reason are probable, those above reason are wonderful, those against reason are incredible.” The two extremes lie outside the scope of faith: “For those which are entirely known by reason cannot be believed, since they are known. And those which are against reason cannot be believed by reason either, nor does reason ever acquiesce in them.” Faith, however, is concerned with the two intermediate categories, though differently: “Therefore, those which are according to reason and those which are above reason alone admit of faith. (a) In the first category, faith is aided by reason, and reason is perfected by faith, since what is believed is according to reason. Even if reason does not comprehend their truth, it does not contradict the faith in them. (b) In the second category, faith is not aided by any reason, since reason cannot grasp what faith believes, and yet there is something by which reason is admonished to venerate the faith it does not comprehend” (*De Sacram.*, bk. I, pt. III, 30; PL 176, 232).
These important programmatic declarations did not meet with immediate implementation for lack of an adequate conceptual tool; indeed, they suffered a setback through repeated prohibitions by ecclesiastical authority against studying the works of Aristotle on natural philosophy and moral metaphysics, which, translated from the Arabic and also from the original Greek, began to infiltrate student circles toward the end of the 12th century. The letter which Gregory IX addressed from Perugia on 17 July 1288 to the professors of theology at the University of Paris, in its picturesque style of biblical allusions, contains a whole diatribe against the use of philosophy in theology:
“Et quidem theologicus intellectus quasi vir habet praesens cultibet facultati, et quasi spiritus in carmen exercere, acum in viam dirigere rectitudinis ne aberret. Denique qui verba caelestis oraculi adulterina philosophorum doctrinae committione a sui sensus molitur inflatus et nihil sciens puritate divertere inclinans eadem ad philosophum intellectum et quasi de corde suo profanans viro adultero adhaerere cum muliere Samaritana videtur”
(Chartul. Univ. Paris., ed. Denifle-Chatelaín, I, Paris 1880, n. 50, p. 114 sg.).
The conservative stance drew strength from these prescriptions to apply, in the strictest sense, to philosophy and reason in general, the principle “Philosophia ancilla theologiae”; it would enjoy special favor in the Franciscan school. St. Bonaventure not only wrote the *De reductione artium ad theologiam* but also declared that “in descensu ad philosophiam est maximo cum periculo,” and after recalling that St. Jerome, through reading Cicero, lost his taste for Holy Scripture, he adds:
“Ideo magistri et doctores Scripturae non tantum appretiare debent scripta philosophorum, ut discipuli exemplo eorum dimittant aquas Siloe, in quibus est summa perfectio, et vadant ad philosophiam, in qua est periculosa deceptio”
(Collat. in Hexaem., Visio III, coll. VII, 12; ed. F. Delorme, in Bibl. Franc. Schol. M. Aevi, VIII, Quaracchi 1934, p. 216 sg.).
Still following, not only spiritually but also doctrinally, St. Bonaventure are Scotus and Ockham, inasmuch as, with their schools, they deny that theology can be called a science in the strict sense, in direct opposition to St. Thomas, who, while admitting that the other sciences are “ancillae huius” (Sum. Theol., I, q. 1, a. 5, sed contra e ad 2)—that is, of theology—clearly distinguishes the two orders of faith and philosophy. Ockham, pushing to its extreme the doctrine of intuitive (affective) knowledge in his *Ordo*, admits a complex of truths of faith accessible even to reason, including the mystery of the Most Holy Trinity; yet it must be maintained that only Holy Scripture and tradition can reveal their existence, so that theological discourse with rational mediation clarifies but does not constitute them, or in any case enters into the realm of faith itself. In this sense Ockham reacted against the rationalism of Scotus’s “distinctio formalis” in defense of the transcendence of faith:
“Et ideo non debet poni (distinctio formalis) nisi ubi evidenter sequitur ex traditis in Scriptura sacra vel determinatione ecclesiae propter cuius auctoritatem debet omnis ratio captivari. Et ideo cum omnia tradita in Scriptura sacra et determinatione Ecclesiae possunt salvari non ponendo eam inter sapientiam et essentiam (divinam), ideo simpliciter nego talem distinctionem ibi possibilem (sicut inter essentiam et relationem) et eam universaliter nego in creaturis”
(In I Sent., dist. II, q. 1, ed. Lyon 1495, f. I, 10 sqq.).
St. Thomas’s viewpoint on the relationship of faith and reason is that of his entire theology, namely that “gratia non tollit sed perficit naturam,” developed in his commentary on Boethius’s *De Trinitate*, q. 2, a. 3: “Utrum in scientia fidei, quae est de Deo, liceat rationibus physicis uti.” The main points are as follows: a) both the “lumen fidei” and the “lumen rationis” derive from God, and therefore it is impossible that one should contradict the other, for “non potest veritas fidei contraria esse veritati quae per naturam nobis est indita...; oportet enim alterum esse falsum: et cum utrumque sit nobis a Deo, Deus esset nobis auctor falsitatis, quod est impossibile.” b) Since created things are a certain “imitatio” of the divine essence, they can well bear and suggest a likeness to the mysteries of faith: “Unde impossibile est quod ea quae sunt philosophiae, sint contraria his quae sunt fidei, sed deficiunt ab eis; continet tamen quasdam similitudines eorum, et quaedam ad ea praeambula, sicut natura praeambula est ad gratiam.” c) If any philosopher has opposed faith, “hoc non est philosophiae, sed magis philosophiae abusus ex defectu rationis,” which the theologian can reject as not being in accord with faith. d) Moreover, theology can make use of
The relationship between philosophy and theology can be outlined in three ways: 1) to demonstrate the "pleasant ideas" (the existence and attributes of God, the creation of the world, the immortality of the soul, etc.) which faith presupposes; 2) to clarify in some way the truths of faith, using analogies and similitudes drawn from nature and reason—"as St. Augustine himself uses many similitudes and philosophical doctrines in his books *De Trinitate* to manifest the Trinity"; 3) to defend against the fragility of attacks from false philosophy, "whether by showing [these doctrines] to be false or by showing them to be unnecessary."
Finally, the Angelic Doctor points out two dangers or errors in the use of philosophy in theology: "One way is to use it as if it had a certain center of faith, which are not matters of philosophy but rather of error or its abuse." In another way, "what belongs to faith is included within the boundaries of philosophy; for example, if someone wishes to believe nothing unless it can be grasped through philosophy, whereas, on the contrary, philosophy must be brought within the boundaries of faith, according to the words of the Apostle: *2 Cor. 10:5* (Opuscula, ed. De Maria, Città di Castello 1886, p. 302 sq.)."
The result of the collaboration between faith and reason in theology is that it has, in the conception of St. Thomas, a true character of science; indeed, it is the preeminent created wisdom (*Summa Theol.*, I, q. 1, art. 4, ad 26). St. Thomas energetically combated the erroneous thesis of the "double truth," according to which a philosophical truth could, as such, be directly contrary to faith, so that the believer had to reject the conclusion of philosophy solely by virtue of faith. According to this error, the necessary conclusions of philosophy would include the eternity of the world, merely general providence, and the unity of the human intellect in all individuals; but the believer has faith, which surpasses reason. Thus Siger of Brabant protests: *"Hoc dicimus sensisse Philosophum de unione animae intellectivae ad corpus; sententiam tamen sanctae fidei catholicae, si contraria huic sit sententiae Philosophi, praeferre volentes sicut et in aliquibus... In tali dubio fidei adhaerendum est, quae omnem rationem superat"* (*Quaestio de anima intellectiva*, ed. Mandonnet in *Siger de Brabant*, II, 2nd ed., Louvain, 1911, pp. 157, 169). His style is more moderate in the *Commentary on the Metaphysics* (cf. ed. C. A. Graff, Louvain, 1948, esp. pp. 140, 153). More resolute is John of Jandun: *"Quamvis haec opinio sit Commentatoris et Aristotelis et quamvis etiam haec opinio non possit removeri rationibus demonstrativis, tamen ego dico aliter... Hoc autem non probo ratione aliqua demonstrativa, quia hoc non scio esse possibile, et si quis hoc sciat, gaudeat. Istam tamen conclusionem (plurality of individual human intellects) assero simpliciter esse veram et indubitatam, immo sola fide"* (*Quaestiones super libros Aristotelis De Anima*, lib. III, q. VII, ed. veneta 1565, col. 282).
Recent studies on the precise position of Averroes, conducted by L. Gauthier on hitherto unpublished original works of the Commentator, have shown that—beneath the caution of his formulas—Averroes affirms the absolute superiority of philosophy over religion, whose dogmas it explains in their ultimate sense, for it is only through speculation that we arrive at true knowledge of God (*Traité décisif sur l'accord de la religion et de la philosophie*, ed. L. Gauthier, 3rd ed., Algiers, 1947, p. 6). This attitude of Averroes forms the central theme of his polemic with the theologian-mystic al-Ghazali, who, author of a *Destructio philosophorum*, opposes his own *Destructio destructionum*, translated and edited in the 16th-century Venetian edition of Averroes’ works (IX, Venice 1562).
This is the genuine Averroist position of the subordination of religion to philosophy, not that of Latin Averroism, which, after the hesitations of Humanism and the open negations of rationalist Enlightenment, would be taken up and deepened by modern idealism, especially Hegelian panlogism. In this process, religion (a) constitutes an inferior sphere to reason; (b) can lay claim to truth only by subordinating itself to reason. It is Kant who expressly proclaims *"die allgemeine Menschenvernunft [as] die herrschende, souveräne über die natürliche Religion"* and at the same time wishes it to be *"anerkannt und geehrt als das oberste gebietende Prinzip in der Lehre des christlichen Glaubens"* (*Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft*).
The Church has declared:
5. The existence of a twofold order of knowledge, one deriving from natural reason, the other from divine Revelation (*Denz
U., 1795 and 1816*).6. Natural reason can assist faith by showing the connection among the mysteries of faith and the analogies with created truths, though remaining inaccessible in their intimate nature (*Denz
U., 1796*). 3. A real opposition between faith and reason is therefore impossible, since both have God Himself as their common principle (*ibid.*, 1797–98 and 1817). 4. Indeed, faith and reason can assist one another, reason preparing the way for the assent of faith, and faith preserving reason from error. 5. The genuine sense of the dogmas of faith is safeguarded by the magisterium of the Church and not abandoned to the changing vicissitudes of reason and science (*ibid.*, 1800–18).The same doctrine is now taught in the encyclical *Humani generis* of 12 August
1950. In the condemnation of Modernism (*Pascendi*, 8 September 1907), it is declared that phenomenism leads to absolute agnosticism and thus to the explicit denial of rational, objective knowledge of God, which becomes the object solely of subjective religious experience (*Denz
U., 2072 ff.*); hence the absolute separation made by Modernists between science and faith is condemned, inasmuch as the former would have as its object mere phenomena and the latter the unknowable which is the object of religion and Revelation (*ibid.*, 2084 ff.; cf. also the Anti-Modernist Oath in the *motu proprio Sacrorum Antistitum*, 1 September 1910, *ibid.*, 2145).IV. FAITH AND SCIENCE
If science is distinguished from philosophy in that science pursues the knowledge of the laws of particular objects or spheres of objects, whether in the realm of nature or of spirit (*die Naturwissenschaften* and *Geisteswissenschaften* of W. Dilthey), while philosophy seeks the truth and universal principles of being as such, then the relationship between science and faith is more indirect than direct. The positivist-oriented science of the second half of the 19th century had claimed to have the final word on the origin of the world and of man, on the nature of the human soul and of thought, defending the eternity of matter, the evolution of man from anthropoids, the materiality of the soul, the absolute necessity of physical laws, and thereby denying the foundations of the Christian religion: the creation of the world and of man, the immortality and spirituality of the soul, human freedom, the possibility and reality of miracles, etc. Idealism believed it could refute positivism by denying all value to science. The reality is that positive science must limit itself to formulating its laws for the objects within its domain, without pretending to pronounce upon the ultimate being of those objects, which belongs to philosophy, and still less upon the truths proper to faith. In the strict sense, it must be said that science has no direct contact with faith but only with philosophy; or at most, through philosophy, it may sometimes touch upon the domain of faith: for example, the hypothesis of evolution requires that the nature of man be clarified philosophically before pronouncing on the mode of his first origin. The more recent direction of science has reversed the situation, inasmuch as today, with the advances of atomic physics and the knowledge of the processes of morphogenesis and biological heredity, the ultimate laws of phenomena have a probabilistic character (Planck’s quantum theory, Mendel’s laws of heredity as developed by contemporary genetics, especially the school of T. H. Morgan), which recalls the Thomistic conception according to which the course ofThe particularity of natural phenomena depends on the contingency that has its root in matter; likewise, the course of historical events depends on the contingency of created freedom. And above all nature and created freedom, as the first directive principle, watches over divine Providence (Summ. Theol., I, q. 22, a. 3) V. also SCIENCE.
For the physician, on the conflict between Averroes and Islamic theology, see: L. Gauthier, Ibn Rochd (Averroës), Paris 1943 (p. 17 ff.; and especially p. 266 ff.). For Latin scholasticism: M. Grabmann, Geschichte der scholastischen Methode, I, Freiburg 1945, pp. 125-43; id., I dici ecclesiaristi di Aristotele in Innocenzo III e Gregorio IX, Rome 1941; Th. Heitz, Les rapports entre la philosophie et la foi de Bérenger de Tours à St Thomas d'Aquin, Paris 1960; F. Sartiaux, Foi et science au moyen âge, 1925; E. Gilson, Christianisme et philosophie, ibid. 1936; id., La Théologie mystique de Saint Bernard, ibid. 1947; R. Guelluy, Philosophe et théologe chez Guillaume d'Ockham, Louvain-Paris 1947.
Modern: heterodox conceptions: F. W. Hegel, Glaube und Wissen, in Erste Druckschriften, ed. G. Lasson, Leipzig 1928, pp. 221-246; D. Fr. Strauss, Der alte und der neue Glaube, in Ges. Schr., ed. E. Zeller, V. VI, Bonn 1877; A. Messer, Glaube und Wissen, Munich 1919; E. S. Brightman, A philosophy of religion, New York 1946, pp. 127, 178 ff.; 422 ff. and passim; J. Boisset et al., Le problème de la philosophie chrétienne, Paris 1949; L. Charlier, Essai sur le problème théologique, Ramezoul-Thuillies 1938 (denies the validity of theological conclusions. Condemned by the Holy Office).
A complete exposition of traditional principles is found in: M. J. Scheeben, Die Mysterien des Christentums, new ed. by J. Höfer in Ges. Schr., vol. II, Freiburg 1945, pp. 614-671 (with careful bibliographic updating by J. Hofer. For the existential conception: G. Marcel, Foi et réalité, in Être et Avenir, Paris 1935, p. 239 ff.; id., Homo viator, Paris 1944; K. Jaspers, Der philosophische Glaube, Hamburg 1946; C. Fabro, Foi et raison dans l'œuvre de Kierkegaard, in Rev. des Sciences philo. et théol., 32 (1948), pp. 169-206; J. Welte, Der philosophische Glaube bei Karl Jaspers und die Möglichkeit seiner Deutung durch die theologische Philosophie, in Symposium, II, Freiburg in Br. 1949, pp. 1-190. Cornelio Fabro