SCOTISM. – Since the Scotist synthesis is found under the entry Duns Scoto (v. Duns Scoto), here we treat Scotism in the sense of the interpretation and dissemination of Scotus’s doctrine, that is, the "Scotist school."
I. ORIGIN
The Scotist school owes its origin to no imposition or prescription on the part of the Franciscan Order, which always granted full freedom to follow one or another Doctor « secundum Deum et veritatem », as is read in the acts of the Chapter.Since the provided text appears to be a fragment (it cuts off mid-sentence and lacks a complete entry), I will translate only the available portion while adhering strictly to the rules:---
In 1337 (Chronologia historico-legalis Seraphici Ordinis, I, Napoli 1650, p. 51).
Thus, while Guglielmo Occam was founding his own school and Pietro Aureolo, Roberto di Cowton, Gugliel-
(from M. Bulard, Le scorpion symbole du peuple juif..., Paris 1885, tav. 8)
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SCORPION - The S. reproduced on the standards of the teaching Synagogue (left) and cursed by Jesus (center). Miniature from a Bible illuminated by Sienese artists (early 14th century) - Paris, Bibliothèque nationale, ms. franc. 9561, f. 98².
The cause of the election of Scoto as the head of that school, Alessandro di Hales (v.) and founded by St. BONAVENTURA, SANTO (v.), lies in his profound doctrine and subtle intellect, for which he was, as Mariano da Firenze writes (Compendium Chronicarum, in Archivum Franciscanum historicum, 2 [1909], p. 631), « toti saeculo stupendus ». Francesco di Mayrone, Giovanni da Bassolis, Ugo da Novocastro, Giacomo d'Ascoli, Landolfo Caracciolo, Francesco della Marca, Gerardo Odone, Pietro d'Aquila, Pietro Thomas, Nicola Bonet, and numerous other doctors of the 14th century, attracted by the acuteness and solidity of Scoto's doctrine, spontaneously began to comment on, illustrate, and defend the Master's doctrine, to exalt the man and the Franciscan, even placing the most laudatory inscriptions on his tomb, such as: « Fons Ecclesiae », « Doctor iustitiae », « Arca sophiae », « Dux cleri », « Claustri lux », « Tuba veri » (Wadding, Annales Minorum, ad an. 1308 n. 35, VI, Quaracchi 1931, p. 133). Although this enthusiasm of the first disciples somewhat diminished during the general decline of scholasticism, nonetheless, even in this century, valiant Scotists are found (e.g., Pietro Tatareto, Bartolomeo Bellati, Nicola d'Orbellus, Antonio Sirrect, Francesco Vidal y Noya, Giovanni Foxal, Guglielmo Vorlion) who continue the tradition of the first disciples of the Doctor Subtilis.
II. DEVELOPMENT
Scotism in the 16th-18th centuries experienced its golden age. Alongside general causes that favored the restoration of scholasticism in general—of which Scotism is an integral part (the invention of printing, the reform following the Council of Trent, the insistence of Pius V and Sixtus V on scholasticism)—there were particular causes, among which one must recall the edition of Scotus's Opera omnia edited by Wadding in 1639; the struggles for the Immaculate Conception, which were pursued to the extreme and in which Duns Scotus was considered by all as the principal representative of the common doctrine; the prescriptions of the Franciscan Order, which, while initially not recognizing any preference for Scotus,(courtesy of Fr. C. Balić)
SCOTISM - Thomism and Scotism compared. Title page of the Collationes doctrinae s. Thomae et Scoti in tertium sententiarum... by Fr. Francisco a S. Augustino Macedo, Padua 1680.
And in 1500, having placed him on an equal footing with other Doctors, after 1593 they strictly ordered that lecturers in the schools « should endeavor to explain only the text of Scotus, and not other authors »: prescriptions confirmed by the supreme pontiffs (v. DUNS SCOTO). Furthermore, the development of Scotism was greatly aided by the fact that, in schools and various universities, the Opus Oxoniense was expounded in place of the Libri sententiarum and alongside the Summa Theologiae of St. Thomas, according to the ordinance of 1520 by the Minister General Lycheto (Wadding, Censura in Opera Scoti, ed. Vivès, VIII, p. 2). Thus, Scotism had its own chair in Padua, Perugia, Bologna, Florence, Rome, Turin, Vienna, Louvain, Paris, but especially in the various universities of Spain.
Among the numerous authors who expounded Scotus's Opus Oxoniense and whose commentaries were printed, we recall Clemente Bascetti, Lorenzo Brancati di Laura, Alfonso Briceño, Francesco Casimiri, Maurizio Centini, Bartolomeo Cimarelli, Giovanni da Cartagena, Francesco da Herrera, Girolamo Galli, Antonio Hiquey, Filippo Fabri, Melchior Flavi, Giovanni Fonio, Armando Hermann, Giacinto Hernandez de la Torre, Giovanni della Incarnazione, Carlo Lanteri, Maturino Lebreton, Giuseppe Leali, Francesco Lycheto, Giacomo Malafossa, Paolo da Mercatello, Giovanni Ovando, Marco Odoñez, Bonaventura Passeri, Francesco dei Pitigiani d'Arezzo (Aretinus), Giovanni Francesco Perez Lopez, Pietro di Posnania, Giacomo Pierio, Giacomo Podborski, Giovanni Poncio, Andrea Rochemarin, Gregorio Ruiz, Paolo Scriptor, Gaspare Sghemma, Matteo Sosa, Giovanni Vigerio, Pietro Vriese.
From the golden age of Scotism, Claudio Frassen, Giovanni Gabriele Boyvin, Bartolomeo Mastro, Bonaventura Belluti, Maurizio da Porto O'Fhely, Francesco
Macedo, Matteo Ferchio, Sebastiano Dupasquier, Carlo del Moral, Girolamo da Montefortino, Crescenzo Krisper, and Teodoro Smising are celebrated. Despite the Order's prescription to explain only the text of Scotus, even in this period one finds that independence and freedom of spirit which is one of the characteristic notes of Franciscan doctors. Alongside the Capuchins, who generally preferred St. Bonaventure, alongside great theologians such as Alfonso da Castro and Lodovico Carvajal, who were not admirers of the division into Thomists, Scotists, and nominalists, even among the most ardent disciples of the Subtle Doctor, the principle was affirmed that to be a good Scotist it is not necessary to blindly follow the great master. Thus, Giovanni Poncio writes: « Proposui non semel argumenta aliqua contra nonnullas rationes Doctoris Subtilis, et dixi non esse necesse ut sectatores ipsius singulas eius rationes tueantur » (Philosophiae ad mentem Scoti cursus. Appendix apologetica, Rome 1645, p. 2). These authors remembered the admonition of the master himself: « In processu generationis humanae semper crevit notitia veritatis » (Ox., IV, d. 1, q. 3, n. 8, ed. Vivès, XVI, p. 136).
Scotists also played a very important and effective role in the various activities and controversies of the period. About a hundred Franciscan theologians were present at the Council of Trent, among whom not a few shared the judgment expressed by the celebrated Andrea Vega: « Tanta est mihi pietas in Doctorem Subtilem, tamque piam habeo opinionem de illius felicissimo ingenio et catholica et omnino singulari et praecellenti doctrina ut neque illis argumentis adduc possim... » (cf. Wadding, Annales Minorum, VI, p. 152). Scotists carried out great activity against the "reformers," so much so that in England, under Edward VI, among the works of the scholastics, those of Scotus were particularly cited, which were burned by heretics with the cry of « Funus Scoti ac Scotistarum » (Wadding, op. cit., p. 148; P. de Martigné, La scolastique et les traditions franciscaines, Paris 1888, p. 314). Also in the controversy de auxiliis, between Jesuits and Dominicans, some, like Mastro and Krisper, created a mediating theory. But undoubtedly the greatest effort of the Scotists of this period was concentrated on the defense of the Immaculate Conception, and among the most ardent defenders of the Marian privilege, Pietro Alva y Astorga must be remembered.
BIBL.:
In addition to the works cited in the text, see: C. Balić, Les commentaires de Jean Duns Scot sur les quatre livres des Sentences, Louvain 1927; Id., Ioannis Duns Scoti theologiae marianae elementa, Sibenik 1933; Id., De origine et evolutione scholasticae franciscanae, in Antonianum, 1935; Id., De doctrina Ioannis Duns Scoti, Quaracchi 1938; P. Minges, Der hl. Bonaventura und die Scotistische Schule, Munich 1908; P. de Martigné, La scolastique et les traditions franciscaines, Paris 1888; L. Wadding, Scriptores Ordinis Minorum, Rome 1650; Id., Annales Minorum, vols. I-XXV, Rome 1731-1741; V. Doucet, Commentaires sur les Sentences. Supplément au Répertoire de M. Frédéric Stegmüller, Quaracchi 1954.
P. CARLO BALIĆ, O.F.M.
III. DECLINE AND RENAISSANCE
In the second half of the 18th century and throughout the 19th century, Scotism, like scholasticism in general, entered a phase of decline. However, while a few decades after 1854—the year in which the Scotist school celebrated its greatest triumph with the proclamation of the dogma of the Immaculate Conception—scholasticism began to renew itself effectively, Scotism showed no signs of revival. During this period, the Franciscan Order, which in the golden age of the Scotist school numbered approximately 150,000 religious, had not yet recovered from the scourge of wars and revolutions; moreover, it had almost become fashionable to present Scotus as the precursor of all those evils and errors against which the Church had to struggle. Yet, the closer the fiftieth anniversary of the proclamation of the dogma of the Immaculate Conception approached, and the more the historical-critical movement inaugurated in the second half of the 19th century spread, the more the figure of the Subtle Doctor began to emerge in its historical reality (v. DUNS SCOTO). Indeed, the historical-critical method has not only effectively contributed to the knowledge of Scotus’s life, works, and the history of the Scotist school, but above all, it has highlighted the relationship between Thomism and Scotism. Among the protagonists of this Scotist renaissance, the disciples of St. Thomas, such as Gilson and Grabmann, do not occupy the last place.IV. SCOTUS AND THOMISM
Duns Scotus did not merely attempt a synthesis of the two early Franciscan schools—that of Oxford, with its mathematical-scientific tendency, and that of Paris, rich in the material gathered in Alexander of Hales’ Summa and the works of St. Bonaventure—but also a synthesis of the Aristotelian-Thomistic current with the Augustinian-Franciscan one. By positing ens in quantum ens as the object of metaphysics, ens infinitum as the object of theology, affirming the univocity of being, formal distinction, and the primacy of the will, Duns Scotus formulated a doctrine which, though different from those of St. Thomas and St. Augustine, does not appear contrary to them. More than with the Doctor Angelicus, Scotus engages in continuous dialogue with the Belgian doctor Henry of Ghent and with Godfrey of Fontaines.It was rather the Scotists and Thomists who, over the centuries and in their disputes, set Thomas and Scotus in opposition, attempting to refute one another on the basis of these masters’ doctrines. Already in the first decade of the 14th century, followers of St. Thomas (such as Thomas of Sutton and Hervé of Nédellec) combat Scotus’ doctrine in Thomas’ name. While the two schools remain united in the struggle against nominalism (v. NOMINALISMO), they increasingly diverge on the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception. At the end of the 14th century, John of Montesono, at the University of Paris, opposes the Immaculatist thesis in the name of St. Thomas. The University responds that the Doctor Angelicus was not an auctoritas (H. Denifle, Chart. Univ. Paris, III, 491, 493, 499, 503; J. Gerson, Opera, I, Antwerp 1706, pp. 709-722). And after Sixtus IV’s intervention in the matter with new important decrees, a forgery was invented claiming that Innocent VI had said the authority of the Doctor communis was so great that all his adversaries were to be considered suspect de veritate, or, as some repeated, de haeresi (cf. K. Balić, Die Bedeutung der historisch-kritischen Methode, in Wissenschaft und Weisheit, 4 [1947], pp. 188-93). And since it was believed that Scotus had systematically sought to destroy St. Thomas—or, as Cajetan put it, singula prope verba (cf. E. Gilson, Note sur un texte de Cajetan, in Antonianum, 27 [1952], pp. 377-80)—Duns Scotus could not but appear to some as in error or even “heretical.” Meanwhile, the continuator of Baronio’s Annales ecclesiastici, Bzovius, in the year 1294, piled up the most atrocious accusations against the Doctor Marianus, so that Duns Scotus was considered not only by Franciscans but also by others defending the privilege of the Immaculate Conception as the Martyr Immaculatae.
On the other hand, however, Hugh Caghwell (Cavellus), Anthony Hickey, Matthew Ferchio, Alfonso Briceño, Basil Rychlewicz, and others wrote Apologies for Scotus. Possevin, James Walter, Nicholas Vernulz, Michael Hoyer, and others pronounced great praises in Scotus’ favor. The Dominican Ambrose Catharinus declared of Scotus that “laus quanta sit in Ecclesia, et merito, soli prava affecti mente non conspiciunt” (Disputatio pro veritate Immaculatae Conceptionis B. V. et eius celebranda a cunctis fidelibus festivitate ad sanctam Synodum Tridentinam, Rome 1551, col. 67). And one of the principal Thomists, John of St. Thomas, O.P., emphasized how Duns Scotus departed from Thomas “magna cum modestia et nulla irreverentia” (Cursus theologicus, disp. I, art. 3, I, Paris 1883, p. 318). While the defenders of Scotus, in their Apologies and praises, enumerate some twenty points “in quibus communiter non tenetur s. Thomae sententia”, but rather Scotus’ (Fr. Dermicius Thadaei = Anthony Hickey, Nitela Franciscanae religionis..., Lyon 1627, pp. 46-47), while they affirm that their school is “longe communior” than the Thomist one (G. Herinck, Summa theologica scholastica et moralis, II, part 1, Antwerp 1680, pp. 5-6; G. Poncius, Theologiae cursus integer, Lyon 1671, “ad lectorem”), and while they declare that no genuine Scotist thesis was ever condemned by the Church (Fr. Dermicius Thadaei, op. cit., pp. 59-63), Apologies multiply on the Thomist side as well. Thus, for example, Gonet’s Clypeus theologiae thomisticae contra novos eius impugnatores corresponds to Bartholomew Durand’s Clypeus scoticae theologiae contra novos eius impugnatores (Marseille 1685).
Amid these controversies, conciliators were not lacking: John of Rada, Constantine Sarnano, Eutropius Bertrand, Matthias Hauzeur, William Herinck, Francis Henno—without abandoning Scotus’ doctrine—sought to compare and, if possible, reconcile it with that of other scholastics, and above all with that of St. Thomas. These authors noted that the two great Doctors sometimes differ “potius in nomine quam in ipsa re” (John of Rada, Controversiae theologicae inter s. Thomam et Scotum, Venice 1598, p. 110), and that it was their disciples who dug an abyss between the two doctrines: “sed eius discipuli ne videantur cum Scoto sentire D. Thomam in aliam adducunt sententiam” (ibid., p. 16); that even in cases of contrasting positions, sometimes both “probabiles sunt et fortasse aeque verisimiles” (Macedo, Collationes doctrinae s. Thomae et Scoti cum differentiis inter utrumque, I, collat. 6, diff. 4, sect. 4, Padua 1671, p. 141), so that if one understands the position of each, one must say: “bene dicit s. Thomas et Scotus” (Sarnano, Conciliatio s. Thomae et Scoti, Rome 1911, p. 10).
These controversies and various attempts at conciliation, however, could not always lead to a happy outcome—not only because they were based on a false principle, namely the systematic opposition of Scotus to Thomas, but also because the disputants did not always take care to understand the fundamental positions of their masters, as is evident from considerations on the saint in his relations with dogmas.
V. SCOTISM AND DOGMAS
Scotism did not derive its metaphysics from dogmas, nor can its philosophical theses be considered a corollary deduced from revealed truths. However, it would be a grave error to overlook that Scotist philosophy arose from the effort to comprehend the mysteries of faith and to form an intellectus fidei. As proof of having achieved this intellectus fidei to a greater or lesser extent, Duns Scotus employs the magisterium of the Church: « Si aliqua de novo proponuntur non tenetur quia assentire, sed... prius tenetur consulere Ecclesiam, et sic errorem vitare » (Rep. Paris., III, d. 25, q. unica, n. 6; ed. Vivès, XXIII, p. 402). It would not be particularly useful to reproduce the list of doctrinal points in which the particularities of Scotist doctrine are reflected, as Fulgenzio Stella did in the seventeenth century in his work titled Celebriores Thomistarum et Scotistarum theologicae controvertiae (Milan 1651). What matters is to clearly understand the Scotist perspective—that is, to see precisely how Scotists, through the univocity of being, formal distinction, and so-called "voluntarism," attempted to comprehend and illustrate revealed truths. Only in this way can the misunderstandings that have unfortunately filled the history of Catholic theology be avoided.
First and foremost, it is necessary to recognize that in Scotism, being is not « habens esse », but « entitas essentiae ». And this being, which « as such » (ens in quantum ens), is the primary object of the intellect, is conceived as an absolutely indeterminate essence, as a « quid » whose « quale » has not yet been considered. This being must not be posited as a genus because it is common; rather, it is too common to be a genus: « Ens autem non est sic limitatum, sed indifferens, quia ex hoc habetur quod praedicetur in quid de ente limitato sicut illimitato, et ideo non est genus » (D. Scoto, Collatio 24, ed. Balić, De Collationibus, I. D. Scoti..., in Bogoslovni Vestnik, 9 [1929], p. 214). It is therefore not conceived in the manner of the genera of the Porphyrian tree, from which created and uncreated essence could derive as further specific determinations. The unique concept « which in such a way is one that its unity suffices to generate contradiction when affirmed and denied of the same thing » (Ox., I, d. 3, q. 2, n. 5, ed. Vivès, IX, p. 18) and « which every inquiry into God presupposes » (Ox., I, d. 3, q. 3, nn. 6-9, ed. Vivès, IX, pp. 102-109) refers only to the transcendental-logical aspect, not the metaphysical one. It escapes pantheism: an accusation that Gilson rightly characterizes with the words: « une aussi complète absurdité ne vaut pas la peine de la réfuter » (Les seize premières Theoremata..., in Archives d'hist. doctr. et litt. du M. A., 11 [1939], p. 36). This scholar of Scotist and Thomist doctrine, after recounting how Thomists accused Duns Scotus of pantheism while Scotists, in turn, accused St. Thomas of agnosticism, concludes by noting that « tous perdaient leur temps, puisque le mot « ens » ne signifie pas la même chose dans les deux doctrines. Si elle signifiait chez saint Thomas comme chez Scot l'essence commune et transcendantale à ses modalités, l'analogie de l'être impliquerait un certain agnosticisme des attributs divins; si elle signifiait chez Scot, comme chez saint Thomas, l'essence dont la perfection suprême est son acte d'être, l'univocité de l'être impliquerait un certain panthéisme. Or, précisément l'histoire fait connaître que tel n'était pas le cas. Il n'y a pas d'agnosticisme chez l'un ni de panthéisme chez l'autre, si l'on prend le mot « ens » dans le sens que chacun d'eux lui attribue » (E. Gilson, D. Scot à la lumière des recherches historico-critiques, in Scholastica ratione historico-critica instauranda, Rome 1951, pp. 509-10).
The same misunderstandings arise regarding questions of the divine nature, the hypostatic union, and the human soul. After demonstrating that in the Most Holy Trinity, the unity of essence with the other persons is impossible, Scotus observes that « it does not seem intelligible how the essence could not multiply while there are multiple supposita (persons) unless a certain distinction is admitted between the notion of essence and the notion of suppositum » (Ord. I, d. 2, n. 388; ed. Vaticana 1950, II, p. 349). Indeed, the reason, for example, why the first person of the Most Holy Trinity is Father differs both from the reason why He is God and from the reason why the second and third persons are Son and Holy Spirit. These reasons are not something of our intellect but rather something in the divine essence itself: they are the formal reasons that objectively express a diversity in divinity and paternity, in filiation and spiration. Yet they cannot be something really distinct because this is incompatible with the infinite simplicity of the divine essence. There is, therefore, a formal distinction—or rather, a formal non-identity—of the different realities of the same thing « prior to every act of created or uncreated intelligence » (ibid.).
To the question of whether « such a distinction can be called real », Duns Scotus responds that it is neither « real actual » nor « real potential » (ibid.). All accusations against the formal distinction, therefore, generally stem from misunderstanding: some, contrary to Scotus’s explicit thought, interpret it as « real actual »; others consider the principle « tot esse, quot entitates » an intolerable error, marveling that Scotus and the Scotists do not see the nature of being nor understand how « ex duobus existentibus in actu non potest fieri unum per se ens », as Cajetan said. On the other hand, there are Thomists who, objectively considering the problem, marvel that Cajetan himself « does not see that Scotus’s entitas formalis rightly does not have actual existence » (E. Gilson, Jean Duns Scot, Paris 1952, p. 470; cf. D. Cornelisse, Tractatus de Deo Uno et Trino, Quaracchi 1913, pp. 197-206).
Since, then, in Scotism existence is but a mode of essence, as many real essences as there are, so too are there « esse »; and since in Christ there are two natures, one created and the other uncreated, there must also be two « esse »: one created and the other uncreated. Nevertheless, Christ is not two beings, since both « esse » are the « esse » of a single Christ. If it is objected that « esse » constitutes the being, Scotists respond that in concrete beings, beings are counted according to the number of subjects. In our case, there is but one subject, Christ, and consequently, the fact that there are two « esse » in no way implies that there are two beings: « Etti in Christo sunt duae voluntates, non tamen duo volentes, quia concretum non numeratur absque numeratione suppositi, sicut patet de habente duas scientias, qui non dicitur duo scientes. Ita in Christo, si sint plura esse, quorum utrumque erit esse simpliciter suppositi, non sequitur suppositum esse duo entia » (Ox., III, d. 6, q. 1, n. 8; ed. Vivès, XIV, p. 311). Thus, though Scotus posits two « esse » and two filiations in Christ, he vigorously defends—and, according to his principles, logically—the perfect unity of Christ, insisting that the Word is formally man: « Verbum formaliter homo » (ibid., d. 7, q. 1, n. 3; ed. Vivès, XIV, p. 333); that the operations of Christ are the operations of the Word: « Omnes operationes Christi sunt operationes Verbi per communicationem idiomatum ».
BIBL.:
E. Gilson, Les seize premières Theoremata de Jean Duns Scot, in Archives d'hist. doctr. et litt. du M. A., 11 (1939); Id., Jean Duns Scot, Paris 1952; Id., Duns Scot à la lumière des recherches historico-critiques, in Scholastica ratione historico-critica instauranda, Roma 1951; D. Cornelisse, Tractatus de Deo Uno et Trino, Quaracchi 1913; C. Balić, De Collationibus Ioannis Duns Scoti, in Bogoslovni Vestnik, 9 (1929); Fulgenzio Stella, Celebriores Thomistarum et Scotistarum theologicae controvertiae, Milano 1651.
A. ZAMBONI
(Rep. Paris., III, d. 12, n. 2; ed. Vivès, XXIII, p. 326); that, instead of the traditional formula of the assumptus homo, the more secure and less ambiguous one of the "assumed nature" is preferable: "proprie homo non fuit assumptus sed natura humana" (ibid., d. 6, q. 3, n. 3; ed. Vivès, XXII, p. 291). "When it is said 'the Word assumed man,'" writes Girolamo Galli in commenting on Scotus' text, "although 'man' on the predicate side seems to abstract and stand for the nature, nevertheless, since Nestorius understood 'man' as the supposited nature, and through assumption meant a union not hypostatic but moral, that expression must be avoided" (Opus de ineffabili Incarnationis mysterio, Milan 1645, p. 143). "Christ is one person," adds another Scotist, "one subject, one 'I,' one son, to whom both divine and human attributes belong" (P. Minges, Compendium theologiae dogmaticae specialis, II, Ratisbon 1921, p. 262).
Certainly, the Subtle Doctor, also called the Doctor of the Incarnate Word, would be greatly astonished to observe how today some have presented under his name the history of the assumptus homo "enriched not only with propositions such as: 'a perfect man, though assumed, Jesus is therefore someone,' 'Jesus Christ in recto designates the assumed man, and not the Word...,' but with various other expressions derived from modern psychology rather than that of the Scholastics." But here it is fitting to say that just as St. Thomas is not always Thomistic, neither is Scotus always Scotistic!
And while certain Scotists go beyond the intention of the Subtle Doctor regarding the so-called "human psychology of Christ," there are also Thomists who, though far from admitting the single esse in Christ, lament Scotistic infiltrations (cf. H. Diepen, La psychologie humaine du Christ selon st Thomas, in Rev. thomiste, 58 [1950], p. 524 ff.), or even fear that "one day or another St. Thomas may be suspected of having been a Scotist avant la lettre" (cf. C. V. Héris, O. P., A propos de la psychologie humaine du Christ, ibid., 59 [1951], p. 468). However this may be regarding this thorny and intricate Christological question (cf. P. Parente, L'io di Cristo, Brescia 1951; P. Galtier, La conscience humaine du Christ, in Gregorianum, 32 [1951], pp. 525-69), in the history of dogmas there are no lack of examples of how Thomistic thinkers may arrive at Scotistic conclusions if for a moment they forget their own positions.
Passing over in silence the Scotistic critique of the argument from motion to demonstrate the existence of God—which some theologians, after the declarations of Cajetan and Báñez, call the "triumph of Scotistic subtleties" (cf. M. Chossat, Dieu, in DThC, IV, col. 933)—one cannot fail to recall the problem of the immortality of the soul. It is well known that Cajetan (v. DE VIO), shortly before his death, candidly confessed that no philosopher had given an apodictic demonstration of the soul's immortality, so much so that it was said of this prince of Thomists that he "declined toward the path of Hervé and Scotus" (cf. Thomas de Vio card. Cajetanus, Scripta philosophica; Commentaria in De Anima Aristotelis, I, Rome 1938, p. LI, n. 2). Duns Scotus, though holding that a moral demonstration of immortality can be given philosophically, repeats that there is no strictly metaphysical, apodictic, and necessary demonstration: "Non video aliquam rationem demonstrativam necessario concludentem propositum" (Rep. Paris., IV, d. 43, q. 2, n. 15; ed. Vivès, XXIV, p. 496); "Non est demonstratio nec ratio simpliciter necessaria, sed tantum probabilis" (ibid., n. 24, p. 499). If the intellectual soul, observes Gilson, is not a spiritual form having actum essendi, but a real essence that derives existence from its cause and not from the act of being, analyzing this soul reveals no intrinsic principle of perpetuity or incorruption. In this metaphysics of essence, the forma totius individual integrates the being as the esse does in the metaphysics of the act of being. Where the latter disappears, the Thomistic proof of the soul's immortality disappears with it (E. Gilson, Jean D. Scot, pp. 487-97). Certainly, immortality could be proven if one could demonstrate that the soul was created in itself and for itself, not as part of the composite, but Aristotle never attempted this, nor can one see how he could do so from his principles: "valde dubium est," says Scotus, "quid ipse senserit de uiceptione animae intellectivae" (Ord., IV, d. 43, q. 2, n. 19; ed. Vivès, XIX, p. 47).
This observation—that starting from certain principles posited by pagan philosophers we cannot apodictically prove this or that truth of faith—is frequently found in St. Thomas. It concerns a demonstration that is evident and necessary for philosophers who know nothing of Revelation and are not predisposed to the knowledge of religious truths accessible even by the light of reason alone. But what pagan philosophers could not do, Christian philosophers can, even by means of natural reason alone. From this perspective, one must judge the Scotistic concept of theology as a science. If theology, due to its contingent object and its lack of intrinsic evidence, cannot be called a science according to the four conditions laid down by Aristotle in the Posterior Analytics (I, c. 2), this does not mean that the sacred doctrine must be denied its scientific character (cf. A. M. Vellico, De characteris scientificis theologiae apud Doctorem Subtilem, in Antonianum, 16 [1941], pp. 3-30).
In particular, to evaluate and justly appreciate the so-called "Scotistic voluntarism," it is necessary to keep in mind its point of departure. Duns Scotus, writing after 1277—that is, after the ecclesiastical authority condemned certain philosophical theses in which the Arab-Greek concept of the world was presented, according to which God necessarily does all that He does ad extra—aimed to safeguard contingency and freedom without, however, placing the will of God at the origin of ideas. Thus, the Subtle Doctor teaches that the knowledge of God, insofar as He is the cause of the existence of things, is not necessary but free, and declares that "if it concerns the existence of concrete things with all their attributes, God knows it from the decrees of His will, and not from necessary ideas, for otherwise things would not be contingent, and indeed no contingency would be possible in the world" (P. Minges, I. D. Scoti doctrina philosophica et theologica, II, Quaracchi 1930, p. 101).
BIBL.:
Per la cristologia scotista: P. Minges, Christologie des Duns Scotus, in Divus Thomas (Piacenza), 28 (1925), pp. 161-80; H. Diepen, La psychologie humaine du Christ selon st Thomas, in Rev. thomiste, 58 (1950), pp. 524-54; C. V. Héris, A propos de la psychologie humaine du Christ, ibid., 59 (1951), pp. 468-72; P. Parente, L'io di Cristo, Brescia 1951; P. Galtier, La conscience humaine du Christ, in Gregorianum, 32 (1951), pp. 525-69. – Per l'immortalità dell'anima: E. Gilson, Jean Duns Scot, Paris 1952, pp. 487-97; M. Chossat, Dieu, in DThC, IV, col. 933. – Per il volontarismo: P. Minges, I. D. Scoti doctrina philosophica et theologica, II, Quaracchi 1930, pp. 95-105; E. Gilson, Jean Duns Scot, cit., pp. 501-10.
A. M. Landgraf
Regarding the so-called "moral voluntarism," although it is often asserted that Scotism subjects a part of the Decalogue—and consequently a part of the natural moral law—to God's free and arbitrary will, it must be noted that Duns Scotus did not intend to include in this law everything in which God has sometimes dispensed, precisely because the natural moral law depends on God's intellect alone and not on His will. "The discussion between Scotists and Thomists," observes Gilson rightly (Jean D. Scot, pp. 613-14), "can only concern what is actually included in the natural law; as for the very notion they have of this law, it is no less intellectualist in Duns Scotus than in St. Thomas Aquinas." In short: the so-called Scotist "voluntarism," considered in the metaphysical, moral, or psychological field, has no connection with modern voluntarism, which establishes that the will, and not the intellect, is the rule of truth and certainty. In Scotism, it is a question of a certain primacy of dignity of the will over the intellect: Scotus emphasizes love, the charity whose excellence theology generally speaks of, while Thomists give greater prominence to the intellect, that is, to knowledge; but it is clear that neither does love exclude knowledge nor does knowledge exclude love.
From this brief overview of the principal positions of Scotism in relation to certain dogmas, it is evident how Duns Scotus was convinced that the thought of none of his predecessors could simply represent human intelligence in all its fullness and fertility, and that no one could formulate a system that would be the definitive and absolute expression of Christianity in every detail; thus, using the same freedom granted to others, he intended, through a serene search for truth, to illustrate and understand these same dogmas, accepted by all, following his own path. Over the centuries, Scotists have multiplied works and volumes in which they attempted to highlight these more or less original aspects of their doctrine, though they did not always succeed in demonstrating the correctness of their positions. Nor is it surprising, given that such is the condition of human nature—that what appears clear to one seems obscure to another. "Indeed, I would be utterly ignorant of customs and temperaments," declared a Scotist in the 17th century, "if I believed that what pleases me would always please others, or even that it would never displease them gravely. For such is the blindness of humanity that what is clear to one is utterly obscure to another" (G. van Sichen, Cursus integer philosophicus, Antwerp 1666, "ad lectorem").
However, among so many controversial questions, one deserves to be remembered, which in past centuries was qualified as "the Scotist opinion" and is today a dogma of faith: the Immaculate Conception. "Among all the Religious Orders," wrote Tommaso Strozzi, S.J., "that in the early 14th century contended for the glory of the Conception of Our Lady, the Franciscan Order distinguished itself, for under the banner raised by Scotus it undertook above all others the defense of this mystery, for which in the following centuries it endured so many labors, disseminated so many volumes, engaged in such continuous battles, and achieved such signal victories that for this single enterprise it has become more illustrious in the Christian world than for all the other merits that render it admirable..." (Controversia della Concezione della Vergine Maria, part 1, ch. 30, Palermo 1700, pp. 566-67).
VI. EVALUATION
Duns Scotus, contemplating with his powerful and subtle intellect the mystery of being and Christian dogmas, uncovered aspects unknown or unconsidered by his predecessors. Through one of the most daring efforts of human reason engaged in the pursuit of truth, he gave an impulse to theological studies that, from the 14th century, has continued to the present day. Scotism has a history spanning centuries, rich in a literature that in past times rivaled that of Thomism; and, together with Thomism, in the 17th century, it was expounded in nearly all the universities of Europe, not only by the sons of St. Francis but also by theologians and philosophers of other religious orders, so much so that the Cistercian Caramuel could speak of Scotists "qui non sunt Franciscani" and affirm that Scotist doctrine was "communissima" (C. Lobkowitz, Theologia moralis fundamentalis, lib. II, nn. 568, 570, Lyon 1657, pp. 149, 150)."The criticism," wrote Mausbach, "made of Thomism by the Scotists had value for all theology, because it kept at bay the danger of rigidity and fossilization, which easily leads to 'iurare in verba magistri'; on the other hand, it pointed out the weakest points of the Thomistic doctrinal system, thereby highlighting the strength and grandeur of the entire structure" (Thomismus und Skotismus, in Wetzer und Welte's Kirchenlexikon, 2nd ed., XI, Freiburg im Br. 1899, col. 1709). Something similar could be said of the criticism made by Thomists of Scotism. The controversies and noble emulation of Catholic schools are opportune not only for the progress of science but also so that the uncertain is not mistaken for the probable, opinion for faith, falsehood for truth. "Sicut enim ex collisione lapidum exilit ignis, sic ex confricatione ingeniorum per disputationes subtiles elicitur et emicat veritas" (Cornelius a Lapide, Commentarium in Sapientium, ch. 6, 22; Opera omnia, IV, Naples 1855, p. 710). However, to avoid useless and vain controversies, it is necessary, before attempting the defense or refutation of a thesis, to understand it in its text and context. Today’s historical-critical method has demonstrated that, from this point of view, there were deficiencies in past centuries. Today, it can be said that instead of opposing Duns Scotus to St. Thomas, he must be placed alongside him, remembering that neither one nor the other finds a place among those presumptuous individuals who, as the Common Doctor says, think: "totum esse verum quod eis videtur, et falsum quod eis non videtur" (St. Thomas, Summa contra gentiles, I, 5).