**PROVIDENCE. -
I. NOTION AND EXISTENCE
**In general, Providence denotes the divine governance of the world inasmuch as the divine intelligence comprehends the entire development of beings, both in their totality and in their individual parts, and guides them to their proper end. Providence thus constitutes the concluding moment of divine causality following creation (q.v.) and conservation. Properly speaking, Providence consists in an act of intelligence insofar as it envisages the “plan of development” of a thing that preexists in the mind of the Creator. Both the Latin term *providentia* and the Greek πρόνοια consider Providence as a “foresight” on the part of divine intelligence regarding the course of events, according to the expression of Proclus: πρόνοια... ἔστι τὸ ὄνομα διὰ τήν νόησις ἐνέργειαν (In Tim., 40 Bc, ed. C. Diehl, I, Leipzig 1903, p. 415, 21 ff.). St. Thomas therefore places Providence as the principal part of the virtue of prudence and defines it as *ratio ordinis rerum in finem* (Sum. Theol., I, q. 22, a. 5), which he aligns with the traditional definition of Boethius: “Providentia est ipsa divina ratio in summo omnium principe constituta, quae omnia disponit” (De consol. philos., I, IV, prosa 6: PL 63, 814). Once the will has established the end to be attained, it belongs to reason, through prudence, to determine the appropriate means to achieve II. In this sense, Providence is an attribute of the divine intellect, which, however, presupposes the will’s determination of the end (Sum. Theol., loc. cit., ad 3).
The existence of divine Providence can be made evident to all men, according to the degrees of certainty that philosophical reflection and Christian faith attain regarding the mystery of divine operation. This certainty thus begins with the natural knowledge accessible to all and is perfected through faith and theological reflection. Especially the spectacle of the marvelous order of the universe demonstrates the existence of a first ordering principle that guides every being to its proper end. Thus, the immanent finalism of nature—whereby, without knowing it, beings arrive at their end—attests to the direction of a higher principle beyond this finalism (already recognized in antiquity in the harmony of the macrocosm and microcosm). This finalism has become even more evident today with advances in astrophysics regarding the organization of the sidereal world, in microphysics concerning the structures of the subatomic world, and in microbiology, which, in the fields of physiology, genetics, and embryology, has discovered the ultimate constitutive individualities of the living organism. It is impossible for this imposing complex of elements and forces, which converge toward well-defined and constant particular and global ends, to exist in matter as such and to move and arrive at their term without the guidance of a mind that embraces them in their individual parts and as a whole—and this is precisely Providence. The appeal to “chance” (q.v.) explains nothing, for natural phenomena are not sporadic but constant and constitutive, tending toward the attainment of the optimum, as St. Thomas observes (cf. Sum. Theol., I, q. 2, a. 3: 5th way), and this shows that the order of a supreme intellect operates in nature, as was already seen by the perspicacity of post-Socratic philosophers, who “... evidentibus indicis et rationibus ostendit res naturales providentia regi” (Prol. in lib. Iob, ed. Parm., t. XIV, 1 col. a). It is therefore erroneous to attribute the governance of nature to chance, fate, or necessity, as many pre-Socratics, and in particular Democritus and Empedocles, did (cf. H. Diels, *Doxographi graeci*, 2nd ed., Berlin 1929, p. 321, a 14 ff.).
The existence of Providence seems instead doubtful in the history of human events, for in them, as St. Thomas again observes, there appears to be a lack of order, since the good do not always receive benefits nor the wicked misfortunes, nor do the good always suffer misfortunes and the wicked benefits in this life, but rather goods and evils befall the good and the wicked indiscriminately: “Hoc est quod maxime corda hominum commoveat ad opinandum res humanas providentia divina non regi” (loc. cit.). Yet nothing is more pernicious than the denial of Providence, for once divine Providence is removed, men lose the fear and reverence of God, and with it all vices are unleashed: “Nihil enim est quod tantum revocet homines a malis et ad bona inducat quantum Dei timor et amor” (Prol. in lib. Iob, ed. cit., XIV, 1 col. b). The only real difficulty against the existence of Providence, therefore, is the existence of evil; but this difficulty is not resolved by referring evil to an independent principle (Gnostic and Manichaean dualism) nor by reducing it to a necessary moment in the development of the whole (the “negative” of Hegelian dialectic). The only solution to the problem of evil is that of theology (q.V. EVIL).
The presence of divine Providence in human history can also be suggested by what might be called the principle of the incommensurability of political action with its actual outcome in the relationship each man has with society. Indeed, those who hold political power and make decisions do not thereby control the unfolding of events, which can suffer sudden arrests or precipitate reversals, disrupting all immediate logic of facts and thwarting the most careful preparation, as the most recent history of Europe confirms. This means that the course of human history does not lie in the hands of man but in those of an absolute Principle, to which must be referred whatever good may arise from evil in such crises of humanity, in accordance with Kierkegaard’s warning: “It is true that injustice has often had fortunate consequences: but in such cases we must be grateful not to this man or that state but to Providence” (Diary, Italian trans., I, Brescia 1948, p. 10).
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II. CATHOLIC DOCTRINE
**Catholic doctrine expressly affirms the universality of divine Providence: “Universa quae condidit Deus providentia sua tuetur atque gubernat, attingens a fine usque ad finem fortiter et disponens omnia suaviter” (Council of Trent, Session III, chap. 1: Denz.-U., 1784).
The active presence of God in the world and in the course of history is the subject of all the teaching of Holy Scripture, which centers on God’s unceasing solicitude for man: already in creation, God shows a special interest in man; immediately after the Fall, He resolves to save him by promising the Redeemer. Thus, the axis of human history is oriented by God toward a “history of salvation” (Heilsgeschichte, O. Cullmann) that unfolds in successive stages: the election first of the chosen people with Abraham, the guidance of Moses, and the uninterrupted action of the Prophets, culminating in the
The institution of the Church until the end of the world. Therefore, Sacred Scripture sets forth the concrete content of divine providence: the historical books express divine providence in its temporal unfolding; the prophetic books contain its presence or its anticipated announcement; the sapiential books develop the hidden motifs of consolation that it brings to man, and among these, Wisdom and the Book of Job show the value of the suffering of the just. Divine action is, according to Sacred Scripture, the principal factor in history: “The Lord has not granted even to the Saints to recount all His wonders... because the Lord knows all things and observes the signs of the times, announces the past and the future, and reveals the traces of hidden things” (Ecclesiasticus 42:17-19). “He upholds all things by the word of His power” (Hebrews 1:3). “In Him we live and move and have our being” (Acts 17:28). The problem of providence is therefore resolved in the active presence of God in nature and in history; it is an ordinary presence in the conservation of the cosmos and extraordinary through prophecies and miracles of the Old and New Testaments, which are the modes and moments of the realization of the one plan of salvation for humanity through the Redemption in Jesus Christ (cf. O. Cullmann, *Christus und die Zeit. Die zeitliche und geschichtlichefassung*, 2nd ed., Zurich 1948, pp. 59 ff., 107 ff.).
This unity of the divine plan of salvation (Heilsplan) toward fallen humanity is manifested with perfect continuity in the early stages of the apostolic Church and particularly in the discourses of St. Peter, St. Stephen, and St. Paul: Judaism and Christianity are the two unique stages in which the divine “dispensation” for the salvation of man has been successively realized (cf. Acts 2:15-36 [St. Peter’s discourse at Pentecost]; 7:2-53 [St. Stephen’s discourse to the Pharisees]; 13:15-41 [St. Paul’s discourse at Antioch]). This unfolding of the divine plan of salvation, which constitutes the intimate structure of human history, is called by St. Paul *oikonomia* (Ephesians 1:10; on the use of the term in the sense of divine providence in act, cf. G. Kittel, *Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament*, V, pp. 154 ff.).
The central core of divine providence is thus indicated by Revelation in a supernatural fact, which St. Paul called the “mystery of Christ,” inasmuch as the “plan of salvation” is nothing other than the historical development in the Old and New Testaments of the “line of salvation as the line of Christ” (*Heilslinie als Christuslinie*, in O. Cullmann, *op. cit.*, pp. 92 ff.).
It is especially the thought of St. Paul: “In Him (Christ) we have redemption through His blood, the forgiveness of sins according to the riches of His grace, which He lavished upon us in all wisdom and prudence, making known to us the mystery of His will, which He set forth in Christ as a plan for the fullness of time, to unite all things in Him, things in heaven and things on earth” (Ephesians 1:7-10; cf. Colossians 1:26 ff.).
But if divine providence operates as the gratuitous emanation of divine liberality, it is nonetheless realized gradually according to the nature of the things to which it applies. Theology therefore distinguishes a most general or natural providence, which extends to all natures, including inanimate and irrational beings, as St. Thomas defends against Maimonides (Summa Theologiae, I, q. 22, a. 2). Then comes special providence, which concerns rational creatures and more precisely man, who is the subject of “sacred history” and of divine revelation (ibid., I, q. 22, a. 2, ad 5). Finally, there is the most special providence, which is the purpose of divine predestination that first concerns the humanity of the Incarnate Word and then the elect who will triumph with Christ in eternal beatitude, by which the history of humanity will be concluded: “God, however, has a certain more excellent providence for just men than for the wicked, inasmuch as He does not permit anything to happen to them which would finally impede their salvation” (ibid., I, q. 22, a. 2, ad 4). In these last two senses, one also speaks of supernatural providence.
It must nonetheless remain steadfast that divine providence immediately attains every being in its singular individuality and concerns each one directly, since the divine intellect contains the first measure of each thing down to the smallest details (ibid., loc. cit., a. 3). But St. Thomas adds that divine providence leaves intact the proper nature of things themselves, both inasmuch as in the execution of the natural and supernatural divine plan God does not remove the order of the ontological subordination of causes but rather uses them as instruments for the execution of the divine plan, and especially inasmuch as the spiritual creature finds from providence no obstacle to the exercise of its freedom; indeed, it is the proper task of divine providence to establish not only the reality of events but also the manner of their occurrence, necessary for necessary causes and free for free causes (ibid., loc. cit., a. 4, ad 1). The most difficult point in this matter is to define the nature of the “concurrence” of the divine motion upon free creatures, and this holds true both within the sphere of natural freedom and in the supernatural order of grace and predestination (q.v.): the solutions advanced by the various schools (the Augustinian *decretatio victrix*, the Thomistic *praemotio physica*, the Molinist *scientia media*) depend upon the different metaphysical orientations of their respective theologies and cannot touch the revealed core of divine providence.
The same problem is found in the thought of Aristotle and of the Aristotelian school, according to which Aristotle would have denied to God knowledge (and therefore any providence) of things outside Himself and certainly of material things as unworthy of His dignity. St. Thomas, in his commentary, has defended instead its fittingness (In XII Metaphysicorum, ed. Cathala, lect. II, nn. 2614-16) and has been followed by Giles of Rome (cf. *Errores philosophorum*, ed. J. Koch, Milwaukee 1944, p. 12), who attributes to Averroes, Algazel, and Maimonides the admission of only a universal providence (op. cit., pp. 22-40, 62 ff.). The explicit denial of providence over particulars is certainly found in Epicurus, who, against Plato and the Stoics, expressly attributes to the gods the “non-caring” (ἀπονοησάς: cf. H. Usener, *Epicurea*, Leipzig 1887, pp. 246 ff.). The doctrine of providence was, however, a cornerstone of Stoic thought; like Plato, the Stoics and Posidonius conceive the world as an organism vivified by the *Anima mundi* and pervaded by the *logos spermatikos* of Reason and providence of Jupiter, so that the cosmos is a living, animate, and rational being (ζῷον ἔμψυχον καὶ λογικόν: Diogenes Laertius, VII, 139; ed. Cobet, Paris 1929, p. 189, 8).
Among the Stoics, Chrysippus, Seneca, and Cicero have treated providence expressly, and the problem of providence is at the center of the polemic between Stoics and Epicureans, who reproach Plato (Leg. 889 B-582 B), as well as the early Aristotle (in the *Protrepticus*) and the Stoics, for the principle that places nature (φύσις) before divine art (τέχνη) and conceives God as the artificer (τεχνιτός) of the world. In the Peripatetic school, Alexander of Aphrodisias defends free will against the fatalism of the Stoic conception in *De fato*, where he distinguishes: 1) acts that have their cause in themselves, i.e., nature; 2) acts according to reason; 3) acts performed with a view to an end, where fate is confined solely to the sphere of natural acts; only thus can the freedom of human action (τὸ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν) be preserved.
Plutarch (q.v.), who polemicizes sharply in various writings against the Epicureans, subordinates fate or necessity to Providence (as Plato had already done: Tim., 29 D), and he develops this in three orders: 1) the first is the will of the First God over all things, 2) the second is that of the secondary gods within the realm of celestial bodies which produce the effects of the sensible world, 3) the third is the assistance rendered by tutelary spirits or ξύλινοι to man and his institutions and undertakings, in agreement with Posidonius (cf. H. Diels, *Doxographi graeci*, ed. cit., p. 324 a 4). The treatise by Plato on Providence (Emm., III, 2-3) closely approaches, according to Bréhier, the Christian dogma (*Notice*, III, Paris 1924, p. 21); on the problem of Providence, there are the opuscula by Proclus, *De providentia et fato et eo quod est in nobis*, and *De decem dubitationibus circa providentiam*, which have been preserved in the Latin translation by William of Moerbeke in the 13th century (1st ed. by V. Cousin, *Procli platonici opera*, I, Paris 1820). A synthesis of Platonic Providence and Stoic fate is found in Calcidius’ Commentary on the *Timaeus* (chaps. 147-25), which enjoyed great fame and influence in the early Middle Ages.
One may therefore conclude that the Greek conception of Providence never completely freed itself from dependence on necessity, whether of nature or of reason. The Jew Philo, in a treatise on Providence of which Eusebius has preserved some fragments, although he insists, like the Stoics, on universal Providence, has not denied particular Providence, for he admits, according to the Bible, the miraculous interventions of God on behalf of men (cf. H. A. Wolfson, *Philo*, II, Cambridge, Mass., 1948, pp. 292 ff.).
The problem of Providence particularly attracted the attention of the Fathers of the Church in order to refute the most widespread errors regarding the nature of God, which in various forms stemmed from the common root of Greek dualism (Manichaeism, Gnosticism, meditated Providence, fatalism, etc.), and according to their particular doctrinal orientation, some of them accepted, transforming them within the Christian climate, extensive suggestions from Greek thought (as St. Augustine, St. Basil, the Pseudo-Dionysius from Neoplatonism). The cornerstones of the defense that the Fathers make of divine Providence are: the absolute omnipotence of God, which extends even to individual things and persons, and the inviolability of human freedom. St. Augustine’s *De Civitate Dei* is the most extensive and significant work of patristic literature on the problem of Providence; noteworthy also are the six extant orations of St. John Chrysostom on Providence (PG 50, 749-74) and Boethius’ treatment in *De consolatione philosophiae* (4-5).
In modern thought the problem of Providence has found special expression in Leibniz, who wrote the *Theodicy* to defend divine Providence against all the various forms of fatalism. In Hegel, the theological conception of Providence, founded on the “faith” in divine assistance, is resolved without remainder into the conception of history as the development of Spirit or Absolute Reason—“which is itself faith in Providence, only in another guise”—because only in this way can chance be eliminated and the truth attained (*Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie*, Introduction, ed. I. Hoffmeister, Leipzig 1944, XV a, p. 122). In contrast, with a far higher intuition of the presence of God in history, Vico (q.v.) conceived the gradual development of the human race through the principle of the “heterogeneity of ends,” which affirms the unfathomable direction of divine Providence, which can draw from human passions themselves beneficial effects of human civilization and progress (cf. the conclusion of the *Scienza Nuova*, especially §§ 1003-1009, ed. F. Niccolini, Bari 1928, pp. 161 ff.).
In this way the problem of Providence constitutes the ultimate meeting point of the most difficult problems of philosophy and faith concerning the meaning and outcome of the nature and life of man.