Providence

PROVIDENCE. –

I. NOTION AND EXISTENCE

In general, this indicates the divine governance of the world, insofar as the divine intelligence embraces the entire development of beings, both as a whole and in its individual parts, and guides it toward its proper end: providence thus constitutes the concluding creation (v.) and conservation. Providence properly consists in an act of intelligence, insofar as it envisages the “plan of development” of a thing that pre-exists in the mind of the Creator. Both the Latin term providentia and the Greek πρόνοια regard providence as an “anticipation” on the part of the divine intelligence of the course of events, according to Proclus’s expression: πρόνοια... ἄσῃ τὸ ὄνομα διὰ ὑπὲρ νοῦν ἐνέργειαν (In Tim., 40 Bc, ed. C. Diehl, I, Leipzig 1903, p. 415, 21 ff.). S. Tommaso therefore places providence as the principal part of the virtue of prudence and defines it as ratio ordinis rerum in finem (Sum. Theol., 1ª, q. 22, a. 5), which he associates with the traditional definition of Boethius: “Providentia est ipsa divina ratio in summo omnium principe constituta, quae omnia disponit” (De consol. philos., book IV, prose 6: PL. 63, 814). Once the end to be attained has been established by the will, it belongs to reason, through prudence, to determine the appropriate means of attaining it; in this sense providence is an attribute of the divine intellect, which nevertheless presupposes the willing of the end (Sum. Theol., loc. cit., ad 3).

The existence of divine providence can be made evident to all human beings, according to the degrees of certainty that philosophical reflection and Christian faith attain concerning the mystery of divine operation: this certainty therefore begins with natural knowledge accessible to all and is completed by faith and theological reflection. In particular, the spectacle of the universe’s marvellous order (5th way) demonstrates the existence of a first ordering principle that guides every being toward its proper end. Thus the immanent teleology of nature—which reaches its end without knowing—attests to the direction of a principle superior to this teleology. Already recognized in antiquity in the overall harmony of the macrocosm and the microcosm, it has today become more evident through the progress of astrophysics concerning the organization of the sidereal world, of microphysics concerning the structures of the subatomic world, and of microbiology, which has found, in the fields of physiology, genetics, and embryology, the ultimate constitutive individualities of the living organism. It is impossible that this imposing complex of elements and forces, which converge toward clearly defined and constant particular and global ends, should be found in matter as such and should thus move and reach its goal without the guidance of a mind that embraces them in their individual parts and as a whole; and this is precisely providence. Recourse to “chance” (v.) explains nothing, because natural phenomena are not sporadic but constant and constitutive, and tend toward the attainment of the optimum, as s. Tommaso observes (cf. Sum. Theol., 1ª, q. 2, a. 3: 5th way); this shows that the order of a supreme intellect is operative in nature, as the perspicacity of the post-Socratic philosophers had already seen, and that intellect “... evidentibus indicis et rationibus ostendit res naturales providentia regi” (Prol. in lib. Iob, ed. Parm., vol. XIV, 1 col. a). It is therefore an error to attribute the becoming of nature to chance and fate or to blind necessity, as not a few pre-Socratics did, particularly Democritus and Empedocles (cf. H. Diels, Doxographi graeci, 2nd ed., Berlin 1929, p. 321, a 14 ff.).

The existence of providence, on the other hand, seems doubtful in the history of human events because, as s. Tommaso again observes, every order appears to be absent from them: the good do not always receive benefits, nor the wicked misfortunes, nor do the good always receive misfortunes and the wicked benefits in this life; rather, goods and evils befall the good and the wicked alike: “Hoc est quod maxime corda hominum commoveat ad opinandum res humanas providentia divina non regi” (loc. cit.). But nothing is more harmful than the denial of providence, because once divine providence is removed, human beings lose fear and reverence for God, and consequently all vices are unleashed: “Nihil enim est quod tantum revocet homines a malis et ad bona inducat quantum Dei timor et amor” (Prol. in lib. Iob, ed. cit., XIV, 1 col. b). The only real difficulty, therefore, against the existence of providence is the existence of evil; but this difficulty is not removed either by referring evil to a principle existing in its own right (Gnostic and Manichaean dualism) or by reducing it to a necessary moment in the development of the whole (the “negative” of Hegelian dialectic). The only solution to the problem of evil is that of theology (v. MALE).

The presence of divine providence in human history may also be suggested by what could be called the principle of the incommensurability of the political act with its actual outcome, in the relation that every human being has to society. Indeed, whoever holds political power and makes decisions does not thereby control the course of events, which may undergo sudden halts or precipitous flights, breaking the immediate logic of events and thwarting the most careful preparation, as the most recent history of Europe confirms. This means that the helm of human history is not in human hands but in those of an absolute Principle, to which must in any case be referred the good that may arise from evil in such crises of humanity, according to Kierkegaard’s warning: “It is true that injustice has often had fortunate consequences: but we must then be grateful not to this man or that state but to Providence” (Diario, Italian trans., I, Brescia 1948, p. 10).

II. CATHOLIC DOCTRINE

It expressly affirms the universality of divine p.: « Universa quae condidit Deus providentia sua tuetur atque gubernat, attingens a fine usque ad finem fortiter et disponens omnia suaviter » (Conc. Vat., sess. III, cap. 1: Denz-U, 1784).

God’s active presence in the world and in the course of history is the subject of the whole teaching of Sacred Scripture, whose theme is God’s continual solicitude for man: already in creation God shows an entirely special interest in man; immediately after the Fall he decides to save him by promising the Redeemer. Thus the axis of human history is directed by God in the sense of a « history of salvation » (Heilgeschichte, O. Culmann), which unfolds through successive stages: first, the election of the chosen people with Abraham, the guidance of Moses and the uninterrupted activity of the Prophets, the accomplishment of the Incarnation of the Word and the

institution of the Church until the end of the world. Sacred Scripture therefore sets forth the concrete content of divine p.: the historical books express divine p. in its temporal unfolding; the prophetic books contain its presence or its anticipatory announcement; the wisdom books develop the hidden grounds of consolation that it brings to man, and among them Wisdom and the Book of Job show the value of the suffering of the just. According to Sacred Scripture, divine action is the principal factor of history: « The Lord did not permit even the Saints to recount all his wonders...; for the Lord knows all things and observes the signs of the times, announces the past and the future, and reveals the traces of hidden things » (Eccl. 42, 17-19). « He carries all things by the word of his power » (Hebr. 1, 3). « In him we live and move and have our being » (Act. 17, 28). The problem of p. therefore is resolved in God’s active presence in nature and in history; it is an ordinary presence in the preservation of the cosmos and an extraordinary one through the prophecies and miracles of the Old and New Testaments, which are the means and moments in the implementation of the one plan of salvation for humanity through Redemption in Jesus Christ (cf. O. Cullmann, Christus und die Zeit. Die urchristliche Zeit und Geschichtauffassung, 2ª ed., Zurich 1948, p. 59 ff., 107 ff.).

This unity of the divine plan of salvation (Heilsplan) for fallen humanity, restored with perfect continuity in the first steps of the apostolic Church and especially in the discourses of s. Pietro, s. Stefano and s. Paolo, is evident: Judaism and Christianity are the two successive stages in which the divine « dispensation » for man’s salvation was uniquely accomplished (cf. Act. 2, 15-36 [discourse of s. Pietro at Pentecost]; 7, 2-53 [discourse of s. Stefano to the Pharisees]; 13, 15-41 [discourse of s. Paolo at Antioch]). This unfolding of the divine plan of salvation, which constitutes the intimate structure of human history, is called by s. Paolo olomegis (Eph. 1, 10; concerning the use of the term in the sense of divine p. in action, cf. G. Kittel, Theol. Wörterb. z. N. T., V, p. 154 ff.).

The central nucleus, therefore, of divine p. is indicated by Revelation in a supernatural fact, which s. Paolo called the « mystery of Christ », insofar as the « plan of salvation » is nothing other than the historical development in the Old and New Testaments of the « line of salvation as the line of Christ » (Heilslinie als Christuslinne, in O. Cullmann, op. cit., p. 92 ff.).

This is above all the thought of s. Paolo: « In him (Christ) we have redemption through his blood, the remission of sins according to the riches of his Grace, which he lavished upon us in all wisdom and prudence, making known to us the mystery of his will which he had predetermined within himself to carry it into effect in the fullness of time: it is (the mystery) of gathering all things together in Christ, both heavenly and earthly » (Eph. 1, 9-10; cf. Col. 1, 26 ff.).

But although divine p. is exercised as the gratuitous emanation of divine liberality, it is nevertheless actualized by degrees according to the nature of the things to which it is applied. Theology therefore distinguishes a most general or natural p., which extends to all natures, including inanimate and irrational beings, as s. Tommaso defends against Moses Maimonides (Sum. Theol., 1ª, q. 22, a. 2). Then comes special p., which concerns rational creatures and more precisely man, who is the subject of « sacred history » and of divine revelation (ibid., 1ª, q. 22, a. 2, ad 5). Finally, there is the most special p., which is the purpose of divine predestination, concerning first the humanity of the Incarnate Word and then the elect who will triumph with Christ in the eternal beatitude with which the history of humanity will close: « Hominum autem iustoum quodam excellentiori modo Deus habet providentiam quam impiorum, in quantum non permittit contra eos evenire aliquid quod finaliter impediat salutem eorum » (ibid., 1ª, q. 22, a. 2, ad 4). It is also in these latter two senses that one speaks of supernatural p.

It must nevertheless remain firmly established that divine p. immediately reaches every being in its own individual singularity and concerns each one immediately, since the divine intellect contains the primary measure of each thing down to the smallest details (ibid., loc. cit., a. 3). But s. Tommaso adds that divine p. leaves intact the proper nature of things themselves, both insofar as, in the execution of the divine natural and supernatural plan, God does not abolish the order of the ontological subordination of causes, but rather makes use of it as an instrument for executing the divine plan, and especially insofar as the spiritual creature encounters no obstacle on the part of p. to the exercise of its freedom; indeed, it is proper to divine p. to establish not only the reality of events but also the manner of their occurrence, necessary for necessary causes and free for free causes (ibid., loc. cit., a. 4 ad 1). The most difficult point in this matter is to specify the nature of the « concurrence » of divine motion upon free creatures, and this applies both within the sphere of natural freedom and in the predestination (v.): the solutions advanced by the various schools (the Augustinian deletatio victrix, the Thomistic praemotia physica, and the Molinist scientia media) depend upon the differing metaphysical orientation of their respective theologies and cannot affect the revealed nucleus of divine p.

III. HISTORICAL OUTLINE

The notion of divine providence follows the concept of God that man has formed with the progress of culture: the Greek terms themselves πρόνοια and θεός relate to the act of seeing. It must nevertheless be said that neither Greek philosophy nor Arabic philosophy arrived at more than an imperfect concept of divine providence, both because they did not entirely free themselves from the doctrine of “fate” and, above all, because they did not consider human existence from the perspective of the “plan of salvation” manifested by divine Revelation. This does not prevent us from admitting that the deuterocanonical books themselves, and especially Wisdom, may have drawn upon Greek thought, as seems to be demonstrated in the books of Ecclesiastes and Wisdom (cf. F. Heinisch, Die griechische Philosophie im Buche der Weisheit, in Alttestamentliche Abhandlungen, I, IV, Münster 1908, pp. 109 ff.); it must, however, be added that the biblical meaning of providence is far deeper than the philosophical one, because it simultaneously affirms the absolute omnipotence and independence of God’s action and the complete freedom of man—two elements essential to the concept of providence that Greek thought never succeeded in clarifying completely.

In ancient Greek thought, in the absence of any notion of God’s personality, providence has no prominence and is identified with necessity (ἐντάγκα), fate (ἐνταγμένη), and fortune (τῶτα), as Parmenides and Democritus do according to the testimony of Aetius (H. Diels-W. Kranz, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, 5th ed., Berlin 1934, 28 A 32; I, 223, 21 ff.).

Among the tragedians, while Euripides seems to emphasize the inevitability of fate even for the gods, Sophocles appears more liberal in presenting divine intervention in human affairs: it is upon this admission that the ancient belief in divine “epiphanies,” or interventions of the deity on behalf of mortals, and in the practice of “divination” (μαντική) was founded—divination presupposed divine inspiration and therefore the direct influence of the deity (cf. W. Nestle, Griechische Religiosität vom Zeitalter des Perikles bis auf Aristoteles, Berlin-Leipzig 1933, pp. 56 and 106). But it seems that Plato was the first to affirm the distinction between “events that occur according to providence” (εἰς πρόνοιαν) and those “according to necessity” (H. Diels, Doxographi graeci, 2nd ed., Berlin 1929, p. 321,10). Plato in fact states that the world is, in all likelihood, truly an intelligent living animal produced through the providence of God: the world is conceived precisely as an organism held together by the soul (ὑπούς ἐν σώματι ξυνίστας τὸ πᾶν συντακτικοί. Tim. 30 A. C.; ed. Stallbaum, Leipzig 1899, p. 509 b). The developments of the Stoics and Neoplatonists concerning the problem of providence are connected with Plato. Aristotle’s thought seems to find its definitive expression in the principle that God knows only himself, since he is all-powerful, thought of thought: αὐτὸν ἄρα νῶσι, εὐπὲ τὸ κράτιστον, νόησις νόησως νόησις (Metaph., XII, 9, 1074 b 34); this stands against the tradition of the early Fathers (Clement of Alexandria, Protrept., V, 66, 4; Strom., II, 14 and 21; Origen, Contra Celsum, I, 21 and II, 27) and of the Aristotelian school itself, according to which Aristotle would have denied God knowledge—and consequently any providence—of things outside himself, and certainly of material things, as unworthy of his dignity. St. Thomas, in his commentary, instead defended the appropriateness of this view (In XII Metaph., ed. Cathala, lect. II, nn. 2614-16) and was followed by Giles of Rome (cf. Evrores philosophorum, ed. J. Koch, Milwaukee 1944, p. 12), who attributes to Averroes, Algazel, and Moses Maimonides the admission of a merely universal providence (op. cit., pp. 22-40, 62 ff.). The explicit denial of providence concerning particulars is certainly found in Epicurus, who, in opposition to Plato and the Stoics, expressly attributes to the gods “non-providence” (ἀπρονοησία: cf. H. Usener, Epicura, Leipzig 1887, pp. 246 ff.). The doctrine of providence, on the other hand, was a cornerstone of Stoic thought; like Plato, the Stoics and Posidonius conceive the world as an organism vivified by the World Soul and wholly pervaded by the λόγος σπερματικώς of the Reason and providence of Jupiter, so that the cosmos is a living, animated, and rational being (Ζώων ἐμίωγων καὶ λογικῶν: Diog. Laertius, VII, 139; ed. Cobet, Paris 1929, p. 189, 8).

Among the Stoics, Chrysippus, Seneca, and Cicero, among others, dealt explicitly with providence, and the problem of providence lies at the center of the controversy between the Stoics and the Epicureans. The latter reproach Plato (Leg., 889 B–892 B), as well as the early Aristotle (in the Protrepticus) and the Stoics, for the principle that makes nature (φῶσις) preceded by divine art (τέγνη) and conceives God as the craftsman (τεχνίτης) of the world. In the Peripatetic school, Alexander of Aphrodisias defends free will against the fatalism of the Stoic conception in De fato, where he distinguishes: 1) acts whose cause lies within themselves, that is, nature; 2) acts according to reason; 3) acts performed with a view to an end, in which fate is confined exclusively to the sphere of natural acts. Only in this way can the freedom of the human act be preserved (τὸ ἑρ' ἡμῖν).

Plutarch (v.), who polemicizes sharply against the Epicureans in various writings, subordinates fate, or physical necessity, to providence (as Plato had already done: Tim., 29 D), and develops the latter in three orders: 1) the first is the will of the First God concerning all things; 2) the second is that of the secondary gods within the sphere of the heavenly bodies, which produce the effects of the sensible world; 3) the third is the assistance that the guardian spirits, or ἔδιονες, provide to man and to his institutions and undertakings, in agreement with Posidonius (cf. H. Diels, Doxographi graeci, cited edition, p. 324 a 4). Plotinus’s treatise on providence (Enn., III, 2–3) comes very close, according to Bréhier, to Christian dogma (Notice, III, Paris 1924, p. 21); concerning the problem of providence, there are the treatises of Proclus, De providentia et fato et eo quod est in nobis, and De decem dubitationibus circa providentiam, which have been preserved in the thirteenth-century Latin translation by William of Moerbeke (1st ed. by V. Cousin, Procli platonici opera, I, Paris 1820). A synthesis of Platonic providence and Stoic fate is found in Chalcidius’s Commentary on the Timaeus (chaps. 147–25), which enjoyed considerable renown and influence in the early Middle Ages.

It may therefore be concluded that the Greek conception of providence never completely freed itself from dependence upon necessity, whether natural or rational. The Jew Philo, in a treatise on providence of which Eusebius has preserved some fragments, although insisting like the Stoics upon universal providence, did not deny particular providence, because, in accordance with the Bible, he admits God’s miraculous interventions on behalf of human beings (cf. H. A. Wolfson, Philo, II, Cambridge, Mass., 1948, pp. 292 ff.). The problem of providence particularly attracted the attention of the Fathers of the Church, who sought to refute the errors most widespread concerning the nature of God. These errors all derived, in various forms, from the common root of Greek dualism (Manichaeism, Gnosticism, mediated providence, fatalism...) and, according to their particular doctrinal orientation, some of the Fathers accepted extensive influences of Greek thought, transforming them within a Christian framework (as did St. Augustine and St. Basil, and Pseudo-Dionysius from Neoplatonism). The foundations of the Fathers’ defense of divine providence are: God’s absolute omnipotence, which extends to individual things and persons, and the inviolability of human freedom. St. Augustine’s De Civitate Dei is the most extensive and significant patristic work on the problem of providence; mention should also be made of the six vigorous homilies of St. John Chrysostom on providence (PG 50, 749–74) and Boethius’s treatment in De cons. philos. (4–5).

Nel pensiero moderno il problema della p. ha avuto speciale risultato in Leibniz, che ha scritto la Theodicea per difendere la divina p. contro tutte le varie forme di fatalismo. In Hegel si compie la risoluzione senza residui della p. teologica, fondata nella « fede » della divina assistenza, nella concezione della storia come sviluppo dello Spirito o Ragione assoluta « ch'è anch'esso fede nella p., soltanto in altra guisa », perché soltanto a questo modo si può eliminare il caso e attingere il vero (Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie, Einleitung, ed. I, Hoffmeister, Lipsia 1944, XV a, p. 122). Al contrario, con ben più alto intuito della presenza di Dio nella storia, il Vico (v.) concepì lo sviluppo graduale del genere umano mediante il principio della « eterogenità dei fini », che afferma l'infallibile direzione della divina p. la quale sa trarre dalle stesse passioni umane effetti benefici di umano incivilimento e progresso (cf. la conclusione della Scienza Nuova, specialmente §§ 1003-1009, ed. F. Niccolini, Bari 1928, p. 161 sgg.).

A questo modo il problema della p. costituisce il punto d'incontro conclusivo dei più ardui problemi della filosofia e della fede circa il senso e l'esito della natura e della vita dell'uomo.