PREDESTINATION. - It is the design conceived by God to lead the rational creature to the supernatural end, which is eternal life.
I. THE TEACHING OF REVELATION
The Gospel is the good news of the Redemption that must be announced to all (Mt. 28:19). St. Paul states clearly: "God wills that all men be saved and come to the knowledge of the truth" (I Tim. 2:4). According to the teaching of the Old and New Testaments, God, infinite Wisdom and Goodness, does not command the impossible and therefore truly makes possible for all the observance of his precepts. There are, nevertheless, souls who through their own fault are lost: souls that at times have been very close to the Savior, like the "son of perdition" (Jn. 17:12), and this does not happen without a permission of God, with a view to a greater good. Other souls, on the other hand, the elect, will, according to the Gospel, be infallibly saved; belonging to this category are the children who die after Baptism and those adults who, by means of Grace, observe the commandments and obtain the gift of final perseverance.
Jesus Christ affirmed: "Those whom you have given me I have kept, and none of them is lost, except the son of perdition, and this so that the Scripture might be fulfilled" (Jn. 17:12). And more generally he states: "My sheep hear my voice; I know them and they follow me and I give them eternal life; they shall never perish and no one shall snatch them out of my hand. My Father, who has given them to me, is greater than all: and no one can snatch them from the Father's hand. The Father and I are one" (Jn. 10:27). According to this testimony there are elect, chosen by God from all eternity. On other occasions Jesus alluded to predestination (cf. Mt. 20:23; 22:14; 24:22-24).
The Savior's teaching receives its precision from what St. Paul asserts in I Cor. 4:7: "For who distinguishes you from others? and what have you that you have not received? and if you have received it, why do you glory as if you had not received it?"; and in Phil. 2:13: "It is God who produces in us both the willing and the acting, according to his good pleasure."
St. Paul moreover speaks explicitly of predestination in Rom. 8:28-30 (cf. Eph. 1:3-6): "We know moreover that all things work together for good for those who love God, that is, for those who according to his plan are called. For those whom he foreknew he also predestined to be conformed to the image of his Son, so that he might be the firstborn among many brothers, and those whom he predestined, these he also called, and those whom he called, he also justified, and those whom he justified, he also glorified." In the same letter (chaps. 9-12) St. Paul also treats of the sovereign independence of God in the distribution of his graces; the Jews, although they were the chosen people, were rejected because of their unbelief, and salvation was announced to the Gentiles. St. Paul concludes with words that apply to peoples as he does to individuals: "What then shall we say? Is there injustice in God? By no means. He says to Moses: I will use mercy on whom I wish to use mercy and I will have compassion on whom I wish to have compassion. Therefore it is not of him who wills, nor of him who runs, but of the merciful God" (Rom. 9:14). And he concludes: "O depth of the riches and wisdom and knowledge of God. How inscrutable are his judgments and untraceable his ways. Who has known the mind of the Lord, or who was his counselor? Who gave to him first that he should have repayment? For from him and through him and to him are all things, to him be glory forever, amen" (Rom. 11:33, cf. I Thess. 5:9; II Thess. 2:13; I Pt. 1:1-2).
Already in the Old Testament there is mention of the "Book of life" which is reserved only for the just. "Then your people shall be saved, whoever is found written in the book of life" (Dan. 12:1; cf. Ex. 32:32 and Ps. 69 [68]:19; the identical image is found in Apoc. 3:5; 17:8; 21:12). What is also emphasized in the Old Testament is that God freely chose the Hebrew people in preference to others, just as no less freely he chose among many others Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, the Prophets and led them to the attainment of their goal.
The doctrine of Scripture concerning predestination can be summarized in the three points established by St. Robert Bellarmine (De Gratia et libero arbitrio, I, II, chaps. 9-15) and by the Thomists: 1) God has elected certain men (Mt. 20:16; 24:31; Lk. 12:32; Rom. 8:33; Eph. 1:4); 2) God has elected them efficaciously, so that they infallibly attain eternal life (Mt. 24:24; Jn. 6:39 and 10:28; Rom. 8:30); 3) God has chosen the elect in a manner entirely gratuitous (Lk. 12:32; Jn. 15:16; Eph. 1:4; Rom. 8:29 and 11:5). From these texts of Scripture St. Augustine drew the elements of a definition that has become classic: "Praedestination est praescientia et praeparatio beneficiorum Dei, quibus certissime liberantur, quicumque liberantur" (De dono perseverantiae, chap. 14). More explicitly the same St. Augustine says (De praedestinatione sanctorum, chap. 10): "Praedestinatione sua Deus ea praescivit quae fuerat ipse facturus." By means of his predestination God has foreseen and disposed what he was to do in order to lead the elect infallibly to eternal life. St. Thomas says: "Praedestination est ratio transmissionis creaturae rationalis in finem vitae aeternae, nam destinare est mittere" (Summ. Theol., 1a, q. 23, a. 1). Predestination is in the thought of God the design for leading determined intelligent beings to the ultimate supernatural end. In this St. Thomas truly preserves the thought of St. Augustine, which is in turn founded on Sacred Scripture.
II. DOCTRINE OF THE CHURCH
The Church's teaching on predestination was formulated, on the one hand, against Pelagianism (v.) and Semi-Pelagianism (v.), and, on the other, against predestinarianism (v.), Protestantism (v.) and Jansenism (v.): 1) against Pelagianism and more particularly against Semi-Pelagianism the Church affirms: a) predestination to Grace is not determined by the foreknowledge of natural good works nor by the natural beginning of salvation: « initium naturale salutis, seu bonae voluntatis salutaris ». Salvation has its beginning in prevenient Grace; it is God who first turns toward the sinner; b) predestination to glory is not caused by the foreknowledge of supernatural merits that would endure without the special gift of final perseverance. The Church affirms against Semi-Pelagianism that the Grace of a good death is a special gift granted to the elect; c) adequate predestination (which comprises the whole complex of the supernatural helps of Grace, from the prevenient Grace of conversion to that of a good death) is gratuitous or antecedent to the foreknowledge of merits (cf. the Second Council of Orange of 529: Denz-U, 176, 177, 178, 179 '091: 183-85-89, 191-93, 200).
The last proposition (concerning the gratuitousness of predestination) is variously interpreted by Catholic theologians, according as they hold or do not hold that efficacious Grace is such in itself and not merely through our consent.
The three points against Semi-Pelagianism are summarized in the expression of St. Prosper, consecrated by the Council of Quierzy in Gaul (Concilium Curiciacum, a. 853; Denz-U, 318): « Quod quidam salvantur, salvantis est donum; quod autem quidam pereunt, pereuntium est meritum ».
2) Against predestinarianism and the Protestant and Jansenist doctrines, the Church affirms: a) there is no predestination to evil, but God has established to inflict the penalty of damnation for the foreseen sin of final impenitence (of which God is absolutely not the cause) permitted only for a higher good of which he alone is judge (cf. Rom. 9, 22 and Denz-U, 200, 316 ff., 318, 321 ff., 514, 816, 827); man, after original sin, remains free and under the influence of Grace cooperates freely in what God wills (Denz-U, 793, 806, 814); b) God wills that all men be saved, even though he permits some to be lost (cf. Denz-U, 318: « Deus omnipotens omnes homines sine exceptione vult salvos fieri licet non omnes salvantur »); c) « Deus impossibilia non iubet, sed iubendo monet et facere quod possis, et petere quod non possis, et adiuvat ut possis »; God never commands the impossible, but in giving us his precepts he admonishes us to do what we can, to ask him for what we cannot, and he gives us his Grace so that we may be able (Council of Trent: Denz-U, 904, which cites ad litteram the text of St. Augustine, De natura et Gratia, chap. 43, n. 50: PL 44, 271).
These principles give a glimpse of the possibility of reconciling the universal salvific will (denied by predestinarianism, Protestantism and Jansenism) with the predestination asserted by Scripture. It should be noted, moreover, that in the 9th century the controversies stirred up by Gottschalk (v.) ceased at the Council of Tuzey (Concilium Tusiacum a. 860: PL 126, col. 123) with the affirmation of the dogma of Providence formulated thus: « Nihil in coelo et in terra fit, nisi quod ipse Deus aut propitius facit, aut fieri iuste permittit ».
III. PRINCIPAL DIFFICULTIES OF PREDESTINATION
The first difficulty lies in the intimate reconciliation of predestination with the universal salvific will. It is not clear how God wills to save all men, if not all are predestined. The question therefore arises whether it is human effort that renders God's grace efficacious, or rather whether it is the intrinsic efficacy of grace that stirs up human effort. A
similar difficulty is found in the natural order when one confronts the problem of how the existence of evil (especially moral evil) can be reconciled with the infinite goodness and the omnipotence of God. A second difficulty concerns no longer the two groups (the elect and the non-elect), but individual persons; indeed the question arises spontaneously why God placed Peter among the number of the elect and not Judas (cf. Rom. 9:14).
Once the twofold difficulty of the problem has been presented in this way, it seems difficult to arrive at a solution. Therefore theology, drawing inspiration from the principles of its method, must limit itself to demonstrating the non-evident impossibility of the revealed mysteries. Indeed St. Thomas affirms (In Boetium de Trinitate, q. 2, a. 3) that theology must show that the objections made against the mysteries of the faith are either false or not necessary, not convincing, not demonstrative, "sive false, sive non necessaria." It is easy to fall into error, leaning toward Semipelagianism or toward Jansenism. The theologian must avoid the two reefs and is bound, moreover, to examine the different theological systems and the attempts at reconciliation proposed by eclecticism. While the supporters of this system are incapable, for lack of inspiring principles, of offering a satisfactory solution, the great doctors attained a higher synthesis, where the different aspects of reality are reconciled, in the light of the most universal principles, which, harmonizing with one another, can let us glimpse what is not knowable except through the immediate contemplation of the divine essence. These higher principles that harmonize are, on the one hand: "God wills to save all men and never commands the impossible and makes possible for all the observance of his precepts"; on the other: "the love that God has for us is the cause of every good: we have nothing that has not been given to us (I Cor. 4:7); no one is better than another, except because he has received more from God." These two principles are absolutely certain, but their intimate connection remains obscure. They allow us to classify the different theological systems concerning predestination.
IV. CLASSIFICATION OF THEOLOGICAL SYSTEMS ON PREDESTINATION
For the classification to be objective, one must be concerned not with defending the doctrine upheld by this or that school, but with the two great truths of faith of which we have spoken.
If one classifies the systems by bringing out their conclusions more than their principles, two main tendencies are noted: a) in the first, the predestination of adults to eternal life in God would follow the foreknowledge of merits (post praevita merita: this is the tendency of the pure Molinists, such as Vásquez and Lessius); b) in the second, the predestination of adults to glory is prior to the foreknowledge of merits (ante praevita merita) and negative reprobation, or non-election, is prior to the foreknowledge of demerits (this is the tendency of the Thomists, Augustinians, Scotists and congruists such as Bellarmine and Suárez). Of these theologians, however, who admit the absolute gratuitousness of predestination to glory, almost all the older ones (Thomists, Augustinians and Scotists) hold that it is founded on divine decrees that predetermine but do not necessitate, whereas Bellarmine and Suárez reject such decrees and retain the Molinist theory of the middle knowledge of conditional or futurible future things in order to explain the distribution of so-called "congruous" Grace and the divine certainty of the free consent that the elect will give to that Grace, which is not intrinsically efficacious.
Another classification of the systems can be given, starting from the principles rather than from their conclusions, as Norbert del Prado did (De Gratia et libero arbitrio, III, Fribourg 1911, p. 188). Setting the question up in this way, it is easy to distinguish two schools: the first admits the divine decrees that predetermine (but do not necessitate) and Grace that is intrinsically efficacious, which stirs up man's free effort; the second, on the other hand, admits Grace made efficacious by our consent, foreseen by the middle knowledge of futuribles.
The first school believes itself faithful to the thought of St. Augustine and St. Thomas. In reality St. Augustine asserts against the Semi-Pelagians: "Quare hunc trahat
(Deus) et illum non trahat, noli velle diudicare si non vis errare" (In Io., tr. 26, initio); St. Thomas affirms (Sum. Theol., 1ª, q. 23, a. 5): "Everything in man that disposes him to salvation falls entirely within the influence of predestination, even the preparation for Grace. And this is had only through God's help." According to St. Thomas, Grace, efficacious by its very nature, not only does not destroy freedom, but brings it into act, makes it flourish and bear fruit (cf. Sum. Theol., 1ª, q. 19, a. 8; q. 83; a. 1, ad 3; q. 105, a. 5; 1ª-2ª, q. 6; a. 4 ad 1; q. 10, a. 4; 2ª-2ª, q. 24, a. 11; C. Gent., 1, q. 85; 3, q. 72, 73, 75; De Verit., q. 22, a. 5, 8, 9).
On the other hand, one must affirm with St. Augustine: "God never commands the impossible, but by giving us his precepts, he exhorts us to do what we can, to ask him for Grace for what we cannot do, and he grants us Grace so that we may be able to do it." This is the fundamental text of St. Augustine, cited by the Council of Trent (Denz-U, 804); it must always be kept in mind.
V. THE TRANSCENDENCE OF THE MYSTERY
When one attempts to reconcile the revealed doctrine of predestination with the universal salvific will, one observes that there is no evident contradiction, since the universal salvific will is conditioned, in the sense that it does not exclude the divine permission of the final impenitence of certain persons; an impenitence permitted with a view to the manifestation of divine justice (cf. Rom. 9:22 and St. Thomas, Sum. Theol., I, q. 23, a. 5 ad 3). One even glimpses the positive reconciliation of these two great truths, but one also observes that they cannot be intimately harmonized except in the impenetrable obscurity of the intimate life of God.
It is worth noting that St. Francis de Sales expressed himself as St. Augustine did when in the Theotimus (l. IV, ch. 7) he showed that one must never inquire why the wisdom of God has distributed Grace to Peter rather than to Judas, and never seek why it makes its favors abound in one direction rather than in another; it is not given to us to understand the ways of God in the distribution of Grace, but it is certain that he makes possible for all the observance of his commandments.
It is above all the mystery of evil permitted by God for a greater good that surpasses our intelligence and of which God alone is judge. The obscurity is great, but no absurdities or incoherences are discernible in it, provided one approaches it through two most certain principles: God never commands the impossible to anyone, and no one becomes better than another without a greater help from God.
Grace alone, which is a participation in the divine nature, can admit us into the mystery of the intimate life of God. It makes us await, in the obscurity of faith, the high summit at which the divine attributes are identified above our concepts, which are so limited and resemble the tesserae of a mosaic, which render harsh the spiritual countenance of God. The soul of the Saints has not yet reached the vision of the intimate life of God, but has almost an anticipation of it and almost a secret instinct, and in confident abandonment and in fidelity to Grace it prevents it from falling into disturbance at the thought of predestination and grants it peace.
"Believe firmly," says Bossuet, "that Jesus Christ is the Savior and all contradictions will vanish" (Elévations sur les mystères, 18th week, 15th elevation on the mystery of Grace).
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Reginaldo Garrigou-Lagrange