Predestination

PREDESTINATION. — It is the design conceived by God to lead the rational creature to the supernatural end, which is eternal life.

I. THE TEACHING OF REVELATION

The Gospel is the good news of the Redemption, which must be announced to all (Mt. 28, 19). St. Paolo clearly affirms: « God wills that all men be saved and come to the knowledge of the truth » (I Tim. 2, 4). According to the teaching of the Old and New Testaments, God, infinite Wisdom and Goodness, does not command the impossible and therefore makes observance of his precepts truly possible for all. There are, nevertheless, souls who through their own fault are lost: souls who at times have been very close to the Savior, such as the « son of perdition » (Io. 17, 12); and this does not occur without God’s permission, in view of a higher good. Other souls, however—the elect—will, according to the Gospel, be infallibly saved; this category includes children who die after Baptism and those adults who, through Grace, observe the commandments and obtain the gift of final perseverance.

Jesus Christ affirmed: « Those whom you have given me, I have guarded, and none of them has perished except the son of perdition, and this in order that Scripture might be fulfilled » (Io. 17, 12). And more generally he affirms: « My sheep hear my voice; I know them and they follow me, and I give them eternal life; they shall never perish, and no one shall snatch them from my hand. My Father, who has given them to me, is greater than all: and no one can take them from the Father’s hands. The Father and I are one » (Io. 10, 27). According to this testimony, there are elect souls, chosen by God from all eternity. On other occasions Jesus alluded to p. (cf. Mt. 20, 23; 22, 14; 24, 22-24).

The teaching of the Savior receives further precision from what St. Paolo asserts in I Cor. 4, 7: « For who makes you different from others? And what do you have that you have not received? And if you have received it, why do you glory as though you had not received it? »; and in Phil. 2, 13: « It is God who produces in us both the willing and the acting, according to his good pleasure ».

St. Paolo also speaks explicitly of p. in Rom. 8, 28-30 (cf. Eph. 1, 3-6): « We know, moreover, that everything works together for good for those who love God, that is, for those who are called according to his plan. For those whom he foreknew he also predestined to be conformed to the image of his Son, so that he might be the firstborn among many brethren; and those whom he predestined, these he also called; and those whom he called, these he also justified; and those whom he justified, these he also glorified ». In the same letter (chs. 9-12), St. Paolo also treats of God’s sovereign independence in the distribution of his graces; the Jews, although they were the chosen people, were rejected because of their unbelief, and salvation was announced to the Gentiles. St. Paolo concludes with words that apply to peoples as well as to individuals: « What shall we say, then? Is there perhaps injustice in God? By no means. He says to Moses: I shall show mercy to whom I wish to show mercy, and I shall have compassion on whom I wish to have compassion. Therefore it depends neither on him who wills nor on him who runs, but on God who has mercy » (Rom. 9, 14). And he concludes: « O depth of the riches and wisdom and knowledge of God. How inscrutable are his judgments and unsearchable his ways. Who has known the mind of the Lord, or who has been his counselor? Or who has first given to him, so as to receive recompense? For from him and through him and to him are all things; to him be glory forever, so be it » (Rom. 11, 33, cf. I Thess. 5-9; II Thess. 2, 13; I Pt. 1, 1-2).

Already in the Old Testament there is mention of the « Book of life », which is reserved solely for the righteous. « Then your people shall be saved, everyone who is found written in the book of life » (Dan. 12, 1; cf. Ev. 32, 32 and Ps. 69 [68]; 19; the identical image is found in the Apoc. 3, 5; 17, 8; 21, 12). What is also emphasized in the Old Testament is that God freely chose the Jewish people in preference to the others, just as he no less freely chose from among many others Abramo, Isacco, Giacobbe, and the Prophets, and led them to the attainment of their goal.

The doctrine of Scripture concerning p. may be summarized in the three points established by St. Roberto Bellarmino (De Gratia et libero arbitrio, I, II, chs. 9-15) and by the Thomists: 1) God has chosen certain men (Mt. 20, 16; 24, 31; Lc. 12, 32; Rom. 8, 33; Eph. 1, 4); 2) God has chosen them efficaciously, so that they may infallibly attain eternal life (Mt. 24, 24; Io. 6, 39 and 10, 28; Rom. 8, 30); 3) God has chosen the elect in an entirely gratuitous manner (Lc. 12, 32; Io. 15, 16; Eph. 1, 4; Rom. 8, 29 and 11, 5). From these texts of Scripture St. Agostino drew the elements of a definition that became classical: « Praedestination est praescientia et praeparatio beneficiorum Dei, quibus certissime liberantur, quicumque liberantur » (De domo perseverantiae, ch. 14). More explicitly, St. Agostino himself says (De praedestinatione sanctorum, ch. 10): « Praedestinatione sua Deus ea praescivit quae fuerat ipse facturus ». Through his p. God foresaw and ordained what he was to do in order to lead the elect infallibly to eternal life. St. Tommaso says: « Praedestination est ratio transmissionis creaturae rationalis in finem vitae aeternae, nam destinare est mittere » (Summ. Theol., 1º, q. 23, a. 1). P. is, in God’s thought, the plan for leading certain intelligent beings to the supernatural final end. In this St. Tommaso truly preserves the thought of St. Agostino, which in turn is founded upon Sacred Scripture.

II. DOCTRINE OF THE CHURCH

The Church’s teaching on p. was formulated, on the one hand, against Pelagianism (v.) Semi-Pelagianism (v.), and, on the other, predestinarianism (v.), Protestantism (v.) and Jansenism (v.): 1) against Pelagianism and, more particularly, against Semi-Pelagianism, the Church affirms: a) predestination to Grace is not determined by foreknowledge of good natural works, nor by the natural beginning of salvation: « initium naturale salutis, seu bonae voluntatis salutaris ». Salvation begins with prevenient Grace; it is God who first turns toward the sinner; b) predestination to glory is not caused by foreknowledge of supernatural merits that would endure without the special gift of final perseverance. Against Semi-Pelagianism, the Church affirms that the Grace of a good death is a special gift granted to the elect; c) adequate predestination (which comprises the entire complex of supernatural aids of Grace, from prevenient Grace for conversion to the Grace of a good death) is gratuitous, or prior to foreknowledge of merits (cf. the Second Council of Orange of 529: Denz-U, 176, 177, 178, 179 '091: 183-85-89, 191-93, 200).

The last proposition (concerning the gratuitousness of predestination) is interpreted in different ways by Catholic theologians, according to whether or not they hold that efficacious Grace is such in itself and not merely by virtue of our consent.

The three points against Semi-Pelagianism are summarized in the expression of s. Prospero, consecrated by the Council of Quiersy in Gaul (Concilium Curiciacum, a. 853; Denz-U, 318): « Quod quidam salvantur, salvantis est donum; quod autem quidam pereunt, pereuntium est meritum ».

2) Against predestinarianism and Protestant and Jansenist doctrines, the Church affirms: a) there is no predestination to evil, but God has established that the penalty of damnation be inflicted for the foreseen sin of final impenitence (of which God is in no way the cause), permitted only for a higher good of which he alone is judge (cf. Rom. 9, 22 and Denz-U, 200, 316 sgg., 318, 321 sgg., 514, 816, 827); after original sin, man remains free and, under the influence of Grace, freely cooperates in what God wills (Denz-U, 793, 806, 814); b) God wills that all men be saved, even though he permits some to be lost (cf. Denz-U, 318: « Deus omnipotens omnes homines sine exceptione vult salvos fieri licet non omnes salvantur »); c) « Deus impossibilia non iubet, sed iubendo monet et facere quod possis, et peter quod non possis, et adiuvat ut possis »; God never commands the impossible, but in giving us his precepts he admonishes us to do what we can, to ask him for what we cannot do, and gives us his Grace so that we may be able (Council of Trent: Denz-U, 904, which quotes ad litteram the text of s. Agostino, De natura et Gratia, cap. 43, n. 50: PL 44, 271).

These principles suggest the possibility of reconciling the universal salvific will (denied by predestinarianism, Protestantism and Jansenism) with the predestination asserted by Scripture. It should also be noted that in the ninth century the controversies provoked by Godelecalco (v.) came to an end at the Council of Tuzey (Concilium Tusiacum a. 860: PL 126, col. 123) with the affirmation of the dogma of Providence, formulated as follows: « Nihil in coelo et in terra fit, nisi quod ipse Deus aut propitius facit, aut fieri iuste permittit ».

III. PRINCIPAL DIFFICULTIES OF PREDESTINATION

The first difficulty lies in reconciling predestination with God’s universal salvific will. It is not clear how God can will to save all human beings if not all are predestined. Hence the question arises whether it is human effort that makes God’s grace effective, or, instead, whether it is the intrinsic efficacy of grace that arouses human effort. A similar

difficulty is found in the natural order when one confronts the problem of how the existence of evil (especially moral evil) can be reconciled with God’s infinite goodness and omnipotence. A second difficulty concerns not the two groups (the elect and the non-elect), but individual persons; for the spontaneous question arises why God placed Pietro among the elect and not Giuda (cf. Rom. 9, 14).

Once the twofold difficulty of the problem is presented in this way, it seems difficult to arrive at a solution. Theology must therefore, in accordance with the principles of its method, limit itself to demonstrating that the revealed mysteries are not evidently impossible. Indeed, s. Tommaso states (In Boetium de Trinitate, q. 2, a. 3) that theology must show that objections raised against the mysteries of faith are either false or unnecessary, inconclusive, non-demonstrative, « sive false, sive non necessaria ». It is easy to fall into error, inclining either toward semi-Pelagianism or toward Jansenism. The theologian must avoid both pitfalls and is also obliged to examine the various theological systems and the attempts at reconciliation proposed by eclecticism. While the proponents of this system, for lack of guiding principles, are incapable of offering a satisfactory solution, the great Doctors achieved a higher synthesis in which the various aspects of reality are reconciled in the light of the most universal principles; these, harmonized with one another, can offer us a glimpse of what can be known only through the immediate contemplation of the divine essence. These higher principles, which harmonize with one another, are, on the one hand: « God wills to save all human beings and never commands the impossible, and makes the observance of his precepts possible for all »; on the other: « the love that God has for us is the cause of every good: we have nothing that has not been given to us (I Cor. 4, 7); no one is better than another except because he has received more from God ». These two principles are absolutely certain, but their intimate connection remains obscure. They make it possible to classify the various theological systems concerning predestination.

IV. CLASSIFICATION OF THE THEOLOGICAL SYSTEMS CONCERNING P

For the classification to be objective, it is necessary to be concerned not with defending the doctrine upheld by this or that school, but with the two great truths of faith of which we have spoken.

If the systems are classified by bringing their conclusions rather than their principles into greater prominence, two principal tendencies may be observed: a) in the first, the p. of adults to eternal life in God would follow the foreknowledge of merits (post praevita merita: this is the tendency of the pure Molinists, such as Vásquez and Lessio); b) in the second, the p. of adults to glory precedes the foreknowledge of merits (ante praevita merita), and negative reprobation, or non-election, precedes the foreknowledge of demerits (this is the tendency of the Thomists, Augustinians, Scotists, and Congruists such as Bellarmino and Suárez). Of these theologians, however, who admit the absolute gratuity of p. to glory, almost all the more ancient ones (Thomists, Augustinians, and Scotists) hold that it is founded on the divine predetermining, though not necessitating, decrees, whereas Bellarmino and Suárez reject such decrees and retain the Molinist theory of the middle knowledge of conditional future events or futuribles in order to explain the distribution of the so-called « congruous » Grace and the divine certainty of the free consent that the elect will give to this Grace, which is not intrinsically efficacious.

Another classification of the systems may be made by starting from their principles rather than from their conclusions, as Norberto del Prado did (De Gratia et libero arbitrio, III, Fribourg 1911, p. 188). By framing the question in this way, it is easy to distinguish two schools: the first admits the divine predetermining (but not necessitating) decrees and intrinsically efficacious Grace, which awakens man’s free effort; the second, on the other hand, admits Grace made efficacious by our consent foreseen through the middle knowledge of futuribles.

The first school considers itself faithful to the thought of s. Agostino and s. Tommaso. In reality, s. Agostino asserts against the Semi-Pelagians: « Quare hunc trabat (Deus) et illum non trahat, noli velle diudicare si non vis errare » (In Io., tr. 26, initio); s. Tommaso affirms (Sum. Theol., 1ª, q. 23, a. 5): « Everything in man that disposes him to salvation falls wholly within the influence of p., even preparation for Grace. And this is obtained only through God’s help ». According to s. Tommaso, Grace, efficacious by its very nature, not only does not destroy freedom, but actualizes it, makes it blossom and bear fruit (cf. Sum. Theol., 1ª, q. 19, a. 8; q. 83; a. 1, ad 3; q. 105, a. 5; 1ª-2ª, q. 6; a. 4 ad 1; q. 10, a. 4; 2ª-2ª, q. 24, a. 11; C. Gent., 1, q. 85; 3, q. 72, 73, 75; De Verit., q. 22, a. 5, 8, 9).

On the other hand, it is necessary to affirm with s. Agostino: « God never commands the impossible, but, in giving us his precepts, exhorts us to do what we can, to ask him for Grace concerning what we cannot do, and grants us Grace so that we may be able to do it ». This is the fundamental text of s. Agostino, cited by the Council of Trent (Denz-U, 804); it must always be kept in mind.

V. LA TRASCENDENZA DEL MISTERO

When one attempts to reconcile the revealed doctrine of p. with the universal salvific will, it is observed that there is no evident contradiction, since the universal salvific will is conditional, in the sense that it does not exclude the divine permission of final impenitence in certain persons; impenitence permitted with a view to the manifestation of divine justice (cf. Rom. 9:22 and following, and St. Thomas, Sum. Theol., 1ª, q. 23, a. 5 ad 3). Indeed, one can glimpse the positive reconciliation of these two great truths, but one also observes that they can be harmonized intimately only in the impenetrable obscurity of the intimate life of God.

It should be noted that St. Francis de Sales expressed himself like St. Augustine when, in the Teotimo (bk. IV, ch. 7), he showed that one must never investigate why the wisdom of God has distributed Grace to Peter rather than to Judas, nor ever seek to know why he causes his favors to abound in one direction rather than another; it is not granted us to understand the ways of God in the distribution of Grace, but it is certain that he makes the observance of his commandments possible for all.

It is above all the mystery of evil permitted by God for a greater good that surpasses our understanding and of which God alone is judge. The obscurity is great, but no absurdities or inconsistencies are discernible in it, provided that one approaches it through two most certain principles: God never commands the impossible to anyone, and no one becomes better than another without receiving greater help from God.

Grace alone, which is participation in the divine nature, can introduce us into the mystery of the intimate life of God. It makes us await, in the darkness of faith, the lofty summit at which the divine attributes are identified above our concepts, which are so limited and resemble the pieces of a mosaic that make the spiritual countenance of God appear harsh. The soul of the Saints has not yet attained the vision of the intimate life of God, but it has almost an anticipation and almost a secret instinct of it; and, in trusting surrender and fidelity to Grace, it prevents the soul from falling into agitation at the thought of p. and grants it peace.

“Believe firmly,” says Bossuet, “that Jesus Christ is the Savior, and all contradictions will vanish” (Eléactions sur les mystères, 18th week, 15th elevation on the mystery of Grace).

BIEL: 1) Scripture: M.-J. Lagrange, Epître aux Romains, Paris 1916, p. 244 ff.; F. Prat, La théologie de st Paul, I, 15th ed., ibid. 1927, p. 562 ff.; A. Lemonnier, La prédestination dans l'Écriture Sainte, in DThC, XII, cols. 1809-15. 2) The Fathers of the Church: H.-D. Simonin, La prédestination d'après les Pères grecs, ibid., cols. 2815-32; J. Saint Martin, La prédestination selon st Augustin, ibid., cols. 2835-96; R. Garrigou-Lagrange, La prédestination d'après les disciples de st Augustin, ibid., cols. 2896-2901; L. Pelland, S. Prosperi Aquitani doctrina de praedestinazione et voluntate Dei salvifica, Montréal 1936. 3) Controversy of the ninth century and subsequent errors: B. Lavaud, La controverse de la prédestination au IXe siècle, in DThC, XII, cols. 2901-35;

E. Amann, L'epoca carolingia, in Fliche-Martin-Fruta, VI, pp. 331-56; R. Garrigou-Lagrange, La prédestination selon le protestantisme et le panéisme, in DThC, XII, cols. 2959-63. 4) Scholastics: R. Garrigou-Lagrange, La prédestination d'après les docteurs du moyen âge, ibid., cols. 2935-59; G. Busnelli, Il dubbio di Dante sulla p., in Acta Academiae Romanae S. Thomae, nuova serie, 8 (1943), pp. 7-48. 5) Modern theologians: R. Garrigou-Lagrange, La prédestination selon les théologiques postérieurs au Concile de Trente, in DThC, XII, cols. 2963-89; L. Cattani, Il metodo teologico di Giovanni Maldonado nella sua teoria della p., Rome 1949. 6) Speculative syntheses: N. del Prado, De Gratia et libero arbitrio, 3 vols., Fribourg 1907, passim; L. Billot, De Deo Uno, Rome 1926, pp. 283-330; A. D'Ales, Prédestination, in DFC, IV, cols. 195-270 (the speculative-apologetic synthesis is preceded by a historical exposition); L. Ciappi, De divina misericordia et prima causa operum Dei, Rome 1935; R. Garrigou-Lagrange, La prédestination des Saints et la Grèce, Paris 1936; id., La prédestination: partie théorique, in DThC, XII, cols. 2989-3022; M. Francesconi, Dottrina di s. Giovanni Damasceno sulla p., Rome 1945; A. Abertos Egües, La doctrina de la prédestinación y de la Gracia eficaz en J. Martínez de Ripalda, Pamplona 1950. Reginaldo Garrigou-Lagrange