PREDESTINATION. — It is the design conceived by God to lead the rational creature to the supernatural end, which is eternal life.
I. THE TEACHING OF REVELATION
The Gospel is the good news of Redemption that must be announced to all (Mt. 28, 19). St. Paul clearly affirms: “God wills that all men be saved and come to the knowledge of the truth” (1 Tim. 2, 4). According to the teaching of the Old and New Testaments, God, infinite Wisdom and Goodness, does not command the impossible and therefore truly renders the observance of His precepts possible for all. There are, however, souls that through their own fault are lost: souls that have sometimes been very close to the Saviour, such as the “son of perdition” (Jn. 17, 12), and this does not happen without a permission of God, in view of a higher good. Other souls, on the other hand, the elect, will, according to the Gospel, be infallibly saved; to this category belong children who die after Baptism and those adults who, through Grace, observe the commandments and obtain the gift of final perseverance.Jesus Christ affirmed: “Those whom You have given Me, I have kept, and none of them is lost except the son of perdition, and this so that the Scripture might be fulfilled” (Jn. 17, 12). And in a more general way He states: “My sheep hear My voice; I know them and they follow Me, and I give them eternal life; they shall never perish, and no one shall snatch them out of My hand. My Father, Who has given them to Me, is greater than all; and no one can snatch them out of the hand of My Father. The Father and I are one” (Jn. 10, 27–29). According to this testimony there are elect, chosen by God from all eternity. On other occasions Jesus alluded to predestination (cf. Mt. 20, 23; 22, 14; 24, 22–24).
The teaching of the Saviour receives its precise formulation from what St. Paul asserts in *1 Cor. 4, 7*: “For who makes you different? And what do you have that you did not receive? And if you received it, why do you boast as if you had not received it?”; and in *Phil. 2, 13*: “For it is God Who works in you both to will and to do, for His good pleasure.”
St. Paul also explicitly speaks of predestination in *Rom. 8, 28–30* (cf. *Eph. 1, 3–6*): “We know that all things work together for good to those who love God, to those who are called according to His purpose. For those whom He foreknew He also predestined to be conformed to the image of His Son, in order that He might be the firstborn among many brethren; and those whom He predestined He also called, and those whom He called He also justified, and those whom He justified He also glorified.” In the same letter (chaps. 9–12) St. Paul also treats of God’s sovereign independence in the distribution of His graces; the Jews, although the chosen people, were rejected because of their unbelief, and salvation was announced to the pagans. St. Paul concludes with words that apply to peoples as to individuals: “What shall we say then? Is there injustice on God’s part? By no means. For He says to Moses: ‘I will have mercy on whom I have mercy, and I will have compassion on whom I have compassion.’ So then it depends not upon man’s will or exertion, but upon God’s mercy” (Rom. 9, 15–16). And he concludes: “O the depth of the riches and wisdom and knowledge of God! How unsearchable are His judgments and how inscrutable His ways! ‘For who has known the mind of the Lord, or who has been His counsellor?’ ‘Or who has given a gift to Him that he might be repaid?’ For from Him and through Him and to Him are all things. To Him be glory for ever. Amen” (Rom. 11, 33–36; cf. *1 Thess. 5, 9*; *2 Thess. 2, 13*; *1 Pt. 1, 1–2*).
Already in the Old Testament mention is made of the “Book of Life,” which is reserved only for the just. “Then your people shall be delivered, every one who is found written in the book of life” (Dan. 12, 1; cf. *Ex. 32, 32* and *Ps. 69 [68]: 28*; the same image is found in *Apoc. 3, 5*; 17, 8; 21, 12). What is also emphasized in the Old Testament is that God freely chose the Jewish people in preference to others, just as freely He chose among many others Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, the Prophets, and led them to the attainment of their end.
The doctrine of Scripture concerning predestination may be summarized in the three points fixed by St. Robert Bellarmine (*De Gratia et libero arbitrio*, bk. II, chaps. 9–15) and by the Thomists: 1) God has elected certain men (Mt. 20, 16; 24, 31; *Lk. 12, 32*; Rom. 8, 33; *Eph. 1, 4*); 2) God has elected them efficaciously, so that they infallibly attain eternal life (Mt. 24, 24; *Jn. 6, 39* and *10, 28*; Rom. 8, 30); 3) God has chosen the elect in a completely gratuitous manner (Lk. 12, 32; *Jn. 15, 16*; *Eph. 1, 4*; Rom. 8, 29 and *11, 5*). From these texts of Scripture St. Augustine drew the elements of a definition that has become classical: “Praedestinatio est praescientia et praeparatio beneficiorum Dei, quibus certissime liberantur, quicumque liberantur” (*De dono perseverantiae*, chap. 14). More explicitly the same St. Augustine says (*De praedestinatione sanctorum*, chap. 10): “Praedestinatione sua Deus ea praescivit quae fuerat ipse facturus.” Through His predestination God has foreseen and disposed what He was to do to infallibly lead the elect to eternal life. St. Thomas says: “Praedestinatio est ratio transmutationis creaturae rationalis in finem vitae aeternae, nam destinare est mittere” (*Summ. Theol.*, I, q. 23, a. 1). Predestination is in the thought of God the design to lead certain intelligent beings to their ultimate supernatural end. In this St. Thomas truly preserves the thought of St. Augustine, which in turn is founded on Holy Scripture.
II. DOCTRINE OF THE CHURCH
The teaching of the Church on predestination has been formulated, on the one hand, against Pelagianism (v.) and Semipelagianism (v.), and on the other, against predestinarianism (v.), Protestantism (v.), and Jansenism (v.): 1) against Pelagianism and more particularly against Semipelagianism the Church affirms: a) predestination to Grace is not determined by the foreknowledge of natural good works or by the natural beginning of salvation: “initium naturale salutis, seu bonae voluntatis salutaris.” Salvation has its beginning in prevenient Grace; it is God Who first turns toward the sinner; b) predestination to glory is not caused by the foreknowledge of supernatural merits that would endure without the special gift of final perseverance. The Church affirms against Semipelagianism that the Grace of a good death is a special gift granted to the elect; c) adequate predestination (which includes the whole complex of supernatural aids of Grace, from the prevenient Grace of conversion to that of a good death) is gratuitous or antecedent to the foreknowledge of merits (cf. the Second Council of Orange, 529: Denz.-Ul., 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181–85, 191–93, 200).The last proposition (concerning the gratuity of predestination) is variously interpreted by Catholic theologians, according as they hold or not that efficacious Grace is such in itself and not merely through our consent.
The three points against Semipelagianism are summarized in the expression of St. Prosper, consecrated by the Council of Quierzy in Gaul (*Concilium Carisiacense*, a. 853; Denz.-Ul., 318): “Quod quidam salvantur, salvantis est donum; quod autem quidam pereunt, pereuntium est meritum.”
2) Against predestinarianism and Protestant and Jansenist doctrines, the Church affirms: a) there is no predestination to evil, but God has decreed to inflict the penalty of damnation for the sin of final impenitence (of which God is absolutely not the cause), permitted only for a higher good of which He alone is the judge (cf. Rom 9:22 and Denz.-Ul., 200, 316 ff., 318, 321 ff., 514, 516, 527); man, after original sin, remains free and under the influence of grace, cooperating freely with what God wills (Denz.-Ul., 793, 806, 814); b) God wills that all men be saved, even though He permits some to be lost (cf. Denz.-Ul., 318: «Deus omnipotens omnes homines sine exceptione vult salvos fieri licet non omnes salventur»); c) «Deus impossibilia non iubet, sed iubendo monet et facere quod possis, et petere quod non possis, et adiuvat ut possis»: God never commands the impossible, but in giving us His precepts, He admonishes us to do what we can, to ask for what we cannot, and He gives His grace so that we may do it (Council of Trent: Denz.-Ul., 904, which literally cites the text of St. Augustine, *De natura et gratia*, ch. 43, no. 50: PL 44, 271).
These principles reveal the possibility of reconciling the universal salvific will (denied by predestinarianism, Protestantism, and Jansenism) with the predestination asserted by Scripture. It should be noted, moreover, that in the 9th century the controversies aroused by Gottschalk (v.) ceased at the Council of Tuzey (*Concilium Tusicam*, a. 860: PL 126, col. 123) with the affirmation of the dogma of Providence thus formulated: «Nihil in coelo et in terra fit, nisi quod ipse Deus aut propitius facit, aut fieri iuste permittit».
III. Principal difficulties of P
The first difficulty lies in the intimate reconciliation of predestination with the universal salvific will. It is not seen how God can will to save all men if not all are predestined. One therefore asks whether it is human effort that makes God’s grace effective, or whether it is the intrinsic efficacy of grace that arouses human effort. A similar difficulty arises in the natural order when one confronts the problem of how the existence of evil (especially moral evil) can be reconciled with God’s infinite goodness and omnipotence. A second difficulty concerns not the two groups (the elect and the non-elect), but individuals; indeed, the spontaneous question arises why God placed Peter among the elect and not Judas (cf. Rom 9:14).Presented thus, the double difficulty of the problem seems to defy solution. Therefore, theology, inspired by the principles of its method, must limit itself to demonstrating the non-evident impossibility of revealed mysteries. Indeed, St. Thomas affirms (In *Boetium de Trinitate*, q. 2, a. 3) that theology must show that objections raised against the mysteries of faith are either false or unnecessary, unconvincing, non-demonstrative, and must be dismissed if not necessary. It is easy to fall into error, veering toward semi-Pelagianism or Jansenism. The theologian must avoid these two shoals and is bound, moreover, to examine the different theological systems and the attempts at reconciliation proposed by eclecticism. While the advocates of this system are incapable, for lack of inspirational principles, of offering a satisfactory solution, the great doctors achieved a superior synthesis, where the diverse aspects of reality were reconciled in the light of the most universal principles, which, harmonizing with one another, can allow us to glimpse what is knowable only through the immediate contemplation of the divine essence. These superior principles that harmonize are, on the one hand: «God wills to save all men and never commands the impossible, and renders the observance of His precepts possible for all»; on the other: «the love that God has for us is the cause of every good: we have nothing that has not been given to us (1 Cor 4:7); no one is better than another, except insofar as he has received more from God». These two principles are absolutely certain, but their inner harmony remains obscure. They allow for the classification of the different theological systems concerning predestination.
IV. Classification of theological systems on P
For the classification to be objective, one must be concerned not with the defense of the doctrine upheld by this or that school, but with the two great truths of faith of which we have spoken.If the systems are classified by placing more emphasis on their conclusions than on their principles, two main tendencies are noted: a) in the first, the predestination of adults to eternal life in God follows upon the foreseen merits (post praevia merita): this is the tendency of pure Molinists, such as Vázquez and Lessius; b) in the second, the predestination of adults to glory is prior to the foreseen merits (ante praevia merita), and negative reprobation, or non-election, is prior to the foreseen demerits (this is the tendency of Thomists, Augustinians, Scotists, and congruists such as Bellarmine and Suárez). Of these theologians, however, who admit the absolute gratuity of predestination to glory, almost all the older ones (Thomists, Augustinians, and Scotists) hold that it is founded upon divine predetermining decrees, but not necessitating ones, whereas Bellarmine and Suárez reject such decrees and retain the Molinist theory of the scientia media of conditioned futures or futuribles to explain the distribution of so-called «congruous» grace and the divine certitude of the free consent that the elect will give to such grace, which is not intrinsically efficacious.
Another classification of the systems can be made, starting from the principles rather than their conclusions, as Norberto del Prado did (*De Gratia et libero arbitrio*, III, Freiburg 1911, p. 188). By framing the question thus, it is easy to distinguish two schools: the first admits divine predetermining (but not necessitating) decrees and grace intrinsically efficacious, which arouses man’s free effort; the second, instead, admits grace made efficacious by our consent foreseen by the scientia media of futuribles.
The first school considers itself faithful to the thought of St. Augustine and St. Thomas. In reality, St. Augustine asserts against the semi-Pelagians: «Quare hunc trahat Deus et illum non trahat, noli velle diiudicare si non vis errare» (In *Io.*, tr. 26, initio); St. Thomas affirms (*Sum. Theol.*, I, q. 23, a. 5): «Everything in man that disposes him to salvation is entirely within the influence of predestination, even the preparation for grace. And this is obtained only by the help of God». According to St. Thomas, grace, by its very nature efficacious, not only does not destroy freedom but brings it into act, causes it to flourish and bear fruit (cf. *Sum. Theol.*, I, q. 19, a. 8; q. 83, a. 1, ad 3; q. 105, a. 5; I-II, q. 6, a. 4 ad 1; q. 10, a. 4; II-II, q. 24, a. 11; *C. Gent.*, I, q. 85; III, qq. 72, 73, 75; *De Verit.*, q. 22, a. 5, 8, 9).
On the other hand, it must be affirmed with St. Augustine: «God never commands the impossible, but in giving us His precepts, He exhorts us to do what we can, to ask Him for grace for what we cannot, and He grants us grace so that we may do it». This is the fundamental text of St. Augustine, cited by the Council of Trent (Denz.-Ul., 804); it must always be kept in mind.
V. The transcendence of the mystery
When an attempt is made to reconcile the revealed doctrine of predestination with the universal salvific will, it is seen that there is no evident contradiction, since the universal salvific will is conditioned, in the sense that it does not exclude the divine permission of the final impenitence of some persons; this impenitence is permitted with a view to the manifestation of divine justice (cf. Rom 9:22 and St Thomas, *Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 23, a. 5, ad 3). Rather, a positive reconciliation of these two great truths is glimpsed, but it is also observed that they can be intimately harmonised only in the unfathomable darkness of the intimate life of God.It should be noted that St Francis de Sales expressed himself like St Augustine when, in the *Teotimo* (bk. IV, ch. 7), he showed that one must never inquire why the wisdom of God has distributed grace to Peter rather than to Judas, nor seek to understand why He causes His favours to abound in one direction rather than another; it is not given to us to comprehend the ways of God in the distribution of grace, but it is certain that He makes it possible for all to observe His commandments.
Above all, it is the mystery of evil permitted by God for a greater good that surpasses our understanding, and of which God alone is the judge. The darkness is great, but no absurdity or inconsistency is to be found in it, provided that one approaches it through two most certain principles: God never commands the impossible of anyone, and no one becomes better than another without a greater help from God.
Only grace, which is a participation in the divine nature, can introduce us to the mystery of the intimate life of God. It enables us to await, in the darkness of faith, the other summit at which the divine attributes are identified above our concepts, which are so limited and resemble the tesserae of a mosaic, rendering the spiritual countenance of God hard to discern. The souls of the saints have not yet attained the vision of the intimate life of God, but they have almost an anticipation and a secret instinct of it, and in confident abandonment and fidelity to grace, this prevents them from falling into disturbance at the thought of predestination and grants them peace.
‘Firmly believe,’ says Bossuet, ‘that Jesus Christ is the Saviour, and all contradictions will vanish’ (*Elevations sur les mystères*, 18th week, 15th elevation on the mystery of grace).
these, however, would never have formed an organised group (cf. E. Portalié, *Augustinisme*, in *Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique*, I, II, cols. 2522-24).
III. GOTESCALC
Predestination reappeared in the 9th century, provoking a violent dispute between the years 840-60. Its protagonist was Gotescalc (q.v.), an oblate in the monastery of Fulda and a monk without vocation. Having applied himself, with insufficient preparation, to the study of St Augustine and St Fulgentius, he took a particular interest in the difficult problems of grace. Condemned by the Synod of Mainz (848), and the following year by that of Quierzy, he was relegated to the monastery of Hautvillers, where he died impenitent in 868. In the profession of faith presented to the Synod of Mainz, he admitted that there is a twofold predestination, both of the elect to glory and of the reprobate to death (cf. Incmarus of Reims, *De praedestin.*, ch. 5: PL 125, 89). He also taught that God does not intend to save those sinners for whom His Son neither ‘was incarnate’, nor prayed, nor shed His blood, nor in any way was crucified, since He foresees their most wicked conduct and justly preordained to condemn them to eternal torments (PL 125, 275). Rabanus Maurus also reports, without quoting his exact words, that according to Gotescalc the reprobate commit nothing but sins (PL 121, 347; 350). Gotescalc therefore seems to have held that: a) there is an absolute twofold predestination; b) Christ died only for the predestined; c) the actions of the reprobate are only sins (this last point only probably). It is difficult, however, to pronounce a certain judgment on his thought, given the fragmentary state of his works. Incmarus, who makes him better known than anyone else, is not above suspicion, and was in fact harsh towards the infected monk (cf. B. Lavaud, *Précurseur de Calvin ou témoin de l'Augustinisme? Le cas de Gottschalk*, in *Revue thomiste*, 15 [1932], pp. 71-101).IV. WYCLIF & HUSS
In an even harsher form, predestination was renewed by the Englishman Wyclif, and later by Huss, whose doctrines, steeped in fatalistic determinism, were condemned by the Council of Constance (1414-18). According to these critics, the reprobate (whom they call *praesciti*) were never members of the Church, since this is the invisible society of those predestined to glory. From this Wyclif deduced that the prayer of the reprobate has never had any value before God (Denz-U, 609), and Huss, that no one who has for a time belonged to the Church can ever be lost (Denz-U, 627-29). These tendencies were developed by the Protestant ‘Reformation’, of which they were the true precursors.I «REFORMERS» OF PROTESTANTISM — I. Luther
For the «Reformation», Luther constitutes one of the doctrinal cornerstones. The fear in the face of the problem of predestination is the dark backdrop of the life and system of the founder. If Luther entered the convent, it may already have been out of a distressing concern, which in him would become ever more pronounced, regarding divine election. From these anxieties he believed himself liberated by the affirmation of an eternal reprobation, against which man would be wrong to rebel (cf. H. Grisar, *Lutero*, Turin 1934, p. 65; 35 ff.). Already in the *Dictata super Psalterium* the idea of a salvific will of God restricted to some appears: «It was for His elect that Christ drank the cup of bitterness, not for all men» (M. Luthers, *Werke*, IV, Weimar 1886, pp. 227-32). From this it appears how, even then, he was ill-prepared to interpret the strong expressions of St Paul regarding the freedom of God in the distribution of grace. In his commentary on the Epistle *to the Romans* he already interprets them in a predestinarian sense, and he arrived there by launching his attacks on free will, rendered impotent by concupiscence from performing any good work (cf. J. Ficker, *Luthers Vorlesung über den Römerbrief*, I, 4th ed., Leipzig 1930, pp. 22-23, 208-10, 225-26). In the *De servo arbitrio*, which, according to the author’s assessment, must be placed at the head of his works and constitutes the cornerstone of his system, Luther presents the «definitive formulation of his thought on predestination». From the negation of freedom he is led to posit an absolute predestination to damnation and eternal life. God has the right to elect or reject thus, without freedom or good works on our part, because, according to the conception of Ockham, of which Luther repeatedly professes himself a follower, good and evil depend exclusively on His will (*Werke*, ed. Weimar, XVIII, p. 712, n. 35). Luther indeed believes, and loves to repeat, that God has two wills: one revealed in Jesus Christ, the other hidden in the depths of His being; with the revealed will God wants to save all men, but with the hidden will He predestines arbitrarily to life and to death. By this second will He is, according to a common expression, the «Deus absconditus» (cf. *loc. cit.*, pp. 684, n. 35; 68, n. 83; 686, n. 6; 689, n. 10). The timid halt at the revealed will, but for men there is nothing left but the hidden will that counts. With this, «God loves or hates men with an eternal and unchangeable love or hatred, and this not only before their works, but even before the world existed» (*loc. cit.*, p. 724, n. 34). From all eternity hell awaits some, and the Kingdom of Heaven the others (*loc. cit.*, pp. 694, n. 91). As an aid against despair Luther counselled not to think about it, but to adore in silence the incomprehensible God; and it is for this reason that in his popular writings he refrains from speaking of II. In the end, on this subject Luther was no less harsh than Calvin, although the latter is credited with paternity of ideas that Luther had already formulated. Even distinguished Protestant historians acknowledge this: «While Luther accepts the harshest consequences of predestination, he essentially does one thing with the other great men of the Reformation» (J. Koestlin - G. Kawerau, *Martin Luther*, II, Berlin 1903, p. 601). Soon, however, Lutheranism altered the predestinarian doctrine. This was the work of Melanchthon himself, who, gradually renouncing the ideas that, under Luther’s influence, he had expressed in 1521, worked to make them disappear when, around 1550, he established the official doctrine of the «Reformation». Thus in the *Augsburg Confession* (1530) the question of predestination was omitted, and the *Formula of Concord*, in article 11, not only dropped the idea of the «hidden will of God», instead emphasizing the universal salvific will, but also laid the basis for the later Lutheran doctrine according to which God predestines to salvation «ex praevisa fide» (cf. C. Algermissen, *La Chiesa e le chiese*, 2nd ed., Brescia 1944, p. 711).
2. Zwingli
While Luther grounded his theological thought on the complete moral inability of man, Zwingli derived his entire system, and therefore also the problem of predestination, from the concept of a sovereign Providence, to which nothing can be withdrawn, not even the perverse will of the sinner. According to Zwingli, predestination is nothing other than Providence itself with regard to the salvation of men (*Corpus reformatorum*, III, p. 843, n. 15). It adds to the concept of Providence, as a new element, the division of men into the reprobate and the elect; and since it is considered as the determination of the divine will regarding the elect, it can have no other cause than the goodness of God (ibid., pp. 650, n. 25; 908, n. 33). Although he directs his attention preferentially to this assertion, Zwingli openly attributes to divine causality also reprobation (*op. cit.*, IX, p. 30, n. 34), even sometimes delighting in extolling this arbitrariness of God, which he claims to find in *Rom.* 9:21 (*op. cit.*, III, p. 844, n. 21). «God ordains His vessels, that is, we men, as He wills; He chooses one to make of him a vessel of honour; the other He does not will. He can preserve His creatures in their integrity, or shatter them at His pleasure» (ibid., p. 180, n. 10). Zwingli’s predestination therefore substantially connects with that of Luther, though distinguished by greater logical rigour and less pessimism.3. Calvin
The most uncompromising of all the heralds of an unconditional predestination was Calvin, who, moreover, did no more than push to their extreme conclusions the Lutheran principles. According to Calvin, God does everything in all things and even moves to sin. Wishing to manifest to the world both His majesty and His mercy, He destines, without regard to merits or demerits, by eternal and irrevocable decree, some to salvation and others tonation: «For not all are created in the same condition, but eternal life is preordained for some, eternal damnation for others» (Inst., III, cap. 21, n. 5). To Calvin, absolute predestination was as important as Luther’s faith in justification. He discovered it in Rom. 9:11-13 and expounded it in his *Institutio Christianae Religionis* (III, chaps. 21-24) and in the pamphlet *De aeterna Dei praedestinatione*. To support it, he distorted the meaning of Pauline texts (Eph. 1:4; Col. 1:2; Rom. 9:11 and others) and attacked the teaching of Origen, St Ambrose, St Jerome and the entire Catholic tradition, which teaches otherwise (Inst., III, cap. 22, n. 8). He offered no explanation of God’s conduct except to appeal to His will (op. cit., III, cap. 21, n. 11); in this, like the Reformers in general, he harked back to the exaggerations of the nominalists, who held that if God so willed He could do evil and could cause hatred of God without contradicting His essence, which is absolute will (cf. H. Denifle – A. Weiss, *Luther und Luthertum*, I, Mainz 1904, pp. 591-613).
Calvin sensed the difficulty that would arise in many minds, namely that it would then be useless to strive to do good works since God has already fixed each person’s destiny (Inst., III, cap. 23, n. 12). He admitted, too, that such a doctrine is terrible (horribile, fateor, decretum), indeed inconceivable (vere labyrinthus), as he puts it in his commentary on the Epistle to the Romans (9:14); yet he did not shrink from even more unheard-of explanations, such as when he speaks of the means God uses to hurl the reprobate to their doom. These means are antecedently willed (not merely permitted) by Him, who withholds from the non-elect the opportunity to hear the word of salvation or hardens them through preaching itself, sometimes even insinuating Himself into their minds to produce a semblance of faith that renders them more convinced and more inexcusable (Inst., III, cap. 24, n. 8; cf. I, cap. 18, n. 4; III, cap. 2, n. 11).
This central tenet of Calvin’s system logically led to the theory of the irresistibility of grace and its inadmissibility, so that the elect must believe that not even their sins can compromise their perseverance. Later, however, it became a sign of contradiction, provoking ardent supporters and equally convinced opponents even among Protestants themselves. Famous was Arminius (J. van Harmuesen) of Amsterdam (1560-1600), who taught a cooperation between grace and human freedom. The reaction of his followers to Calvin’s doctrine of predestination was so strong that every sect that, following their example, does not follow Calvin on this point is today called Arminian. Other Arminians held that reprobation follows from God’s foreknowledge of original sin and are therefore called “infralapsarians,” to distinguish them from the “supralapsarians,” who regard it as absolute and antecedent to any foreseen sin (cf. Van Oppenraaij, *La predestination de l’Église réformée des Pays-Bas*, Louvain 1906).
VI. BAIUS AND JANSENIUS
The fatalism of the “Reformation” found its continuation in the teaching of Baius. Strictly speaking, Baius did not treat the problem of predestination expressly; he touched on it only in passing (cf. *De libero arbitrio*, chap. 12), and none of his condemned propositions refers to it directly. Nevertheless, the pessimistic view he took of the present state of human nature led logically to grave consequences. It suffices to recall some of his principles: “Free will, without the aid of God’s grace, is capable only of sin” (Denz.-U., 1027). “Only violence is repugnant to man’s natural freedom” (ibid., 1066). “Man, in what he necessarily does, sins and thereby merits condemnation” (ibid., 1067). “The elevation of human nature to share in the divine nature was due to the state of innocence and must therefore be called natural, not supernatural” (ibid., 1021).Jansenius, heir to Baius’s principles, undertook to develop the logical content regarding grace, predestination and reprobation. Between the harsh determinism of the predestinarians and the Reformers on the one hand and the Catholic Church on the other, he sought a compromise on the ground of Augustinian doctrine. In his *Augustinus*, starting from Baius’s conception of the state of original justice, he affirmed that original sin made all men a mass of perdition and thereby constitutes the radical cause of damnation. From this mass God, purely out of mercy, frees whom He wills; to these elect He remits sins, removes ignorance and grants all the graces necessary to attain salvation infallibly (tit. III, *De Gratia Christi*, IX, 8-10). Those, however, who are not chosen and whom God justly leaves in the mass remain in ignorance and hardness of heart solely because God has decreed not to save them; hence, rejected, whatever they do they are certainly lost (ibid., IX, 20). To be fully delivered from the mass of perdition it is not enough to have original guilt removed by baptism, for concupiscence remains, driving to sin; efficacious graces and final perseverance are also required (ibid., X, 3-5). In this system there is no room for a serious and effective universal salvific will on God’s part. Jansenius admits this only for the progenitors; for fallen humanity he grants a merely empty divine wish (“nuda quaedam velleitas nihil omnino Gratiae causans”; cf. ibid., III, 21). Consequently he denied the existence of a sufficient grace given by God to all: every grace is efficacious and therefore invincible, and is given only to the predestined, for whom alone Christ died. Thus the revealed mystery is replaced by an absurd and cruel doctrine in which God forces the reprobate to sin and then punishes them. Such a God, of purely Calvinian stamp, excludes not only any idea of mercy but also that of justice.