PREDESTINAZIONISM. – Heresy that attributes both the salvation of the elect and the damnation of the reprobate solely to an eternal and unconditional decree of God, and excludes the free cooperation of man with regard to the destinies of the life to come.
I. NATURE AND ORIGIN OF P
This heresy displays certain characteristic features that remain constant: a) the exclusive cause of salvation and eternal reprobation is the antecedent and positive will of God, without reference to merits or demerits; b) for the execution of the divine decree, the elect is deprived of freedom under the irresistible influence of Grace, whereas the reprobate, deprived of this, is under the necessity of sinning; c) God’s salvific will is not universal, and Christ died only for those predestined to glory. The origin of P. is linked to a false interpretation of St. Agostino’s thought concerning the problem of salvation. This occurred only after the death of the holy Doctor, and from then on there was no predestinarian who did not claim to justify his heretical assertions by appealing to the authority of the bishop of Hippo. This heresy remained confined within the boundaries of the Western Church, whereas the East was almost uninvolved in controversies of this kind. Greek theology, in fact, always displayed an instinctive reluctance to address questions that imply direct speculation about divine intentions (cf. H. D. Simonin, La prédestination d'après les Pères grecs, in DThC, XII, II, col. 2835).II. LUCIDO
The first manifestation of p. occurred around the middle of the 5th century, as an episode in the long struggle waged in southern Gaul between the semi-Pelagians and the followers of the doctrines of St. Augustine. The priest Lucido is known as the first of these predestinarians, and he occasioned the two Councils of Arles and Lyons, between 475 and 480. Fausto, bishop of Riez, after vainly attempting to persuade Lucido to retract his errors, required him in a letter (PL 53, 681) to subscribe to six “anathemas,” under pain of denouncing him to the Council of Arles. Lucido submitted, and in a letter written to the bishops assembled at Arles he listed the series of errors rejected. Among other things, he condemned the opinion that “Christ the Lord and our Savior did not die for the salvation of all ...; God’s foreknowledge drives man violently toward death, and whoever is lost is lost by God’s will ...; some are destined to death, others predestined to life” (PL 53, 683). Apart from the African Monimus, refuted by St. Fulgentius, no other names of predestinarians are known from this period. Among scholars, the question is raised whether a predestinarian heresy really existed in the 5th century, or whether it should rather be considered an invention of the semi-Pelagians who, unable to understand authentic Augustinianism, wished by such theories to render the doctrines of the bishop of Hippo odious. This was the view held by the Jansenists, whereas others, such as Sirmond (Historia praedestinaziana, Paris 1648), regarded Lucido as the most significant representative of a genuine sect. Today it is generally held that some isolated predestinarians existed in the 5th century;they, however, never formed an organized group (cf. E. Portalié, Augustinisme, in DThC, I, II, cols. 2522–24).
III. GODESCALCO
Predestinationism reappeared in the ninth century, provoking a violent dispute between the years 840 and 860. GODESCALCO D'ORBAIS (v.), an oblate at the monastery of Fulda and a monk without a vocation. Applying himself, with insufficient preparation, to the study of St. Augustine and St. Fulgentius, he took a particular interest in the arduous problems of Grace. Condemned by the Synod of Mainz (848), and the following year by that of Quiercy, he was relegated to the monastery of Hautvillers, where he died impenitent in 868. In the profession of faith presented to the Synod of Mainz, he admitted that there is “a twofold predestination, both of the elect to glory and of the reprobate to death” (cf. Hincmar of Reims, De praedestin., c. 5: PL 25, 89). He also taught that God did not intend to save those sinners for whom his Son “neither became incarnate, nor prayed, nor shed his blood, nor was crucified in any way, since he foresaw their most evil conduct and justly predestined them to eternal torments” (PL 125, 275). Rabanus Maurus further reports, without citing the exact words, that according to Godescalco the reprobate commits nothing but sins (PL 121, 347; 350). Godescalco therefore seems to have held that: a) there is an absolute twofold predestination; b) Christ died only for the predestined; c) the actions of the reprobate are only sins (this last point probably). Nevertheless, it is difficult to pronounce a definite judgment concerning his thought, given the fragmentary state of his works. Hincmar, moreover, who acquaints us with him more than anyone else, is not above all suspicion, and was genuinely harsh toward the unfortunate monk (cf. B. Lavaud, Précurseur de Calvin ou témoin de l’augustinisme? Le cas de Gottschalk, in Revue thomiste, 15 [1932], pp. 71-101).IV. WICLEFF AND HUS
In an even harsher form, predestinarianism was revived by the Englishman Wicleff and later by the Bohemian Hus, whose doctrines, imbued with fatalistic determinism, were condemned by the Council of Constance (1414–18). According to these heretics, the reprobate (who in their language are called praeciti) have never been members of the Church, since the latter is the invisible society of those predestined to glory. Wicleff deduced from this that the prayer of the reprobate has no value before God (Denz-U, 609), and Hus that no one who has belonged to the Church for any length of time can ever be lost (Denz-U, 627–29). These tendencies were developed by the Protestant “Reformation,” of which they were the true precursors.V. THE PROTESTANT “REFORMERS.” — 1. Luther. — For the “Reformation,” predestinarianism constitutes one of its doctrinal cornerstones. Fear in the face of the problem of predestination is the dark background of the founder’s life and system. If Luther entered the convent, it was perhaps already because of an anguished concern about divine election, a concern that would grow ever stronger in him. He believed he could free himself from these anxieties by affirming an eternal reprobation, against which man would be wrong to rebel (cf. H. Grisar, Lutero, Turin 1934, p. 65 ff.). Already in the Dictata super psalterium there appears the idea of a restricted salvific will of God: “It is for his elect that Christ drank the cup of bitterness, not for all men” (M. Luther, Werke, IV, Weimar 1886, pp. 227–32). This shows how, from that time onward, he was ill prepared to interpret the strong expressions of St. Paul concerning God’s freedom in the distribution of Grace. In his commentary on the epistle ad Romanos, he already interpreted them in a predestinarian sense, arriving at this position through his attacks on free will, rendered powerless by concupiscence to perform any good work (cf. J. Ficker, Luther's Forlenung über den Römerbrief, I, 4th ed., Leipzig 1930, pp. 22–23, 208–10, 225–26). In the De servo arbitrio, which, in the author’s judgment, should be placed at the head of his works and constitutes the cornerstone of his system, Luther presented the definitive formulation of his thought concerning predestination. From the denial of freedom he was led to posit an absolute predestination to damnation and eternal life. God has the right to elect or reject us in this way, without freedom or good works on our part, because, according to the conception of Occam, whose follower Luther repeatedly professed himself to be, good and evil depend exclusively on his will (Werke, Weimar edition, XVIII, p. 712, n. 35). Indeed, Luther believed—and delighted in repeating—that God has two wills: one revealed in Jesus Christ, the other hidden in the depths of his being; by the revealed will God wishes to save all men, but by the hidden will he arbitrarily predestines them to life or death. Through this second will he is, in a customary expression, the “Deus absconditus” (cf. loc cit., pp. 684, n. 35; 685, n. 83; 686, n. 6; 689, n. 10). The timid halt at the revealed will, but for men there is no longer any will that counts except the hidden will. By this will, “God loves men or hates them with an eternal and immutable love or hatred, and this not only before their works, but before the world itself existed” (loc cit., p. 724, n. 34). From all eternity, hell awaits some, and the Kingdom of Heaven others (loc cit., pp. 694, n. 91). As a remedy against despair, Luther advised people not to think about it, but silently to adore the inconceivable God; and for this reason he refrained from speaking of it in popular writings. Ultimately, on this subject Luther was no less harsh than Calvin, although the paternity of ideas that Luther had already formulated is attributed to the latter. This is acknowledged even by distinguished Protestant historians: “While Luther accepts the harshest consequences of predestination, he is essentially at one with the other leading men of the Reformation” (J. Koestlin - G. Kawerau, Martin Luther, II, Berlin 1903, p. 601). Lutheranism, however, soon altered the predestinarian doctrine. This was the work of Melanchthon himself, who, gradually repudiating the ideas he had expressed under Luther’s influence in 1521, worked to make them disappear when, around 1550, he established the official doctrine of the “Reformation.” Thus, in the Confession Augustana (1530), the question of predestination was omitted, and the Formula concordiae, in art. 11, not only abandoned the idea of the “hidden will of God,” emphasizing instead the universal salvific will, but also laid the foundation for the later Lutheran doctrine, according to which God predestined to salvation “ex praevia fide” (cf. C. Algermissen, La Chiesa e le chiese, 2nd ed., Brescia 1944, p. 711).
2. Zwingli. — Whereas Luther based his theological thought on man’s complete moral inability, Zwingli derived his entire system, and consequently also the problem of predestination, from the concept of a sovereign Providence, from which nothing can escape, not even the sinner’s perverse will. According to Zwingli, predestination is none other than Providence with regard to the salvation of men (Corpus reformatorum, III, p. 843, n. 15). It adds to the concept of Providence, as a new element, the division of men into reprobate and elect; and since it is considered the determination of the divine will with regard to the elect, it can have no other cause than God’s goodness (ibid., pp. 650, n. 25; 908, n. 33). Although he directs his attention preferably to this election, Zwingli nevertheless openly attributes reprobation also to divine causality (op. cit., IX, p. 30, n. 34), at times even taking pleasure in exalting this arbitrariness of God, which he believes he finds in Rom. 9:21 (op. cit., III, p. 844, n. 21). God “orders his vessels, that is, us men, as he wishes; he chooses one to make it a suitable vessel; the other he does not want. He can preserve his creatures in their integrity or break them at his pleasure” (ibid., p. 180, n. 10). Zwingli’s predestinarianism is therefore essentially connected with that of Luther, while differing from it through greater logical rigor and lesser pessimism.
3. Calvin. — The greatest of all the heralds of unconditional predestination was Calvin, who, moreover, did no more than press Lutheran principles to their ultimate consequences. According to Calvin, God does everything in all things and also moves men to sin. Wishing to manifest to the world both his majesty and his mercy, he destines, without regard to merits or demerits, by an eternal and irrevocable decree, some to salvation and others to dam-
damnation: « Non enim pari conditione creantur omnes, sed aliis vita aeterna, aliis dammatio aeterna preordinatur » (Inst., III, cap. 21, n. 5). For Calvin, absolute predestination is as important as faith in justification is for Luther. He discovered it in Rom. 9:11–13 and formulated it in his Institutio christianae religionis (III, capp. 21–24) and in the booklet De aeterna Dei predestinazione. To support it, he corrupts the meaning of the Pauline texts (Eph. 1:4; Col. 1:2; Rom. 9:11 and others) and combats the doctrine of Origen, s. Ambrogio, s. Girolamo, and the entire Catholic tradition, which teaches otherwise (Inst., III, cap. 22, n. 8). He is unable to explain God’s conduct, which he seeks to justify by appealing to his will (op. cit., III, cap. 21, n. 11); in this, like the “reformers” in general, he connects with the exaggerations of the nominalists, according to whom God, if he wills, can also do evil and can even cause “hatred of God” without contradicting his essence, which is absolute will (cf. H. Denifle - A. Weiss, Luther und Luthertum, I, Magonza 1904, pp. 591-613). Calvin perceives the difficulty that would arise in the minds of many: namely, that it would then be useless to strive to perform good works, since God has already fixed the destiny of each person (Inst., III, cap. 23, n. 12); he also acknowledges that such a doctrine is terrible (horribile, fateor, decretum), indeed inconceivable (vere labyrinthus), as he expresses himself in his commentary on the epistle ad Romanos (9:14); yet he does not shrink from even more extraordinary explanations, as when he speaks of the means God uses to plunge the reprobate toward their destiny. These means are antecedently willed (not merely permitted) by him, who deprives the non-elect of the opportunity to hear the sacred word, or hardens them through preaching itself, sometimes insinuating himself even into their minds, in order to produce an appearance of faith that makes them more firmly convinced and more inexcusable (Inst., III, cap. 24, n. 8; cf. I, cap. 18, n. 4; III, cap. 2, n. 11). This central point of Calvin’s system had as its logical complement the theory of the irresistibility and inadmissibility of Grace, according to which the elect must believe that not even sins can compromise their perseverance. It later became, however, a sign of contradiction, since it found ardent supporters and equally convinced opponents among the Protestants themselves. The celebrated Arminius (J. van Harmeusen), of Amsterdam (1560–1609), taught cooperation between Grace and human freedom. So strong was the reaction of his followers against Calvin’s predestinarian doctrine that every sect which, following their example, does not follow Calvin on this point is today called Arminian. Other Arminians maintained that reprobation proceeds from the foreknowledge of original sin, and were therefore called “infralapsarians,” to distinguish them from the “supralapsarians,” who considered it absolute and antecedent to the foreknowledge of every sin (cf. Van Oppenraaij, La prédestination de l'Église réformée des Pays-Bas, Lovanio 1906).
VI. BAIO E GIANSENIO
Il fatalismo della « riforma » trovò la sua continuazione nella dottrina di Baio. Veramente questi non si occupò espressamente del problema della predestinazione; lo toccò solo di passaggio (cf. De libero arbitrio, cap. 12), e nessuna della sua proposizione condannata vi si riferisce direttamente. Tuttavia la concezione pessimistica che egli aveva dello stato presente della natura umana, porta logicamente a conseguenze ben gravi: è sufficiente ricordare qualcuno dei suoi principi: « Il libero arbitrio, senza l'aiuto della Grazia di Dio, è capace solo di peccare » (Denz-U, 1027). « Solamente la violenza ripugna alla libertà naturale dell'uomo » (ibid., 1066); « l'uomo, in ciò che fa necessariamente, pecca e merita anche la condanna » (ibid., 1067); « la elevazione della natura umana al consorzio della divina natura, era dovuta allo stato dell'uomo innocente, e pertanto deve chiamarsi naturale, non soprannaturale » (ibid., 1021).Giansenio, erede dei principi di Baio, si incaricò di svilupparne il contenuto logico circa la Grazia, la predestinazione, riprovazione; e tra il determinismo duro dei predestinaziani e dei « riformatori » e la Chiesa cattolica, cercò di porre un compromesso, sul terreno della dottrina
agostiniana. Nel suo Augustinus, muovendo dalla concezione di Baio circa lo stato di giustizia originale, affermò che il peccato originale ha fatto di tutti gli uomini una massa di perdizione e costituisce, per conseguenza, la causa radicale della dannazione. Da questa massa, Dio, per pura misericordia, libera chi vuole; a questi eletti egli rimette i peccati, toglie l'ignoranza e accorda tutte le grazie necessarie per giungere infallibilmente alla salvezza (tit. III, De Gratia Christi, IX, 8-10). Coloro invece che non furono scelti, e che Dio giustamente lascia nella massa, rimangono nella ignoranza e nell'indurimento, unicamente perché Dio ha decretato di non salvarli; quindi, perché scartati, qualunque cosa facciano certamente andranno perduti (ibid., IX, 20). Per essere liberati completamente dalla massa di perdizione, non è sufficiente aver tolto con il Battesimo la colpa originale, perché rimane ancora la concupiscenza, che determina al peccato; occorrono altresì le grazie efficaci e la perseveranza finale (ibid., X, 3-5). In questo sistema, non vi può essere posto per una volontà salvifica universale seria ed efficace da parte di Dio. Questa Giansenio l'ammette solo per i progenitori; per l'umanità decaduta concede una velleità divina universale (« nuda quaedam velleita nihil omnino Gratiae causam »; cf. ibid., III, 21). Conseguentemente negò l'esistenza di una Grazia sufficiente data da Dio a tutti: ogni Grazia è efficace e pertanto invincibile, e viene data solo ai predestinati, per i quali soltanto Cristo è morto. In tal modo, il Matero rivelato è sostituito da una dottrina assurda e crudele, in cui Dio costringe al peccato i reprobi, e poi li punisce. Un Dio siffatto, di pura marca calviniana, esclude non solo qualsiasi idea di misericordia, ma anche quella di giustizia.