PREDESTINARIANISM. - A heresy that attributes both the salvation of the elect and the damnation of the reprobate solely to an eternal and unconditional decree of God, and excludes man's free cooperation regarding the destinies of the future life.
I. NATURE AND ORIGIN OF PREDESTINARIANISM
This heresy presents certain unchanging characteristic marks: a) the exclusive cause of salvation and eternal reprobation is the antecedent and positive will of God, without reference to merits or demerits; b) for the execution of the divine decree, freedom is taken away from the elect, under the irresistible influence of Grace, while the reprobate, deprived of this, is under the necessity of sinning; c) God's salvific will is not universal and Christ died only for those predestined to glory. The origin of p. is tied to a false interpretation of the thought of St. Augustine on the problem of salvation. This occurred only after the death of the holy Doctor, and from then on there was no predestinarian who did not claim to justify his heretical assertions without appealing to the authority of the bishop of Hippo. This heresy remained confined within the boundaries of the Western Church, while the East was almost a stranger to controversies of this kind. Greek theology in fact always felt an instinctive repugnance to treating questions that imply a direct speculation on the divine intentions (cf. H. D. Simonin, La prédestination d'après les Pères grecs, in DThC, XII, II, col. 2835).
II. LUCIDO
The first manifestation of p. occurred around the middle of the 5th century, as an episode in the long struggle waged in southern Gaul between the Semi-Pelagians and the followers of the doctrines of St. Augustine. The priest Lucidus is known as the first of these predestinarians and provoked the two Councils of Arles and Lyons, between 475 and 480. Faustus, bishop of Riez, after having vainly sought to persuade Lucidus to retract his errors, imposed upon him in a letter (PL 53, 681) the signing of six "anathematisms," under penalty of denouncing him to the Council of Arles. Lucidus submitted, and in a letter written to the bishops assembled at Arles he listed the series of errors he rejected. Among other things, he condemned the opinion according to which "Christ our Lord and Savior did not die for the salvation of all...; the foreknowledge of God drives man violently toward death and whoever is lost, is lost by the will of God...; some are destined to death, others predestined to life" (PL 53, 683). Apart from the African Monimus, refuted by St. Fulgentius, no other names of predestinarians are known in this period. Among scholars the question is asked whether in the 5th century a predestinarian heresy really existed, or rather whether it should be considered an invention of the Semi-Pelagians who, failing to understand authentic Augustinianism, sought by such theories to make the doctrines of the bishop of Hippo odious. Thus held the Jansenists, while others, such as Sirmond (Historia praedestinaziana, Paris 1648), considered Lucidus as the most significant representative of a true and proper sect. Today it is commonly held that in the 5th century there existed some isolated predestinarians; these, however, would never have constituted an organized group (cf. E. Portalié, Augustinisme, in DThC, I, II, coll. 2522-24).
III. GODESCALCO
Predestinarianism reappeared in the 9th century, stirring up a violent dispute in the years 840-60. Its protagonist was Gottschalk (v.), an oblate in the monastery of Fulda and a monk without a vocation. Having applied himself with insufficient preparation to the study of St. Augustine and St. Fulgentius, he took a particular interest in the arduous problems of Grace. Condemned by the Synod of Mainz (848), and the following year by that of Quierzy, he was relegated to the monastery of Hautvillers, where he died impenitent in 868. In the profession of faith presented to the Synod of Mainz, he admitted that there is "a twofold predestination, both of the elect to glory and of the reprobate to death" (cf. Hincmar of Reims, De praedestin., c. 5: PL 25, 89). He further taught that God does not intend to save those sinners, for whom his Son "neither became incarnate, nor prayed, nor shed his blood, nor was in any way crucified, since he foresaw their utterly wicked conduct, and justly foreordained to condemn them to eternal torments" (PL 125, 275). Rabanus Maurus moreover reports, without giving the exact words, that according to Gottschalk the reprobate commits nothing but sins (PL 121, 347; 350). Gottschalk therefore seems to have held that: a) there is a twofold absolute predestination; b) Christ died only for the predestined; c) the actions of the reprobate are only sins (this last only probably). Nevertheless it is difficult to pronounce a sure judgment concerning his thought, given the fragmentary state of his works. Hincmar, moreover, who more than anyone makes him known to us, is not above every suspicion, and was truly harsh toward the unfortunate monk (cf. B. Lavaud, Précurseur de Calvin ou témoin de l'augustinisme? Le cas de Gottschalk, in Revue thomiste, 15 [1932], pp. 71-101).
IV. WICLEFF E HUS
In an even harsher form, predestinarianism was renewed by the Englishman Wycliffe, and later by the Bohemian Hus, whose doctrines, imbued with fatalistic determinism, were condemned by the Council of Constance (1414-18). According to these heretics, the reprobate (who in their language are called praesciti) were never members of the Church, since the Church is the invisible society of those predestined to glory. Wycliffe deduced from this that the prayer of the reprobate has never had any value before God (Denz-U, 609), and Hus, that he who has at any time belonged to the Church can never be lost (Denz-U, 627-29). These tendencies were developed by the Protestant "reformation," of which they were the true precursors.
V. THE PROTESTANT "REFORMERS.". — 1. Luther. — For the "reformation," predestinarianism constitutes one of the doctrinal cornerstones. The fear in the face of the problem of predestination is the dark background of the life and system of the founder. If Luther entered the convent, it was perhaps already out of an anguished preoccupation, which in him would become ever more pronounced, regarding divine election. From these anxieties he believed he could free himself by affirming an eternal reprobation, against which man would be in the wrong if he wished to rebel (cf. H. Grisar, Lutero, Turin 1934, p. 65 ff.). Already in the Dictata super psalterium there appears the idea of a restricted saving will of God: "It is for his elect that Christ drank the cup of bitterness, not for all men" (M. Luther, Werke, IV, Weimar 1886, pp. 227-32). From this it appears how even then he was ill prepared to interpret the strong expressions of St. Paul concerning God's freedom in the distribution of Grace. In his commentary on the epistle to the Romans he already interprets them in a predestinarian sense, and he arrived at this by directing his attacks against free will, rendered impotent by concupiscence to perform any good work (cf. J. Ficker, Luther's Vorlesung über den Römerbrief, I, 4th ed., Leipzig 1930, pp. 22-23, 208-10, 225-26). In the De servo arbitrio, which, according to the author's own estimation, must be placed at the head of his works, and which constitutes the cornerstone of his system, Luther presents the definitive formulation of his thought concerning predestination. From the denial of freedom he is led to posit an absolute predestination to damnation and to eternal life. God has the right to elect us or reject us thus, without freedom or good works on our part, because according to the conception of Occam, of which Luther repeatedly professes himself a follower, good and evil depend exclusively on his will (Werke, ed. Weimar, XVIII, p. 712, n. 35). Luther indeed believes, and loves to repeat, that God has two wills: the one revealed in Jesus Christ, the other hidden in the depths of his being; with the revealed will God wishes to save all men, but with the hidden one he predestines arbitrarily to life and to death. By this second will he is, according to a customary expression, the "Deus absconditus" (cf. loc. cit., pp. 684, n. 35; 685, n. 83; 686, n. 6; 689, n. 10). The timid stop at the revealed will, but for stronger men only the hidden will counts. With this, "God loves men or hates them with an eternal and immutable love or hatred, and this not only before their works, but even before the world existed" (loc. cit., p. 724, n. 34). From all eternity hell awaits some, and the Kingdom of Heaven others (loc. cit., pp. 694, n. 91). As a help against despair Luther advised not to think about it, but to adore in silence the inconceivable God; and it is for this reason that in his popular writings he refrains from speaking of it. At bottom, on this subject, Luther was no less harsh than Calvin, although the latter is credited with the paternity of ideas that Luther had already formulated. Distinguished Protestant historians also acknowledge this: "While Luther accepts the harshest consequences of predestination, he is essentially at one with the other major men of the reformation" (J. Koestlin - G. Kawerau, Martin Luther, II, Berlin 1903, p. 601). Soon, however, Lutheranism changed the predestinarian doctrine. This was the work of Melanchthon himself, who, gradually renouncing the ideas that, under Luther's influence, he had expressed in 1521, worked to make them disappear, when around 1550 he established the official doctrine of the "reformation." Thus in the Augsburg Confession (1530) the question of predestination was omitted, and the Formula concordiae, in art. 11, not only let drop the idea of the "hidden will of God," emphasizing instead the universal saving will, but also laid the basis of the later Lutheran doctrine, according to which God has predestined to salvation "ex praevia fide" (cf. C. Algermissen, La Chiesa e le chiese, 2nd ed., Brescia 1944, p. 711).
2. Zwingli
While Luther based his theological thought on the complete moral inability of man, Zwingli derived his entire system, and therefore also the problem of predestination, from the concept of a sovereign Providence, from which nothing can escape, not even the perverse will of the sinner. According to Zwingli, predestination is nothing but Providence itself with regard to the salvation of men (Corpus reformatorum, III, p. 843, n. 15). It adds to the concept of Providence, as a new element, the division of men into reprobate and elect; and since it is considered as the determination of the divine will with regard to the elect, it can have no other cause than the goodness of God (ibid., pp. 650, n. 25; 908, n. 33). Although he directs his attention by preference to this election, Zwingli nevertheless openly attributes reprobation also to divine causality (op. cit., IX, p. 30, n. 34), indeed sometimes taking pleasure in exalting this arbitrariness of God, which he believes he finds in Rom. 9, 21 (op. cit., III, p. 844, n. 21). God "orders his vessels, that is, us men, as he wills; he chooses one to make of him a fitting vessel; the other he does not will. He can keep his creatures in their integrity, or shatter them at his pleasure" (ibid., p. 180, n. 10). Zwingli's predestinarianism therefore substantially links up with Luther's, though distinguished by greater rigor of logic and less pessimism.
3. Calvin
The most rigid among all the proclaimers of an unconditional predestination was Calvin, who, moreover, did nothing but push Lutheran principles to their extreme consequences. According to Calvin, God does everything in all things and moves even to sin. Wishing to manifest to the world both his majesty and his mercy, he destines, without regard to merits or demerits, by an eternal and irrevocable decree, some to salvation and others to damnation: "Non enim pari conditione creantur omnes, sed aliis vita aeterna, aliis damnatio aeterna praeordinatur" (Inst., III, ch. 21, no. 5). For Calvin absolute predestination is as important as faith in justification is for Luther. He discovered it in Rom. 9:11-13, and formulated it in his Institutio christianae religionis (III, chs. 21-24) and in the tract De aeterna Dei praedestinatione. To sustain it, he corrupts the sense of the Pauline texts (Eph. 1:4; Col. 1:2; Rom. 9:11 and others) and combats the doctrine of Origen, of St. Ambrose, of St. Jerome and of the whole Catholic tradition which teaches otherwise (Inst., III, ch. 22, no. 8). He cannot give an explanation of God's conduct, which he tries to justify by appealing to his will (op. cit., III, ch. 21, no. 11); in this, like the "reformers" in general, he links up with the exaggerations of the nominalists, according to whom God, if he wills, can do even evil and can cause even "the hatred of God" without contradicting his essence, which is absolute will (cf. H. Denifle - A. Weiss, Luther und Luthertum, I, Mainz 1904, pp. 591-613). Calvin is aware of the difficulty that would arise in the minds of many, namely that it is then useless to strive to perform good works, since God has already fixed the fate of each one (Inst., III, ch. 23, no. 12); he also acknowledges that such a doctrine is terrible (horribile, fateor, decretum), indeed inconceivable (vere labyrinthus), as he expresses himself in his commentary on the epistle ad Romanos (9:14); and yet he does not shrink from explanations still more unheard-of, as when he speaks of the means of which God makes use to plunge the reprobate to their destiny. These means are antecedently willed (not merely permitted) by him, who deprives the non-elect of the opportunity to hear the sacred word, or hardens them through the preaching itself, sometimes even insinuating himself into their mind, in order to determine an appearance of faith that renders them better convinced and more inexcusable (Inst., III, ch. 24, no. 8; cf. I, ch. 18, no. 4; III, ch. 2, no. 11). This central point of Calvin's system had as its logical complement the theory of the irresistibility of Grace and of its inadmissibility, whereby the elect must believe that not even sins can compromise their perseverance. It later became, however, a sign of contradiction, since it found ardent supporters and equally convinced opponents within the ranks of the Protestants themselves. Famous is Arminius (J. van Harmeusen), of Amsterdam (1560-1609), who taught a cooperation between Grace and human freedom. So strong was the reaction of his followers to Calvin's predestinarian doctrine that every sect which, following their example, does not follow Calvin on this point is today called Arminian. Other Arminians maintained that reprobation proceeds from the foreknowledge of original sin, and are therefore called "infralapsarians," to distinguish them from the "supralapsarians," who held it to be absolute and antecedent to the foreknowledge of any sin (cf. Van Oppenraaij, La prédestination de l'Église réformée des Pays-Bas, Louvain 1906).
VI. BAIO E GIANSENIO
The fatalism of the "Reformation" found its continuation in the doctrine of Baius. To be sure, he did not deal expressly with the problem of predestination; he touched on it only in passing (cf. De libero arbitrio, ch. 12), and none of his condemned propositions refers to it directly. Nevertheless, the pessimistic conception he had of the present state of human nature leads logically to very grave consequences: it is enough to recall a few of his principles: "Free will, without the help of God's grace, is capable only of sinning" (Denz-U, 1027). "Only violence is repugnant to man's natural freedom" (ibid., 1066); "man, in what he does necessarily, sins and also merits condemnation" (ibid., 1067); "the elevation of human nature to the fellowship of the divine nature was due to the state of innocent man, and therefore must be called natural, not supernatural" (ibid., 1021).
Jansenius, heir to Baius's principles, took it upon himself to develop their logical content regarding grace, predestination, and reprobation; and between the harsh determinism of the predestinarians and the "reformers" and the Catholic Church, he sought to establish a compromise, on the ground of doctrine
Augustinian. In his Augustinus, starting from Baius's conception of the state of original justice, he affirmed that original sin has made all men a mass of perdition and constitutes, consequently, the radical cause of damnation. From this mass, God, out of pure mercy, frees whom He wills; to these elect He remits sins, removes ignorance and grants all the graces necessary to attain salvation infallibly (tit. III, De Gratia Christi, IX, 8-10). Those, on the other hand, who were not chosen, and whom God justly leaves in the mass, remain in ignorance and in hardness, solely because God has decreed not to save them; therefore, because they have been rejected, whatever they do they will certainly be lost (ibid., IX, 20). To be completely freed from the mass of perdition, it is not enough to have had original guilt removed by Baptism, because concupiscence still remains, which determines one to sin; effective graces and final perseverance are also required (ibid., X, 3-5). In this system, there can be no place for a serious and efficacious universal salvific will on God's part. Jansenius admits this only for the first parents; for fallen humanity he concedes a universal divine velleity ("nuda quaedam velleita nihil omnino Gratiae causam"; cf. ibid., III, 21). Consequently he denied the existence of a sufficient grace given by God to all: every grace is efficacious and therefore invincible, and is given only to the predestined, for whom alone Christ died. In this way, the revealed Mystery is replaced by an absurd and cruel doctrine, in which God compels the reprobate to sin, and then punishes them. Such a God, of pure Calvinist stamp, excludes not only any idea of mercy, but also that of justice.