Sin

SIN. - Here, it signifies moral fall or ruin, the evil human act, indicated in the New Testament Greek with several other expressions: ἀμαρτία or ἀμάρτημα, that is, the act by which man distances himself from the attainment of his end (Rom. 5:12; 7:7; 8:3); παράβασις or ἀνομία or παρενημία, that is, transgression of the law which man is bound to observe (II Pt. 2:16; Rom. 4:15; I Jn. 3:4); παράπταμα, that is, the state of one who has fallen from his moral dignity or perfection (Mk. 11:25-26).

SUMMARY:

I. Metaphysical aspect

II. Psychological aspect

III. Theological aspect

IV. The distinction of sins

V. The subjective aspect of sin

VI. Internal sins

I. METAPHYSICAL ASPECT

For one to speak of sin, therefore, it is necessary to have: a) a free act; b) a norm of conduct; c) an opposition between the first and the second. It is clear that sin will be all the more grave the more the first and third elements are present, the greater the degree of awareness and consent, and the greater the degree of opposition to the norm of conduct. For the first, one ranges from a minimum, barely sufficient for there to be conscious and willed opposition, to a maximum in which awareness and consent are perfect. At this point must be situated the frequently made distinction between sins of ignorance or fragility and sins of malice. The former presuppose lesser knowledge or lesser consent, or even ignorance, but in some way responsible. The latter presuppose perfect, or nearly perfect, knowledge of the mind and adherence of the will. To this is also traced the group of sins against the Holy Spirit. These involve a particular knowledge and a fuller consent, thus leading to obstinacy, which, if it persists, renders them irremissible.

At this point arises the question of what, more precisely, that violation of the moral order, that lack of conformity to the norm of conduct, consists in. This is what is usually called the metaphysical problem of sin.

Two currents are usually distinguished in scholastic theology and philosophy. According to some, the essence of sin would consist in the positing of an act discordant with the norm of conduct, in the tendency toward an object irreconcilable with the moral order. The essence of sin would therefore consist in something positive. According to others, however, the essence of sin would consist rather in the lack of ordination to the norm of conduct, in the absence of conformity to duty, in the privation of adequation to the moral order. It would therefore consist essentially in something negative.

To the first current are usually traced Cajetan (In I-II, q. 18, a. 2; q. 71, a. 6; q. 79, a. 1), the Salmanticenses (Cursus theologiae moralis, De vitiis et peccatis, tr. 13, disp. 6, Venice 1728), C. Billuart (De peccatis, diss. 1, a. 2 sqq., Lyon 1864, p. 278 sqq.), and, more recently, L. Billot (De personali et originali peccato, 5th ed., Rome 1924), Th. Deman (Péché, in DThC, XII, col. 150 sqq.). To the second current are usually traced Scotus (In II, dist. 34, a. 1, q. 7), Durandus (In II, dist. 34, a. 1, q. 2), etc.

Without fully addressing the question, it can be said that the two opinions are perhaps less distant than might appear at first glance. It might be opportune to distinguish between essential constituents of sin and its formal constituent. The body, for example, according to the scholastic conception, is an essential constituent of man but not the formal constituent. The same should be said of sin: both the positive and the negative are essential constituents; only the negative would be the formal constituent (Sum. Theol., III, q. 86, a. 4, ad 1ᵘᵐ).

II. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECT

It is now necessary to define the concept of the norm of conduct. It is well known that this norm fundamentally consists in one’s own nature or being. Just as in theatre an actor performs well when he behaves according to the character or role he represents, so in life each person acts well when he acts according to his own being or nature.

Consequently, sin can be defined as a free act against one’s own nature. Whenever one sins, one freely violates one’s own nature, and whenever one freely violates one’s own nature, one sins. There are no “supernatural” sins. This allows us to delve deeper into the meaning of the widely used distinction between sins against nature and sins according to nature. With these expressions, it is not intended to suggest that some sins violate human nature while others do not, but rather that some sins go against the spontaneous tendencies of man, requiring a significant presence of the will to commit them, whereas others merely follow the tendencies of our being, making it easier for man to fall victim to them. The former are more serious than the latter, if only subjectively, because they involve a greater presence of free human decision. For the latter, precisely because they align with the tendencies of our being, particular vigilance and attention will be necessary.

The being or nature that has been said to be the fundamental norm of conduct is not the concrete being in its actual mode of presentation at a given moment, but the ideal type to which each person corresponds—the “perfect,” “complete” being that each possesses potentially within himself. In this sense, it can also be said that the norm of conduct is perfection, or, what amounts to the same, the end.

Sin, therefore, is a free action against one’s own end, a free act that impedes it, a decision of the will contrary to one’s own perfection and thus to one’s own happiness. This concept of missing a goal, of failing to reach an objective, is moreover quite clear in the Hebrew and Greek terms commonly used to denote sin (ἁμαρτία = to miss the mark, to fail the purpose: cf. Is. 65:20, Ps. 25:8, where the delinquentibus in via are not those whom sin halts along the way, but those who miss the goal).

The end that constitutes the criterion distinguishing good from evil is the true end of our humanity, that is, the supernatural end. We are no longer destined for a purely natural development—that is, for that full unfolding of ourselves that results from the analysis of pure nature—but for a supernatural unfolding that will find its culmination in the immediate possession of God.

Sin, therefore, does not merely constitute an obstacle to natural happiness but also to supernatural happiness, of which grace is the seed and pledge. It was seen in the first part what this entails in concrete terms: the loss of Grace, the increase of concupiscence, ignorance, disorder, and death in this life, and an eternal punishment in the next.

Another definition of sin can be given here: sin is that which brings death to the soul. Every sin, therefore, is a diminution of one’s own being, an assault on one’s own perfection and thus on one’s own happiness. It is understandable, then, why Scripture is wont to connect the idea of sin with that of death and the idea of virtue and good with that of life.

At this point, another very serious problem arises: the psychological problem of sin. How is sin possible? How is it possible to freely tend toward something that impedes one’s own perfection and happiness? For we necessarily tend toward both. Hence, it seems one must say: if one acts against one’s own happiness, it is only because one is ignorant of it; but if one is ignorant, there is no sin.

To begin addressing this difficult question, it seems necessary to briefly recall two sets of considerations. First, in the sinful act, there is not only the aspect of violating the moral order; there is also some aspect of good. It may be merely a material or even only an immediate good, but it exists. Let us analyze, for example, sins against temperance, chastity, property, obedience, etc. Furthermore—and this is the second set of considerations—it must be kept in mind that historical man, while knowing that, of the two parts of which he consists (soul and body), the first is objectively far more important than the second, subjectively feels the latter much more than the former. The lack or loss of corporeal goods affects us much more deeply than the lack or loss of spiritual goods. If nothing else, each of us feels the lack of immediate goods much more deeply than the lack of distant goods, even if the latter are objectively far more important. Between renouncing the satisfaction of an immediate pleasure and renouncing eternal joy, more than once the renunciation of the immediate pleasure seems harder to us.

One can therefore conclude: sin is psychologically possible because an apparent or inferior good deceives the will. The tendency toward good remains, but it settles for something partial or momentary (A. Vermeersch, Theol. Moralis, I, Roma 1924, n. 371, p. 368; cf. also Sum. Theol., 1ᵃ-2ᵃᵉ, q. 73, a. 1).

With this, the psychological problem of sin is not yet completely resolved. The fact remains that a lesser good is freely chosen. Historically, the problem arises especially in the case of angels and our first parents. How could they sin, favored as they were with a special light of knowledge and a particular balance of will?

A partial answer can be drawn from the fact that sometimes the assertion of one’s own autonomy, of one’s own independence, can be preferred to any other good. Even among men, there are no lack of examples of obstinacy in one’s own point of view and in one’s own decision, even at the cost of any sacrifice. Precisely something similar would have occurred in the case of the rebellious angels and our first parents.

In this sense, sin would appear above all as a disordered search for self, an absurd and insane attempt at self-deification. The tempter already introduced this idea when he insinuated to our first parents that, by sinning, they would become “sicut di” (Gen. 3:5). Above all around this theme, St. Augustine developed his City of God, in which, among other things, a group of men seeks the love of self to the point of despising God.

Leaving aside further developments, which are easily intuited, it will suffice here to establish a few points: 1) the ability to sin is not a perfection of the will but a weakness of it; it is like the ability to fall ill or to die. God, therefore, cannot be said to be less perfect than us because He cannot sin; 2) the genesis of sin always involves some struggle and some suffering: the free choice against one’s own end, though prompted by a good that is subjectively more strongly felt because it is more corporeal or more immediate, cannot be separated from some inner laceration, from some struggle with oneself. This dramatic aspect seems undeniable even in the guilt of Adam. However the biblical narrative is understood, it must be admitted that our first parents did not arrive at the fatal decision without some internal suffering and some form of struggle.

BIBL.:
A. Vermeersch, Theologia Moralis, I, Roma 1924; Summa Theologiae, 1ᵃ-2ᵃᵉ, q. 73, a. 1; Sum. Theol., 3ᵃ, q. 86, a. 4, ad 1ᵘᵐ; s. Agostino, De Civitate Dei; Gen. 3, 5; Is. 65, 20; Ps. 25, 8.

G. Graneris
### III. THEOLOGICAL ASPECT

It must also be said that the norm of conduct is the divine will. For God desires our good and our perfection far more than we do; He therefore wills that we observe the moral order, which is the presupposition and the path to attaining II. Indeed, to make the achievement of perfection easier for us, He has positively intervened by giving us certain norms and infallibly manifesting them in Revelation.

Consequently, sin can be defined as: factum vel dictum vel concupitum aliquid contra legem aeternam (St. Augustine, Contra Faustum, 20, 27: PL 42, 418). This is, in fact, the aspect of sin most frequently recalled in Revelation (cf. Gen. 39:9; 13:13; 38:10; Ex. 33:23; Jud. 10:7; 19:25; Rom. 5:19; 2:29; 4:16; etc.). Thus, from the idea of a violated order, we move to that of an offended person. To Potiphar’s wife, who tempts him, Joseph responds that he does not wish to sin against his God (Gen. 39:9), and the prodigal son cries out to his father: Peccavi in coelum et coram te (Lk. 15:21), while in the Miserere it is affirmed: Tibi soli peccavi. Indeed, Scripture adds that this is not a matter of offending a common person, for God is He who can do all things and knows all things, He who alone can love. He is a person of particular power, particular knowledge, and particular love.

Moreover, according to Scripture, sin is not merely opposition to a person who has loved us and continues to love us, but to One to whom we have freely promised love more than once. This undoubtedly applies to the chosen people, but it also applies to other peoples; furthermore, it certainly applies to priests and religious persons, but it also applies, albeit in lesser forms, to every soul. For each soul, at least in some part or at least at some moment, has freely promised fidelity to God. Thus, according to Revelation, sin takes on a wholly particular aspect: it is like the breaking of a promise made, of a sworn faith, the violation of a quasi-spousal relationship, which is why Scripture sometimes likens sin to adultery (Jer. 3:20).

At this point, another highly difficult question arises, one that is commonly called the question of philosophical sin and theological sin.

The history of this question is now well known. In June 1686, the Jesuit François Musnier publicly defended in Dijon the thesis that one who is ignorant of God or does not currently think of Him and acts against right reason commits a sin, called philosophical sin, but not an offense against God, that is, not a theological sin. The thesis did not go unnoticed, especially in Louvain. In July 1689, Arnauld denounced it to the world with a small work titled La nouvelle hérésie dans la morale, denoncée au Pape et aux évêques, aux princes et aux magistrats. Father De Reulx responded to Arnauld with the pamphlet Le janséniste dénonciateur de nouvelles hérésies convaincu de calomnie et de falsification, minimizing the matter; he reduced the possibility of philosophically sinning to the very brief time in which one is inculpably ignorant of God’s existence. Arnauld did not desist: he responded with his Seconde dénonciation de la nouvelle hérésie du péché philosophique. The Society of Jesus then intervened, essentially maintaining that the doctrine denounced by Arnauld was truly unacceptable but was foreign to the Dijon Jesuit. Arnauld responded again, challenging the distinction made. Soon after, the controversy became further complicated by the intervention of other elements and other contenders (Dominicans, sufficient grace, Jansenism, etc.), until it led to the well-known proposition condemned by Alexander VIII (namely, «Peccatum philosophicum... quantumvis grave, in illo, qui Deum vel ignorat vel de Deo actu non cogitat, est grave peccatum, sed non est offensa Dei, neque peccatum mortale dissolvens amicitiam Dei, neque aeterna poena dignum») as «scandalous, reckless, offensive to pious ears, and erroneous» (Denz-U, 1290).

Undoubtedly, in the objective order, every sin is also a theological sin. For every sin is a violation of the divine will, an offense to His person, a disregard of His dispositions: «quacumque continentur sub ordine rationis continentur sub ordine ipsius Dei» (Sum. Theol., I-II, q. 72, a. 4 c). Can the same be said for the subjective order? Here, a second distinction must be made, namely, between those who posit the authority of God as the immediate and even proximate foundation of obligation (e.g., L. Billot, De Deo uno, Rome 1931, p. 50; V. CATHREIN, VIKTOR, Filosofia morale, I, Florence 1913, p. 424, etc.) and those who posit human nature as the proximate foundation of duty (e.g., E. Elter, Norma honestatis ad mentem Dei Thomae, in Gregorianum, 8 [1927], pp. 337-57; L. Taparelli, Saggio teoretico di diritto naturale, I, Rome 1950, nn. 93-98). For the former, it is not possible to have a sin that is not also a theological sin. For them, one cannot speak even proximately of a true obligation unless one knows that God commands. Consequently, until one realizes that one is opposing a divine order, one cannot speak of sin. Every sin, therefore, is either theological or it is not. Indeed, from this, some (e.g., Billot) conclude that many adults do not sin; thus, they are adults only in age but not in reason and are therefore assimilable, despite everything, to children who die before the use of reason. For the latter, that is, for those who hold that the proximate foundation of obligation is nature or the connection between acts and the end of man, the question is far more complicated. For these, it is necessary to further distinguish between the theoretical formulation of the question and its practical formulation, and, in the practical field, between habitual cases and some exceptional case.

Theoretically, it is not clear why an act that is perceived as a violation of the moral order cannot be perceived as opposition to the divine will. For it is not clear why it cannot happen that one knows an act is incompatible with one’s nature or with the attainment of one’s perfection and at the same time is ignorant that it opposes the divine will, either because one is ignorant that God exists or because one is ignorant that God forbids one to behave as one is doing. Practically, however, the idea of God is so easily attainable and in fact so widespread that it is not clear how such a case could occur, at least normally. Perhaps in some exceptional case this may happen, but normally it does not. Thus, many authors hold (cf. F. Girerd, Péché, in Dict. pratique des connaissances religieuses, V, col. 398 ff.; E. Génicot, Institutiones Theol. mor., I, Brussels 1946, n. 154).

With these clarifications, it can be held without reservation that every sin is also subjectively an offense against God. If the Bible distinguishes a special group of sins that cry out for vengeance in the sight of God, it is not because the others do not contain an offense against Him, but because they may not contain so grave an opposition. Thus, when sins are divided, for example, into sins against God, against one’s neighbor, and against oneself, it is not meant that there are sins that do not offend God, but only that there are acts that oppose the moral order in the part that concerns our attitude toward our neighbor or toward ourselves.

Evidently, when studying the theological aspect of sin, one must guard against facile anthropomorphisms. The offense against God must not be conceived as the offense we inflict upon creatures, from whom we take something and thus cause a state of suffering or disturbance. For nothing can be taken from God, not even His internal tranquility and beatitude. On the other hand, it must not be thought of as something purely external that does not touch Him at all: for in sinning, we go against His will, we neglect the indications of His love. We must therefore strive

The offense of sin must therefore be conceived as something that contravenes His will and thus offends Him, without in any way diminishing His beatitude. Care is thus required when speaking of sin as the evil of God or the sorrow we cause Him by sinning. The situation changes, evidently, when referring to Christ, who in His human nature truly suffered.

Moreover, the principle is now traditional (cf., e.g., L. Lessio, De perfectionibus divinis, Antwerp 1620, bk. 13, n. 193) that the gravity of the offense increases with the dignity of the offended person, just as the dignity of the homage grows with the dignity of the person offering II. From this it follows that, since God—the offended person—is of infinite dignity, the gravity of sin should be infinite. In reality, it is not, because man is always a finite being. Even in the most perfect act, the conditions of limitation and finitude proper to a created being remain.
IV. THE DISTINCTION OF SINS — Among the many distinctions that can be made and are made regarding sins (deliberate and indeliberate; against God, against neighbor, and against ourselves; of malice, of infirmity, and of ignorance; sins cordis, oris, operis; sins of omission and of commission; one’s own and others’; personal and original; etc.), we limit ourselves here to the theological, specific, and numerical distinctions.

1. Theological Distinction — From the perspective of the entity of opposition to the moral order and thus of the offense against God, sins are distinguished into mortal and venial. The former is the fully free violation of the moral order, or, what is the same, a fully conscious and deliberate disobedience to the will of God. It therefore requires: a) an action or behavior incompatible with the moral order, or a way of acting reducible to it, b) placed with full awareness of the mind and c) full consent of the will. It constitutes a true and proper rupture of the moral order; it deprives one of sanctifying Grace and precludes the way to the attainment of one’s end (hence the qualification of “mortal”). Venial sin, on the other hand, is only not referable to the moral order; it weakens it without destroying II. This can occur either a) by the very nature of the thing that is done (when, for example, I take away a small sum from the rightful owner, I perform an action that is not referable to the moral order, but does not destroy it due to the very nature of the action I perform; the same can be said of idle words or playful lies); or b) due to the lack of complete awareness or c) of complete assent (it being inadmissible that insufficient awareness and incomplete assent could totally destroy the moral order, which is essentially founded on free decision). Consequently, it does not preclude the way to the attainment of the end, nor does it deprive one of sanctifying Grace. For this reason, it is called venial; not because it can in fact be remitted and is remitted (which occurs or can occur for any sin in this life), but because it is almost by its nature reparable, capable of being forgiven (Sum. Theol., 1ᵃ-2ᵃᶜ, q. 72, a. 5).

The terms “mortal sin” and “venial sin” are not found in Sacred Scripture. However, the distinction between mortal and venial sins, and in particular the existence of the latter, is clearly affirmed in it and is confirmed by reason through the considerations just expounded.

For these reasons, the Church has always opposed those who denied the distinction between mortal and venial sins, and in particular the existence of the latter. See, for example, its stance against the Pelagians (Conc. Milevit., can. 7), the Protestants (cf. Conc. Trid., sess. VI, c. 11), and Baius (the 20ᵗʰ of the propositions condemned by Pius V: Denz-U, 1020), as well as all the doctrine on purgatory.

From what has been said so far, it immediately appears that mortal sin and venial sin are not two specifications of a single indeterminate reality, denotable as sin, much as brute and man are further determinations of the single generic reality that is the sentient living being. True sin is mortal sin; venial sin is only an imperfect form of mortal sin, which does not distance us from the end but only delays its attainment (L. Billot, op. cit., p. 9).

Consequently, multiplying venial sins does not in itself result in a mortal sin. When it is said that many small, continuous, and in some way connected thefts constitute a mortal sin, it is only affirmed that by uniting small quantities, one removes what makes the sin venial, namely, the light matter.

Theologians commonly distinguish mortal and venial sins into those that are mortal or venial ex toto genere suo and those that are ex genere suo: mortal sins ex toto genere suo are those whose object always includes a substantial violation of the moral order; venial sins ex toto genere suo are those whose object never includes a substantial violation of the moral order; whereas mortal sins ex genere suo are those that usually constitute a violation of the moral order but also admit exceptions. It is also said that mortal sins ex toto genere suo do not admit parvity of matter, while the others do.

At this point, the question arises regarding the nature of imperfection; that is, whether there can be a “free transgression or free omission of a divine counsel” without there being any sin, not even venial. Some theologians answer in the negative (e.g., D. M. Prümmer, Man. theol. mor., I, 8ᵗʰ ed., Friburgo i. Br. 1931, n. 131; E. Hugueney, Imperfection, in DThC, VIII, coll. 1286-98); others, however, in the affirmative (De Lugo, De Poenitentia, dist. III, sectio 1ᵃ, capp. 9-10; E. Génicot, Theol. mor., I, n. 149; J. Aertins, - C. A. Damen, Theol. mor., I, n. 233 bis), basing their view on the argument that a sin without the transgression of some law is inconceivable; but they also observe that sometimes there may be sin due to the “evil end,” by which one transgresses or omits the practice of that counsel.

From the criteria given above and the observations made, it is necessary to distinguish the application to practical cases. It is not always easy to establish whether a given matter is always gravely injurious to the moral order or not. Even more difficult is it to determine in practice when there is full awareness and full consent and when there is not. The first part constitutes the torment of casuistry and explains the numerous divergences among different authors; the second constitutes the entire torment of individual life and confession. Often even the most acute and prepared moralist remains uncertain, and the most refined psychologist remains perplexed: «Quae sint... levia, quae gravia peccata, non humano, sed divino sunt pensanda judicio» (St. Augustine, Euchiridion, cap. 78).

2. Specific Distinction — Another problem that arises is whether there is a specific distinction between mortal sins and mortal sins (and, respectively, between venial sins and venial sins) and from where it originates. For the first part, there are no difficulties. Sacred Scripture already alludes to different sins (e.g., Rom. 1:29-31; I Cor. 6:9; Gal. 5:19), and reason clearly shows that, for example, blasphemy and theft cannot be of the same species.

More difficult is the second part. There are two main currents among Catholic moralists on this matter. According to the first, the specific distinction of sins is derived from the object to which one tends; in sin, there are, as it were, two aspects: one of good that is directly sought by our will, and one of evil (the violation of the moral order) that is only indirectly willed; now, the specification arises from what is directly willed; consequently, the root of the specific distinction lies in the object. Thus St. Thomas (cf., e.g., Sum. Theol., 1ᵃ-2ᵃᶜ, q. 72, a. 1), many of his commentators and followers (cf. Cajetan, In I-II, q. 72, a. 1; L. Billot, op. cit., p. 46; A. Verneersch, Theol. mor., I, n. 372, p. 369; L. Deman, Péché, in DThC, XII, col. 159 ff.). According to another current, however, the distinction is derived from the privation found in every sin. Thus, for example, Scotus (In II Sent., d. 37, q. 1): sin is formally constituted by its opposition to the moral order; it will therefore be distinguished according to such opposition. The divergence between the two currents is perhaps less strong than it might appear externally, as the various hypotheses can be reduced to different aspects of a single «ratio distinctionis» (D. M. Prümmer, Man. Theol. mor., I, Friburgo in Br. 1931).

3. Numerical Distinction

THE SUBJECTIVE ASPECT OF SIN

Resuming the analysis of sin once more, it is known that the immediate norm of conduct is conscience, that is, the judgment one has regarding the morality of one's action.

Sin is therefore a free act against one's own conscience. However, conscience may also differ from the objective norm of conduct (the end, the divine will). In this case, we have an act that is good because it conforms to the subjective norm, and evil because it differs from the objective norm. Theologians say that this is an act formally good but materially evil. Thus, we arrive at the distinction between material sin and formal sin.

Here arises the question of whether such a fracture can last for a long time or even an entire lifetime, or whether one who follows their conscience will certainly arrive, at least in the long run, at the knowledge of the objective order.

Without fully delving into the question, it seems impossible that one who strives to follow their conscience would not, at least substantially and in the long run, come to glimpse the demands of the objective order. For if sin is also a darkening of the intellect, virtue cannot but be light or an increase of light, whence Christ says that those who follow Him non ambulat in tenebris, not to mention that we could not conceive of a Father God who does not offer His help to those who sincerely seek Him. For the same reason, however, we must admit that those who do not follow their conscience, even if they act objectively in conformity with the moral order, will end up detaching themselves from the objective order as well. This encompasses the entire tormented problem of the salvation of those who do all that is in their power, the impossibility of losing faith without fault, as well as the possibility of detaching oneself from the Church without committing a sin in the decision to leave. This makes clearer the importance for each person of acting according to their conscience and striving to form it ever more perfectly. In this lies the entire moral value of man and thus the only universal basis for salvation (cf. Pius XII, Radiomessage on Christian Conscience as the Object of Education, 23 March 1952, in AAS, 44 [1952], pp. 270-78; and COSCIENZA, II, 7. Education of Conscience, in Enc. Catt., IV, coll. 681-82).

Those who, unfortunately, have strayed from it always have in this life a possibility of salvation. It suffices that they break the will with which they sinned and strive to restore the universe to the situation in which it would be if their sin had not been committed (v. RIPARAZIONE). Under this condition, by approaching the minister of Christ (v. CONFESSIONE), they will have the sensible assurance of having been forgiven.

Theologians distinguish three different kinds of internal sins: morose delectation, sinful joy, and evil desire.

1. Morose delectation. — This is the voluntary complacency of the free will in an evil action or thing that the subject creates with his own imagination and thinks of as present, without, however, any desire to commit it in fact. But such imagination, though merely intellectual, is a true sin because it amounts to approval and affection toward the evil thing.

It is called morose because the will, as soon as it becomes aware of it, does not withdraw from it; in other words, morose means known and voluntary. The malice of morose delectation is a sin of the same kind and gravity as the evil action mentally represented, because, like every other human act, it derives its morality from the object as it is formally. Therefore, if the thing deliberately thought of and approved is shameful, the morose delectation is a shameful sin, that is, against chastity; if the complacency is in the harm done to someone who is robbed of his goods or offended in his honor, the morose delectation is a sin against justice, etc. The gravity of the internal sin, considered in itself, is equal to that of the corresponding external sin. Ordinarily, morose delectation does not probably incur the special malice of the circumstances that accompany the object of complacency, unless the will, with full knowledge and awareness, determines itself precisely because of those circumstances.

The complacency may turn toward the knowledge of the sinful object; such complacency may not only be lawful but even sometimes obligatory. Thus, for example, for a physician or confessor, for the proper exercise of their office, knowledge of evil deeds is necessary: they must therefore study them; and complacency in this knowledge would not be sinful. In reality, knowledge is a perfection of the intellect, hence a good (St. Thomas, Quest. disput., de veritate, XV ad 4; Sum. Theol., 1a-2ae, q. 74, a. 8). The study for such persons has a proportionate reason, and will be lawful even if (when done with right intention) it involuntarily causes disturbance in the senses.

Likewise, morose delectation may regard the ingenious way in which a theft, or even a shameful act, was committed; it may refer to the brilliant, witty style in which certain stories are written. These complacencies are not forbidden, because the object is not the evil, but the cunning, skill, or art with which the evil action was carried out: therefore, they are not in themselves a sin. They can be (at least venial) if the complacency were sought exclusively out of curiosity or levity; but if it arose from a bad intention, it could become a mortal sin, at least due to the grave danger to which one would expose oneself, without sufficient reason, of disturbance of the senses or consent to sin. In this regard, it should be noted that morose delectation is distinct from sensual delectation, which is always a grave, external sin against the sixth commandment.

2. Sinful joy. — This is the intellectual, deliberate complacency in an evil action already committed, either by the subject himself or by others, which is vividly recalled to memory and reapproved by the will. In sinful joy, it is certain that the internal sin assumes not only the malice of the object but also that of the circumstances, because memory recalls the act as it was actually committed.

The following are reduced to sinful joy: 1) boasting to others of the internal complacency; this adds an external sin of scandal; 2) internally regretting not having committed an evil action that, given the opportunity, one could have done. In sinful joy, when the complacency is in the ingenious way the evil deed was carried out, the same principles apply as those set forth for morose delectation. One may also rejoice in a good effect derived from an evil deed: the good effect, taken in itself, contains no disorder. Thus, it is lawful to rejoice in an inheritance that comes from a violent death: the complacency concerns the goods and not the death (cf. in this regard the proposition condemned by Innocent XI, decree of the Holy Office, 2 March 1679; Denz-U, 1165).

3. Evil desire. — This is the will to commit some illicit action. It therefore differs from morose delectation, which lingers on the evil action imagined as present, and from sinful joy, which delights in the memory of past sin. It can be effective if it is a true intention to do evil, and ineffective (some speak then of conditional desire) if it is merely a velleity. The effective or unconditional desire for a forbidden thing is always a sin of the same kind and gravity as the action to which the desire tends. Moreover, like sinful joy, it touches not only the malice of the object but also that of the circumstances that accompany it, if they fall within the scope of the things desired, insofar as it refers to the action as it will be in its concrete reality and therefore with its circumstances. The Gospel itself underscores this responsibility (Mt. 5:28).

For ineffective or conditional desire, it must be seen whether the condition is such as to empty the action, which is in itself illicit and desired, of its malice. Guilt may be removed, by means of the added condition, in all actions that are prohibited only by positive law (e.g., if it were lawful, I would eat meat on Friday); and also in actions prohibited by natural law, which, however, in certain situations may be lawful (e.g., if in legitimate defense it were necessary to kill a man, I would kill him). However, such conditional desires are mostly idle and often dangerous; therefore, they are to be avoided. On the other hand, guilt is not removed in those actions prohibited by natural law that are intrinsically so evil that not even God could permit them (e.g., if it were not a sin, I would blaspheme). It is true, however, that often these desires remain in the sphere of instinctive feelings and indicate only that the natural inclination is so strong that it would lead to action if it were not prohibited; in this realization, there is no sin.

The question arises whether it is lawful to desire a physical evil, even death, for someone for a good end, e.g., for a wayward son so that a scandalous life may be eliminated, which in no other way has been possible to remove. Speaking absolutely and theoretically, the answer is that it would be lawful; because one would not desire the temporal evil, but the spiritual good, which is of a higher order (cf. propositions 13, 14, and 15 condemned by Innocent XI [*Denz-U, 1163-65]). In this sense, the Church exclaims in its liturgy of Holy Saturday: O certe necessarium Adae peccatum. O felix culpa!* In practice, however, the desire for evil for a good that may come from it is not considered lawful, due to the serious danger that the desi-

the desire for evil may prevail over that for good, thereby actually committing sin. Thus, it is not commonly admitted that a wife may licitly desire the death of her husband, from whom she suffers the harshest mistreatment without any hope of amendment; nor is it licit to desire one’s own death to escape many afflictions and vexations, because in such desires self-love almost always prevails over love of neighbor, and the great spiritual good found in the exercise of holy patience is impeded.

A practical question is determining the number of internal sins. This is not easy; however, the fundamental criterion is as follows: there are as many sins of the same nature numerically distinct as there are morally interrupted acts of the will. For example, one who interiorly and willingly rejoices over a sin already committed remains in a state of sin until, repentant, they interrupt and retract that interior voluntary act. Voluntary detestation is the surest means of interruption. But in purely internal sins (dilectatio morosa and gaudium pravum), a natural interruption may also occur, an almost unnoticed cessation. If this is of brief duration, it is considered a moral continuation of the preceding act, so that the will, after that brief interval, returns almost spontaneously without new deliberation to the sin, which thus continues and remains numerically one. However, how long the spontaneous interval (e.g., sleep) must last for the act to cease is not uniformly defined.

Nevertheless, there are internal acts that the will deliberates almost as definitive, for example, adherence to an error against faith, that is, heresy. It is held, in fact, that the heretic intends to remain such until an explicit retraction, so that an interval of hours, sleep for an entire night, or even months and years does not interrupt the act: the sin remains numerically one. Likewise, the intention to kill an enemy may endure as a single sin for several days or weeks (despite natural interruptions such as sleep), during the preparation of poison, weapons, etc. For capital sins, V. VIZI CAPITALI. For irremissible sins, V. PENITENZA.

2. Sin according to the latest ethnological research. — Modern ethnology has rejected these evolutionist theories, firmly demonstrating the opposite: namely, that among the most archaic primitive peoples, an ethical monotheism exists, from which one may rightly deduce what the primordial one was. The Supreme Being is conceived as good and moral in itself and as the guardian of morality. Reward and punishment are not limited to this world; in all the most ancient civilizations, there is mention of a reward after death for those who in life followed the laws of the Supreme Being, and of a punishment for those who transgressed them. This belief is so widespread among the most archaic populations that it undoubtedly belongs to the core of humanity’s most ancient religion (v. Ethnology).

Primitives generally distinguish sins according to their gravity. For certain kinds of sins, for example, the Andamanese, Semang, and Pygmies of the Ituri in Africa believe that God punishes them with storms, floods, fire, or by striking with lightning, making thunder heard, or causing the rainbow to appear—all manifestations of the wrath of the Supreme Being for a great sin committed. There are indications, such as the expiatory sacrifice made with one’s own blood among the Semang and African Pygmies, from which it may be affirmed that, according to them, the sinner who has committed a grave sin incurs death. Moreover, this belief also appears in their legends about the origin of death. These narrate that the Creator, who then lived in the company of the first men—happy and immortal—punished them with death and suffering when they transgressed his command. Therefore, all their descendants are mortal and subject to suffering.

Malinowski, speaking of incest among the inhabitants of the Trobriand Islands (Melanesia), distinguishes seven degrees of aversion to incest and expressly notes that incest with one’s own mother and with one’s own daughter or sister arouses an incomparably greater moral indignation than incest with a cousin, while incest with a “classificatory” mother or a “classificatory” sister is easily condoned.

The effects of sin are individual, but they can also be social, as when God sent the flood or fire to punish the sins of the impenitent. In the magical conception of sin, one may escape its consequences if, as is believed among the Igulik Eskimos (banana) and in almost all of northern and northeastern Asia into the heart of Siberia, the Shaman appeases the offended deity and if the sin is confessed. In this magical conception, sin is considered a transgression of a universal cosmic law, which entails automatic vengeance. The non-observance of such a law, even if unintentional, results in the sinner becoming evil, mortifying or defiling the deity, and automatically incurring an individual or collective penalty, such as illness, famine, or death.

It has been noted, for example, among the Andamanese, that primitives understand that the transgression of justice entails the duty to repair the damage. Man observed among the aforementioned Andamanese that, for things stolen from the English, they spontaneously offered equivalent items in compensation. Primitives also recognize that one of the principal characteristics of sin is the freedom of the human will. The same explorer Man, for instance, noted that when Indian prisoners were first landed in the Andaman Islands, the natives, seeing them in chains, immediately understood that the landing was forced and not voluntary; therefore, they did not shoot arrows at them but at the escort, considering them unjust invaders of their lands. The ancient Mexicans held as a fundamental principle that no one could be punished unless guilty. The same Mexicans punished not only the committed crime but also the attempted one. Their laws, for example, distinguished the case of an evident attempt on another’s life from that of clear premeditation, as well as in relation to sodomy, imposing penalties of varying degrees (death penalty in the first case; threat of death penalty in the second). All primitive peoples recognize that every man has his own moral conscience, by which he distinguishes good from evil and has the freedom to do good or evil and thus merits or demerits. Just as the idea of good, so too the idea of evil is first received from the family environment, or from the environment of one’s own social group (from the clan or the extended family, Sippe), and later officially during the initiation of youth. The right of the tribe or clan to teach moral law is justified by the public good, the protection of offspring and the weak, but originally by the will of the Supreme Being, for He is believed to be the ultimate judge, the origin and root of every moral idea. Therefore, God is the first source of moral law. The individual is not conscious of it in every act but acts in accordance with the good because he has been so taught. The tribe, however, in transmitting its traditional moral law, explicitly appeals to the authority of God as the legislator who imposes His will.

3. Sin, morality, and religion among primitives. — To form an idea of what sins the primitive is capable of, one must consider his moral ideal. This ideal has been judged very differently by various authors. Setting aside those who have judged primitives as simply amoral, lowering them to the rank of beasts or nearly so, according to Tylor, the moral principles of savages are fairly good but more relaxed and weaker than ours.

It is clear that this evaluation by Tylor errs against a fundamental canon of modern ethnology, namely, the rule of the double interpretation of cultural facts: the present one and the remote one. One must then distinguish, as for the individual so for a people, the moral ideal and its practical realization, because the latter, despite the ideal being high, may prove much inferior due to a temporary state of decadence of the entire people itself. Thanks to the great development of modern ethnology, different groups of primitive peoples are now distinguished, even from a moral standpoint. Today, it can be said that primitive peoples, particularly the most archaic ones, despite certain anomalies and a great irritability of temperament, have a fairly good and elevated moral code.

Non è possibile trattare qui in particolare dell'ideale morale dei primitivi delle diverse culture. Ci si limiterà agli Acciuabo, popolo dell'Angola portoghese, studiato dal p. Schulien. Questi, trattando del p. e della sua riparazione presso di essi, secondo la loro lingua e la tradizione viva, distingue sei gruppi di p., accennando anche alle pene che vi sono connesse. a) È contro l'ideale morale colui che è sempre malcontento, contraddice, brontola e persino colui che emette suoni corporali molesti agli altri. Anche la bugia è considerata da tutta la tribù come cosa cattiva, benché si mentisca molto presso di loro. Ma gli altri non credono più al bugiardo, se non quando conferma la sua parola con il giuramento. È contro il buon contegno sociale che una donna sia litigiosa e capricciosa verso il marito. b) Sono azioni cattive la pigrizia, il dormire a lungo, la vanità, la voracità, la millanteria, particolarmente la millanteria di un uomo che vuole farsi ammirare da una donna, come pure la gelosia della donna. c) Azioni cattive sono le mancanze di rispetto verso i superiori, i genitori, i vecchi e gli invalidi. d) È p. ciò che è contro il buon nome di una persona e contro la sua proprietà. e) È p. ogni stregoneria che porta danno al prossimo: uccidere i neonati per ottenere ricchezze; chiedere ai demoni che uccidano altre persone; fare azioni magiche contro la vegetazione dei prodotti della terra; trarre medicine dai morti; la profanazione dei cadaveri, il che è creduto una potente medicina magica, ecc. f) È vietato l'adulterio, l'aborto, la violenza e il ratto di una giovane. È proibito all'uomo conoscere la sua donna puerpera fino all'ottavo giorno. Sono offese ancor più dirette a Dio il negare il cibo all'affamato e l'acqua all'assetato. Gli Acciuabo considerano p. non solo il dire e il fare le cose cattive, ma anche il pensarle. Infatti, è proibito, p. es., presso di loro fantasticare su cose sessuali. Nella loro lingua si dice area viabure il pensare trasognati a cose oscene.

4. Conclusioni. - Indubbiamente esiste una duplice concezione del p.: quella religiosa o teistica o teologica, e quella magica. Queste due concezioni riguardano lo stesso soggetto, ma sono inconciliabili; storicamente poi sono indipendenti; la conce-

zione magica inoltre è di origine recente rispetto a quella religiosa. L'etnologia moderna ha dimostrato che, come si è detto sopra, presso i popoli etnologicamente più antichi la religione e la morale sono intimamente unite, cioè la morale è fondata sulla religione.