SIN. — Here it signifies the moral fall or ruin, the evil human act, indicated in New Testament Greek by various expressions: χαρὰς ὁ ἀμάρτημα, i.e. the act by which man turns aside from attaining his end (Rom. 5:12; 7:7; 8:3); περάβασις ὁ ἀνομία or περάνομία, i.e. transgression of the law which man is bound to observe (2 Pt. 2:16; Rom. 4:15; 1 Jn. 3:4); περάπτωμα, i.e. the state of one who has fallen from his moral dignity or perfection (Mk. 11:25–26).
Summary:
I. Metaphysical aspect
II. Psychological aspect
III. Theological aspect
IV. The distinction of sins
V. The subjective aspect of sin
VI. Internal sins
VII. Sin among primitive peoples.I. METAPHYSICAL ASPECT
The primary concept of sin is that of a free violation of the moral order (Würzburgens, *De peccatis*, d. 1., c. 1, a. 1, n. 2, Würzburg 1762). Every free violation of the moral order, however it occurs, is sin either by the commission of something that ought to be avoided (sin of commission) or by the omission of something that ought to be done (sin of omission), whether in thought, word, or deed, whether against oneself or against others, etc.For sin to be spoken of, therefore, there must be: a) a free act; b) a norm of conduct; c) opposition between the first and the second. It is clear that sin will be all the more grave insofar as the first and third elements are present, and the greater the degree of advertence and consent and the degree of opposition to the norm of conduct. The first ranges from a minimum, barely sufficient to constitute conscious and willed opposition, to a maximum in which knowledge and consent are perfect. At this point we must bring the very frequent distinction between sins of ignorance or frailty and sins of malice. The former presuppose lesser knowledge or lesser consent, or even ignorance, yet in some way culpable. The latter presuppose perfect, or nearly perfect, knowledge of mind and adherence of will. To this also the group of sins against the Holy Spirit is to be referred. They involve a particular knowledge and fuller consent, leading to obstinacy, and remain irremissible as long as they persist.
At once the question arises of what precisely this violation of the moral order is, this lack of conformity to the norm of conduct. This is what is commonly called the metaphysical problem of sin.
Two currents are usually distinguished in scholastic theology and philosophy. According to some, the essence of sin consists in the performance of an act at variance with the norm of conduct, in a tendency toward an object incompatible with the moral order. The essence of sin would therefore lie in something positive. According to others, the essence of sin consists rather in the lack of ordination to the norm of conduct, in the absence of conformity to duty, in the privation of conformity to the moral order. It would therefore lie essentially in something negative.
To the first current are usually reckoned Cajetan (*In I–II*, q. 18, a. 2; q. 71, a. 6; q. 79, a. 1), the Salmanticenses (*Cursus theologiae moralis, De vitiis et pec-*catibus, tr. 13, disp. 6, Venice 1728), C. Billuart (*De peccatis*, diss. 1, a. 2 sqq., Lyons 1864, p. 278 sqq.), and more recently L. Billot (*De personali et originali peccato*, 5th ed., Rome 1924), Th. Deman (*Péché*, in *DThC*, XII, cols. 150 sqq.). To the second current are usually reckoned Scotus (*I Sent.*, dist. 34, a. 1, q. 7), Durandus (*In II Sent.*, dist. 34, a. 1, q. 2), etc.
Without fully entering into the question, it may be said that the two opinions are perhaps less distant than they may at first appear. It might be well to distinguish between essential constitutives of sin and its formal constitutive. Even the body, for example, according to the scholastic conception, is an essential constituent of man, yet not a formal one. The same should be said of sin: both the positive and the negative are essential constitutives; only the negative is the formal constitutive (*Sum. Theol.*, 3a, q. 86, a. 4, ad 1um).
II. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECT
We must now clarify the concept of the norm of conduct. It is well known that this consists fundamentally in one’s own nature or being. Just as on the stage one acts well when one behaves according to the person or part one represents, so in life everyone acts well when he acts according to his own being or nature.Consequently, sin may be defined as a free act against one’s own nature. Whenever one sins, one freely violates one’s nature, and whenever one freely violates one’s nature, one sins. There are no supernatural sins. All this allows us to see more deeply the meaning of the widely used distinction between sins against nature and sins according to nature. These expressions do not mean that some sins violate human nature while others do not, but that some sins go against the spontaneous tendency of man, so that a notable exercise of will is required to sin; others, instead, merely follow the tendencies of our being, so that it is easier for man to fall victim to them. The former are more grave than the latter, if only subjectively, because they involve a greater exercise of free decision. For the latter, precisely because they conform to the tendencies of our being, particular vigilance and attention will be required.
The being or nature spoken of as the fundamental norm of conduct is not concrete being in its actual mode of presentation at a given moment, but the ideal type to which each corresponds, the “perfect,” “finite” being that each has potentially within himself. In this sense it may also be said that the norm of conduct is perfection, or what is the same, the end.
Sin is therefore a free action against one’s own end, a free act that impedes it, a decision of the will contrary to one’s own perfection and hence to one’s own happiness. This concept of failing to attain an end, of missing a goal, is indeed quite clear in the Hebrew and Greek terms commonly used to denote sin (ἀμαρτία = to fail, to miss the mark cf. Is. 65:20, Ps. 25:8, where those who “go astray in the way” are not those whom sin detains along the way, but those who fail to reach the goal).
The end that constitutes the discriminating criterion between good and evil is the true end of our humanity, namely the supernatural end. We are no longer destined for purely natural development, i.e. for that full unfolding of ourselves which results from the analysis of pure nature, but for a supernatural unfolding that will reach its consummation in the immediate possession of God.
Sin therefore constitutes not only an obstacle to natural happiness but also to supernatural happiness, of which grace is the germ and pledge. In the first part we have seen what this involves concretely: loss of grace, increase of concupiscence, ignorance, disorder, and death in this life, and eternal punishment in the life to come.
Here another definition of sin may be given: sin is what gives death to the soul. Every sin is therefore a diminution of one’s being, an assault upon one’s perfection and hence upon one’s happiness. It is thus easy to understand why Scripture is wont to connect the idea of sin with that of death, and the idea of virtue and good with that of life.
At this point another very grave problem arises: the psychological problem of sin. How is it possible to sin? How is it possible freely to tend toward something that impedes one’s own perfection and happiness? For to both we tend necessarily. Hence it would seem we must say: if one acts against one’s own happiness, it is only because one is ignorant of it; but if one is ignorant, there is no sin.
To initiate a solution to this difficult question, it seems necessary to briefly recall two orders of considerations. First, in the sinful act there is not only the aspect of violation of moral order, but there is also some aspect of good. It will be only a material good or even only an immediate one: but it exists. Let us analyze, for example, sins against temperance, chastity, property, obedience, etc. Second—and this is the second order of considerations—it is necessary to keep in mind that historical man, although knowing that, of the two parts of which he consists (soul and body), objectively the first is much more important than the second, subjectively feels the second much more than the first. The lack or loss of bodily goods affects us much more deeply than the lack or loss of spiritual goods. At the very least, each of us feels much more deeply the lack of immediate goods than that of distant goods, even if objectively much more important. Between renouncing the satisfaction of an immediate pleasure and renouncing eternal joy, more than once the renunciation of immediate pleasure seems harder to us.
We can therefore conclude: sin is psychologically possible because an apparent or inferior good deceives the will. The tendency toward good remains, but it settles for something partial or momentary (A. Vermeersch, *Theologia Moralis*, I, Rome 1924, n. 371, p. 368; cf. also *Summa Theologiae*, 1a-2ae, q. 73, a. 1).
With this, the psychological problem of sin is not yet completely resolved. The fact remains that a lesser good is freely chosen. Historically, the problem arises especially with regard to angels and our first parents. How could they sin, favored as they were by a special light of knowledge and a particular equilibrium of will?
Some answer can be derived from the fact that sometimes the affirmation of one’s own autonomy, of one’s own independence, can be preferred to any other good. There are no lack of examples even among men of obstinacy in one’s own point of view and in one’s own decision, even at the cost of any sacrifice. Precisely something similar would have happened in the case of the rebellious angels and our first parents.
In this sense, sin would appear above all as a disordered search for self, a vain and unhealthy attempt at self-deification. Already in this sense the tempter introduced himself when he insinuated to our first parents that, by sinning, they would become “like gods” (Gen 3:5). Above all, St. Augustine developed this theme in his *City of God*, in which, among other things, a group of men seeks love of self even to the point of contempt for God.
Without pursuing further developments, which are easily intuited, it will suffice here to establish a few points: 1) the ability to sin is not a perfection of the will, but a weakness of it; it is like the ability to fall ill or to die. Therefore, God cannot be said to be less perfect than we are because He cannot sin; 2) the genesis of sin always involves some struggle and some suffering: the free choice against one’s own end, however much it is solicited by a good subjectively felt as more corporeal or more immediate, cannot be separated from some inner laceration, from some struggle with oneself. This dramatic aspect seems undeniable even in the fault of Adam. However the biblical narrative is understood, it must be admitted that our first parents did not arrive at the fatal decision without some internal suffering and some form of struggle.
III. THEOLOGICAL ASPECT
It must also be said that the divine will is a norm of conduct. God indeed wills our good and our perfection much more than we do; therefore He wills that we observe the moral order which is both the presupposition and the way to attain II. Indeed, to make it easier for us to reach perfection, He has positively intervened by giving us certain norms and infallibly manifesting them in Revelation.Consequently, sin can be defined as: *factum vel dictum vel concupitum aliquid contra legem aeternam* (St. Augustine, *Contra Faustum*, 20, 27: PL 42, 418). This is indeed the aspect of sin most frequently recalled in Revelation (cf. Gen 39:9; 13:13; 38:10; Ex 33:23; Judg 10:7; 19:25; Rom 5:19; 2:29; 4:16; etc.). Thus from the idea of an order violated to that of a person offended. To the wife of Potiphar who tempts him, Joseph replies that he does not wish to sin against his God (Gen 39:9), and the prodigal son cries to his father: *Peccavi in caelum et coram te* (Lk 15:21), and in the *Miserere* it is affirmed: *Tibi soli peccavi*. Indeed, Scripture adds, this is not a matter of an ordinary person, because God is He who can do all things and knows all things, He who alone can love. He is a person particularly powerful, particularly knowing, particularly loving.
Moreover: according to Scripture, it is not only a matter of opposition to a person who has loved us and loves us, but to whom we have more than once freely promised love. This undoubtedly applies to the chosen people, but it also applies to other peoples; moreover, it certainly applies to the priest and religious persons, but it also applies, albeit in lesser forms, to every soul. Each one, in fact, at least in some part or at least at some moment, has freely promised fidelity to God. Sin therefore assumes, according to Revelation, a quite particular aspect: it is like the breaking of a promise made, of a sworn faith, the violation of a quasi-marital relationship, which is why Scripture sometimes compares sin to adultery (Jer 3:20).
At this point another very difficult question arises, the question commonly called that of philosophical sin and theological sin.
The history of the question is now well known. In June 1686, the Jesuit François Musnier publicly upheld at Dijon the thesis that whoever ignores God or does not currently think of Him and acts against right reason commits a sin, called philosophical sin, but not an offense against God, that is, not a theological sin. The thesis did not go unnoticed, especially at Louvain. In July 1689, Arnauld denounced it to the world with a pamphlet entitled *La nouvelle hérésie dans la morale, dénoncée au Pape et aux évêques, aux princes et aux magistrats*. Arnauld was answered by Fr. De Reulx with the pamphlet *Le janséniste dénonciateur de nouvelles hérésies convaincu de calomnie et de falsification*, minimizing the matter; he in fact reduced the possibility of philosophically sinning to the very brief time in which one culpably ignores the existence of God. Arnauld did not desist: he replied with his *Seconde dénonciation de la nouvelle hérésie du péché philosophique*. The Society of Jesus then intervened, essentially maintaining that the doctrine denounced by Arnauld was truly unacceptable, but that it was extraneous to the Dijon Jesuit. Arnauld replied again, impugning the distinction made. Immediately after, the controversy became further complicated by the insertion of other elements and other contenders (Dominicans, sufficient grace, Jansenism, etc.) until it reached the noted proposition condemned by Alexander VIII (namely, “Philosophical sin... however grave it may be, in one who either ignores God or does not actually think of God, is a grave sin, but it is not an offense against God, nor a mortal sin dissolving friendship”).
Pope Alexander VIII condemned it as “scandalous, temerarious, offensive to pious ears, and erroneous” (Denz-U, 1290).
It is necessary, therefore, to conceive of something that contravenes His will and thus offends Him, without in any way diminishing His beatitude. Care must therefore be taken when speaking of sin as the evil of God or the pain that we cause Him by sinning. The matter changes, obviously, when reference is made to Christ, who in His human nature truly suffered.
Moreover, the principle has now become traditional (cf., e.g., L. Lessius, *De perfectionibus divinis*, Antwerp 1620, bk. 13, no. 193) that the gravity of the offense increases with the dignity of the person offended, while the dignity of the homage grows with the dignity of the person rendering II. From this it follows that since God—the person offended—is of infinite dignity, the gravity of sin should be infinite. In reality, it is not, because man is always a finite being. Even in the most perfect act, the conditions of limitation and finiteness proper to the created being remain.
IV. THE DISTINCTIONS OF SIN — Of the many distinctions that can be made and are made of sins (deliberate and non-deliberate; against God, against one’s neighbor, and against oneself; of malice, of infirmity, and of ignorance; sins of heart, of mouth, and of deed; sins of omission and of commission; proper and others’ sins; personal and original sins; etc.), we limit ourselves here to the theological, specific, and numerical distinctions.
1. **Theological distinction.** — From the perspective of the degree of opposition to the moral order and thus of the offense against God, sins are distinguished into mortal and venial. The former is the fully free violation of the moral order, or, what is the same, a fully conscious and deliberate disobedience to the will of God. It therefore requires: a) an action or conduct incompatible with the moral order, or a mode of acting irreducible to it; b) full advertence of the mind; and c) full consent of the will. It constitutes a true and proper rupture of the moral order; it deprives one of sanctifying grace and precludes the path to attaining one’s end (hence the qualification “mortal”). Venial sin, on the other hand, is only not referable to the moral order; it weakens it without destroying II. This can occur either a) by the very nature of the act performed (e.g., when I take a small sum from its rightful owner, I commit an act not referable to the moral order but do not destroy it by the very nature of the act itself; the same may be said of idle words or playful lies); or b) by the lack of full advertence or c) of full consent (it cannot be admitted that insufficient advertence, as an incomplete consent, can totally destroy the moral order, which is essentially founded on free decision). Consequently, it does not preclude the path to attaining the end nor does it deprive one of sanctifying grace. For this reason it is called venial—not because it can in fact be remitted and is remitted (which may happen or not in this life)—but because, as it were, it is by its very nature reparable and capable of being forgiven (*Summa Theologiae*, I-II, q. 72, a. 5).
The terms “mortal sin” and “venial sin” are not found in Sacred Scripture. The distinction, however, between mortal and venial sins—and in particular the existence of the latter—is clearly affirmed in Scripture and confirmed by reason in light of the considerations just presented.
For these reasons, the Church has always opposed those who denied the distinction between mortal and venial sins, and in particular the existence of the latter. See, for example, her stance toward the Pelagians (*Concilium Milevitanum*, canon 7), Protestants (cf. *Council of Trent*, sess. VI, ch. 11), and Baius (the 20th of the propositions condemned by Pius V: *Denzinger-Umberg*, no. 1020), as well as the entire doctrine on purgatory.
From what has been said, it is clear that mortal and venial sin are not two specifications of a single indeterminate reality called sin, much as brute and man are further determinations of the single generic reality that is the sensitive living being. True sin is mortal sin; venial sin is only an imperfect form of mortal sin, which does not remove us from the end but only delays its attainment (L. Billot, *op. cit.*, p. 9).
Consequently, multiplying venial sins does not in itself produce a mortal sin. When it is said that many small, repeated, and in some way connected thefts constitute a mortal sin, what is affirmed is only that by uniting small quantities, the element that renders the sin venial—namely, slight matter—is removed.
At this point, the question arises concerning the nature of imperfection: whether there can be “free transgression” or free omission of a divine counsel without there being even a venial sin. Some theologians answer in the negative (e.g., D. M. Prümmer, *Manuale Theologiae Moralis*, I, 8th ed., Freiburg im Br. 1931, no. 131; E. Hugueney, “Imperfection,” in *Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique*, VIII, cols. 1286–98); others, in the affirmative (De Lugo, *De Poenitentia*, dist. III, sect. 1, chaps. 9–10; E. Génicot, *Theologia Moralis*, I, no. 149; J. Aertnys – C. A. Damen, *Theologia Moralis*, I, no. 233 bis), on the grounds that a sin without the transgression of some law is repugnant, while also observing that there may sometimes be sin by reason of a “bad end,” whereby one transgresses or omits the practice of that counsel.
From the criteria given above and the observations made, it is necessary to distinguish their application to practical cases. It is not always easy to determine whether a given matter is always gravely injurious to the moral order or not. All the more so, it is not always easy in practice to determine when there is full advertence and full consent and when these are lacking. The first part constitutes the torment of casuistry and explains the numerous divergences among different authors; the second part constitutes the torment of individual life and of confession. Often even the most acute and learned moralist remains uncertain, and the most refined psychologist is perplexed: *“Quae sint... levia, quae gravia peccata, non humano, sed divino sunt pensanda judicio”* (St. Augustine, *Enchiridion*, chap. 78).
2. **Specific distinction.** — Another question that arises is whether there is a specific distinction between mortal sins and mortal sins (and, respectively, between venial sins and venial sins) and whence it derives. As to the first part, there are no difficulties. Sacred Scripture already alludes to different sins (e.g., Rom 1:29–31; 1 Cor 6:9; Gal 5:19), and reason clearly shows that not all sins can be of the same species—e.g., blasphemy and theft.
More difficult is the second part. In this regard, there are two main currents among Catholic moralists. According to the first, the specific distinction of sins is to be deduced from the object toward which one tends; for in sin there are, as it were, two aspects: one of good, which is directly sought by our will, and one of evil (the violation of the moral order), which is willed only indirectly. Now, the specification arises from what is directly willed; consequently, the root of the specific distinction lies in the object. Thus St. Thomas (cf., e.g., *Summa Theologiae*, I-II, q. 72, a. 1), many of his commentators and followers (cf. Cajetan, *In I-II*, q. 72, a. 1; L. Billot, *op. cit.*, p. 46; A. Vermeersch, *Theologia Moralis*, I, no. 372, p. 369; L. Deman, “Péché,” in *Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique*, XII, cols. 159 ff.). According to another current, however, the distinction is drawn from the privation that is found in every sin. Thus, for example, Scotus (*In II Sent.*, d. 37, q. 1): formally, sin consists in its opposition to the moral order; a condition of such opposition is distinguished. The divergence between the two currents is perhaps less strong than it might appear at first sight, since the various hypotheses can be reduced to different aspects of a single *“ratio distinctionis”* (D. M. Prümmer, *Manuale Theologiae Moralis*, I, Freiburg in Br. 1931).
3. **Numerical distinction.** Finally, a question that arises is that of the numerical distinction of sins and whence it derives. The issue developed late and was influenced by the prescription of the Council of Trent to confess *“omnia et singula peccata mortalia”* (sess. XIV, c. 7). Generally, moralists derive the numerical distinction from the plurality of acts and objects, admitting that there are as many distinct sins as there are distinct acts or distinct objects.
V. THE SUBJECTIVE ASPECT OF SIN
Resuming the analysis of sin, it is known that the immediate norm of conduct is conscience, that is, the judgment one has regarding the morality of one's action.Sin is therefore a free act against one's own conscience. However, conscience may also be at variance with the objective norm of conduct (the end, the divine will). In such a case, we have an act that is good because it conforms to the subjective norm, and bad because it is at variance with the objective norm. Theologians say that this is an act formally good but materially bad. Thus, we arrive at the distinction between material sin and formal sin.
Here arises the question whether such a breach can last long or even throughout life, or whether one who follows his own conscience will certainly, in the long run, come to know the objective order.
Without fully entering into the question, it seems impossible that one who strives to follow his conscience should not, in the long run, at least substantially, come to perceive the demands of the objective order. For if sin is also an obscuring of the intellect, virtue cannot but be light or an increase of light, so that Christ says that whoever follows Him does not walk in darkness (Jn 8:12), not to mention that we cannot conceive of a Father God who does not offer His help to those who seek Him sincerely. For the same reason, however, we must admit that one who does not follow his conscience, even if objectively he acts in conformity with the moral order, will in the end also depart from the objective order. Here lies the whole tormented problem of the salvation of those who do all that is within their power, and of the impossibility of losing faith without fault, as well as the possibility of departing from the Church without committing a sin in the decision to leave. This makes clearer the importance for each person of acting according to one's conscience and of striving to form it more each day. In this lies the whole moral value of man and therefore the only universal basis for salvation (cf. H.H. Pius XII, Radio Message on Christian Conscience as an Object of Education, 23 March 1952, in AAS, 44 [1952], pp. 270-78; and CONSCIENCE, II, 7, Education of Conscience, in Enc. Catt., IV, cols. 681-82).
Whoever unfortunately has departed from it always has, in this life, a possibility of salvation. It suffices that he break the will with which he sinned and strive to restore the universe to the state it would have been in had his sin not been committed (v. REPARATION). Under this condition, by approaching the minister of Christ (v. CONFESSION), he will receive the sensible assurance of having been forgiven.
freshness; for if it arose from bad intention, it can become mortal sin at least because of the grave danger to which one would expose himself, without sufficient reason, of disturbing the senses or of consenting to sin. In this regard, it should be noted that morose delectation is distinct from sensual delectation, which is always a grave external sin against the sixth commandment.
2. *Sinful joy.* — This is the deliberate intellectual complacency in a bad action already committed, whether by the subject himself or by others, which is vividly recalled to memory and again approved by the will. In joy, it is certain that internal sin assumes the malice not only of the object but also of the circumstances, because memory recalls the act exactly as it was performed.
The following are reduced to sinful joy: 1) boasting to others of the internal complacency; by this, an external sin of scandal is added; 2) internally resolving not to have performed a bad action, which, given the opportunity, one could have done. In sinful joy, when the complacency is in the clever way in which the bad deed was done, the same principles apply as those set out for morose delectation. One may also rejoice in a good effect derived from a bad deed: the good effect, taken by itself, contains no disorder. Thus, it is lawful to rejoice in an inheritance that comes as a result of violent death: the complacency regards the goods and not the death (cf. on this point the proposition condemned by Innocent XI, decree of the Holy Office, 2 March 1679; Denz-U, 1165).
3. *Evil desire.* — This is the will to commit some illicit action. It differs therefore from morose delectation, which lingers on the bad action imagined as present, and from sinful joy, which takes delight in the memory of past sin. It can be effective if it is a true resolve to do evil, and ineffective (some speak then of conditional desire) if it is merely a wish. Effective or unconditional desire, which is always forbidden, is sin of the same kind and gravity as the action to which the desire tends. Moreover, like joy, it touches not only the malice of the object but also that of the circumstances that accompany it, if they fall within the sphere of the things desired, inasmuch as they relate to the action as it will be in its concrete and circumstantial reality. The Gospel itself underscores this responsibility (Mt 5:28).
As for ineffective or conditional desire, one must consider whether the condition is such as to remove or not the malice of the illicit action desired in itself. Guilt can be removed by the added condition in all actions that are forbidden only by positive law (e.g., if it were lawful, I would eat meat on Friday); and also in actions forbidden by the natural law, which, however, in certain situations may be lawful (e.g., if in legitimate self-defence it were necessary to kill a man, the killing). Yet such conditional desires are mostly idle and often dangerous; therefore they are to be avoided. Guilt is not removed, however, in those actions forbidden by the natural law that are intrinsically so evil that not even God could permit them (e.g., if it were not sinful, I would blaspheme). It is true, however, that often these desires remain in the sphere of instinctive feelings and indicate only that the natural inclination is so strong that it would lead to the action if it were not forbidden; in this realization, there is no longer
that the desire for evil may prevail over that of good, being committed in reality. Thus it is not commonly admitted that it is licit for a wife to desire the death of a husband who maltreats her most cruelly, without any hope of amendment; nor is it licit to desire one’s own death to escape so many afflictions and vexations, because in such desires self-love almost always prevails over love of neighbour and the great spiritual good that lies in the exercise of holy patience is impeded.
A practical question is that of determining the number of internal sins. The matter is not easy; here, however, is the fundamental criterion: as many are the sins of the same nature numerically distinct as are the acts of the will morally interrupted; for example, he who, having interrupted and voluntarily rejoices in a sin already committed, is in the state of sin until, repentant, he does not interrupt and retract that interior voluntary act. Voluntary detestation is the surest means of interruption. But in purely internal sins (morose delectation and evil joy) interruption may also occur naturally, an almost unnoticed destruction: if this is of short duration, it is regarded as a moral continuation of the preceding act, so that the will, after that brief interval, almost spontaneously returns without new deliberation to the sin, which thus continues and remains numerically one. How long, however, the spontaneous interval must last (for example, sleep), in order that the act may cease, is not equally defined.
There are, however, internal acts which the will deliberates almost as definitive, for example, the adherence to an error against the faith, that is, to heresy. It is indeed held that the heretic intends to remain such until an explicit retraction, so that the interval of hours, of sleep for a whole night, and even of months and years does not interrupt the act: the sin remains numerically one. Even the purpose of killing an enemy may last as one for several days or weeks (notwithstanding the natural interruptions of sleep), in the preparation of poison, weapons, etc. For capital sins, V. VIZI CAPITALI. For irremissible sins, V. PENITENZA.
VII. SIN AMONG PRIMITIVE PEOPLES
1. Sin according to evolutionists
It is probable, according to Frazer, that men at first had no notion of sin in a religious sense, but only in a magical sense: originally, that is, sin would have been conceived as something almost physical, a kind of morbid substance hidden in the sinner’s body, which could be driven out by physical agents: fire, water, fasts, purgatives, fumigation, sacrifices. As men slowly advanced in moral life, they would later have conceived the idea of sin as a transgression of the will of a wise and beneficent God, for the cancellation of which and to avert its consequences it was necessary that the sinner repent of the fault and confess it (v. primitivi).2. Sin according to the latest ethnological research
Modern ethnology has rejected these evolutionist theories, firmly demonstrating the contrary, namely that among the most ancient ethnologically primitive peoples there exists an ethical monotheism, from which one may justly deduce what the primordial one was. The Supreme Being is conceived as good and moral in Himself and as the guardian of morality. Reward and punishment are not limited to this world, but in all the most archaic civilizations mention is made of a reward after death for those who in life followed the laws of the Supreme Being, and of punishment for those who transgressed them. This belief is so widespread among the most archaic populations that it undoubtedly belongs to the core of the most ancient religion of humanity (v. *Etnologia*).Primitive peoples generally distinguish sins according to their gravity. For certain kinds of sin, for example, the Andamanese, Semang and Pygmies of the Ituri in Africa believe that God punishes them with storms, floods, fire, or by striking with lightning, or making thunder heard, or causing the rainbow to appear, all manifestations of the wrath of the Supreme Being for a great sin committed. There are indications, such as the expiatory sacrifice made with one’s own blood among the Semang and African Pygmies, from which it may be affirmed that, according to them, the sinner who has committed a grave sin renders himself liable to death. Moreover, this belief also appears in their legends of the origin of death. They tell how the Creator, who then lived in the company of the first men, happy and immortal, punished them with death and suffering when they transgressed his precept. Hence all their descendants are mortal and subject to suffering.
Malinowski, speaking of incest among the inhabitants of the Trobriand Islands (Melanesia), distinguishes seven degrees of aversion to incest and expressly notes that incest with one’s own mother and with one’s own daughter or sister arouses an incomparably greater moral indignation than incest with a cousin, while classificatory incest with a mother or with a classificatory sister is easily condoned.
The effects of sin are individual, but they can also be social, as when God sent the flood or fire to punish the sins of the impenitent. In the magical conception of sin, its consequences can be escaped if, as is believed among the Iglulic Eskimos (banana) and in almost all of northern and north-eastern Asia as far as the heart of Siberia, the shaman appeases the offended deity and if the sin is confessed. In this magical conception sin is regarded as a transgression of a universal cosmic law, which entails automatic vengeance. The breach of such a law, even if unconscious, has the consequence that the sinner becomes evil, mortifies or defiles the deity, automatically incurs an individual or collective penalty, such as illness, famine, or death.
It has been observed, for example, among the Andamanese, that primitives understand that the transgression of justice entails the duty of repairing the harm done. MAN noted among the said Andamanese that, for things stolen from the English, they spontaneously offered equivalent things in compensation. The primitives also recognize that one of the main characteristics of sin is the freedom of the human will. The same explorer MAN, for example, noted that when Indian convicts were first landed in the Andaman Islands, the natives, seeing them in chains, immediately understood that the landing was forced and not voluntary, and so did not shoot arrows at them, but at the escort, considering them unjust invaders of their lands.
The ancient Mexicans had as a fundamental principle that no one could be punished unless guilty. The same Mexicans punished not only the crime committed, but also the attempt to commit II. Their laws, for example, distinguished the case of an evident attempt on another’s life from that of clear premeditation, and similarly with regard to sodomy, imposing penalties of different degrees (death in the first case; threat of death in the second).
All primitive peoples recognize that every man has his own moral conscience, by which he distinguishes good from evil and has the freedom to do good or evil, and thus deserves reward or punishment. As the idea of good, so the idea of evil is first received from the family environment, or from the environment of one’s own social group (from the clan, or the extended family, *Sippe*), and then officially in the initiation of youth. The right of the tribe or clan to teach the moral law is justified by the public good, by the protection of offspring and the weak, but originally by the will of the Supreme Being, because He is believed to be the ultimate judge, the origin and root of every moral idea. Therefore it is God who is the first source of the moral law. The individual is not conscious of this in every act, but acts in conformity with good because that is what he has been taught. The tribe, however, in transmitting its traditional moral law, explicitly appeals to the authority of God as legislator who imposes His will.
3. Sin, morality and religion among primitives
To form an idea of what sin the primitive is capable of, one must consider his moral ideal. This ideal has been judged very differently by various authors. Setting aside those authors who have judged primitives simply as amoral, reducing them to the level of beasts or nearly so, according to TYLOR the moral principles of savages are quite good, but are more relaxed and weaker than ours.It is clear that this evaluation of TYLOR’s offends against a fundamental canon of modern ethnology, namely the rule of the double interpretation of cultural facts: the present and the remote. One must then distinguish, as for the individual so for a people, the moral ideal and its practical realization, because this, despite a high ideal, may be much inferior, owing to a temporary state of decline in the entire people itself. Thanks to the great development of modern ethnology, it is now possible to distinguish, even from the moral point of view, various groups of primitive peoples. Today it can be said that primitive peoples, particularly those most archaic, despite certain anomalies and great irritability of temperament, have a moral code that is quite good and elevated.
It is not possible to treat here in detail the moral ideal of primitives of different cultures. We shall limit ourselves to the Acciaiuolo, a people of Portuguese Angola, studied by Fr. SCHULIEN. He, treating of sin and its reparation among them, according to their language and living tradition, distinguishes six groups of sins, also touching on the punishments connected with them.
a) He who is always discontented, contradicts, grumbles and even emits bodily sounds offensive to others is contrary to the moral ideal. Lying is also considered by the whole tribe as a bad thing, although much lying goes on among them. But others no longer believe the liar unless he confirms his word with an oath.
b) Bad actions include laziness, sleeping too long, vanity, gluttony, boasting—especially a man’s boasting to make himself admired by a woman—as well as a woman’s jealousy.
c) Bad actions include lack of respect toward superiors, parents, the elderly and the infirm.
d) Sin is anything that is against a person’s good name and against his property.
e) Every kind of sorcery that brings harm to others is sinful: killing infants to obtain wealth; asking demons to kill other people; performing magical actions against the vegetation of the earth’s produce; deceiving the dead; profaning corpses, which is believed to be a powerful magical medicine, etc.
f) Adultery, abortion, violence and the abduction of a young woman are forbidden. A man is forbidden to have relations with his wife until the eighth day after childbirth. Even more direct offenses against God are refusing food to the hungry and water to the thirsty.
The Acciaiuolo consider sinful not only saying and doing bad things, but also thinking them. Indeed, it is forbidden among them, for example, to dwell in a dreamy way on sexual matters. In their language they say *ora viabare* to mean thinking in a distracted way about obscene things.