BLASPHEMY. - Etymologically, b. (from βλάστιο = to harm and φήμη = voice) means "injurious word." In Sacred Scripture this term designates the uttering of insult either against God or against creatures (II Sam. 21:21; II Reg. 13:28-35; 19:10, 13, 22; Ez. 20:27; Tob. 13:16; I Par. 20:7; I Cor. 4:13; 10:30; Tit. 3:2); but according to the observation of St. Augustine: "blasphemia non accipitur nisi mala verba de Deo dicere" (PL 32, 1354), by b. is meant an injurious expression against God.
It is customary to distinguish b. cordis, operis, oris: the first consists in an outrageously insulting thought against God; the second is embodied in an external action equally insulting (for example, an insulting gesture toward heaven); the third, to which the term b. should properly be reserved, consists in an injurious expression against God. Hence in theological language b. is a vitium linguae, although both the sin and the crime of b. can also be committed in writing, since the written word has the same meaning as the spoken word. Given these acceptations of the term b., both in the moral order and in the juridical order, it follows, for the interpretation of penal laws and of the reservation of sins (should b. be a reserved sin in a given territory), that both the reservation and the penalty can refer to b. only in the proper sense, that is, ore aut scripto prolata.
B. is opposed both to the due manifestation of faith (Sum. Theol., 2a-2ae, q. 13, a. 1), because by b. something contrary to the divine goodness is asserted, and to the virtue of religion, because the blasphemer brings dishonor upon God. The CIC contemplates the crime of b. (punishing it with an indeterminate penalty) in can. 2323, precisely under title XII, de delictis contra religionem, while in can. 2314 it punishes the same crime when it constitutes heresy. Given the sense of the word, b. can be heretical or non-heretical, according as by it affirmations contrary to the faith are made (for example, God is the cause of sin) or, without containing heresy, it contains injurious expressions against God. The latter is customarily distinguished into simple and imperative b.: the first consists in a simple insult (in this sense the Jews blasphemed: "Vah, qui destruis templum Dei et in triduo illud reedificas; salva temet ipsum" [Mt. 27:40]); the other consists in an expression by which one would wish evil upon God. With regard to the object, b. can be immediate or mediate, according as the blasphemer directs his utterance directly against God, or directly against the saints and sacred things insofar as they have a particular relation to God. This, however, does not bring about a differentiation of species, because "blasphemia quae fit in sanctos, ex consequenti in Deum redundat": b. directed against the saints consequently redounds also to the offense of God (Sum. Theol., 2a-2ae, q. 13, a. 1 ad 2; P. Ballerini, Opus theologicum morale, II, Prato 1890, pp. 366-80).
In order for b. to be imputable, moralists require two conditions: 1) that words truly blasphemous be uttered (or written) (which is inferred from the meaning of the expressions, from the sense commonly attributed in a given place, and also from the manner in which they are uttered [*Sum. Theol., 2a-2ae, q. 72, a. 2]); 2) that the one who utters them have the necessary advertence both to the act itself and to the morality of the act itself. This last condition, especially in the case of uneducated persons, may be lacking, for example because of emotional states of the subject or because the expressions are uttered out of habit. In such a case the principles that are applied to the human act performed in emotional or passionate states or out of habit must be applied. What can here be said summarily about habit (v.) can be summed up in the following norm: one who has contracted the habit of blaspheming must, with every effort, free himself from such a habit; otherwise the blasphemous expressions are imputable to the subject even if he has no advertence regarding his acts, precisely because it is a voluntary habit. It must be observed, in addition to the first element (namely, that the expressions be blasphemous), that the mere uttering of the name of God, of the saints or of holy things vainly, but not injuriously (vana assumptio nominis Dei*), barring the danger of scandal, does not properly constitute b., although it can be a sin against the virtue of religion.
B. is objectively a mortal sin that does not admit of parvity of matter, being directly opposed to charity toward God (Sum. Theol., 2a-2ae, q. 13, a. 2). The gravity of the sin, as mentioned above, can be diminished when either advertence or deliberate consent is lacking, which are the subjective conditions for incurring full responsibility for one's acts. In the Old Testament b. was judged so grave that it was punished with death: "qui blasphemaverit nomen Domini morte moriatur" (Lev. 24:16), and St. Thomas declares: "omnium peccatorum ex genere suo gravissimum est" (Sum. Theol., 2a-2ae, q. 13, a. 3).
Bibliography3 works
Giacomo Violardo
ITALIAN LAW
Blasphemy was provided for as a crime in Italy until the Penal Code of 1890, which no longer considered it such. Penalties against blasphemy (a fine of up to
2,000 lire) were restored in the public security law (Royal Decree of 6 Nov. 1926, no. 1848, art. 232); and then the Penal Code of 1930 (art. 724) punished with a fine (currently from 8,000 to 24,000 lire) "anyone who publicly blasphemes, with invectives or insulting words, against the divinity or the symbols or the persons venerated in the religion of the State." If the act is committed with malice aforethought, the more severe penalty established for vilification of the religion of the State (art. 402) shall be applicable, when its elements are present.