BLASPHEMY. — Etymologically, *b.* (from βάθος = injury and φήμη = voice) means “injurious speech.” In Holy Scripture the term denotes the utterance of insults both against God and against creatures (2 Sam 21:21; 2 Kgs 13:28–35; 19:10, 13, 22; Ezek 20:27; Tob 13:16; 1 Chr 20:7; 1 Cor 4:13; 10:30; Titus 3:2), but according to the observation of St. Augustine: “blasphemia non accipitur nisi mala verba de Deo dicere” (PL 32, 1354), by *blasphemy* is meant an injurious expression against God.
A distinction is usually drawn between *blasphemy of the heart, of deed, and of speech*: the first consists in an insulting thought against God; the second is realized in an external action likewise insulting (e.g., an insulting gesture toward heaven); the third, to which the term *blasphemy* properly applies, consists in an injurious expression against God. Hence in theological language *blasphemy* is a *vice of the tongue*, although it may be committed in writing as well as in speech, since writing has the same meaning as spoken words. Given these meanings of the term *blasphemy*, both in the moral and in the juridical order, it follows, for the interpretation of penal laws and the reservation of sins (wherever blasphemy is a reserved sin in a given territory), that both the reservation and the penalty can refer to blasphemy only in the proper sense, i.e., *profanity uttered or written*.
Blasphemy is opposed both to the due manifestation of faith (*Sum. Theol.*, II-II, q. 13, a. 1) because it asserts something contrary to the divine goodness, and to the virtue of religion because the blasphemer brings dishonor upon God. The *Codex Iuris Canonici* contemplates the crime of blasphemy (punishing it with an indeterminate penalty) in can. 2323, precisely under title XII, *de delictis contra religionem*, while in can. 2314 it punishes the same crime when it constitutes heresy. In view of the meaning of the word, blasphemy can be *heretical* or *non-heretical*, according as it makes assertions contrary to the faith (e.g., “God is the cause of sin”) or, without containing heresy, contains expressions injurious to God. The latter is usually distinguished into simple and imperative blasphemy: the first consists in a simple insult (in this sense the Jews blasphemed: “Ah! You who destroy the temple of God and in three days rebuild it, save yourself!” [Matt 27:40]); the second consists in an expression by which one would wish evil upon God. With regard to its object, blasphemy can be immediate or mediate, according as the blasphemer in his utterance directs himself immediately against God, or immediately against the saints and sacred things insofar as they have a special relation to God. This, however, does not introduce a differentiation of species because “blasphemia quae fit in sanctos, ex consequenti in Deum redundat”: blasphemy directed against the saints, consequently redounds also to the offense of God (*Sum. Theol.*, II-II, q. 13, a. 1 ad 2; P. Ballerini, *Opus theologicum morale*, II, Prato 1890, pp. 366–80).
For blasphemy to be imputed, moralists require two conditions: 1) that truly blasphemous words be uttered (or written) (which is inferred from the meaning of the expressions, from the sense commonly attributed in a given place, and also from the manner in which they are uttered [*Sum. Theol.*, II-II, q. 72, a. 2]); 2) that the one uttering them have the necessary advertence both to the act itself and to the morality of the act. This latter condition, especially in the case of uneducated persons, may be lacking, e.g., because of emotional states of the subject or because the expressions are uttered out of habit. In such a case the principles that apply to a human act performed in emotional or passionate states or through custom must be applied. What may be briefly said here about habit (v.) can be summarized in the following rule: whoever has contracted the habit of blaspheming must, by every effort, free himself from such a habit; otherwise blasphemous expressions are imputable to the subject even if he lacks advertence to his acts precisely because of a voluntary habit. It must be observed, in addition to the first element (that the expressions be blasphemous), that the mere utterance of the name of God, of the saints, or of sacred things vainly, but not injuriously (vana assumptio nominis Dei), except for the danger of scandal, does not properly constitute blasphemy, although it may be a sin against the virtue of religion.
Blasphemy objectively is a mortal sin that admits no parity of matter, since it directly opposes charity toward God (*Sum. Theol.*, II-II, q. 13, a. 2). The gravity of the sin, as noted above, may be diminished when either advertence or deliberate consent is lacking—these being the subjective conditions for incurring full responsibility for one’s acts. In the Old Testament blasphemy was judged so grave that it was punished with death: “Whoever blasphemes the name of the Lord shall be put to death” (Lev 24:16), and St. Thomas declares: “omnium peccatorum ex genere suo gravissimum est” (the gravest of all sins by its very nature) (*Sum. Theol.*, II-II, q. 13, a. 3).
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**Italian Law.** — Blasphemy was treated as a crime in Italy until the Penal Code of 1890, which no longer considered it such. Penalties against blasphemy (fines up to 2,000 lire) were reintroduced in the Public Safety Law (R.D. 6 Nov. 1926, no. 1848, art. 232); and thus the Penal Code of 1930 (art. 724) punished with a fine (currently from 8,000 to 24,000 lire) “whoever publicly blasphemes, with invectives or insulting words,” against the Divinity or the symbols or persons venerated in the religion of the State. If the act is committed willfully, the more severe penalty established for the vilification of the religion of the State (art. 402) shall be applied when its elements are present.