CENSORSHIP. – The word c. [censorship], from *censor*, the Roman magistrate charged with keeping the citizens’ census up to date and later also with overseeing morals, correcting and punishing, in its manifold meanings always implies a judgment of blame and repression with respect to some error or disorder. Today three distinct kinds of c. are clearly distinguished: preventive censorship of books, doctrinal and theological censorship, and medicinal penal censorship.
I. PREVENTIVE CENSORSHIP OF BOOKS
1. Notion
The Catholic Church has among its duties that of preserving the Catholic faith from contamination by error and of safeguarding the holiness of morals from corruption. And since bad press can inflict very grave harm upon faith and morals, ecclesiastical authority must exercise control over the press from the religious and moral standpoint. This control is exercised in two ways: one preventive, the other repressive. Through preventive censorship the competent ecclesiastical authority seeks to prevent spiritually and morally dangerous publications; through condemnation and prohibition of bad books already published it endeavours to remove from the hands of the faithful that pernicious press whose publication it was unable to prevent by means of preventive censorship. For this reason the *Codex Iuris Canonici* divides this matter into two parts: *de praevia librorum censura* and *de prohibitione librorum* (can. 1384–1405). Following this division, only preventive censorship will be treated here (see INDEX OF PROHIBITED BOOKS, regarding repressive censorship).Ecclesiastical preventive censorship, or censorship in the strict sense, is the judgment of the competent ecclesiastical authority declaring that a given publication may or may not be issued without danger to faith or good morals. This judgment, even when favourable, does not imply positive approval of the doctrine contained in a book, but merely affirms that the book, at least under present circumstances, is harmless; hence it can happen that a book permitted in one place or at one time may later be prohibited elsewhere or at another time, and vice versa. Distinct from censorship is the faculty or permission to publish, which
Generally, it follows the c. [V. IMPRIMATUR], but it can be separated from it and pertains directly, not to the book, but to the person of the author or publisher, and is necessary even in cases where the c. is not required.
2. Historical note
Ecclesiastical legislation on preventive censorship began with the invention of printing (for manuscripts, repressive censorship sufficed), first with measures limited to certain dioceses or territories, then with general provisions for the entire Catholic world. Alexander VI, upon learning that many books contrary to Catholic doctrine were being published especially in the dioceses of Cologne, Mainz, Trier, and Magdeburg, prohibited, by the constitution *Inter multiplices* (1 June 1501), all printers in those regions from printing books, treatises, or writings of any kind without special and explicit permission from the local Ordinaries, under pain of latae sententiae excommunication and a fine. A few years later, Leo X, at the Fifth Lateran Council, with the constitution *Inter sollicitudines* (4 May 1515), issued the first general law on preventive censorship, prescribing that no one should dare to print books or writings of any kind unless they had first been examined and approved, for Rome, by the Vicar General of His Holiness and the Master of the Sacred Apostolic Palace, and for other dioceses by the respective bishops. The penalties were: latae sententiae excommunication, a fine of 100 ducats, suspension for one year from the exercise of the printing trade, and the seizure of the printed work, which was to be publicly burned. The prescriptions of Leo X were confirmed, with the same penalties, by the rules of the Tridentine Index (Rule X), promulgated by Pius IV with the constitution *Dominici gregis* (24 March 1564). To the aforementioned Rule X of the Tridentine Council were later added: the *Instructio* of Clement VIII, prefixed to the edition of his Index of Prohibited Books (1596), and the *Observationes* of Alexander VII, promulgated with his Index (1664). Wise directives for ecclesiastical censors were issued by Benedict XIV with the constitution *Sollicita ac provida* (9 July 1753). Pius IX, considering that with the multiplication of printed works it was no longer possible for ecclesiastical censors to follow and examine everything that was published, and taking into account the changed conditions of the times regarding ecclesiastical discipline, introduced many mitigations to the subsequent Rule X of the Tridentine Council: with an encyclical of 2 June 1848 to the episcopate of the Papal States, he restricted, for the subjects of those States, the obligation of preventive censorship to books and periodicals of a religious and moral nature; and with the constitution *Apostolicae Sedis* (12 Oct. 1869), he mitigated for the entire Church the spiritual penalties against violators of the law. The temporal penalties remained practically abrogated with the loss of support from secular authority. Leo XIII, with the constitution *Officiorum ac munerum* (25 Jan. 1897), entirely reformed for the whole Church the previous legislation on preventive and repressive censorship, retaining in force only the aforementioned constitution *Sollicita ac provida* of Benedict XIV. And the constitution of Leo XIII was substantially reproduced in the new Code of Canon Law.3. Object of preventive censorship
According to the current Code (canons 1385, 1387–92), the following publications are subject to ecclesiastical preventive censorship: 1. books of Holy Scripture or notes and commentaries on them; 2. a) books dealing with Holy Scripture, sacred theology, ecclesiastical history, canon law, natural theology, ethics, and other similar religious and moral disciplines; b) books and pamphlets of prayers, devotion, or religious, moral, ascetical, mystical doctrine and instruction, or similar, even if they appear intended to foster piety; c) in general, writings containing anything that particularly concerns religion and the honesty of morals; 3. sacred images, however they are to be printed, whether they include prayers or not; 4. anything that in any way pertains to the processes of beatification and canonization of the Servants of God, when these processes are pending before the Sacred Congregation of Rites; 5. all books, summaries, pamphlets, leaflets, etc. of indulgences, containing the concessions of the same; 6. collections of decrees of the Roman Sacred Congregations; 7. liturgical books and their parts, and litanies approved by the Holy See; 8. translations and new editions of an already approved work. However, extracts from periodicals published separately are not considered new editions and therefore do not require new approval.Before the new Code of Canon Law, some canonists excluded journals and newspapers from preventive censorship, since the law seemed to them limited to books alone. But now canon 1384 § 2 explicitly provides that what is prescribed for books shall also apply to newspapers, periodicals, and any other publication, unless the nature of the matter or the context of the law indicates otherwise. Naturally, daily and periodical press is subject to preventive censorship only when its principal subject is religious or moral matters, whether theoretical or practical, or when it contains something that particularly concerns religion and the honesty of morals, either in itself or due to particular contingent circumstances; for example, if it reports new private revelations, recounts prodigious events or heavenly graces received (cf. decree of the Sacred Congregation of the Council, 7 June 1932), if it proposes a new form of worship (cf. decrees of the Holy Office, 26 May 1937 and 17 Apr. 1942), etc.
The Code does not address manuscripts, since the very purpose of preventive censorship is publication—that is, the public dissemination of a book, whereas a manuscript is not ordinarily widely circulated. However, the term *scriptis* in canon 1384 § 2 can apply to manuscript works as well as printed ones. Nevertheless, considering the purpose of the law, it must be concluded that a manuscript also falls under preventive censorship when, in any manner reproduced, it is intended for the public, offered for sale to all, for in such a case it too becomes published.
For information on which authority is competent for preventive censorship, how it is exercised, and how the granting of the *licentia edendi* is regulated, see IMPRIMATUR.
4. Gravity of the law and current penalties
The law of ecclesiastical preventive censorship binds all the faithful, including the laity, and extends to the publisher of a publication who, after the author, bears the greater responsibility. It does not, however, pertain to the printer, who is not entrusted with the sale or dissemination of the book. Naturally, he too bears a moral responsibility for the publication of a bad book, but positive ecclesiastical law considers the edition—that is, the dissemination—not the mere printing of the book. The moral obligation to obey this law is in itself grave, and in the past it incurred very severe penalties, as has already been noted. According to current discipline, authors and publishers who, without due permission, have books of Holy Scripture or notes or commentaries on them printed incur ipso facto a non-reserved excommunication. For excommunication of publishers of books by apostates, heretics, or schismatics, see INDEX OF PROHIBITED BOOKS. Those who violate other prescriptions of ecclesiastical preventive censorship fall under the general provisions against violators of canon law, which authorize the diocesan bishop to take appropriate measures, up to imposing ecclesiastical penalties (canons 2221, 2222). Giuseppe MontiII. DOCTRINAL OR THEOLOGICAL CENSORSHIP
Serves to qualify a doctrine as erroneous, determining its nature and the degree of its contrast with faith and morals. Such a contrast can be more or less grave.It is profound, and therefore the judgment can be expressed by the competent authority in various ways, hence the distinction among the various censures, of which only the principal ones are indicated.
A doctrine is censured as "heretical" if it certainly and directly opposes a revealed truth, defined and proposed as such by the Church to the faith of its members; it is censured as "near to heresy" if it opposes a truth unanimously held in the Church as revealed, but not yet defined as such; it is censured as "erroneous in faith" if it opposes a theological conclusion, that is, a truth known by inference from two premises, one of which contains a revealed truth and the other a truth known naturally by human reason. The expression "erroneous in faith" is also applied to a doctrine that opposes a truth commonly accepted by the Church but not defined, nor proximately definable as a truth of faith.
The object of the deprivation inflicted upon the delinquent, according to the cited canon, is a spiritual good or one annexed to spiritual matters. It is obvious that by "spiritual good" here cannot be meant anything other than a good dependent upon the administration of the Church, which the faithful enjoy as members of the Church, such as the administration and reception of the Sacraments, the sacrifice of the Mass, ecclesiastical offices, benefices and their income, the *officia divina* (can. 2256 § 1), ecclesiastical burial (can. 1203 ff.), the exercise of Holy Orders, etc.; it cannot, however, refer to an intrinsic spiritual good, that is, one inherent to the soul and not dependent upon the will of the Church, such as, for example, the sacramental character, the power of Order, sanctifying grace, infused virtues, or goods that derive from individual faithful (such as private prayers), inasmuch as, precisely because such goods do not directly fall under ecclesiastical jurisdiction and pertain to direct relations between the soul and God, it is not within the power of the Church to deprive subjects of them. On the other hand, penalties may be imposed which have as their object goods annexed to spiritual matters.
As regards the active subject of medicinal penalties, *v.* PENA: it will suffice here to observe that, in addition to the supreme legislator who establishes universal law in force everywhere (though he may also enact particular laws for certain territories) and in addition to particular legislators (whether singular or collegial: can. 2221), there are also certain ecclesiastical authorities endowed with the power of the external forum by virtue of which, given the very special nature of the canonical penal system (especially of medicinal penalties), they may impose specific precepts with annexed sanctions for the purpose of removing subjects from the violation of the law or inducing them to desist from crime (can. 2220 § 1). The violation of these precepts entails the infliction of the penalty either by sentence (*ferendae sententiae*) or *ipso facto* (*latae sententiae*). This notion must be kept in mind when, in what follows, the legal element of the crime is to be considered (which may be the law or the precept with canonical sanction), and particularly when the question of reserved and non-reserved penalties, as well as the canonical admonition necessary for their infliction, is to be examined.
As for the passive subject of the medicinal penalty, just as every act of ecclesiastical jurisdiction can be exercised only over the subjects of the Church, so too the penalty can only strike the baptized. For by Baptism, while man becomes a person in the Church (can. 87), he acquires the fundamental capacity for those spiritual goods (which he must possess at the moment of the penalty) the deprivation of which is effected by the penalty. Nor do apostates, heretics, or schismatics cease to be subjects of the Church; indeed, their defection is regarded by canon law as a crime punishable by the most severe penalties.
An ecclesiastical penalty, the medicinal penalty is, however, a *sui generis* penalty, that is, it is a medicinal penalty, by which is particularly highlighted its peculiar extrinsic end, namely, the correction of the delinquent. For this reason, the cited canon adds *donec a contumacia recedens absolvatur*, expressly indicating that the prerequisite for a subject to be liable to the penalty is contumacy, from which, by desisting, he has the right to be absolved. Precisely because of its remedial purpose and the necessity of contumacy, the penalty cannot be applied to a crime that has already been fully consummated even in its effects; rather, for punishability, the crime must have the subsequent trait (i.e., a continuing crime: *v.* DELITTO), or the effects to be repaired must persist at the moment the penalty is inflicted. Nor can it be inflicted for an indeterminate or lifetime duration, for this would render the desistance from contumacy irrelevant; whereas a *latae sententiae* penalty that can be inflicted upon an unknown delinquent, that is, one not known, cannot, however, be inflicted upon an uncertain delinquent.
From these notions it is evident that the essential elements for incurring a medicinal penalty are two: 1) the crime; 2) contumacy.
The penalty, like every other penalty, presupposes the crime; indeed, being a most grave penalty (particularly if incurred in the form of a *latae sententiae* penalty), it requires a particularly grave imputability and the consummation of the crime (can. 2242 § 1, 2220 § 2, 2228), while the Code also warns that it be applied with moderation and restraint (can. 2241 § 2). This norm was already laid down by the Council of Trent to remove the abuse that had crept in with the frequent imposition of excommunication; for since the penalty consists in the deprivation of spiritual goods, it constitutes a powerful means of inducing the censured person to repentance, but if abused, it can only lead to social disintegration and thus to the ruin of souls, *aut levibus ex rebus incutatur magis contemni, quam formidari et pernicem potius parere quam salutem* (sess. XXIII, cap. 3, *de Ref.*).
It is further necessary that the crime be committed with specific contumacy, which, from the verb *contemnere*, consists in *contemptus censurae*, that is, in the criminal will that refuses to desist from the crime and to make reparation for the effects it has produced.
A fundamental principle of penal law is that no penalty may be inflicted when the crime committed has not been established with certainty (can. 2233 § 1); but when it comes to the medicinal penalty, this presupposition is not sufficient, for the law expressly prescribes that *reus reprehendatur ac moneatur ut a contumacia recedat... dato, si prudenti eiusdem iudicis vel superioris arbitrio casus id ferat, congruo ad resipisceniam tempore* (can. 2233 § 2). This form of admonition is essentially prescribed when it comes to inflicting the *ferendae sententiae* penalty; but to incur a *latae sententiae* penalty, such an express admonition is not required, and the mere transgression of the law or precept threatening a *latae sententiae* penalty is sufficient. In other words: since the medicinal penalty is given to break contumacy, this must be revealed after the admonition, which may occur in two distinct forms: admonition by the judge or superior, if it is a matter of *ferendae sententiae* penalties, and in this case the contumacy will be formal; admonition contained in the law or precept, if it is a matter of *latae sententiae* penalties, and in this case the contumacy may be called interpretative, because the law itself or the precept threatening the penalty contains the admonitions (*lex interpellat pro homine*).
Nor would the *monitio* be required when, a medicinal *latae sententiae* penalty having been incurred, in order to achieve all its effects in the external forum (can. 2232 § 1), it were a matter of proceeding to the declaratory sentence (*v.* SENTENZA), saving, of course, the citation of the accused so that he may defend himself, unless the crime is notorious (*v.* DELITTO; can. 1747 n. 1).
The penalty becomes executory and produces its penal effects from the moment it is incurred or inflicted. Therefore, the CIC grants no other remedy against a penalty already imposed than appeal or recourse without suspensive effect (can. 2243 § 1), while allowing recourse with suspensive effect (but limited to matters in which such recourse is permitted by law) when the penalty has only been threatened and not yet imposed (can. 2243 § 2).
It must also be considered that the penalty, like every penalty, entails a juridical bond between the subject and society, and therefore this bond may be multiplied as often as the violation of the law occurs (*tot poenae quot delicta*).
can. 2224), due consideration must also be given to the fact that the subject may be deprived of the very good for different reasons, and consequently, not only may the case arise where the same subject is affected by censures of different kinds, but also where the same subject is affected by multiple censures of the same kind (can. 2244). It is to be noted that the censures are: excommunication (v.), interdict (v.), and suspension (v. can. 2255 § 1), and that the first is always a censure, while the other two may be either censures or vindictive penalties (can. 2255 § 2). It must be observed that the common distinctions of penalties (v.) in general also apply to censures.
A distinction proper to censures, however, is that between reserved and non-reserved censures (v. ASSOLUZIONE; RISERVA).
5. Absolution
Regarding the cessation of censures, the fundamental principle is that, once the original relationship between the authority of the Church and the censured person has been established by the censure, it cannot be altered except through absolution (can. 2241 § 1 and 2248 § 1). There is only one exception to this rule, which occurs when the censure was imposed under a resolutory condition, in which case absolution would be implicit. Since, however, a censure is a bond in the external forum, the absolution of a censure differs essentially from the absolution of sin (v. ASSOLUZIONE): the latter reconciles man before God and cannot be effective unless the subject has all the dispositions relating to sorrow of soul for the sin committed, confession, and the formation of the sacrament of Penance; the former, on the other hand, removes the juridical bond between the offender and the society established by the application of the penalty, and may be fully effective even if the subject lacks the necessary dispositions or acts against his will. And since, as has been seen, multiple bonds of censure may accumulate in the same subject, and each bond remains distinct and independent, the subject may be absolved from one or more censures while remaining subject to the others (can. 2249 § 1); on the contrary, the absolution of sins (when dealing with mortal sins) cannot take place except through the infusion of sanctifying grace, and thus either has universal effect for all sins or has no effect even for particular sins confessed and for which the subject was repentant. Moreover, the power to absolve from sins is distinct from the power to absolve from censures: the former is jurisdiction in the sacramental internal forum, while the latter is jurisdiction in the external forum. Therefore, in the absolution of censures, the extent of the remission depends on the will of the absolver: a person subject to multiple censures who seeks absolution must indicate and specify their nature and number, since the absolution is valid only for the cases expressly mentioned. However, by provision of the law, if the absolution were general, even though the petition had been particular, it would still be effective for all censures tacitly incurred in good faith, with the exception of censures reserved in a most special way to the Holy See (can. 2249 § 2).Since a censure is a bond in the external forum, the absolution necessary for its removal is that given in the external forum; such absolution, however, also exercises its efficacy in the internal forum (can. 2251). When, instead, absolution is given in the internal forum, various cases must be distinguished: a) if the censure incurred was absolutely occult, the absolution given in the internal forum may be considered as releasing the person from the penalty even in the external forum; b) if the censure incurred was notorious and public, the offender, absolved in the internal forum, must conduct himself outwardly as censured so as not to cause scandal; c) in both cases, the authority of the external forum may demand the external observance of the censure, except when the absolution in the internal forum is proven or legitimately presumed (ibid.).
The condition ordinarily required for absolution, according to can. 2242 et seq., is the receding from contumacy (repentance for the offense, reparation of scandal, satisfaction to the party injured). In keeping with the notions of penalty mentioned above, it must be said that whoever recedes from contumacy certainly has the right to be absolved (can. 2284 § 2) after the favorable judgment of the absolver (can. 2242 § 3); but even in the absence of such receding, absolution, although generally lacking just cause, would still produce juridical effects insofar as the censure is a juridical bond entirely dependent on ecclesiastical jurisdiction.
Now, to briefly mention the faculties of the active subject of absolution, it is necessary to examine the three factual situations in which the censured person may find himself, namely: a) the ordinary case; b) the case of danger of death; c) the urgent case.
a) In the ordinary case (can. 2253): from a latae sententiae censure not reserved, any confessor may absolve in the sacramental internal forum; in the extra-sacramental external forum, anyone with jurisdiction in the external forum may absolve; from a censure imposed by a judge (ab homine), only the one who imposed the censure, his superior, or successor may absolve (can. 2245 § 2), and these alone may absolve the offender even outside his domicile or quasi-domicile; if the latae sententiae censure is reserved by law, only the one who imposed the censure or the person to whom it is reserved, their successors, superiors, and delegates may absolve (cf. also can. 239 § 1 n. 1, 401, V. RISERVA).
b) In danger of death (v.). — According to can. 882, any priest, even one not having the faculty to receive confessions, may absolve from any censure, regardless of how or in what form it was reserved. However, the censured person who, in danger of death, is absolved from a censure imposed by a judge (ab homine) or reserved in a most special way to the Apostolic See by a priest not possessing the necessary regular faculties, but only by the jurisdiction deriving from the law according to the cited canon, is bound, if he recovers his health, to have recourse within one month to the person who imposed the censure (if ab homine), to the Sacred Penitentiary, or to the bishop or to the one possessing the faculties (if reserved in a most special way), and to abide by their instructions. This obligation to have recourse, if not fulfilled through grave negligence (though physical or moral impossibility is an excusing cause), implies reincidence in the same censure already absolved, in the sense that the negligence would give rise to a new offense subject to the same penalty (can. 2252). As is clear, the censured person in this case would remain absolved from any other censure that was not imposed by a judge (ab homine) or reserved in a most special way to the Holy See.
c) case (v.). — Can. 2254 specifies that an urgent case exists, and consequently grants to all confessors the faculty to absolve from reserved censures when the restrictions imposed by the censures cannot be maintained without danger of grave scandal or infamy, or when it would be burdensome for the penitent to remain in a state of grave sin for the time necessary for the competent Superior to provide (can. 2254 § 1). This may occur even if the case is reserved without a censure.
The clause "si durum sit" must be understood, as is evident, in a subjective sense, because objectively it is always burdensome, even for a minimal period of time, to remain in a state of grave sin. From this it follows that the confessor not only may, but must believe the penitent who asserts that it is burdensome for him to remain long in his sin; and if the penitent says nothing or does not show great desire to be absolved, the confessor may stir up this desire in him and thus absolve him (cf. A. Arregui, *Sum. theol. mor.*, 14th ed., Bilbao 1927, n. 614).
Although the absolution imparted by the confessor is exercised in the sacramental internal forum, it is valid also for the external forum, save for the rights of the Superior to demand in the external forum the observance of the penalty, if his absolution cannot be proven or presumed (can. 2251).
Certain conditions are also prescribed according to which absolution must be given. Namely, the penitent must be enjoined with the obligation to have recourse within a month (under pain of relapsing into the censure) at least by letter or through
Confessor, if this can be done without serious inconvenience and without mentioning the name, to the Apostolic Penitentiary or to the bishop or to another Superior possessing the faculty, and to abide by their instructions (can. 2254 § 1).
The obligation of recourse is under pain of relapse into the censure. However, according to can. 2218 § 2, all those circumstances which excuse from grave imputability likewise excuse from the penalty of relapse, even in the external forum, provided they can be proven. Nothing prevents that, after receiving absolution and while the recourse is pending, the censured person who accuses his delict to another confessor possessing the faculty to absolve from reserved cases, may receive from him absolution and the necessary instructions, without thereafter being bound by any prescriptions that might come from the Superior to whom recourse was made (can. 2254 § 2).
It may happen, and not infrequently, that recourse is impossible. The impossibility (which is always a moral impossibility) may be on the part of the confessor or on the part of the penitent. In these cases, the same confessor may grant absolution without the formality of recourse, imposing only a suitable penance, which must be fulfilled within the time determined by the confessor, again under pain of relapse into the censure. The only exception is the case envisaged in can. 2367, namely that of the priest struck by a censure reserved specialissimo modo to the Holy See for the abusive absolution of an accomplice. In this case, since it concerns a priest who knows and can write for himself, there does not exist a moral impossibility of recourse, at least by letter, to the Apostolic Penitentiary (can. 2254 § 3).
If, however, this impossibility truly exists, moralists say that not even this case can be excluded from the general benefit.