CENSURA. – The word c., from censor, the Roman magistrate charged with keeping the citizens’ censuses up to date, and later also with watching over morals, correcting and punishing, in its various meanings always implies a judgment of censure and repression with regard to some error or disorder. Today three kinds of c. are clearly distinguished: preventive censorship of books, doctrinal or theological censorship, and medicinal penal censorship.
I. PREVENTIVE CENSORSHIP OF BOOKS
I. Notion. — The Catholic Church has among its duties that of preserving the Catholic faith from contamination by error and safeguarding the holiness of morals from corruption. And since bad print can cause the gravest harm to faith and morals, ecclesiastical authority must exercise control over the press from the religious and moral point of view. This control is exercised in two ways: one preventive, the other repressive. Through preventive censorship, the competent ecclesiastical authority seeks to prevent spiritually and morally dangerous publications; through the condemnation and prohibition of bad books already published, it seeks to remove from the hands of the faithful that pernicious literature whose publication it failed to prevent through preventive censorship. Therefore, the CIC divides this matter into two parts: de praestia librorum censura and de prohibittione librorum (canons 1384–1405). Following this division, only preventive censorship will be dealt with here (v. censorship).Ecclesiastical preventive censorship, or censorship in the strict sense, is the judgment of the competent ecclesiastical authority declaring that a particular publication may, or may not, be produced without danger to faith or good morals. This judgment, even when favorable, does not imply a positive approval of the doctrine contained in a book, but merely affirms that the book, at least in the present circumstances, is harmless; it may therefore happen that a book permitted in one place or at a given time is later prohibited elsewhere or at other times, and vice versa. The faculty or permission to publish must be distinguished from censorship: it generally follows censorship, but may be separated from it, and concerns directly not the book but its author or publisher; it is also necessary in cases in which censorship is not required.
2. Historical outline
Ecclesiastical legislation on preventive censorship began with the invention of printing (for manuscripts, repressive censorship sufficed), first with measures limited to certain dioceses or territories, and then with general provisions for the entire Catholic world. Alexander VI, having learned that many books contrary to Catholic doctrine were being published especially in the dioceses of Cologne, Mainz, Trier, and Magdeburg, prohibited, by the constitution Inter multiplices (1 June 1501), all printers in those regions from printing books, treatises, or writings on any subject without the special and explicit permission of the local Ordinaries, under penalty of latae sententiae excommunication and a fine. A few years later, Leo X, at the Fifth Lateran Council, by the constitution Inter sollicitudines (4 May 1515), issued the first general law of preventive censorship, prescribing that no one should dare to print books or writings of any kind unless they had first been examined and approved: in Rome, by His Holiness’s vicar general and the master of the Sacred Apostolic Palace, and in the other dioceses, by the respective bishops. The sanctions were: latae sententiae excommunication, a fine of 100 ducats, suspension for one year from the exercise of the printing profession, and the confiscation of the printed work, which was to be publicly burned. Leo X’s prescriptions were confirmed, with the same penalties, by the rules of the Index of the Council of Trent (Rule X), promulgated by Pius IV with the constitution Dominici gregis (24 March 1564). The aforementioned Rule X of the Council of Trent was subsequently supplemented by Clement VIII’s Instructio, prefixed to the edition of his Index of Prohibited Books (1596), and by Alexander VII’s Observaciones, promulgated with his Index (1663). Benedict XIV issued wise directives for ecclesiastical censors in the constitution Sollicita ac provida (9 July 1753). Pius IX, considering that, with the multiplication of printed works, it was no longer possible for ecclesiastical censors to follow and examine everything that was published, and taking into account the changed conditions of the times with regard to ecclesiastical discipline, introduced many modifications to his aforementioned Rule X of the Council of Trent: by an encyclical of 2 June 1848 to the episcopate of the Papal States, he restricted, for the subjects of those States, the obligation of preventive censorship to books and periodicals dealing with religious and moral subjects; and by the constitution Apostolicae Sedis (12 October 1869), he mitigated throughout the Church the spiritual penalties against transgressors of the law. The temporal penalties practically ceased to apply with the withdrawal of the support of the secular arm. Leo XIII, with the constitution Officiorum ac numerum (25 January 1897), entirely reformed, for the whole Church, the preceding legislation concerning preventive and repressive censorship, retaining in force only the aforementioned constitution Sollicita ac provida of Benedict XIV. Leo XIII’s constitution was in substance reproduced by the new CIC.3. Subject matter of preventive censorship
According to the Code currently in force (canons 1385, 1387–92), the following publications are subject to ecclesiastical preventive censorship: 1. the books of Sacred Scripture, or notes and commentaries on them; 2. a) books dealing with Sacred Scripture, sacred theology, ecclesiastical history, canon law, natural theology, ethics, and other similar religious and moral disciplines; b) books and pamphlets of prayer, devotion, or religious, moral, ascetical, mystical, and other similar doctrine and instruction, even if they appear intended to foster piety; c) in general, writings containing anything that particularly concerns religion and moral propriety; 3. sacred images, however they are to be printed, whether they have prayers added to them or are printed without them; 4. everything that in any way belongs to the processes of beatification and canonization of the servants of God, when these processes are pending before the S. Congregation of Rites; 5. all books, summaries, pamphlets, leaflets, etc. concerning indulgences and containing the grants thereof; 6. collections of the decrees of the Roman S. Congregations; 7. liturgical books and their parts, and litanies approved by the Holy See; 8. translations and new editions of a work already approved. However, extracts from periodicals, published separately, are not considered new editions and therefore do not require a new approval.Before the new CIC, some canonists excluded magazines and newspapers from preventive censorship, because the law seemed to them to be limited to books alone. But now canon 1384 § 2 explicitly provides that what is prescribed for books is to be extended also to newspapers, periodicals, and every other publication, unless the nature of the matter itself or the context of the law indicates otherwise. Naturally, the daily and periodical press is subject to preventive censorship only when its principal subject is religious and moral matters, theoretical or practical, or when it contains something that particularly concerns religion and moral propriety, either in itself or because of specific contingent circumstances; for example, if it reports new private revelations, recounts prodigious events or heavenly graces received (cf. decree of the S. C. Conc. of 7 June 1932), proposes a new form of worship (cf. decrees of the S. Uff. of 26 May 1937 and 17 April 1942), etc.
The Code does not address manuscripts, since the reason for the existence of preventive censorship is publication, that is, the dissemination of a book among the public, whereas a manuscript is not usually, in fact, widely circulated. However, the term « scriptis » in canon 1384 § 2 may be applied to handwritten works as well as to printed works. In any case, considering the purpose of the law, it must be inferred that a manuscript also falls under censorship when, reproduced in any manner, it is intended for the public and offered for sale to everyone, since in that case it too becomes published.
Whatever the competent authority for preventive censure may be, how it is exercised, and how the granting of the licentia edendi is regulated, V. IMPRIMATUR.
4. Gravity of the law and penalties in force
The law of ecclesiastical preventive censure binds all the faithful, including laypersons, and extends to the publisher of a publication, who, after the author, bears the greatest responsibility for II. It does not, however, concern the printer, who is not responsible for the sale or dissemination of the book. Naturally, he too bears moral responsibility for the publication of a bad book, but positive ecclesiastical law concerns the edition, that is, the dissemination, not the material printing of the book. The moral obligation to obey this law is in itself grave, and in the past it carried the sanction of extremely severe penalties, as has already been stated. Under the discipline currently in force, authors and publishers who, without the required permission, have books of Sacred Scripture, or notes or commentaries on it, printed incur ipso facto a non-reserved excommunication. For excommunication of publishers of books by apostates, heretics, and schismatics, V. INDICE DEI LIBRI PROIBITI. Anyone who violates other prescriptions of ecclesiastical preventive censure falls under the general provisions against transgressors of the canon laws, which authorize the diocesan bishop to take the appropriate measures, including the imposition of ecclesiastical penalties (cann. 2221, 2222). Giuseppe Monti II. DOCTRINAL OR THEOLOGICAL CENSORSHIP. — It serves to qualify a doctrine as erroneous, determining the nature and degree of its opposition to faith and morals. Such opposition may be more or less graveand profound; therefore, the judgment may be expressed by the competent authority in various ways, whence the distinction among the various censures, of which only the principal ones are indicated.
A doctrine is censured as «heretical» if it certainly and directly opposes a revealed truth defined as such by the Church and proposed for belief to her children; it is censured as «proximate to heresy» if it opposes a truth unanimously held in the Church to be revealed, but not yet defined as such; it is censured as «erroneous in faith» if it opposes a theological conclusion, that is, a truth known by inference from two premises, one of which contains a revealed truth and the other a truth known naturally by human reason. A doctrine is also called «erroneous in faith» when it opposes a truth commonly admitted by the Church, but neither defined nor soon definable as a truth of faith.
At times the censure does not concern the substance of the doctrine, but rather the unfortunate form of the propositions expressing it, insofar as they may be interpreted in a sense more or less contrary to faith and morals. In this case the propositions are qualified as «equivocal, ambiguous, captious, suspect, offensive to pious ears», etc.
At other times, however, propositions are subject to censure because of the deleterious effects that their publication might produce among the faithful. These propositions are qualified as «scandalous», «schismatic», or «seditious», according as they may lead to sin, oppose the unity of the Church by tending to lead the faithful themselves away from legitimate authority, or be such as to provoke disturbances and seditions among the people. Theological censures may be imposed on each individual proposition or in globo, when several censures are imposed on several propositions together without specifying to which of them they refer. In such a case each of the censures issued applies to some one of the propositions charged, and each of these falls under some one of those censures.
Moreover, propositions may be censured absolutely or in the sense intended by their author, where the sense intended by the author means not what he might have in his mind, but what appears objectively from the obvious and literal meaning of the propositions, confirmed by the context.
The competent authority for issuing censures is the Church, by virtue of the mission received from Christ to safeguard and defend revealed truths, namely, the pope and, with him, the ecumenical councils, as well as, derivatively, particular councils, bishops, and in general all those who have jurisdiction in the external forum, within the limits of their jurisdiction. The censures issued by them are called «judicial» or «authentic». The Church is infallible when, with the fullness of her authority, she issues the censure of heresy concerning a doctrine; and, according to the more reliable theologians and canonists, also when she issues the censure of erroneousness. In other cases it is held that she intends to perform an act of her authentic magisterium for the defense of truth. Private theologians too may judge whether or not a doctrine is orthodox: the censures once issued by the theological faculties of the Universities of Louvain, Paris, and Cologne against the errors of Luther and other innovators are well known. They nevertheless have a value corresponding to the competence of their authors, and to distinguish them from those issued by the infallible or authentic magisterium of the Church, they are called «doctrinal» or «scientific». In 1679, Innocenzo XI limited this power, establishing that no one should censure propositions or doctrines freely debated among theologians.
1904, p. 338 sgg.; Chr. Pesch, Praelectiones dogmaticae, I, ibid. 1924, p. 392 sgg.; H. Dieckmann, De Ecclesia, II, ibid. 1925, p. 201 sgg.; H. Quilliet, s. V. in DThC, II, col. 2101 sgg.
Egidio Caggiano
III. PENAL MEDICINAL CENSURE
In the penal system of the Church, censures, or medicinal penalties, occupy a particularly important place because they display certain wholly special characteristics of ecclesiastical punishment and because, in comparison with vindictive penalties (v.), they are applied far more frequently.5. History
Although the notion of a medicinal penalty is adumbrated in the Gospels (Mt. 18:17) and in St Paul (I Cor. 5:2; II Cor. 2:7-8; 5:6; II Thess. 2:14), it did not establish itself in the practice of the first centuries of Christianity. Conscious of its original coercive power, the Church did indeed from the beginning use its right to punish those disturbing the social order (especially for offences relating to the faith and to ecclesiastical persons), not limiting itself to the imposition of vindictive penalties; thus the Apostle Paul himself Satanae tradidit [I Cor. 5:2] the incestuous man of Corinth: cf. St Ambrose, De poenit., I, chap. 13.In the fourth century there are already indications of certain penalties imposed first on clerics and subsequently also on laymen usque ad emendationem, and it is this element that came to constitute the true medicinal penalty, although at that time there was still considerable uncertainty as to whether a penalty was medicinal or vindictive. It was not until the fifteenth century that the doctrine concerning the nature of the two kinds of penalty was fully formulated.
The first general censure for the entire Church was imposed by canon 24 of the Third Lateran Council (1179), and many others followed. From the fourteenth century onward, a list began to be formed of general excommunications reserved to the Roman Pontiff, which was solemnly promulgated every year on Holy Thursday by the bull In coena Domini and was then to be published in all cathedral churches; but for political reasons this did not occur everywhere, and in Rome itself such publication was omitted from 1779 onward.
As time passed, many censures fell into disuse, and the existence and validity of many others were called into question, until Pius IX, by the constitution Apostolicae Sedis (v.) of 12 October 1869, determined the censures in force; this arrangement remained applicable until the Code. The current Code, having arranged the entire penal law of the Church in Book V, in accordance with canon 6, no. 5, abrogates every different provision and admits no other source of penal law than that established by Book V.
6. Object and subject
In canon 2241 § 1, the CIC gives the essential notions of a censure, while also indicating its passive subject: Censura est poena qua homo baptizatus, delinquens et contumax, quibusdam bonis spiritualibus vel spiritualibus adnexis privatur, donec a contumacia recedens, absolvatur. A censure is therefore first and foremost a penalty (v.), and consequently the concept of penalty laid down by the legislator must be present in a censure (privatio alicuius boni ad delinquentis correctionem et delicti punitionem: canon 2215). According to this concept, a penalty does not consist in inflicting a positive evil, but in depriving the subject of a good he possesses, for the twofold purpose of restoring the juridical order violated by the offence and reforming the offender.Scholars are not in agreement as to which of the two elements of the definition—the restorative or the corrective—is predominant and essential. Nevertheless, it must be observed that the rule nulla poena sine delicto applies to every penalty, and therefore also to medicinal penalties. Since the formal reason that moves the legislator to establish as an offence specific forms of violation of the law is not the harm that the offender does to himself by committing the offence, but rather the damage thereby caused to society, the intrinsic foundation of every penalty can be nothing other than the restoration of the juridical order injured by the violation of the law. Thus, although a censure serves particular corrective purposes, because it is nevertheless a penalty, it cannot lack the aforementioned intrinsic foundation of punishment.
According to the cited canon, the object of the deprivation imposed on the offender is bonum spirituale vel spiritualibus adnexum. It is obvious that spiritual good can here mean only a good dependent upon the administration of the Church and enjoyed by the faithful as a member of the Church—for example, the administration and reception of the Sacraments, the sacrifice of the Mass, ecclesiastical offices, benefices and their revenues, the officia divina (canon 2256 § 1), ecclesiastical burial (canon 1203 ff.), the exercise of Holy Orders, and so forth. It cannot, however, mean an intrinsic spiritual good, that is, one inherent in the soul and not dependent upon the will of the Church, such as the sacramental character, the power of Order, sanctifying Grace, infused virtues, or goods proceeding from individual faithful (such as private prayers). Since these goods are not directly subject to ecclesiastical jurisdiction and concern direct relations between the soul and God, the Church has no power to deprive subjects of them; censures may, however, be imposed whose object is goods attached to spiritual things.
As regards the active subject of medicinal penalties, V. PENALTY: it will suffice here to observe that, besides the supreme legislator who establishes the universally applicable law (though he may also enact particular laws for specific territories), and besides particular legislators (whether individual or collegial: canon 2221), there are also certain ecclesiastical authorities endowed with the power of the external forum. By virtue of this power, and in view of the highly special nature of the canonical penal system (especially that of censures), they may, in order to remove subjects from violation of the law or induce them to desist from the offence, impose specific precepts with an attached sanction (canon 2220 § 1). Violation of these precepts entails the imposition of the penalty either by sentence (ferendae sententiae) or ipso facto (latae sententiae). This notion must be kept in mind when it is later necessary to assume the legal element of the offence (which may be the law or the precept with canonical sanction), and particularly when considering the question of reserved and non-reserved penalties, as well as the canonical admonition necessary for the imposition of censures.
As for the passive subject of a censure, just as every act of ecclesiastical jurisdiction can be exercised only over subjects of the Church, so a censure can affect only the baptized. Through Baptism, in fact, while man becomes a person in the Church (canon 87), he acquires the fundamental capacity for those spiritual goods—which he must possess at the time of the censure—the deprivation of which is effected by the censure. Apostates, heretics, and schismatics do not cease to be subjects of the Church; indeed, their defection is regarded by canon law as an offence punished by the gravest penalties.
Although an ecclesiastical penalty, a censure is nevertheless a penalty sui generis, that is, a medicinal penalty, a designation intended especially to emphasize its distinctive extrinsic purpose, namely, the correction of the offender. For this reason the cited canon adds donec a contumacia recedens absolvatur, expressly indicating that the presupposition for subjecting someone to a censure is contumacy, and that, upon abandoning it, he has the right to be absolved. Precisely because of its corrective purpose and the necessity of contumacy, a censure cannot be applied to an offence that has already been completely exhausted, including its effects. For punishability, it is instead necessary that the offence have a subsequent duration (that is, be a continuing offence: V. OFFENCE), or that the effects requiring reparation persist at the time when the censure is imposed. Nor can it be imposed for an indeterminate period or for the lifetime of the offender, since that would render withdrawal from contumacy irrelevant. On the other hand, a censure latae sententiae, which may be incurred by an unknown offender, that is, one who is not known, cannot be imposed on an uncertain offender.
From these notions it is evident that the essential elements for incurring a medicinal penalty are two: 1) the delict; 2) contumacy.
Censorship, like every other penalty, presupposes the delict; indeed, since it is a very grave penalty (particularly when one incurs the form of a latae sententiae penalty), particularly grave imputability and the consummation of the delict are required (cc. 2242 § 1, 2229 § 2, 2228); the Code also admonishes that it be applied with moderation and circumspection (can. 2241 § 2). This norm had already been laid down by the Council of Trent in order to eliminate the abuse that had arisen through the extremely frequent infliction of excommunication; since censorship consists in the deprivation of spiritual goods, it constitutes a powerful means of inducing the censured person to repentance, but when abused it can only bring about social disintegration and consequently the ruin of souls si temere, aut levibus ex rebus incutatur magis contemni, quam formidari et perniciem potius parere quam salutem (sess. XXIII, chap. 3, de Ref.).
It is also necessary that the delict have been committed with specific contumacy, which, from the verb contemnere, consists in the contemptus censurae, that is, in the criminal will that refuses to withdraw from the delict and to submit to reparation for the effects produced by II.
A fundamental principle of penal law is that no penalty may be inflicted when the commission of the delict has not been established with certainty (can. 2233 § 1); but when censorship is concerned, this presupposition is insufficient, since the law strictly prescribes that reus reprehendatur ac monentur ut a contumacia recedat... dato, si prudenti eiusdem iudicis vel superioris arbitrio casus id ferat, congruo ad resipiscentiam tempore (can. 2233 § 2). This form of admonition is prescribed essentially when the issue is the infliction of censorship ferendae sententiae; but in order to incur censorship latae sententiae, such express admonition is not required, and transgression of the law or precept imposing a latae sententiae penalty is sufficient. In other words: since censorship is a medicinal penalty given ad frangendam contumaciam, this must be established after admonition, which may occur in two distinct forms: admonition by the judge or superior, when censures ferendae sententiae are concerned, in which case the contumacy will be formal; and admonition contained in the law or precept, when censures latae sententiae are concerned, in which case the contumacy may be called interpretative, because the law itself or the precept imposing the penalty contains the admonition (lex interpellat pro homine).
Nor would the monitio be required when, after the medicinal penalty latae sententiae had been incurred, it was a matter of proceeding to a declaratory sentence (v. SENTENZA) in order to obtain all its effects in the external forum (can. 2232 § 1), provided, naturally, that the accused be summoned so that he may defend himself, unless the delict be notorious (v. DELITTO; can. 1747 n. 1).
Censorship becomes operative and produces penal effects from the moment at which it is incurred or inflicted. Therefore, with regard to censorship already imposed, the CIC can grant no remedy other than an appeal or recourse without suspensive effect (can. 2243 § 1), while allowing recourse with suspensive effect as well (but only in matters for which such recourse is permitted by law) when the censorship has merely been threatened and has not yet been imposed (can. 2243 § 2).
It must also be considered that censorship, like every penalty, entails a juridical bond between the subject and society, and consequently this bond may be multiplied as often as violation of the law occurs (tot poenae quot delicta: can. 2224), also bearing in mind that the subject may be deprived of the same good on different grounds, and consequently not only may the same subject be struck by censures of different kinds, but the same subject may also be struck by several censures of the same kind (can. 2244). excommunication (v.), interdict (v.), and suspension (v. can. 2255 § 1), and that the first is always a censure, whereas the other two may be either censures or vindictive penalties (can. 2255 § 2), it must be observed that the customary distinctions of penalty (v.) in general also apply to censures.
Proper to censures, however, is the distinction between reserved and non-reserved censures (v. ASSOLUZIONE; RISERVA).
7. Absolution
With regard to the cessation of censures, the fundamental principle is that, once the original relationship between the authority of the Church and the censured person has been constituted by the censure, it cannot be modified except by absolution (cc. 2241 § 1 and 2248 § 1). A single exception is made in the event that the censure was imposed under a resolutive condition, in which case absolution would be implicit. Since, however, the penalty is a bond of the external forum, absolution from censure differs essentially from absolution from sin (v. ASSOLUZIONE): the latter reconciles man before God and can be effective only if all the dispositions of the subject relating to the animi dolor de peccato commisso, to the accusation, and to the constitution of the sacrament of Penance are present; the former, on the other hand, removes the juridical bond between the delinquent and society that was brought about by the application of the penalty, and can be fully effective even if the subject lacked such dispositions or against his will. And since, as has been seen, several penal bonds may be accumulated in the same subject, and each bond remains separate and independent, he may be absolved from one or more censures while the others remain (can. 2249 § 1); absolution from sins, on the contrary (when mortal sins are concerned), since it can take place only through the infusion of sanctifying Grace, either has universal effect for all sins or has no effect even for particular sins confessed and of which the subject was repentant. Moreover, the potestas absolventi a censuris is one thing, and the potestas absolventi a peccatis another: the former is jurisdiction of the external forum, the latter jurisdiction of the sacramental internal forum. In the absolution from censures, therefore, the extent of the remission depends on the will of the absolving authority: whoever is entangled in several censures and asks for absolution must indicate and specify their nature and number, since absolution is valid only for the cases expressed. By provision of law, however, if the absolution were general, even though the petition had been particular, it would nevertheless be effective for all censures omitted in good faith, with the exception of censures reserved specialissimo modo to the Holy See (can. 2249 § 2).Since the censure is a bond of the external forum, the absolution necessary for its cessation is that given in the external forum; this, however, also exercises its efficacy in the internal forum (can. 2251). When, on the other hand, absolution is given in the internal forum, various cases must be distinguished: a) if the censure incurred had been absolutely occult, the person absolved in the internal forum may be considered released from the penalty also in the external forum; b) if the censure incurred had been notorious and public, the delinquent, absolved in the internal forum, must conduct himself as censured in external acts in order not to cause scandal; c) in both cases, the authority of the external forum may demand outward observance of the censure, except when the absolution in the internal forum has been proved or is legitimately presumed (ibid.).
The condition ordinarily required for absolution, according to can. 2242 ff., is withdrawal from contumacy (delicti poenitentia, scandali reparatio, partis laesae satisfactio). Consistently with the notions of punishment mentioned above, it must be said that whoever withdraws from contumacy certainly has the right to be absolved (can. 2284 § 2), after the favorable judgment of the absolving authority (can. 2242 § 3); but even in the absence of such withdrawal, absolution, although generally lacking just cause, would nevertheless equally be、】【
productive of legal effects, since the c. is a legal bond wholly dependent upon ecclesiastical jurisdiction.
Now, to indicate briefly the powers of the active subject of absolution, it is necessary to examine the three factual situations in which the censured person may find himself, namely: a) the ordinary case; b) danger of death; c) the urgent case.
a) In the ordinary case (can. 2253): from a non-reserved c. latae sententiae, any confessor may absolve in the sacramental internal forum; in the extrasacramental forum, anyone possessing external-forum jurisdiction; from a c. ab homine, only the person who imposed the c., his superior, and his successor may absolve (can. 2245 § 2), and they alone may absolve the offender even outside his domicile or quasi-domicile; if the c. latae sententiae is reserved by law, only the person who established the c. or the one to whom it is reserved may absolve, together with their successors, superiors, and delegates (cf. also cann. 239 § 1 n. 1, 401, and V. RISERVA).
b) In danger of death (v.). — According to can. 882, anyone who is a priest, even if he does not have the faculty to hear confessions, may absolve from any c., regardless of the manner or form in which it was reserved. The censured person, however, who in danger of death has been absolved from a c. ab homine or from one a iure specialissimo modo Sedi Apostolicae reservata by a priest lacking the relevant ordinary faculties, but possessing only the jurisdiction ex iure by virtue of the cited canon, is obliged, if he recovers his health, to have recourse within one month to the person who imposed the c. (if ab homine), to the S. Penitentiary, or to the bishop or another person possessing the faculty (if reserved specialissimo modo), and to comply with their directives. If this obligation of recourse is not fulfilled through grave negligence (though physical or moral impossibility is an excusing cause), it entails reincidence in the same c. from which he had already been absolved, in the sense that the negligence gives rise to a new offence subject to the same penalty (can. 2252). Clearly, in such a case the censured person would remain absolved from every other c. that was not ab homine or a iure specialissimo modo Sanctae Sedi reservata. Giacomo Violardo
c) In the urgent case (v.). — Can. 2254 specifies that an urgent case exists and consequently grants all confessors the faculty to absolve from reserved c., when the restrictions imposed by the c. cannot be maintained without danger of grave scandal or infamy, or when it would be burdensome for the penitent to remain in a state of grave sin for the time necessary for the competent Superior to take action (can. 2254 § 1). This may also occur when the matter is reserved absque censura.
The clause (si durum sit) must evidently be understood in a subjective sense, because objectively it is always burdensome, even for the briefest period, to remain in a state of grave sin. It follows that the confessor not only may, but must believe the penitent who states that remaining long in his sin would be burdensome for him; and if the penitent says nothing or does not show a strong desire to be absolved, the confessor may arouse this desire in him and thus absolve him (cf. A. Arregui, Sum. theol. mor., 14ª ed., Bilbao 1927, n. 614).
Although the absolution imparted by the confessor is exercised in the sacramental internal forum, it is also valid for the external forum, without prejudice to the Superior’s right to demand in the external forum observance of the penalty, if his absolution can be neither proved nor presumed (can. 2251).
Certain conditions are also prescribed according to which absolution must be granted. The penitent must, that is, be enjoined to have recourse within one month (under penalty of falling again into the c.), at least by letter or through the
confessor, if this can be done without serious inconvenience, and without mentioning his name, to the S. Penitentiary or to the bishop or another Superior possessing the faculty, and to comply with their instructions (can. 2254 § 1).
The obligation of recourse is sub poena reincidentiae. However, according to can. 2218 § 2, all those circumstances that excuse from grave imputability likewise excuse from the poena reincidentiae, even in the external forum, provided that they can be proved. Nothing prevents the censured person who, after receiving absolution and while the recourse is pending, confesses his offence with c. to another confessor possessing the faculty to absolve from reserved cases from receiving from him absolution and the appropriate injunctions, without thereafter remaining bound by the prescriptions that might come from the Superior to whom recourse was made (can. 2254 § 2).
It may happen, and not infrequently, that recourse is impossible. The impossibility (which is always moral impossibility) may arise either on the part of the confessor or on the part of the penitent. In these cases the same confessor may grant absolution, without the obligation of recourse, only by imposing an appropriate satisfaction, which must be fulfilled within the time determined by the confessor, here too sub poena reincidentiae. The sole exception is the case of can. 2367, namely, a priest struck by excommunication reserved specialissimo modo to the S. See for the abusive absolution of an accomplice. In this case, since the priest in question knows how and is able to write for himself, there is no moral impossibility of having recourse, at least by letter, to the S. Penitentiary (can. 2254 § 3).
If, however, this impossibility truly existed, the moral theologians say that even this case cannot be excluded from the general benefit.