JUDGMENT. – It is the juridical act by which the dispute is concluded that has not ceased for other reasons (prescription, renunciation, transaction); it is defined by the CIC as “legittima pronuntiatio qua iudex causam sibi litigantibus propositam et iudiciali modo pertractatam definit” (can. 1868 § 1).
Judgments, with respect to their content, are on the merits or on procedure, according as they define the dispute regarding what constitutes the object of the substantive legal relationship in question or resolve questions of a procedural nature. The judgment will then be definitive if it resolves the principal cause either by denying the existence of one or more procedural prerequisites or by examining the merits; it will instead be interlocutory if it affirms the existence of necessary procedural prerequisites or resolves an incidental cause arising during the course of the principal cause. In turn, the interlocutory judgment may be either simple, mixed, or having the force of a definitive judgment, according as it merely resolves the incidental matter, leaving the positions and developments of the principal cause unimpaired, or alters them in such a way as practically to exclude a definitive judgment (this is the case with every interlocutory ruling that, for example, ascertains the existence of procedural prerequisites or the existence of defects in the constitution of the process or the peremption), or prejudges the same in the sense that it necessarily determines its content (which occurs, for example, when an interlocutory judgment ascertains the age in matters of restitutio in integrum). This last distinction has practical importance: a) because the judge may, before the principal cause is concluded, correct or modify only interlocutory judgments, even those having the force of definitive judgments, but not definitive judgments, except in the case provided for in can. 1878, at the request of a party or, after hearing the parties, ex officio; b) because the appeal against interlocutory judgments is permitted only with respect to those having the value of a definitive judgment (can. 1880 n. 6). With respect to the action, judgments are distinguished into condemnatory, which impose some condemnation upon one or more parties in favor of others; declaratory, which merely pronounce a mere ascertainment of a right in favor of one or more parties and to the prejudice of others; and constitutive, by which legal situations are altered or created, from which new substantive legal relationships arise in favor of one or more parties. The judgment, finally, is just or unjust (or legitimate or illegitimate) according as it conforms or not to the laws, and valid or invalid (or null) according as it conforms or not in all its substantial elements.
No judge must pronounce judgment without first having acquired, iuxta acta et probata and by means of a free evaluation (which he will make, that is, according to his own conscience) or obligatory (where he must follow criteria established by law) of the results of the instruction, for his own intimate conviction, the moral certainty regarding what is to be the object of the judgment itself (can. 1869 § 1). When the moral certainty required by law cannot be attained, whether on account of doubts of law, that is, doubts regarding the law to be applied, or doubts of fact, concerning the factual situation, the judge, if general principles of presumption proper to canon law are not applicable to the former (e.g., de iure divino et humano melior est condicio possidentis, in dubio pro reo quia nemo praesumitur esse malus, in dubio pro matrimonio, etc.; cf. can. 1014, 1127, 1869 § 4, 1677 § 2, 2233) and if supplementary proofs (suppletory oath, expert clarifications) have not sufficed for the latter, he shall decide the cause on the merits by declaring that the right of the plaintiff is not proven and absolving the defendant from the judgment. When the cause is to be decided by a collegial judge, the moral certainty that each member of the college is obliged to acquire before expressing his own judgment on the definition of the cause must be translated into a deliberation reflecting the will of the college, and for this the law establishes the criterion of an absolute majority of votes (can. 1577 § 1); if, however, there is exceptionally a judging college composed of an even number of members and an absolute majority is not formed, the cause shall be decided according to the general criterion actor non probante reus absolvitur, unless the Ordinary believes it appropriate to substitute the judges.
As regards the manner of proceeding in the deliberation of the judgment, the CIC requires that this be reached as soon as the discussion is closed; but it does not exclude that, when the cause is considered complex, the same may allow a more or less lengthy interval of time to elapse, according to the circumstances, between the final moment of the discussion and that of the deliberation (can. 1870). If the judge is collegial, the president of the college fixes the place (which will normally be the seat of the tribunal [can. 1636]), the day, and the hour at which the members of the college are to meet to render the deliberation. At this meeting, each judge will participate equipped with his written conclusions as well as the written reasons on which they are based; these conclusions will then be preserved sub secreto together with the acts of the cause. At the meeting, the conclusions themselves will be read in order according to precedence, so that it always begins with the ponens or relator of the cause, and a moderate discussion will be held under the direction of the president of the college, during which the judges are naturally permitted to modify their opinion (can. 1871 § 2, 3, 4; cf. Regulae Rotae § 178). If the discussion is not completed on the day established or if it is otherwise useful to continue it on another day, the judges may defer the deliberation, provided that the deferral is not for more than one week (can. 1871 § 5, and for the Rota, loc. cit., 31 § 4). Any unjustified deferral of the deliberation of the cause could in fact give rise to the recourse provided for in can. 1625.
The judgment must, in its content, define first of all the controversy and for this purpose absolve or condemn the defendant or declare the disputed rights (can. 1873 § 1) in relation to the libellus, the joinder of issue, the changes in the libellus itself, and the incidental questions that may have arisen in the course of the trial as well as the causes connected with the principal cause. Moreover, the judgment must specify in a determinate form (that is, not alternative, except where special provisions of law admit an alternative judgment) and absolute (that is, not conditional, except where the condition pertains to an act that does not require further cognition: e.g., decisive oath), as well as the terms of the compulsory execution to which the losing party is subjected in relation also to the accessories of the principal claim, the conditions of time and place in which the execution itself is to take place (can. 1873 § 1, n. 2). The judgment must be reasoned with the enunciation of the factual and legal grounds on which the operative part of the ruling is based (can. 1837 § 1, n. 3). With regard to the legal grounds, the judge is free to present them in the order he deems fit, without the conclusions of the parties in any way binding him, provided that he naturally resorts to legal norms pertinent to the factual situation; for the factual grounds, the judge may not go beyond the scope of the acta et probata. Finally, the judgment must contain the ruling on the costs of the trial, which generally follow the outcome (can. 1873 § 1; cf. Regulae Rotae, § 184). This decision on costs, by ensuring that even in this respect the regulation of the controversy is exhausted in the judgment, has the purpose of preventing future disputes between the parties over the matter that was the object of the litigation.
The following elements, set forth in can. 1874, also contribute to the constitution of the sentence (s.).
It must begin with the invocation of the Divine Name; thereafter all identifying data of the judge issuing the sentence, as well as of the parties who have been in litigation and their procurators, must be specified (can. 1874 § 2; cf. Regulae Rotae § 181, 1). Next, the legal matter must be briefly stated, the doubts submitted for resolution to the judge must be set forth, and the conclusions of the parties must be reported. These are followed by: the proper reasoning of the sentence, which will consist of two parts—one in iure and the other in facto (each of which sometimes takes the respective form of “considerando” and “resultando”)—and the dispositive part, in which the judge answers the doubts and rules on costs, adopting, if necessary, the executory formula. Finally, the sentence is concluded with the indication of the place and time and the signatures of the judge or of all members of the adjudicating panel and of the notary (can. 1874 § 5).
For the sentence to be juridically operative, it must, like the law, be published. Publication must occur as soon as possible, though the law has not established any specific term (can. 1876); and under current positive law it is effected, unlike what was prescribed in the ius vetus (according to which the sentence in ordinary proceedings was published by reading it aloud in the session in the presence of the parties, and in summary proceedings by notification to the parties), in the three ways fixed by can. 1877. That is, the sentence may be published by the judge reading it aloud summarily in a session set for that purpose, after summoning the parties to appear. Publication may also be made by the judge notifying the parties that the sentence has been deposited in the chancery and simultaneously granting them the right to read it in the chancery and to request a copy. Lastly, the sentence is deemed published when it is notified to the parties by means of the postal service, in accordance with can. 1719. Nothing, however, prevents such notification from being carried out by the court’s messengers in virtue of that provision.
Finally, it must be considered that once the sentence has been perfected by publication, as a juridical act resolving the relationship of cognition it produces certain effects, namely: a) the obligation to pay costs falls upon the losing party; b) res iudicata, understood also in the substantive sense of the definitiveness of the sentence with respect to future proceedings; and c) the executory action (actio iudicati).