SENTENZA. — This is the juridical act by which a dispute that has not come to an end for other reasons (prescription, renunciation, settlement) is concluded; it is defined by the CIC as « legitima pronuntiatio qua iudex causam a litigantibus propositam et iudiciali modo pertractam definit » (can. 1868 § 1).
With regard to their content, judgments are judgments on the merits or judgments on procedure, according as they define the dispute with respect to what constitutes the object of the substantive legal relationship stated therein, or resolve questions of a procedural nature. A judgment, moreover, is definitive if it resolves the principal case, either by denying the existence of one or more procedural prerequisites or through examination of the merits; it is interlocutory, on the other hand, if it affirms the existence of necessary procedural prerequisites or resolves an incidental matter arising during the course of the principal case. In turn, an interlocutory judgment may be either simple or mixed, or have the force of a definitive judgment, according as it merely resolves the incidental matter while leaving the positions and developments of the principal case unaffected, or alters them in such a way as practically to exclude a definitive judgment (this is the case with every interlocutory pronouncement which, for example, establishes the existence of procedural prerequisites or of defects in the constitution of the proceedings, or else the peremption), or prejudices the latter in the sense that it necessarily determines its content (which occurs when, for example, an interlocutory judgment establishes age in the matter of restitutio in integrum). This last distinction has practical importance: a) because, before the principal case has ended, the judge may correct or modify only interlocutory judgments, even those having the force of definitive judgments, and not definitive judgments, except in the case referred to in can. 1878, upon the application of a party or, after hearing the parties, ex officio; b) because an appeal against interlocutory judgments lies only with respect to those having the value of definitive judgments (can. 1880 n. 6). With regard, moreover, to the action, judgments are distinguished as condamatorie, which impose any condemnation upon one or more parties in favor of others; dichiarative, which are limited to pronouncing a mere determination of law in favor of one or more parties and to the detriment of others; and costitutive, by which legal situations are changed or created, giving rise to new relationships of substantive law in favor of one or more parties. Finally, a judgment is giusta or ingiusta (or legittima or illegittima) according as it conforms or does not conform to the laws, and valida or invalida (or tritia) according as it is complete or incomplete with respect to all its essential elements.
No judge may issue a judgment without first having acquired, iusta acta et probata, through the evaluation—free (that is, made according to his own conscience) or obligatory (that is, where he must follow criteria predetermined by law)—of the results of the inquiry, the moral certainty, by his own intimate conviction, concerning what must itself be the object of the judgment (can. 1869 § 1). When the moral certainty required by law could not be attained, whether because of doubts of law, that is, concerning the law to be applied, or because of doubts of fact, concerning the factual situation, the judge, where certain general principles of presumption proper to canon law are not applicable to the former («de iure divino et humano melior est condicio possidentis, in dubio pro reo quia nemo praesumitur esse malus, in dubio pro matrimonio, ecc.» cf. : cann. 1014, 1127, 1869 § 4, 1677 § 2, 2233), and where the supplementary evidence has not proved sufficient in the latter (supplementary oath, expert clarifications), shall decide the case on the merits by declaring that the plaintiff’s right has not been established to him and dismissing the defendant from the proceedings. When the case must be decided by a collegiate court, the moral certainty which every member of the panel is obliged to acquire before expressing his own judgment on the resolution of the case must be translated into a decision reproducing the will of the panel; for this purpose the law establishes the criterion of an absolute majority of votes (can. 1577 § 1). If, however, exceptionally, the adjudicating panel consists of an even number of members and no majority is formed, the case shall be decided according to the general principle actore non probante reus absolutur, unless the Ordinary considers that the judges should be replaced.
As to the manner of proceeding in deliberating the judgment, the CIC requires that this take place as soon as the discussion has been closed; but it does not exclude the possibility that, when the case is considered complex, it may allow an interval of greater or lesser length, according to the circumstances, between the final moment of the discussion and that of the deliberation (can. 1870). If the court is collegiate, the president of the panel determines the place (which will normally be the seat of the tribunal [can. 1636]), the day, and the hour at which the members of the panel are to meet in order to deliberate. At this meeting the individual judges shall each attend equipped with the written conclusions, as well as the written reasons on which they rest; these conclusions shall then be kept sub secreto together with the case records. At the meeting the conclusions themselves shall be read in order of precedence, so that the reading always begins with the ponent or relator of the case, and a moderate discussion shall take place under the direction of the president of the panel; during this discussion the judges are naturally permitted to modify their opinions (can. 1871 §§ 2, 3, 4; cf. Regulae Rotae § 178). If the discussion is not completed on the appointed day, or if it is in any event useful to continue it on another day, the judges may postpone the deliberation, provided that the postponement does not exceed one week (can. 1871 § 5, and for the Rota, loc. cit., 31 § 4). Any unjustified postponement of the deliberation of the case could indeed give rise to the appeal referred to in can. 1625.
In its content, the judgment must first of all decide the controversy and, for this purpose, acquit or condemn the defendant, or declare the rights in dispute (can. 1873 § 1), in relation to the petition, the litis contestatio, amendments to the petition itself, and incidental questions that may have arisen during the proceedings, as well as cases connected with the principal case. The judgment must also specify in determinate form (that is, not alternatively, unless special provisions of law permit an alternative judgment) and absolutely (that is, not conditionally, unless the condition concerns an act not requiring further examination: e.g., a decisive oath), in addition to the terms of the compulsory execution to which the unsuccessful party is thereby bound, also in relation to the accessories of the principal claim, the conditions of time and place in which that execution is to take place (can. 1873 § 1, n. 2). The judgment must state its reasons by setting forth the grounds of fact and law on which the operative part of the pronouncement is based (can. 1837 § 1, n. 3). With regard to the grounds of law, the judge is free to present them in whatever order he considers appropriate, without the parties’ conclusions in any way binding him, provided, naturally, that he has recourse to legal norms relevant to the factual situation; as for the grounds of fact, however, the judge may not go beyond the scope of the acta et probata. Finally, the judgment must contain the decision concerning the costs of the proceedings, which generally follow the outcome against the unsuccessful party (can. 1873 § 1; cf. Regulae Rotae, § 184). This decision concerning costs, by ensuring that the regulation of the controversy is exhausted in the judgment also in this respect, is intended to prevent disputes between the parties from remaining pending in the future concerning the matter that formed the subject of the litigation.
The extrinsic elements specified in can. 1874 also contribute to constituting the judgment. It must begin with the invocation of the Divine Name; thereafter, all the identifying details of the judge issuing the judgment, as well as of the parties who have appeared in the proceedings and of their procurators, must be specified (can. 1874 § 2; cf. Regulae Rotae § 181, 1). The facts of the case must then be stated briefly, together with the questions submitted to the judge for resolution and the parties’ conclusions. These are followed by the proper reasoning of the judgment, which consists of two parts, one in iure and the other in facto (both of which sometimes assume respectively the form of a series of considerando and risultando), and by the operative part, which answers the questions and rules on costs, adopting, where necessary, the enforcement formula. The judgment concludes with an indication of the place and date and the signatures of the judge or of all the members of the judicial panel and of the notary (can. 1874 § 5).
For the judgment to be legally operative, it must, like the law, be published. Publication must take place as soon as possible, although the law has established no time limit (can. 1876); under the law currently in force, unlike what was prescribed by the ius vetus (according to which a judgment was published in ordinary proceedings by reading it at the hearing in the presence of the parties, and in summary proceedings by notifying the parties), publication is effected in the three ways established by can. 1877. The judgment may, that is, be published by the judge’s reading of a summary of it at a hearing specifically scheduled for that purpose, after the parties have been summoned to appear. Publication may also take place by notifying the parties that the judge has deposited the judgment in the registry and simultaneously granting them the opportunity to read it there and to request a copy. Finally, the judgment is deemed published when it is notified to the parties through the postal service, in accordance with can. 1719. Nothing, however, prevents such notification, by virtue of that provision, from also being carried out by cursors.
Finally, it should be considered that, once perfected through publication, the judgment, as the legal act resolving the adjudicatory relationship, produces specific effects, namely: a) the obligation to pay costs incumbent upon the unsuccessful party; b) res judicata, understood also in its substantive sense as the finality of the judgment with respect to future proceedings; c) the enforcement action (actio iudicati).
Fernando Della Rocca