Secret

SECRET. - Materially understood, the secret is the same hidden thing; formally understood, it is the knowledge of that thing with the obligation not to disclose or communicate it to others.

SUMMARY:

I. General notion

II. Sacramental S. (Seal). - III. S. of the Holy Office. - IV. Professional S.

I. GENERAL NOTION

Undoubtedly, man does not possess only the right of property over external things or the free disposal of the members of his body; he also has a true dominion over his own ideas and actions. Some of these are so intimate and personal that, by their very nature, they demand to be kept hidden from others (e.g., the intimate relations of the soul with God). Even if knowledge of them should leak to others, it is natural that such knowledge be kept circumscribed, at least until it enters the realm of public interest or the common good. Other ideas and actions, however, are not so strictly personal as to require this confidentiality or preservation of secrecy by their very nature, but they demand it due to extrinsic circumstances—for instance, to avoid harm to the acting subject or to third parties. Finally, some ideas or actions of others must be kept in a reserved environment because a commitment or promise to that effect has been made beforehand, or because the information was communicated for a private interest to persons who are commonly bound by secrecy. Depending on the different source from which the obligation of secrecy may arise, one speaks of natural, promised, and entrusted secrecy.

Natural secrecy pertains to the first and second categories of information, in which the object itself demands secrecy, either because it concerns ideas and actions that have a strictly personal and private order or because it involves ideas or actions whose disclosure could harm either individual or common good (e.g., the preservation of good reputation, the avoidance of damage, or the provision of assistance). Entrusted secrecy pertains to information learned through communication from someone who possessed it, with an explicit or implicit agreement that the information would not proceed further. Promised secrecy pertains to information for which the recipient has committed to keeping its knowledge confined to himself or to a few others.

Thus far, the problem has been considered primarily from a personal standpoint—the right that the person has over his ideas, actions, and even his reputation (v.). However, the problem of secrecy is connected with other grave issues, particularly that of language and the communication of ideas. Language is made precisely for the exchange of ideas among men: what, then, are the relationships between the communication of ideas, language, and secrecy? From this perspective, three groups of questions deserve particular attention: those concerning the obligation to speak or to remain silent, those regarding the behavior to adopt when one has both the obligation and the faculty to remain silent, and those concerning the attitude to assume toward the information of others.

1. OBLIGATION TO SPEAK AND TO REMAIN SILENT

It is well known that man, among other things, has the faculty to express his thoughts or his states of mind. It is also known that he can do so only by means of signs; he is not, in fact, capable of directly transmitting the content of his judgments and reasonings, the object of his knowledge and reflections. Finally, it is known that the signs he employs are substantially free. The transmission of thought is not a necessary fact, an ineluctable phenomenon that imposes itself fatally upon the thinking man. It is possible for someone to have a thought and not manifest it; it may even happen that one expresses something he does not possess; in other words, it is possible for thought to lack external expression, and, in the event that such expression exists, it is possible for it to conform to the thought and reproduce it or even to be at variance with it and veil II. Looking more deeply, one may say that men are quite reluctant to communicate about themselves or others things that they fear may harm their interests or reputation; they are, however, ready to say what they think may benefit them; indeed, they easily reach the point, in the latter case, of inventing what is not, and, in the former, of denying even what is, lying in both cases, though in different forms. Finally, if one considers the usual consequences that occur when one tells the truth and when one lies, one finds that they are very different; they depend on what is said (it is not the same to say something pleasant or unpleasant); on the manner in which it is said (it is not the same to speak inconsiderately and without prudence, or, instead, with regard and finesse); on habitual behavior (an isolated lie is not usually enough to destroy a person’s credibility, just as an isolated truth is not enough to restore it to one who has lost it; the habit of lying destroys credibility, just as the habit of truthfulness confers great credibility).

From the phenomena indicated and from what has been said above about secrecy, a complex of problems arises. Is it permissible in some cases to conceal one’s thought? Are there cases in which it is necessary to do so? Can one go so far as to alter one’s thought, that is, to lie? As can be seen, these are the grave moral problems of secrecy and falsehood. Here, the latter are deliberately set aside (for which V. MENZOGNA) to focus on those of silence or secrecy.

Already on the basis of natural law alone, it can be said that, since speech is a human faculty, it is subject to the norm that governs the morality of man’s faculties, that is, the harmonious development of the person, in total subordination to God, in the use of things, in respect and love for other human creatures, or—to use the words of Christ, which undoubtedly also apply to the faculty of speech—love of God and neighbor. Everyone, therefore, will be free to say or to conceal what does not harm the person and does not contradict either the subjection due to God or the justice and love due to one’s brothers; he will, however, be obliged to say what is necessary for his own good and that of others and to conceal what harms any of the persons indicated.

However, it is not always easy to see how to apply the principles indicated in concrete terms. Consider, for example, the realm of speaking to children, especially regarding sexual initiation, or speaking to the gravely ill, etc. What is good to say to all these? Each of the chosen solutions—to say everything, to conceal everything, or to say only a part—has advantages and disadvantages, and it is not always clear in practice which is the good one. Indeed, more than once, it will not be possible to obtain the good of all simultaneously. In these cases, recourse to the well-known "principle of double effect," or of the "greater good" or the "lesser evil," which has such wide application in the concrete circumstances of human affairs, will be inevitable. In this matter, the two terms of comparison are often public interest or private interest; fidelity to a promise or assistance to one’s neighbor. The greater good to be observed often takes the name of causa scusans that exempts from secrecy. The social importance of the theme could not fail to attract the attention of civil and ecclesiastical legislators. Both legislations take care to establish a minimum of cases in which they impose the obligation to speak or to remain silent.

The obligation to speak—and to tell the truth—acquires singular prominence and gives rise to particular problems in the field of procedural law. Since judicial activity, both civil and criminal, has as its primary duty the ascertainment of the truth, which is manifestly an essential presupposition for the correct application of the law and thus for a just sentence, it is readily understood that the obligation of truthfulness is rigorously prescribed, with the most severe sanctions, for those who—such as witnesses (v.) and experts (v.)—must assist the judges in clarifying the reality of the facts at issue. This obligation does not extend to the accused, nor to the close relatives of the defendant (Italian Civil Code, art. 350; for canon law cf. can. 1743) and certain categories of persons bound by professional secrecy (v. TESTIMONE).

In the field of canon law, see also can. 999 on the obligation to reveal impediments to sacred orders. No less important are the interventions of the Authority regarding the obligation to remain silent. Here, all provisions concerning military and political secrecy, as well as professional secrecy, should be recalled (arts. 622 and 623 of the Italian Penal Code; for canon law, cf. can. 243 § 2).

2. CONDUCT TO BE HELD WHEN UNDER THE OBLIGATION OR FACULTY TO REMAIN SILENT

The affirmation of the moral obligation—sometimes also juridical—of remaining silent or at least the faculty to do so immediately raises another series of problems: that of how to behave when one does not wish or is not obliged to communicate a piece of information. The first suggested attitude is silence. While it is true that qui tacet consentire videtur, it is also true that qui tacet nihil dicit. The easiest and safest way to protect a secret will therefore be, first and foremost, silence. Often, however, this means cannot be employed: sometimes it is undeniable that silence implies consent or, in any case, it is beyond doubt that even silence can be a way of expressing certain thoughts. In such cases, a way to defend oneself may be—and this is the second way of preserving a secret—the use of evasive formulas, that is, expressions that seem to say something but say nothing. In more serious cases, one may also resort to amphibologies, that is, expressions that truly have two meanings, one of which the speaker intends while foreseeing that the listener will understand the other. Here we are in the field of applications of the principle of double effect, to which it is certainly permissible to resort when the action is in itself good or indifferent and there are sufficient reasons to permit the evil that will follow.

Can one proceed further? Some have answered yes, proposing the well-known doctrine of mental reservation or even the opinion that, at least in certain cases, false statements can be made (v. RISERVA MENTALE). Others—and perhaps not unjustly—point out that a false enunciation, or more simply, a lie, remains a lie and therefore something intrinsically evil and morally inadmissible, even if directed toward a good end; it cannot therefore be told unless one admits that the end justifies the means. The defense of a secret may therefore entail significant sacrifices in certain cases; but this should not surprise, given that, in all other sectors, the will to fully respect the demands of moral law may cost more than one renunciation. Something remains, therefore, to be further explored in this field to clarify the conduct that one who finds themselves in the necessity of defending a secret should or may hold, especially in the most difficult cases. And it is obvious that in this question, as in all others, purely verbal procedures must be avoided.

3. ATTITUDE TO BE HELD IN THE FACE OF OTHERS' INFORMATION

A third series of problems concerns the attitude to be assumed in the face of others' information. Indeed, anyone can "deposit" their thoughts in very diverse sources (writings, records, magnetic tape, etc.), and we can, by accessing such sources, appropriate others' thoughts. It is also known that one can, in various ways, lead someone to manifest their thoughts even outside or even against their will (one may think of torture, certain interrogation techniques, narcoanalysis, etc.).

What attitude can or should be assumed in this regard? In the answer, it seems necessary to distinguish between information concerning the common good and other information. As for the former, the public authority certainly has the faculty to appropriate it, within the limits of the common good's exigency. It therefore has the right, in case of necessity, to violate postal secrecy, to control telegraphic and telephone communications, to extract secrets with those technical means that do not offend morality. Only it remains to specify how far the exigencies of the common good extend and which technical means are not in contrast with morality. Needless to say, it is in the light of these principles that the question of the lawfulness for the public authority to resort to torture, narcoanalysis (v.), etc., must be posed and resolved. Instead, as for information not necessary for the common good, no one—not even the public authority—has the right to appropriate or to extract it; the right, indeed, to preserve a secret whenever a piece of information is not indispensable for one's own or others' good carries with it the prohibition for others to extract it—and even more so—to divulge II. Classical moralists have extensively treated the case of letters, carefully distinguishing when the owner still preserves them, when they have been abandoned or left exposed, and when they have been torn or discarded: in the first case, all agree that it is not lawful to read them; in the second case, all concur that they can be read, it being easily presumed that the owner has renounced their right to preserve the secret; in the third case, however, some (e.g., Laymann, Lugo) think that, by tearing them, the owner intended or consented to renounce their secret and that therefore they can be read; others, instead, hold the opposite opinion because they believe that by tearing them, the owner precisely demonstrated their unwillingness to renounce their right.

The problem, however, is much broader, concerning all information, in all fields, wherever it may be recorded. Here too, legislation has intervened, imposing severe penalties in some cases against those who violate others' secrets. It suffices here to recall arts. 616 ff. of the Italian Penal Code on the violation of postal, telephone, and telegraphic secrecy, of secret documents, of scientific or industrial secrets; on the violation, subtraction, and suppression of correspondence. It is easy to see the complexity of the problems that arise around secrecy, both for morality and for law, for public authority, and for technique and science.

4. GRAVITY OF THE OBLIGATION TO PRESERVE A SECRET AND OF ITS VIOLATION

When, therefore, there is an obligation to observe a secret and there are no excusing causes, what lesion of the moral order does its revelation import? It is necessary to distinguish the various kinds of secrets. 1) The natural secret in a grave matter obliges per se sub gravi and ex iustitia. Therefore, whoever has extracted a secret from another, by fraud or fault, is obliged to repair every damage both in relation to the injured reputation and in relation to any patrimonial damages, provided these damages were foreseen, at least confusedly. 2) The promise (v.). The gravity and the obligation are deduced from the intention with which the promise was made and from the extent of the obligations one wished to assume. When there is an obligation to manifest the secret either by a superior's precept, or for a reason of charity, or by the judge's legitimate interrogation, the obligation to maintain the merely promised secret ceases; and this even if the promise was confirmed by oath, because the obligation by oath is accessory and follows the vicissitudes of the principal obligation. 3) The entrusted secret obliges by justice and sub gravi both because it is based on a contract or quasi-contract and because it is ordinarily of considerable interest for the public good that it be faithfully maintained.

The secret can be violated either by direct revelation, when both the information and the person are disclosed; or by indirect revelation, when only the information is communicated to others, but under such circumstances that one may still arrive at the discovery of the person to whom the information refers. It can also be violated by the abuse of knowledge acquired through the secret's disclosure, especially if this occurs to the detriment of the one who entrusted the secret; or by unjust inquisition (v. IPNOTISMO; NARCOANALISI).

The problem of the violation of a secret is also detraction (v.), of the violation of reputation (v. INFAMIA; INGIURIA).

BIBL.:
Per la trattazione generale: A. Vermeersch, Theologiae moralis principia, II, Roma 1945, p. 340 ss.; A. Koch, Manuale theologiae moralis, I, Roma 1948, p. 420 ss.; B. H. Merkelbach, Summa theologiae moralis, II, Parigi 1938, p. 400 ss.; F. Cappello, Summa iuris canonici, I, Roma 1945, p. 320 ss. Per la restrizione mentale: V. RISERVA MENTALE. Per la narcoanalisi: V. NARCOANALISI. Per la detrazione: V. DETRAZIONE. Per la fama: V. INFAMIA; INGIURIA.
G. Lazzati

With sacramental seal is properly meant the strict and absolute obligation to observe secrecy and to refrain from any extrasacramental use regarding all that has been said by the penitent in relation to sacramental absolution, the revelation or use of which would harm the penitent or generate an unfavorable opinion in those who see or hear. The obligation to observe such a seal is called sigillum; by analogy with letters, whose content is intended to remain hidden and are therefore closed and secured with a seal.

1. History. — The obligation of the seal is based on a motive of religion, for the reverence due to the Sacrament, which must not be rendered odious; and on a motive of justice, insofar as one must maintain the entrusted secret, that is, the contract of silence implicitly and tacitly stipulated with the penitent, and, when it concerns an occult sin, the natural secret of not defaming one’s neighbor.

The obligation of the sacramental seal is of divine law; that is, according to St. Thomas (Summ. Theol. Suppl., q. 11, a. 1 and 4; in IV, D. 21, q. 3, a. 1), the obligation of the sacramental seal arises directly and immediately from the divine institution of the Sacrament of Penance and of secret confession. Since secret confession is of divine institution, everything that obstructs—such as the violation of the seal—its exercise is prohibited by divine law.

From the beginning, what is fundamental and primary in the law of the sacramental seal has been observed in the Church, namely, to maintain secrecy, except with the contrary authorization of the penitent, regarding sins known through secret confession; further determinations came later, especially concerning the use of sacramental knowledge, which is forbidden only by ecclesiastical law.

In the ancient Church, positive documents of the obligation and fidelity to the sacramental seal are found. Origen compares confession to the revelation made to a physician of a hidden wound (In Levit., 2, 4: PG 12, 418). Aphraates recommends to priests who are physicians of souls: «cumque (infirmitatem) vobis revelaverit, nolite eam publicare, ne propter illum ab inimicis et ab iis qui nos oderunt, innocentes in culpa esse iudicentur» (Demonstr., 7, 3: PL 1, 318-19). St. Asterius of Amasea exhorts sinners to candidly reveal even occult faults to the confessor, promising that the latter will provide for both the salvation and the good reputation of the penitent, because a father cares more for the honor of his children than they themselves do (Hom., XIII: PG 40, 189). The biographer Paulinus praises St. Ambrose because «caussa autem criminum quae illi confitebatur nulli nisi Domino soli, apud quem intercedebat, loquebatur, bonum relinquens exemplum posteris sacerdotibus» (Vita s. Ambrosii, 39: PL 14, 43). St. Augustine affirms: «In secreto debemus corripere, in secreto arguere: ne volentes arguere prodamus hominem» (Serm., 82, 8: PL 38, 511) and further recommends that penance should not be done «in notitia multorum», except in the case of scandal and when the bishop judges «hoc expedire utilitati Ecclesiae» (Serm., 351, 9: PL 39, 1545). St. Leo the Great reproves the bishops of Campania because, contrary to the apostolic rule, they published sins (Ep. 168: PL 54, 1211). The Council of Tovin in Armenia (ca. 527) appears to be the first to have taken measures against the priest who violates the sacramental seal (Hefele-Leclercq, II, 1079; cf. also: Councils of Carthage XV and XVIII [a. 419], in Mansi, IV, 438).

In the following centuries, writers more energetically insist on the necessity of preserving the sacramental seal. Thus, in the 9th century, Hincmar of Reims (De divortio Lotharii: PL 125, 634) and the Capitulare of Charlemagne (a. 813; cf. MGH. Capitularia, I, p. 175); Lanfranc, Archbishop of Canterbury, in the 11th century wrote an entire treatise on the subject (De celandis confessions: PL 150, 625 ff.), and in the same century Anselm of Lucca included in his Collectio canonum a canon concerning the sacramental seal, falsely attributed to Pope Gregory, which would become part of all subsequent collections (c. 2, D. 6 de poenit.).

The Fourth Lateran Council (a. 1215) therefore introduced no innovation when it promulgated the first universal law on the matter, enforcing it with very severe penalties (cap. 21: Denz-U, n. 438).

A more complex problem was whether the confessor, without exposing himself to the danger of betraying the penitent, could make use of the information obtained in confession cum gravamine poenitentis, when it was a matter of securing a greater good for him (St. Thomas, Quodlib., V, D. 13). In the 12th and 13th centuries, the question was explicitly posed. The authors of the time unanimously answered that the thing was lawful, provided the confessor had grave reasons to act in such a way (cf. Th. Sanchez, De s. matrimonii sacramento, I, III, disp. 6, Venice 1625, p. 233 ff.). But Clement VIII, on May 24, 1593, forbade regular superiors and those confessors who later became superiors from making use, in the exercise of their power in the external forum, of information learned in confession (decr. Sanctissimus, § 4; Fontes iuris canonici, ed. P. Gasparri, I, Rome 1923, p. 177). A declaration of the Holy Office on November 18, 1682, forbade every confessor from making use of the knowledge acquired in confession cum gravamine poenitentis and warned against upholding in the future the lawfulness of contrary opinions (cf. G. van Belleghem, L'usage illicite des connaissances acquises en confession, Québec 1948, pp. 215-16). In the following century, Benedict XIV condemned the practice of requesting in confession the name of the accomplice, because this practice was intended as a kind of use of the information acquired in the administration of confession (brief Suprema omnium ecclesiarum sollicitudo, July 7, 1745: Denz-U, n. 1474).

An instruction on the use of sacramental knowledge was issued in the following century by the Congregation of Propaganda Fide (February 20, 1836). These instructions and decrees led theologians to adopt an increasingly strict practice of the sacramental seal, erroneously extending to indirect violation of the sacramental seal the mere use of knowledge obtained from confession.

More than the use of knowledge acquired in confession, the danger of indirect violation of the sacramental seal concerns the instruction of the Holy Office of June 9, 1915 (op. cit., p. 214 ff.). Now, the discipline regarding both the sacramental seal and the use of knowledge acquired in the practice of confession is sanctioned in the CIC.

From what has been said, it appears that the obligation of the sacramental seal is not only of divine law but also of ecclesiastical law, while only ecclesiastical law governs what, apart from the proper object of the sacramental seal, is disposed for its better protection (sacramental knowledge).

The obligation of the sacramental seal also exists among the Easterners, both united and dissident (cf. M. Jugie, Theologia Orientalis, Lyon 1928, p. 368).

2. Obligation and Object of the Sacramental Seal. — Only the penitent can grant the confessor permission to speak of what was said in confession, but even then the confessor cannot make use of this faculty if harm to the Sacrament is feared in the sense of rendering it odious to others.

The reason is given by St. Thomas (Summ. Theol., Suppl., L. 11, a. 4): «primo quidem et principaliter, quia illud ut occultatio est de essentia Sacramenti, in quantum sit illud ut Deus, cuius vicem gerit in confessione; alio modo, propter scandalum vitandum». The obligation of the seal, however, is of divine law not absolute but conditioned by the penitent’s permission (cf. ibid., a. 1; a. 4 ad 2), which must be expressed, free, and not revoked.

BIBL.:
Oltre gli autori citati nel testo: A. Vermeersch, De religiosis institutis et personis, III, Roma 1949, p. 350 sgg.; F. Cappello, De sacramentis, II, Roma 1945, p. 365 sgg.; P. Palazzini, Dizionario di teologia morale, Roma 1954, V. SACRAMENTALI; G. van Belleghem, L'usage illicite des connaissances acquises en confession, Québec 1948; J. Creusen, Religieux et religieuses d'après le droit ecclésiastique, Bruxelles 1950, p. 182 sgg.; A. Michelitsch, Das Beichtgeheimnis, Graz 1913; E. F. Regatillo, Theologiae moralis summa, I, Santander 1952, p. 780 sgg.; A. Eszer, Das Beichtgeheimnis in der Lehre des hl. Thomas von Aquin, Roma 1956.

Giovanni Battista Guzzetti.

The secret, materially understood, is the same as the hidden thing; formally understood, it is the obligation to conceal what has been entrusted in confidence.

Outside of this hypothesis, the confessor cannot reveal anything he has learned in the tribunal of penance, even if it concerns avoiding death or other public or social harms, however grave. The principle that private good must yield to public interest does not apply here, because the inviolability of the sacramental secret represents the most general interest, namely, the good of consciences and the good of the Church. Moreover, in the penitential tribunal, relations unfold between man and God, of whom the priest acts as vicar (cf. Innocent III, Serm., I: PL 217, 625, and St. Thomas, loc. cit.). And the divine, or quasi-divine, order must prevail over every other purely human order.

The differences between the sacramental secret and any other secret are profound. The sacramental secret binds in foro Dei, never ceases, applies even with respect to the penitent, excludes triviality of matter where direct violation is concerned, and its non-observance is always sacrilege—characteristics that do not apply to natural or entrusted secrets.

The obligation of the sacramental secret arises solely from a sacramental confession, even if, without the penitent’s fault, it is invalid, sacrilegious, or interrupted, or if absolution is denied or deferred. It is required and sufficient that the penitent has accused himself to receive absolution, which may be inferred from words or actions. There is therefore no sacramental confession, nor consequently a seal, if one knowingly confesses to a layperson or to a priest lacking jurisdiction, if one seeks only advice, if one approaches confession with the intent to deceive, mock, or rob the confessor, nor if the priest openly and clearly protests that he does not wish to fulfill the office of confessor. In doctrine, the object of the sacramental secret is distinguished into essential and accidental, depending on whether it naturally or for other reasons falls under the secret.

The direct essential object consists of:
1) All mortal sins, whether generically or specifically accused, past and future, occult or even public, provided the latter are known to the confessor only through confession;
2) Venial sins, even the slightest, if specifically—not generically—manifested.

The indirect essential object consists of everything necessary, useful, or even superfluous for declaring sins, such as: the circumstances (e.g., the end, place, time) connected with the sin; the imposed penance, except when imposed in minimal form; the denied or deferred absolution; the matter of the sins and the name and sin of the accomplice (cf. Benedict XIV, brief Suprema omnium Ecclesiarum sollicitudo, 7 July 1745, in Denz-U, n. 1474).

The accidental object of the sacramental secret includes:
a) The penitent’s occult defects—natural, moral, or civil—especially those whose revelation would burden the penitent or render the Sacrament odious, such as scruples, meticulousness, or imperfections properly so called;
b) Sins committed during the act of confession and accused in confession, e.g., impatience, offense against the confessor.

The following do not constitute matter of the sacramental secret: the penitent’s virtues, special gifts of God, good desires, granted absolution, the fact of having confessed, the penitent’s condition or state, etc., except in cases where there may accidentally arise the danger of an indirect violation. For this reason, the confessor, when asked by the penitent, cannot refuse to attest that confession was made, even if he did not grant absolution; acting otherwise could easily constitute an indirect violation of the sacramental secret. It is superfluous to note that even when the law of the sacramental secret does not apply, the obligation of an entrusted or at least natural secret normally remains. Prudence in such matters must never be lacking, to avoid giving rise to scandal or making confession burdensome.

3. Subject of the seal. – All persons who, in any way, have come to know the declarations made in the penitential tribunal are bound by the sacramental secret. First among these is the confessor (can. 889 § 1), whether approved or not—that is, lacking jurisdiction—even if excommunicated, suspended, interdicted, deposed, or degraded. His silence must be such that he may oppose the most formal and sworn denial to any question aimed at making him reveal the object of the confession. Indeed, ut homo, he is ignorant, outside of confession, of everything confided to him ut Deus in the tribunal of penance. He cannot, therefore, be interrogated about the confidences received. If questioned, he may evade the questions or limit himself to saying that he has fulfilled his duty or even affirm that he knows nothing. If interrogated in court regarding the matter of the confession, he may and must refuse to testify. By canon law (can. 1757 § 3, n. 2), he is considered an incapable witness; the same holds in many modern state codes (cf., e.g., art. 351 Italian Code of Criminal Procedure; art. 458 Belgian Penal Code, etc.). In causes of beatification and canonization, the confessor is no longer admitted as a witness today (can. 2027 § 2, n. 1; 1757 § 3, n. 2). Finally, if the confessor cannot accuse his personal sins without compromising the sacramental secret, he may omit the accusation of his fault rather than risk violating the sacramental secret.

Secondarily, the following are subject to the sacramental secret (cf. can. 889 § 2):
1) The interpreter, if freely chosen for the act of confession;
2) The ecclesiastical superior to whom recourse is made to obtain the power to absolve from reserved cases (cf. also cann. 2252, 2254 § 1);
3) The theologian or canonist, whether priest or lay, that is, anyone consulted by the confessor with or—according to the dominant and practically certain doctrine—without the penitent’s permission, to resolve a difficulty. If, however, the priest is consulted directly by the penitent, he is bound to secrecy only if the object of the consultation concerns a confession to be made to himself.
4) All those who, voluntarily or involuntarily, through malice or by chance, come to know the matter of the confession. But if someone, out of a spirit of penance or humility, makes a public confession of his faults, it is evident that those who listen are not bound by the sacramental secret. Furthermore, anyone who has direct or indirect knowledge of a penitent’s sins, whether through a criminal or otherwise revelation by a confessor or for other reasons, is bound to secrecy. The same applies to one who, by chance or voluntarily, reads a confession written by the penitent, provided the writing is considered an actual confession or a means to an actual confession.

The penitent is not bound by the secret. As he may, for a reasonable motive, renounce his right and authorize the confessor to speak of his faults, so, and with even greater reason, the penitent may speak of himself. However, the natural secret remains not to reveal the words, advice, or prescriptions given by the confessor when such disclosure would harm the latter, unless required by the common or general good (cf. can. 904).

4. Violation of the sacramental secret and sanctions. Use of sacramental knowledge. – As stated, the violation of the sacramental secret is a sacrilege, an injustice, and sometimes detraction. Direct violation is always grave, that is, when the sin and the sinner are explicitly or implicitly revealed. Indirect violation, however, admits of triviality of matter, that is, when the confessor’s words or actions may give rise to the danger of knowing the object of the sacramental secret and the identity of the penitent.

Distinct from violation, even indirect, is the use of information acquired in confession. Indeed, the CIC clearly and carefully distinguishes between violations of the sacramental secret (can. 889) and the prohibition of using knowledge acquired in confession « cum gravamine poenitentis, excluso etiam quovis revelationis periculo » (can. 890 § 1). This prohibition exists even when there is no danger of direct or indirect violation, as long as the use of such acquired knowledge results in gravamen for the penitent.

Therefore, a superior may not use sacramental knowledge for external governance, that is, in his administration he may not adopt or change measures while keeping in mind sins heard in confession (can. 890 § 2). The words of can. 890 § 1 cum gravamine poenitentis, meaning to the detriment of the penitent, should not be understood solely in reference to the particular penitent in question, but to any penitent, considered indeterminately; they mean that the sacrament of Penance must not be burdensome or troublesome to any penitent, knowing that at times the use of sacramental knowledge is permitted. However, when any danger of revelation is eliminated and gravamen poenitentis is excluded, it is not forbidden to make use of information heard in confession.

Furthermore, the Church absolutely prohibits even reckless speech (cf. Instruction of the Holy Office, 9 June 1915) regarding matters heard in confession, even for a good purpose. To some superiors, it also prohibits the ordinary hearing of confessions, not only to safeguard the freedom and sincerity of confessions but also to prevent the illicit use of information obtained in confession for the external forum. Thus, it prohibits religious superiors from habitually hearing the confessions of their subjects (can. 518 § 2); the novice master and any assistants; rectors of seminaries or colleges with respect to their students, except in extraordinary and individual cases upon the spontaneous request of the interested party (can. 891). Finally, it prohibits requesting the vote of the confessor when deciding whether to admit a student to sacred Orders or to expel him from the seminary (can. 1361 § 3). By ecclesiastical law, the secret is obligatory for those who, by reason of spiritual direction, counsel, or the exercise of jurisdiction, come to know intimate matters concerning the relationship of souls with God (cann. 243 § 2, 546, etc.), although in all these cases one is outside the sacramental secret and the use of sacramental knowledge.

A confessor who dares (praesumpserit) to directly violate the sacramental secret incurs latae sententiae excommunication (that is, ipso facto) reserved in a most special manner to the Apostolic See (can. 2369). Indirect violation by the confessor and direct or indirect violation by others, as well as the use of such knowledge and reckless speech, are punished by ferendae sententiae penalties (can. 2369; 2222; cf. Instruction of the Holy Office, cited).

The latae sententiae censure also applies to Eastern priests. The knowledge of the most grave crime of direct and conscious violation of the sacramental secret by a confessor belongs to the Sacred Penitentiary for the internal forum and to the Holy Office for the external forum (cf. declaration of the Holy Office, 21 July 1934: AAS, 26 [1934], p. 550).

The modalities of the secret are defined in the decrees of Clement XI (1 December 1709) and especially of Clement XIII (1 February 1759) and in the motu proprio of Blessed Pius X Romani Pontifices (17 December 1903), now implicitly reconfirmed in cann. 239 § 1 and 243 § 2. Members of the Sacred Congregations, tribunals, and offices of the Holy See naturally have the obligation of secrecy regarding official matters, but the modalities vary according to the different Congregations, tribunals, and offices and the importance or delicacy of the subjects treated (can. 243 § 2). In general, this secret, confirmed by oath, concerns all those matters in which "the sacred canons or superiors command the secret to be preserved" and also obliges "when it is required by Ordinaries and when the revelation of some act could cause prejudice to the parties or to the Church." The penalty for violators of this secret, when it exists, is no different from that generally imposed for all perjurers.

The Holy Office, however, has an exclusive procedure. Part of this is the strictest secrecy with which all the affairs of this Sacred Congregation are handled, and, according to the instructions given by Blessed Pius X in the motu proprio of 17 December 1903, it binds those who are subject to it "to faithfully fulfill their office and to preserve the secret inviolate in all things and with all persons, under pain of latae sententiae major excommunication, to be incurred ipso facto and without any declaration, from which they cannot be absolved except by us and our successors, the Roman Pontiffs, privative even with respect to the Penitentiary and the cardinal penitentiary himself, outside the case of the article of death." The excommunication also applies to the indirect revelation of the secret, and in case of doubt, the presumption is in favor of the existence of the secret.

BIBL. cf. the commentaries on cann. 239 § 1, 1°; 243 § 2; 247 of the CIC; for example, A. Vermersch-J. Creusen, Epitome iuris canonici, I, Malines-Rome 1937, nn. 362, 4; 363; 370; pp. 296, 298. See also: C. Gennari, Sul segreto del S. Ufficio, in Il Monitore ecclesiastico, 22 (1897), pp. 74-86; F. Cadène, De secreto S. Officii, in Analecta ecclesiastica, 5 (1897), pp. 498-504. Giuseppe Palazzini

IV. PROFESSIONAL SECRET

This is a form of entrusted secret and binds those who, by reason of their state, office, profession (the term being used here in a comprehensive sense), art, come to know confidential information pertaining to persons who have turned to them for counsel or assistance.

It aims to foster the special trust inherent in a given office and to guarantee free recourse to practitioners of confidential professions, even in cases where one strongly desires that one’s affairs remain concealed. The violation of professional secrecy is considered more serious than that of a simple entrusted secret, due to its natural foundation and its repercussions on the common good.

The first condition for the existence of professional secrecy is the quality of the person bound by II. This person must have come to know the secret by reason of their office, art, or profession; otherwise, one may speak of other forms of secrecy or of entrusted secrecy in general, but not specifically of professional secrecy.

Among the most common professions in this regard are the priestly ministry, which forms a category of its own—also due to the attached obligation of the sacramental seal—the professions of physician, pharmacist, midwife (or healthcare professions in general), notary, lawyer, procurator, judge, technical consultant, magistrate in general, employee, official (taking professional secrecy in a general sense, as inclusive of official secrecy), etc. As for the nature of the confidence received or the matter known, it must concern a secret matter and thus not public facts, of which the practitioner of that particular art or profession might have become aware through other means. The secret must also be such that, if revealed, it could cause harm. The harm may be either material or moral, and may concern either honor or property. As for the intentional element, the general principles of voluntariness and involuntariness apply. The gravity of the fault in revealing a professional secret will be greater or lesser depending on whether there was deliberate intent and intention to harm, or merely the voluntariness of the revelation, or whether the revelation was made due to a lack of that reflection found in a prudent person. The obligation of professional secrecy is not absolute in every respect; rather, it has a relative character.

The revelation of the secret, to be culpable, must be made without just and proportionate cause. The assessment of the motives that may justify the revelation of a professional secret is a matter of prudence. A just cause for revelation may be not only the common good but also the private good of the person who knows the secret, the good of others, and of the person herself interested in maintaining the secret, when the harm attached to maintaining the secret becomes too great in comparison to the good. The obligation of professional secrecy protects a common good of great importance; yet it is always limited by other exigencies of human life.

5. Foundation of professional secrecy

All the opinions advanced to explain the foundation of the obligation of professional secrecy may be reduced to three: the first centers on a contractual obligation; the second, instead, is linked to the natural right to a good reputation; and the third explains it as a creation imposed by the exigencies of the public good. In older legal systems, official secrecy first took the name of exemption from giving testimony in court. The legislator, in fact, forbade harmful and indiscreet revelations that were not necessary for public order. In more recent times, however, the illegal character of the revelation of official secrecy is emphasized, considering it a crime comparable to theft or fraud. Between these two classes of opinions—the first on the contractual foundation and the second on the institutional or public foundation—there is also an intermediate opinion that holds that official secrecy is founded on contract as to its object, and on the exigency of public order as to its end. These opinions find favor especially among jurists.

For scholars of natural law, professional secrecy is founded primarily on man’s right to a good reputation: consequently, he has the right not to be deprived of it by others. To that right in others corresponds the obligation not to harm II. This doctrine refers back to the teaching of the Scholastics (Sum. Theol., 2°-2°, q. 73 a. 1 c.; In IV Sent., d. 21, 9, 3, a. 1) and also underlies the current doctrinal elaboration of moral theologians. The latter, too, focus on the personal right to reputation, a right which, when duly respected, fosters the common good itself (hence the consideration of professional secrecy in positive law). The contractual bond, rather than being the basis of the obligation of professional secrecy, is a determination of it, insofar as one who turns to a professional, public practitioner, etc., relies on the set of ethical and juridical norms that regulate the exercise of their profession according to natural and positive law. The conflict of interests that may arise among those interested in maintaining the secret or in its revelation is to be resolved according to the principles of a common conflict of laws, naturali aequitate servata.

6. Professional secrecy in canon law

Although not explicitly mentioned, professional secrecy in canon law also encompasses official secrecy, just as the moral consideration is identical. In particular, one form of professional secrecy proper to canon law and to the gravity and delicacy of the problems dealt with by ecclesiastical authority is the secret of the Holy Office. In its common form, official secrecy is also binding for the other congregations, tribunals, and offices of the Roman Curia (Ordo servandus in Romana Curia — Normae peculiares, cap. 7, art. I, 11: AAS, 1 [1909], p. 80). Indeed, it must be confirmed by a special oath (ibid., cap. 3: AAS, 1 [1909], p. 40) and is provided with a special sanction (suspension from office, imposed by the Regolamento per il personale della Curia Romana: art. 73, 5). The Supreme Tribunal of the Apostolic Signatura, among the matters within its competence, has that of judging denunciations made against the prelates auditors of the Sacred Roman Rota for violation of official secrecy (can. 1603 § 1, n. 1). All those who receive information to admit someone into an Order or Congregation—not only superiors but also examiners, counselors who read testimonial letters or receive information—are bound by the grave obligation to preserve secrecy (can. 546). To all these, the information is given by reason of office.

In canon law, professional secrecy takes these various forms: sacramental secrecy, quasi-sacramental secrecy, and extra-sacramental or official secrecy stricto sensu, to be observed in the sacred ministry. Quasi-sacramental secrecy arises from freely opening one’s conscience to another, whether to satisfy—as ancient religious rules prescribed—or to enlighten the conscience, either on the occasion of confession or outside sacramental confession, when the matter does not fall under the object of the sacramental seal.

For the protection of these forms of secrecy, the ecclesiastical legislator declares priests incapable of giving testimony for all that they have learned in confession (can. 1757 § 3, 2) and exempts from giving testimony before a judge, regarding matters they have learned by reason of their office or profession, priests concerning matters known in the exercise of their ministry outside confession, magistrates, physicians, midwives, lawyers, notaries, and others bound by secrecy concerning matters they handle by office (can. 1755 § 2, n. 1).

For the common good and to avoid potential harm to the innocent party, official secrecy is always required in criminal trials; in contentious proceedings, it may sometimes be imposed on the judge or the tribunal assistants (can. 1623 § 1; cf. also can. 1943). Certain witnesses legitimately questioned by the judge are permitted to conceal the truth, which they have learned by reason of sacred ministry, office, counsel, or assistance, insofar as they are bound by official secrecy (can. 1755 § 2, 1). In removal proceedings, examiners, consultants, and the notary must observe secrecy regarding everything they have learned by reason of their office (can. 2144). Bound by secrecy are also the Ordinary, the priest who has assisted at marriage, and the witnesses in so-called "marriages of conscience," but if harm to the innocent party is to be avoided and the good of religion so requires, the obligation ceases on the part of the Ordinary, for otherwise secrecy would be transformed into a bond of iniquity (cann. 1105-1106).

Official secrecy then binds in a special way, by virtue of an oath that may have been taken. The force of the obligation is to be deduced from the tenor of the oath. There is, in fact, a common formula, which binds according to the sacred canons, and a special formula, which may be imposed by Superiors; in this second case, the violation of official secrecy is punished more severely with an ecclesiastical penalty to be incurred ipso facto (Ordo cit., cap. 3: AAS, 1 [1909], p. 41).

3. Professional secrecy in Italian law. - The revelation of a professional secret is considered a crime, prosecutable upon complaint by the injured party. Likewise, the use of secret information for one's own or another's profit is considered a crime. The penalty is imprisonment for up to one year or a fine from L. 300 to 500 (Italian Penal Code, art. 622). The revelation of official secrecy by a public official, however, constitutes a specific crime (art. 326). The right to abstain from testifying by reason of professional secrecy is also recognized here for many categories of persons (ministers of the Catholic religion or admitted cults, lawyers, procurators, technical consultants, notaries, physicians, surgeons, pharmacists, midwives, and health practitioners in general), but the law may impose on them the obligation to inform the authorities (Italian Code of Criminal Procedure, art. 351), as it does for certain infectious diseases. This obligation, however, cannot be

directly imposed in the case of official secrecy, but requires the authorization of the Minister of Justice (ibid., art. 352).

For the revelation of professional or official secrecy to be imputed as a crime, the law requires the occurrence of certain conditions, such as: a) the revelation made, b) the quality of the person subject to secrecy, c) the circumstance in which it becomes known that the fact is secret, d) the criminal intention of the agent, which is identified with the motive of the action, since one who knowingly reveals a secret cannot be said to have acted without intention. Conversely, the revelation of a secret without the intention of doing so cannot be called a crime due to its involuntary and unconscious character.

SEGRETO DELLA CONFESSIONE

The sacramental seal (v. CONFESSIONE SACRAMENTALE) is the most rigorous form of secrecy, both in canon law and in civil law. It binds the confessor absolutely, under pain of excommunication latae sententiae reserved to the Apostolic See (can. 2369 § 1), and no authority, ecclesiastical or civil, can dispense from II. The obligation extends not only to the sins confessed but also to everything that the penitent has manifested in confession, even if not sinful, and to all circumstances that might lead to the identification of the penitent. The confessor cannot make use of the knowledge acquired in confession, even for the spiritual good of the penitent, without his explicit consent (can. 889 § 2). The seal also binds interpreters, if any, and all those who, in any way, have come to know the contents of the confession (can. 889 § 1).

The absolute inviolability of the sacramental seal is recognized by many civil legislations, which exempt the confessor from the obligation to testify about what he has learned in confession (e.g., Italian Code of Criminal Procedure, art. 351). However, some legal systems impose restrictions or do not recognize this exemption, creating conflicts between canon law and civil law.