CONFESSIONE

CONFESSION.

Sometimes the term *C.* is used to refer to the sacrament of Penance itself, which is therefore commonly called the sacrament of *C.* But in the strict sense, *C.* is the act by which one manifests to a priest endowed with jurisdiction one’s sins committed after Baptism, in order to obtain sacramental absolution.

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### I. DOGMATIC THEOLOGY

**OUTLINE:**

I. Institution

II. Necessity

III. Minister

IV. Manner

V. Frequency

VI. Ethical and social value.

#### I. Institution

The history of religions shows that *C.*, in the most varied forms—public or private, oral or written, individual or collective, made directly to the divinity or before its representatives—is an almost universal phenomenon in the religious life of humanity (cf. R. Pettazzoni, *La confessione dei peccati*, 3 vols., Bologna 1929–36). Man has always felt the need for a purification of guilt to strengthen his relationship with the divinity, to quiet the remorse of conscience, and to be freed from present and future physical or moral evils, conceived as consequences of sin. Nor has he been satisfied with mere interior repentance; he has also sought to externalize this inner understanding through penitential rites, among which *C.* is one of the most commonly practiced (cf. M. Schülein, *Espiazione e redenzione*, Rome 1930, pp. 65–90). The universality of the practice of *C.* demonstrates how consonant it is with the needs of the human soul. Taking these needs into account, Jesus instituted *C.* in the Church as a means of reconciling the sinner with God.

That *C.* in Christianity is of divine institution is a dogma of faith, defined against the rising Protestant error by the Council of Trent (sess. XIV, can. 6), which also indicates the Gospel texts that demonstrate this institution (ibid., cap. 5). These are the same texts that pertain to the granting of the power of the keys to the Apostles and the institution of the sacrament of Penance; namely, Matt. 18:18: “Whatever you bind on earth shall be bound in heaven, and whatever you loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven”; and John 20:23: “If you forgive the sins of any, they are forgiven; if you retain the sins of any, they are retained.”

Indeed, these texts, speaking of the power to “bind or loose,” to “forgive or retain,” show that the power granted by Christ to the Apostles is a judicial power, which in its exercise involves a twofold act—either of condemnation or of absolution. But this presupposes that the minister must first know and examine the condition of the sinner, his faults, and his dispositions, so that he may then decide with equity whether to issue a sentence of absolution or condemnation. And how can such prior knowledge be obtained unless the sinner manifests through *C.* the sins committed, his repentance, and his dispositions for the future?

Furthermore, the proper exercise of this judicial power entails the imposition of penalties on the sinner, which, as far as possible, must be proportionate both to the gravity of the crimes and to the subjective condition of the guilty party, as well as to his particular dispositions of soul, etc. But only through *C.* can these elements of judgment be made known to the priest. Therefore, in conferring upon the Apostles the power to forgive or retain sins, Jesus implicitly instituted the *C.* of sins.

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#### II. Necessity

Of divine institution, *C.* is, by the will of Jesus, necessary for the remission of sins. This truth, too, was defined by the Council of Trent (loc. cit.), which teaches that it also arises from the aforementioned Gospel texts: Matt. 18:18; John 20:23; and from these same texts it is deduced that *C.* must be integral and complete. As the Roman Catechism states: “Since the Lord has granted to priests the faculty of forgiving or retaining sins, it is evident that they have been constituted judges in this matter. And since, according to the wise admonition of the holy Council of Trent, it is impossible to pronounce a just sentence on any matter nor to observe the rule of justice in assigning punishments for crimes unless the case has been fully set forth and weighed, it follows that penitents must in their *C.* manifest all and each of their sins” (ed. Rome 1918, p. 399).

Some Fathers (Origen, *In Levit. hom.*, 2, 4; Chrysostom, *De Sacerdotio*, 3, 6), and in general the scholastics in their commentaries on the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard (I. 4, dist. 17), adduce the text of the Epistle of St. James—“Confess your sins to one another, and pray for one another, that you may be healed. The prayer of a righteous man has great power in its effects” (5:16)—to demonstrate the obligation and necessity of *C.* However, it is now generally denied that this text suffices to prove the necessity of sacramental *C.* This conclusion extends also to the texts Acts 19:18 and 1 John 1:9, which, especially in polemics against Protestants, were sometimes cited by Catholic authors.

Besides Sacred Scripture, the necessity of *C.* is demonstrated both by the practice that the Church has maintained since antiquity and by the doctrine of the Fathers, which illuminates and upholds this practice.

As for the practice of *C.* in the early Church, it is useful first to observe that in the first centuries this practice, for various reasons, was much less frequent than it later became. There was then no general custom of seeking absolution for venial sins, a practice that originated later in monasteries and gradually spread among the laity. Moreover, it does not seem that at that time the ecclesiastical discipline obliging those guilty of grave sins to abstain from the Eucharist until they had received sacramental forgiveness was universally observed; it is possible, therefore, that many who had committed hidden mortal sins approached Communion with only interior contrition, postponing *C.* to another time. Many received Baptism in adulthood, with full awareness and serious commitment to observe the Gospel law; since they did not commit grave transgressions, they did not confess. Others, influenced by the corruption of the pagan environment, had a very coarse morality; as attested by St. Basil (*De iudicio Dei*, 7) and more frequently by St. Augustine (*Enchirid.*, 80; *De catechiz. rud.*, 7, 11; 25, 48; *De civit. Dei*, 21, 25, 4; *Serm.*, 9, 9, 11; 10, 15–16; 82, 10, 13; 224, 3; 278, 7, 8), they considered very grave offenses as venial and thus easily dispensed themselves from confessing. Finally, other faithful, guilty of very grave sins, frightened by canonical penance or fearing to become relapsed and thus be forever excluded from ecclesiastical reconciliation, postponed *C.* until their deathbed.

Given this, it is clear that the early Church did practice *C.*, as evidenced by the following observations.

It is well known that penance was determined by the priest, who, before imposing it, had to take into account the nature and gravity of the fault, the personal condition of the guilty party, and the circumstances in which the sin was committed. This practice is attested, among others, by Augustine (*Serm.*, 351, 9), Innocent I (*Ep. ad Decentium*, 7), and Gregory the Great (*In Evang. hom.*, 26). But this clearly presupposes the use of *C.* on the part of the penitent.

In fact, this prior confession is recalled by Pope Cornelius, writing of the reconciliation he effected of some Novatianists (Ep. Cornelii ad Cyprianum: PL 3, 718-22). It is recalled by the Didascalia Apostolorum on the occasion of the different manner in which certain specific kinds of sinners were reconciled (2, 16-18; 38-41; 42-43). Cyprian, moreover, informs us that some faithful, even though they had only thought of sacrificing to idols, nevertheless “confessing this with sorrow and simplicity to the priests of God, make an *exomologesis* of conscience, reveal the weight of their soul, and seek a salutary remedy for their wounds” (De Lapsis, 28). This demonstrates that even sins committed only internally were customarily confessed. Tertullian, already a Montanist, attests to the custom of the faithful obtaining from the bishop the forgiveness of lesser and more easily committed sins (De Pud., 18, 17; 19, 23-24): evidently after the bishop had been informed through confession.

Nor are the complaints of the Fathers infrequent against those faithful who, while confessing their sins to the priest, nevertheless refrain from performing the penance imposed upon them. Thus, for example, Ambrose (De paenit., 2, 9, 86 and 10, 91), Pacian (Paracensis ad paenit., 8), and Asterius of Amasea (Hom.: PG 40, 368).

The practice of the faithful confessing their sins receives solid doctrinal foundation from the teaching of the Fathers and ecclesiastical writers on the necessity of confession.

Explicit, in fact, is their assertion that for the remission of sins, confession to the priest is altogether required: cf. Cyprian: “Let each one confess his own offense while he is still in the world, while he can make his confession, while satisfaction and remission through the priests is pleasing to the Lord” (De Lapsis, 29); Origen (In Levit., hom. 3, 4); Ambrose, whose saying is: “Sin is poison, the remedy is the accusation of one’s crime; iniquity is poison, confession is the remedy for the fall” (In ps. 27, 11); Jerome, who affirms that it is the office of the priests of the New Law to bind and loose, not arbitrarily, but only “after hearing the various kinds of sins” (In Matth., 3, 16, 19); Augustine (Serm., 351, 10); Leo the Great, who writes that the norm of the Church is to grant penance only to those who confess their faults (Epist., 108, 2).

But the Fathers teach the necessity of confession in another way as well; namely, by describing the penitential process in analogy to either the resurrection of Lazarus or the healing of bodily infirmities. Just as Lazarus was told “Come forth” (John 11:43) and then was unbound from the bands that held him, so it is necessary that the sinner bring forth, that is, manifest his iniquities through confession, so that he may then be loosed by the ministers of the Church: cf. Ambrose (De paenit., 2, 7, 57-58); Augustine (Enarr. in ps., 101, 2, 3; Serm., 67, 1, 2; In Ioan. tract., 22, 7). Furthermore, just as to obtain healing from a physician one must first make known the illness, so to be healed from sin one must manifest it to the priest through confession: cf. Origen (In Ps. 37, hom. 2, 6), Aphraates (Demonstr. 7; De paenitentibus, 2-3).

Some authors express wonder that, when writing of penance, contrary to what happens today, the mention of confession is not more frequent in the Fathers. Others then think that the confession of which the Fathers speak must be understood, not as the act by which sins are manifested to the priest, but only as the confession made exclusively and directly to God. And it is to the name of Chrysostom that such observations are most often directed.

In this regard, however, it must be noted that in the ancient Church the most grave and impressive thing, which constituted the greatest difficulty for the sinner, was not the accusation before the priest, but rather the penance. So much so that, as we have seen, many confessed, asked for and obtained penance, but then lacked the courage and strength to perform II. It is then understandable that the shepherds of souls insist so much on penance and so little on confession: contrary to what happens today, when, since the manifestation of sins constitutes for many Christians the principal obstacle, it is upon this that preaching insists, without however thinking that the Church no longer requires penance or contrition of heart.

That the Fathers intend by confession the manifestation of sins to the priest is deduced from the insistence with which they, Chrysostom not excepted, inculcate that confession must be made in church, must be oral, must concern individual sins, and the sinner must not be overcome by shame in revealing his iniquities (cf. Ambrose, De paenit., 2, 7, 57; In ps. 37, 57; Chrysostom, Hom. 2 de paenit., 1; De Lazaro, hom., 4, 4; Hom. non esse ad gratiam concionandum, 3). Such admonitions would not be comprehensible if confession were understood as made only to God. The warning that is sometimes found in the Fathers to confess sins only to God, when it does not refer to daily faults that can be expiated by prayer (cf. Augustine, De Symbolo, sermo I ad catechumenos, 7, 15; Serm., 9, 11), indicates the confession to be made in secret, in opposition to public confession (cf. Chrysostom, De Lazaro, hom., 4, 4); and this with all the more reason inasmuch as, holding that in the reconciliation of the sinner the priest acts as an instrument and minister of the Lord (cf. Ambrose, De paenit., 1, 8, 34-37; Pacian, Epist., 1, 6 and 3, 7; Chrysostom, In Ioan. hom., 87, 4), they could reasonably, focusing on the principal agent, speak of confession as if it were to be made only to God.

In reality, that confession made to God did not exclude the intervention of the priest is confirmed both by the exhortations found in the writings of the Fathers, addressed to the ministers of confession, to receive sinners kindly: cf. Didascalia Apostolorum, 2, 12; 13, 4; 14, 3 and 11; 15, 1-3 and 8; 18, 2; 20, 10-11; Asterius, Hom., 13; Aphraates, Demonstr., 7, 7, 11, 25; Ambrose, De paenit., 2, 8, 73; and by the constant concern that the same Fathers manifest to be suitable ministers of penance, by healing the wounds of the faithful that were made known to them through confession, and by proportioning penance to the different kinds of sins: cf. Cyprian, Epist., 59, 15-16; Pacian, Paranes. ad paenit., 8; Gregory of Nazianzus, Orat. 2 Apologetica, 16-33; Chrysostom, De Sacerdotio, 2, 2-4.

III. Minister

The Council of Trent teaches that those doctrines are false and certainly foreign to the truth of the Gospel which extend the power of the keys to persons other than bishops and simple priests; and furthermore that for the valid exercise of this power the power of jurisdiction is required (sess. XIV, chaps. 6 and 7; Denz-U, no. 902 ff.).

Historically it is evident that in the ancient Church, just as it was the function of the bishop to celebrate the Eucharist and administer Baptism (cf. Ignatius, Ad Smyrn., 8, 1), so too the bishop, that is, the “priest” par excellence, was the ordinary minister of Penance (cf. Tertullian, De pud., 18, 18).

Soon, however, according to the needs of the various Churches, in this ministry the bishop associated priests, to whom therefore he gave the faculty to administer Penance and reconcile sinners after having heard their confession (power of jurisdiction).

The office of the presbyters in the administration of Penance is attested at Rome during the persecution of Decius, when the episcopal see was vacant and the reconciliation of the *lapsi* was urgent (cf. *Inter Cyprian. epist.*, 30, 8). It is attested for the Church of Carthage by Cyprian (*Epist.*, 18, 1; 19, 2), and for the Church of Alexandria by Dionysius of Alexandria (cf. Eusebius, *Hist. ecc.*, 7, 44). In some Churches, the bishop’s duties in administering Penance were assigned to a special presbyter, called the “penitential presbyter.” Socrates (*Hist. ecc.*, 5, 19) and Sozomen (*Hist. ecc.*, 7, 16) speak of this institution, from whom we learn that in 391 at Constantinople, such an office was abolished due to a scandal. In Asia Minor, according to Basil (*Epist.*, 217, can. 74) and Gregory of Nyssa (*Epist.*, can. 4), there was a steward (*economus*) of Penance, charged with hearing the confession and imposing canonical penances on the guilty.

While the power to administer Penance—and thus to receive confession—was granted to presbyters, it was denied to deacons. This is clearly stated by Jerome, who writes that the “bishop or presbyter” can bind or loose (*In Matth.*, 16, 19), and by Ambrose, who says: “The right to bind and loose is granted only to priests” (*De paenit.*, 1, 2, 7).

Nevertheless, both in the early centuries of the Church (cf. Cyprian, *Epist.*, 18, 1; *Conc. Illiber.*, can. 32) and especially in the Middle Ages (9th–13th centuries), it is found that in cases of necessity, deacons were permitted to hear confession. The many documents regarding this practice, consisting of canons from canonical collections and statutes of particular councils, have been collected by P. Laurain (*De l'intervention des laïques, des diacres, et des abesses dans l'administration de la Pénitence*, Paris 1897). In the Middle Ages, in cases of necessity, even laypeople were accustomed to hear the confession of their sins (cf. A. Teetaert, *La confession aux laïques*, 1926). Indeed, after Peter Lombard (*Sent.*, 4, dist. 17, 4), many doctors of the 12th–13th centuries defended the obligation of such confession if a priest could not be found. This practice was supported by a text from *De vera et falsa paenitentia*, a 11th-century work attributed to Augustine, which states: “The value of confession is so great that, in the absence of a priest, one must confess to a neighbor... Although the one to whom confession is made does not have the power to absolve, the penitent’s desire for a priest will obtain forgiveness if he confesses his crime to his neighbor” (10, 25: *PL* 40, 1122).

However, such confessions were not considered properly sacramental, since neither deacons nor laypeople possessed the power of absolution. Indeed, in the Synodal Constitutions of Odo of Paris (1197), it is stated: “It is strictly forbidden for deacons, in any way, to hear confessions, except in cases of the gravest necessity; for they do not possess the keys nor can they absolve” (can. 56; *Mansi*, XXII, 676). Instead, these confessions were regarded as a means of expressing repentance and the resolve to make satisfaction, thus obtaining God’s forgiveness directly. Rather, the practice of confessing to deacons or laypeople demonstrates how deeply rooted was the conviction of the necessity of confession and how highly the acts of the penitent were valued in relation to divine forgiveness.

IV. MODALITIES. — In the history of Penance, particular importance attaches to secret confession, made privately to the priest from whom absolution is sought, and to public confession, in which the sin is manifested before the community. The Council of Trent, while noting that secret confession has been in use in the Church from the beginning, nevertheless praises the practice of sometimes confessing one’s sins publicly, as beneficial both to the sinner and to the faithful (sess. XIV, cap. 5).

Historically, it may be considered certain that for secret sins the Church never prescribed public confession. An attempt to introduce such a practice was made in the 5th century in Campania, where some priests compiled detailed lists of sins heard in confession and read them publicly in the assemblies of the faithful. In this way, they thought to humiliate the guilty in a salutary manner and deter others from sinning, lest they suffer such shame. However, Pope Leo the Great vigorously protested against this “unlawful usurpation,” calling it “contrary to the apostolic rule” according to which “it is sufficient to indicate the offenses of the conscience to the priests alone through secret confession” (*Epist.*, 168, 3). Only as an exceptional measure could it be suggested, as appears from a text of Origen (*In ps. 37, hom. 2, 6*), that one who had made a secret confession of a hidden sin might also make a public confession: both for the good of others and to more easily expiate the fault.

For public sins, however, confession before the community was ordinarily required (cf. Cyprian, *Epist.*, 4, 4, and 59, 15–16), even though they were later expiated through private penance; such confession was probably of a sacramental nature (cf. *PENITENCE*).

Beginning in the 4th century, secret confession gained in importance and spread more widely; public confession thus became increasingly rare and almost disappeared by the 8th century.

V. FREQUENCY. — It has already been noted that in ancient times the use of confession was much less frequent than today, and some of the reasons for this have been mentioned. Nevertheless, even before the 13th century—that is, before the Fourth Lateran Council—the practice of periodic confession had taken hold among the faithful. Many documents attest, from the 8th century onward, the obligation and custom of the faithful to confess and receive communion at Christmas, Easter, and Pentecost. These have been collected by P. A. Kirsch (*Zur Geschichte der katholischen Beichte*, Würzburg 1902). However, in various places, due to the ignorance of the laity and the negligence of the clergy, much laxity had crept in. Indeed, Alan of Lille, after stating: “Laypeople are obliged to confess especially three times a year, namely at Christmas, Easter, and Pentecost,” must admit: “But today the bad habit has prevailed that laypeople and clergy confess only once a year, and even then it is more out of custom than from sincere repentance of heart” (*Summa de arte praedicatoria*, 31: *PL* 210, 173).

The Fourth Lateran Council (1215) enacted for the whole Church the prescription: “Every faithful person of either sex who has reached the age of discretion must faithfully confess all his sins in secret to his own priest at least once a year” (*Mansi*, XXII, 1007). This prescription was renewed by the Council of Trent (sess. XIV, can. 8) and is now incorporated into the *Codex Iuris Canonici* (can. 906).

VI. ETHICAL AND SOCIAL VALUE. — From a psychological standpoint, confession responds to an innate sentiment of human nature, namely “the desire to manifest one’s sorrows, to pour out one’s remorse for evil deeds into another” (cf. L. Monsabré, *Esposizione del dogma cattolico*, Italian trans., XIII, Turin 1941, pp. 81–82).

Greater significance, however, attaches to the moral value of confession. The examination of one’s conscience, the humbling act of accusing oneself, the reproaches, advice, and admonitions of the priest, and the moral certainty of having regained divine friendship all represent a powerful incentive toward good and a restraint against perverse inclinations.

The influence of confession on the social order is so evident that it is acknowledged even by the enemies of Catholicism. A notable testimony is that of Voltaire, who writes: “One may consider confession as the greatest curb on hidden crimes. It is excellent for inducing hearts ulcerated by offense to forgive, and for causing those who have stolen to restore to their neighbor what belongs to him” (*Catéchisme*, in *Dictionnaire philosophique*).

II. MORAL THEOLOGY

SUMMARY:

I. Nature

II. Necessity

III. Qualities or requisites of Confession

IV. Integrity of Confession

V. Excusing causes from material integrity

VI. Repetition of Confession

VII. General Confession.

I. NATURE

In the strict sense indicated, Confession is called an accusation or sacramental confession, to distinguish it from the disclosure of one’s sins made even to a priest-confessor solely for the purpose of obtaining advice or forgiveness for offenses committed against his person.

Two things are therefore required for there to be sacramental confession; namely, the disclosure of one’s sins: made: a) to the legitimate minister of the Church, that is, to a priest who actually possesses or at least, in the penitent’s persuasion, has the faculty to absolve from sins; b) with the intention of receiving sacramental absolution.

II. NECESSITY

To obtain absolution for sins committed after Baptism, sacramental confession is required, as has been stated. This is the ordinary means; for it is certain that a sinner, unable to confess, may obtain forgiveness for his sins through perfect contrition alone, provided it is not devoid of the purpose to confess. Moreover, even when confession is conveniently available, if it is necessary *hic et nunc* to be in a state of grace, this may be attained through perfect contrition alone, for example, by one who, being in mortal sin, must receive the sacrament of Confirmation; though the obligation to confess remains in force. It is also licit to absolve sacramentally one who is in danger of death and is physically or morally unable to confess.

III. QUALITIES OR REQUISITES OF CONFESSION

Moral theologians, almost unanimously, enumerate six qualities or requisites of confession: a) integrity; b) brevity or simplicity; c) humility; d) sincerity; e) prudence; f) vocal confession. Integrity, which is the most important requisite, will be treated after the others.

1. Confession must be brief or simple

That is, avoiding unnecessary matters (such as, for example, an exposition of the genesis of sin or of inessential circumstances, as well as dwelling on the sins of others), manifesting sins with candor and simplicity, and shunning any artifice. The lack of brevity or simplicity in itself does not exceed venial fault; indeed, it often entirely lacks fault due to lack of reflection.

2. Confession must be humble

That is, with a consciousness of one’s unworthiness and with the spirit in which the publican, striking his breast, said: “O God, be merciful to me a sinner” (Lk 18:13); without boasting of one’s good works, without seeking excuses for one’s sins, without becoming indignant if the confessor reproves or questions, etc.

3. Confession must be sincere

Sincerity in confession requires that:

a) nothing pertaining to the malice of sin be concealed; that is, grave sins or circumstances that change the species of sin must not be knowingly omitted without grave reason; mortal sins must not be deliberately expressed in such a way that the confessor cannot perceive their malice.

It would not, however, fail in the duty of sincerity, though not entirely commendable, if one approaches the confessional at night or alters one’s voice so as not to be recognized by the confessor. Likewise, one who, to avoid losing the esteem of one’s habitual confessor, goes to another to confess possible mortal sins does not sin gravely unless, in addition to this, one is also induced by bad will not to be bound to the remedies necessary to destroy the habit of sin.

b) Nothing must be said to diminish or increase the malice of sin. He who deliberately states false circumstances or narrates true ones in such a way that the confessor is led to believe that what is grave is light sins gravely. He who knowingly confesses in such a way as to be falsely believed guilty of mortal sin, according to St. Alphonsus and others cited by him (*Theologia moralis*, I. VI, n. 497, ed. L. Gaudé, III, Rome 1909, p. 509), sins gravely against religion and truthfulness. It is commonly held that the sin against religion, and thus sacrilege, exists only when one knowingly accuses oneself of a sin not committed, and nothing else; for only in this case is the sacrament knowingly rendered null. The lack of veracity certainly harms the penitent’s reputation, but does not constitute a grave fault, since squandering one’s reputation is not in itself a grave matter (cf. A. Ballerini - D. Palmieri, *Opus theologicum morale*, 3rd ed., V, Prato 1893, n. 459).

c) One must answer the confessor’s questions sincerely. In this regard, there is grave sin only when sincerity is lacking in grave matters. There is not even a light sin if the penitent, in answering the confessor, omits things that in no way pertain to confession.

The occasionary sinner, the habitual sinner, or the recidivist, disposed to fulfill one’s duty loyally, in our opinion, does not sin gravely if, when questioned, one denies being such. The proposition: *Non tenemur confessario interroganti fateri peccati alicuius consuetudinem* (Denz-U, 1208), is condemned because, being too general, it would excuse even from grave fault one who, by so answering, did not concern oneself with the duty to amend.

4. Confession must be prudent

That is, made with language befitting the reverence due to the sacrament and without unnecessary revelation of the sins of one’s neighbor or of one’s accomplice.

5. Confession must be vocal

This was declared by Eugene IV in his decree for the Armenians (bull *Exultate Deo* of 22 Nov. 1439; cf. *Summa Theologiae*, 3a, q. 9, a. 3). To confess with mere signs is considered by some to be a grave fault when necessity does not excuse (cf. *Salmanticenses, Cursus theologiae moralis*, Venice 1714, tract. VI, cap. 7, n. 11); it is licit when there is a reasonable motive. No one, however, is bound to confess in writing or by signs when this is impossible, and because this is an extraordinary means that no one is bound to employ.

IV. INTEGRITY OF CONFESSION

Confession is integral: a) materially, when all sins committed after Baptism and not yet directly remitted by sacramental absolution are disclosed to the confessor; b) formally, when all mortal sins committed after Baptism, not yet remitted by sacramental absolution, of which, after a diligent examination of conscience in the act of confessing, one has memory and no just and reasonable cause for not disclosing them in the present confession, are disclosed to the confessor.

To receive sacramental absolution validly, confession must be at least formally integral. This doctrine is of faith (*Council of Trent*, sess. XIV, *De poenit.*, cap. 7).

For integrity of confession to be present, it is necessary to disclose: a) the species of the sins, at least as perceived by the penitent; b) the number of the sins; certainly, if known; uncertainly, if the exact number is unknown; in which case the probable number must be declared; sometimes it is sufficient to declare how often one has fallen into sin each month, week, or day; indeed, it may be sufficient and more fitting to declare the habit and the time during which one lived in it; c) circumstances that change the moral species (e.g., theft of a sacred object) or the theological species (e.g., theft of grave matter).

Probably there is no obligation to manifest notably aggravating circumstances; nor is there an obligation to manifest doubtful sins, except in the case of negative doubt accompanied by reasons militating for the existence of a mortal sin or grave sin not yet confessed.

Undoubtedly there is an obligation to manifest a grave external act (cf. Council of Trent, sess. XIV, De poenit., cap. 5). It is not certain that there is an obligation to manifest the evil effect of the act which could not be prevented.

V. Excusing causes from material integrity

These are:

6. Physical impotence

That is: a) involuntary forgetfulness; b) inability to speak, such as that of the mute, those who, in danger of death, are unable to speak, those who, not knowing the language spoken by the confessor, cannot make themselves understood: these are not bound to confess through an interpreter.

7. Moral impotence

That is: a) deafness, whenever sacramental secrecy is thereby compromised; b) lack of time (illness or imminent battle or grave danger which do not allow for integral confession); c) danger of grave spiritual or corporal harm to the confessor or to the penitent or to others (danger of violation of sacramental secrecy, of falling into sin, danger of plague or contagious disease, etc.); d) danger of loss of reputation (impossibility of confessing without others listening, etc.).

Probably excused from the integrity of confession is one who cannot manifest his sin without his accomplice being known to the confessor, or without danger of the sin of one who is not an accomplice being known. Likewise, extraordinary and morally insurmountable shame excuses from integrity.

VI. REITERATION OF CONFESSION

Confession must be repeated whenever it is certain that it was invalid. Invalidity can depend on: a) the confessor, if he is without jurisdiction, if he does not pronounce the formula of absolution or pronounces it substantially correct or complete but without the intention of absolving; b) the penitent, if he had no sorrow or purpose of amendment, if he gravely sinned in his examination of conscience, if he culpably omitted to confess some mortal sin which ought to have been manifested, if he lied in a grave matter, if before absolution he had firmly decided not to perform the grave satisfaction which was obligatory, if he deliberately confessed to a confessor who was bribed for something he did not wish to do, if he deliberately deceived the confessor, if he did not wish to make satisfaction, if he did not know that he was unable to perceive sins.

If confession was invalid because of the confessor, he himself is bound to repair the defects committed.

If the penitent, after receiving absolution, realizes that the confessor has perceived no grave sin, he must repeat the entire confession the first time he wishes to confess again.

Confession made outside the case of necessity with a confessor known to be ignorant or lax must be repeated because it is invalid not through lack of jurisdiction in the confessor, but through lack of proper dispositions in the penitent.

Confession invalid through lack of proper dispositions on the part of the penitent himself must be repeated if the penitent goes to another confessor. Yet it is probable that, just as he need not repeat it if he returns to the same confessor, so he need not repeat it if he goes to another; because the reason which excuses him from repeating it when he returns to the same confessor is not so exclusive to this case that it cannot also apply to another confessor (A. Piscetta - A. Gennaro, *Elementa theol. moralis*, V, 6th ed., Turin 1934, n. 907).

VII. GENERAL CONFESSION

By general confession is meant the renewed accusation of all the sins of one’s past life of which one has memory after a diligent examination of conscience. Ordinarily, however, general confession also refers to the renewed accusation of sins committed, for example, in a decade or a five-year period.

General confession can be necessary, useful, or harmful, depending on the various conditions of the penitent.

General confession is necessary for one who for a long time has confessed sacrilegiously. It must not, however, be imposed unless it is certain that all or many confessions of the past life were sacrilegious.

General confession may be advised for those who prudently doubt the validity of their past confessions; likewise also for those who, though not doubting, may yet derive no small benefit from II. Such are adults who have never made a general confession and find themselves in a good opportunity such as spiritual exercises, missions, or a jubilee; those who are beginning a life of piety and recollection; those who are entering the priestly or religious state, etc.

General confession may be permitted to those for whom it is neither necessary nor useful, yet is not harmful. But it must be forbidden to those for whom it may prudently be feared to be harmful, such as especially the scrupulous.

If general confession is not necessary, the penitent may omit sins, even mortal ones, already duly and directly absolved by sacramental absolution. For these are a matter of free choice — See plate X.

Andrea Gennaro

III. HISTORY OF RELIGIONS

SUMMARY:

I. Confession of sins among primitive peoples

II. Confession of sins among peoples of culture.

I. CONFESSION OF SINS AMONG PRIMITIVE PEOPLES

There have been and there are scholars who have a very low opinion of primitive peoples, to the point of denying them any true spiritual life and any true knowledge of sin. J. G. Frazer, *ad loc.*, holds that among peoples of little advanced civilization sin would be conceived as a kind of morbid substance hidden in the body of the sinner, almost a tenacious and deadly vapor, which would be driven out by confession. Hence confession would be nothing more than a kind of emetic, a kind of physical purgation, similar to ablution and fumigation ceremonies, rather than a moral and spiritual purification. At a later stage, with the progress of civilization, these peoples, according to the same author, acquire the notion of sin as a transgression of the will of a wise and good God, so that the confession of sins loses its former magical character as a physical purgative, being judged now as superfluous and absurd, and assumes the new aspect of a purely religious rite, conceived as the only way to avert divine wrath and the fatal consequences of sin, provided that the sinner is humble and repentant. It is believed that God, angered by the offense received through sin, can, by a simple act of his sovereign will, annul the guilt and restore the repentant sinner to his former innocence.

Thanks to the numerous studies and researches conducted thus far on the religion of primitive peoples, especially those ethnologically most ancient, this theory is now outdated. Even among the ethnologically most ancient peoples, a true awareness of sin has been observed, linked to the knowledge of an ideal of moral life; an ideal imposed by the will of God, creator and lawgiver, before whom both the individual and society feel responsible. Actions, thoughts, words, and the entire conduct of every rational creature and of society as a whole are judged good or bad according as they correspond or not to this moral ideal. Precisely because primitive peoples feel the duty to live according to this ideal, they seek to put themselves in a position to know it, to realize it, and to transmit it to future generations, providing the youth, from their earliest years, with an adequate education and imposing on them an ascetic discipline. Among these peoples, therefore, the moral ideal, an expression of the divine will, is, in the fullest sense, a morality and an asceticism, a criterion of good and evil, of virtue and vice.

Among the Andamanese of the Indian Ocean, the ideal of moral life, though open to criticism in certain respects,

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is, on the whole, truly complex and concerns the entire human life, individual and social, in its various states and conditions. They believe that at one time this ideal was taught to Tomo, the first ancestor of the human race, by Puluga, the creator God of the world and of the first human couple. Puluga wishes it to be observed by men, and after their death he will judge their souls according to it; if found guilty, they will be condemned to torment in jereg-lar-mugu. Indeed, although Puluga, as the embodiment of goodness, is merciful to those who suffer, he nevertheless becomes angry at certain sins, such as falsehood, murder, adultery, and burning wax for magical purposes, and may send another flood to destroy humanity, as he did with the descendants of Tomo who disobeyed his commandments. When it thunders, the Andamanese exclaim: “Puluga igrielle,” that is, “Puluga is angry,” from which it is easy to infer that he is seized with great fear for his sin and examines himself, if he does not have immediate awareness of it, to see whether he has committed II. In this case, seized as he is by fear, does he appeal to the goodness of Puluga, asking for forgiveness and promising not to sin again? The explorers tell us nothing about this; but the question does arise. It is, without doubt, a question concerning the innermost feelings of man, a very delicate matter, because, given the keen sense of honor observed among the Andamanese, one naturally feels shame in revealing one’s sins and spiritual miseries.

A moral ideal of life, more or less similar and sometimes higher than that of the Andamanese, is also found among the ethnologically most ancient peoples, known as gatherers, of Asia, Africa, America, and Australia, as well as among many ethnologically more advanced peoples.

Among all these peoples, a true awareness of sin is observed, but only among a certain number of them (about a hundred according to Pettazzoni’s researches) does the confession of sins exist and has existed. This confession is both private and public, individual and collective, and sometimes takes both forms among the same people; it is made for all sins or only for some of them; it is an act to be performed under certain periodic or special circumstances, or it is required only occasionally in life. Among the gatherer peoples, the existence of the confession of sins has been observed only among the Semang of the Malay Peninsula, where it is a public and individual confession made to Karei, the Supreme Being, to obtain forgiveness, at the same time offering the sacrifice of one’s own blood in atonement. Like the Andamanese, the Semang believe that thunder is a sign of Karei’s wrath for the sins of men, and that, as punishment, he could send another flood to destroy all humanity. Therefore, when a Semang sinner hears thunder, he feels obliged to offer the sacrifice of his own blood, which he does by wounding his leg and collecting the blood in a vessel. Then he mixes this blood with water and throws it toward the sky, the abode of Karei, confessing his sins and asking forgiveness from him. This confession is evidently of a religious nature, made directly to God, without any intermediary. A similar confession, but in the presence of a priest, existed among the ancient Mexicans. The priest would pray to God for the sinner’s forgiveness and help him make a good confession, finally imposing severe and painful penances. Among the same ancient Mexicans, in addition to this private individual confession, there was also a public collective one, performed on the oldest woman of the place, who was finally stoned to death by the priest and then covered with a heap of stones thrown upon her body by all those present.

Among the Wakulwe of East Africa (Lake Rukwa), a collective and religious confession of sins is practiced; it is collective because it is made by all members of the family or clan, beginning with the head of the family; it is religious because it is made to ask forgiveness from God, whom they call Nguluwu. The confession must be sincere and complete; it is made collectively when someone in the family is seriously ill, or a woman is in dangerous childbirth, or when a group must cross a difficult stretch of water. The Wakulwe also practice individual confession under special circumstances, such as when the head of a family is about to undertake a journey.

Among the Dinka of Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, there is a custom of making a public confession of sins of murder and theft, kept secret, in the proximity of death. This confession is also of a religious nature, because it is made to Nhialic, the Supreme Being of the Dinka, so that he may forget the sinner’s sins.

Among the Igulik Eskimos, there is a custom of private individual confession, for example by the sick, and of public collective confession by an entire group of individuals on the occasion of a public calamity. These Eskimos judge good and evil, virtue and vice, sin, reward, and punishment according to a moral ideal of life imposed by the Supreme Being, whom they call Sila; but in their conception of the effects of sin, there also intervenes a conception of a universal cosmic law whose relation to Sila is not clear: a rather magical conception, according to which sin, even involuntary, automatically brings with it vengeance, that is, a punishment for the sinner or for the whole society; the sinner becomes evil, and his evil action mortifies and defiles a particular divinity, for example, the sea goddess Tacanacap-salu. To annul all these consequences of sin, confession is necessary, in which the “shaman,” standing beside the sick person or in the midst of a group of people, helps to perform an examination of conscience, enumerating possible sins, and the sinner, who recalls having committed them, confesses them publicly. A characteristic of this confession is precisely the role of the shaman, not only because he directs the confession, but also because he influences the people with his magical action, with his imaginary journeys to communicate with spirits, for example, going to the bottom of the sea to the said sea goddess Tacanacap-salu.

Among the Ewe of West Africa, there is a custom of confession for very different reasons, such as to have children or to obtain healing. This confession, made before the priest, does not seem to be directed directly to the Supreme Being, Mauw-ga, but to spirits, for example, the spirit of the earth.

Among the Acioli there are two kinds of confession, which are occasional and often concern sexual sins. When a woman is in difficult labour, she confesses her sexual sins, committed before and after marriage, to the women who are assisting her. These women report the matter to the husband and then an expiatory sacrifice is made near the door of the hut of the woman in childbirth. The victim for the sacrifice is provided by the men with whom the woman has had relations; if she was already married, they must also pay a fine of seventeen goats or one ox and one cow. This confession has, alongside a practical purpose—for only through the confession can the women inform the husband of the sacrifice to be made and at the same time tell the adulterers to provide the proper victim—also a religious purpose, because the sacrifice is offered to the Supreme Being, who, according to the Acioli, is the author and avenger of their moral code.

Among the Acioli Paycò, confession is made through the father of the sinner when there has been violence against a girl. The one who has violated the girl must pay to her father a fine of one ox and one cow; and moreover, give a sheep for the expiatory sacrifice. While the sacrifice is being made, the father of the guilty party confesses the sin of his son and the girl is subjected to a purification ceremony.

There is an implicit confession of the sinner in every expiatory sacrifice made for the sin or sins of a person or of an entire community, as is customary among the Negrilli of Africa and other peoples, in order to obtain forgiveness and avert its consequences.

These examples of confession of sins belong to different types of civilization and clearly indicate the complexity of this phenomenon in the life of the peoples among whom it exists, while they also show the difficulties involved in researching its origin. Indeed, the question of origin presupposes not only research into whether confession exists among other peoples where it has not yet been observed, but also the solution to many issues that require special investigation. Thus, among peoples where both private and public confession exist, as among the Mexicans, the question arises: which of the two originated first, private confession, given that sin is primarily a personal phenomenon, or public confession? Or did they both arise together? Among peoples where the shaman plays an important role in confession, as among the Eskimos, did it exist before shamanism? Where confession is made to spirits, as among the Ewe, was it first made to the Supreme Being, God, and only to Him? Among those peoples in which there exists a magical conception of sin and confession, is the close connection between sin and its moral sanctions not prior to the magical conception, given that such a connection is already found, as seen above, in the most ancient ethnological cultures? In any case, in the current state of studies in religious ethnology, the question of the origin of confession must be distinguished from that of the knowledge and awareness of sin. The true notion of sin already exists among the most ancient ethnological peoples. For these, except for the Semang, the issue is not that of the confession of sins, which they do not know, but rather that of the forgiveness of sins, namely, what the sinner does to obtain from God the forgiveness of his sins and avert their dire consequences.

The question of the origin of confession has been posed as follows: it has been asked whether the confession of sins arose independently, in different places and times, or whether it had a single centre of origin, from which it spread in various directions, undergoing various modifications and transformations along the way; and more precisely, whether it is possible to assign confession of sins genetically to a particular type of civilization, to a given area, and to a given cultural cycle. Pettazzoni, who has taken a great interest in this question, states as a provisional hypothesis—since his research is still in progress—that the confession of sins is genetically connected with a civilization of a “matriarchal” type. He awaits further in-depth investigations to indicate the correct solution to the question. For now, it is noted that confession of sins is not a universal phenomenon and often exists only for a particular kind of sins; yet there must have been very serious reasons for imposing it on the people. It is sufficient, in fact, to reflect simply that, given the strong sense of honour among men, as noted above, confession is a great humiliation, an act that is repugnant to man; the revelation of sins, moreover, which accompanies confession, especially of certain sins such as adultery, murder, and theft, brings serious social consequences. Thus, among the Acioli, as seen, after the confession of the adulterous woman comes the payment of heavy fines, the expiatory sacrifice, the justified resentment of the husband and the wives of the adulterers with the consequent easy discord in families; moreover, grave anxieties are caused, because it is believed that God may send, as punishment for the adultery committed, not only illness to someone in the family, but may also destroy the entire kinship group. This suggests the possibility that confession of sins was imposed, both for religious and for moral and social reasons, precisely to prevent sins, especially certain graver sins, and therefore also the possibility that confession arose independently among certain peoples for very different reasons.

In the religious cultures of various peoples, the concept of confession (c.) of sins has taken different forms.

In Japanese Shintoism, the festival of oho-harahi ("great purification") was and is a collective confession. During the rite, "objects of purification" are presented, which are then thrown into flowing water or loaded onto a boat that carries them out to sea. During the oho-harahi, one of the Norito is recited, consisting of a list of sins, including sexual sins and unintentional ones. The sin, thus evoked, is transferred onto the "objects of purification" and then eliminated.

In ancient China, aside from the confession of the sovereign when some public calamity was afflicting the land, the practice of confession is linked to the later Taoist development (1st century AD). Here, the sick would write their sins in three copies: one was thrown into the air from a tower, the second was buried, and the third was cast into the sea.

The Vedic texts, in their most archaic parts, preserve both the memory of an objective conception of guilt, which can therefore be eliminated, after being confessed, through material agents, and the subjective conception of transgression against the will of a god (especially Varuna). The two ideas frequently intermingled.

Brahmanical literature contains mention of a sacrifice (Varunapraghasa) dedicated to Varuna and the Maruts, whose evocatory and eliminatory character is quite transparent.

In Jainism, it is especially the monks who practice confession (alocana), followed by a penance proportionate to the gravity of the sin.

Buddhism, in comparison to earlier Brahmanical and Jain practices, fully revalues inner repentance in the confession of guilt. There was a confession of monks on the occasion of the festival at the end of the rainy season (pavarana) and at the fortnightly meetings (upasatha). A list of faults (patimokkha) was recited, and a penance was performed that had the power to cancel the fault itself. According to Buddhism, sincere confession by the sinner truly destroys sins, annulling the moral debt as the sun evaporates dew on the grass without leaving a trace. However, it distinguishes between the enlightened person and the one who is not yet enlightened. The latter, by confessing his sin and praying to Amida Buddha, can only obtain a suspension of the punishment due to his sin and time to convert, whereas the act of repentance by the enlightened person destroys all the debt of sin. This act must come from the depths of the heart with a firm resolve for amendment and renunciation of past vices. Since the Amidist, especially in China, attributes to Amida Buddha all the attributes that we give to God, his confession becomes entirely religious.

In ancient Egypt, the confession of sins is attested by inscriptions in the Theban necropolis from the 13th century BC (19th–20th Dynasty). The nature of the confession appears slightly altered.