CONFESSION (MEANS OF PROOF). - Confession, as a means of proof, is distinguished in canon law into judicial confession and extrajudicial confession.
I. Judicial confession is a true and proper legal proof. It occurs when one of the parties in a trial asserts some fact, the acknowledgment of which is contrary to that party and favorable to the other, and provided that the assertion is made, in writing or orally, before the competent judge (at least within the absolute limits), that the person making the assertion has the legal standing to appear in court, and finally that the person makes the confession itself with full awareness.
Among the various effects of judicial confession, the following above all must be remembered: a) by it the opponent is relieved of the burden of proof, provided that only private interests are at stake in the case (CIC, can. 1751); b) from it there derives, for the facts to which it refers, the notoriety of law referred to in can. 2197 § 2 and, as a direct consequence of such notoriety, by the confession itself the presumptions and proofs contrary to it are successfully overcome.
Confession can be revoked by the one confessing, if he does so immediately, or if the established requirements are lacking; whereas, once it has been completed, only if the conditions were lacking (and in particular that of free awareness), or if the confession was the product of an error of fact (can. 1752).
II. Extrajudicial confession is that which is made, whether in writing or orally, to the opponent or to others, extra iudicium (CIC, can. 1753).
It has, as is obvious, a lesser force than that proper to judicial confession, given that it must reasonably be presumed to have been made without the exact knowledge of what its repercussions on the judicial plane may be; nevertheless, if it appears detailed and made with full awareness of its importance and at a time not suspect, it can be placed on the same plane on which judicial confession stands before the judge: however, the evaluation of the efficacy to be attributed to it is expressly left to the discretionary judgment of the judge (can. 1753).
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Fernando Della Rocca