CONFESSIONE (MEZZO DI PROVA). – Confession, as a means of proof, is distinguished in canon law into judicial confession and extrajudicial confession.
I. Judicial confession is a genuine legal proof. It exists when one of the parties in a trial asserts some fact whose acknowledgment is contrary to that party and favorable to the other, provided that the assertion is made, in writing or orally, before the competent judge (at least within the absolute limits), that the person making the assertion has standing to appear in court, and finally that the confession itself is made with full awareness.
Among the various effects of judicial confession, the following in particular should be recalled: a) through it, the opposing party is relieved of the burden of proof, provided that only private interests are at stake in the case (CIC, can. 1751); b) from it derives, for the facts to which it refers, the notoriety in law referred to in can. 2197 § 2 and, as a direct consequence of this notoriety, the confession itself successfully overcomes presumptions and evidence to the contrary.
The confession may be retracted by the confessor if this is done immediately, or if the established requirements are lacking; whereas, once it has been completed, it may be retracted only if the conditions were lacking (in particular, that of free awareness), or if the confession was the product of an error of fact (can. 1752).
II. Extrajudicial confession is that which is made, either in writing or orally, to the opposing party or to others, extra iudicium (CIC, can. 1753).
As is obvious, it has less force than that proper to judicial confession, since it must reasonably be presumed to have been made without exact knowledge of what its repercussions might be in the judicial sphere; nevertheless, if it appears detailed and was made with full awareness of its importance and at a time free from suspicion, it may be placed on the same level as that occupied before the judge by judicial confession: the assessment of the effectiveness to be attributed to it is, however, expressly left to the discretionary judgment of the judge (can. 1753).