### BEING, ENTITY
In ordinary language, the terms can be synonymous. In philosophical reflection, however, they are usually taken as concrete and abstract: “ente” (entity) refers to what has being, to everything that is in any way. For all speculative systems, the concept of being is the simplest and most fundamental: controversies begin when it comes to specifying the manner in which being presents itself to consciousness, according to which each system takes a position in attributing to it that content and structure which corresponds to its own interpretation of reality. For empiricist philosophies, the separation of being and its content coincides entirely with the presentation and content of experience. For rationalist philosophies, being is given without remainder and adequately expressed through concepts (dogmatic rationalism) or resolved in the activity of thought (idealism). In the first form of rationalism, being is known and determined according to a real “a priori” (innatism, ontologism); in the second, according to a logical-functional “a priori.” Thus, the reference to the problem of being provides the exact orientation for every system, which is recognized and qualified, in its nature and method, by the “beginning” it takes regarding the concept of being. For example, Hegel’s position that being, pure being, is identical to nothingness, and therefore a mere dialectical moment (Encicl., § 86 ff.), on the one hand forces the suprasensible concept of being (as *genus generalissimum*) beyond the limits of the Wolffian-skeptical concept of being, and on the other hand gives full scope to the principle of the “synthesis a priori,” which Kant had restrained by maintaining the real being as opposed to thought.
Aristotle always begins from the observation that being is said in many ways (πρὸς ἀρχὴν). The principal ways are: real being = logical being (Met., V, 7, 1017 a 31); the first constitutes the structure of material and spiritual entities; the second is being as truth and falsity in the copula of judgment. Real being is divided into per se and per accidens beings (Met., V, 7, 1017 a 8); this division distinguishes in predication what belongs to an entity according to its essence from what is merely associated with II. Real being per se, considered in its fundamental determinations, is divided according to the “figures of the categories” (Met., X, 10, 1051 a 35; Top., I, 9, 103 b 27 ff.); considered in its fundamental modes, it is divided into “act and potency,” the binomial that ultimately summarizes Aristotle’s conception of the structure of the entity and the nature of becoming (Met., IX and X).
The entity in act is substance or accident, finite or infinite, that is, creature or Creator (St. Thomas, *De ente et essentia*, especially II, 4-5). In this classification, as is easily seen, the multiplicity of meanings reveals an order of intrinsic subordination, which is twofold: first, in that the following pair deepens and dissects the content of the main element of the preceding pair, and second, in that in each pair one element dominates the other, which is dependent, in its order, on the former (Met., IV, 2, 1003 a 33).
Consequently, the concept of entity, although it has the poorest and most indeterminate content (“something that is”), signifies it while comprehending the various ways in which it is predicated, and thus is virtually the richest concept. The comprehension of this virtuality is the task of metaphysics (v.), which has as its object “being insofar as being” (Met., IV, 1003 a 21), and the various types of realistic metaphysics indicate the different methods of unfolding the comprehension of being. It has been noted (W. D. Ross) that Aristotle’s classification lacks the existential act of being, which instead appears explicitly in St. Thomas (In I Sent., dist. 33, I, 4 ad r.). In pagan philosophy, which does not know creation, the act of being coincides concretely with being as substance, quantity, quality, etc.; in Christian philosophy, the act of being is the proper effect of God, communicated to creatures according to a participation (Quodlib., XII, q. 5, a. 5) measured by the degree of perfection of each essence. The entity is therefore split (in concept) and
composed (in reality) of essence and act of being: the First Cause, which is Pure Act, has no essence and therefore is not an “entity” but the “Being that subsists by itself.” Thus, the notion of being applies also to accidents, to potency, and to creatures; but above all and primarily, being belongs to substance, to form, and to Divinity, from which they respectively derive their being.
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### NATIONAL ENTITY FOR THE DISTRIBUTION OF AID IN ITALY (E.N.D.S.I.)
It was established by the joint initiative of the Italian Government, the Catholic Church in Italy, and the Italian Red Cross; it was constituted by Royal Decree-Law No. 220 of September 28, 1944, with the purpose of providing free distribution of aid—sent to Italy by foreign governments, entities, or private individuals or allocated by the Italian government—to the most needy categories of the Italian civilian population.
The E.N.D.S.I. is administered by a directive committee composed of nine members, of whom three are appointed by the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, three by the Catholic Church in Italy, and three by the Italian Red Cross.
The directive committee appoints an executive board composed of three members, chosen one by the Presidency of the Council, one by the Catholic Church in Italy, and one by the Italian Red Cross. Provincial and municipal committees are constituted in the same manner.
The aid received has come largely from the United States of America, which, through two major organizations—the American Relief for Italy and the War Relief Services of the National Catholic Welfare Conference—and numerous other relief agencies, sent 1,700% of the aforementioned aid, much of which was directed to the Holy Father, who generously entrusted it to the E.N.D.S.I. for the assistance of the needy Italian population. In total, the aid received from the United States by the end of 1949 amounted to 1,650,000 parcels of clothing, food, medicine, etc., and 7,200 tons.
Significant contributions were also made by Catholic organizations in Ireland, whose government arranged for the shipment to Italy of 1,740,000 parcels (4,500 tons) of various relief goods. Another substantial contribution came from Switzerland through the “Dono Svizzero” organization, which, by channeling donations from various donors—some of them Catholic—facilitated the distribution of significant quantities of clothing and footwear, household goods, medicine, foodstuffs, and materials for barracks and fixtures. Other nations, such as Australia, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Norway, Peru, Sweden, Turkey, etc., through the establishment of autonomous committees—some represented by local Catholic figures—collected and sent to Italy relief supplies in the form of clothing and food.
By December 31, 1949, the vehicles of the E.N.D.S.I. had transported goods over a distance of 20,590,497 quintal-kilometers and traveled 559,880 kilometers for the transport of children to summer camps.