HEGEL, GEORG FRIEDRICH WILHELM. - He is the principal representative of modern idealism: b. in Stuttgart on 24 Aug. 1770, d. in Berlin on 14 Nov. 1831.

SUMMARY: I. Life. - II. Writings. - III. Doctrine. - IV. Problems of Hegelianism.

I. LIFE

The life of H. marks in its stages the principal moments of the formation of his thought. Having completed his lower studies at the gymnasium of his native city, in 1788 he entered the theological seminary of Tübingen, remaining there until 1793: this is the period of the first elaboration of his thought, in the comparative study of Greco-Roman civilization and of revealed religion (Judaism and Christianity), and of his friendship with Hölderlin and Schelling, whose influence he deeply underwent. From 1793 to 1796 he was in Bern as a private tutor, and with the same office he moved to Frankfurt for the years 1797-1800. His first academic activity was at Jena from 1801 to 1807, which constitutes the period of the maturation of his philosophy and of his progressive detachment from Schelling's naturalism. After the brief interlude at Bamberg (1807-1808) as editor of the Bamberger Zeitung, in 1809 he was appointed director of the Nürnberger Gymnasium; in 1816 he rose to the chair of philosophy at the University of Heidelberg, and finally in 1818 he obtained the coveted chair of philosophy at the University of Berlin, of which in the year 1829-30 he was also rector. His rapid death was caused by a cholera epidemic.

II. WRITINGS

They can be divided into four classes with respect to chronology and doctrinal importance.

1) Early writings. Remaining unpublished, they were discovered and described as a whole by Dilthey at the Prussian Academy of Sciences in Berlin in 1905 and published in full by H. Nohl in 1907 under the title H.s theologische Jugendschriften. They comprise the following essays: Popular Religion and Christianity (pp. 1-72); five fragments; The Life of Jesus (pp. 73-136); The Positivity of the Christian Religion (pp. 137-240); The Spirit of Christianity and Its Fate (pp. 241-342); Systematic Fragment, known as the Frankfurt one, of 1800 (pp. 345-51). Some fragments of lesser importance are collected by Nohl in an appendix (pp. 355-402).

2) Preparatory writings of the period 1801-12, which can be subdivided into three moments: a) the Erste Druckschriften (principal ones: Differenz des Fichte'schen und Schelling'schen Systems der Philosophie, published separately in 1801; Verhältnis des Skeptizismus zur Philosophie [1802]; Glaube und Wissen [1802]). These two extensive essays were published as articles in the Kritisches Journal der Philosophie which H. edited together with Schelling). b) The System der Sittlichkeit of 1802 and the important mass of the Jena courses (Jenenser Logik, Metaphysik u. Naturphilosophie [1802-1803] and Jenenser Realphilosophie [1804-1806]). c) Die Phänomenologie des Geistes (1807), which is the first exposition of the system and marks the definitive break with Schelling. In this new climate belong the Nuremberg courses which go under the title of Philosophische Propädeutik (1809 onwards).

3) Systematic writings published by H.: a) Wissenschaft der Logik, the most characteristic work of Hegelian philosophy; the 2nd ed. was prepared by H. with a new preface in 1831. b) Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse of 1817, divided into three books (I, the science of logic; II, the philosophy of nature; III, the philosophy of spirit) in the form of an academic textbook. A successful work for the concision and force of its style, which H. expanded in the two subsequent edd. of 1827 and 1830.

4) Berlin courses. a) Grundlinien der Philos. d. Rechts oder Naturrecht u. Staatwissenschaft im Grundrisse, written in full in 1820 and published by H. in 1821. b) The imposing block of Vorlesungen on the various fields of spirit (aesthetics, philosophy of religion, history of philosophy and philosophy of history), collected and published by his disciples after H.'s death, making use of fragments and notes left by the master.

III. DOCTRINE

1. The genesis of Hegelian thought

In Hegelian philosophy the deepest motifs of classical thought, of Christian theology and of modern thought are found at work and brought to synthesis: such as the necessity of the concept as the truth of the particular, the presence of the Absolute in the finite, and the productivity of consciousness as the definitive affirmation of the autonomy of human thought. Viewed in its cultural environment, H.'s work presents itself almost as the concluding dialectical moment after the dominion of absolute Reason proclaimed by the Enlightenment on the one hand, and the appeal to the dynamism of the real and to its profound original wellsprings from the Absolute itself affirmed by romantic irrationalism. In this thought there is a continual oscillation or tension (Spannung) between a manifold and diverse reality that tends to gain absolute unity and identity, and the Absolute itself which — as concept or idea of the whole — embraces and penetrates the reality of nature and of human history, actualizing itself in its forms and in its degrees of development: Hegelian idealism therefore starts from multiplicity and diversity, from doubt and contradiction as they arise from the immediate presentation of the real, and seeks to fix absolute Truth in the supreme identity of the true, which is the totality of being and the life of the absolute Spirit.

This metaphysical framing of the problem of truth H. draws from various sources: a) There is first of all the Lutheran principle of faith, with which H. declares his full solidarity, considering his own philosophy as the development and maturation of that same principle: "What Luther began as belief in feeling and in the testimony of the spirit is the same that the Spirit, further matured, has striven to comprehend in the concept" (Philosophie des Rechts, Vorrede, ed. E. Gans, Berlin 1840, p. 19). "Luther — H. further declares — by shattering the religious vows in Christendom and the hierarchical structure of the Church [with the 'we are all pastors!'] obtained the freedom and autonomy of the spirit that unfolds in and for itself and is therefore the divinity itself. Only with Luther did the freedom of the spirit begin in germ... Thus in the innermost part of man a place has been made where he is solely with himself and with God, and with God he is solely insofar as he is himself: in consciousness he must find himself at home, as in his own house" (Gesch. der Philosophie, ed. C. L. Michelet [*Werke, 15], Berlin 1844, pp. 227 ff., 230 ff.). The task was to elevate the Lutheran faith from the condition of closed subjectivity and immediate feeling to the absolute certainty that embraces its entire content and expresses it "as absolute objectivity," and this is the work of objective idealism (cf.: Philosophie der Religion, I. Begriff der Religion, ed. G. Lasson [Sämtl. Werke, 12], Leipzig 1925, p. 288). b) In the second place comes the Spinozian principle of the unity of substance, which romanticism and above all the idealism of Fichte and Schelling had rediscovered, overcoming the dualism of Kantian epistemology. For H. "to be Spinozians is the beginning of philosophizing": Spinoza's merit is to have affirmed, more concretely than the Cartesian cogito, the metaphysical identity of thought and being (unity of attributes and modes in Substance), thereby securing the essential presence of the Absolute to itself in its manifestations. The enormous progress of Spinoza, according to H., lies in the methodological principle: "Omnis determinatio est negatio," whereby Being gives itself solely as the "Totality of all its modes and forms" (Gesch. der Philosophie, ed. cit., I, p. 460 f.). The Spinozian point of view must therefore be recognized as essential and necessary, before passing on to the formation of the completed system (Wissenschaft. der Logik, II, 2nd ed., ed. G. Lasson, Berlin 1934, p. 218). H. reproaches the Spinozian Substance for its rigid, intellectualistic and pantheistic conception of the divinity, identifying the latter outright with things ("God is everything, is this piece of paper!"), thereby falling back into the indeterminacy of Indian religion and into the immobile öv of the Eleatics (Philosophie der Religion, ed. cit., I, p. 191 f.): Spinoza's Substance lacks the "return to itself" from its modes and attributes, and is therefore not conceived as an absolute Subject that differentiates itself (Wissenschaft. der Logik, ed. cit., I, p. 337). c) There comes third the speculative principle, and truly the decisive one, which is the Kantian "I think," that is, the transcendental unity of consciousness conceived — not, as with Kant, in a gnoseological and instrumental form with respect to the determination of Being and of truth, but as productive and constitutive of that same truth; to Kant, moreover, is owed the clarification of the antinomic structure of "reason" (Vernunft): from Kant H. also learned the dissolving critique of positive revealed religions. H. reproaches Kant for having shattered truth into a dualistic system of abstract intellectualistic oppositions with no way of reconciliation (subject-object, understanding-reason, matter and form, thing in itself-thought, nature-God, freedom-necessity, etc.), incapable of rising to a higher point of view (cf.: Enzyklop. der philos. Wissenschaft., especially §§ 56-60; ed. L. von Henning, Berlin 1840, pp. 11-725). But H. praises without reservation the Critique of Judgment, where Kant, expounding the "kingdom of ends" proper to the life of the spirit, presents finalities as "life," and this is also the position of Aristotle (Philos. d. Relig., ed. cit., I, p. 216): the task is to specify what the motive principle of the process is, which for H. is dialectic. A strong suggestion in this sense, and in continuity with the Spinozian principle ("omnis determinatio est negatio"), H. received from Böhme: to him H. expressly attributes the conception of dialectic as a process of synthesis of opposites through the mediation of negativity, and of considering everything in function of the "sacred triplicity": "In him the principle of the concept is perfectly alive... everything indeed consists in thinking the negative as simple, since it is at the same time an opposite: the torment (Quol) is therefore this inner scission, and at the same time the simple"; and it is H. himself who brings Böhme close to Proclus, the theorist of triadic dialectic. H. further admires in the mystic of Görlitz the discovery that God, in order to be God, must become, through a process of "return to himself" across contraries, and in this the Trinitarian mystery of the Christian religion, creation, Redemption, etc., have meaning and truth — a principle that H. enunciates with a felicitous expression: "God's diremption of himself" (Gottes Diremption seiner selbst: Gesch. d. Philos.*, ed. cit., I, p. 297). The more immediate influence that his thought underwent from the idealisms of Fichte and Schelling could mature his detachment from them and the conception of an objective metaphysical idealism only in reflection on the themes and principles now indicated, which give his philosophy an interest of universal historical value.

2. Dialectic

The purpose of philosophical consideration is to "eliminate the accidental," that is, the manifold and contingent element of immediacy, and to attain an absolute universal principle: "A content that gives and bears witness to itself and in which everything that man can consider as his own interest has its basis" (Vorles. über d. Philos. d. Geschichte, I, Die Vernunft in der Geschichte, ed. G. Lasson, Leipzig 1930, p. 5). Previous philosophies either stopped at the immediate datum (empiricism, theories of feeling) or isolated the true in the abstraction of particular formalities, one outside the other, or in formal categories that precede rather than spring from the original determination of being (Verstandesmetaphysik). It is from this that the beginning (Anfang) must be taken in order to pass over (übergehen, hinausgehen) from the finite to the Infinite; this is the path of dialectic.

a) The principle of consciousness. — Granted that the Absolute is the term, and not the point of departure (as Schelling wanted), of knowing, the organ or rather the principle of truth is not the intellect (Verstand) but reason (Vernunft): that is, thought in its unfolding from form to form is no longer a subjective activity that reveals something other than itself, which would be being itself, but is this very being, and every form of being is a form of knowing and the totality of being is the totality of knowing. One must no longer separate truth from being (Kant), subjectivity from objectivity (the I and Non-I of Fichte), nature from consciousness (Schelling), but the Absolute is their higher identity insofar as it is their thought: one must therefore hold firm that "thought is the one truth and the supreme reality" (Philos. d. Gesch., ed. cit., I, p. 6). Then the categories, the content, the forms of thought are resolved into thought itself, into its activity, and this is what thought does in returning into itself according to the necessity of its nature as "concept" (Begriff): "No object — H. writes — would be in itself and of itself capable of being expounded with such rigor of immanent plasticity as the unfolding of thought in its necessity, even more than mathematical deduction" (Wissenschaft. d. Logik, ed. cit., I, p. 19). H. arrives at this with the conception of consciousness as absolute principle, which he expounds systematically in the Einleitung to the Phenomenology of Spirit (cf. ed. by J. Hoffmeister, Leipzig 1937, pp. 69-73). Here are its essential stages.

a) Consciousness is for itself its own concept. Not only, therefore, does the object of thought not refer to a reality outside thought itself, but the concept that is identical with being is in turn identical with consciousness. Finding itself therefore in every object and act, consciousness "is the act of going beyond the limited and, since this limited belongs to it, is the act of going beyond itself" (p. 69), and it is precisely this continuous "overcoming of the limited" that constitutes "reason," which, however it moves, always remains in itself, so that "the concept corresponds to the object and the object to the concept." Every supposed "beyond" (Jenseits) of consciousness ultimately falls back into consciousness itself.

b) Consciousness gives itself its own measure. As long as truth is conceived as an "application" of a form to a matter or of a universal to a particular, one must despair of truth itself, insofar as one of the terms is never the other. When, on the other hand, the relating of the objects and forms of consciousness is conceived as intrinsic to consciousness itself, then "the inquiry will be a comparison of consciousness with itself," and H. can then say: "What consciousness designates within itself as the in-itself or the true (is nothing other than) the measure that it itself establishes for measuring its knowledge." It follows that "being-for-another," which is the law of consciousness, is realized within consciousness itself, is resolved, once the path is completed, into a "being-for-itself" (p. 71).

c) Consciousness tests [verifies] itself. This is the conclusion of the two preceding principles. Granted that consciousness, in its advancing and in the determination of objects, does not exit from itself and is its own "measure" (Maßstab), one must grant that the proof of truth of consciousness is its own moving and realizing itself. H. therefore says that "consciousness of the object and consciousness of the subject or of consciousness itself, consciousness of what is in it and of its knowledge, both are the same thing (beide für dasselbe sind) and it itself is their comparison" (p. 72). Only in this way can truth be assured: otherwise — on the hypothesis of a diversity of being and consciousness — one must grant either that reality (in being known) alters consciousness or that consciousness (in knowing) alters reality. The conclusion, therefore, to which the "principle of consciousness" leads is that what presented itself to consciousness as the in-itself (of things) is nothing but the in-itself-and-for-itself (Anstehundfürstich) of consciousness itself.

d) The moments of dialectic. — The powerless mass of the Hegelian work constitutes the attempt to describe this itinerary of the return of consciousness to itself, according to the various points of view that can be assumed in philosophical reflection. It remains established that "reason," of which we have spoken, is the human spirit itself understood in the fullness of its spiritual activities and in the totality of its cultural "moments" and historical periods: the being that is the content of truth is precisely the "becoming" of this spirit, and philosophy is the consideration of this becoming. In the Phenomenology of Spirit one proceeds from "apparent knowledge" (sense-certainty, perception, understanding) to self-consciousness and then to reason and its realization in the life of the spirit up to "absolute knowledge." Of this path the Logic studies the formal side: in the preface to the 2nd ed. of the Logic (1831), at the end of his career, H. warns that the principle of the autonomy of thought must be carried through to the end, so that the "beginning" of philosophizing be "without presuppositions, the very simplest, simplicity itself" (Wissenschaft. d. Logik, ed. cit., I, p. 20 ff.). Thus the Phenomenology, which originally was to constitute the "first part of the system," seems absent from the edifice of the Hegelian Logic, perhaps the most sumptuous that the human spirit has raised to pure thought. Here dialectic is presented systematically: it is the sole method of philosophy.

e) The first moment is pure being (das reine Sein), absolutely indeterminate and empty. This is the only valid logical beginning because it is absolutely without presuppositions: it is made "in the element of thought that is freely for itself, that is, in pure knowing" (Wissenschaft. d. Logik, ed. cit., I, p. 53): this pure knowing — H. specifies — is "being in general, being and nothing more, without any determination or filling" (ibid., p. 54). Is it an immediate or a mediated thing? From the logical point of view, pure being is the immediate itself, because only pure being can be the beginning. On the other hand — H. acknowledges — this pure being "has arisen by way of mediation, and precisely by way of a mediation that is at the same time its own self-sublating" (loc. cit.). H., it seems, does not contradict himself, because the beginning of the Logik is the immediate of reflection, and therefore a tracing backward — by reflection — of that path or process which the real accomplishes forward in its becoming. Hence the pure being of the beginning is already the "result" of mediation insofar as the removal from being of every accidentalness and particularity is required through the moment of negativity. H. can therefore say that "in philosophy going forward is rather a going backward and a grounding" (Wissenschaft. d. Logik, ed. cit., I, p. 55). To this pure empty being corresponds the sphere of Dasein, with which the first part of the Logik deals.

f) The second moment is nothingness, but not the nothingness of nothing, rather the nothingness that is bound to being. If the pure being of the beginning is "the indeterminate immediate," in fact it is nothing, H. concludes, insofar as it is precisely the absence of every determination of that pure being, the impossibility of any intuition: nothingness is therefore inherent in being, and the beginning contains both, it is their unity (ibid., pp. 67 and 58). As a good disciple of Spinoza and of Böhme, H. affirms that this unity of being with non-being can well be taken "as the first and purest definition of the Absolute": but what matters to point out is that nothingness becomes the motive principle of the dialectic. If every particular entity, insofar as it is precisely determined, is a synthesis of being and non-being, then it is through the negation of determination that the authentic positing of the real is obtained: "This nothingness — says H. — is not that of the abstract intellect, but is the nothingness of that from which it results (voraus es resultiert) and therefore in reality... the true result" (Phänom. d. Geistes, ed. cit., p. 68), and in this sense he speaks of the "enormous power of the negative, as the energy of thought, of the pure I" (ibid., p. 29). Nothingness is the evil that is necessary to being so that the good may show itself and affirm itself.

g) The third moment is becoming as the (dynamic) unity of being and non-being. Becoming shows precisely that reality never rests on the finite, on the particular as such, because every finite passes over into something else; what was, now is no longer, and what was not now is. The opposition therefore of being or non-being posits them together as inseparable, so that "immediately each of them vanishes in its opposite" (Wissenschaft. d. Logik, ed. cit., I, p. 67). It is this mutual belonging of being and nothingness that is the reality of becoming, reality (Wirklichkeit) without qualification, but not as a passing of finite into finite toward the infinite (bad infinity), rather in such a way that the being of the finite presents itself as that negative which passes over into the positive as that which is the Infinite. One can therefore say that the dialectic as such is a tension of binary polarity (appearance and reality, essence and existence, parts and Whole, finite and Infinite...), because the three moments belong to logical reflection, and it is known moreover that being and nothingness are inseparable in becoming. The real dialectic lies in the continuous

"nihilating" that one of the members (the finite) shows in becoming, whereby the absolute reality, the Infinite, is revealed. And is the Infinite also dialectical? H. would have to deny it if he does not wish to reopen a new process to infinity and remain in turn a prisoner of bad infinity: and yet the formula of the Hegelian Infinite is that it is the unity of finite and Infinite, and of God H. says that he cannot be God without the world (Ohne Welt Gott ist nicht Gott: Philos. d. Rel., ed. cit., I, p. 148).

IV. PROBLEMS OF HEGELIANISM

It is not difficult to show how, from whatever side one considers it, the Hegelian dialectic presents a fundamental ambiguity. It is asserted that truth is "result," is in the whole (das Wahre ist das Ganze), and then one must assert that the Absolute is present from "the beginning" and works "behind the back" (hinter den Rücken: Enzykl., § 25), that the Absolute is unity of positive and negative, of finite and infinite. Not to mention the methodological ambiguity of wanting to eliminate every content of immediate experience, and then to rely on concepts such as "movement," "force," "passing over," etc., which draw their meaning solely from that experience (the objection of Trendelenburg that has taxed all Hegelians from Michelet to Spaventa, to Gentile). H. therefore did not resolve the fundamental problem of philosophy, that of the relation between sense and reason, between particular and universal: Italian neo-Hegelianism, wishing to give Hegelianism a greater internal coherence, sought with Croce to valorize the particular (historicism), while Gentile sought with the doctrine of the pure act to overcome every dualism, even methodological, but in both cases the metaphysical foundation of the dialectic was repudiated.

For H. — who learned it from Böhme — the authentic schema of the dialectic is the Christian dogma of the Trinity: in which the Father, Power, an abstract universal, divides himself into the Son, and this Son, contemplating himself, is the Holy Spirit — three moments that form a single reality (Philos. d. Gesch., ed. cit., I, p. 32 ff.). But H. places religion halfway between art and philosophy, because it is still bound to the image, and therefore inferior to philosophy. Likewise the dogma of the Incarnation, stripped of its representational content, is reduced to the awareness that self-consciousness has taken of itself in Christ: this is why one understands the enormous influence of H. on dogmatic and biblical liberalism (Wellhausen) and on laicism in general, and how he could even have been accused of atheism.

In the Hegelian conception of the life of the spirit, the highest form or life of consciousness is not religion, but politics as it is realized in the history of peoples and in the various civilizations: the absolute Spirit is the Spirit of the world (Weltgeist), the unique individual of history, to which is subordinated the spirit of each people (Volksgeist) and to this the individual individuals. Thus God, the Spirit of the world, is the absolute-human that dominates nature: "If the divine essence were not the essence of man and of nature, it would be an essence that would be nothing" (Philos. d. Gesch., ed. cit., I, p. 38). H. therefore defends the subordination of religion to politics and of the Church to the State: the concept of individual immortality, moreover, has no theoretical content but derives solely from the extrapolation of a fantastic desire.

The most energetic reaction to Hegelian idealism, outside Catholic thought, has been that of existentialism and Marxism: the former, with Kierkegaard, sought to vindicate the transcendence of Christianity and the freedom of the individual; the latter, with Marx, claimed to make of the "dialectic of the spirit" a "dialectic of sensible matter." For this reason Hegelian studies in Italy, Germany and France have taken on renewed notable vigor, especially research on the genesis of the Hegelian dialectic.

Bibliography44 works

BIBL.: Complete editions of the works: Werke, vollständige Ausgabe durch einen Verein von Freunden des Verewigten, 18 vols., Berlin 1832-45. The edition of the Encyclopedia is in 3 vols. (VI, VII, VII) and includes the Zusätze collected by the disciples during H.'s lectures. — Sämtliche Werke, Jubiläumsausgabe, in 20 vols., edited by H. Glockner, Stuttgart 1927-30; it is a reproduction of the text of the preceding one with revisions. Vols. XXI-XXII constitute a study by H. Glockner and vols. XXIII-XXV (1935) a vast H.-Lexikon by the same. — Sämtliche Werke, critical edition based on the original manuscripts edited by G. Lasson: so far 20 vols., Leipzig 1923 ff. (in the Philosophische Bibliothek of the Meiner publishing house). The Phenomenology was reissued under the editorship of J. Hoffmeister, to whom is also due the edition of the Jenenser Realphilosophie (vols. XIX-XX) with an excellent introductory study on Goethe u. der deutsche Idealismus; the same has begun the reissue of the System u. Gesch. der Philos. (so far only vol. I has been published; XV, Leipzig 1940, repr. 1944) with new criteria for the use of the manuscripts. The youthful unpublished writings are found edited and studied in: H. Nohl, H.s theologische Jugendschriften, Tübingen 1907; Jo. Hoffmeister, Dokumente zu H.s Entwicklung, Stuttgart 1936. — Italian translations: Enciclopedia delle scienze filosofiche, in 3 vols., edited by B. Croce (the Zusätze have been omitted), Bari 1906; Lineamenti di filosofia del diritto, edited by F. Messineo, ibid. 1913; La scienza della logica, 3 vols., trans. with notes by A. Moni, ibid. 1925. Fenomenologia dello Spirito, 2 vols., trans., intro. and notes by E. De Negri, Florence 1933-36; Lezioni sulla filosofia della storia, trans. by G. Calogero and C. Fatta (so far 2 vols.), ibid. 1941-47; Lezioni sulla storia della filosofia, 3 vols. (the third consists of 2 parts), trans. by E. Codignola and G. Sanna, ibid. 1930-44. I principi, edited by E. De Negri, ibid. 1949. — Studies: B. Croce, Saggio da una bibliografia hegeliana, in Ciò che è vivo e ciò che è morto nella filosofia di H., Bari 1907, pp. 211-71, partly reduced in: Saggio sulla H., Bari 1948. Also Überweg, IV, pp. 678-81; W. Windelband-Heinsoeth, Lehrbuch d. Gesch. d. Philos., Tübingen 1935, pp. xxx-xxxi. More recent general expositions: R. Kroner, Von Kant bis H., II (H.), Tübingen 1924; S. Hartmann, Die Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus, part 2: H., Berlin and Leipzig 1932; G. R. G. Hegel, An Introduction to H., Oxford 1940; F. Martinetti, H., Milan 1943; G. De Ruggiero, H., Bari 1948. — Special studies: G. Gentile, La riforma della dialettica hegeliana e altri scritti, 2nd ed., Messina 1923; B. Heimann, System und Methode in H.s Philosophie, Leipzig 1927; G. Della Volpe, H. romantico e mistico (1793-1800), Florence 1929; Th. Steinbüchel, Das Grundproblem der H.schen Philosophie, I, Bonn 1933; N. Hartmann, Aristoteles und H., Erfurt 1933; id., H. und das Problem der Realdialektik, in Blätter f. deutsch. Philos., Berlin 1935, p. 1 ff.; W. Sesemann, Zum Problem der Realdialektik, ibid., p. 29 ff.; A. Hartmann, Der Spätidealismus und die H.sche Dialektik, ibid. 1937; Th. Haering, H., sein Wollen und sein Werk, 2 vols., Leipzig and Berlin 1929-38; A. Dürr, Zum Problem der H.schen Dialektik und ihre Formen, Berlin 1938; J. Schwarz, H.s philosophische Entwicklung, Frankfurt a. M. 1938; R. Schneider, Schellings u. H.s schwäbische Gotteslehre, Würzburg-Aumühle 1938; L. Pelloux, La logica di H., Milan 1938; S. Contri, La genesi fenomenologica della logica hegeliana, 2 vols., Bologna 1937-39; W. Axmann, Zur Frage nach d. Ursprung d. dialektischen Denkens bei H., Würzburg 1939; W. Bauchert, Begriff u. Gestalt bei H., Kiel 1940; F. Alderisio, Esame della riforma attualistica dell'idealismo in rapporto a Spaventa e a H., Todi 1940; K. Domke, Das Problem der metaphysischen Gottesbeweise in der Philosophie H.s, Leipzig 1940; C. Höeschl, Das Absolute, in H.s Dialektik, Sein Wesen und Aufgabe, Paderborn 1941; S. Vanni-Rovighi, La concezione hegeliana della storia, Milan 1942; C. L. Corsi, Studi su H., Faenza 1942; H. Niel, De la médiation dans la philosophie de H., Paris 1945; H. Hippolite, Génèse et structure de la phénoménologie de l'esprit de H., ibid. 1946; id., Introduction à la philosophie de l'histoire de H., ibid. 1948; H. A. Ogiemann, H.s Gottesbeweise, Rome 1948, pp. 191-207; Ph. Weindel, H. Der Mensch in Gott, in Der Mensch vor Gott, Düsseldorf 1948, pp. 191-207 (important evaluation of H.'s thought from the Catholic point of view which links up with the first polemic of anti-Hegelian Catholic theology of J. Sengler and Fr. A. Studenmaier); G. Lukacs, Der junge H., Über die Beziehungen von Dialektik und Ökonomie, Zurich-Vienna 1948 (essay of Marxist orientation); R. Kroner, Introduction, in Early theological writings (trans. by T. M. Knox of a good part of the Jugendschriften), Chicago 1948, pp. 1-66; M. Heidegger, H.s Begriff der Erfahrung, in Holzwege, Frankfurt a. M. 1950, pp. 104-92. The specific problem of the relations between H. and Marx forms a separate subject. Cf. from the Catholic point of view: K. Bekker, Marx philosophische Entwicklung, sein Verhältnis zu H., Basel 1940; R. Heiss, H. und Marx, in Symposion, I, Freiburg im Br. (1949), pp. 169-206; K. Löwisch, Von H. bis Nietzsche, 2nd ed., Stuttgart 1950.

Cornelio Fabro