Vow

VOTO. – From voveo, meaning a promise, the object promised, a sacrifice made to fulfill a promise, and also a free offering made to God: it is the deliberate promise, made to God, of a good that can possibly be realized morally (CIC, 1307).

I. NATURE

In the definition just given, the elements necessary to determine its nature are contained: 1) By saying that the V. promise, its essentially obligatory nature is implicitly indicated, whereby it differs from the mere intention of fulfilling something in honor of the divinity. Because of this nature, the votive promise is compared to the law, which is essentially obligatory. Hence a V. that does not have this obligatory nature cannot be called a v.; 2) Since it is a promise addressed to God, it follows that the V. latria. Vows addressed to the saints retain this character, provided that, at least implicitly, one intends to honor God in the saints, insofar as they are united with him and dependent upon him.

The person who makes a V. must act with full knowledge of the votive obligation and of what is promised by the V. If this knowledge is doubtful, the existence of the V. likewise becomes doubtful, with the moral consequences that arise and apply in doubtful cases. Vows made by those who do not possess the perfect use of reason, such as children, lovers, etc., have no obligatory force. But even when knowledge is sufficient, the V. may not exist if it has not been made freely. For this reason, vows made under gravely unjust causes of violence or fear are also regarded juridically as null.

With regard to the object of the votive promise, it is commonly required: a) that it be physically and morally attainable. Therefore, anything exceeding physical possibilities and not lying under the complete control of each individual could not be the matter of a v.; nor could anything that morally exceeds human possibilities (such as, for example, the promise to avoid every imperfection, even an undeliberate one, except in the case of a particular privilege, as in the Most Holy Virgin); b) that it be not only honest, or simply indifferent, but also better than its opposite, in the sense that, all circumstances being considered, it is morally better to make that votive promise than not to make it, and that the promised object be better than the directly opposed object. Hence the V. concerning an action whose omission is in itself morally better than its performance has no validity; and in this sense the V. to contract marriage is not in itself valid, because, as s. Paolo says (I Cor. 7, 38): « Qui matrimonio iungit virginem suam, bene facit: et qui non iungit, melius facit ».

II. DIVISION

The vow is ordinarily divided: 1) with respect to its object into: personal, when an action to be performed personally by the same person making the vow is promised; real, when the object of the votive promise is a thing; mixed, when the same object comprises both an action and a thing; 2) with respect to its duration into temporary or perpetual, according as the promise is extinguished at a determined time or instead lasts throughout life; 3) with respect to the manner in which it is made, into: absolute, if the votive promise is made without any restriction, and conditional, if the fulfillment of the promise is made dependent upon some condition; in this regard one also speaks of a penal v., if the attached condition is a penalty to be undergone (pure, if only the penalty falls under the votive promise; mixed, if both an action and a penalty in the event of transgression of the promise are promised); 4) with respect to its form and the juridical effects connected with it, into: public and private, according as it is accepted by the legitimate superior in the name of the Church, or not (cf. also can. 1308, § 1); simple or solemn, according as it is considered simple or solemn by the Church (can. 1308, § 2); 5) with respect to the ecclesiastical authority that can dispense it, into: reserved, if it can be dispensed only by the Apostolic See; non-reserved, if other inferior prelates can also dispense it (can. 1308, § 3).

It is always presupposed that the V. is made prudently, because if someone were morally conscious that making the V. occasion of sin, then the V. would be more an evil than a good for him. The goodness of the votive act is then ascribed theologically to the virtue of religion. Indeed, already in a text of Is. 19:21, making V. God; this properly belongs to the virtue of religion (v.). By his v., the person making it implicitly acknowledges that God cares for created things and that one must have recourse to Him in times of need; and this already constitutes an honoring of God and of His Providence.

III. VOTIVE OBLIGATION

As has been mentioned, there can be no vow without the existence also of a votive obligation. This is evident from Sacred Scripture (cf., e.g., Eccl. 5, 3-4) and from theological tradition. It is also commonly taught that such an obligation admits of parvity of matter, inasmuch as God, who is Father and not a tyrant, cannot severely punish the transgression of a votive obligation that is of small significance in the matter promised. Nevertheless, the gravity or lack of gravity of the votive obligation is deduced not only from the gravity or lack of gravity of the matter, but also from the intention of the person making the vow. For this reason, the votive obligation will be slight when its object is slight matter, since this, as such, cannot give rise to a grave obligation, to the point that not even the person making the vow himself can intentionally bind himself sub gravi when the matter of his vow is slight. On the other hand, through the influence of the intention of the person making the vow, the votive obligation will not be grave when, although the matter is grave, he intended to bind himself only sub levi; except if a prohibition by ecclesiastical authority intervened to prevent this. With regard to the matter, it is not always easy to discern when the matter of a vow should be called grave. Theologians generally consider all that which contributes notably to the benefit of the person making the vow or of his neighbor to be such; or that which is ordinarily forbidden sub gravi by natural, divine, and ecclesiastical law. According to this criterion, a votive promise whose object was a fast, a Holy Mass, Communion, or Confession would be grave (cf. B. H. Merkelbach, Summa theologiae moralis, II, Paris 1932, p. 731, n. 719), as would one that contributed notably to the worship of God (cf. J. Teodori, in Apollinaris, 6 [1933], p. 101). A rule for judging gravity with regard to personal vows may also be provided by comparison with sacramental penance, according to the practice of good confessors; and with regard to real vows, by their relation to matter considered grave in the sphere of justice.

The obligation of a real vow may also be fulfilled through a third person. A real vow made by a parent does not, as such, pass to the heirs; but the obligation to which he was bound may pass to the heir by reason of justice or by precept of the Church (can. 1320, § 2). Since canon 1310, § 1, states that a vow does not bind «ratione sui nisi emittentem», it follows that the vow, in itself and however it may be made, does not bind others who did not make II. For this reason, subjects who did not consent are not bound by vows made by their superiors except by virtue of some precept; and similarly, successors are not bound in themselves by the vows of their predecessors. If an entire community consents to the making of a vow and subsequently that same moral body fails to fulfill it, the individual members are not bound as such, because the obligation was undertaken collectively and therefore, in its execution also, binds collectively and not individually.

With regard to a conditional vow, moralists and jurists generally teach that an obligation arises immediately upon the making of the conditional vow itself, consisting in the intention to fulfill the vow should the condition come to pass, and in not placing oneself, before the condition comes to pass, in the impossibility of fulfilling the vow. But by reason of the vow, the person making it may not prevent the fulfillment of the attached condition if this depends entirely upon his will or upon natural causes in cooperation with his will; whereas, when the fulfillment or non-fulfillment of the condition depends upon the will of another, the person making the vow is bound at least not to violate, through force or deception, the free exercise of the other’s will. Nevertheless, if the person making the vow had culpably prevented the fulfillment of the condition by deception, then, on the one hand, he sins against the vow by having rendered the connected obligation fruitless; but, on the other hand, since the vow was bound to that condition, the vow itself is dissolved. In this case, he is obliged to repent of the sin of having prevented the condition from coming to pass, but he is not obliged to make restitution.

IV. EXTINCTION OF THE V

The V. may be extinguished: 1) ab intrinseco, that is, when the time fixed ad finendam obligationem has elapsed, or the attached condition ceases, as in conditional v.; or through a substantial change in the promised matter (can. 1311); or also when the final cause for which the V. was made ceases. Thus the V. of entering religious life would cease, or at least be suspended, if the parents of the person making the vow had fallen into such extreme necessity that they could not do without his assistance. Similarly, the V. object, as a result of subsequent circumstances, becomes either useless or indifferent or an impediment to a greater good; or when it becomes physically or morally impossible. 2) ab extrinseco, through annulment, dispensation, and commutation (can. 1311).

Annulment is an act of free will issued by one who possesses dominative power over the person making the vow or over the matter of the v.; by it the V. obligation. The father enjoys this power of annulling the V. with regard to his impubescent children and probably also with regard to pubescent children who have not yet been emancipated (can. 1312, 88, 89); the guardian, or, according to some, also the mother, provided the father or guardian does not forbid II. It is disputed whether a husband may annul the V. of his wife when they have no direct relation to marriage as such. A religious superior may annul all the V. of his subjects made after religious profession; he may also annul those of novices, but only indirectly. The same faculty belongs to the superiors of women religious with regard to their subjects. There is no doubt that such power belongs to the Bishop with regard to religious subject to him, and to the Supreme Pontiff with regard to all religious. In annulling a V. ad validitatem, no cause is required, although one is required ad liceitatem (can. 1312 § 1).

Dispensation is the dissolution of the votive obligation, made in the name of God by one who possesses the power of jurisdiction. It differs from annulment because the latter is carried out in one’s own name, whereas dispensation is carried out in the name of God; the latter requires the power of jurisdiction, whereas dominative power suffices for annulment; moreover, for dispensation a just cause is also required ad validitatem, whereas it is not necessary for annulment, which may be carried out even against the will of the person making the vow, while dispensation also requires that person’s consent. For it is theologically certain that the power of jurisdiction granted by Jesus to the pastors of his Church (Mt. 16, 19) also includes the faculty of dispensing from V. just cause. The Supreme Pontiff, Ordinaries, and those who possess quasi-episcopal jurisdiction enjoy this power; as do the superiors of exempt clerical religious institutes (cf. can. 514, § 1), and delegates of the Holy See (can. 1313). But there are reserved V. which ordinarily may be dispensed only by the Supreme Pontiff (can. 1309). Distinct from dispensation is the interpretation of the v.; even when made by one who possesses jurisdiction, it is nevertheless not, as such, an act of jurisdiction, but a doctrinal and jurisprudential act.

Commutation is the substitution of one promised object for another, while the votive obligation remains in force. Every commutation in minus bonum is a dispensation secundum quid, and for this reason such commutation also requires the power of jurisdiction and a just cause; but it differs from dispensation because, whereas the latter completely removes the obligation, commutation substitutes another object for it, although in minus. The power of jurisdiction is therefore required only when the commutation reduces in minus bonum the work promised in the v., whereas it is not required to commute it in melius or in aequale bonum. Thus the just cause must be grave in a commutation in opus minus; slight if it is in aequale; none if the commutation is in melius (can. 1314). It is also certain that all those who have the power to dispense from the V. likewise have the faculty of commuting it in minus bonum for a just cause (can. 1314). Ordinary confessors, as also parish priests, have in themselves no faculty to dispense from or commute v., except in danger of death or in a perplexed case relating to marriage (cann. 1044, 1045 § 3); and except when they possess a particular privilege, as do the regular confessors of the mendicant orders with regard to non-reserved V. BIBLICA. In addition to the manuals of moral theology and commentators on canon law, cf.: A. Vermeersch, Quæst. de virtut. relig. et pietatis, Bruges 1912, pp. 138-93; J. Creusen, Les voeux douteux, in Nov. rev. théol., 22 (1925), pp. 312-17; C. A. Damen, De irritatione et suspensione votorum, spectato iure nat. atque eccl. antiquo et novo, in Apollinaris, 1 (1928), pp. 69-476; 2 (1929), pp. 53-61; 306-18; 495-509; id., De probabili voti irritatione, ibid., 3 (1930), pp. 289-95; A. Vermeersch, De probabiliter valida voti irritatione, in Periodica de re morali, canonica et liturgica, 19 (1930), pp. 17-18; Nucerinus [pseud.], De obligatione ex voto promissorio, in Il monitore ecclesiastico, 3ª serie, 3 (1931), pp. 304-306; E. Jombart, Le voeu, in Revue des communautés religieuses, 8 (1932), pp. 185-89; I. Teodori, various articles on the v., in Apollinaris, 6 (1933), V. indice; H. Schaufel, Maritus valetus directe irritare uxoris vota matrimonio durante emissa?, in Per. de re mor. can. lit., 23 (1934), pp. 175-85; O. E. Dignant-E. Jombart, Annulatio de voeu, in Rev. des comm. rel., 16 (1945), p. 58-89; A. Vangheluwe, various articles on the V. in Collat. Bruges, 42 (1946), V. indice; P. Séjourné, Voeu, in DTHC, XV, coll. 3182-3234.
V.

V. SOLENNE

It must be distinguished from the simple v., because the Church recognizes in it particular theological and juridical effects. This distinction and terminology (cf. Misserey, op. cit. in bibl., p. 142 ff.) are said to have been used for the first time by Pietro Lombardo and Rolando Bandinelli (Alessandro III).

1. Brief history of the solemn v. — The following information is drawn from Misserey himself. Although the terminology is late, its existence is nevertheless earlier. In the first centuries of the Church, the religious vow of chastity itself did not have diriment effects with regard to Marriage. Conciliar provisions on the matter were subsequently issued, but exegetes do not agree in presenting the significance and juridical consequences of those decrees. The first decree to hold invalid a marriage contracted by monks is that of Troisiè of 900 (Mansi, XVIII, 288); it was followed by that of Pisa of 1135 (Mansi, XXI, 489); and finally by that of the Second Lateran Council of 1139 (Mansi, XXI, 528). After these decisions, theologians and jurists sought to explain and reconcile the various canons, and felt the need to distinguish between them, since not all vows had the effect of annulling marriage. Thus Ugo di S. Vittore distinguishes between a public vow and a vow made only in secret; and asserts that the Church can declare null only marriages contracted by one who had previously been publicly bound by the vow of chastity through a profession outwardly manifested (De sacramentis, lib. II, part 11ª, cap. 4; part 12ª, cap. 3; PL 176, 483, 503, 521). Graziano (c. 8, D. 27; and c. 4, c. 17, q. 1) distinguishes between the «simpliciter voventes» and those «quibus post votum accedit benedictio consecrationis vel propositum religiosis». Subsequently, Rolando Bandinelli was the first to assert that the vow pronounced before the assembly of the Church, or before the bishop, or before a priest, is considered such, whether the written formula of the vow is deposited upon the altar or other sacred objects, such as the Cross and relics, are used. But other circumstances too can constitute the solemn v., even if no formula has been pronounced (cf. A. M. Gietle, Die Sentenzen Rolandi, Freiburg in Br. 1891, p. 273; F. Thaner, Die Summa Magistri Rolandi, Innsbruck 1844, pp. 116, 118, 123). Pietro Lombardo places the essence of the solemn V. in its publicity (Sententiarum, lib. IV, dist. 58, c. 4, ed. Quaracchi 1916, p. 967, n. 350). But when Rolando Bandinelli became Pope Alessandro III, he declared that the mere assumption of the religious habit, without the making of profession, could not constitute the solemn V. (c. 4, Consuluit, X, 4, 6). Subsequently, the jurist Uguccione di Ferrara sought to maintain that the distinction between simple and solemn V. was not essential and, indeed, ought to be rejected (cf. J. F. Schulte,

Geschichte der Quellen und Literatur des kanonischen Rechts I, Stuttgart 1875, p. 156). Nevertheless, the distinction between simple and solemn V. continued to be made, while the circumstances that solemnized the simple vow were being determined, until Bonifacio VIII established categorically that the vow was rendered solemn by receiving sacred orders or by explicit or tacit profession made in a religion approved by the Holy See (C. un. Quod votum, 3, 15 in VIᵃ).

Until the sixteenth century, the Church approved only religious institutes with solemn v., and thus religious vow, public vow, and solemn V. easily came to be treated as equivalent. But once simple and public religious vows were introduced (albeit with diriment effects also with regard to marriage in the Society of Jesus), the distinction between simple and solemn vow was not only necessarily reaffirmed, but the question of the essential difference between the two kinds of vows was revived.

2. Nature of the solemn v. — All are now agreed in admitting the difference, on the basis of can. 579 of the CIC; nevertheless, considerable disagreement still exists concerning its nature. Certainly, the solemnity of the vow is solely a matter of ecclesiastical law (can. 1308, § 2 of the CIC); hence the Church can, in itself, dispense even from the solemn V. as such. In the solemn v., in fact, the ceremonies of the rite are accidental, while age and the other requirements are necessary conditions; but not all agree on determining the substantial and essential element of the solemn V. (cf. P. Lumbreras, op. cit. in bibl., p. 164 f.). The ancients place the solemnity of the vow in the special consecration or blessing that accompanies the making of the solemn V. Others (Prümmer, Augustine, etc.) hold it to consist in the perfect dedication of the person making the vow and in its acceptance by the Church in the name of God, so that the person making the vow becomes perpetually consecrated to the service of God. Others (Vermeersch) think that the solemn V. Church. This authenticity is the formal reason for the solemnity, which materially manifests itself in the ceremonial apparatus—not the vulgar and external apparatus, but the juridical one. The proper force of this authenticity is the public protection afforded by the authority of the Church in safeguarding the juridical effects proper to the solemn V. Others (Wernz, Bouix, Suárez) place the essence of the solemn V. not only in the incapacitating force that the Church recognizes in certain vows, but also, and at the same time, in the perpetual and irrevocable dedication of the person making the vow and in its corresponding acceptance by the religious institute through the authority conferred upon it by law.

As is evident, this is a rather theoretical question, which has not in itself influenced the exegesis of the canons of the CIC concerning the solemn V.
3. Juridical effects of the solemn v. — In relation to the vow of chastity, the solemn V. renders acts contrary to it not only illicit but also invalid, when they are capable of nullity. Thus, a marriage contracted after the solemn V. is invalid (can. 1073). Indeed, clerics in sacris, religious men and women after a solemn V. chastity, and all those who contract marriage with them, even merely civil marriage, incur the excommunication latae sententiae, Sedi Apostolicae simpliciter reservata (can. 2388 § 1). With regard to the vow of obedience, some authors think that the solemn V. additionally entails that the person making the vow cannot validly undertake any stable obligation either toward God or toward human beings; and the Superior, in fact, can always invalidate such acts (cf. C. Schaefer, op. cit. in bibl., p. 605 f.). With regard to poverty, the religious who makes the solemn V. loses not only the administration, use, and usufruct of goods, but also ownership; and becomes incapable of acquiring or possessing them. For this reason, sixty days before making the solemn v., unless particular indults apply, the person making the vow must renounce the goods he possesses, so that the renunciation may also have civil effects (can. 581, §§ 1–2), and all goods that might subsequently come to the person making the vow in any way would belong to the Order, the Province, or the religious house according to the Constitutions, if the Order is capable of possessing property (can. 582 § 1); whereas in an Order incapable of possessing property, they would pass into the ownership of the Holy See (can. 582 § 2).

Moreover, the making of solemn vows is recognized as

titolo canonico (can. 982, § 1) e toglie l'irregolarità a ricevere gli ordini dipendente «ex defectu natalium» (can. 984 § 1); ma non toglie l'inabilità che vi fosse a ricevere uffici di Superiore nelle religioni classuali esenti (can. 504), o per essere promossi alla dignità cardinalizia (can. 232 § 2, n. 1°) e all'episcopato (can. 991 § 3). La stessa professione dei V. solenni, nelle religioni, dove esiste l'obbligo del coro, obbliga a recitare privatamente le ore canoniche, chi non sia potuto intervenire al coro (can. 610 § 3); procura l'escardinazione dalla propria diocesi, per chierici (cann. 115, 385) e per i religiosi laici (can. 585). Infine il V. scioglie ipso iure il matrimonio non consumato tra i battezzati o tra una parte battezzata e una non battezzata (can. 1119), nel caso che il coniuge con la dispensa della S. Sede sia entrato in una religione (can. 542, n. 1). Per questi ed altri effetti giuridici propri del V. s. il can. 470 § 2 (cf. anche can. 576 § 2) comanda al Superiore religioso del vorente di notificare al parroco dello stesso l'avvenuta professione dei V. solenni, per essere annotata nel registro dei battesimi.