VOTO

VOW. — From the Latin *voveo* with the meaning of a promise, the object promised, a sacrifice made to fulfill a promise, and also a gratuitous donation made to God: it is the deliberate promise made to God of a better good that can be morally realized (CIC, 1307).

I. NATURE

In the definition mentioned, the necessary elements are included to determine the nature: 1) By saying that a vow is a promise, its essentially obligatory nature is implicitly indicated, by which it differs from a simple intention to fulfill something in honor of the divinity. By this nature, the votive promise is compared to the law, which is essentially obligatory. Therefore, a vow that does not have this obligatory nature cannot be called a vow; 2) Since it is a promise directed to God, it follows that the vow is essentially an act of worship. Promises directed to the saints maintain this character, if at least implicitly in the saints one intends to honor God, inasmuch as they are united with Him and dependent on Him.

One who makes a vow must act with full knowledge of the votive obligation and of what is promised with the vow. If this knowledge is doubtful, the very existence of the vow also becomes doubtful, with the moral consequences that apply in doubtful cases. Vows made by those who do not have the perfect use of reason, such as children, the insane, etc., have no obligatory value. But even when the knowledge is sufficient, the vow may not exist if it is not made freely. For this reason, vows made under grave injustice, violence, or fear are considered null even juridically.

Regarding the object of the votive promise, it is commonly required: a) that it be physically and morally attainable. Therefore, anything that exceeds physical possibilities and does not fall under the full dominion of each person cannot be the subject of a vow; nor can anything that exceeds human moral possibilities (such as, for example, the promise to avoid any imperfection, even non-deliberate, except in the case of a special privilege, as in the Blessed Virgin); b) that it not only be honest or merely indifferent, but also better than the opposite, in the sense that, considering all circumstances, it is morally better to make that votive promise than not to make it, and the promised object is better than the directly opposite object. For this reason, a vow regarding an action whose omission is in itself morally better than its performance is not valid, and in this sense, a vow to contract marriage is not valid in itself, because, as St. Paul says (1 Cor. 7:38): “He who marries his virgin does well, and he who does not marry does better.”

II. DIVISION

A vow is ordinarily divided: 1) with respect to its object into: personal, if an action is promised to be performed personally by the one making the vow; real, if the object of the votive promise is a thing; mixed, if the object itself comprises both an action and a thing; 2) with respect to duration into temporal or perpetual, according as the promise is to be fulfilled within a determined time or instead lasts for the whole of life; 3) with respect to the manner in which it is made, into: absolute, if the votive promise is made without any restriction, and conditional, if the fulfillment of the promise is made dependent on some condition; in this regard, one also speaks of a penal vow, if the condition attached is a penalty to be suffered (pure, if only the penalty falls under the votive promise; mixed, if an action is promised along with a penalty in case of transgression of the promise); 4) with respect to form and the juridical effects connected, into: public and private, according as it is accepted by the legitimate superior in the name of the Church or not (cf. also can. 1308, § 1); simple or solemn, according as it is considered simple or solemn by the Church (can. 1308, § 2); 5) with respect to the ecclesiastical authority that can dispense it, into: reserved, if it can be dispensed only by the Apostolic See; non-reserved, if even inferior prelates can dispense it (can. 1308, § 3).

It is always supposed that the vow is made prudently, for if someone were morally certain that the making of the vow would become for him a certain and continuous occasion of sin, then the vow would be for him more an evil than a good. Theologically, moreover, the goodness of the votive act is attributed to the virtue of religion. Indeed, already in a text of Is. 19:21, making a vow and fulfilling it is expressly placed among the ways of honoring God; this belongs precisely to the virtue of religion (q.v.). The one making the vow implicitly, by his vow, acknowledges that God cares for created things and that one must have recourse to Him in necessities; and this is already a way of honoring God and His Providence.

III. VOTIVE OBLIGATION

As has been mentioned, there cannot be a vow without the existence of the votive obligation as well. This is evident from Holy Scripture (cf., e.g., Eccles. 5:3-4) and from theological tradition. It is commonly taught that such an obligation admits of equality in matter, inasmuch as God, Who is a Father and not a tyrant, cannot punish gravely the transgression of a votive obligation that is of slight matter. Nevertheless, the gravity or lack thereof of the votive obligation is deduced not only from the gravity or lack thereof of the matter, but also from the intention of the one making the vow. For this reason, the votive obligation will be light if it has as its object slight matter, inasmuch as such matter, as such, cannot give rise to a grave obligation, to the point that not even the one making the vow can intentionally bind himself sub gravi when the matter of his vow is light. On the other hand, because of the influence of the intention of the one making the vow, the votive obligation will not be grave in the case that, although the matter is grave, the one making the vow intended to bind himself only sub levi; except insofar as an ecclesiastical authority’s prohibition intervenes. With regard to the matter, it is not always easy to discern when the matter of the vow should be said to be grave. Theologians are accustomed to consider as grave all that which notably contributes to the utility of the one making the vow or of the neighbor; or that which is ordinarily prohibited sub gravi by natural, divine, or ecclesiastical law. According to this criterion, a votive promise would be grave if its object were a fast, a Holy Mass, a Communion, a Confession (cf. B. H. Merkelbach, *Summa theologiae moralis*, II, Paris 1932, p. 731, n. 719), or that which notably contributes to the worship of God (cf. J. Teodori, in *Apollinaris*, 6 [1933], p. 101). A rule for judging gravity with regard to personal vows can also be the comparison with sacramental penance, according to the practice of good confessors; and with regard to real vows, the relation to the matter considered grave in matters of justice.

The obligation of a real vow can be fulfilled even by means of a third person. A real vow made by a parent does not pass, as such, to the heirs; but the obligation to which he was bound can pass to the heir by reason of justice or by precept of the Church (can. 1320, § 2). Since it is stated in can. 1310, § 1 that the vow does not oblige *ratione sui* except the one making it, it follows that the vow, as such, does not oblige others who have not made the vow. For this reason, subjects who did not consent are not bound by vows made by their superiors except by force of some precept; and similarly successors are not bound in themselves by the vows of their predecessors. If, however, an entire community consents to the making of a vow, and subsequently the same moral body does not fulfill it, then the individual members are not bound as such, because the obligation was assumed collectively and therefore obliges collectively and not individually in its fulfillment.

With regard to the V. conditioned, moralists and jurists are accustomed to teach that there arises immediately, with the issuance of the V. conditioned, an obligation consisting in the intention to fulfill the V. should the condition be fulfilled, and in not rendering oneself, before the fulfillment of the condition, incapable of fulfilling the V. However, the vower may, for the sake of the v., not impede the fulfillment of the condition appended, if this depends entirely upon his own will or upon natural causes in cooperation with his will; when, instead, the fulfillment or non-fulfillment of the condition depends upon the will of another, then the vower is bound at least not to constrain, by force or deceit, the free exercise of the other’s will. Nevertheless, the vower who culpably impedes the fulfillment of the condition by deceit sins against the V. by rendering the obligation connected therewith vain; yet, since the V. was bound to that condition, the V. itself is thereby dissolved. In this case, he is bound to repent of the sin of having impeded the fulfillment of the condition, but he is not bound to make compensation.

IV. EXTINCTION OF THE V

The V. may be extinguished: 1) ab intrinseco, when, namely, the time appended for the termination of the obligation has elapsed, or the condition appended is fulfilled, as in the case of V. conditioned; or by the substantial change of the matter promised (can. 1311); or also when the final cause for which the V. was made ceases to exist. Thus, the V. of entering religion would cease or at least be suspended if the parents of the vower fall into such extreme necessity that they cannot do without his assistance. Likewise, the V. is extinguished when the object promised becomes, through changed circumstances, either useless or indifferent or an impediment to a greater good; or when it becomes physically or morally impossible. 2) ab extrinseco by means of irritation, dispensation, and commutation (can. 1311).

Irritation is an act of free will, issued by him who has dominative power over the vower or over the matter of the v., whereby the V. itself is either annulled or its obligation is suspended. Those who enjoy this power of irritating the V. are the father with regard to his underage children and probably also his pubescent children not yet emancipated (can. 1312, 88, 89); the guardian or, according to some, even the mother, provided that the father or the guardian does not forbid II. It is disputed whether the husband may irritate the V. of his spouse which have no direct relation to marriage as such. The religious superior may irritate all the V. of his subjects made after religious profession; he may also irritate those of novices, but only indirectly. The same faculty belongs to the superiors of nuns with regard to their own subjects. There is no doubt that such power belongs to the bishop with regard to the religious subject to him and to the Supreme Pontiff with regard to all religious. In irritating a V. ad viabilitatem no cause is required, though it is required ad licitatem (can. 1312 § 1).

Dispensation is the dissolution of the votive obligation, made in the name of God, by him who has the power of jurisdiction. It differs from irritation in that the latter is made in one’s own name, whereas dispensation is made in the name of God; it requires the power of jurisdiction, whereas irritation suffices with dominative power; moreover, for dispensation a just cause is required ad validitatem, which is not necessary for irritation, which may even be done against the will of the vower, whereas in dispensation the consent of the latter is also required. It is indeed a theological certainty that in the power of jurisdiction granted by Jesus to the shepherds of His Church (Mt. 16, 19) is included the faculty to dispense from V. cause. Those who enjoy this power are the Supreme Pontiff, the Ordinaries, and those who have quasi-episcopal jurisdiction; the superiors of exempt clerical religious institutes (cf. can. 1314, § 1), and delegates of the Holy See (can. 1313). There are, however, reserved v., which ordinarily may be dispensed only by the Supreme Pontiff (can. 1309). Different from dispensation is the interpretation of the v., which, even when made by one who has jurisdiction, is not, as such, an act of jurisdiction, but a doctrinal and jurisprudential act.

Commutation is the substitution of one promised object for another, the votive obligation remaining firm. Every commutation to a minus bonum is a dispensation secundum quid, and for such a commutation the jurisdictional power and a just cause are also required; but it differs from dispensation in that whereas the latter removes the obligation entirely, commutation substitutes another object, albeit a lesser one. Jurisdictional power is therefore required only when the commutation reduces the promised work to a minus bonum; it is not required when it is commuted to a melius or an aequale bonum. Thus, a grave just cause is required for commutation to a minus opus; a slight one if it is to an aequale; none if the commutation is to a melius (can. 1314). It is certain, moreover, that all who have the power to dispense from a V. also have the faculty to commute it to a minus bonum for a just cause (can. 1314). Simple confessors, as well as parish priests, do not, of themselves, have any faculty to dispense or commute V. except in the case of a person in danger of death or in a perplexed case relating to marriage (can. 1044, 1045 § 3); nor unless they have a special privilege, such as the regular confessors of the mendicant orders have with regard to non-reserved V. BIBLICA.: besides the manuals of moral theology and the commentators on canon law, cf.: A. Vermeersch, *Quaest. de virtut. relig. et pietatis*, Bruges 1912, pp. 138-153; J. Creusen, *Les voeux du tueux*, in *Nouve. rev. théol.*, 52 (1925), pp. 312-17; C. A. Dame, *De irritatione et suspensione votorum, spectato iure nat. atque excl. antiquo et novo*, in *Apollinaris*, 1 (1928), pp. 69-476; 2 (1929), pp. 53-61; 306-18; 495-509; id., *De probabili voti irritati*, ibid., 3 (1930), pp. 289-95; A. Vermeersch, *De probabili velutia voti irritati*, in *Periodica de re moralia, canonica et liturgica*, 19 (1930), pp. 17-18; Nucerinus [pseud.], *De obligatione ex voto pro missorio*, in *Il monitore ecclesiastico*, 5ª serie, 3 (1931), pp. 304-306; E. Jombart, *Le voeux*, in *Revue des communautés religieuses*, 8 (1932), pp. 185-89; I. Teodori, various articles on the v., in *Apollinaris*, 6 (1933), V. index; H. Schaufele, *Marius valente directe irritare voti vota matrimonio durante emissa?*, in *Per. de re mor. can. lit.*, 23 (1934), pp. 175-85; O. E. Dignant-E. Jombart, *Annulation de voeux*, in *Rev. des comm. rel.*, 16 (1945), p. 18-39; A. Vangheluwe, various articles on the V. in *Collat. Bruges.*, 42 (1946), V. index; P. Séjourné, *Voeu*, in *DTHC*, XV, cols. 3182-3234.

V.

V. SOLENNE

This must be distinguished from the simple v., for the Church recognizes in it particular theological and juridical effects. This distinction (cf. Misserey, op. cit. in bibl., p. 142 ff.) would have been used for the first time by Peter Lombard and by Roland Bandinelli (Alexander III).

Brief history of the solemn vow

From the same Misserey the following information is gathered. Although the name is late, its existence is nevertheless earlier. In the first centuries of the Church, even the religious vow of chastity did not have decisive effects regarding marriage. Subsequently, conciliar provisions were issued on the matter, but scholars are not in agreement in explaining the value and juridical consequences of those decrees. The first decree which holds that a marriage contracted by monks is invalid is that of Trois-le-dei of 909 (Mansi, XVIII, 288); followed by that of Pisa of 1135 (Mansi, XXI, 489); and finally by the Second Council of the Lateran of 1139 (Mansi, XXI, 528). After these decisions, theologians and jurists sought to explain and reconcile the various canons and felt the need to distinguish, since not all vows had the effect of annulling marriage. Thus, after St. Victor, a distinction is made between a public vow and one made secretly; and it is asserted that the Church can declare null only marriages contracted by those who publicly and by a profession, outwardly manifested, were previously bound by the vow of chastity (De sacramentis, lib. II, pars II, cap. 4; pars 12ª, cap. 3; PL 176, 483, 503, 521). Gratian (c. 8, D. 27; and c. 4, c. 17, q. 1) distinguishes between those who vow “simpliciter” and those “quibus post votum accedit benedictio consecrationis vel propositum religiosis.” Later, Roland Bandinelli, first, asserted that such is considered the vow pronounced before the assembly of the Church, or before the bishop, or before a priest, either by depositing the written formula of the vow on the altar, or by using other sacred things such as the Cross and relics. But other circumstances can also constitute the solemn vow even if no formula has been pronounced (cf. A. M. Gietle, Die Sentenzen Rolands, Freiburg in Br., 1891, p. 273; F. Thamer, Die Summa Magistri Rolandi, Innsbruck 1844, pp. 116, 118, 123). Peter Lombard places the essence of the solemn vow in its publicity (Sententiarum, lib. IV, dist. 38, c. 2, ed. Quaracchi 1916, p. 967, n. 350). But when Roland Bandinelli became Pope Alexander III, he declared that the mere assumption of the religious habit, without the emission of profession, could not constitute the solemn vow (c. 4, Consuluit, X, 4, 6). Later, the jurist Huguccio of Ferrara wished to argue that the distinction between a simple and solemn vow was not essential and indeed was to be reproved (cf. J. F. Schulte, Geschichte der Quellen und Literatur des kanonischen Rechts I, Stuttgart 1875, p. 156). Nevertheless, the distinction between a simple and solemn vow continued, with the determination of the circumstances that would solemnize the simple vow, until Boniface VIII categorically established that a vow was rendered solemn by receiving sacred orders or by an express or tacit profession emitted in a religion approved by the Holy See (C. un. Quod votum, 3, 15 in VI°).

Until the 16th century, the Church approved only religions with solemn vows, and thus religious vows, public vows, and solemn vows were easily confused. But with the introduction of simple and public religious vows (even with effects limiting marriage in the case of the Society of Jesus), not only was the distinction between simple and solemn vows necessarily reaffirmed, but the question of the essential difference between the two kinds of vows was reopened.

Nature of the solemn vow

All now agree in admitting the difference, on the basis of can. 579 of the CIC; however, many disagreements still exist in determining its nature. Certainly, the solemnity of the vow is of ecclesiastical law only (can. 1308, § 2 of the CIC), so that the Church can, of itself, dispense even from the solemn vow as such; in the solemn vow, indeed, the ceremonial rites are accidental, and age and other requirements are necessary conditions; but not all agree in determining the substantial and essential element of the solemn vow (cf. P. Lumberras, op. cit. in bibl., p. 164 ff.). The ancients place the solemnity of the vow in the special consecration or blessing that accompanies the emission of the solemn vow. Others (Prümmer, Augustine, etc.) make it consist in the perfect dedication of the solemn vow and in its acceptance by the Church in the name of God, so that the solemn vow becomes perpetually consecrated to the service of God. Others (Vermersch) think that the solemn vow is the fully authentic vow before the Church. This authenticity is the formal reason for solemnity, which materially manifests itself in the apparatus—not the vulgar and external, but the juridical. The proper force of this authenticity is the public protection of the authority of the Church in safeguarding the juridical effects proper to the solemn vow. Others (Wernz, Bouix, Suárez) place the essence of the solemn vow not only in the disabling force that the Church recognizes in certain vows, but also, and simultaneously, in the perpetual and irrevocable dedication of the solemn vow and in the relative acceptance by the religion through the authority granted by law.

As is evident, it is a rather theoretical question, which does not of itself influence the exegesis of the canons of the CIC regarding the solemn vow.

Juridical effects of the solemn vow

In relation to the vow of chastity, the solemn vow renders its acts not only illicit but also invalid, if capable of nullity. Thus, a marriage contracted after the solemn vow is invalid (can. 1073). Moreover, clerics in sacred orders, religious, and nuns after the solemn vow of chastity, and all those who contract marriage with them, even only civilly, incur a latae sententiae excommunication reserved simply to the Apostolic See (can. 2388 § 1). Regarding the vow of obedience, some authors think that the solemn vow adds that the solemn vow cannot validly contract any stable obligation either toward God or toward men; and indeed the superior can always annul such acts (cf. C. Schaefer, op. cit. in bibl., p. 605 ff.). With regard to poverty, the religious with the solemn vow loses not only the administration, use, and usufruct of goods, but also ownership; and becomes incapable of acquiring or possessing. For this reason, sixty days before the emission of the solemn vow, unless particular indults are granted, the religious must renounce the goods he possesses so that the renunciation has civil effects as well (can. 581, § 1-2), and all goods that may in any way come to the solemn vower thereafter devolve to the Order, the Province, or the religious house according to the Constitutions, if the Order is capable of possessing (can. 582 § 1); whereas in an Order incapable of possessing, they pass into the ownership of the Holy See (can. 582 § 2).

Furthermore, the emission of solemn vows is recognized as a canonical title (can. 982, § 1) and removes the irregularity of receiving orders dependent “ex defectu natalium” (can. 984 § 1); but it does not remove the inability to hold offices of superior in exempt clerical religious institutes (can. 504), or to be promoted to the dignity of cardinal (can. 232 § 2, n. 1), or to the episcopate (can. 991 § 3). The same profession of solemn vows, in religious institutes where the obligation of the choir exists, obliges those who could not attend the choir to recite the canonical hours privately (can. 610 § 3); it procures exemption from one’s own diocese, for clerics (can. 115, 585) and for lay religious (can. 585). Finally, the vow dissolves ipso iure a non-consummated marriage between the baptized or between a baptized party and an unbaptized party (can. 1119), in the case that the spouse, with the dispensation of the Holy See, has entered a religious institute (can. 542, n. 1). For these and other juridical effects proper to the solemn vow, can. 470 § 2 (cf. also can. 576 § 2) commands the religious superior of the deceased to notify the parish priest of the same of the profession of solemn vows, to be recorded in the baptismal register.

VOX URBIS. - A fortnightly periodical published in Rome on 1 November 1898, subtitled *De litteris et bonis artibus commentariis*, which defined its aims.

It was promoted by Aristide Leonori, who was its owner and administrator; G. B. Ciampi and G. Fornari also took part in its editorial staff. In 1904 it became a monthly; in 1908 it reduced its format. It ceased publication in 1913, and its legacy was taken up by the journal *Alma Roma* (q.v.).