OCCASION OF SIN
### I. Concepts
Properly speaking, an occasion of sin is an external circumstance of person, thing, place, or situation that entices someone to sin and makes its commission easier. An occasion of sin thus comprises two essential elements: one outside the subject, namely the enticing circumstance whose presence exerts a particular influence on the individual; and one within the subject, namely the general or personal disposition toward the sin in question. An occasion of sin differs from danger, because the latter has a broader meaning and includes various internal inclinations (temptations, habits, passions, natural frailty, etc.), and because danger is rather an effect of the occasion which creates the danger.
Modern life has multiplied occasions of sin: the press, associations with unbelievers, mixed marriages or marriages with persons hostile to the Christian life, neutral or mixed schools, fashion, occupations and mixed workplaces, dance halls, cinemas, various entertainments—all causes which, combined with bad examples, human respect, or personal weakness, are sources of moral contagion.
According to the degree of influence it exerts on the subject, an occasion of sin is remote if it creates only a slight danger of sinning; it is proximate if it creates a probable danger of grave sin, either for all (absolute occasion) or for a particular individual because of his special dispositions (relative occasion).
A proximate occasion of sin is present (continuous) or absent (non-continuous) according as the occasion is actual and permanent for the subject, or requires an approach (going, meeting, etc.). A proximate occasion of sin may further be free (voluntary) or necessary, according as the subject can abandon it or not without serious harm, inconvenience, or scandal. A book, a gathering, a pastime are free occasions, even if the person derives some benefit from them; family, military, or prison life are necessary occasions. The same thing may be a free occasion for one person and a necessary occasion for another, for example, an occupation or a relationship.
One must beware of personal illusions in judgment, since no one is a good judge in his own cause, especially when passion or self-interest is involved (cf. the propositions condemned on this point in Denz.-U., nn. 1141, 1211–13).
### Norms for Moral Activity
A free proximate occasion of grave sin, whether present or absent, must be avoided or physically removed, under pain of grave sin. It is clear that such an occasion constitutes a grave danger of sin, and there is no sufficient reason to expose oneself to a danger that can be removed only by separation. This particular obligation arises from the general duty to exercise proper diligence in fulfilling one’s duty. It may be granted that by using the means to resist, the obligation to remove the occasion ceases, provided that by such means the occasion becomes remote. Subjectively, it may happen that the subject does not have or cannot form a consciousness of the gravity of the danger; one then faces a false conscience, which must be enlightened.
One is not obliged physically to remove a morally necessary proximate occasion of sin, provided it is rendered remote by the use of effective means (prayer, vigilance, the sacraments, mortification, meditation, penance, etc.). In such a case, the grace of God will not fail to prevent falling, since only consent constitutes guilt in itself, not the danger itself.
The difficulty lies in weighing doubtful cases regarding moral necessity, the proximity of the occasion, and the efficacy of the means. In case of uncertainty, one cannot speak of a grave obligation, but only of counsel. Especially in the hypothesis of a relative or morally necessary proximate occasion, discretion should suggest requiring only what the person is capable of giving; for example, even a reduction in falls.