SACRAMENTI

SACRAMENTS. — In the New Testament they are sensible signs that produce grace, instituted by Jesus Christ.

The word *sacramentum* (which in part corresponds to the Greek term *μυστήριον*: V. MISTERIO; MISTERIO) in profane authors indicated both the money deposited in the *aerarium* and consecrated to the deity for the portion that was lost in legal disputes (*sacramentum pecuniae*) and the military oath (*sacramentum militiae*). Tertullian was the first to apply the term, with a new meaning, to Baptism, Confirmation, and the Eucharist (De praescr., 40; De resurrectione carnis, 8–9; De Baptismo, 3; Adv. Judaeos, 10; Adv. Marcionem, 1, 14, etc.), and he was followed by the principal Latin Fathers (St. Cyprian, St. Hilary, St. Ambrose, St. Augustine) until, acquiring an ever more precise sense, by the 12th century the definition given above was reached (cf. J. De Ghellinck, E. de Backer, J. Poukens, G. Lebecq, Pour l'hist. du mot « Sacramentum », I: Les antinéciens, Louvain 1924; A. Michel, Sacrements, in DThC, XIV, cols. 485–94).

I. DOGMATIC THEOLOGY.

I. THE ESSENCE OF THE SACRAMENTS OF THE NEW LAW

A sacrament, by its external rite, is the symbol, the representation of a reality beyond the reach of the senses; for example, in Baptism the external sign (water and the words pronounced by the minister) symbolizes and represents an interior and invisible reality: the renewal and purification of the soul. But the sacrament is also the cause of the reality it signifies, for by the power of God’s action it produces it: it is a sign that brings about what it represents, an efficacious sign. There are therefore two elements that concur to constitute intrinsically the sacraments of the Church: symbolism and causality (Sum. Theol., 3ª, q. 62, a. 1, ad 1).

1. The constituent elements of the sacraments considered synthetically

The classical definition “A sacrament is an efficacious sign of grace” is the fruit of many centuries of reflection on the concrete elements of Revelation. Indeed, the sacraments are presented in Scripture in concrete form on the occasion of their institution or their use in the early Church. Yet from an analysis of biblical texts two fundamental elements can be distinguished: the sign and the cause. In Baptism, for example, St. Paul (Rom. 6:3–11) affirms that immersion and emersion, while reproducing the physical death and resurrection of Jesus, represent the mystical death and resurrection of the believer (the sign), and simultaneously produce what it signifies, since in immersion the catechumen dies to sin and in emersion rises to the new life of grace (the cause).

The first Christian generations made the sacraments the practical center of their life before constructing a theory of them; therefore the most ancient documents of Tradition refer to the use of the sacraments, extolling with biblical terms the effects produced by the sensible rite (cf. Tertullian, De resurrectione carnis, 8: PL 2, 852; St. Cyril of Jerusalem, Catecheses, Mystagogical, 2, 5: PG 33, 1082; St. Ambrose, De Sacramentis, 2, 7: PL 16, 449; St. John Chrysostom, In Ioannem Hom., 25, 2: PG 59, 151). St. Augustine was the first, following Origen (In Ioannem, 6, 17: PG 14, 257), to sketch a metaphysics of the “sign” and apply it extensively to the sacraments, which he defined as “sacrum signum” (De Civitate Dei, 10, 5: PL 41, 282). Although in theory he overlooked the efficient cause (which in practice he affirmed with celebrated expressions: “Whence comes the power of water that it touches the body and washes the heart?”, In Ioannem, tr. 80, 10, 3: PL 35, 1840), he nevertheless took the first step toward the abstract conception of the sacrament, which was perfected into a system by the Scholastics and defined by the Council of Trent (cf. A. D’Ales, Baptême et Confirmation, Paris 1928, p. 10). The Scholastics, in possession of the Aristotelian concept of cause, applied it to the sacraments, bringing to maturity the definition of St. Augustine. The work begun in the 12th century by the author of the *Summa Sententiarum* (tr. 4, c. 1: PL 176, 117) and by Peter Lombard (Sent., d. 1, c. 4: II, Quaracchi 1916, p. 746) was brought to completion by St. Thomas Aquinas (Sum. Theol., 3ª, q. 60, a. 6–8), who wrote: “The sacrament is ordered to our sanctification, of which one may consider the cause, which is the Passion of Christ, the form, which consists in grace and the concomitant virtues, and the end, which is glory. These three realities are signified in the sacrament, whence it is called a sign ‘rememorative’ of what preceded, namely the Lord’s Passion, a sign ‘demonstrative’ of what is produced in us through the merits of the Passion, namely grace, and a sign ‘prognostic’ of future glory” (Sum. Theol., 3ª, q. 60, a. 3).

The peaceful possession of this doctrine was disturbed in the 16th century by the Protestants, who, starting from a false concept of original sin (v.) and thus forced to fix the genuine idea of justification (v.), directly attacked the Church’s sacramental doctrine. According to Luther, “fides fiducialis,” which alone justifies, does not reach the heart except through the senses; but God is wont to provoke it by the preaching of the revealed word, which more deeply impresses the minds of hearers when it is confirmed by some divine sign, whether extraordinary, as a miracle, or ordinary, as the sacrament. The sacrament is therefore like the sensible imprint, the seal affixed to the letter of the New Testament, to assure the faithful more securely that the promises contained in the Gospel are divine: in short, the sacrament is an external sign that quickens justifying faith (Confessio Augustana, art. 13; ed. Müller, Gütersloh 1929, pp. 41–43, 202). For Calvin, on the other hand, faith is immediately produced by the Holy Spirit in the soul, yet, as if by a pre-established harmony, always in concomitance with the external preaching of the word of God. To the revealed word God has added, *ad instar appendicis*, sensible rites, such as Baptism and the Eucharist, to assure the faithful of the reality of His eternal benevolence (predestination). The sacraments are therefore not signs related to justification internally produced, but attestations of a benevolence antecedently granted by the eternal decree of predestination. Since this decree (*hieròbile, fateor decretum*: Institutio religionis christianae, III, 21) excludes the reprobate, who in this life are indistinguishable from the elect, Calvin affirmed that in concomitance with the external rite the Holy Spirit awakens faith only in the elect, that is, when and how He wills (Institutio religionis christianae, I, IV, ch. 14). ZWINGLI, HULDRYCH (v.), God produces faith directly, without any dependence (contrary to Luther) and without any synchronism (contrary to Calvin) with the preaching of the divine word and the administration of the sacraments. The sacraments can therefore be considered as tokens of recognition issued to those who, entering the Church, enroll in the militia of Christ (cf. Ch. L’Ebraiy, La doctrine sacramentaire de Ulrich Zuingli, Clermont-Ferrand 1939, pp. 29–34). Carlstadt (v.) and the Socinians held that the sacraments are mere signs by which the faithful distinguish themselves from the unbelievers (cf. R. Bellarmine, De Sacramentis, I, ch. 15). The 16th-century Protestants were agreed in recognizing the symbolic value of the sacraments, but at the same time they took care to empty them of their content.

The Council of Trent refuted point by point the Protestant error, both in its fundamental ideas and in its nuances, following its logical development (original sin: Session 5; justification: Session 6; sacraments in general: Session 7; sacraments in particular: Sessions 13-14; 21-24). In canons 6 and 8 of Session 7 (celebrated in 1547), it was defined that the sacraments contain and produce, *ex opere operato*, the grace they signify (Denz-U, 849, 851). Against this solid dogmatic structure, the modernists essentially repeated the Protestant error (Denz-U, 2089).

2. Analysis of the individual elements

a) The structure of the sensible sign. — When Sacred Scripture speaks of a sacrament, it presents it as a rite composed of things (*res*) and words (*verba*): for example, for Baptism: “Go therefore and make disciples of all nations, baptizing them (res) in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit (verba)” (Mt 28:19); for the Eucharist: “Jesus took bread (res) and said, ‘This is my body (verba)’; and taking the cup (res) he said, ‘This is my blood (verba)’” (Mt 26:26-28), etc. Scripture, however: a) does not assign greater importance to the words compared to the things; b) does not unite the sensible rite with its meaning: for example, while in Mt 28:19 it indicates that the baptismal rite consists of an action and a Trinitarian formula, in Rom 6:3-11 it affirms that the same rite signifies mystical death and resurrection; γ) does not state abstractly that sacraments consist of a gesture and words, but presents them in their concrete reality. These three indeterminacies were gradually resolved as the Fathers and theologians delved deeper into the analysis of the sacramental compound. In the first four centuries, the Fathers attributed greater importance to the words than to the material elements of the rite; indeed, they affirmed that the words have the power to complete and sanctify the water, bread, and wine (Tertullian, *De Baptismo*, 4: PL 1, 1304; St. Ambrose, *De mysteriis*, 3, 8: PL 16, 391; St. Gregory of Nyssa, *Oratio in Baptismum Christi*: PG 46, 581; cf. B. Neunheuser, *De benedictione aquae baptismalis*, Rome 1931). In the 5th century, St. Augustine showed how, through the union of the thing with the words, the sacramental meaning is immediately obtained: “The word is added to the element, and a sacrament is made” (*Accedit verbum ad elementum et fit Sacramentum*) (*In Ioannis Evangelium Tractatus*, 80, 10, 3: PL 35, 1840), that is, the sensible rite becomes “a sign of a sacred reality.” In the 12th and 13th centuries, the Scholastics, having precisely determined the number of sacraments, were able to state abstractly that all sacraments, considered in their external sign, are composed, at least in a broad sense, of things (*res*) and words (*verba*). They also sought to illustrate their nature by adapting the hylemorphic theory to the sacramental realm: in the physical compound, the indeterminate and potential element is called matter, and the determining element is called form; similarly, in the sacramental compound, the indeterminate element is called matter, and the determining element is called form (cf. *Summa Theologiae*, III, q. 50, a. 6).

Some non-Catholic authors (Harnack, Turmel) have criticized this application of Aristotelianism to theology as illegitimate. The reason given shows the appropriateness of hylemorphic terminology; moreover, it is proper to theology to illustrate dogma “by analogy with things naturally known” (*Concilium Vaticanum*, Session III, chap. 4; Denz-U, 1796). On the other hand, the Church, to whom Christ gave the power to guard and explain the content of Revelation, has for centuries adopted this terminology (Denz-U, 672, 695, 914, 1963). The use of a formula that, besides being sanctioned by the authority of the Church, helps to clarify certain points of sacramental doctrine is therefore legitimate.

b) The nature of sacramental causality. — Definitive doctrine. — a) Sacraments, both in Scripture and in the writings of the Fathers, are presented as instruments moved by God to produce grace, independently of the merits of the minister and the subject, provided that certain moral dispositions are present in the subject as indispensable prerequisites for the sacramental effect to be introduced. b) Sacraments are instruments in the hands of God to produce grace: “The Father… saved us through the washing of regeneration and renewal” (Tit 3:5); Christ cleansed His Church “through the washing of water with the word” (Eph 5:26); the Holy Spirit regenerates “through water” (Jn 5:3). It is God who saves, purifies, and regenerates through Baptism as through an instrument of sanctification. The Fathers echoed the biblical words: St. Ephrem affirms that the Holy Spirit penetrates the waters “so that He may elevate them to expiation” (*Adversus scrutatores*, Sermo 40; ed. Assemani, III, Rome 1743, p. 72); St. Cyril of Alexandria states that God infuses His power into the water of Baptism so that, transformed, it may produce sanctifying effects (*In Ioannis Evangelium*, 3, 5: PG 73, 243). γ) Sacraments produce their effect through the performance of the rite, independently of the merits of the minister and the subject. Indeed, Revelation attributes the power to produce grace to the rite itself (under God’s influence). The early Christians received the Holy Spirit through the laying on of the Apostles’ hands (Acts 8:17; 19:6); Christ affirms that His (Eucharistic) flesh is a principle of supernatural life, just as bread is the cause of natural life: “He who eats me will live because of me” (Jn 6:57). These and other texts enunciate the objective efficacy of the sensible rite (laying on of hands, Eucharistic eating) to produce grace. The Fathers translated biblical doctrine into various affirmations and analogies (cf. St. Augustine, *In Ioannis Evangelium Tractatus*, 1, tr. 80, 10, 3: PL 35, 1840; St. Cyril of Jerusalem, *Catecheses mystagogicae*, 2, 4: PG 33, 1079; St. Leo I, *Sermo* 25, 5: PL 54, 211, etc.). Revelation, moreover, excludes the dependence of such efficacy on the merits of the minister and the subject. Classic are the words of St. Augustine: “Baptism is efficacious not on account of the merits of the one who administers it nor of the one who receives it, but by its own holiness and truth, communicated by Him who instituted it” (*Contra Cresconium*, 4, 19: PL 43, 559). This teaching is confirmed by the constant practice of considering the Baptism of heretics as valid and by the apostolic custom of baptizing infants before the use of reason (v. BAPTISM; CYPRIAN; DONATISTS). δ) Sacraments presuppose in the subject moral dispositions as indispensable prerequisites for introducing their effect into the soul. From St. Peter’s exhortation to the first converts: “Repent and be baptized, every one of you, in the name of Jesus Christ for the forgiveness of your sins” (Acts 2:38, 41), to the fervent exhortations of the Fathers to catechumens and penitents, the sources of Revelation insist, with urgency, on the necessity of faith and repentance, indicating their dispositive function in relation to the justification produced by the sacraments.

It is in harmony with His justice and holiness that God has ordained that man should contribute to the work of justification (v.). Having, through sin, turned away from infinite Goodness to embrace a fleeting good, man must, in order to be readmitted to the enjoyment of God, abandon all attachment to creatures and turn to Him with the humble attitude of the guilty. The Council of Trent, for example, described the acts that unfold in the soul of the penitent, outlining a psychology of conversion: “Faith is the guide of the sinner, for it points out to him in God the supreme end and infinite justice. But at the same time as he believes, the sinner, realizing the punishment his grave fault deserves, conceives a salutary fear that is the beginning of repulsion, and turning to the consideration of divine mercy, is animated by hope, and trusting that God will be propitious to him through the merits of Jesus Christ, begins to love Him as the source of justice. Reflecting on the evil done to his own soul and the injury inflicted upon God, he repents and forms the sincere resolve never to fall back into sin” (sess. VI, cap. 7; Denz-U, 798). Faith, fear, hope, initial love, repentance, and firm resolve are the six acts that mark the stages of the soul’s journey back to God. Inspired by actual grace, these acts provide the psychological point of insertion for sanctifying grace, which is produced by the sensible rite. God, indeed, though employing an external rite, acts in the depths of the human being, in regions beyond the reach of any created power, first by a movement of actual grace that impels the soul toward the divine, rendering it capable of bearing “the immense weight,” and then by a surge of supernatural power, habitual grace, which galvanizes the entire human being, from the deepest roots of the soul to its operative branches in intellect and will.

This doctrine, while avoiding on the one hand the exaggerated subjectivism of Protestantism, which sees in the sacraments only a virtue “excitans et nutriens fidem,” and on the other the extreme objectivism that lapses into magic, sorcery, and mechanism, also shows how the teaching of the Catholic Church maintains a balance and brilliantly surpasses every extreme in a synthesis that unites and fuses the objective operation of the sacraments and the subjective dispositions of the faithful (cf. encycl. Mediator Dei of 20 Nov. 1947, in AAS, 39 [1947], pp. 530–37). To confirm this, it is well to recall that the Church has always taught that the grace infused by the sacraments is proportionate to the dispositions of the faithful, for God “gives Himself in measure as He finds ardor” (Dante, Purg., XV, 70). The penitent who receives the sacrament with more intense sorrow, the faithful who approaches the altar with greater fervor, receive in greater abundance the gifts of God. Although subjective acts are not the efficient cause of the infusion of grace, they are its “causa materialis,” that is, the indispensable prior condition and at the same time an “amplificative of the receptivity” of the soul. The opening of the window is not the cause of the illumination of the room, yet the room is all the more illuminated the wider the window is.

All the elements of this doctrine on the causality of the sacraments were defined by the Council of Trent: “The sacrament of the New Law [as instrumental causes] contains and confers grace ex opere operato, provided no obstacle is placed in the way” (sess. VI, cap. 7; Denz-U, 799; sess. VII, cann. 6 and 8; Denz-U, 849, 851).

c) Theological controversy. — The “instrumental causality” of the sacraments lends itself to further discussion, which lies beyond the realm of dogma: in what precise sense the sacraments are instrumental causes of grace. The question constitutes a genuine problem, for it is difficult to conceive how material elements can produce a wholly spiritual and supernatural effect: grace. The responses have been many and varied, but the principal ones reduce to five:

a) William of Auxerre (A. Van Hove, Doctrina Gulielmi Altissiodorensis de causalitate Sacramentorum, in Divus Thomas Plac., 3rd ser., 7 [1930], pp. 305–24) and Durandus affirmed that the sacraments are signs on the occasion of which, as if by a pre-established harmony, God infallibly confers grace (occasional causality). This system, little followed, was abandoned after the Council of Trent, since this occasionalism does not seem to verify the reason of a true cause assigned by the Council as a distinctive mark of the sacraments of the New Law.

b) Billot (De Sacramentis, I, Rome 1927, pp. 102–41), followed by few disciples, proposes a new theory according to which the sacrament is an instrumental cause of an intentional nature, ordered to produce an exigent title to grace (intentional causality). But it is observed that the documents of the faith present as the immediate effect of the sacrament grace itself, not an exigent title to II. Many theologians of the 16th and 17th centuries (Vitoria, Cano, Vasquez, Lugo; cf. F. Feliziani, La causalità dei S. in Domenico Soto, Rome 1939) and in the 19th century Cardinal Franzelin (De Sacramentis, 5th ed., Rome 1911, pp. 106–25) were persuaded that they could explain the causality of the sacraments by regarding them as rites morally and intrinsically dignified by the Blood of Christ, at whose sight God is moved to confer grace (moral causality). This opinion seems to many to be at odds with Tradition and the Council of Trent, which consistently assert that the sensible rites are true instrumental efficient causes of justification.

c) Alexander of Hales (Sum. Theol., pars 4, q. 5, a. 5), followed by St. Albert the Great, Capreolus, and Ferrariensis, affirmed that the sacraments are instrumental causes that, under the influence of God, physically produce a spiritual effect, though distinct from sanctifying grace, but disposing toward it, which they identified either in the character or in an “ornatus animae,” or in sacramental grace (physical dispositive causality). This doctrine, based on the false opinion that the sacraments cannot instrumentally concur in the production of sanctifying grace, since this was held to be the effect of a creative act (for in creation no instrument is admitted), fell into disuse with the abandonment of the opinion on which it was founded. Moreover, the theory does not seem to harmonize perfectly with the documents of Revelation, according to which the sacraments directly attain grace, not a prior effect.

e) St. Thomas taught (Sum. Theol., 3a, q. 62, a. 1, 3–5) that the sacraments are instrumental efficient causes that, moved by God, physically (really) produce grace (perfective physical causality). The Council of Trent declares that the sacraments are true instruments of justification (sess. VI, cap. 7; Denz-U, 799); now it is proper to the action of an instrument, of whatever order, to modify the power of the principal cause, which thus reaches its effect as if colored by the particular active capacities of the individual instruments. In the sacramental order, God Himself, the first and principal cause, touches the soul and awakens grace within it, but the divine power, by provoking and investing at the same time the action of the sensible instrument, receives from it a “suchness” and thus reaches the soul “in a manner particular to” the instrument, which in this way really concurs with the principal cause in the infusion of grace.

II. Effects of the Sacraments — Although only three sacraments (Baptism, Confirmation, and Holy Orders) imprint a character (v.), all of them confer grace “ex opere operato,” that is, by the very fact of their being performed, sanctifying grace. Besides this common effect, each sacrament produces another, namely, sacramental grace, which is proper to each. For since sacraments are causes of what they signify (id efficienti quod significant), they must necessarily produce seven different effects, since they truly signify them (cf. Council of Trent, sess. VII, can. 6; Denz-U, 849). It is therefore common doctrine that sacramental grace is a supernatural reality added by each sacrament to sanctifying grace. Theologians, however, differ when they attempt to explain its intimate nature. Some (Paladino, Capreolus, the Ferrarese theologian) maintained that sacramental grace is a supernatural habit really distinct from sanctifying grace: regenerative in Baptism, confirmative in Confirmation, nutritive in the Eucharist, etc. Others (Cajetan, Soto, Suárez, and Lugo) regarded it as a mere right to receive, at the opportune moment, special helps of actual grace. The majority of theologians (with John of St. Thomas, the Salmanticenses, and Billuart) hold that it is a modification of disposition and a strengthening by which habitual grace is rendered capable of producing those particular supernatural effects to which the individual sacraments are ordained (for the history of the various opinions cf. B. Brazzara, *La natura della Grazia sacramentale nella dottrina di Tommaso*, Grottaferrata 1941).

Accepting and completing the valid elements of the various opinions, it may be held that sacramental grace is a stable orientation of the entire supernatural organism toward the end of each sacrament. The supernatural organism consists of habitual grace (in the place of the soul), the infused virtues and the gifts of the Holy Spirit (which correspond to the powers of the soul: the intellect and the will), and the impulses of actual grace (corresponding to natural motions). Sacramental grace invests the individual parts of this organism and directs them to the particular end of each sacrament; it modifies and strengthens sanctifying grace, rendering it capable of sustaining the new development of an increased life; it increases and perfects the virtues and gifts that are in harmony with the particular end of the sacrament, such as faith in Baptism and charity in the Eucharist; finally, it establishes a constant right to obtain, at the right moment, all the helps of actual grace that accompany and bring to completion the supernatural acts, through the habitual repetition of which the faithful attains the proximate end of the sacrament and the ultimate end of salvation (cf. St. Thomas, *In II Sent.*, d. 26, q. 1, a. 6, ed. 5; *In IV Sent.*, d. 7, q. 2, a. 2, q. 2; *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 66, a. 5). For their application to the individual sacraments, see the respective articles.

III. ORIGIN OF THE SACRAMENTS — The sacraments have existed in the Church for twenty centuries by the direct institution of Jesus Christ (remote origin). In concreto, the plan established by the Redeemer is realized for individual faithful through the valid administration of the various rites under particular circumstances of time and place (proximate origin).

1. Institution of the Sacraments — In order that the Redemption (v.) might be applied to individual men, Jesus Christ established a plan that in some way continued the series of actions performed in the work of salvation. To renew the supreme act of worship by which He placated the Father on the Cross, He established the Sacrifice of the Mass (v.) to be repeated daily until the end of the world “until He comes” (1 Cor 11:26); to distribute the supernatural gifts acquired in His Passion, He instituted the seven sacraments. He was free either to transmit grace immediately or through sensible rites. Revelation attests that, while retaining the power to influence souls in extraordinary ways corresponding to His wisdom, “non enim alligavit Gratiam suam Sacramentis” [He did not bind His grace to the sacraments], He chose the latter course. Indeed, Scripture and Tradition report the direct intervention of Christ in instituting in the Church the use of communal rites of grace (see the individual sacraments).

The testimonies of the Gospel, supported by the assertions of the earliest writers, not only render unjustified the elimination of five sacraments attempted by the innovators of the 16th century, but also expose the inconsistency of the judgment passed by liberal Protestants on the present sacramental economy: “There is no spectacle more sad for us than this transformation of the Christian religion, which from what it originally was, namely, the worship of God in spirit and truth, becomes the cult of signs. To destroy this form of religion, Jesus Christ was crucified, and behold it is resurrected under the weight of His name and authority” (A. Harnack, *Essence of Christianity*, Italian trans., Turin 1903, pp. 238–239). The Church has solemnly defined in the Council of Trent that Christ instituted the seven sacraments “neither more nor fewer” (Denz-U, 844). This definition not only affirms their institution but also establishes their number as seven, against which Luther had directed his most impassioned attacks. By embracing in a single dogmatic canon the two truths of institution and the number seven, the Church perhaps wished to indicate the unity of the revealed foundation on which they rest: indeed, the same biblical and patristic texts that attest to the fact of institution concretely fix their number as seven. It is granted that neither Scripture nor the Fathers ever enunciate abstractly and exclusively the number seven, and that it is only in the 12th century that we find the global enumeration of the seven sacraments. This merely means that, while admitting the enumeration, the lack of error did not provoke doctrinal deepening, and the practical nature of the sacraments diverted attention from theoretical reflection. Thus, Tertullian, St. Cyril of Jerusalem, and St. Ambrose, when instructing catechumens, listed only three sacraments: Baptism, Confirmation, and the Eucharist, because these were the ones to which their hearers were to approach at the end of the catechumenate (sacraments of initiation). Chrysostom, on the other hand, for pastoral purposes, spoke of the Eucharist, Penance, and priestly dignity. St. Augustine, in contrast, in his polemic with the Donatists, dealt preferably with the sacraments that imprint a character, and, in response to the controversies with the Manicheans and Pelagians, with Matrimony. It was known, moreover, that Baptism, Confirmation, the Eucharist, etc., consist of a symbolic rite to which, by divine power, is united the efficacy of producing what they signify; yet this was a concrete knowledge, and when Origen and St. Augustine began the process of abstraction, they easily applied to the rites the notion of sign, but had no incentive to illustrate the concept of cause. From Augustinian speculation emerged the abstract concept of a sacrament as a “sacred sign”; so vague as to allow the inclusion in the same category of all symbols, of which the liturgy was particularly rich. Indeed, St. Augustine and his disciples placed, abstractly, in the same line of comparison the “Sacramentum Baptismi” with the “Sacramentum salis” [Sacrament of salt] (Sermon 228, 3: PL 38, 1102). It was only when the scholastics of the 12th and 13th centuries added to the idea of sign, as a distinguishing mark, that of cause, that it became easy to reserve the name of sacrament for those sacred signs that are simultaneously causes of what they signify, and to group under the same definition the seven rites that produce grace.

On the other hand, the fact that the list of seven sacraments was only drawn up by Magister Simon around 1145 (cf. H. Weis-

The acceptance by all theologians and canonists of the thesis of Maitre Simon and his group (*De Sacramentis*, Louvain 1937, pp. XLVII-LXII) and its rapid diffusion throughout the Catholic world, even to the point of being incorporated into official magisterial documents, demonstrates that it was not a novelty but rather corresponded to what the Church had hitherto practiced and implicitly taught. This is effectively corroborated by the ancient Eastern Churches (Nestorians, Monophysites, Greek-Russians, Armenians, etc.), which, although separated from the Catholic Church in part since the 5th century, still profess the seven sacraments. Had there been any doubt regarding the divine origin of such teaching, the animosity toward Rome would certainly have led to the abandonment of this number, thereby creating a deeper division between the two Churches (cf. for the Greek-Russian Church: *La Confession orthodoxe de Pierre Moghila*, ed. Malvy-Viller, Paris 1927, pp. XXII-XLIII).

2. *Administration of the Sacraments* — Jesus Christ did not merely wish to witness the unfolding of His work throughout the centuries, but remained at the center of His sacramental economy, invisible yet ever operative. He Himself offers the sacrifice: “*Oblatio eadem est, quisquis offerat, quia non homines hanc sanctificant sed ipse Christus*” (St. John Chrysostom, *Hom. 2 in 2 Tim.*, n. 4: PG 62, 612). He administers the sacraments: “*Petrus baptizat ministerio, Christus baptizat potestate*” (St. Augustine, *In Io.*, tr. 5, 18: PL 35, 1424). Yet, having established a plan of salvation in which the invisible must manifest itself in the visible, harmony required that His activity, veiled beneath the sacrificial rite and sacramental symbols, be rendered in some way perceptible through human ministry. Therefore, Jesus chose visible ministers from among His disciples (cf. *Lk. 22:19; Jn. 20:23; 1 Cor. 1:4; 2 Cor. 5:18-20*), to whom He transmitted a real participation in His power to sanctify (cf. *ORDINE*), though always subordinate to His action as the principal cause. Thus, ministers are but an irradiation of the priesthood of Jesus, an externalization of His activity as Eternal High Priest, as it were, the “longa manus” through which He operates.

In this capacity as free instruments, the ultimate reason is found why, while their moral qualities (faith and state of grace) are not necessary for the validity of the sacraments, an intention (cf. *INTENZIONE, VI. L'él. nel ministro dei S.*)—at least virtual—of acting as ministers of Christ, that is, of doing what Christ and the Church intend, is required.

For the question of the reviviscence of the sacraments, cf. *REVIVISCENZA DEI SACRAMENTI*.

**

**Sacraments**
1. The Eucharist. Miniature by Liberale da Verona (15th c.). Choir of the Piccolomini Library – Siena.

**

---

II. MORAL THEOLOGY

### I. REQUIREMENTS IN MATTER AND FORM
In sacramental matter, it is necessary to adhere to the will of the Divine Institutor, who willed that certain sensible things (res, matter) be designated, together with the determining formal element (verba, form), to constitute the sensible sign that produces grace. For the unity of the sensible sign, it is necessary that the two elements (res et verba, matter and form) be suitably united and that they be certain and integral.

1) **Regarding certainty:** Outside cases of urgent necessity or notable spiritual advantage, it is a grave sin to use matter that is not morally certain in the conferral of the sacraments. This is required both by the reverence owed to the sacrament, which might thereby be exposed to the danger of invalidity, and by the good of the recipient, who might thereby be deprived of the sacrament’s benefit. The certainty here demanded is a moral certainty: the doubt to be excluded is factual doubt, that is, hesitation as to whether this or that matter was designated by Christ as valid matter for the sacraments. Therefore, probabilism—which concerns itself with legal doubt—cannot be applied to the sacraments.

The proposition condemned by Innocent XI: Dens-U, 1151). Only two exceptions are admitted: the case of necessity or notable utility. Regarding the first, all authors agree that in a case of necessity it is licit to administer the sacraments even with doubtful matter, because the sacraments are instituted for men, and therefore when in a case of necessity doubtful matter is used, the reverence due to the sacrament is not violated, since it is used for the same end willed by Christ, our Lord. Nor is the good of the recipient of the sacrament administered in this way harmed; indeed, whatever is done is directed to his advantage, to promote his salvation in every possible way. In a case of extreme necessity, therefore, not only is it admitted but it is obligatory to act thus, since it concerns the decisive moment of the salvation of a soul. This is the case of a gravely ill child, not yet baptized, to whom Baptism is conferred with doubtfully valid water, there being no other available. This is the case in which absolution is given conditionally to a dying person doubtfully disposed.

What has just been said regarding the case of necessity may, in the judgment of most, be extended to the case of grave utility, although some authoritative authors dissent.

2) Regarding the integrity of matter and form, a distinction must be made between substantial change (which renders the sacrament invalid) and accidental change (which allows the validity of the sacrament, though it is sinful for the one introducing it, unless he is moved by motives of necessity or other excusing reasons). There is a substantial change in the matter when the alteration or separation of the words is such that it must be considered no longer that matter but another. As a criterion for evaluating such alterations of the matter, recourse is not had to formulas and scientific language, but to the common manner of thinking and acting. For the sacraments are within the reach of all, instituted for all, and even the evaluation of their elements must be made according to a criterion accessible to all and not reserved to an elite. There is then an accidental change when, despite the alteration made, the matter, in common judgment, remains the same, even if respect for the sacraments, motives of propriety, or prescriptions of canon law are contravened.

Concretely, such an accidental change occurs: a) if the words are changed only materially, because others of the same meaning are employed; b) if the minister adds some other complementary word; c) if one or more words are changed or omitted, without however the meaning of the phrase being transformed; d) if the minister, through haste or slips of the tongue, omits or changes letters of words (especially final ones). In these cases, even if the meaning remains ambiguous, it can be determined by the manifest intention of the minister.

Substantial changes in matter and form that render the sacrament invalid are gravely sinful, except in the case of licit simulation (v.). The sin is against the virtue of religion and sometimes against charity and justice. An accidental change, on the other hand, which does not render the sacrament invalid, if done without cause, in proportion to the measure of the alterations introduced and other circumstances, will be grave or light.

3) The union of matter and form in the conferral of the sacraments must be such as is necessary in the sacraments for the words to be understood as directed to that particular thing and to form with it a single sacramental sign. In particular: a) physical simultaneity is required only in the Eucharist, because the words of the form, “This is my body,” would no longer make sense if the matter were not before the priest at the moment he begins to pronounce the form. b) Strictly understood moral simultaneity (that is, in such a way that the words of the form and the application of the matter are morally simultaneous) is required in Baptism, Confirmation, Extreme Unction, and Holy Orders. Therefore these sacraments are certainly valid if the matter is applied before the last word of the form is pronounced, and vice versa. They are equally valid if the words are begun as soon as the application of the matter is completed. They are probably still valid if there is a very brief interval between matter and form. c) In the sacrament of Penance, since Penance is ordered after the manner of a judicial process, in itself an interval may elapse between the instruction of the process and the sentence, that is, an interval such as occurs between the knowledge of the judgment and the sentence—an interval that may even be rather long. But since the sacrament of Penance is a singular judgment, in which the penitent must bring certain dispositions (attrition or contrition), which are not required and ordinarily are not had in common judgments, the interval for the union of matter and form may of necessity be shortened because of the lack of perseverance in these dispositions. d) In Matrimony, which is celebrated after the manner of a contract, and in which matter and form are contained in the mutual consent, it is sufficient that the consent of one come when the consent of the other still persists, for the sacrament to be valid.

4) Application of matter and form. a) In those sacraments in which matter and form must be applied to the subject, this must be done by the minister himself: this is demonstrated by the common practice of the Church, the common opinion of theologians, and, for Extreme Unction, also by the spoken words of St. James (5:14–15). Moreover, since the administration of the sacraments must be a single action composed of two elements—namely, the application of the form to the matter—if one were to apply the form and another the matter, there would rather be two actions and not one. Furthermore, the meaning of the form would often not be verified if one applied the remote matter and another pronounced the form, for example in Baptism. To this reasoning others, such as Cajetan, reply that the unity is given by the fact that the ministers act in the name of Christ; from this unity derives the unity of the action. Given the probability of this opinion, according to which the identity of the secondary minister in the application of matter and form would not be indispensable, in a case of extreme necessity it is not illicit to confer the sacraments in the ways described above. b) In those sacraments, however, in which the minister supplies the form and the subject supplies the matter, it is the rule that one puts the matter and another the form. Thus it is in the sacraments of Penance and Matrimony.

II. REQUIREMENTS IN THE MINISTER OF THE SACRAMENTS. The minister of the sacraments (here we speak of the secondary minister) is only a man in this life who is either consecrated or at least legitimately deputed.

A distinction is made between a consecrated and a non-consecrated minister, according as he has or has not received a special consecration. A consecrated minister is required in five sacraments: in Confirmation, the Eucharist, Penance, Extreme Unction, and Holy Orders; a non-consecrated minister suffices, however, in Baptism, and is required in the Latin Church in Matrimony.

A further distinction is made between an ordinary and an extraordinary minister. An ordinary minister is one to whom it pertains by office to administer these sacraments; an extraordinary minister is one who can administer them only in a case of necessity or by special delegation.

Finally, a distinction is usually made between a public and a private minister. The former is one who administers solemnly, using all the ceremonies prescribed by the Ritual; the latter is one who applies only the matter and the form, omitting all other ceremonies.

### Requirements in the Minister for the Valid Administration of the Sacraments

The requirements for the minister to validly administer the sacraments are as follows:

a) Proper authority, since not all can administer every sacrament, but only those to whom Jesus Christ has granted such power; in administering the sacraments, man acts as a mandatary;

b) Proper intention, namely, to do what the Church does (see above), and that this intention be at least virtual in the minister (see INTENTION, VI. THE INTENTION OF THE SACRAMENT);

c) The correct application of the form to the matter.

### Requirements in the Minister for the Lawful Administration of the Sacraments

The requirements for the minister to lawfully administer the sacraments are:

a) The state of grace (see);

b) Immunity from censures and irregularities, an immunity which in Penance may even pertain to the validity of the sacrament;

c) It is further required that the minister, in his action, proceed with due reverence. This respect sometimes demands the use of the conditional form rather than the absolute form in the administration of the sacraments. The conditional form is that by which the minister, through a condition (expressed in words or merely in the mind), intends to administer the sacrament only if all the requirements for its validity are simultaneously present. This form must always be used in the repetition of a sacrament; and when expressly required by the Ritual even in the first conferral, as in Baptism and Extreme Unction. In other cases, the condition must be used whenever the sacrament, if conferred absolutely, might be exposed to the danger of nullity, or if absolutely denied, would deprive a person of a great good and expose him to grave danger of perdition. Therefore, it is almost never lawful to attach a condition *de futuro*; indeed, all sacraments so conferred, except Matrimony, are invalid, because the moral coexistence of the elements is lacking. In Matrimony, a condition *de futuro* (suspensive, not resolutive) is sometimes also lawful (see CONDITION). A sacrament conferred under a condition *de praesenti* or *de praeterito* is valid if the condition is fulfilled or has already been fulfilled; otherwise, it is invalid.

But respect also demands that every kind of simulation be removed from the administration of the sacraments (see). The dissimulation of sacraments, on the other hand, is lawful for a grave reason. It consists in performing a non-sacramental action under circumstances such that it may be believed that a sacrament is being administered;

d) Due attention is also required, that is, internal attention that excludes any distraction;

e) A prudent solicitude for the value of the sacrament, and therefore a diligent inquiry into the matter and form, must never be lacking on the part of the minister. If, due to a defect in some essential element, a previous administration of the sacrament was certainly invalid, the sacrament must be repeated in the absolute form. If, however, there is only a prudent doubt regarding the validity of the sacrament, it must be reiterated conditionally. If, then, there is no reasonable doubt about the validity of the sacrament, even conditional reiteration is unlawful. The malice of such reiteration in this case is grave in itself, on account of the irreverent use of the sacramental sign; however, due to circumstances (special psychological conditions, e.g., scruples or bad habit), grave sin rarely occurs.

It is to be condemned to repeat one or more words of the form;

f) The observance of the prescribed rites is also required of the minister, along with the necessary authorization to administer the sacrament (license);

g) Finally, the administration of the sacraments must be gratuitous. Canon 736 states: “For the administration of the sacraments, the minister, for any reason or occasion, directly or indirectly, must not demand or require anything, except the offerings mentioned in can. 1507 § 1” (fees established in provincial councils and episcopal assemblies). He therefore cannot demand or require anything, but spontaneous offerings are not forbidden;

h) It is unlawful to administer the sacraments to an incapable subject. This, implying a grave abuse of a sacred thing, is an intrinsically evil act both on the part of the minister and on the part of the subject to whom the sacrament is administered. It is also a grave obligation to deny the sacraments to the unworthy, unless the action is excused by a proportionately grave reason (see UNWORTHY).

### The Obligation of the Minister to Administer the Sacraments

To judge the nature and gravity of this obligation, one must consider the burdens incumbent upon the minister and the condition of the faithful who request the sacraments.

#### a) The Faithful Who Request the Sacraments

They may be in extreme, grave, or common necessity.

a) Extreme necessity exists when a person is in danger of eternal damnation and cannot overcome this danger by his own efforts or can do so only with such difficulty that the effort must be considered morally impossible.

b) Grave necessity exists when a person, speaking absolutely, could provide for his own salvation, but only with great difficulty, so that without the help of others, the danger of damnation is probable for him.

c) Common necessity exists for every faithful person who has committed or is about to commit a grave sin, unless he is assisted by others.

#### b) The Ministers of the Sacraments

Some are bound by charity, others by justice, to administer the sacraments.

a) Those in pastoral ministry are bound by justice or by duty of office, and they are bound *sub gravi* to administer the sacraments to their subjects when they reasonably request them (expressly or tacitly); they are bound to do so even at great personal inconvenience and, at times, even at the risk of their lives.

The faithful reasonably request the administration of the sacraments not only when they are bound to receive them by precept or by necessity to provide for their souls (having committed a grave sin, facing grave temptation), but also when they request them for pure devotion or spiritual profit. Pastors of souls are bound *ex iustitia* to administer the sacraments because, in assuming pastoral office, they implicitly obligate themselves to fulfill various duties, including administering the sacraments to their subjects either personally or through others (can. 892). Those constituted in pastoral ministry are bishops, parish priests, and their vicars for the faithful in general; for religious in particular, the care of souls is entrusted to superiors.

This ministry, in itself, is binding *sub gravi*, because the obligation is one of justice and the matter is grave (it concerns eternal salvation, justification, and the increase of grace).

In the extreme necessity of subjects, the necessary sacraments must be administered for eternal salvation even at evident risk to life. For the obligation to subsist, three conditions are required: that there be moral certainty that the subject is in extreme necessity; that there be moral certainty or at least well-founded hope of success; and that it concern necessary sacraments. The necessary sacraments are: Baptism, Penance, and, for those not absolved or deprived of their senses, Extreme Unction. It is debated whether Viaticum should be classified among the necessary sacraments (see).

In grave necessity, the sacraments must be administered even at grave and probable risk to one’s own health. The same cannot be said in the case of common necessity; in this case, one must be disposed to endure some inconvenience, but no more is required, because it is presumed that the pastor of souls did not intend to bind himself to grave inconvenience.

b) By charity, all other ministers who do not exercise pastoral care are bound, and the obligation is more or less grave according to the order of the virtue of charity. The obligation may become more grave to avoid scandal, which in such circumstances

It can easily arise. In particular: those faithful who find themselves in extreme spiritual need must be assisted even at great inconvenience and even with some risk to life, provided that the true necessity is evident and there is a certain hope of being able to save the neighbor. Extreme necessity is assimilated to grave common necessity, which occurs in times of contagious diseases. All ministers are bound, under grave obligation, to administer the sacraments to those in grave spiritual need, if they can do so without notable inconvenience.

To those faithful who reasonably request the administration of the sacraments outside the case of necessity, ministers are generally bound, under grave obligation, to administer them.

III. REQUIREMENTS IN THE RECIPIENT OF THE SACRAMENTS — Except for the Eucharist, all other sacraments are effected by their application to the subject.

1) To receive the sacraments validly, the following are required: a) the capacity of the subject. Every wayfarer, and only he, is a capable subject of the sacraments. The sacraments were instituted by Christ to confer the first or second grace. b) For the reception of any sacrament other than Baptism, a valid Baptism of water is required. The mere reception of the Eucharist without Baptism would be only a material reception. c) For the reception of Holy Orders, the male sex is required. d) For the sacrament of Penance, the use of reason is required. The same applies to the valid reception of the sacrament of Matrimony (in this case). e) For Extreme Unction, besides the use of reason, a grave illness or old age is required (can. 49). f) For the sacrament of Matrimony, besides the use of reason, freedom from any prior bond and at least radical physical capacity are required.

For the valid reception of the sacraments, the following are not required: a) neither faith nor probity in the subject, since these elements do not enter into the constitution of the sacrament (cf. Sacred Congregation of the Holy Office, 19 Sept. 1677). An exception is made for Penance, since for its validity perfect or at least imperfect contrition (attrition) is required, and this enters into the very constitution of the sacrament. Now contrition presupposes faith; b) nor any kind of attention on the part of the subject, whether internal or external; but the intention (ordinary) of habitually retaining an implicit intention is required. However, in the case of children and habitual madmen, for the valid reception of those sacraments of which they are capable, such as Baptism and Confirmation, no personal intention is required (v. INTENTION, VII. I. in the subject of the sacraments).

2) For the licit reception of the sacraments, speaking generally, two conditions are required: that the recipient be endowed with the proper dispositions; and that he request the sacraments from a worthy minister. a) Whoever knowingly receives a sacrament without the proper dispositions commits a grave sin of sacrilege, because he renders ineffective the rite instituted by Christ as an efficacious sign of grace. In particular, to receive the sacraments of the living, one must be in a state of grace. Therefore, lacking grace, one commits sacrilege by receiving the sacraments of the living (v. SACRILEGE; STATE OF GRACE). To receive the sacraments of the living with habitual venial sin does not constitute a sin; to receive them with affection for venial sin is a venial sin. There is no sin at all if one seeks in the sacrament a remedy against this affection for venial sin. For the sacraments of the dead (Penance and Baptism in the state of sin mentioned above), the proper disposition is supernatural attraction. b) It is illicit to ask for and receive sacraments from a minister who is certainly unworthy, that is, a habitual sinner or one who is in proximate occasion of sin or is bound by a censure. But since the request for a sacrament is not in itself an evil thing, it is permitted to ask for and receive sacraments from a sinful minister not bound by a censure, if there is a grave and proportionate cause. Indeed, it is lawful, for a just cause, to cooperate materially in another’s sin, since the request is not in itself an evil thing and the minister can regain a state of grace through perfect contrition.

Some authors hold that it is lawful to receive the sacraments from an occult sinner, even if the unworthiness of the minister is certainly known. If, however, the minister is struck by a censure, the faithful may, for any just reason, ask for sacraments and sacramental from him, provided that he is not a vitandus excommunicate or one censured by a declaratory or condemnatory sentence (can. 2261 § 2, 2275, 2284). From a vitandus excommunicate or from one who is suspended or interdicted, after a condemnatory or declaratory sentence, the faithful may in danger of death ask for sacramental absolution, even if other worthy ministers are present. If these are lacking, they may also ask for the other sacraments from him (can. 2261, 2275 § 2, 2284). According to some authors, danger of death is to be equated with a very grave harm to be avoided, such as scandal, infamy, or a grave loss. The same must be said of a minister who is not bound by a censure but by a vindictive penalty, such as perpetual or temporary suspension. It is then lawful to ask for the sacraments when there is a just motive (can. 2298). If, however, the minister is a deposed or degraded cleric with a condemnatory or declaratory sentence, it is lawful only in danger of death. If the minister is a publicly apostate, heretic, or schismatic, it is lawful to ask for the sacraments from him only in danger of death. In this case, account must also be taken of scandal and the danger of perversion (Sacred Congregation of the Holy Office, 7 July 1864). — See plates XCVII–XCVIII.