Sacraments

SACRAMENTS. - In the New Testament they are sensible signs productive of Grace, instituted by Jesus Christ.

The word sacramentum (which partly corresponds to the Greek term μυστήριον: v. MYSTERIES; MYSTERY) among profane authors indicated both the money deposited in the aerarium and consecrated to the divinity for the part that was forfeited in lawsuits (sacramentum pecuniae) and the military oath (sacramentum militiae). Tertullian was the first to apply, with a new meaning, the term to Baptism, Confirmation and the Eucharist (De praeser., 40; De resurr. carnis, 8-9; De Baptismo, 3; Adv. Judaeos, 10; Adv. Marcionem, 1, 14, etc.), imitated by the principal Latin Fathers (St. Cyprian, St. Hilary, St. Ambrose, St. Augustine) until, acquiring an ever more precise sense, in the 12th century the definition given above was reached (cf. J. De Ghellinck, E. de Backer, J. Poukens, G. Lebecqz, Pour l'hist. du mot «Sacramentum», I: Les anténiciens, Louvain 1924; A. Michel, Sacrements, in DThC, XIV, coll. 485-94).

I. DOGMATIC THEOLOGY.

I. ESSENCE OF THE SACRAMENTS OF THE NEW LAW

The S., by its external rite, is the symbol, the representation of a reality not attainable by the senses; for example, in Baptism the external sign (water and the words pronounced by the minister) symbolizes and represents an interior and invisible reality: the renewal and purification of the soul. But the S. is furthermore the cause of the reality signified, since by virtue of the hidden action of God, it produces it: it is a sign that realizes what it represents, an efficacious sign. There are therefore two elements that concur to constitute intrinsically the S. of the Church: symbolism and causality (Sum. Theol., 3ª, q. 62, a. 1, ad 1).

1. The constitutive elements of the S. considered synthetically

The classic definition "The S. is an efficacious sign of Grace" is the fruit of many centuries of reflection on the concrete elements of Revelation. Indeed the S. are presented by Scripture in concrete form on the occasion of their institution or of their use in the nascent Church. However, from an analysis of the biblical texts one can distinguish the two fundamental elements: the sign and the cause. In Baptism, for example, St. Paul (Rom. 6, 3-11) affirms that the immersion and the emersion, while reproducing the physical death and resurrection of Jesus, represents the mystical death and resurrection of the faithful (the sign), and simultaneously produces what it signifies, since in the immersion the catechumen dies to sin and in the emersion rises again to the new life of Grace (the cause).

The first Christian generations made the S. the practical center of their life before constructing the theory; therefore the most ancient documents of Tradition allude to the use of the S., extolling with biblical terms the effects produced by the sensible rite (cf. Tertullian, De resurrect. carnis, 8: PL 2, 852; St. Cyril of Jerusalem, Catech.

Myst., 2, 5: PG 33, 1082; St. Ambrose, De Sacramentis, 2, 7: PL 16, 449; St. John Chrysostom, In Io. Hom., 25, 2: PG 59, 151). St. Augustine was the first who, following in the footsteps of Origen (In Io., 6, 17: PG 14, 257), sketched a metaphysics of the "signum," making broad application of it to the sacraments, which he defined as "Sacrum signum" (De Civitate Dei, 10, 5: PL 41, 282). Although in theory he neglected efficacy (which in practice he affirmed with expressions that have become famous: "unde tanta virtus aquae ut corpus tangat et cor abluat?"), In Io., tr. 80, 10, 3: PL 35, 1840), nevertheless he took the first step toward the abstract conception of the sacrament, perfected into a system by the Scholastics and defined by the Council of Trent (cf. A. D'Alès, Baptême et Confirmation, Paris 1928, p. 10). The Scholastics, in fact, in possession of the Aristotelian concept of cause, applied it to the sacrament, bringing to maturity the definition of St. Augustine. The work begun in the 12th century by the author of the Summa Sententiarum (tr. 4, c. 1: PL 176, 117) and by Peter Lombard (IV Sent., d. 1, c. 4: II, Quaracchi 1916, p. 746) was brought to completion by St. Thomas (Sum. Theol., 3ª, q. 60, aa. 6-8), who wrote: "The sacrament is ordered to our sanctification, of which one may consider the cause, which is the Passion of Christ, the form, which consists in Grace and the concomitant virtues, and the end, which is Glory. These three realities are signified in the sacrament, whence it is called a 'rememorative' sign of what preceded, that is, of the Passion of the Lord, a 'demonstrative' sign of what is produced (efficitur) in us by the merits of the Passion, namely Grace, and a 'prognostic' sign of future glory" (Sum. Theol., 3ª, q. 60, a. 3).

The peaceful possession of this doctrine was disturbed in the 16th century by the Protestants, who, starting from a false concept of original sin (v.) and therefore compelled to distort the genuine idea of justification (v.), struck directly at the Church's sacramental doctrine. According to Luther, the "fides fiducialis," which alone justifies, reaches the heart only through the paths of the senses; but God customarily provokes it through the preaching of the revealed word, which makes a deeper impression on the minds of hearers when it is confirmed by some divine sign, whether extraordinary, like a miracle, or ordinary, like a sacrament. The sacrament thereforeis like the sensible imprint, the seal affixed to the letter of the New Testament, to better assure the faithful that the promises contained in the Gospel are divine: in short, the S. is an external sign that quickens justifying faith (Confessio Augustana, a. 13; Apologia Confessionis Augustanae, a. 13; ed. Müller, Gütersloh 1929, pp. 41-43, 202). For Calvin, on the other hand, faith is produced immediately by the Holy Spirit in the soul, yet, as it were by a pre-established harmony, always in conjunction with the external preaching of the word of God. To the revealed word God added, ad instar appendicis, sensible rites, such as Baptism and the Eucharist, to assure the faithful of the reality of his eternal benevolence (predestination). The S. therefore are not signs related to justification interiorly produced, but attestations of a benevolence granted beforehand, by the eternal decree of predestination. Since this decree ("horribile, fateor decretum": Institutio relig. christ., III, 21) excludes the reprobate, who in this life are not distinguished from the elect, Calvin affirmed that in conjunction with the external rite the Holy Spirit quickens faith only in the elect, that is, when and as he wills (Institutio relig. christ., I, IV, c. 14). For Zwingli (v.) God produces faith directly without any dependence (against Luther) and without any synchronism (against Calvin) with the preaching of the divine word and the administration of the S. These therefore can be considered as tokens of recognition issued to those who, entering the Church, enroll in the militia of Christ (cf. Ch. L'Ebraly, La doctrine sacramentaire de Ulrich Zuingli, Clermont-Ferrand 1939, pp. 29-34). Carlstadt (v.) and the Socinians held that the S. are simple signs by which the faithful are distinguished from the unbelievers (cf. R. Bellarmino, De Sacramentis, I, I, c. 15). The Protestants of the 16th century agreed in recognizing the symbolic value of the S., but at the same time all took care to empty it of its content.

The Council of Trent rebutted the Protestant error point by point, both in its fundamental ideas and in its nuances, following its logical development (original sin: sess. 5; justification: sess. 6; S. in general: sess. 7; S. in particular: sess. 13-14; 21-24). In canons 6 and 8 of sess. 7 (celebrated in 1547) it was defined that the S. contain and produce "ex opere operato" the Grace signified by them (Denz-U, 849, 851). Against this solid dogmatic construction, the Modernists substantially repeated the Protestant error (Denz-U, 2089).

2. Analysis of the individual elements

a) The structure of the sensible sign. - When Sacred Scripture speaks of an S., it presents it as a rite composed of things (res) and words (verba): for example, for Baptism: "Go and teach all nations, baptizing them (res) in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit (verba)" (Mt. 28, 19); for the Eucharist: "Jesus took bread (res) and said: this is my Body (verba): and taking the chalice in his hands (res) he said: this is my Blood (verba)" (Mt. 26, 26-28), etc. Scripture, however, a) does not assign greater importance to the words in comparison with the things, b) does not unite the sensible rite with its meaning: for example, while in Mt. 28, 19 it indicates that the baptismal rite is constituted of a washing and a Trinitarian formula, in Rom. 6, 3-11 it affirms that the same rite signifies mystical death and resurrection; c) does not state in the abstract that the S. are constituted of a gesture and words, but presents them in their concrete reality. These three indeterminacies were eliminated gradually as the Fathers and theologians advanced in the analysis of the sacramental composite. In the first four centuries the Fathers attributed greater importance to the words than to the material elements of the rite; indeed they affirmed that the words have the power to complete and sanctify the water, the oil, the bread and the wine (Tertullian, De Baptismo, 4: PL 1, 1304; St. Ambrose,

De mysteriis, 3, 8: PL 16, 391; St. Gregory of Nyssa, Oratio in Baptismum Christi: PG 46, 581; cf. B. Braunheuser, De benedictione aquae baptismalis, Rome 1931). In the 5th century St. Augustine showed how, with the union of the thing with the words, the sacramental meaning is immediately obtained: "Accedit verbum ad elementum et fit Sacramentum" (In Io., tr. 80, 10, 3: PL 35, 1840), that is, the sensible rite becomes "signum rei sacrae". In the 12th and 13th centuries the Scholastics, having exactly determined the septenary number, could easily state, in abstract form, that all the S., considered in their external sign, are composed, at least in a broad sense, of things (res) and words (verba). They also sought to illustrate the manner of this, adapting the hylomorphic theory to the sacramental world: in the physical composite the indeterminate and potential element is called matter and the determining one form, so in the sacramental composite the indeterminate element is called matter and the determining one form (cf. Sum. Theol., 3a, q. 50, a. 6).

Some non-Catholic authors (Harnack, Turmel) have criticized as illegitimate this application of Aristotelianism to theology. The reason indicated shows the appropriateness of the hylomorphic terminology; moreover, it is proper to theology to illustrate dogma "ex eorum, quae naturaliter cognoscuntur, analogia" (Conc. Vatic., sess. III, cap. 4; Denz-U, 1796). On the other hand the Church, to which Christ gave the power to guard and explain the content of Revelation, has for centuries adopted this terminology (Denz-U, 672, 695, 914, 1963). The use of a formula that, besides being consecrated by the authority of the Church, helps to clarify certain points of sacramental doctrine is therefore legitimate.

b) The nature of sacramental causality. - Defined doctrine. - a) The S., both in the expressions of Scripture and in the works of the Fathers, are presented as instruments that, moved by God, produce Grace, independently of the merits of the minister and of the subject, presupposing however certain moral dispositions in the subject, as conditions that cannot be postponed if the sacramental effect is to be introduced. b) The S. are instruments in the hands of God to produce Grace: the Heavenly Father has saved us "per lavacrum regenerationis et renovationis" (Tit. 3, 5); Christ purified his Church "lavacro aquae in verbo" (Eph. 5, 26); the Holy Spirit regenerates by means of water "ex aqua" (Io. 5, 3). It is God who saves, purifies, regenerates by means of Baptism as by an instrument of sanctification. The Fathers echoed the biblical words: St. Ephrem affirms that the Holy Spirit penetrates the waters "ut eas ad expiationem elevet" (Adv. scrutatores, sermo 40; ed. Assemani, III, Rome

1743, p. 72); St. Cyril of Alexandria, that God infuses his power into the water of Baptism, so that, transformed by it, it may produce the effects of sanctification (In Io. 3, 5: PG 73, 243). 7) The sacraments produce their effect by the positing of the rite, independently of the merits of the minister and of the subject. In fact, Revelation attributes the power of producing Grace to the rite itself (under the influence of God). The first Christians received the Holy Spirit "per impositionem manus Apostolorum" (Acts 8, 17; 19, 6); Christ affirms that his (eucharistic) flesh is a principle of supernatural life, just as bread is the cause of material life: "qui manducat me et ipse vivet propter me" (Io. 6, 57); these and other texts set forth the objective efficacy of the sensible rite (imposition of hands, eucharistic manducation) to produce Grace. The Fathers translated the biblical doctrine into various affirmations and analogies (cf. St. Augustine, In Io., tr. 80, 10, 3: PL 35, 1840; St. Cyril of Jerusalem, Catech. myst., 2, 4: PG 33, 1079; St. Leo I, Sermo 25, 5: PL 54, 211, etc.). Revelation, on the other hand, excludes the dependence of such efficacy on the merits of the minister and of the subject. Classic are the words of St. Augustine: "Baptism does not avail by the merits of him who administers it, nor even by those of him who receives it, sed propria sanctitate atque veritate, communicated to it by Him who instituted it" (Contra Cresconium, 4, 19: PL 43, 559). A teaching confirmed by the constant practice of holding the Baptism of heretics as valid and by the apostolic custom of baptizing children before the use of reason (v. BATTESIMO; CIPRIANO; DONATISTI). 8) The sacraments presuppose in the subject moral dispositions, as irreplaceable prerequisites for them to be able to introduce their effect into the soul. From the exhortation of St. Peter addressed to the first converts: "Do penance and let each of you be baptized for the remission of sins" (Acts 2, 38, 41), down to the warm exhortations of the Fathers to catechumens and penitents, the sources of Revelation insistently inculcate the necessity of faith and repentance, also indicating their dispositive function in relation to the justification produced by the sacraments.

It is in harmony with his justice and holiness that God has ordained that man bring his own contribution to the work of justification (v.). Since man by sin has left infinite Goodness to turn to an ephemeral good, it is necessary that, in order to be readmitted to the enjoyment of God, man completely abandon the creature and turn to him with the humble attitude of the guilty. The Council of Trent, for example, described the acts that succeed one another in the soul of the penitent, tracing a psychology of conversion: "Faith is the guide of the sinner, because it points out to him in God the supreme end and infinite justice. But at the same time that he believes, the sinner, realizing the punishment that his grave fault merits, conceives a salutary fear that is the beginning of breathing again, and turning to the consideration of divine mercy he is animated by hope, and trusting that God will be propitious to him through the merits of Jesus Christ, he begins to love him as the source of justice, and reflecting on the evil done to his own soul and the injury inflicted on God, he repents and formulates the sincere purpose of never falling back into sin" (sess. VI, cap. 7; Denz-U, 798). Faith, fear, hope, initial love, repentance and the firm purpose are the six acts that mark the stages of the itinerary of the soul returning to God. Placed under the influence of actual Grace, these acts offer the psychological point of insertion for sanctifying Grace, produced by the sensible rite. God, in fact, even while making use of an external rite, acts in the deepest part of the human being, in regions that escape every created force, first with a movement of his actual Grace, which impels the soul toward the divine, making it capable of bearing "the immense weight" of it, then with a release of supernatural current, habitual Grace, which galvanizes the whole human being, from the deep roots of the soul to its operative ramifications, in the intellect and in the will. This doctrine, while avoiding on the one hand the exaggerated subjectivism of Protestantism, which sees in the sacrament only a virtue "excitans et nutriens fidem", and on the other an extreme objectivism, which borders on magic, enchantment, and mechanism, also shows how the teaching of the Catholic Church is balanced and brilliantly surpasses every extreme, in a synthesis that unites and fuses the objective working of the sacrament and the subjective dispositions of the faithful (cf. the encyclical Mediator Dei of 20 Nov. 1947, in AAS, 39 [1947], pp. 530-37). By way of confirmation it is helpful to recall that the Church has always taught that the Grace infused by the sacraments is proportioned to the dispositions of the faithful, because God "gives himself as much as he finds of ardor" (Dante, Purg., XV, 70). The penitent who receives the sacrament with more intense sorrow, the faithful who approach the altar with greater fervor, receive in greater abundance the gifts of God. Although the subjective acts are not the efficient cause of the infusion of Grace, they are nonetheless its "causa materialis", that is, the indispensable prior condition and at the same time "amplificativa della recettività" of the soul. The opening of the window is not the cause of the illumination of the room, yet the room is all the more illuminated the wider the window.

All the elements of this doctrine on the causality of the sacraments were defined in the Council of Trent: "Sacramenta Novae Legis [ut causae instrumentales] continent et conferunt gratiam ex opere operato non ponentibus obicem" (sess. VI, cap. 7; Denz-U, 799; sess. VII, cann. 6 and 8; Denz-U, 849, 851).

c) Theological controversy. — The "instrumental" causality of the sacraments gives rise to further discussions, which fall outside the field of dogma: in what precise sense the sacraments are instrumental causes of grace. The question constitutes a genuine problem, because it is difficult to conceive how material elements can produce a totally spiritual and supernatural effect: grace. The answers were many and varied, but the principal ones come down to five: a) William of Auxerre (A. Van Hove, Doctrina Gulielmi Altissiodorensis de causalitate Sacramentorum, in Divus Thomas Plac., 3rd series, 7 [1930], pp. 305-24) and Durandus affirmed that the sacraments are signs on the occasion of which, almost by a pre-established harmony, God infallibly confers grace (occasional causality). The system, little followed, was abandoned after the Council of Trent, because this occasionalism does not seem to verify the notion of true cause assigned by the Council as the distinguishing mark of the sacraments of the New Law. 3) Billot (De Sacramentis, I, Rome 1927, pp. 102-41), followed by a few disciples, proposes a new theory, according to which the sacrament is an instrumental cause of an intentional nature ordered to produce a claim entitling one to grace (intentional causality). But it is observed that the documents of the faith present grace itself, and not a claim entitling one to it, as the immediate effect of the sacrament. 4) Many theologians of the 16th and 17th centuries (Vitoria, Cano, Vasquez, Lugo; cf. F. Feliziani, La causalità dei S. in Domenico Soto, Rome 1939) and in the 19th century Cardinal Franzelin (De Sacramentis, 3rd ed., Rome 1911, pp. 106-25), persuaded themselves that they could explain the causality of the sacraments by holding them to be rites morally and intrinsically dignified by the Blood of Christ, cuius intuitu God would be moved to confer grace (moral causality). This opinion seems to many to be in contrast with Tradition and the Council of Trent, which constantly assert that the sensible rites are true instrumental efficient causes of justification. 5) Alexander of Hales (Sum. Theol., pars 4, q. 5, a. 5), followed by St. Albert the Great, Capreolus and Ferrariensis, affirmed that the sacraments are instrumental causes which, under God's influence, physically produce a spiritual effect, different however from sanctifying grace, but disposing toward it, which they located either in the character or in an "ornatus animae," or in sacramental grace (physical dispositive causality). This doctrine, founded on the false opinion that the sacraments cannot instrumentally concur in the production of sanctifying grace, because this was held to be the effect of a creative act (in creation, indeed, there are no instruments), fell with the cessation of the opinion on which it was based. Moreover, the theory does not seem to harmonize perfectly with the documents of Revelation, according to which the sacraments directly attain grace, and not a prior effect.

e) St. Thomas taught (Sum. Theol., 3rd part, q. 62, aa. 1, 3-5) that the sacraments are instrumental efficient causes which, moved by God, physically (really) produce grace (physical perfective causality). The Council of Trent declares that the sacraments are true instruments of justification (sess. VI, cap. 7; Denz-U, 799); now it is proper to the action of an instrument, of whatever order, to modify the power of the principal cause, which thus reaches its effect as it were colored by the particular active capacities of the individual instruments. In the sacramental order, God himself, the first and principal cause, touches the soul and stirs up grace in it, but the divine power, by arousing and at the same time investing the action of the sensible instrument, receives from it a "taleitas" and thus reaches the soul "particulata" by the instrument, which in this way really concurs in the effect of the principal cause in the infusion of grace.

II. EFFECTS OF THE SACRAMENTS

If only three sacraments (Baptism, Confirmation, Order) imprint the character (v.), all of them infuse sanctifying Grace (v.) "ex opere operato". Besides this common effect, the sacraments produce another, the sacramental grace, proper to each one. In fact, the sacraments, being the cause of what they signify (id efficient quod significant), must necessarily produce seven different effects, since they really signify them (cf. Council of Trent, sess. VII, can. 6; Denz-U, 840). Accordingly it is common doctrine that sacramental grace is a supernatural reality added by the individual sacraments to sanctifying grace. Harmony, however, breaks down when theologians attempt to elucidate its intimate nature. Some (Paludanus, Capreolus, Ferrariensis) maintained that sacramental grace is a supernatural "habitus" really distinct from sanctifying grace, regenerative in Baptism, confirmatory in Confirmation, nutritive in the Eucharist, etc. Others (Cajetan, Soto, Suárez and Lugo) regarded it as a mere right to receive, at the opportune moment, special aids of actual grace. The majority of theologians (with John of St. Thomas, the Salmanticenses and Billuart) hold that it is an accidental modification and a strengthening, by which habitual grace is made capable of producing those determinate supernatural effects to which the individual sacraments are ordered (for the history of the various opinions cf. B. Brazzarola, La natura della Grazia sacramentale nella dottrina di s. Tommaso, Grottaferrata 1941).

Accepting and completing the good elements of the various opinions, one may hold that sacramental grace is a stable orientation of the whole supernatural organism toward the end of each sacrament. The supernatural organism is constituted by habitual grace (in place of the soul), by the infused virtues and the gifts of the Holy Spirit (which correspond to the powers of the soul, the intellect and the will) and by the impulses of actual grace (corresponding to the natural motions). Sacramental grace invests the individual parts of the organism and orients them to the particular end of each sacrament, modifies and strengthens sanctifying grace, making it fit to sustain the new development of an increased life, increases and perfects the virtues and gifts that are in harmony with the particular end of the sacrament, such as faith in Baptism and charity in the Eucharist, and finally lays the foundations of a constant right to obtain at the right moment all the aids of actual grace, which accompany and bring to completion the supernatural acts, by the habitual repetition of which the faithful attain the proximate end of the sacrament and the ultimate end of salvation (cf. St. Thomas, II Sent., d. 26, q. 1, a. 6, ed 5; IV Sent., d. 7, q. 2, a. 2, qc. 2; Sum. Theol., 3ª, q. 69, a. 5). For the application to the individual sacraments v. the individual entries.

III. ORIGIN OF THE SACRAMENTS

The sacraments have existed in the Church for twenty centuries by the direct institution of Jesus Christ (remote origin). Concretely, the plan established by the Redeemer is realized for individual believers through the valid administration of the various rites in the particular circumstances of time and place (proximate origin).

1. Institution of the sacraments - So that the Redemption (v.) might be applied to individual men, Jesus Christ established a plan that would in some way continue the series of gestures performed in the work of salvation. To renew the act of supreme worship with which he appeased the Father on the Cross, he established the Sacrifice of the Mass (v.) to be repeated daily until the end of the world "donec veniat" (I Cor. 11:26); to distribute the supernatural gifts acquired in his Passion, he instituted the seven sacraments. He was free to transmit Grace immediately or through sensible rites. Revelation attests that he, while preserving the power to influence souls in extraordinary ways corresponding to his wisdom, "non enim alligavit Gratiam suam Sacramentis", chose the second path. In fact Scripture and Tradition report the direct intervention of Christ to institute in the Church the use of rites that communicate Grace (v. the individual sacraments).

The testimonies of the Gospel flanked by the affirmations of the most ancient writers not only demonstrate that the elimination of five sacraments attempted by the innovators of the 16th century was unjustified, but also the inconsistency of the judgment given by liberal Protestants on the current sacramental economy: "There is for us no sadder spectacle than this transformation of the Christian religion, which from what it was in origin, that is, the adoration of God in spirit and truth, becomes the cult of signs. To destroy this form of religion Jesus Christ had himself crucified, and behold it resurrected under the armament of his name and his authority" (A. Harnack, Essenza del cristianesimo, Ital. trans., Turin 1903, pp. 238-239). The Church has solemnly defined at the Council of Trent that Christ instituted the seven sacraments "neque plura neque pauciora" (Denz-U, 844). The definition is directed not only at affirming the institution but also at establishing the septenary number, against which Luther had directed his most impetuous attacks. Embracing in a single dogmatic canon the two truths of the institution and of the septenary number, the Church perhaps wished to allude to the unity of the revealed foundation on which they rest: in fact the same biblical and patristic texts that attest the fact of the institution concretely fix the number at seven. It is granted that neither Scripture nor the Fathers ever enunciate in abstract and exclusive form the septenary number, and that one must descend to the 12th century to find the global enumeration of the seven sacraments. This means only that, although they admitted and used the seven rites, they had neither occasion nor means to draw up the list, both because the absence of errors did not provoke doctrinal deepening, and because the very practical character of such rites induced them more to inculcate their right use than to construct a theory of them. Thus Tertullian, St. Cyril of Jerusalem, St. Ambrose, having to instruct the catechumens, listed only three sacraments: Baptism, Confirmation, Eucharist, because it was to these that their hearers had to approach at the end of the catechumenate (Sacraments of initiation). Chrysostom, on the other hand, for pastoral purposes, spoke of the Eucharist, of Penance and of the priestly dignity. St. Augustine, by contrast, in polemicizing with the Donatists, treated preferentially the sacraments that imprint the character and, for the needs of the Manichaean and Pelagian controversy, Matrimony. It was known, moreover, that Baptism, Confirmation, the Eucharist, etc. are constituted of a symbolic rite, to which by divine power is united the efficacy of producing what they signify, but it was a concrete knowledge, and when Origen and St. Augustine began the process of abstraction, they found it easy to apply the notion of sign to the rites, but had no incitement to illustrate the concept of cause. From Augustinian speculation there emerged the abstract concept of sacrament as a "sacred sign"; so vague as to permit placing in the same framework all the symbols with which the liturgy was particularly rich. In fact St. Augustine and his disciples placed, abstractly, in the same line of comparison the "Sacramentum Baptismi" with the "Sacramentum salis" (Sermo 228, 3: PL 38, 1102). Only when the scholastics of the 12th and 13th centuries added to the idea of sign, as a distinctive note, that of cause, was it easy to reserve the name of sacrament to those sacred signs that are simultaneously cause of what they signify, and to group under the same definition the seven rites productive of Grace.

On the other hand, the fact that the list of the seven sacraments just drawn up by Magister Simon, ca. 1145 (cf. H. Weisweiler, Maître Simon et son groupe "De Sacramentis", Louvain 1937, pp. XLVI-LXII), was accepted by all theologians and canonists, spread rapidly throughout the Catholic world to the point of being inserted into the official documents of the magisterium, demonstrates that it was not a novelty but that it corresponded to what the Church had until then practiced and implicitly taught. This is effectively supported by the ancient Eastern Churches (Nestorians, Monophysites, Greek-Russians, Armenians, etc.), which although detached from the Catholic Church, in part, since the 5th century, profess the sacramental septenary. If a doubt had been possible on the divine origin of such teaching, animosity against Rome would certainly have caused this number to be abandoned, in order to create a deeper separation between the two Churches (for the Greek-Russian Church cf. La Confession orthodoxe de Pierre Moghila, ed. Malvy-Viller, Paris 1927, pp. XXII-XLIII).

2. Administration of the sacraments - Jesus Christ did not wish merely to assist at the unfolding of his work over the centuries, but remained at the center of his sacramental economy, invisible but always operative. He indeed offers the sacrifice: "Oblatio eadem est, quisquis offerat, quia non homines hanc sanctificant sed ipse Christus" (St. John Chrysostom, Hom. 2 in 2 Tim., n. 4: PG 62, 612). He administers the sacraments: "Petrus baptizat ministerio, Christus baptizat potestate" (St. Augustine, In Io., tr. 5, 18: PL 35, 1424). However, having established a plan of salvation in which the invisible must be manifested in the visible, harmony required that his activity, veiled under the sacrificial rite and under the sacramental symbols, be in some manner rendered sensible in the human ministry. Therefore Jesus chose visible ministers among his disciples (cf. Lk. 22:19; Jn. 20:23; I Cor. 1:4; II Cor. 5:18-20), to whom he transmitted a real participation in his power of sanctifying (cf. ORDER), but always subordinated to his action as principal cause, so that the ministers are but a radiance of the priesthood of Jesus, an externalization of his activity as Eternal Pontiff, almost the "longa manus" through which he operates.

In this their quality as free instruments is identified the ultimate reason why, while their moral qualities (faith and state of Grace) are not necessary for the validity of the sacraments, there is instead required the intention (v. INTENTION, VI. The i. in the minister of the sacraments), at least virtual, of acting as ministers of Christ, that is, of doing what Christ and the Church intend.

For the question of the reviviscence of the sacraments, v. REVIVISCENCE OF THE SACRAMENTS.

1930, pp. 89-94; P. Gounin, Sur la Grâce sacramentelle, in Rev. apolog., 54-55 (1932), pp. 129 ff., 239 ff.; Ch. B. Crawley, A defense of the common thomistic teaching on Sacramental Grace, Rome 1947; D. Bertetto, La Grazia sacrament., in Salesianum, 11 (1949), pp. 397-413. 5. Institution: H. Lennerz, Salva eorum substantia, in Gregorianum, 3 (1922), pp. 385-419, 524-47; J. Bittremieux, L'instit. des Sacrem. d'après st Bonaventure, in Etudes francisc., 35 (1933), pp. 129-32, 225-40, 337-55; A. D'Alès, Salva eorum substantia, in Ech. theol. Lov., 1 (1924), pp. 496-504; E. Guillaume, De instit. Sacram. iuxta A. Halemem, in Antonianum, 2 (1927), p. 437 ff. 6. Septenary number: J. De Ghellinck, A propos de quelques affirmations du nombre septénaire des Sacrem. au XIIe siècle, in Rech. de sc. rel., 1 (1910), p. 494 ff.; M. Jugie, Theol. dogm. christian. Orient., III, Paris 1930, pp. 15-25; E. Dhanis, Quelques anciennes formules septénaires des Sacrem., in Rev. d'hist. ecclis., 26 (1930), pp. 574-608, 916-50; 27 (1931), pp. 5-26.

Antonio Piolanti

II. MORAL THEOLOGY.

I. REQUIREMENTS IN MATTER AND FORM

In sacramental matter, it is necessary to attend to the will of the Divine Institutor, who willed that certain sensible things (res, materia) be called, together with certain formulas (verba, forma), to constitute the sensible sign productive of Grace; and in order that there be unity of the sensible sign, it is necessary that the two elements (res et verba, matter and form) be suitably joined to one another and that they be certain and entire.

1) As regards certainty, outside the case of urgent necessity or of notable spiritual utility, it is a grave sin to use matter that is not morally certain in the confection of the Sacraments. This is demanded both by the reverence owed to the Sacrament, which could be exposed to the danger of nullity, and by the good of the one who receives it, who could thus be deprived of the benefit of the Sacrament itself. The certainty required here is moral certainty: the doubt that is to be excluded is doubt of fact, by which one remains hesitant as to whether this or that matter was destined by Christ as valid matter of the Sacraments. Therefore in the Sacraments one absolutely cannot use probabilism, whose theory and practice concern doubt of law (cf. the proposition condemned by Innocent XI: Denz-U, 1131). Only two exceptions are admitted: the case of necessity or of notable utility. As for the first, all authors agree that in a case of necessity it is lawful to administer the Sacraments even with doubtful matter, because the Sacraments are made for men and therefore when in a case of necessity doubtful matter is used, the reverence owed to the Sacrament is not violated, since it is used for the very end willed by Christ, our Lord. Nor is harm done to the good of the one who receives the Sacrament so administered; on the contrary, what is done is directed to his advantage, in order to favor his salvation in all possible ways. In a case of extreme necessity, therefore, not only is it permitted, but it is obligatory to act thus, since it is a question of the decisive moment of the salvation of a soul. This is the case of a gravely ill child, not yet baptized, to whom Baptism is conferred with water that is doubtfully valid, there being no other. This is the case in which absolution is imparted, under condition, to a dying person doubtfully disposed. What has just been said for the case of necessity can, in the judgment of most, be repeated for the case of grave utility, although there is no lack of some authoritative contradictor.

2) As regards the integrity of the matter and of the form, one must distinguish between substantial change (which renders the Sacrament null) and accidental change (which allows the validity of the Sacrament, even though it is sinful for the one who introduces it, unless he is driven by motives of necessity or by other excusing motives). There is substantial change of the matter when the change or the separation of the words is such that it must be considered no longer that matter, but another. As an evaluative criterion of such alterations of the matter, one does not have recourse to scientific formulas and language, but to the common manner of thinking and acting. The Sacraments, in fact, are within everyone's reach, instituted for all, and even the evaluation of their elements must be made on the basis of a criterion accessible to all and not reserved to an elite of persons. There is, then, accidental change when, despite the change made, the matter, in common judgment, remains the same, even though one contravenes the respect owed to the Sacraments, motives of propriety, or prescriptions of canon law. In concrete terms, such a change occurs: a) if the words are changed only materially, because others having the same meaning are used; b) if the minister adds some other complementary word; c) if one or more words are changed, or omitted, without however transforming the meaning of the phrase; d) if the minister, through haste or stammering, omits or changes letters of words (especially final ones). In these cases, even if the meaning remained ambiguous, it can be determined by the manifest intention of the minister.

The substantial changes of the matter and of the form that render the Sacrament invalid are gravely sinful, except in the case of lawful simulation (v.). The sin is against the virtue of religion and at times against charity and justice. Accidental change, on the other hand, which does not render the Sacrament null, if it is made without reason, in proportion to the measure of the alterations introduced and of the other circumstances, will be grave or light.

3) The union of the matter and the form in the confection of the Sacraments must be as great as is necessary in the individual Sacraments, so that the words are supposed to be directed to that determined thing and such as to form with it a single sacramental sign. In particular: a) physical simultaneity is required only in the Eucharist, because the words of the form: "This is my body" would here have no sense if the matter were not before the priest at the moment when he begins to pronounce the form. b) Moral simultaneity, strictly understood (that is, in such a way that the words of the form are morally uttered together and the matter applied), is required in Baptism, Confirmation, Extreme Unction and Holy Orders. Therefore these Sacraments are certainly valid if the application of the matter is made before the last word of the form is uttered and vice versa. They are equally valid if the words are begun as soon as the application of the matter has been completed. They are probably still valid if there is a very brief interval between the matter and the form. c) In the Sacrament of Penance, since Penance is ordered in the manner of a judicial process, per se, between the instruction of the process and the sentence, there can intervene that interval which exists between the cognizance of the judgment and the sentence, that is, an interval even rather long. But since the Sacrament of Penance is a singular judgment, in which the penitent must bring certain dispositions (attrition or contrition), which are not required and ordinarily are not had in common defendants, the interval for the union between matter and form can of necessity be shortened because of the lack of perseverance in the said dispositions. d) In Matrimony, which is celebrated in the manner of a contract, and both the matter and the form are contained in the mutual consent, it is sufficient that the consent of one follow upon the other, while the consent of the other still persists, for the Sacrament to be valid.

4) Application of the matter and the form. — a) In the Sacraments in which the matter and the form must be applied to the subject, this must be carried out by the same minister: thus it is shown by the common practice of the Church, by the common opinion of theologians; and, for Extreme Unction, also by the well-known words of St. James (3, 14-15). Moreover, since the administration of the Sacraments must be an action composed of two elements, namely the application of the form to the matter, if one applied the form and another the matter, there would be rather two actions and not only one. Furthermore, the meaning of the form would often not be verified if one applied the remote matter and the other pronounced the form, for example in Baptism. To this reasoning others, such as Cajetan, reply that the unity is given by the fact that the ministers act in the name of Christ; from this the unity springs. Given the probability of this opinion, according to which the identity of the secondary minister in the application of the matter and the form would not be indispensable, in a case of extreme necessity it is not unlawful to confer the Sacraments in the ways described above. b) In the Sacraments, on the other hand, in which the minister pronounces the form and the subject provides the matter, it is the rule that one places the matter and the other the form. Thus in the Sacraments of Penance and of Matrimony.

II. REQUIREMENTS IN THE MINISTER OF THE SACRAMENTS

The minister of the sacraments (we speak here of the secondary minister) is only a wayfaring man who is consecrated or at least legitimately deputed.

A distinction is made between the consecrated and the non-consecrated minister, according as he has or has not received a special consecration. A consecrated minister is required in five sacraments: in Confirmation, in the Eucharist, in Penance, in Extreme Unction and in Holy Orders; a non-consecrated minister is sufficient, however, in Baptism, and is required for the Latin Church in Matrimony.

A distinction is also made between the ordinary and the extraordinary minister. Ordinary is that minister upon whom it falls by office to administer these sacraments; extraordinary, on the other hand, is he who can administer the sacraments only in case of necessity or by special delegation.

Finally, a distinction must be made between the public minister and the private minister. The former is he who administers solemnly, using all the ceremonies prescribed by the Ritual; the latter, on the other hand, is he who applies only the matter and the form, all the other ceremonies being omitted.

1) The requirements in the minister for the valid administration of the sacraments are the following: a) the due power, since not all can administer every sacrament, but only those to whom Jesus Christ has conferred such power; in the administration of the sacraments man is a mandatory; b) the due intention, that is, of doing what the Church does (v. above) and that this intention be at least virtual in the minister (v. INTENZIONE, VI. L'I. nel ministro dei Sacramenti); c) the correct application of the form to the matter.

2) The requirements in the minister for the licit administration of the sacraments are: a) the state of grace (v.); b) immunity from censures and from irregularities, an immunity which in Penance can concern the very validity of the sacrament; c) it is required, moreover, that the minister, in his action, act with due reverence. This respect sometimes demands that the conditional form be used, rather than the absolute one, in the administration of the sacraments. The conditional form is that by which the minister, by means of a condition (expressed in words or only mentally), intends to administer the sacrament only if all the requirements for its validity exist together. This form must always be used in the repetition of the sacrament: and when it is expressly required by the Ritual also in the first conferral, as in Baptism and in Extreme Unction. In other cases the condition must be used whenever the sacrament, conferred absolutely, could be exposed to the danger of nullity, or, denied absolutely, would deprive man of a great good and would place him in grave danger of being lost. Therefore it is almost never licit to attach a condition de futuro; indeed all sacraments thus conferred, except Matrimony, are null, because the moral coexistence of the elements is lacking. In Matrimony the condition de futuro (suspensive, not resolutive) is sometimes even licit (v. CONDIZIONE). The sacrament conferred under a condition de praesenti or de praeterito is valid if the condition is verified or has already been verified; otherwise it is null. But respect also demands that every sort of simulation be removed from the administration of the sacraments (v.). The dissimulation of the sacraments is, on the other hand, licit for a grave reason. It consists in performing a non-sacramental action, in circumstances such as to make one believe that a sacrament is being administered; d) it is further required that one have due attention, that is, internal attention, which excludes any distraction; e) a prudent solicitude for the validity of the sacrament and therefore a diligent inquiry into the matter and the form must never be lacking on the part of the minister. If, through the defect of some essential element, the previous administration of the sacrament was certainly invalid, the sacrament must be repeated in absolute form. If, on the other hand, there is only a prudent doubt about the validity of the sacrament, it must be reiterated conditionally. If, then, there is no reasonable doubt about the validity of the sacrament, even conditional repetition is illicit. The malice of reiteration in this case is in itself grave, because of the irreverent use of the sacramental sign; nevertheless, on account of the circumstances (special psychological conditions, p. c.s., scruples or bad habit) the grave sin is rarely present. The repeating of one or more words of the form is to be condemned; f) the observance of the prescribed rites is also required on the part of the minister, together with the necessary authorization to administer the sacrament (licence); g) the administration of the sacraments, finally, must be gratuitous. Can. 736 decrees: «For the administration of the sacraments the minister shall, for any reason or occasion whatsoever, directly or indirectly, exact or demand nothing, except the offerings of which in can. 1507 § 1 and (the taxes imposed in provincial Councils and in the assemblies of bishops). He cannot therefore demand or exact, but the offering made spontaneously is not forbidden; h) it is illicit to administer the sacraments to an incapable subject. This, implying a very bad abuse of a sacred thing, is an act intrinsically evil both on the part of the minister and on the part of the subject to whom the sacrament is administered. The obligation to deny the sacraments to the unworthy is also grave, if the action is not excused by a proportionately grave reason (v. INDEGNI).

3. Obligation to administer the sacraments on the part of the minister

To judge of the nature and gravity of the obligation, one must attend to the burdens with which the minister is charged and to the condition of the faithful who request the sacraments.

a) The faithful who request them may find themselves in extreme, grave and common necessity. a) In extreme necessity is he who is in danger of eternal damnation and who cannot overcome this danger by himself, or can do so only with such difficulty that the effort must be held to be morally impossible. b) In grave necessity is he who, absolutely speaking, could provide for his own salvation, but with great difficulty, so that, without the help of others, the danger of damnation is for him probable. c) In common necessity is every member of the faithful who has committed grave sin or is about to commit it, if he is not helped by others.

b) As for the ministers of the sacraments, some are bound to administer them out of charity, others out of justice. a) Those who are in the pastoral ministry are bound out of justice or by duty of office, and these are bound sub gravi to administer the sacraments to their own subjects, when reasonably request them (expressly or tacitly); they are bound to do so even at grave personal inconvenience, and at times even at the risk of their life.

The faithful reasonably request the administration of the sacraments not only when they are bound to receive them by precept or by necessity of providing for their own soul (grave sin committed, grave temptation), but also when they request them out of pure devotion or for spiritual profit. Pastors of souls are bound ex iustitia to the administration of the sacraments because, in assuming the pastoral office, they have implicitly obligated themselves to fulfill its various duties and therefore to administer the sacraments to their own subjects personally or through others (can. 892). Those constituted in the pastoral ministry are bishops, parish priests and their vicars, for the faithful in general; for religious in particular, the care of souls is entrusted to Superiors.

This ministry is, of itself, binding sub gravi, because the obligation is one of justice and the matter is grave (it concerns eternal salvation, justification, and the increase of grace).

In the extreme necessity of subjects, the necessary sacraments must be administered, for the sake of eternal salvation, even at evident risk of life. And for the obligation to hold, three conditions are required: that there be moral certainty that the subject is in extreme necessity; that there be moral certainty or at least well-founded hope of success; that it be a question of necessary sacraments. The necessary sacraments are: Baptism, Penance, and, for those who have not been absolved, or are sensibus destituti, Extreme Unction. It is disputed whether Viaticum (v.) should be classified among the necessary sacraments. In grave necessity the sacraments must be administered even at grave and probable risk to one's own health. The same cannot be said in a case of common necessity; in that case one must be prepared to bear some inconvenience, but no more is required, because it is presumed that the pastor of souls did not intend to obligate himself at grave inconvenience. b) Ex charitate all other ministers are bound who do not exercise the pastoral care, and the obligation is more or less grave according to the order of the virtue of charity. The obligation can become more grave because of the necessity of avoiding a scandal, which on such occasions can easily arise. In particular: the faithful who find themselves in extreme spiritual necessity must be assisted even at grave inconvenience and even at a certain risk of life, provided that the true necessity is established and there is a certain hope of being able to save one's neighbor. To extreme necessity is assimilated the grave common necessity that exists in times of contagious diseases. To the faithful who are in grave spiritual necessity, all ministers are bound to administer the sacraments sub gravi, if they can do so without notable inconvenience.

To the faithful who reasonably request the administration of the sacraments outside a case of necessity, ministers are bound, generally speaking, sub gravi to administer them.

III. REQUIREMENTS IN THE SUBJECT OF THE SACRAMENTS

Except for the Eucharist, all the other sacraments are effected by application to the subject.

1) To receive the sacraments validly, the following are required:
a) the capacity of the subject. Every man who is a wayfarer, and only he, is a capable subject of the sacraments; the sacraments were instituted by Christ to confer first or second grace. b) To receive the other sacraments besides Baptism, a valid Baptism of water is required. The very reception of the Eucharist without Baptism would be only a material reception. c) To receive Holy Orders, the male sex is required. d) For the sacrament of Penance, the use of reason is required. Likewise for the valid reception of the sacrament of Matrimony (contract). e) For Extreme Unction, besides the use of reason, a grave illness or old age is required (can. 940). f) For the sacrament of Matrimony, besides the use of reason, freedom from another bond and physical capacity, at least radical, are required. For the valid reception of the sacraments, on the other hand, neither faith nor probity in the subject is required, since these elements do not enter into the constitution of the sacrament (cf. Sacred Congregation of the Holy Office, 19 Sept. 1677). Penance is excepted, because for its validity perfect or at least imperfect contrition (attrition) is required, and this enters into the very constitution of the sacrament. Now contrition presupposes faith; b) nor is any attention of the subject required, whether internal or external; but intention is required (ordinarily habitual and implicit). In children and habitual madmen, however, for the valid reception of the sacraments of which they are capable, such as Baptism, Confirmation, etc., no personal intention is required (v. INTENZIONE, VII. 1. in the subject of the Sacraments).

2) For the licit reception of the sacraments, generally speaking, two conditions are required: that the recipient be endowed with the due dispositions; that he request the sacraments from a worthy minister. a) Whoever knowingly receives a sacrament without the due dispositions commits a grave sin of sacrilege, because he renders useless the rite instituted by Christ as an efficacious sign of grace. In particular, to receive the sacraments of the living, the state of grace is required. Therefore, when grace is lacking, one commits sacrilege by receiving the sacraments of the living (v. SACRILEGIO; STATO DI GRAZIA). To approach the sacraments of the living with habitual venial sin does not constitute a sin; to approach with an affection for venial sin will be a venial sin. There is no sin at all if one seeks in the sacrament the remedy against this affection for venial sin. For the sacraments of the dead (Penance and Baptism in the adult sinner) the due disposition is supernatural attrition. b) It is unlawful to ask for and receive the sacraments from a certainly unworthy minister, that is, one who is a habitual sinner or who is in the proximate occasion of sin or is bound by censure. But since requesting a sacrament is not a thing evil in itself, it is permitted to ask for and receive the sacraments from a sinful minister not bound by censure, if there is a grave and proportionate cause. Indeed, it is lawful, for a just cause, to cooperate materially in another's sin, since it is not a thing evil in itself and the minister can regain the state of grace through perfect contrition.

Some authors maintain that it is lawful to receive the sacraments from a secret sinner, even though the minister's unworthiness is certainly known. If, on the other hand, it is a question of a minister struck by censure, the faithful may for any just reason ask for the sacraments and sacramentals from him, provided it is not a question of an excommunicate "vitandus", or of a censure inflicted by means of a declaratory or condemnatory sentence (cans. 2261 § 2, 2275, 2284). From the excommunicate "vitandus" or from one who is suspended or interdicted, after a condemnatory or declaratory sentence, the faithful may in danger of death ask for sacramental absolution, even if other worthy ministers are present. If these are lacking, the other sacraments may also be asked from him (cans. 2261, 2275 § 2, 2284). According to some authors, a very grave harm to be avoided, such as scandal, infamy and grave loss, is to be equated with danger of death. The same must be said of a minister who is not bound by censure but by a vindictive penalty, such as perpetual or temporary suspension. It is then lawful to ask for the sacraments when there is a just reason (can. 2298). If, however, it is a question of one who has been deposed or degraded, by a condemnatory or declaratory sentence, it is lawful only in danger of death. If it is a question of a minister who is publicly an apostate, heretic or schismatic, it is lawful to ask him for the sacraments only in danger of death. Here account must also be taken of scandal and of the danger of perversion (Sacred Congregation of the Holy Office, 7 July 1864). - See plates XCVII-XCVIII.

Pietro Palazzini