SIMULATION. – In general, it is any attitude intended to create a false judgment in others. In juridical language, simulation consists in performing an act, normally solemn, by employing a formula that in common usage has a precisely determined meaning, while the intention of the person acting is entirely different. Simulation is also called fiction (fictio) and must be distinguished from dissimulation, which consists in performing an act in circumstances such as may lead others into error, without the agent intending to deceive them, although permitting this, and without the act employed having that single specific meaning on which the error of others is based. It must also be distinguished from a joke or play (iocus), in which the fiction is made evident beforehand and subsequently, among normal people, by the circumstances: this is not the case with simulation, where the intention contrary to the act remains secret or is communicated to only a few.
For St. Tommaso, every simulation, like every lie, is always a sin (Sum. Theol., 2ᵃ-2ᵃ, q. 111, a. 1 c.); but not every simulation constitutes a grave sin; indeed, according to a well-founded opinion, exceptionally, for serious reasons, one may resort to simulation, for example, in marriage, without committing a fault. Simulation is formal or material according as deception is positively intended or merely permitted. Material simulation too differs from dissimulation, because the act or formula employed always has a single meaning and consequently the error of others is inevitable, although merely permitted. The theory of simulation has been developed above all in the field of contracts, as a defect of consent, but it has found application in various areas of theology, in matters of faith, in matters concerning the Sacraments, etc.
I. SIMULATION IN CONTRACTS AND IN CIVIL-LAW LANGUAGE
One of the constituent elements of a contract is consent, or agreement between the parties, which must be manifested externally by a corresponding sign. To avert any possibility of litigation, civil laws often require a specific form, under penalty of nullity, either by public deed or by private writing (Cod. civ. it., arts. 1323, 1350). If, however, one of the contracting parties inwardly does not intend to bind himself, despite pronouncing the words required by law, the contract is, considered solely in light of natural law, invalid because of simulation of consent. If, instead, there is merely an intention not to fulfil one’s own obligation, the contract is valid. In cases of invalidity through simulation, one is bound to compensate the damages. Most often, the damage resulting from such fraud can be contract (v.). Merely making a false promise, on the other hand, is a sin against truthfulness (a lie), but not against justice.Among civil lawyers, the concept of simulation does not coincide with that of theologians and canonists. For them, simulation is the declaration of a non-real content of will, knowingly and jointly made by the parties, in order to create, for the purpose of deception, the appearance of a transaction that does not exist and that differs from the one actually concluded (F. Ferrara, Della s. nei negozi giuridici, Roma 1922, p. 47); therefore, for simulation to exist, there must be: 1) an intended external declaration differing from the intention; 2) awareness of this discrepancy on the part of the simulator; 3) an agreement between the parties concerning this divergence; 4) an intention to deceive. If the third of these requirements is lacking, there is no simulation but rather mental reservation, in which the inward will, consciously differing from the declaration, is not contractually manifested. Here simulation is understood in the theological and canonical sense.
II. S. DELLA FEDE. — To simulate faith is tantamount to denying it, which is never permissible (Mt. 10:33; Lk. 9:26; Rom. 10:10). There is no denial of faith, however, when it is concealed (v. FEDE).
III. THE S. OF THE SACRAMENTS. - This may occur either 1) by using matter and form without the intention of conferring the Sacrament, or 2) by pronouncing an invalid form, although the matter is valid, or 3) by using matter that is invalid because of a hidden defect. Sacramental s. is always a sacrilege and can under no circumstances become licit, as is shown by the proposition condemned on 2 March 1679 by Innocent XI (Denz-U, 1179). The dissimulation of the Sacraments, on the other hand, may be licit for a grave reason. It consists in performing a non-sacramental action in circumstances such as to lead people to believe that a Sacrament is being administered.
The CIC explicitly punishes only three cases of s.: 1. S. of the celebration of Holy Mass (v. MESSA, and can. 2322, n. 1). This is the offense committed by one who, layman or cleric—although he has not been ordained a priest, or notwithstanding an Ordination received invalidly—acts in such a way that people may be led to believe that Holy Mass is being celebrated. Authors commonly require that there actually be deception on the part of those attending such a celebration; others do not require actual deception. The offense is considered consummated (can. 2228) when the fictitious celebration of Holy Mass begins, even if it is not brought to completion. 2. S. of sacramental confession. - This occurs when the penitent is deceived into believing that his confession is sacramental because 1) he has confessed even a single real or putative sin in order to obtain absolution; 2) because he has believed that the person who heard his confession was a true confessor. From the earliest times, the Church has punished the exercise of an Order not actually received. Thus, for example, from the fourth century onward, priests who dared to usurp the exercise of episcopal power were punished by deposition (Council of Sardica [343–44], chap. 19: Hefele-Leclercq, I, pp. 800–802). From the eighth century, special sanctions were imposed against those who simulated the celebration of Holy Mass and sacramental absolution (cf. F. X. Wernz, Ius decretalium, VI, Prato 1913, n. 459). Several pontifical constitutions established for this offense the penalty of degradation and delivery to the secular arm, which punished with death priests found guilty of it (P. Gasparri, Fontes, I, Rome 1926, pp. 256, 357, 393, 813; ibid., II, there 1923, p. 255). For the offenses mentioned above, the CIC (can. 2322) establishes: 1) excommunication specially reserved to the Holy See; and 2) if the offender is a layman, deprivation of a pension or offices, together with other appropriate penalties; 3) if a cleric, also deposition. Excommunication latae sententiae is a penalty not found in ancient law. Criminal cases concerning the s. of Mass and sacramental Confession fall under the jurisdiction of the Holy Office because of the suspicion of heresy that they imply (P. Gasparri, Fontes, cit., I, p. 255). - 3) the absolution of an accomplice in a grave sin (v. COMPLICE IN PECCATO TURPE. TURPE). The s. of consent (v. MATRIMONIO, IV, 1, 5) in marriage «occurs when one of the contracting parties externally pretends to wish to marry, expressing seriously and in ritual form a consent that is not present inwardly». Whether it is bilateral or unilateral s., once its existence has been proved, the marriage is invalid. Jurisprudence and doctrine generally distinguish a total s., which occurs when the contract itself is excluded, from a partial s., which occurs when the parties, although having a serious intention to marry, do not wish to bind themselves, or exclude one of the essential qualities (can. 1013). In every case, however, there must be a true positive act of the will; simple error concerning unity and indissolubility or sacramental dignity is not sufficient, even if such error is the cause of the contract (can. 1084; S. R. Rotae decisiones..., decis. XIII, n. 32: vol. XXXV, Vatican City 1943, p. 114).
As regards proof, cases of s., especially when it is total, are exceedingly difficult, as the rotal jurisprudence repeatedly states; for this is an internal act, in evaluating which two principles favoring the validity of marriage must be borne in mind: 1) marriage enjoys the favor of the law (can. 1014), and 2) the inward consent of the will is always presumed to conform to the words and signs used in the celebration of marriage (can. 1086 § 2: S. R. Rotae decisiones..., decis. XXXVIII, n. 12: vol. XXXV, p. 368 and passim). On the other hand, the confession of the simulating party does not constitute evidence (loc. cit., decis. XXXIX, n. 3: vol. XXXII, there 1941, p. 435), because a confession made in proprium commodum is suspect (Wernz-Vidal, VI, p. 309).
For a correct evaluation of s., its cause must also be carefully examined; this must be distinguished from the simple motives that may have led to the marriage (loc. cit., decis. XCI, n. 16: vol. XXXV, p. 1007), while the circumstances preceding, accompanying, and following the celebration of the marriage must be carefully considered (loc. cit., decis. XXXIX, n. 3, vol. XXXII, p. 436). In the moral sphere, according to the common opinion, those who pretend to contract marriage under the influence of grave fear neither commit mortal sin nor sacrilege, since the voluntary consent is lacking, and consequently the matter and form are lacking; therefore there would be no s. of a Sacrament, but only of a contract (T. Jorio, Theologia moralis, III, Naples 1947, p. 17).
The dissimulation of the Sacraments may be licit only if there is an urgent and grave reason, provided that there is no contempt or scandal on the part of the faithful. Thus, for example, it is licit for a priest, in place of the formula of absolution, to recite only a prayer and give a blessing to an indisposed penitent, so that those present do not realize that he is being dismissed without absolution (v. SACRAMENTI). In addition to what has been said concerning s., Italian criminal law is concerned with the simulation of an offense (Italian Penal Code, art. 367); both criminal law and forensic medicine are concerned with the simulation of illnesses, which carries us into the field of mental illnesses.