SIMULATION. - In general it is any attitude whose purpose is to create a false judgment in others. In legal language, simulation consists in performing an action, normally a solemn one, in using a formula that in common usage has a well-determined meaning, while the intention of the one acting is totally different. Simulation is also called fiction (fictio) and must be distinguished from dissimulation, which is the performing of an action in such circumstances that it can lead others into error, without however the agent having this intention of leading into error, though permitting it, and without the action employed having that single specific meaning which is the basis of the other's error. It must further be distinguished from jest or play (iocus), in which the fiction is made manifest beforehand and afterwards, in normal people, by the circumstances: something that does not occur in simulation, where the intention contrary to the act remains secret or is communicated to few.
For St. Thomas every simulation, like every lie, is always a sin (Sum. Theol., 2ᵃ-2ᵃ, q. 111, a. 1 c.); but not every simulation constitutes a grave sin; indeed, according to a well-founded opinion, exceptionally, for grave reasons, one may have recourse to simulation, for example of marriage, without committing a fault. Simulation is formal or material according to whether the deception is positively intended or only permitted. Material simulation too is distinguished from dissimulation, because the action or formula employed always has a single meaning and therefore the other's error is inevitable, although only permitted. The theory of simulation has been elaborated above all in the matter of contracts, as a defect of consent, but it has found application in various fields of theology, in matters of faith, in matters of the Sacraments, etc.
I. SIMULATION IN CONTRACTS AND IN CIVIL-LAW LANGUAGE
One of the constituent elements of a contract is the consent or agreement between the parties, which must be manifested externally by a corresponding sign. Civil laws, in order to avoid any possibility of disputes, often require a determined form under penalty of nullity, either by public act or by private writing (Cod. civ. it., arts. 1323, 1350). If, however, one of the contracting parties does not inwardly intend to bind himself, even though he pronounces the words required by law, the contract is in itself, by natural law alone, invalid through simulation of consent. If, on the other hand, there is only the will not to fulfill one's obligation, the contract is valid. In the case of invalidity through simulation, one is bound to make reparation for damages. Most of the time the damage resulting from such fraud can be repaired only by performance of the contract (v.). To make only a feigned promise, on the other hand, is a sin against truthfulness (lying), but not against justice.
The conception of simulation held by civil lawyers does not coincide with that of theologians and canonists. For them, simulation is the declaration of a content of will that is not real, knowingly and by agreement of the parties, in order to produce, for the purpose of deception, the appearance of a transaction that does not exist and that differs from the one actually carried out (F. Ferrara, Della s. nei negozi giuridici, Rome 1922, p. 47); therefore, for simulation to exist there is required: 1) a deliberate external declaration differing from the intention; 2) awareness of such divergence on the part of the simulator; 3) an agreement between the parties on such divergence; 4) the purpose of deception. If the third of these requirements is lacking, there is no simulation, but mental reservation, in which the inner will, consciously differing from the declaration, is not contractually manifested. Here simulation is taken in the theological and canonical sense.
II. HOLY FAITH
To simulate the faith is equivalent to denying it: which is never lawful (Mt. 10:33; Lk. 9:26; Rom. 10:10). There is, however, no denial of faith when one dissembles it (v. FEDE).
III. THE HOLY [CHURCH] OF THE SACRAMENTS
It can take place either 1) by using matter and form without the intention of effecting the Sacrament, or 2) by pronouncing an invalid form, even though the matter is valid, or 3) by using matter which is invalid due to a hidden defect. Sacramental simulation is always a sacrilege and can in no case become lawful, as appears from the proposition condemned on 2 March 1679 by Innocent XI (Denz-U, 1179). The dissimulation of the Sacraments, on the other hand, can be lawful for a grave reason. It consists in performing a non-sacramental action in circumstances such as to make it believed that a Sacrament is being administered.
The CIC explicitly punishes only three cases of simulation: 1. The simulation of the celebration of Holy Mass (v. MESSA, and can. 2322, n. 1). It is the crime of one who, whether layman or cleric - whether not having been ordained a priest, or despite having invalidly received
Ordination - acts in such a way that one could be led to believe that Holy Mass is being celebrated. Commonly the authors require that there in fact be deception on the part of those assisting at such a celebration; others do not require actual deception. The crime is considered consummated (can. 2228) when the feigned celebration of Holy Mass begins, even if it is not carried through to completion.
2. The simulation of sacramental confession
It occurs when the penitent is led into error in regarding his confession as sacramental because 1) he has confessed even a single true or putative sin in order to receive absolution; 2) because he believed him who received his confession to be a true confessor. The Church, from the earliest times, has punished the exercise of an Order not in fact received. Thus, for example, from the 4th century and following, priests who dared to usurp the exercise of episcopal power were punished with deposition (Council of Sardica [343-44], ch. 19: Hefele-Leclercq, I, pp. 800-802). From the 8th century there were special sanctions against those who simulated the celebration of Holy Mass and sacramental absolution (cf. F. X. Wernz, Ius decretalium, VI, Prato 1913, n. 459). Several pontifical constitutions decree, for this crime, the penalty of degradation and delivery to the secular arm, which punished with the death penalty priests who made themselves guilty of it (P. Gasparri, Fontes, I, Rome 1926, pp. 256, 357, 393, 813; ibid., II, ibid. 1923, p. 255). For the crimes mentioned above, the CIC (can. 2322) decrees: 1) excommunication specially reserved to the Holy See, and 2) if a layman, deprivation of pension or offices along with other fitting penalties; 3) if a cleric, also deposition. The latae sententiae excommunication is a penalty that is not found in ancient law. Criminal cases concerning the simulation of the Mass and of sacramental Confession fall within the competence of the Holy Office because of the suspicion of heresy that they presuppose (P. Gasparri, Fontes, cit., I, p. 255). - 3) the absolution of an accomplice in a shameful sin (v. COMPLICE IN PECC. TURPE). The simulation of consent (v. MATRIMONIO, IV, 1, 5) in marriage "occurs when the contracting party externally feigns the will to contract, expressing with seriousness and in ritual manner a consent which inwardly is not there." Whether it be a case of bilateral or unilateral simulation, when its existence is proven, the marriage is invalid. Jurisprudence and doctrine customarily distinguish a total simulation, which occurs when the contract itself is excluded, and a partial simulation, which occurs when the parties, although having a serious intention to contract marriage, do not wish to bind themselves, or exclude one of the essential qualities (can. 1013). In every case, however, there must be a true positive act of the will, a simple error concerning unity and indissolubility or the sacramental dignity not being sufficient, even if such error is the cause of the contract (can. 1084; S. R. Rotae decisiones..., decis. XIII, n. 32: vol. XXXV, Vatican City 1943, p. 114).
As regards proof, cases of simulation, especially if it is total, are extremely difficult, as the Rotai jurisprudence repeatedly states; for it is a matter of an internal act, for the evaluation of which one must bear in mind a twofold principle that militates in favor of the validity of the marriage: 1) marriage enjoys the favor of the law (can. 1014), and 2) the internal consent of the will is always presumed to conform to the words and signs used in the celebration of marriage (can. 1086 § 2: S. R. Rotae decisiones..., decis. XXXVIII, n. 12: vol. XXXV, p. 368 and passim). On the other hand, the confession of the simulating party does not constitute an argument of proof (loc. cit., decis. XXXIX, n. 3: vol. XXXII, ibid. 1941, p. 435), because a confession in proprium commodum is suspect (Wernz-Vidal, VI, p. 309).
For a correct evaluation of the simulation, one must also carefully examine its cause, which must be distinguished from the simple motives that may have led to the marriage (loc. cit., decis. XCI, n. 16: vol. XXXV, p. 1007), bearing well in mind the circumstances that preceded, accompanied and followed the celebration of the marriage (loc. cit., decis. XXXIX, n. 3, vol. XXXII, p. 436). In the moral field, according to the common opinion, those who were to feign do not sin mortally nor commit sacrilege to contract marriage under the influence of grave fear do not sin mortally nor commit sacrilege, for, since voluntary consent is lacking, matter and form are lacking; and therefore there would be no simulation of a Sacrament, but only of a contract (T. Jorio, Theologia moralis, III, Naples 1947, p. 17).
The dissimulation of the Sacraments can be lawful only if there be an urgent and grave cause, provided there be no contempt and scandal on the part of the faithful. Thus, for example, it is lawful for a priest, instead of the absolution formula, to recite only a prayer and give the blessing to an indisposed penitent, so that those present do not notice that he is being sent away without absolution (v. SACRAMENTI). Besides what has been said on the subject of simulation, Italian criminal law is concerned with the simulation of a crime (Cod. pen. ital., art. 367); both criminal law and forensic medicine are concerned with the simulation of illnesses, which carries us into the field of mental illnesses.