SUSPICION AND RASH JUDGMENT. - When one speaks of malevolent thoughts concerning the honesty of one's neighbor, the terms rash judgment, rash opinion, rash suspicion and rash doubt are often used indiscriminately. In fact, these always involve evaluations of the mind that expresses itself internally, with regard to one's neighbor, without sufficient grounds. Nevertheless, the terms indicate multiple states of the mind, which differ among themselves as so many degrees, distinguished according to the greater or lesser firmness of assent.
I. NOTION
The rash judgment, strictly understood, is the firm and certain assent of the mind, by which, without sufficient foundation, some action of another is held to be evil. In common usage it is usually taken in a broader sense, to indicate any opinion that is not benevolent toward one's neighbor. The rash opinion is an assent of the mind, less firm, by which an action of one's neighbor is held only as probably evil, again without sufficient ground for judgment. Rash suspicion is the propensity to attribute evil to one's neighbor without sufficient reason; but the mind, thus inclined, does not reach the point of actually attributing evil to one's neighbor. Rash doubt is the suspension of judgment, made without sufficient reason, concerning the probity or impropriety of one's neighbor.
These four states of soul are called rash, because they are not founded on a real motive, and in this consists the disorder of these internal acts. The essence of the sin lies in the internal act itself, independently of communication to others: this would constitute, if anything, defamation (v. DETRAZIONE).
Rashness can be merely material when one does not advert to the insufficiency of the motives, although one judges hastily; if, on the other hand, there is advertence, then the rashness becomes formal. Therefore rashness consists in this, that one consciously neglects to consider the reasons on which one's own judgment, opinion, suspicion or doubt is founded. And this can happen either through levity or through malice. In fact it not rarely happens that the soul, through envy, inclines to a malevolent judgment, even though there is no lack of motives by which, if one wished, one could instead direct oneself to a favorable judgment or opinion regarding one's neighbor.
II. MALICE
1) The g. t. [temerarious judgment] is a sin grave in its own kind. It is suggested by the words of the Gospel: Nolite iudicare et non iudicabimini; nolite condemnare et non condemnabimini (Lk. 6:37). All moralists admit this. Moreover, it is evident that anyone who, without sufficient reason, denies another internal esteem, with a firm judgment, imputing to him a wicked action, without any certain argument, gravely injures that person's right to reputation. In all this there is implicit a certain contempt of one's neighbor (Sum. Theol., 2a-2ae, q. 60, a. 3). Nevertheless, for the sin to be grave, it is required that the judgment be perfect, completely temerarious and truly grave. That is, it is required that: a) on the part of the object, grave harm be done to another's reputation. For although men commonly bear it with greater sorrow that something be taken from their external reputation, rather than that an unfavorable judgment about their conduct be formed internally in other persons, nevertheless he does not seem to violate any less the other's right to reputation who without sufficient motive deprives someone of his esteem, than he who reveals to others a fault of his neighbor that was truly committed; b) that one arrive at a true judgment; therefore mere suspicion or doubt is not enough; c) that the temerariousness of the judgment be perfect in its kind, and that one have full awareness of it.
2) Suspicion and temerarious doubt in themselves constitute a light sin, because they do not fully remove the esteem of one's neighbor from our mind, but only diminish it.
3) When doubt about another's honesty disturbs our mind, charity requires that one incline rather to weighing the reasons that favor the other. Nevertheless we are not bound, by doing violence to our mind, to formulate a positive and benevolent judgment: rather it is fitting to leave the matter to the judgment of God, who does not err.