Suspicion and Rash Judgment
When speaking of malevolent thoughts regarding the honesty of one’s neighbor, the terms *g. t.*, rash opinion, rash suspicion, and rash doubt are often indiscriminately employed. These are indeed always evaluations of the mind expressed internally toward another without sufficient justification. Nevertheless, the terms indicate various states of the mind, which differ from one another as so many distinct degrees, distinguished according to the greater or lesser firmness of assent.
### I. Notion
Rash judgment (*g. t.*), strictly understood, is the firm and certain assent of the mind by which, without sufficient foundation, one holds another’s action to be evil. Commonly, however, it is taken in a broader sense to denote any unfavorable opinion regarding one’s neighbor. A rash opinion is a less firm assent of the mind, by which one holds an action of another as probably evil, still without sufficient reason for judgment. Rash suspicion is the inclination to attribute evil to another without sufficient motive, though the mind so inclined does not go so far as to actually attribute evil to the neighbor. Rash doubt is the suspension of judgment, made without sufficient reason, regarding the probity or wickedness of another.
These four states of mind are called rash because they are not founded on real grounds, and it is in this that the disorder of these internal acts consists. The absence of sin lies in the internal act itself, independently of its communication to others; the latter, if it occurs, would constitute, at most, defamation (*V. DETRAZIONE*).
Rashness may be merely material when one does not perceive the insufficiency of the grounds, though judging hastily; if, however, there is awareness, then the rashness becomes formal. Therefore, rashness consists in knowingly neglecting to consider the reasons upon which one’s judgment, opinion, suspicion, or doubt is based. This can occur either through levity or malice. Indeed, it often happens that the mind, through envy, inclines toward an unfavorable judgment, even though there are reasons that, if one wished, could lead to a favorable judgment or opinion regarding the neighbor.
### II. Malice
1) Rash judgment is, *ex genere suo*, a grave sin. This is suggested by the evangelical words: *Nolite iudicare et non iudicabimini; nolite condemnare et non condemnabimini* (Lk. 6:37). All moralists admit this. Moreover, it is evident that whoever, without sufficient reason, denies another internal esteem by firmly judging him guilty of a bad action, without any certain argument, gravely violates the neighbor’s right to good name. Implicit in all this is a certain contempt for the neighbor (*Sum. Theol.*, II-II, q. 60, a. 3). Nevertheless, for a grave sin to occur, the judgment must be perfect, entirely rash, and truly grave. That is to say, it is required that:
a) on the part of the object, grave harm is done to the neighbor’s good name. For although men generally suffer more pain when something is taken from their external reputation than when an unfavorable internal judgment is formed about their conduct, it does not seem less to violate another’s right to good name to deprive him of esteem without sufficient reason than to reveal to others a fault actually committed by the neighbor;
b) a true judgment is reached; hence mere suspicion or doubt is not sufficient;
c) the rashness of the judgment is perfect in its kind, and there is full awareness of II.
2) Rash suspicion and doubt, in themselves, constitute a light sin, because they do not entirely remove esteem for the neighbor from our mind, but only diminish II.
3) When doubt regarding another’s honesty disturbs the mind, charity requires that one rather incline to consider reasons that favor the other. Nevertheless, one is not bound, by forcing the mind, to form a positive and favorable judgment; rather, it is better to leave the matter to the judgment of God, who does not err.
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