SOSPETTO and GIUDIZIO TEMERARIO. — When speaking of malevolent thoughts concerning the honesty of one’s neighbor, the terms rash judgment, rash opinion, rash suspicion, and rash doubt are often used indiscriminately. In fact, these always concern assessments of the mind that are expressed inwardly, with regard to one’s neighbor, without sufficient grounds. Nevertheless, the terms indicate multiple states of mind, which differ from one another as so many degrees,
distinguished according to the greater or lesser firmness of consent.
I. NOTION
Temerary judgment, strictly understood, is the firm and certain assent of the mind by which, without sufficient foundation, some action of another is considered evil. In common usage it is taken in a broader sense, to indicate any malevolent opinion concerning one’s neighbor. Temerary opinion is an assent of the mind, less firm, by which an action of one’s neighbor is considered merely probably evil, again without sufficient reason for judgment. Temerary suspicion is the inclination to attribute evil to one’s neighbor without sufficient reason; but the mind, thus inclined, does not go so far as actually to attribute evil to one’s neighbor. Temerary doubt is the suspension of judgment, made without sufficient reason, concerning the probity or improbitý of one’s neighbor.These four states of mind are called temerary because they are not founded on a real motive; and therein consists the disorder of these interior acts. The essence of the sin lies in the interior act itself, independently of its communication to others: the latter would constitute, if anything, defamation (v. DETRAZIONE).
Temerity may be merely material when one is unaware of the insufficiency of the reasons, although one judges hastily; if, on the other hand, there is awareness of it, temerity becomes formal. Temerity therefore consists in knowingly neglecting to consider the reasons on which one’s judgment, opinion, suspicion, or doubt is founded. This may occur either through frivolity or through malice. Indeed, it not infrequently happens that the mind, through envy, inclines toward a malevolent judgment, even though there are reasons which, if one wished, could instead lead one to a favorable judgment or opinion concerning one’s neighbor.
II. MALICE
1) The temerarious judgment is a sin grave by its nature. This is implied by the Gospel words: Nolite indicare et non iudicabimini; nolite condemne et non condemnabimini (Lk. 6:37). All moralists admit this. In any case, it is evident that anyone who, without sufficient reason, denies someone internal esteem through a settled judgment, imputing a wicked action to him without any certain argument, seriously violates that person’s right to his reputation. Implicit in all this is a certain contempt for one’s neighbor (Sum. Theol., 2ᵃ-2ᵃᵉ, q. 60, a. 3). Nevertheless, for the sin to be grave, the judgment must be complete, entirely temerarious, and truly grave. This means that: a) with regard to the object, serious harm must be done to another’s reputation. Indeed, although people commonly endure with greater pain the taking away of something from their external reputation than the inward formation in others of an unfavorable judgment about their conduct, nevertheless it does not seem to violate another’s right to reputation any less to deprive someone of one’s esteem without sufficient reason than to reveal to others a fault of one’s neighbor that was actually committed; b) one must arrive at a true judgment; hence mere suspicion or doubt is not enough; c) the temerity of the judgment must be complete in its kind, and one must have full awareness of II.2) Temerarious suspicion and doubt in themselves constitute a venial sin, because they do not entirely remove esteem for one’s neighbor from our mind, but only diminish II.
3) When doubt about another’s honesty disturbs our mind, charity requires that we incline rather to weigh the reasons that favor the other person. Nevertheless, we are not obliged, by doing violence to our mind, to formulate a positive and benevolent judgment; rather, it is fitting to leave the matter to the judgment of God, who does not err.
BIBLI: all treatises of moral theology on de iustitia and, in addition: Sum. Theol., 2ᵃ-2ᵃᵉ, q. 66, aa. 3-4; E. van Roes, De obiectis et actibus ad iustitiam pertinentibus, Malines 1923; A. Gougnard, De iudicio temerario, in Coll. Meel., 3 (1929), pp. 593-595; J. Dermine, Outrage et diffamation, in Rev. disc. de Tournai, 3 (1948), pp. 519-27. V. INGIURIA; ONORE.