SPERANZA

HOPE. – The original meaning of the term *ἐπὶ* is desire; to hope is to strive toward an object that appears to us as a good. Hope, considered on the natural plane, is the desire for a future good, difficult but possible (*Sum. Theol.*, 1a-2ae, q. 40, a. 2). Its essential elements are desire and trust. It is the tension of one who is not yet all that he ought to be, yet is conscious both of his imperfection and of his perfectibility.

Christian hope presents the same structure, but the tension surpasses man’s natural capacity, reaching as far as the eternal possession of God. For this reason, it is essentially a gift from Him. Infused into the soul of the baptized as a permanent quality, together with the virtue of faith, hope, under the impulse of actual grace, is the principle of that holy unrest which spurs man, beyond his weakness and his sins, to continual self-transcendence until he attains his supreme end.

I. OBJECT AND MOTIVE OF CHRISTIAN HOPE

The principal object of Christian hope is the treasures of an incorruptible inheritance, the supreme beatitude in the eternal possession of God. Consequently, Christian hope extends to all the means necessary for each person to attain this same beatitude (Rom. 5:2; 1 Jn. 3:2). Even earthly goods may fall within the orbit of its scope, but only insofar as and in the manner in which God ordains them for our salvation. Therefore, it is always God who stimulates our desires and sustains our expectation. To elevate us so far above ourselves and to stretch us toward Him, we cannot rely on our own strength or on the help of creatures, but must place our trust in Him, in His goodness, in His omnipotent assistance, and in His divine promises. These are the motives of our hope taken together, rather than any one of them in isolation, such as His goodness toward us (Scotus, Suárez), His omnipotent assistance—that is, His omnipotence and mercy (Prümmer)—or His fidelity to His promises, considered in themselves as the sole motive.

For this reason, faith in God’s omnipotence, in His salvific will, and in His unfailing goodness forms the foundation of hope. And just as faith is centered in Christ, so hope culminates in Him: He is our hope (1 Tim. 1:1; Col. 1:26-27). In Him, God has summed up and fulfilled all His promises, revealing and accomplishing His salvific plan. If He did not spare His own Son for us all, how will He not also, with Him, graciously give us all things? (Rom. 8:32). In Christ, we have been saved (Rom. 5:10; cf. also Eph. 2:12ff.; 2 Cor. 5:18ff.). His Resurrection is the sure guarantee of ours (1 Cor. 15:14; cf. also Eph. 1:18-20). United to Him as members to the Head, we are already, in a certain sense, in glory, for there is no condemnation for those who are in Christ Jesus. Whoever believes in Him already has eternal life (Jn. 3:18, 36; Rom. 9:33; 10:11).

II. VALUE AND NECESSITY OF HOPE

1. The value of hope

It is immense both for what it gives and for what it promises. Christian hope gives man a new degree of life, maximizing both his nature and his worth. As the soul stretches toward the future in God, it already breathes, as it were, the blessed air of God, savoring it in advance. Moreover, the divine promises confer upon man the greatest security, almost giving him a sense of omnipotence: “I can do all things in Him who strengthens me” (Phil. 4:13). Only on this ground can the victorious conviction arise that withstands and triumphs over the most arduous tasks. Hence comes the steadfast firmness in trial, the sure confidence that divine aid will never fall short of our need. Hence comes the certainty that nothing can separate us from the love of God (Rom. 8:38). Hence, finally, the transformation of suffering into Christian joy, which draws nourishment from suffering itself and is renewed each day in the expectation of the Lord’s nearness.

This does not prevent one from working out his salvation “with fear and trembling” (Phil. 2:12), ever mindful of his own fragility and defectibility. Indeed, this fear perfects security, preserving the confidence in God from the diminution that carelessness and imperfect evaluation of things might bring.

2. Necessity of hope

Without hope, our supernatural life would have no meaning. Grace is the seed of glory, and by definition a seed is a promise, an expectation, a beginning. On the other hand, our expectation would be unjustified and absurd if it did not rest on God’s promises and on the help of Christ. For this reason, Christian hope, composed of desire and trust, is indispensable for attaining salvation: in it we have been saved (Council of Trent, sess. VI, chaps. 6-7, *De iustificatione*: Denz.-U., 798, 800), and the Apostle admonishes us to put on the helmet of the hope of salvation (1 Thess. 5:8), to rejoice in hope (Rom. 12:12), and to live piously in this world in expectation of the blessed hope (Tit. 2:13). For this same reason, there is no condition of life or degree of holiness from which hope should or can be excluded. Nor can hope be understood, as some have thought, as a disinterested expectation of an eternity in which love will triumph, as though the desire and expectation of one’s own happiness were incompatible with the state of the perfect. Among the Kant (v.), one of the apostles of pure love.

Ordered self-love is not incompatible with the most perfect love of God; indeed, the former in a certain sense conditions the latter, for it is not possible to love an object if the subject does not love itself. Moreover, this love finds its full justification in the perfect conformity of the human will with the divine will. God wills our happiness. The Gospel and the preaching of the Apostles continually and lovingly appeal to the abundant reward of heaven, to the inheritance of eternal life, to the unfading crown that awaits the athletes of the spirit (cf. Mt. 5:12; Lk. 12:5; 1 Cor. 9:24; Col. 3:24). Therefore, the so-called disinterested love, understood as a habitual and exclusive disposition of the spirit, is not only psychologically absurd but also theologically erroneous. For this reason, the Church has condemned II. The first condemnation on this matter was that of Meister Eckhart (

V. ECKHART), who was among the first masters of pure love (Denz

U., 508). The Council of Trent, in opposition to the Protestants, confirmed the rectitude of human actions performed with a view to eternal reward (sess. VI, chap. 16, can. 31: Denz.-U., 841; sess. VI, chap. 11: Denz.-U., 804). Alexander VIII condemned, with the condemnation of a proposition, the Jansenist doctrine, revived by some theologians of Louvain, which claimed to derive hope solely from the love of benevolence (D. Viva, *Damnatae theses*, ad prop. 10, Alexander VIII, III, Naples 1708, n. 17). Innocent XI followed with the condemnation of the quietism (v.) of Miguel de Molinos (Denz.-U., 1227-32), partially revived by Fénelon ([v.]; Denz.-U., 1327, 1332).

### 3. Subject of Hope

The subject of theological hope is the will: its proper object consists in supernatural goods, which cannot be attained except through the will (Sum. Theol., 2a-2ae, q. 18, a. 1). From this it follows that the act of hope is free; for although man necessarily desires beatitude in the abstract, he freely places it in one object or another.

The proximate subject capable of the act and habit of hope comprises all wayfarers and the souls in purgatory. The damned and the blessed are incapable of hope, at least with respect to the aid of grace and the indispensable conditions. In the formal object, for example, the virtue of hope cannot remain, since the coexistence of hope without faith is impossible. Sinners, however, are capable of hope in themselves (unless sin opposes hope) (Council of Trent, sess. VI, cap. 6: Denz.-U., 798). In the souls of purgatory, hope remains, because although for them beatitude is certain, it is nevertheless future and difficult to attain, as it must be reached through suffering (Sum. Theol., 2a-2ae, q. 18, a. 3).

### III. Sins Against Hope

One may sin against hope either by defect or by excess.

1) One sins by defect both by no longer aspiring to eternal life and by despairing of attaining II. The first attitude may be determined either by unbelief or by excessive attachment to earthly goods. Despair, on the other hand, is most often determined by distrust. Proper despair must be distinguished from discouragement, not only when it weighs involuntarily upon the soul as a temptation or an illness, but also when it is accepted by the will: for it is not a renunciation but a slackening of hope. It may arise either from the cooling of faith or from pusillanimity of spirit. Nevertheless, if not mastered, discouragement may gradually degenerate into despair.

2) Presumption stands opposed to hope by excess (v.).

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