HOPE. – The original meaning of the term Ἀπίς is desire; to hope is to tend toward an object that appears to us as a good. Hope, considered on the natural level, is the desire for a future good, arduous but possible (Sum. Theol., 1ª-2ª, q. 40, a. 2). Its essential elements are desire and trust. It is the striving of one who is not yet all that he ought to be, but is conscious both of his imperfection and of his capacity for perfection.
(Alinari photograph)
SPERANDIO DI MANTOVA – Portrait of Giovanni II Bentivoglio. Marble relief – Parigi, Musée du Louvre.
I. OBJECT AND MOTIVE OF CHRISTIAN HOPE
The principal object of Christian hope is the treasure of the incorruptible inheritance, supreme blessedness in the eternal possession of God. Consequently, Christian hope extends to all the means necessary for each person to attain that same blessedness (Rom. 5, 2; I Io. 3, 2). Earthly goods, too, may fall within the orbit of its scope, but only insofar as and in the manner in which God orders them toward our salvation. Thus it is always God who stirs our desires and nourishes our expectation. To rise so far above ourselves and reach out toward him, we cannot rely on our own strength or on the help of creatures, but must depend on him, on his goodness, on his assisting omnipotence, and on his divine promises: these, taken together rather than singly, are the motives of our hope, rather than one or another considered in isolation, such as goodness toward us (Scoto, Suárez), God’s assisting omnipotence, that is, omnipotence and mercy (Prümmer), or fidelity to the promises, considered in themselves as unique motives.For this reason, faith—faith in God’s omnipotence, in his salvific will, and in his unfailing goodness—lies at the foundation of hope. And just as faith is encountered in Christ, so hope culminates in him: he is our hope (I Tim. 1,1; Col. 1,26-27). In him God has gathered up and fulfilled all his promises, revealing and accomplishing his salvific plan. If he did not spare his own Son for all of us, how could he fail to grant us everything along with him? (Rom. 8,32). In Christ we have been saved (Rom. 5, 10; cf. also Eph. 2, 12 sgg.; II Cor. 5,18 sgg.). His Resurrection is the sure guarantee of ours (I Cor. 6,14; cf. also Eph. 1, 18-20). United to him as members to the head, we are already, in a certain sense, in glory, since there is
«no condemnation for those who are in Christ Jesus. Whoever believes in him already has eternal life» (Io. 3, 18, 36; Rom. 9,33; 10,11).
II. VALUE AND NECESSITY OF H
1. The value of h
It is immense because of what it gives and what it promises. Christian hope gives man a new degree of life, developing his nature and worth to the highest degree. As the soul reaches forward toward the future, in God, it already breathes, savoring it in advance, the blessed air of God. Not only this. The divine promises grant man the greatest security, giving him almost a sense of omnipotence: “I can do all things in him who strengthens me” (Phil. 4, 13). Only on this foundation can the victorious conviction flourish that withstands and triumphs in the face of the most arduous tasks. Hence the invincible firmness in trial, the sure confidence that divine assistance will never be inferior to the violence of the trial. Hence the certainty that nothing will be able to separate us from the love of God (Rom. 8, 38). Hence, finally, the transformation of sorrow into Christian joy, which draws nourishment from suffering itself and is renewed each day in expectation of the Lord who is near.This does not, however, mean that he should not work out his salvation “in fear and trembling” (Eph. 6, 5), conscious of his own frailty and fallibility. Indeed, this fear completes security, preserving confidence in God from the impairments that frivolity and an imperfect evaluation of things might cause II.
2. Necessity of h
Without hope our supernatural life would have no meaning. Grace is the seed of glory, and the seed is, by definition, a promise, an expectation, a beginning. On the other hand, our expectation would be unjustified and absurd if it did not rest upon the promises of God and the help of Christ. For this reason Christian hope, consisting of desire and confidence, is indispensable for attaining salvation: in it we have been saved (Conc. Trid., sess. VI, capp. 6-7, de initio; Denz-U, 798,800), and the Apostle admonishes us to put on as a helmet the hope of salvation (I Thess. 5,8), to rejoice in hope (Rom. 12,12), and to live piously in this world while awaiting the blessed hope (Tit. 2, 13). For this same reason there is no condition of life or degree of holiness from which hope ought or can be excluded. Nor can hope be understood, as it has seemed to some, as a disinterested expectation of an eternity in which love will triumph, as though desire and expectation of one’s own happiness constituted a calculation incompatible with the state of the perfect. Among Catholics, Kant (v.) is one of the apostles of pure love.An ordered love of oneself is not incompatible with the most perfect love of God; indeed, the former in a certain sense conditions the latter, since love of the object is impossible if the subject does not love himself. Moreover, this love finds its full justification in the perfect conformity of the human will with the divine will. God wills our happiness. The Gospel and the preaching of the Apostles continually and lovingly call attention to the abundant reward of heaven, to the recompense of the inheritance, and to the incorruptible crown awaiting the athletes of the spirit (cf. Mt. 5, 12; Lc. 12, 5; I Cor. 9, 24; Col. 3, 24). Consequently, so-called disinterested love, understood as a habitual and exclusive attitude of the spirit, besides being psychologically absurd, is theologically erroneous. For this reason the Church has condemned II. The first condemnation in this matter was that of Meister Eckhart (v. ECCARDO), who was among the earliest teachers of pure love (Denz-U, 508). The Council of Trent, against the Protestants, affirmed the legitimacy of human actions performed under the vision of the eternal reward (sess. VI, cap. 16, can. 31: Denz-U, 841; sess. VI, cap. 11: Denz-U, 804). Alexander VIII, by condemning a proposition, rejected the Jansenist doctrine, renewed by certain theologians of Louvain, who claimed that hope derived solely from benevolent love (D. Viva, Damnatae theses, ad prop. 10 Alexandri VIII, III, Napoli 1708, n. 17). This was followed by the condemnation quietism (v.) of Michele Molinos (Denz-U, 1227-32), partially renewed by Fénelon ([v.]; Denz-U, 1327, 1332).
3. Subject of h
The subject of theological hope is the will: its object, in fact, is supernatural goods, which can be attained only through the will (Sum. Theol., 2°-2°, q. 18, a. 1). It follows that the act of hope is free; although man necessarily wills beatitude considered in the abstract, he freely places it thereafter in one object or another. The proximate subject capable of the act and habit of hope comprises all wayfarers and the souls in purgatory. The damned and the blessed are incapable of hope, at least insofar as assistance by Grace and the indispensable conditions are concerned. In the formal heretic, for example, the virtue of hope cannot remain, since the coexistence of hope without faith is impossible. Sinners, however, in themselves (unless sin is opposed to hope) are capable of hope (Conc. Trid., sess. VI, cap. 6: Denz-U, 798). In the souls in purgatory hope remains, because although beatitude is certain for them, it is nevertheless future and difficult to attain, since it must be reached through suffering (Sum. Theol., 2°-2°, q. 18, a. 3).III. SINS AGAINST HOPE
One can sin directly against hope: by defect and by excess. 1) He sins by defect who no longer aspires to eternal life, as does he who despairs of attaining II. The former attitude may be caused either by unbelief or by excessive attachment to the goods of this earth. Despair, on the other hand, is most often caused by distrust. Properly speaking, discouragement must be distinguished from despair, not only when it weighs involuntarily upon the soul as a temptation or as an illness, but also when it is accepted by the will: for it is not the renunciation of hope, but its slackening. It may arise either from the cooling of faith or from pusillanimity of spirit. Nevertheless, if not overcome, discouragement can gradually degenerate into despair.2) Opposed to hope, by excess, presumption (v.).
Pietro Palazzini