GRAZIA. – It derives from the Greek root χvarphi (cf. Latin gratus), which conveys the sense of enjoyment and delight and gave rise to the word χvarphivarphiς (= “g.”). In profane literature this term means physical and moral beauty (cf. the three Graces associated with Venus and the Muses), benevolence, favor, benefit, gratitude. The idea of g. as a divine influence upon man is also found in mystery religions and in magic. In Sacred Scripture the term g. (φεη in the Old Testament, χvarphivarphiς in the New) is used both in a subjective sense (benevolence, gratitude) and in an objective sense (material or spiritual gift). On the basis of the texts of the New Testament, and particularly of s. Paolo, G. is defined theologically as a gratuitous, supernatural gift conferred by God upon the human soul with a view to eternal life. It presupposes the beatific vision as the supernatural end of human life, and entails the entire divine economy that accompanies man on his journey toward that end, offering him the means suited to attaining II.
G. properly so called is a gift infused into the depths of the soul and its faculties, and is divided into habitual and actual, according as it has a permanent character (in the manner of a habit) or is transient.
To the first category belong G. sanctifying, which has its seat in the essence of the soul, and the virtues gifts of the Holy Spirit (v.), which are infused into the faculties of the soul; the second category (actual G.) comprises various kinds of G.: exciting and assisting, prevenient and subsequent, sufficient and efficacious. The last of these is the most important, also because it has been the object of great theological controversies.
SUMMARY:
I. Existence
II. Necessity
III. Essence
IV. Cause and effects.I. EXISTENCE
Objectively, the existence of G. in general is attested by divine Revelation. But the question may be posed from the subjective point of view, by asking whether man can have direct awareness or knowledge of G. infused into his soul. Certain Protestant sects (e.g., Quakers and Pentecostals) admit a vivid psychological experience of G.; the Immanentists likewise speak of an experience of the divine. Catholic doctrine generally rejects such opinions, insofar as they compromise the supernatural transcendence of the divine gift; but it recognizes the extraordinary experiences of great converts and mystics, who are raised to an ineffable spiritual contact with God, who works within them.A more debated aspect of the question is the rational knowledge of G. Against the certainty of his own sanctification claimed by Luther, the Council of Trent (sess. VI, Denz-U, 802) defined that no one can know with certainty of faith, immune from falsity, that he has attained the G. of God, and yet all may fear for their own state and destiny. But the theological schools debate whether a sanctified person can, by natural knowledge, have certainty that he is in the G. of God. The opinion of s. Thomas and of a large part of the theologians admits the possibility only of a moral certainty in the broad sense.
As regards objective existence, there is the twofold testimony of Sacred Scripture and Tradition. As with other mysteries, so too with G. there is no explicit and formal revelation in the Old Testament, but only simple indications, which become progressively more pronounced as the messianic times approach. The first is the state of original justice in which our first parents were created, and by which concupiscence (v.) and enjoyed the friendship of God. After the sin, God restored the broken bond by establishing a covenant with Abraham and his offspring, a covenant renewed with Moses on the basis of the concept of divine fatherhood in relation to the people regarded as a son (II Sam. 7, 14), the object of the love of the heavenly Father (Ex. 4, 22; Deut. 8, 5). But the covenant, begun in the spiritual and supernatural sphere, gradually degenerated, owing to the crude mentality of the Jewish people, into material interest, reducing religious feeling to a banal externalism. God made use of the prophets to call them back to interiority (Am. 4, 11-22; 5, 14-15; Mich. 6, 8; Is. 66, 2; Ier. 4, 3-4 and 14, 7). They inculcated the relationship between the soul and God not only through the ancient concept of filial adoption, but also through the delicate image of the spiritual nuptials (Os. 1-3; Ier. 2, 2; Ex. 16, 8; Cantico), of life-giving water, light, and fire (cf. Salmi e Libri sapienziali).
From the Old Testament as a whole, these elements can readily be derived, in which the fundamental concept of sanctifying G. is implicit: a) an action of God within the depths of the soul (Jer. 18, 6; 17, 14; 31, 18; I Reg. 8, 58); b) a purification of the spirit (Is. 1, 18; Ps. 50); c) an inner renewal, according to the forceful expression of Ez. 11, 19: « Et dabo eis cor unum et spiritum novum tribuam in visceribus eorum et auferam cor lapideum de carne eorum et dabo cor carneum ut in praeceptis meis ambulent ». Here one senses the prelude to the kingdom of G. announced by the Gospel.
In the New Testament, the message of the Kingdom of God dominates; it principally entails a new life of the spirit regenerated in the faith and charity of Christ. The fundamental characteristics of the Kingdom are already outlined in the Synoptic Gospels: a change of spirit (μετάνους: Mt. 4, 17; Mc. 1, 4) brought about through Baptism (Mc. 1, 15 and 16, 16; cf. Io. 3, 5), interior holiness in antithesis to Pharisaical formalism (Mt. 5, 20; 23, 23), and above all supreme charity toward God and neighbor (Mt. 22, 37).
But the full revelation of G. is found in s. Paul and s. John. The former presents it in a soteriological light as a redemptive force from sin. This restoration begins with Baptism, which is rebirth in the risen Christ (Rom. 6, 4-11), a new life nourished by faith and charity (I Cor. 13; Eph. 3, 14-19), through which a new creation comes about (II Cor. 5, 17), the new man clothed with Christ (Col. 3, 9; Gal. 3, 27), living by Christ (Gal. 2, 20). The synthesis of s. Paul’s thought, which vibrates throughout all the Epistles (Eph., first chapters), is found in Tit. 3, 5: « Secundum suam misericordiam salvos nos fecit per laxacrum regenerationis et renovationis Spiritus Sancti, quem effudit in nos abunde per Iesum Christum Salvatorem nostrum; ut iustificati gratia ipsius heredes simus secundum spem vitae aeternae ». The life of G. Mystical Body (v.), in which Christ the Head transfuses regenerating sap into its members, the faithful incorporated into him, who are thereby enabled to realize the truth in love (Eph. 4, 16).
According to s. John, G. is supernatural life which Christ kindles in souls through Baptism (Io. 3), nourishes with the Eucharistic bread (Io. 6), and preserves through his indwelling in us and ours in him, like branches in the vine (Io. 15). Like s. Paul, s. John also insists on filial adoption, which makes the faithful, each of them, born of God (Io. 1; I Io. 3, 1), and on the profound unity between Christ and those who believe in him (Io. 17). It is therefore supernatural, divine life, which implies a certain participation in the very nature of God, « consortium (κοινωνία) divinae naturae », as II Pt. 1, 4 says. Such riches are not the fruit of human ingenuity and effort, but God’s gratuitous gift: « Gratia enim estis salvati per fidem et hoc non ex vobis: Dei enim donum est » (Eph. 2, 8). This G., which commits man to cooperate with God, is a viaticum for eternal life; indeed, it is already eternal life anticipated: « Gratia autem Dei vita aeterna in Christo Iesu Domino nostro » (Rom. 6, 22).
The Fathers found in Sacred Scripture the essential elements for constructing a theology of Grace, which is ultimately a supernatural anthropology. The Apostolic Fathers, lacking theological concerns, contented themselves with echoing the concepts of St. Paul and St. John, emphasizing rather the fruits of divine Grace in man. A passage from St. Clement of Rome (Ep. ad Cor., 35) serves for all: « Quam beata sunt, dilecti, et mirabilia dona Dei! Vita in immortalitate, splendor in iustitia, veritas in libertate, fides in confidentia, continentia in sanctitate... Unus est Deus et unus Christus et unus Spiritus gratiae, qui effusus est super nos » (ibid., 46); but it requires our cooperation, even as we are justified by virtue of faith (ibid., 33-37).
However, from the end of the 2nd century, the doctrine of Grace became, in the hands of the Fathers—especially the Eastern ones—a weapon against Gnostic and Manichaean pessimism. Starting from the idea of participation in the divine nature (cf. St. Peter) or of rebirth by virtue of the Holy Spirit (cf. St. John) or of the new creation in Christ and divine adoption (cf. St. Paul), they expressed the entire economy of Grace in synthesis with the term « deificazione » (θεοποίησις), which became common in their writings. St. Irenaeus repeatedly insists on the efficacy of the redemption wrought by Christ, who saves men by rebirthing them to God (Adv. haer., II, 22, 4); the Incarnation aims to divinize men: « Per il suo immenso amore si è fatto quel che noi siamo per farci diventare quel che lui è » (ibid., prof. al I. V). The Alexandrians (Clement, Origen) speak even more vividly in this sense. In the 4th-5th centuries, amid controversies surrounding the mysteries of the Holy Trinity and the Hypostatic Union, the Fathers developed the doctrine of Grace in light of those two supreme truths of faith. St. Athanasius, in his struggle against the Arians, readily used this argument to defend the consubstantiality of the Word with the Father: Christ the Redeemer makes us (by His Grace) partakers of the divine nature, therefore He is truly God (Ep. de synodis, 51). He adds: « Per questo il Figlio di Dio si è fatto figlio dell'uomo, perché i figli dell'uomo, cioè di Adamo, diventino figli di Dio... partecipi della vita stessa di Dio... lui dunque Figlio di Dio per natura, noi invece per G. » (De Incarn. Dei Verbi et c. Arianos, 8). The divinity of the Holy Spirit is also proven by the fact that the Spirit, like the Word and together with it, makes us divine (Ep. ad Serapionem, 1, 24); an argument also dear to St. Basil (De Spiritu Sancto, 9, 22 and elsewhere). St. Cyril of Alexandria underscores the human-divine union of the Hypostatic Union as the exemplar of the union between God and man elevated to participation in supernatural life: « Divinam participamus naturam non solum quia gratia ad supernaturalem gloriam evolamus, verum etiam quia Deum inhabitantem possidemus » (In Io., I, 9).
In this way, the Eastern Fathers presented Grace rather as a state of communion with God. But in the West, Pelagianism (v.) provided the occasion to highlight the dynamic and anthropological aspect of Grace. Against Pelagius, who exalted human activity to the point of attaining eternal life by one’s own strength, St. Augustine, the doctor of Grace, opposed the action of God in man, transposing all human ethical activity into the supernatural sphere, where divine Grace and our freedom harmonize. From the vast work of St. Augustine, it is not difficult to derive these principles, which form the framework of his supernatural anthropology against the Stoicizing naturalism of Pelagius: a) God dominates man, even in the sphere of free will, without infringing upon it (De corrupt. et gratia, 14, 45; De spiritu et littera, 37, 58, and elsewhere); b) Grace is not the result of human effort and merit, but a gratuitous gift of God (Ep. 207 ad Vitalem and elsewhere); c) before original sin, man possessed Grace, by which he could persevere in holiness (auxilium sine quo non); after sin, a stronger Grace is necessary, one that positively influences man and inclines him to persevere (auxilium quo; cf. De corrupt. et gratia, 13, 14). St. Augustine sings of the triumph of Grace over the reluctance of the flesh and the lost spirit, according to his dramatic experience, which brings him close to St. Paul.
II. NECESSITY
Human activity can be considered in relation to truth and to good, according to its supreme specific faculties: the intellect and the will. Furthermore, both truth and good may belong to two distinct spheres, one natural and the other supernatural, depending on whether they are proportionate to human nature or transcend its potentiality and demands (v. ORDINE NATURALE E SOPRANNATURALE). Against Pelagianism (v.), which grants too much to the natural powers of man, and against Lutheranism (v.), which denies him too much, Catholic doctrine teaches these points:a) Despite original sin and its consequences, man can know with his own intelligence every truth of the natural order, including the existence and the principal attributes of God (cf. Vatican Council, sess. III, De Revelatione, can. 1). However, the extrinsic aid of Revelation is morally necessary, so that mankind may attain «expedite, firma certitudine et nullo admixto errore» the complex of ethical-religious truths (Vatican Council, sess. III, cap. 2).
b) To know absolutely supernatural truths, such as mysteries (v.), divine Revelation is required (objective aid); to adhere to them with certainty and on the authority of God, faith (v.) is necessary, which, though having a rational foundation as credibility, is supernatural and thus an effect of grace, both as a free determination of the will and as assent of the intellect (Council of Trent, sess. VI, chaps. 6-7; Vatican Council, sess. III, cap. 3 and corresponding canons).
c) Man, even without the aid of grace, can generally do natural good and avoid evil; but he cannot do all good nor observe all the natural law, in such a way as to avoid every sin, without that aid.
d) However, grace is physically necessary to perform even the slightest salutary act, that is, one proportionate to the supernatural end, which is eternal life. Indeed, not even a positive preparation for grace is possible without grace, and even for man already sanctified, the special aid of actual grace is necessary to persevere for a long time in that state, and a most special aid for final perseverance, to which eternal life is bound (Council of Carthage, Arausican II, Trent, sess. VI; furthermore, V. the Propositions of Baius condemned by Pius V and the Propositions of Jansenius condemned by Innocent X).
Thus, the Church upholds the fundamental integrity of human nature as well as man’s free cooperation with God against the ethical-religious pessimism of Luther, Baius, and Jansenius; and it defends the necessity of God’s supernatural intervention in the activity of man wounded by original sin, against the anthropological naturalism of Pelagius.
III. ESSENCE
Luther, starting from the concept of original sin as an intrinsic and irreparable corruption of nature, was logically compelled to reduce the redemptive grace of Christ to an element extrinsic to man’s psychology, namely, to the mercy of God, which conceals sin and imputes to the sinner (who remains such on this earth) the holiness of the Redeemer. Later, Baius would instead assert that grace is an integrative element of human nature and, in concrete terms, reduces to the same activity of man insofar as it is morally good, that is, corresponding to the law of God.Catholic doctrine is clearly summarized in the Council of Trent (sess. VI, chaps. 6-7) for both sanctifying grace (habitual) and actual grace. Sanctifying grace is the formal cause of our sanctification, in the sense that God produces in our soul the justice that renews us and makes us truly holy (chap. 7). Grace and charity are poured into our hearts by the Holy Spirit and adhere to it (can. 11). Grace, therefore, is a supernatural reality wrought by God in the depths of the soul, as is already known from divine Revelation. Luther’s extrinsicism cannot be reconciled with the doctrine of St. Paul and St. John, nor with that of St. Peter, who speaks of participation (souvenir) in the divine nature in man. The reality of grace is confirmed by its formal effects, namely, adoptive filiation and the right to eternal life, which constitutes merit (v.).
From these sure principles, theology rightly deduces that sanctifying grace is of an accidental nature and more precisely reduces to a habit or entitative quality inherent in the essence of the soul, which is thus elevated to a deformed mode of being, almost to a new nature, which, integrated by infused virtues and gifts of the Holy Spirit (v.), becomes the principle of supernatural activity proportionate to eternal life.
The richness of divine grace is not of the same degree in all, but can increase both through the worthy frequentation of the Sacraments, especially the Holy Eucharist, and through the generous effort of cooperation on the part of man. Grace is lost, together with charity, at the moment the soul commits a gravely sinful act, which renders impossible the coexistence of the bond of friendship and union with God. Whoever is in grace has God within (v. 1) (INDWELLING).
If errors and heresies have arisen concerning the essence of sanctifying grace (habitual), great theological controversies have flared up concerning the essence of actual grace. The Thomists, following in the footsteps of St. Thomas, hold that actual grace is a positive divine influence on the faculties of the soul to move them to act in the supernatural sphere. In other words, actual grace would physical premotion (v.) transposed onto the supernatural plane. The Molinists, instead, identify actual grace with the human act itself, which must be attributed simultaneously to God and to the creature according to the double aspect of supernaturality and factuality. Some (Billot) admit this identification only for indeliberate acts, which are like the awakening of the will’s activity, which afterward proceeds to act freely, without further divine influence. According to Thomistic doctrine, actual grace is a transient operative virtue, which easily reduces to a flowing quality, distinct from God and from the soul upon which it acts. Indeed, in the documents of Revelation, grace is called vocatio, illuminatio, pulsatio, tractio, terms that express a true action of God upon the creature. St. Thomas speaks in this sense (Sum. Theol., I-II, q. 109, a. 9): « Homo in gratia (habituali) existens... indiget tamen auxilio gratiae secundum alium modum, ut scilicet a Deo moveatur ad recte agendum. » Elsewhere, he alludes to a gratuitous aid « interius ammonens movens ».
Theological controversies center especially on the nature of efficacious grace and depend entirely on the divine concurrence (v.) in general upon free human activity. Beyond all discussion is the fact or existence of a sufficient grace and an efficacious grace, at least in the sense that divine grace sometimes produces its effect (salutary act) and sometimes remains sterile. In Sacred Scripture, there is testimony of both: « Quia vocavi et renuisti » (Prov. 1, 24); « Ierusalem, Ierusalem... quoties volui congregare filios tuos... et noluisti » (Mt. 23, 37). Thus, man can refuse God’s invitation and lose the fruits of His gift. But on the other hand, it is written: « Sicut divisiones aquarum, ita cor regis in manu Domini: quocunque voluerit inclinabit illud » (Prov. 21, 1); « Faciam ut in praeceptis meis ambulietis » (Ez. 36, 27); « Deus est enim qui operatur in vobis et velle et perficere » (Phil. 2, 13). The obvious meaning of such expressions leads to the concept of an action, that is, of a divine grace that infallibly achieves its effect.
The Church has defined: a) that man can resist grace (Council of Trent, sess. VI, can. 4 de justificatione); b) that there is a merely sufficient grace, which is also a gift of God (against Jansenism: prop. 1 and 2 of Jansenius, Denz-U, 1092-93; and Jansenist prop. 6, Denz-U, 1296); c) that there is a grace that obtains its effect while preserving human freedom (Council of Trent, sess. VI, chaps. 5-6). The efficacy of grace is connected with the question of divine will (v.).
However, a lively theological controversy arose in the 16th century regarding the nature of the efficacy of grace, between the Jesuit Molina and the Dominican Báñez, who represented the Thomistic tradition. For the complex question, V. MOLINISM and BAÑEZ. Here, it suffices to recall what strictly concerns the problem of grace in relation to human freedom.
Luis de Molina, concerned about the freedom compromised or denied by Lutherans, constructed a theological system to safeguard it despite divine prescience, natural concurrence, grace, and predestination. He does not admit a direct influence of God upon the human will such that the latter is determined by the former to act; rather, he reduces divine action to a simultaneous concurrence (more cooperative than operative). Moreover, while subordinating the world and man to God, he maintains that there exists in things a concatenation of causes and circumstances that influence the free determination of the human will, which is thus foreseen by God through middle knowledge but is not directly caused by the divine will, which realizes things according to the order foreseen (independently of it) in the divine essence. Based on these principles, Molina explains the efficacy of grace extrinsically, that is, in relation to the correspondence of man’s free will, to which grace is offered. The same grace can be merely sufficient. If God wishes to save a man, He explores his free will through middle knowledge and, according to its foreknowledge, prepares those graces to which the man will certainly correspond, given his psychological dispositions and the circumstances of time and place.
The main obstacle of Molinism is that it seems to attribute to man rather than to God the efficacy of grace and thus eternal salvation. To avoid this obstacle, congruism (v.) arose, proposed by Suárez and other Jesuits, who recognize in efficacious grace a greater benefit than in sufficient grace, insofar as the former possesses in itself a congruity to more securely obtain the consent of free will and thus the salutary act.
BIBL.:
J. Bainvel, De gratia Christi, Parigi 1903; A. Michel, Gratia, in DThC, VI, coll. 1595-1867; M. de la Taille, De gratia Christi, Parigi 1926; J. Pohle, Grace, Actual and Habitual, St. Louis 1946; F. Diekamp, Theologiae dogmaticae manuale, ed. P. Parente, I, Torino 1950, pp. 301-412; G. Filograssi, De gratia Christi, Roma 1949; H. Rondet, Gratia Christi, Parigi 1948; J. Alfaro, Gratia et libertas, Roma 1956.
A. Michel
The Dominicans, represented by Domenico Bañez, following the footsteps of St. Thomas, defend a clear distinction between the one and the other grace. Consistent with their system on prescience and divine concurrence (physical predetermination), they maintain that the human free act, like any other reality, depends on the divine will as its own determining cause. Grace that is efficacious is by its very nature such as to infallibly incline the human will toward a determined act. Nevertheless, the act that follows is free because it springs from a will that could resist (in divided sense), even though in fact it does not resist (in composite sense). Instead, sufficient grace, of an entirely different nature, does not move one to act but merely prepares the subject for action. The stumbling block of Thomism is human freedom, which seems compromised under the action of intrinsically efficacious grace. To avoid this obstacle, attenuated systems have arisen, which go under the generic name of syncretism, insofar as they seek to reconcile extreme positions. Such is the theory elaborated by the Sorbonne and adopted by St. Alphonsus de' Liguori, such are the efforts made recently by theologians from both sides (Billot, Guillermin, Marin Sola, etc.). The Church allows discussion. But to overcome the deadlock of this age-old controversy, it now seems necessary to take a path of sound eclecticism, which knows how to draw from both opposing systems the best elements in an attempt to find a solution that avoids the harshness of the extremists. Modern syncretism is on the right path and tends to reconcile human freedom with efficacious grace, attenuating divine action and harmonizing it with the demands of human psychology. Molinism eliminates the mystery from man and concentrates it in God; rigid Thomism does the opposite. It seems more just to leave the mystery where it is, that is, at the point where the supernatural energy of grace inscribes itself into the complex psychology of the human act. However, one must avoid what seems repugnant to true human freedom, such as the Bañezian physical predetermination ad unum, and what seems repugnant to supreme divine causality, such as the scientia media of the Molinists. But an adequate solution will never be reached as long as the obscurity of faith does not give way to the light of the beatific vision.
IV. CAUSE AND EFFECTS
The Council of Trent determined in detail the causality in relation to Grace (sess. VI, chap. 7): sanctification (or sanctifying Grace) has its final cause in the glory of God and of Christ and, with regard to man, in eternal life; its efficient cause in God who purifies and sanctifies; its meritorious cause in Jesus who redeemed us, meriting for us and offering satisfaction to divine justice offended by us; its instrumental cause in the sacrament of Baptism; and finally, its formal cause in justice and holiness, by which God justifies us and truly makes us holy.Of greatest interest is the efficient cause. It is God who produces Grace in us, as healing from sin and as participation in the divine nature and life. The nature of the action by which God produces Grace is debated: one cannot speak of creation, because Grace is not a substance but an accident, and the proper term of the creative act is substantial being. Theologians say that God draws Grace from the obediential potency of the soul, which means that the soul has a (passive) capacity for the Grace that God infuses into II. The Sacraments are attributed an instrumental causal influence in the production of Grace, but it is debated whether this involves physical causality or moral causality.
The distribution of Grace depends on the free will of God; but since He wills the salvation of all (I Tim. 2:3-6), He grants at least sufficient Grace to all for salvation. It is a doctrine of faith that God gives Grace to avoid evil and to do good to the faithful in a state of sanctification (cf. the 1st proposition of Jansenius, condemned by Innocent X: Denz-U, 1092). It is also certain that God bestows Grace upon sinners so that they may convert: «Vivo ego, dicit Dominus, nolo mortem impii, sed ut convertatur impius a via sua et vivat» (Ez. 33:11). Nor are the infidels—whether positive (those who rejected faith through sin) or negative (those who lack faith because they do not know divine Revelation)—deprived of the benefit of Grace: the Church has condemned the contrary opinion of Jansenius (5th proposition: Denz-U, 1379). The reason lies in the truth of God’s salvific will and in the universality of the Redemption accomplished by Jesus Christ, who «pro omnibus mortuus est» (II Cor. 5:14). However, the salvation of the infidels (v. INFIDELI) constitutes a separate theological problem.
The principal effects of Grace are justification and merit: both are treated in detail elsewhere (v. the respective entries). Here it suffices to note that justification is an effect of Grace as its formal cause and consists in a real liberation from sin and a true participation in the divine nature and life. Luther, however, reduced it to a juridical fiction, that is, to a non-imputation of sin and an imputation of God’s holiness and the merits of Jesus Christ.
Merit is an effect of Grace as its efficient cause and has its root in the free cooperation of man with divine action, by which man acquires a right to eternal life. From the entirety of Catholic doctrine on Grace, while the infinite love of God toward His creature stands out, the value and dignity of human nature and person, called to cooperate with God for their own salvation, are also evident. Thus, there is a harmony between the divine and the human, affirming the rights and dominion of God without undermining the psychology and dignity of man. This harmony is gravely compromised by both Pelagianism and Lutheranism.
BIBL.:
1. Sacred Scripture: E. Tobac, s. V. in DFC, II, coll. 324-44; P. Bonnetain, s. V. in DBs. III, coll. 701-1319 (copious erudition); A. Rademacher, Die übernatürliche Lebensordnung nach der paulinischen und isomenischen Theologie, Freiburg im Breisgau 1903; P. Rousselot, La Grâce d'après st Jean et St Paul, in Recherches de science religieux, 18 (1928), pp. 57-104; A. Lemonnier, La théologie du Nouveau Testament, Paris 1928, pp. 78-138, 162-68; I. Bonsirven, Les enseignements de Jésus-Christ, ibid. 1946, pp. 280-97; id., L'Évangile de Paul, ibid. 1949, pp. 175-306; P. Denis, La révélation de la Grâce dans St Paul et dans St Jean, Liège 1949; P. Heinisch, La teologia del Vecchio Testamento, trans. by D. Pintonello, Rome 1950, pp. 360-61 and passim.
2. Church Fathers: I. Habert, Theologiae Graecorum Patrum vindiciae circa universam materiam Gratias, Paris 1647; F. Wörser, Die christl. Lehre über das Verhältnis von Gnade und Freiheit von den apost. Zeiten bis auf Augustinus, Freiburg im Breisgau 1860; O. Koerber, S. Irenaeus de Gratia sanctificante, Würzburg 1865; E. Scholl, Die Lehre des hl. Basilius von der Gnade, Freiburg im Breisgau 1881; G. A. Pell, Die Lehre des hl. Athanasius von der Sünde und Erlösung, ibid. 1888; F. K. Hümmer, Des hl. Gregor von Nazianz Lehre von der Gnade, Kempten 1890; F. Holt, Des hl. Gregor von Nyssa Lehre vom Menschen, Freiburg im Breisgau 1890; E. Weigl, Die Heilslehre des hl. Cyrillus von Alex., Mainz 1905; I. B. Aufhauser, Die Heilslehre des hl. Gregor von Nyssa, Munich 1910; T. Salgueiro, La doctrine de st Augustin sur la Grâce d'après le traité à Simplicien, Porto 1925; J. Rivière, Notre vie dans le Christ chez st Augustin, in La vie spirituelle, 11 (1930), pp. 71-94; N. Merlin, St Augustin et le dogme du péché originel et de la Grâce, Paris 1931; V. Capanaga, La teologia agustiniana de la Gracia y la historia de las controversias, El Escorial 1933; T. I. Mc Kugo, De relatione inter castitatem Augustinianum et Gratiam actualem, Mundelein 1936; I. Fahy, Doctrina s. Hieronymi de Gratiae divinae necessitate, ibid. 1937; L. Janssens, Notre filiation divine d'après st Cyrille d'Alexandrie, in Ephemerides theologiae Lovanienses, 15 (1938), pp. 233-78; I. Gross, La divinisation du chrétien selon les Pères grecs, Paris 1938; J. Schmucker, Die Gnade des Urstandes und die Gnade der Auserwählten in Augustins De correptione et gratia, Regensburg 1939; F. Di Sciaccio, Fulgenzio di Ruspe e i massimi problemi della G., Rome 1941; R. Pio, La G. abituale in s. Agostino, ibid. 1943; H. du Manoir, Dogme et spiritualité chez st Cyrille d'Alexandrie, Paris 1944, pp. 163-84 and passim.
3. Scholastics: P. Minges, Die Gnadenlehre des Duns Scotus, Mainz 1900; I. Ude, Doctrina Capreoli de influxu Dei in actus voluntatis humanae, Graz 1905; K. Heim, Das Wesen der Gnade und ihr Verhältnis zu den natürlichen Funktionen des Menschen bei Alexander Halesius, Lignitz 1907; G. Božitkovicz, S. Bonaventurae doctrina de Gratia et libero arbitrio, Marienbad 1919; F. Mitzka, Die Lehre des hl. Bonaventura von der Vorbereitung auf die heiligmachende Gnade, in Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie, 50 (1926), pp. 27-72, 220-52; H. Doms, Die Gnadenlehre des sel. Albertus Magnus, Breslau 1929; J. Shupp, Die Gnadenlehre des Petrus Lombardus, Freiburg im Breisgau 1932; M.-L. Conger, Albert le Grand théologien de la Grâce sanctifiante, in La vie spirituelle, 15 (1933), pp. 109-40; V. Doucet, Matthaeus ab Aquasparta quaestiones disputatae de Gratia nunc primum editae cum introductione et citatis, Quaracchi 1935; I. Hartnett, Doctrina s. Bonaventurae de deformitate, Mundelein 1936; I. Auer, Die Entwicklung der Gnadenlehre in der Hochscholastik, I., Freiburg im Breisgau 1942; A. Landgraf, Die Erkennbarkeit des eigenen Gnadenstandes nach der Lehre der Frühscholastik, in Scholastik, 20-24 (1949), pp. 39-58.
4. S. Tommaso: R. M. Schultes, Circa doctrinam s. Thomae de instificatione, in Angelicum, 3 (1926), pp. 166-75, 345-54; Th. Ohm, Die Stellung der Heiden zu Natur und Übernatur nach dem hl. Thomas von Aquin, Münster 1927; E. Neveut, Controverses récentes sur le concours divin et la promotion divine, in Divus Thomas Plac., 47 (1927), pp. 123-26; id., Etudes sur la Grâce sanctifiante, ibid., 47 (1927), pp. 656-75; id., Notion et caractère surnaturel de la Grâce actuelle, ibid., 48 (1928), pp. 362-85; id., Des actes entativement surnaturels, ibid., 49 (1929), pp. 357-82; id., De la Grâce actuelle élevante, ibid., 50 (1930), pp. 588-99; O. Lottin, Liberté humaine et motion divine, De st Thomas à la condamnation de 1277, in Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale, 7 (1933), pp. 52-69; 156-73; H. Bouillard, Conversion et Grâce chez st Thomas d'Aquin, Parigi 1944 (tesi di laurea molto discutibile); H. Rondet, Nature et surnaturel dans la théologie de st Thomas d'Aquin, in Recherches de science religieuse, 33 (1946), pp. 56-91; H. De Lubac, Surnaturel, Etudes historiques, Parigi 1946, pp. 231-60 (su s. Tommaso: l'opera è molto criticata). F. Bourassa, Les missions divines et les surnaturelles chez st Thomas d'Aquin, in Sciences ecclésiastiques, 1 (1948), pp. 42-94; Th. Deman, St Thomas d'Aquin Théologien de la Grâce, in Revue de l'Université d'Ottawa, 19 (1949), pp. 66-79; G. Ladrille, Grâce et motion divine chez st Thomas d'Aquin, in Salesianum, 12 (1950), pp. 37-84.
5. Grandi controversie: G. Schneemann, Controversiarum de divinae Gratiae libérique arbitrii concordia, initia, progressus, trad. lat. di G. Gietmann, Friburgo in Br. 1881; Th. De Régnon, Bannes et Molina, Parigi 1885; id., Bannesianisme et molinisme, ivi 1890; A. M. Dummermuth, S. Thomas et doctrina praemotionis physicae, Responsio ad p. Schneemann aliasque doctrinae scholae thomisticae impugnatores, ivi 1886; V. Frins, S. Thomae doctrina de cooperatione Dei cum omni creatura praesertim libero, Responsio ad p. Dummermuth, ivi 1893; A. M. Dummermuth, Defensio doctrinae s. Thomae de praemotione physicae, Responsio ad p. Frins, Lovanio 1895; A. Wagner, Doctrina de Gratia sufficienti, Graz 1911; X. M. Le Bachelet, Prédestination et Grâce efficace, Controverses dans la Compagnie de Jésus au temps d'Aquaviva (1620-23), 2 voll., Lovanio 1931; P. Dumont, Liberté humaine et concours divin d'après Suarez, Parigi 1936; A. Di Giovanni, La G. del primo uomo e la perdita di essa nelle controversie di s. Roberto Bellarmino, Messina 1941.
6. Autori recenti: Hanno scritto trattati teologici sulla G.: C. Mazzarella, P. Pesch, S. Schiffini, G. de San, B. Beraza, H. Lange (molinisti); N. Del Prado, E. Hugon, F. Diekamp, A. Hoffmann, R. Garrigou-Lagrange (tomisti rigidi); L. Janssens, L. Billot, I. Van der Meersch, C. Boyer, P. Parente (temperati). Nuove controversie tra A. D'Alès, Providence et libre arbitre, Parigi 1927 e R. Garrigou-Lagrange, Dieu, 5e ed., ivi 1928 (appendice: St Thomas et le néomolinisme); tra R. Gar-
rigou-Lagrange, De comedia banneziona et recenti syncretismo, in Angelicum, 22 (1946), pp. 3-25 e P. Parente, Causalità divina e libertà umana, in La scuola cattolica, 75 (1947), pp. 89-108; H. Rondet, Gratia Christi, Essai d'histoire du dogme et de théologie dogmatique, Parigi 1948 (saggio di una sintesi critica integrale, che però non si può accettare senza qualche riserva); M. J. Scheeben, I misteri del cristianesimo, a cura di I. Gorlani, Brescia 1949, pp. 453-521; F. Walland, La G. divinizzante, Colle don Bosco (Avi) 1949. Pietro Parente