MERIT OF MAN. — Merit, theologically, is the good work which, performed by man
under certain conditions, is worthy of a supernatural reward.
I. REALITY OF THE M. OF M. —
1. Sacred Scripture
The word “merit” is absent from the Bible, but not the reality, since reward, remuneration, crown, and recompense for good works are correlative concepts.In the Old Testament, the perspective is still little open to eternal goods, and attention is directed more to the community than to the individual, who nevertheless gradually comes to be given greater prominence. Moreover, earthly sanctions too are divine, and it is logical to think that the relationship is transferred to the higher sphere.
In the New Testament, the Kingdom, that is, eternal beatitude, appears as a gift proceeding from the Father’s gratuitous favor. But alongside divine initiative there is found the human element, which normally conditions its application. One should recall the discourse on the mount with the beatitudes and the moral norm of the Kingdom, as well as the parables of the talents, the minas, and the workers in the vineyard. The Kingdom, which initially is pure gift, becomes subjectively, in its phase of progress and perfection, also a conquest through works: “Possess the Kingdom; for I was hungry and you gave me food” (Mt. 25:34). What Jesus condemns in the supernatural order is not the works of the law performed by the Pharisee, but the human principle on which he exclusively bases them: vain ostentation before men and presumptuous insistence before God. “They have already received their reward” does not, however, deny the works or their right to recompense; rather, it teaches how to make that right truly certain and effective before the Father, who sees in secret (Mt. 6:4).
The doctrine of the Apostles is in perfect harmony with the Gospel. St. James knows that “every good gift and every perfect gift is from above and comes down from the Father of lights” (Jac. 1:17); but he inculcates good works and emphasizes their value: “what good will it do, my brethren, if someone says that he has faith while he has no works? Can faith perhaps save him?” (ibid. 14). St. Peter speaks of “the unfading crown of glory” (I Pt. 5:4), which, at the appearing of the Chief Shepherd, will be received by the “presbyters” who have worthily fulfilled their ministry; the same reward awaits all the faithful for their good works (II Pt. 1:5-6). According to St. John, God searches the reins and hearts and will give to each according to his works (Apoc. 2:23), and will give recompense to his servants (ibid. 11:18). “Be faithful unto death and I will give you the crown of life” (ibid. 2:10). For those who die in the Lord, death is rest from their labors; their good works follow them (ibid. 13).
St. Paul, while emphasizing the principal role of Grace in the order of salvation and its absolute gratuity, affirms the value of the good works performed by the justified. “A man will reap what he has sown … from the flesh corruption, from the spirit eternal life” (ibid. 6:8). “Each will receive his reward according to his own labor” (I Cor. 3:8) and “from the Lord the recompense of the inheritance” (Col. 3:23), “on the day of the Revelation of the just judgment of God, who will render to each according to his works” (Rom. 2:6-7). The justified are like athletes competing in a race: “Run so as to win the prize, which will be an incorruptible crown” (I Cor. 9:24-25): “I have fought the good fight, I have finished the race, I have kept the faith; for the rest, there is reserved for me the crown of justice, which the Lord, the just Judge, will give me on that day, and not only to me but also to those who long for his coming” (II Tim. 4:7-8). Thus Sacred Scripture teaches that the justified can, with Grace, bear fruit in good works, that he must perform them, and that they are meritorious before God.
2. Tradition
The Church’s faith in the meritorious value of good works is evident from the writings of the first and second centuries, in which, in the judgment of the Protestant Schutz, alongside the Grace of God, the acquisition of a reward through human action appears as something natural.St. Justin: “We have learned from the prophets and declare it to be true that punishments and torments and good rewards are distributed according to the merit (κατ' ἀξίαν) of each one’s works” (Apologia I, 43: PG 6, 392). St. Irenaeus: “We esteem the crown precious … which is acquired through struggle … and all the more precious the more it comes to us through combat” (Adv. Haeres., 4, 37, 7: PG 7, 1104). Tertullian was the first to introduce the word meritum, which remained in theological usage (Apologeticum, 18: PL 1, 434-35). St. Cyprian: “You can attain to seeing God, if you have merited God through your life and works” (De opere et eleemosynis, 14: PL 4, 635). The teaching of the Fathers was progressively determined above all in ordinary catechesis and homilies; for example, St. Cyril of Jerusalem says: “The root of every good action is hope in the resurrection, since expectation of the reward strengthens the soul” (Cathech., 18, 1: PG 33, 107); St. Ambrose: “Before each person stands the balance of our merits; on the day of judgment either our works will help us or they will plunge us into the depths” (Epist., 2, 14, 16: PL 16, 883); St. Augustine: “having said” (Rom. 6:23) that death is the wages of sin, who would not think of adding: then eternal life is the wages of justice? And this is true, since just as death is rendered as punishment for the merit of sin, so eternal life is rendered as reward for the merit of justice” (Epist., 194, 20-21: PL 33, 881; cf. Rivière, articolo cit. in bibl., col. 576 sgg).
3. Scholasticism. — The Middle Ages gathered up the patristic inheritance, subjected it to rigorous analysis, deepening the notions of the natural and the supernatural and the “synergy” between Grace and free will, investigating the essence and foundation of the m. of m., and clarifying the concepts of merit de condigno and de congruo.
The distinction is based on the different relationship between the meritorious work and the reward. Merit de condigno entails a certain moral and proportional (not arithmetical) equality between the good work and the reward, so that, once God’s acceptance and promise are posited, the reward is due according to justice; de congruo merit is not based on equality, and therefore the reward does not belong to the order of justice, but rather to that of appropriateness (decentia) and benevolence; if God’s promise is added, to which God is faithful, one has infallible de congruo merit. Between the two there is only analogy; true merit, in the proper and strict sense, is only de condigno merit: according to the common interpretation of theologians, the term “merit” in the Tridentine documents should be understood with this value.
4. The ecclesiastical magisterium. — In 529, at the conclusion of the semi-Pelagian controversy, the Second Council of Orange, in canon II (Denz-U, 191), affirmed: “Grace is not preceded by any merit. To good works, if they are performed, the reward is due; but in order that they may be performed, Grace precedes, although it is not due.” The Council of Trent treated the subject with particular clarity, especially in chapter 16 and canon 32 of session VI: “If anyone shall say that the good works of the justified man are in such a manner the gifts of God that they are not also good merits of the justified himself; or that the justified man, by the good works which he performs through the Grace of God and the merit of Jesus Christ (of whom he is a living member), does not truly merit an increase of Grace, eternal life, and the attainment of eternal life itself (provided, however, that he dies in Grace), and also an increase of glory: let him be anathema” (Denz-U, 809, 842; cf. also canons 2, 24, and 26: Denz-U, 812, 834, 856). In 1567, s. Pius V condemned the errors of Michele Bajo, who, failing to recognize the distinction between the natural and supernatural orders, asserted that human works give a right to heavenly reward “by virtue of a natural law” and denied that, in order truly to merit, man needs the Grace of divine sonship and of the indwelling Holy Spirit (cf. propositions 2–18; Denz-U, 1002–18). In 1653, Innocent X declared and condemned as heretical the third proposition of Giansenio: “In the state of fallen nature, in order to merit and demerit, freedom from necessity is not required in man; freedom from coercion is sufficient” (Denz-U, 1094).
5. Polemic observations. — After this brief survey, one may conclude that when the Church opposed the denials of the “Reformation” with the memorable chapters and canons of the sixth session of Trent, she was expressing nothing other than the doctrine of Jesus. The “Reformation” was essentially a violent struggle against the merit of good works. It is true that the original radical Lutheran denials were immediately, and still more subsequently, supplemented by qualifications; but the substance remained, and remains, in the symbolical books and in the general conception of Protestant and Reformed Christianity. The power of the will of fallen man for good was considered entirely extinguished, so that it would remain inert in itself even under divine Grace, whereas a merely external and imputed justification can certainly not provide a stable inner principle for genuinely human and at the same time divine living and action. The reasoning proceeded from the false presupposition that Grace and human action are like two straight lines originating from two distinct points, whereas it is Grace that begins, and the free will joins itself to it, moving vitally under its continuous, strong and gentle impulse. Merit is the product of two factors, Grace and freedom, both genuinely operative and indispensable to the reality of the effect.
Man’s meritorious work seems to place the creature in possession of rights before the Creator, and moreover on a supernatural plane, whose essential characteristic is gratuitousness. To this objection one replies, on the one hand, by conceding that between God and man there can be no relation of strict justice, and, on the other, by recalling s. Paul’s “crown of justice” and s. Augustine’s saying: “God made himself a debtor, not by owing but by promising. We cannot say to him: return what you have received; but we rightly say: return what you have promised” (En. in Ps., 83, 16: PL 37, 1068). For although the Lord affirmed (Lk. 17:10) that we must regard ourselves as “unprofitable servants,” he also said (Mt. 25:23): “Well done, good and faithful servant.” Scripture says that eternal life is inherited by children. That is true, but it also says that it is a reward promised to children who do good. It may be noted in passing that, once again, heresy presents itself as a partial vision claiming totality. From another standpoint, man’s merit does not injure the merit of Jesus Christ, any more than the cluster hanging from the vine injures the vine. The merit of the Lord’s Passion and death was so effective that it obtained for man the possibility of meriting in him. There is also the very common false presupposition that, in the name of a moral purism, the Catholic doctrine of merit is characterized as narrowly egoistic and self-interested, since, it is said, it is dominated by the “mania for reward.” Without intending to refute this position at length, it may be observed that there is an objective relation between a good work and its reward, and that it is therefore moral for man, in acting, positively to intend the recompense.
II. CONDITIONS OF THE M. OF M. — 1. On the part of the agent. — He must be: a) in statu viae, because “when night comes (death), no one can work any longer” (Io. 9:14); one must do good “while we have time” (Gal. 6:10); b) in statu gratiae (v. the Council of Trent and the condemnation of the errors of Bajo, cited above), that is, he must be vitally incorporated, as a living member, into Christ, from whom alone there derives in man the Christlike and meritorious action. Catholic doctrine does not hypostatize works, considering them so detached from the acting subject as though they possessed value in and of themselves, like gold coin possessed by a thief, and as though they did not derive their meritorious value de condigno also from the supernatural dignity of the acting subject, constituted by habitual Grace as a friend of God.
2. On the part of the work. — This must be: a) free, perfectly so—that is, not only exempt from external coercion, but also from internal necessity (v. the 3rd proposition of Giansenio declared heretical): merit belongs to the order of human moral values, whose root is freedom; for this reason, the justified person who dies before having performed free acts obtains eternal life only as an inheritance; nor does merit cease when the work is obligatory: love of enemies is an evangelical commandment, and yet it is said that for those who love them “the reward shall be great” (Lc. 6:35); in the case of a precept by which the work is already owed to God, St. Thomas holds that man merits it “because of his own will he does what he ought” (Sum. Theol., 1°-2°c, q. 104, a. 1, ad 1); b) good, that is, in accordance with all the elements required for the morality of the human act: an evil work merits punishment; omission of an evil action becomes meritorious when it requires moral strength; c) supernatural: certainly by reason of the proximate elicitive principle, which is the faculty elevated by the infused habit, which in all probability must be moved by actual Grace. That the human act must also in some way be directed toward God as the author of supernatural salvation is to be admitted; theologians, however, do not agree in specifying what intentionality or motive is required. The Church condemned certain propositions of Quesnel tending to affirm that only the act of charity is meritorious (Denz-U, 1403 ff.).
3. On the part of God
God’s promise to accept the good work and to reward it is required. The reason is that man cannot claim to possess a strict right before God; God must graciously take the initiative in ordaining human action toward himself through the promise of reward. Revelation has made this point clear in all the passages of Scripture and the Fathers where it is said that good works can and must be performed. Theologians debate the function that such ordination and promise have with regard to the m. of m. Some think that the work, even when performed under the required conditions, is in itself in no way proportionate to the reward without the divine promise; others, on the contrary, hold that it is intrinsically so; many affirm that such a work possesses in itself radically and in actu primo the character of merit, which the divine promise integrates and completes in actu secundo, so that the reward is strictly owed to II. The latter seems to be the true opinion, since it takes proper account both of the intrinsic dignity of the work and of the transcendence of God, who makes himself our debtor only by promising. Finally, it should be noted that the state of Grace is not required for merit de congruo, and that God’s promise is required only for infallible merit de congruo. III. OBJECT OF THE M. DELL’U. — The Council of Trent (sess. VI, chap. 16, can. 2, cited above) defines the objects which a man, freely justified, truly merits through good works, that is, de condigno, namely: 1) eternal life, the principal object; 2) an increase of glory, insofar as the Lord will give to each according to his works and according to his labor: he who has gained ten minas will be set over ten cities, and he who has gained five, over five (Lc. 12, 16 ff.). And since the Kingdom of God, which is eternal life, begins on earth in the soul of the just person, where Grace, intrinsically capable of increase, is its seed, preparation, and pledge, and since a determinate degree of habitual Grace will correspond to a determinate degree of glory, it follows that an increase of Grace is also an object of merit. The just person also merits the conferral or payment of the eternal reward, which, however, will be given in due time and on the condition that he die in the Grace of God.The following are not objects of merit de condigno: a) justification and the graces by which one prepares oneself for it: St Paul affirms this several times, and the Council of Trent defined it (sess. VI, chap. 8; Denz-U, 801); indeed, the condition for such merit is to be just; hence the principle applies here: “the first grace cannot be an object of merit”; b) every supernatural good which the just person intends to obtain for others: God repays each according to his own works, which alone, insofar as they are personal, count toward the crown; it is the exclusive privilege of Jesus Christ, the one mediator, to have merited de condigno for others; c) efficacious Grace as such: this is the common opinion of theologians, based also on the absence of the divine promise in this regard; d) the gift of final perseverance, which Trent calls magnum donum, concerning which the justified person too must always remain in salutary fear: the same Council does not list it among the objects of true merit, but presents it as a condition for the merited attainment of eternal life; e) one’s own restoration after the loss of Grace. Mortal sin places man in the state of one condemned to eternal death, with a sentence immediately to be executed: if God makes him his son again, this is due solely to his goodness.
As for the object of merit de congruo, the sinner can merit: a) further actual graces, by which he may dispose himself more closely to justification; this merit, because of the promise of God, is infallible; b) justification. This is the more common opinion and the one better founded in Revelation and in certain passages of Trent. Indeed, when the act of perfect contrition is concerned, merit de congruo is infallible. The just person can merit: a) efficacious Graces and final perseverance itself; since the divine promise is lacking, however, the merit is fallible: it should be observed with Suárez (De Graeia, 12, 38, 14) that final perseverance is merited not by one or more specific acts or during a certain period, but by a series of good acts extending throughout life; the “great gift” is the infallible object of “supplicatory prayer”; b) temporal goods as well, insofar as they are of assistance for eternal life.
For others, the just person can merit de congruo everything that he can in any way merit for himself, and in addition the first supernatural Grace and the first efficacious Grace, it being understood that these are merited fallibly. Three great things are absolutely and solely gifts for those who receive them: the first supernatural Grace, the first efficacious Grace, and total predestination. The final touch of divine mercy is the revival of merits (v.).