MERIT OF MAN. — Theologically, merit is the good work performed by man under certain conditions that is worthy of a supernatural reward.
I. REALITY OF THE MERIT OF MAN
1. Holy Scripture
The word “merit” is absent from the Bible, but not the concept, since wages, remuneration, crown, and retribution for good works are correlative notions.In the Old Testament the perspective is still not fully open to eternal goods, and the gaze is rather directed toward the community than the individual, though gradually the latter is given prominence. Moreover, even earthly sanctions are divine, and it is logical to think that the relationship extends to the higher sphere.
In the New Testament the Kingdom, that is, eternal beatitude, is presented as a gift that descends from the Father’s free and gracious will. Yet alongside the divine initiative, the human element finds its place, conditioning its normal application. The Sermon on the Mount with its Beatitudes and moral norms of the Kingdom, the parables of the talents, the minas, and the workers in the vineyard are to be recalled. The Kingdom, which is initially a pure gift, subjectively, in its phase of progress and perfection, also becomes a conquest through works: “Come, you who are blessed by my Father; inherit the kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the world. For I was hungry and you gave me food” (Mt 25:34). What Jesus sternly condemns is not the works of the law performed by the Pharisee, but the human principle on which it is exclusively founded; the vain ostentation before men and the petulant attitude before God. “They have received their reward”; yet He does not deny the works their right to recompense; indeed, He teaches the way to render that right truly certain and effective before the Father, who sees in secret (Mt 6:4).
The doctrine of the Apostles is in perfect harmony with the Gospel. St. James knows that “every good endowment and every perfect gift is from above, coming down from the Father of lights” (Jas 1:17); yet he inculcates good works and emphasizes their value: “What does it profit, my brethren, if a man says he has faith but has not works? Can his faith save him?” (ibid., 1:14). St. Peter speaks of “the unfading crown of glory” (1 Pt 5:4), which the “presbyters” who have fulfilled their ministry worthily will receive at the appearance of the Chief Shepherd; the same reward awaits all the faithful for their good works (2 Pt 1:5-6). According to St. John, God searches hearts and minds and will render to each according to his works (Rev 2:23) and give recompense to His servants (ibid., 11:18). “Be faithful unto death, and I will give you the crown of life” (ibid., 2:10). Death for those who die in the Lord is rest from their labors; good works follow after them (ibid., 13).
St. Paul, while emphasizing the primary role of grace in the order of salvation and its absolute gratuity, affirms the value of good works performed by the justified. “For he who sows to his own flesh will from the flesh reap corruption; but he who sows to the Spirit will from the Spirit reap eternal life” (Gal 6:8). “Each will receive his wages according to his labor” (1 Cor 3:8) and “the Lord will render to everyone according to his deeds” (Rom 2:6). The justified are like athletes running a race: “Run in such a way that you may win the prize. Every athlete exercises self-control in all things” (1 Cor 9:24-25): “I have fought the good fight, I have finished the race, I have kept the faith. Henceforth there is laid up for me the crown of righteousness, which the Lord, the righteous judge, will award to me on that Day, and not only to me but also to all who have loved his appearing” (2 Tim 4:7-8). Thus Holy Scripture teaches that the justified, with the help of grace, can produce good works, must perform them, and that these works are meritorious before God.
2. Tradition
The Church’s faith in the meritorious value of good works is evident from the writings of the 1st and 2nd centuries, in which, according to the judgment of the Protestant Schutz, alongside the grace of God, the acquisition of a reward for human action appears as something natural.St. Justin: “We have learned from the prophets and hold it to be true that punishments and torments and good rewards are distributed according to the merit (κατ’ ἀξίαν) of each man’s works” (Apologia I, 43: PG 6, 392). St. Irenaeus: “We esteem the crown... which is acquired through struggle... and all the more precious as it comes to us through combat” (Adv. Haeres., 4, 37, 7: PG 7, 1104). Tertullian was the first to introduce the word meritum, which remained in theological usage (Apologeticum, 18: PL 1, 434-35). St. Cyprian: “You can attain to see God if you have merited God by your life and works” (De opere et eleemosynis, 14: PL 4, 635). The teaching of the Fathers developed progressively especially in ordinary catechesis and homilies; for example, St. Cyril of Jerusalem says: “The root of every good action is the hope of the resurrection, for the expectation of reward invigorates the soul” (Cathec., 18, 1: PG 33, 107); St. Ambrose: “Before each of us stands the scale of our merits; on the day of judgment our works will either help us or plunge us into the depths” (Epist., 2, 14, 16: PL 16, 883); St. Augustine: “Having said (Rom 6:23) that the wages of sin is death, who would not think to add: then the wages of righteousness is eternal life? And this is true, for as the merit of sin is punished by death, so the merit of righteousness is rewarded by eternal life” (Epist., 194, 20-21: PL 33, 881; cf. Rivière, article cited in bibliography, cols. 576 ff.).
3. Scholasticism
The Middle Ages inherited the patristic legacy, subjected it to rigorous analysis, deepening the notions of the natural and the supernatural and the “synergy” between grace and free will, investigating the essence and foundation of the merit of man, and clarifying the concepts of merit *de condigno* and *de congruo*.The distinction is based on the different relationship between the meritorious work and the reward. Merit *de condigno* implies a certain moral and proportional (not arithmetical) equality between the good work and the reward, so that, given God’s acceptance and promise, the reward is owed according to justice; merit *de congruo* is not founded on equality, and therefore the reward is not in the order of justice but rather in that of fitness (convenience) and benignity; if divine promise is added, to which God is faithful, there arises infallible merit *de congruo*. Between the two there is only an analogy; true merit, in the proper and strict sense, is only that *de condigno*: with this meaning, according to the common interpretation of theologians, the term “merit” is to be understood in the Tridentine documents.
4. Ecclesiastical teaching
In 529, at the close of the Semi-Pelagian controversy, the Second Council of Orange, in canon II (Denz-U, 191), declared: «Grace is not preceded by any merit. To good works, if they are performed, a reward is due, but in order that they may be done, there precedes the Grace which is not due.» The Council of Trent treated the subject with particular clarity, especially in chapter 16 and canon 32 of session VI: «If anyone shall say that the good works of the justified man are so the gifts of God that they are not also good merits of the same justified man, or that the justified man himself, by the good works which he performs by the Grace of God and by the merit of Jesus Christ (of whom he is a living member), does not truly merit the increase of Grace, eternal life, and the attainment of eternal life itself (if he shall have died in Grace), and also the increase of glory, let him be anathema» (Denz-U, 809, 842; cf. also canons 2, 24 and 26: Denz-U, 812, 834, 836). In 1567, St. Pius V condemned the errors of Michael Baius, who, failing to recognize the distinction between the natural and the supernatural order, affirmed that the works of man give a right to heavenly reward «by virtue of a natural law» and denied that man truly needs the Grace of divine filiation and the indwelling Holy Spirit in order to merit (cf. propositions 2–18; Denz-U, 1002–18). In 1653, Innocent X declared and condemned as heretical the third proposition of Jansenius: «In the state of fallen nature, in order to merit or demerit, freedom from necessity is not required in man, but freedom from coercion suffices» (Denz-U, 1094).5. Polemical remarks
After this rapid survey, it may be concluded that when the Church opposed the denials of the «Reformation» with the memorable chapters and canons of the Sixth Session of Trent, it was expressing nothing other than the doctrine of Jesus. The «Reformation» was essentially a violent struggle against the merit of good works. It is true that to the initial radical Lutheran denials, corrections were soon added and even more so later, but the substance remains and is found in the confessional writings and in the general conception of Protestant and Reformed Christianity. It was thought that the power of the will of fallen man was entirely extinguished for good, so that it would remain inert even under divine Grace, whereas a justification that is merely external and imputed cannot provide a stable, inner principle for living and acting in a manner that is both truly human and divine. The reasoning proceeded from the false presupposition that Grace and human effort are like two lines originating from two distinct points, whereas it is Grace that initiates, to which the free will is joined, moving vitally under its continuous, strong yet gentle impulse. Merit is the product of two factors, Grace and freedom, both of which are truly operative and indispensable to the reality of the effect.The meritorious work of man seems to place the creature in a position of rights before the Creator, and this moreover on a supernatural plane, whose gratuitousness is an essential note. To this objection it is answered by conceding on the one hand that between God and man there can be no relationship of strict justice, and on the other by recalling the «crown of righteousness» of St. Paul and the saying of St. Augustine: «God has made Himself a debtor not by duty but by promise. We cannot say to Him: render what You have received, but we may rightly say: render what You have promised» (En. in Ps., 83, 16: PL 37, 1068). For if the Lord has said (Lk 17:10) that we must consider ourselves «unprofitable servants», He has also said (Mt 25:23): «Well done, good and faithful servant.» But Scripture says that eternal life is an inheritance for the children. It is true, but it also says that it is a reward promised to children who do good. It may be noted in passing how once again heresy reveals itself as a partial vision, claiming to be total. On the other hand, the merit of man does not detract from the merit of Jesus Christ, any more than the cluster detracts from the vine from which it hangs. So effective was the merit of the passion and death of the Lord that it obtained for man the ability to merit in Him. There is then the very common false presupposition that, in the name of a moral purism, the Catholic doctrine of merit is branded as crassly egoistic and self-interested, in which, it is said, the «mania of reward» prevails. Without wishing to refute this position thoroughly, it is noted that there exists an objective relationship between good works and their reward, and that it is therefore moral for man, in his actions, to have a positive intention regarding retribution.
II. CONDITIONS OF THE MERIT OF MAN
6. On the part of the one who acts
He must be: a) in statu viae, because «when night comes (death), no one can work any longer» (Jn 9:4); it is necessary to do good «while we have time» (Gal 6:10); b) in statu gratiae (cf. the Council of Trent and the condemnation of the errors of Baius, cited above), that is, he must be vitally united, as a living member, to Christ, from whom alone proceeds in man the Christ-like and meritorious action. Catholic doctrine does not hypostasize works, considering them as if severed from the acting subject, as if they had an intrinsic value in themselves, like gold coins possessed by a thief, and as if they did not derive their meritorious value *de condigno* also from the supernatural dignity of the acting subject, constituted by habitual Grace as a friend of God.7. On the part of the work
This must be: a) free, perfectly, that is, not only exempt from external constraint but also from internal necessity (cf. the third proposition of Jansenius, declared heretical): merit belongs to the order of human moral values, whose root is freedom; for this reason the justified man who dies before performing free acts obtains eternal life only as an inheritance; nor does merit cease when the work is obligatory: the love of enemies is an evangelical commandment, and yet it is said that for those who love them «your reward will be great» (Lk 6:35); in the case of a precept whereby the work is already owed to God, St. Thomas holds that man merits it because he does of his own will what he must do» (Sum. Theol., 1a–2ae, q. 104, a. 1, ad 1); b) good, that is, in accordance with all the elements required for the honesty of the human act: a bad work merits punishment; the omission of a bad action is meritorious when it requires moral strength; c) supernatural: certainly by reason of the proximate elicitive principle, which is the faculty elevated by the infused habit, which very probably must be moved by actual Grace. That the human act must also in some way be directed toward God as the author of supernatural salvation must be admitted; theologians, however, are not agreed on the precise degree of intentionality or motive required. The Church has condemned certain propositions of Quesnel tending to affirm that only an act of charity is meritorious (Denz-U, 1403 ff.).8. From God’s Side
The promise of God to accept good works and reward them is required. The reason is that man cannot claim any strict right before God; it is necessary that God graciously take the initiative to ordain human works to Himself by promising a reward. Revelation has made this point clear in all passages of Scripture and the Fathers where it is said that good works can and must be performed. Theologians debate the function that this ordination and promise have regarding the merit of human works. Some think that the work, even when performed under the required conditions, is not in itself proportionate to the reward without the divine promise; others, on the contrary, hold that it is intrinsically so; many affirm that such a work has in itself, fundamentally and in actu primo, the reason for merit, which the divine promise integrates and perfects in actu secundo, so that the reward is strictly due to II. This last opinion seems to be the true one, since it justly takes into account both the intrinsic dignity of the work and the transcendence of God, who, by promising, alone makes Himself our debtor. Lastly, it should be noted that for merit *de congruo* the state of grace is not required, and the promise of God is only demanded for infallible *meritum de congruo*.III. OBJECT OF THE MERIT OF HUMAN WORKS
The Council of Trent (sess. VI, cap. 16, can. 2, cited above) defines the objects that a man, gratuitously justified, truly merits by good works *de condigno*, namely: 1) eternal life, the principal object; 2) an increase in glory, inasmuch as the Lord will render to each according to his works and his labor: “He who has gained ten minas will be put in charge of ten cities, he who five, of five” (Lk 19:16ff.). And since the Kingdom of God, which is eternal life, begins on earth in the soul of the just, where grace, intrinsically capable of increase, is its seed, preparation, and pledge, and since a certain degree of habitual grace will correspond to a certain degree of glory, it follows that even the increase of grace is an object of merit. The just man also merits the conferral or payment of eternal reward, which, however, will be given in due time and on the condition that he dies in the grace of God.The following are not objects of merit *de condigno*: a) justification and the graces that prepare for it: St. Paul affirms this repeatedly, and the Council of Trent has defined it (sess. VI, cap. 8; Denz.-U., 80); indeed, the condition for such merit is being already just; hence the principle applies here: “the first grace cannot be an object of merit”; b) every supernatural good that the just man intends to obtain for others: God renders to each according to his own works, which alone, as personal, are valid for the crown; it is the exclusive privilege of Jesus Christ, the one mediator, to have merited *de condigno* for others; c) efficacious grace as such: this is the common opinion of theologians, also based on the lack, in this regard, of a divine promise; d) the gift of final perseverance, which Trent calls the “great gift,” concerning which even the justified must always be in a state of interior watchfulness; the same Council does not list it among the objects of true merit but sets it as a condition for the attainment of eternal life; e) one’s own reparation after the loss of grace. Mortal sin places man in the state of one condemned to eternal death, with a sentence immediately executable: if God makes him His son again, this is due solely to His benignity.
As for the object of merit *de congruo*, the sinner can merit: a) further actual graces, by which he will be more closely disposed to justification; this merit, by God’s promise, is infallible; b) justification. This is the most common and best-founded opinion in Revelation and in some passages of Trent. Indeed, when it comes to the act of perfect contrition, the merit *de congruo* is infallible. The just man can merit: a) efficacious graces and even final perseverance; yet, lacking a divine promise, the merit is fallible: as Suárez observes (*De Gratia*, 12, 38, 14), final perseverance is merited not by one or more specific acts or during a certain time, but by a series of good acts unfolding throughout life; the “great gift” is an infallible object of “supplicatory prayer”; b) temporal goods, insofar as they are helpful for eternal life.
For others, the just man can merit *de congruo* everything that in any way he can merit for himself, in addition to the first supernatural grace and the first efficacious grace, albeit fallibly. Three great things are absolutely and solely gifts for those who receive them: the first supernatural grace, the first efficacious grace, and total predestination. The final touch of divine mercy is the revivification of merits (v.).