BAIUS (DE BAY, BAIO), MICHEL. - Belgian theologian, b. at Mélin in Hainaut (Belgium) in 1513, d. September 1, 1589.
I. LIFE
B. began his philosophical studies at Louvain in 1533 and became "magister artium" in 1535; from 1536 to 1541 he studied theology, from 1541 to 1544 he was rector of the college of Standone; from 1544 to 1550 he taught philosophy: in the meantime he became "licentiatus" (1545) and "magister" in theology (1550); from 1551 he was royal professor of Sacred Scripture. In theology he began, together with his friend Hessels, a new method, that is, the study of Sacred Scripture and of the Fathers, especially of St. Augustine. But with the new method there also came new doctrines. On 27 June 1560 the Sorbonne condemned 18 theses drawn from the writings of B.'s pupils. In 1563 B. and Hessels were sent as royal theologians to the Council of Trent. Between 1563 and 1566 B. published the writings in which above all the "Baian errors" are found. After careful examination Pius V, on 1 Oct. 1567, condemned in the bull Ex omnibus afflictionibus 76 (by another reckoning 79) theses of the Baianists. The theses are attributed plerisque and not only to B.; moreover, no names are given in the bull. The bull is written without punctuation marks. The condemnation says: quas quidem sententias stricto coram nobis examine ponderatus quamquam nonnullae aliquo pacto sustineri possent in rigore et proprio verborum sensu ab assertoribus intento haereticas erroneas... damnamus. Now, according as a comma is placed after possent or after intento, a different sense results (Comma Pianum): according to the sense of the bull the comma is to be placed after possent. B. submitted at first; but then in 1569 he sent an apology to the Pope. After a new examination the Pope confirmed his first decision (13 May 1569). B. had to retract all the condemned theses. In 1575 he became chancellor of the University. In 1577 his controversy with the Calvinist Philip Marnix, baron of St. Aldegonde, on the Eucharist and on the Church begins. On 29 Jan. 1580 (and not 1579 as is generally said) Gregory XIII confirmed the bull of Pius V with the bull Provisionis nostrae. It was published solemnly by Toleto at Louvain on 21 March 1580. B. and the whole Faculty rejected the articles just as the bull rejected them. To put an end to every dispute, the Faculty compiled, on the instructions of the nuncio Bonomini, the writing: Doctrinae eius quam certorum articulorum damnatio postulare visa est brevis et quoad fieri potuit ordinata et cohaerens explicatio (1586), in which the doctrine to which one must adhere in the face of the condemned theses is set out positively. It is an excellent auxiliary means for rightly understanding the condemned theses. In B.'s last years falls the beginning of the dispute of the theological Faculty with the Jesuits of Louvain (Lessius). It cannot be established with certainty whether and to what extent B. had a part in the compilation of the censure of 1587; but certainly he contributed to its diffusion. B. died in peace with the Church.
II. DOCTRINE
According to B., the exact understanding of the principal truths of the Christian faith depends on the answer to two questions: Qualis ab initio fuerit naturalis hominis integritas et quid sentiendum sit de virtutibus impiorum: because without it one can neither recognize the corruption of human nature, nor its restoration through Christ (De prima hominis iustitia. Praefatio). According to the testimony of Holy Scripture, man was created rectus, ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei, sapiens, iustus, bonus, ceterisque virtutibus praeditus: this rectitudo must be connected with the indwelling of the Holy Spirit (ibid., chaps. 1 and 2). The integrity of the first man consisted not only in the full knowledge of the divine law and in full obedience toward the Creator, but also in the fact that the lower powers of the soul were subject to the higher powers, and all the members of the body subject to the command of the will (ibid., chap. 3).
Integrity, moreover, was not an undue exaltatio of human nature, qua ex bona melior facta sit, but was naturalis eius conditio (ibid., chap. 4): since natural without qualification and in the proper sense is what belongs to the first nativitas. The absence of these goods is defined precisely as malum: but malum is the privatio of what belongs to nature. The evils derived from original sin, concupiscence, death, etc., can also be defined as natural, but only in an improper and analogous sense, inasmuch as they are communicated at birth by corrupted nature (ibid., chaps. 5, 6). If now through Christ those goods are restored to fallen man, which he lost in Adam, they can be called supernatural, but only in the way that what is given by a special benefit of God is called supernatural (for example, the miraculous cure of a sick person), but not in the sense that the gifts themselves are supernatural. If, however, the gifts of the original state are called natural, this does not mean that they originate from the principles of nature and not instead communicated directly by God: but it means that they belong to the nature of man so that their lack is an evil for nature. In the same way, also the soul of man is natural, even if it does not proceed from the principles of nature but must be communicated directly by God (ibid., chap. 11).
In these conditions man would have to obey his Creator and merit eternal life. Just as through a naturalis lex eternal death was established as punishment for man's disobedience and sin, so it was established by natural law that he should receive eternal life as the just reward of his obedience; therefore eternal life is for him only merit and not grace. Likewise the Angels received eternal life as a just retribution, not as grace (De meritis operum, book I, chaps. 1-3). From what has been said it is clear that the integrity in which Adam was created was natural and owed to man; consequently he could not have been created without it. What theologians designate as status naturae purae is impossible according to B.'s doctrine.
With sin Adam lost integrity, and sin was transmitted with its consequences to his descendants. Original sin consists in a vicious and disordered act with which all men are born (De pecc. orig., chap. 2). Its elements are: ignorance, malice of the will, which does not love God and his justice, disobedience of the lower part of man against the higher (ibid., chap. 3). Before the use of reason original sin does not appear, but reveals itself when man grows and vana capit, vana capit et contra semetipum puguare incipit (ibid., chap. 2). Because of original sin man, even the infant, is truly destined to the wrath of God and to eternal death. As Adam was at first pleasing to God, although he was not rectus by his own work, so the newborn child is not an object of divine complacency because he is in opposition to God and to his law, by reason of original sin, even if he has not placed himself in this position (ibid., chap. 4). Sin is in fact essentially disobedience to the command of God.
The question whether sin must be voluntarium does not concern in any way the essence of sin, but only its origin. What is against the law of God is sin in him in whom it is found, and is justly imputed to him, tantum quia inest... si vel actu vel habitu et dominatur (ibid., chap. 7). In the state of integrity man could fulfill the divine commands with his will and without difficulty (De lib. arb., chap. 9). As a consequence of sin he has lost this faculty. Abandoned to himself he can no longer will anything morally good nor overcome any temptation (ibid., chap. 11). However, even after the fall he is not completely deprived of freedom.
B. distinguishes freedom from necessity, and freedom from servitude. The first consists in this, that he who wills something can also not will it: this freedom has remained to man, but only in relation to the goods of this life (eating, drinking, cultivating the soil, and the like); not, however, in relation to the moral good. Another thing is freedom from servitude. By servitude B. means a necessity not willed, or a bad inclination of the will from which man cannot free himself. While before sin he was free from servitude, now man is subject to the servitude of sin (ibid., chaps. 4 and 5). Thus abandoned to himself, he can only perform morally evil actions. The actions of the wicked, which externally appear as virtues, are in fact sin, and merit punishments (De virt. imp., chaps. 4 and 5). Any love of the rational creature is either vitiosa cupiditas with which the world is loved, and which is forbidden by the apostle John, or laudabilis charitas with which God is loved (De charitate, chap. 6). Thanks to the redemptive work of Christ man can again be justified, do good actions and merit eternal life. The gifts that by reason of the merits of Christ are communicated to him are not owed to fallen man, but are grace.
To have an exact concept of justification it is necessary according to B. to establish what justice is, and this in turn is not possible without an exact conception of love. Indeed justice is either one and the same thing as love or is so intimately connected with love that the latter cannot exist without the former (De charit., chap. 1). This love is to be understood as motus animae, that is, actual love. Whether besides this one must also admit a habitual love is a question of little account (ibid., chap. 2). This love is infused into our heart by the Holy Spirit (ibid., chaps. 3, 4). It can precede the remission of sins; it begins in us when God transforms our evil will into a good one (ibid., chap. 8), and will grow little by little ever to greater perfection (ibid., chap. 9).
Justice consists in the observance of the commandments, and since love is the fulfillment of the law, justice is called "love" in Holy Scripture (De iustitia, chap. 1). For fallen man, for the sinner, justice however also embraces the remission of sins, so that for him justice consists of two parts: remission of sins, and renewal of life, that is, the exercise of the virtues (ibid., chaps. 3 and 4). In the proper sense, however, justice is only obedience to the law; the remission of sins is called justice only in an improper sense, inasmuch as it removes the obstacle, in order to obtain eternal life (ibid., chap. 5). Since the sinner possesses love already before the remission of sins, he has in a certain way also justice, but as long as he is in this state, he is not called iustus without qualification (ibid., chap. 7). From what has been said it follows that justification is the constant progress in the exercise of virtue and in the remission of sins (De iustificatione, chaps. 1, 8).
Through the grace of Christ man can merit eternal life anew (De mer. op., I, ch. 5). But whereas eternal life was for man only a merit before sin, now it is both merit and grace, because through grace he is given the possibility of earning it (ibid., ch. 6). Only eternal life is the object of man's merit, and precisely of man alone. Jesus Christ did not merit eternal life for us, but through him man is merely restored to the condition of observing the commandments: if he does this, the natural law comes back into force, by which, according to God's just judgment, eternal life is given as a reward for the observance of the commandments. Everything else that pertains to the reintegration of fallen nature (faith, prayer, penance, remission of sins, remission of punishments, a holy life, perseverance, resurrection of the body) is not the object of man's merit, but only the merit of Christ, because if anything belonging to the reparatio of man were the fruit of the merit of someone other than Christ, that one would be at least in part our redeemer (ibid., ch. 9). Even with works of penance we do not properly make satisfaction, but God, having regard to these works, grants us to participate in the satisfaction of Christ. In the same way B. explains the efficacy of indulgences (De indulgentiis, ch. 8). That a work is meritorious lies in the nature of the work, and not in a particular dignity of the agent, as, for instance, that he is an adopted son of God (De merit. op., II, ch. 2). Therefore even the good work of a man whose sin has not yet been forgiven merits eternal life: naturally he can attain it only when he is freed from sin (ibid., ch. 6).
With regard to the Pope, Baius teaches that he is the successor of Peter, the foundation of the Church, and possesses the primacy; but he is not episcopus universalis, rather patriarcha universalis, he does not have immediate jurisdiction over all the faithful, but only over the faithful of his own diocese. The other faithful are subject immediately only to their own bishops, and these have their jurisdiction directly from God and not from the Pope. Therefore the Pope must not, without grave reason, his tribunal the disputes of the faithful. It does not appear that B. acknowledged the infallibility of the Pope: but he does not express himself with sufficient clarity on this point.