BAIUS (DE BAY, BAIO), MICHEL. - Belgian theologian, b. at Mélin in Hainaut (Belgium) in 1513, d. 19 Sept. 1589.
I. LIFE
B. began philosophical studies at Louvain in 1533, became "magister artium" in 1535; from 1536 to 1541 he studied theology, from 1541 to 1544 he was rector of the college of Standonck; from 1544 to 1550 he taught philosophy: in the meantime he became "licentiatus" (1545) and "magister" in theology (1550); from 1551 he was royal professor of Sacred Scripture. In theology he, together with his friend Hessels, initiated a new method, namely the study of Sacred Scripture and the Fathers, especially St. Augustine. But to the new method were also joined new doctrines. On 27 June 1560 the Sorbonne condemned 18 theses drawn from the writings of B.’s disciples. In 1563 B. and Hessels were sent as royal theologians to the Council of Trent. Between 1563 and 1566 B. published the writings in which above all the "errors of Baius" are found. After careful examination, Pius V, on 10 Oct. 1567, condemned in the bull Ex omnibus afflictionibus 76 (according to another count 79) theses of the Baians. The theses are attributed by many not only to B.; in the bull, moreover, no names are given. The bull is written without punctuation. The condemnation states: "quas quidem sententias stricto coram nobis examine ponderatas quamquam nonnullae aliquo pacto sustineri possent in rigore et proprio verborum sensu ab assertoribus intento haereticas erroneas... damnamus." Now, depending on whether a comma is placed after possent or after intento, a different meaning results (the "Comma Pianum"): according to the sense of the bull, the comma should be placed after possent. B. submitted at first; but then in 1569 he sent an apology to the Pope. After a new examination the Pope confirmed his first decision (13 May 1569). B. was obliged to renounce all the condemned theses. In 1575 he became chancellor of the University. In 1577 he began his controversy with the Calvinist Philippe Marnix, baron of St. Aldegonde, on the Eucharist and the Church. On 29 Jan. 1580 (and not 1579 as is generally said) Gregory XIII confirmed the bull of Pius V with the bull Provisionis nostrae. It was solemnly published at Toledo in Louvain on 21 March 1580. B. and the entire Faculty rejected the articles just as the bull rejected them. To put an end to all dispute, the Faculty, at the request of the nuncio Bonominio, compiled the writing: Doctrine eius quam certorum articulorum damnatio postulare visa est brevis et quoad fieri potuit ordinata et cohaerens explicatio (1586), in which the doctrine to which one must adhere in the face of the condemned theses is positively expounded. It is an excellent auxiliary means for correctly understanding the condemned theses. In the last years of B. falls the beginning of the dispute of the Faculty of Theology with the Jesuits of Louvain (Lessius). It cannot be established with certainty whether and to what extent B. took part in the compilation of the censure of 1587; but certainly he contributed to its dissemination. B. died in peace with the Church.II. DOCTRINE
According to B., the exact understanding of the principal truths of the Christian faith depends on the answer to two questions: "Qualis ab initio fuerit naturalis hominis integritas et quid sentiendum sit de virtutibus impiorum," for without this one cannot recognize either the corruption of human nature or its restoration through Christ (De prima hominis iustitia, Preface). According to the testimony of Sacred Scripture, man was created "rectus," in the image and likeness of God, wise, just, temperate, and endowed with other virtues: this "rectitude" is to be connected with the indwelling of the Holy Spirit (ibid., chaps. 1 and 2). The integrity of the first man did not consist solely in piety and the knowledge of the divine law and full obedience to the Creator, but also in the fact that the lower powers of the soul were subject to the higher, and all the members of the body were subject to the command of the will (ibid., chap. 3).Moreover, this integrity was not an undue exaltation of human nature, by which it was made better from good, but was the natural condition of man (ibid., chap. 4): for what is natural, properly speaking, is what belongs to the first birth. The absence of these goods was defined precisely as a "malum": but malum is the privation of what belongs to nature. The evils derived from original sin—concupiscence, death, etc.—can also be called natural, but only in an improper and analogous sense, inasmuch as they are communicated in birth by the corrupted nature (ibid., chaps. 5, 6). If now, through Christ, those goods which man lost in Adam are restored to the fallen man, they can be called supernatural, but only in the sense in which what is given by a special beneficence of God is called supernatural (e.g., the miraculous cure of a sick person), and not in the sense that the gifts themselves are supernatural. If, however, the gifts of the original state are called natural, this does not mean that they originate from the principles of nature and are not instead communicated directly by God: but it means that they belong to the nature of man so that their lack is an evil for nature. In the same way, the soul of man is natural, even if it does not proceed from the principles of nature but must be communicated directly by God (ibid., chap. 11).
In these conditions man should obey his Creator and merit eternal life. Just as by a natural law eternal death was established as punishment for the disobedience and sin of man, so by natural law it was established that he should receive eternal life as just reward for his obedience; therefore eternal life is for him only merit and not grace. Likewise the Angels received eternal life as just retribution, not as grace (De meritis operum, bk. I, chaps. 1-3). From what has been said it is clear that the integrity in which Adam was created was natural to man; consequently he could not have been created without II. What theologians designate as the "status naturalis purae" is impossible according to the doctrine of B.
With sin Adam lost his integrity, and sin was transmitted with its consequences to his descendants. Original sin consists in a vicious and disordered act by which all men are born (De pecc. orig., chap. 2). Its elements are: ignorance, malice of the will, which does not love God and His justice, disobedience of the lower part of man against the higher (ibid., chap. 3). Before the use of reason original sin does not appear, but it is revealed when man grows up and "vana cupit, vana sapit et contra semetipsum pugnare incipit" (ibid., chap. 2). Because of original sin man, even the child, is truly destined for the wrath of God and eternal death. Just as Adam was pleasing to God in the beginning, although he was not rectus by his own doing, so the newborn child is not an object of divine complacency because it is in opposition to God and His law, by reason of original sin, even if it has not placed itself in this position (ibid., chap. 4). For sin is essentially disobedience to the command of God.
The question whether sin must be voluntary does not pertain in any way to the essence of sin, but only to its origin. What is against the law of God is sin in him in whom it is found, and it is justly imputed to him, "tantum quia inest... si vel actu vel habitu ei dominetur" (ibid., chap. 7). In the state of integrity man could fulfill the divine commands with his will and without difficulty (De lib. arb., chap. 9). After sin he has lost this faculty. Abandoned to himself he can no longer will anything morally good nor overcome any temptation (ibid., chap. 11). Yet he, even after the Fall, is not entirely devoid of freedom.
B. distinguishes freedom from necessity, and freedom from servitude. The first consists in the fact that one who desires something can also not desire it: this freedom remains to man, but only in relation to the goods of this life (eating, drinking, cultivating the soil, and the like); not, however, in relation to the moral good. Another matter is freedom from servitude. By servitude B. means an unwilling necessity, or a bad inclination of the will from which man cannot free himself. While before sin he was free from servitude, now man is subject to the servitude of sin (ibid., chaps. 4 and 5). Thus abandoned to himself, he can only perform morally evil actions. The actions of the wicked, which externally appear as virtues, are in fact sin, and deserve punishment (De virt. imp., chaps. 4 and 5). Any love of the rational creature is either vitious cupidity, by which the world is loved and which is forbidden by the Apostle John, or laudable charity, by which God is loved (De charitate, chap. 6). Thanks to the redemptive work of Christ, man can again be justified, perform good actions, and merit eternal life. The gifts that, on account of the merits of Christ, are communicated to him are not owed to fallen man, but are grace.
To have an exact concept of justification, it is necessary, according to B., to establish what justice is, and this in turn is not possible without an exact conception of love. Indeed, justice is either altogether one with love or so intimately connected with it that love cannot exist without it (De charit., chap. 1). This love is to be understood as motus animae, i.e., actual love. Whether, in addition to this, habitual love must also be admitted is a matter of little importance (ibid., chap. 2). This love is infused into our hearts by the Holy Spirit (ibid., chaps. 3, 4). It can precede the remission of sins; it begins in us when God transforms our evil will into a good one (ibid., chap. 8), and will grow little by little to ever greater perfection (ibid., chap. 9).
Justice consists in the observance of the commandments, and since love is the fulfillment of the law, justice is called “love” in Holy Scripture (De iustitia, chap. 1). For fallen man, for the sinner, justice, however, also embraces the remission of sins, so that for him justice consists of two parts: remission of sins and renewal of life, i.e., the exercise of virtues (ibid., chaps. 3 and 4). In the proper sense, however, justice is only obedience to the law; the remission of sins is called justice only in an improper sense, inasmuch as it removes the obstacle to obtaining eternal life (ibid., chap. 5). Since the sinner possesses love even before the remission of sins, he in a certain way also has justice, but as long as he is in this state, he is not called iustus simply (ibid., chap. 7). From what has been said it follows that justification is the constant progress in the exercise of virtue and in the remission of sins (De iustificatione, chaps. 1, 8).
By the grace of Christ, man can again merit eternal life (De mer. op., I, chap. 5). But whereas eternal life for man was only merit before sin, now it is both merit and grace, because by grace the possibility of attaining it is given to him (ibid., chap. 6). Only eternal life is the object of man’s merit, and precisely only of man’s. Jesus Christ did not merit eternal life for us, but through him man is restored to the condition of observing the commandments: if he does this, the natural law comes back into force, according to which, by God’s just judgment, eternal life is given as a reward for the observance of the commandments. All the rest that pertains to the restoration of fallen nature (faith, prayer, penance, remission of sins, remission of punishment, holy life, perseverance, resurrection of the body) is not the object of man’s merit, but only of Christ’s merit, because if anything belonging to the reparation of man were the fruit of the merit of someone other than Christ, this person would be at least in part our redeemer (ibid., chap. 9). Even with the works of penance we do not properly satisfy, but God, taking these works into account, grants us a share in the satisfaction of Christ. In the same way B. explains the efficacy of indulgences (De indulgentiis, chap. 8). That a work is meritorious lies in the nature of the work, and not in a particular dignity of the agent, such as, for example, that he is an adopted son of God (De merit. op., II, chap. 2). Therefore even the good work of a man whose sin has not yet been remitted merits eternal life: naturally he can attain it only when he is freed from sin (ibid., chap. 6).
With regard to the Pope, B. teaches that he is the successor of Peter, the foundation of the Church, and possesses the primacy; but he is not episcopus universalis, rather patriarcha universalis, does not have immediate jurisdiction over all the faithful, but only over the faithful of his own diocese. The other faithful are immediately subject only to their own bishops, and these have their jurisdiction directly from God and not from the Pope. Therefore the Pope ought not, without grave reason, to take to his tribunal the disputes of the faithful. It does not seem that B. recognized the infallibility of the Pope: but he does not express himself with sufficient clarity on this point.