FINAL PERSEVERANCE. — This denotes the continuation of the just person (that is, of one who is already in a state of sanctifying Grace and is by now adorned with the infused virtues) in the practice of the good until death; not merely the ability to continue, for which everyone has sufficient Grace, nor even merely the desire to continue, but effective continuation.
It is therefore a special case of perseverance in the good (v. GRAZIA) which necessarily and simultaneously includes two elements: a) an active element: effective, actual, or habitual continuation in doing good, beginning at a given moment, without interruption by any mortal sin. b) A passive, formal—that is, determining—element: the interruption by death of the aforesaid continuity in the good, whereby the coincidence is realized in the subject between the moment of death and the state of sanctifying Grace. It is a good death. In the case of a baptized child who dies before attaining the use of reason, it is more appropriate to speak simply of death in a state of Grace than of f. p.
The aforesaid concept of f. p., however, can be fully applied to an adult in a state of Grace whose morally responsible acts are definitively interrupted, even before death, by a state of moral irresponsibility caused by sleep or illness.
When considered in its active element, analysis of the concept of f. p. encounters all the problems concerning the necessity and nature of Grace posed by supernatural action and its continuity in a person already adorned with sanctifying Grace. Against Pelagianism (v.) and Semipelagianism (v.), the merit of St. Augustine (especially in De praedestinatione sanctorum and De dono perseverantiae) was to have firmly demonstrated the absolute necessity and gratuitousness of the Grace of God in general, and of his daily assistance also for all, including those who are already justified, for perseverance in the good (v. also Indicatus, Denz-U, n. 132; Arausicano II, ibid, n. 183). Post-Tridentine theology analyzed the nature of this assistance more accurately: a person already adorned with sanctifying Grace, in order to perform each and every supernatural act effectively, additionally needs an efficacious assistance of actual Grace which, in the logic of St. Thomas’s system (Sum. Theol., 1a-2ac, q. 109, a. 9), is necessarily assisting and exciting Grace—that is, an intrinsically supernatural assistance and therefore a special one, insofar as it is distinguished from the general natural concursus. Moreover, when the just person, already adorned with sanctifying Grace and aided by efficacious actual Graces, practices the supernatural good continuously and thus effectively avoids mortal sin for a notably long period of life, he is the object of a special divine providence. This is manifested in an ensemble of internal and external Graces in his favor, whereby, despite the difficulties of temptations and his own weakness, which has not been perfectly healed by habitual Grace and by actual motions, even efficacious ones, he effectively perseveres in the good for a long period as well. This special providence is all the greater the longer the just person’s perseverance in the good (v. also in this sense the Council of Trent: Denz-U, 832, and various passages of Sacred Scripture, e.g., Phil. 1, 3-6; I Cor. 10, 12 ff; Jo. 17, 11-16; Eph. 6, 10-18; Hebr. 10, 32 ff; I Pt. 5, 8 ff; temptation »).
But f. p. assumes its full and true character as a most special Grace, « the great gift of f. p. », as the Council of Trent says (Denz-U, n. 826), following St. Augustine, when it is considered in its determining, that is, passive, element. Upon the coincidence of the moment of death with the state of Grace depends the whole of salvation (cf. Mt. 10, 22). Now this coincidence cannot in any way be caused by the person himself, even if he is just and aided by ordinary efficacious actual motions: both because he cannot choose the moment of death and because he cannot fix his will irrevocably in the good, since it remains always changeable until the final instant of life. Rather, it is always the fruit of a most special providence of God, arising from his efficacious intention to grant heavenly glory to the one who is its object. Hence not all the just are its objects, but only the predestined. God attains his end in different ways according to the circumstances: for example, by bringing forward the moment of death (cf. Sap. 4, 11), or by delaying it, or by not permitting temptations, or, when permitting them, by giving the efficacious strength to overcome them, or by raising up the fallen sinner, so that the final will of the predestined person may not be sinful, but may be in a state of Grace.
Thus the Grace of f. p., in cases where its active element also includes a considerable duration of continuity in the good before death, consists as it were of two series of special Graces obtained through the special intervention of God’s providence: first, so that the one who is its object may continue for a considerable length of time in doing good without interruption by mortal sin; second, so that the end of this series of meritorious acts may coincide with death. In other cases, the character of f. p. as a most special Grace lies entirely in its passive element.
F. p. does not formally coincide with the concept of confirmation in the state of Grace, granted only, as is believed, to certain saints (e.g., the Apostles) from a given moment in their lives, and which in itself and of itself involves only active and uninterrupted continuation in the good without mortal sin. The difficulties raised by the question of the relations between f. p. and free will must be resolved within the general framework of the relations between efficacious Grace and free will.
The Grace of f. p. described here cannot be the object of merit in the strict sense (de condigno: V. SUMERI. Theol., 1°-2°, q. 114, a. 9), because the principle of merit, the divine motion such as f. p., cannot itself be the object of merit; otherwise the same thing, under the same aspect, would simultaneously be cause and effect. Therefore f. p. depends solely upon the divine motion, which is the principle of all merit, and God grants it gratuitously to whomever he grants it (v. PREDESTINAZIONE). Nevertheless, it can be obtained through prayer, because «in praying we do not ask for what we do not merit» (Sum. Theol., loc. cit., ad 1).
Against the Calvinists, the Council of Trent explicitly determined: «If anyone, apart from the case in which he has learned of it through a special divine revelation, says with absolute and infallible certainty that he will certainly have that great gift of f. p., let him be anathema» (Denz-U, n. 826). Therefore: «No one should promise himself anything with absolute certainty, although all should place the firmest hope in divine assistance. For God, if man does not first fail in Grace, will bring to completion the work he himself has begun, working in man both the will and the deed» (Phil. 2, 13; Denz-U, n. 806). This mixture of uncertainty and confidence is pedagogically beneficial for us. Whoever gives credence to certain private revelations (v.) that seem to promise f. p. to those who perform certain pious practices (e.g., the scapular of Carmel, the nine first Fridays of the month) is nevertheless bound to interpret them according to dogma, that is, in the sense of a well-founded confidence that the mercy of God will grant the Grace of f. p. to those who perform such practices with the proper dispositions.