FINAL PERSEVERANCE. – Indicates the continuation of the just (i.e., of one who is already in a state of sanctifying grace and is now adorned with the infused virtues) in good until death; not merely the power to continue, for which all have sufficient grace, nor even the mere will to continue, but actual continuation.
It is therefore a special case of perseverance in good (v. GRACE) which necessarily and simultaneously includes two elements: a) the active element: the actual, present, or habitual continuation in doing good, from a certain moment onward without interruption by any mortal sin. b) The passive, formal, i.e., determining element: the interruption by death of the aforesaid continuity in good, whereby in the subject there is realized the coincidence of the moment of death with the state of sanctifying grace. It is the good death. For the baptized child who dies before the use of reason, more than of final perseverance one must speak simply of death in a state of grace.
The above concept of final perseverance, however, can be fully applied to the adult in a state of grace, whose morally responsible acts are definitively interrupted before death by a state of moral irresponsibility due to insanity or illness.
Considered in its active element, the analysis of the concept of final perseverance encounters all the problems regarding the necessity and nature of grace that the supernatural action and its continuity in man already adorned with sanctifying grace pose. Against Pelagianism (v.) and Semipelagianism (v.), it was the merit of St. Augustine (especially in *De praedestinatione sanctorum* and *De dono perseverantiae*) to have strongly demonstrated the absolute necessity and gratuity of God’s grace in general and of His aid, even daily, for all, not excluding those already justified, for perseverance in good (cf. also *Indiculus*, Denz-U, no. 132; Second Council of Orange, ibid., no. 183). Post-Tridentine theology analyzed more carefully the nature of this aid: the man, already adorned with sanctifying grace, in order to perform effectively every single supernatural act, further needs an efficacious aid of actual grace, which, in the logic of the system of St. Thomas (*Summa Theologiae*, 1a-2ae, q. 109, a. 9), is necessarily helping and exciting grace, i.e., an intrinsically supernatural aid and therefore special inasmuch as it is distinct from the general natural concurrence. Moreover, when the just man, already adorned with sanctifying grace and aided by efficacious actual graces, continuously practices supernatural good and thus effectively avoids mortal sin for a notably long period of life, he is the object of a special divine providence. This is manifested in a set of internal and external graces in his favor whereby, despite the difficulties of temptations and his own weakness not perfectly healed by habitual grace and even efficacious actual motions, he effectively perseveres in good even for a long time. This special providence is all the greater the longer the perseverance of the just in good (cf. also in this sense the Council of Trent: Denz-U, 832, and various passages of Holy Scripture, e.g., Phil. 1:3-6; 1 Cor. 10:12 sq.; John 17:11-16; Eph. 6:10-18; Heb. 10:32 sq.; 1 Pt. 5:8 sq.; the petition of the *Our Father*: “lead us not into temptation”).
But final perseverance takes on its full aspect as a most special grace, “the great gift of final perseverance,” as the Council of Trent calls it (Denz-U, no. 826), after St. Augustine, when it is considered in its determining, i.e., passive element. The entire salvation depends on the coincidence of the moment of death with the state of grace (cf. Mt. 10:22). Now this coincidence cannot in any way be caused by man himself, even if he be just and aided by ordinary efficacious actual motions: both because he cannot choose the moment of death, and because he cannot irrevocably fix his will in good, since this will remains mutable until the last instant of life. It is rather always the fruit of a most special providence of God for the efficacious intention He has to give heavenly glory to whom He wills to bestow II. Hence it is that not all the just are its object, but only the predestined. God attains His end in various ways according to the cases: e.g., by anticipating the moment of death (cf. Wis. 4:11), or by delaying it, or by not permitting temptations, or, by permitting them, giving efficacious strength to overcome them, or by raising the fallen sinner, so that the last will of the predestined is not sinful but in a state of grace.
Thus the grace of final perseverance, in cases where in its active element it also includes a notable duration of continuity in good before death, consists as it were of two series of special graces obtained through a special intervention of divine providence: first, so that he who is its object may continue for a notable length of time in doing good without interruption by mortal sin; second, so that the end of this series of meritorious acts may coincide with death. In other cases the character of most special grace of final perseverance lies entirely in its passive element.
Final perseverance does not formally coincide with the concept of confirmation in the state of grace, granted, as is believed, only to some saints (e.g., the Apostles) from a certain moment of their life, and to which pertains in itself and by itself only the active and uninterrupted continuation in good without mortal sin. The difficulties raised by the question of the relations between final perseverance and free will are to be resolved within the general framework of the relations between efficacious grace and free will.
The grace of final perseverance here described cannot be the object of merit (v.) properly so called (de condigno: cf. *Summa Theologiae*, 1a-2ae, q. 114, a. 9), because the principle of merit, the divine motion as final perseverance, cannot be the object of merit, otherwise one and the same thing, under the same aspect, would simultaneously be cause and effect. Therefore final perseverance depends solely on the divine motion which is the principle of all merit, and God gives it gratuitously to whomsoever He gives it (v. PREDESTINATION). Yet it can be obtained by prayer, because: “by praying we obtain what we do not merit” (*Summa Theologiae*, loc. cit., ad 1).
Against the Calvinists the Council of Trent explicitly determined: “If anyone, apart from the case in which he has known it by special divine revelation, says with absolute and infallible certainty that he will certainly have that great gift of final perseverance, let him be anathema” (Denz-U, no. 826). Hence: “No one should promise himself anything with absolute certainty, although all should place the firmest hope in divine aid. For God, if man does not first fail grace, will bring to good the work He Himself has begun, working in man both to will and to do” (Phil. 2:13; Denz-U, no. 806). This mixture of uncertainty and trust is, pedagogically, beneficial for us. Whoever places faith in certain private revelations (v.) that seem to promise final perseverance to those who perform certain practices (e.g., the scapular of Carmel, the first Fridays of the month) is bound, however, to interpret them in accordance with dogma, thus in the sense of a founded trust that the mercy of God will give the grace of final perseverance to those who perform such practices with the due dispositions.