FINAL PERSEVERANCE. - It indicates the continuation of the just man (that is, of one who is already in a state of sanctifying Grace and is by now adorned with the infused virtues) in good until death; not only the power to continue, for which all have sufficient Grace, nor even merely the will to continue, but the actual continuation.
It is therefore a special case of perseverance in good (v. GRAZIA) that necessarily and simultaneously includes two elements: a) an active element: the actual continuation, actual or habitual, in doing good, starting from a certain moment without the interruption of any mortal sin. b) A passive, formal, that is, determining element: the interruption by death of the aforesaid continuity in good, whereby there is realized in the subject the coincidence between the moment of death and the state of sanctifying Grace. It is the good death. For the baptized child who dies before the use of reason, one should speak simply of death in a state of Grace rather than of f. p.
On the other hand, the aforesaid concept of f. p. can be fully applied to the adult in a state of Grace, whose morally responsible acts are definitively interrupted even before death by a state of moral irresponsibility of sleep or illness.
Considered in its active element, the analysis of the concept of f. p. encounters all the problems concerning the necessity and nature of the Grace that supernatural action and its continuity in man already adorned with sanctifying Grace pose. Against Pelagianism (v.) and Semi-Pelagianism (v.) it was the merit of St. Augustine (especially in the De praedestinatione sanctorum and the De dono perseverantiae) to have strongly demonstrated the absolute necessity and the gratuitousness of God's Grace in general and of His even daily help for all, not excluding those who are already justified, for perseverance in good (v. also Indiculus, Denz-U, n. 132; Arausicanum II, ibid., n. 183). Post-Tridentine theology analyzed more accurately the nature of this help: man, already adorned with sanctifying Grace, in order to still actually perform each and every supernatural act, needs in addition an efficacious help of actual Grace which, in the logic of St. Thomas's system (Sum. Theol., 1a-2ae, q. 109, a. 9) is necessarily helping and exciting Grace, that is, an intrinsically supernatural help and therefore special inasmuch as it is distinguished from the general natural concurrence. Moreover, when the just man, already adorned with sanctifying Grace and aided by efficacious actual Graces, practices supernatural good with continuity and thus actually avoids mortal sin for a notably long time of his life, he is the object of a special divine providence. This is manifested in a set of internal and external Graces in his favor whereby, despite the difficulties of temptations and his own weakness, not perfectly healed by habitual Grace and by actual motions even efficacious ones, he actually perseveres in good even for a long time. This special providence is all the greater the longer the just man's perseverance in good will be (v. also in this sense the Council of Trent: Denz-U, 832, and various passages of Sacred Scripture, e.g., Phil. 1:3-6; I Cor. 10:12 ff.; Jo. 17:11-16; Eph. 6:10-18; Hebr. 10:32 ff.; I Pt. 5:8 ff.; the petition of the Pater: "lead us not into temptation").
But f. p. takes on its whole true aspect of a most special Grace, "the great gift of f. p.," as the Council of Trent says (Denz-U, n. 826), after St. Augustine, when it is considered in its determining, that is, passive element. On the coincidence of the moment of death with the state of Grace depends the whole of salvation (cf. Mt. 10:22). Now this coincidence can in no way be caused by man himself, even though he be just and aided by the ordinary efficacious actual motions: both because he cannot choose the moment of death, and because he cannot fix his will immovably in good, since it is always mutable until the last instant of life. It is instead always the fruit of a most special providence of God, on account of the efficacious intention He has of giving heavenly glory to those who are its object. Hence it is that not all the just are its object, but only the predestined. God attains His end in different ways according to the cases: e.g., by anticipating the moment of death (cf. Sap. 4:11), or by delaying it, or by not permitting temptations, or, by permitting them, giving the efficacious strength to overcome them, or by raising up the fallen sinner, so that the last will of the predestined may not be sinful, but in a state of Grace.
Thus the Grace of f. p., in those cases in which in its active element it also includes a notable duration of continuity in good before death, consists as it were of two series of special Graces obtained through the special intervention of God's providence: first, so that the one who is its object may continue for a notable duration of time in doing good without interruption of mortal sin; second, so that the end of this series of meritorious acts may coincide with death. In the other cases the character of a most special Grace of f. p. lies entirely in its passive element.
F. p. does not formally coincide with the concept of confirmation in the state of Grace, given only, as is believed, to certain saints (e.g., the Apostles) starting from a certain moment of their life, and to which in itself and of itself there belongs only the active and uninterrupted continuation in good without mortal sin. The difficulties raised by the question of the relations between f. p. and free will are to be resolved within the general framework of the relations between efficacious Grace and free will.
The Grace of f. p. here described cannot be the object of merit (v.) properly so called (de condigno: v. Sum. Theol., 1a-2ae, q. 114, a. 9), because the principle of merit, the divine motion as f. p., cannot be the object of merit, otherwise one and the same thing, under the same aspect, would be simultaneously cause and effect. Therefore f. p. depends only on the divine motion which is the principle of every merit, and God gives it gratuitously to whomever He gives it (v. PREDESTINAZIONE). However, it can be obtained through prayer, because "by asking we obtain what we do not merit" (Sum. Theol., loc. cit., ad 1).
Against the Calvinists the Council of Trent explicitly determined: "If anyone, apart from the case in which he has known it by special divine revelation, says with absolute and infallible certainty that he will certainly have that great gift of f. p., let him be anathema" (Denz-U, n. 826). Therefore: "No one must promise himself anything with absolute certainty, although all must place a most firm hope in the divine help. For God, if man does not first fail the Grace, will bring to a good end the work begun by Himself, working in man both the willing and the doing" (Phil. 2:13; Denz-U, n. 806). This mixture of uncertainty and confidence is, pedagogically, beneficial for us. Whoever gives credence to certain private revelations (v.) that seem to promise f. p. to those who perform certain pious practices (e.g., the scapular of Carmel, the nine first Fridays of the month) is bound, in any case, to interpret them in accordance with dogma, hence in the sense of a well-founded confidence that God's mercy will give the Grace of f. p. to those who perform such practices with the due dispositions.
Bibliography3 works
Cipriano Vagaggini