Semi-Pelagianism

SEMI-PELAGIANISM. - This is the generic name given from the 17th century onward to the whole complex of theological movements that arose in Gallo-Roman circles in the 5th century, more or less as a reaction to the doctrine of Grace formulated by St. Augustine. Its initiators were Cassian, Vincent of Lérins and Faustus of Riez; its principal opponents were Prosper of Aquitaine, St. Fulgentius of Ruspe and St. Caesarius of Arles. Semi-Pelagianism was not, properly speaking, a heresy; these were disputed but free opinions, whose incompatibility with Catholic doctrine became manifest only after the Council of Orange (529).

I. SETTING OF THE PROBLEM

In opposition to the radical Pelagianism of Celestius and Julian of Eclanum, who did not admit the necessity of an exceptional divine aid, the representatives of the "School of Marseilles" acknowledged the existence of a supernatural Grace, coming from God and founded solely on the merits of Christ, indispensable for sanctifying human acts and giving value to their merits. Favorable to the condemnation of Pelagius, they accepted the definitions of the Council of Carthage (418) and of Pope Zosimus on original sin, on the necessity of Baptism, etc. But under the influence of the spirit of Pelagianism on the one hand and of Greek theology (St. John Chrysostom) on the other, they wished to safeguard to the utmost the free will of man and showed themselves worried about the moral consequences of certain Augustinian theses (De correptione et Gratia; De praedestinatione Sanctorum) which seemed to them inclined to fatalism. The controversy developed along two main lines: the initiative of Grace, and the predestination of the elect and of the reprobate. In his XIII collatio, Cassian of Marseilles had posed the question whether it is our good will that attracts God's clemency, or God's clemency that arouses our good will. In him there surfaced the desire to acknowledge a real efficacy in the efforts that can be made with a view to the good and not to minimize them. A tendency was likewise noted among his contemporaries, Vincent of Lérins and Faustus of Riez, to return to the Pelagian thesis of the "proportionality of Grace" as a function of the present or future merits of each one (secundum merita). Moreover, certain expressions of St. Augustine in his last books, which reserve to the mysterious will of God alone the supreme gift of final perseverance, the condition of eternal salvation, seemed to ratify the total nullity, as regards supernatural merit, of man's attitude in his preceding acts, even if charitable and virtuous. Salvation or damnation would depend on an a priori choice of God's justice that has to render account to no one. Augustinian thought insisted on the "number of the elect," which is determined from all eternity, on the "small number" of those who have been saved, on the "mass of perdition" (massa damnata), justly destined to hell in consequence of original sin.

Against such a pessimistic conception, appeal was made to the universality of the divine call, to the mercy of God, who "wills that all men be saved." It is in particular the generous thesis that was taken up not only in Provence, but also in Rome, in the De vocatione omnium gentium (PL 51, 647-722). These are, excellently summarized by Prosper in his letter to Rufinus (PL 51, 78-79), the objections raised against the doctrine of St. Augustine between 425 and 435 by St. Hilary of Arles and Vincent of Lérins and which represent the point of view, in general, of the Gallic episcopate; they echoed the harshest recriminations formulated in Africa by the monks of Adrumetum. At the bottom of the controversy there was a strong dose of misunderstanding: disoriented by the insinuations of the Pelagians, champions of integral free will, by the secret propaganda of certain sects flourishing on the trunk of Priscillianism, which professed a kind of mystical fatalism, the Gallic writers, not having much familiarity with Augustinian metaphysics, did not understand a doctrine of Grace that fitted into the framework of a system comprising the universal economy of the world and of the Redemption. Remaining on the plane of practical life and of the fulfillment of concrete virtues, they feared that an abusive exaltation of divine Grace would end by annulling every merit of man; they did not know how to rise to the supreme laws, by which free will is mysteriously integrated with the plans of God and according to which our destiny is realized and unfolds only in the end assigned to it by God from all eternity. Predestination is nothing but the application to the particular case of each one of the great principle of providence (St. Augustine, De praedestinatione Sanctorum, II, 35). It is beyond doubt, on the other hand, that in his last books St. Augustine's conception of human destiny appears more severe and more pessimistic.

At bottom, however, whatever the controversy concerning the initiative of Grace or predestination, the central problem always remained the condition of man: the question was, in fact, to know whether man had preserved or lost his integrity after the fall of Adam; whether original sin has completely perverted our will, whether it has left our freedom intact, or has only weakened it; and if it has weakened it, to what extent.

II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONTROVERSY

The Semi-Pelagian objections are known, although indirectly; they appear quite timidly in Cassian's Collationes and then in the harsher complaints attributed to Vincent of Lérins. They were sometimes very serious, if they caused a letter of reproach from Pope Celestine (Ep., 21: PL 30, 530) which forbade criticizing in any manner the memory of St. Augustine. But it is rather the writings of St. Prosper of Aquitaine that give exact information on the attitude of his adversaries: letter to Rufinus; Poëma de ingratis (on the ungrateful) and Liber contra Collatorem (PL 51). In his dry and ingenuous, but often sharp criticism, Prosper defended the Augustinian theses; with a subtle vein of partiality he underlined the concordance existing, in his eyes, between the theories of Cassian and Vincent and the essential principles of Pelagianism. To Prosper's polemical writings must be added a dogmatic treatise of Roman origin, Hypomasticon (written around 435), and a collection of a semi-official character: Sedis Apostolicae Episcoporum auctoritates, the Celestinian Capitularies (PL 51, 205-12) which contain the broad lines of Catholic theology concerning Grace (cf. a letter to Demetrias: Cum splendidissimae [PL 55, 162-80], which very probably belongs to St. Leo the Great).

Despite this constant affirmation of the Roman doctrine, the great religious center of Provence, the abbey of Lérins, the seedbed that produced the finest flower of the Gallic bishops, remained throughout the 5th century refractory to Augustinian influence; in 473-75 Faustus, bishop of Riez, not content with rejecting the fatalist theses of the heretic Lucidus, rejected the existence of Gratia specialis, that is, of an actual Grace suited to our particular needs, exalted the effects of free will and came very close to the early positions of Pelagius (De gratia Dei, I, II).

Around the year 519, an unexpected reaction started from the Scoti monks, Eastern theologians led by John Maxentius, and above all from the African bishops in exile, headed by St. Fulgentius of Ruspe (v.), a follower of the strictest Augustinianism. The discussion widened and the episcopate of Gaul was again divided: a council of bishops of the Rhône region, assembled at Valence, seemed to have upheld rather the principles of Faustus. It was then that St. Caesarius, bishop of Arles, in agreement with Rome, decided to proceed to a solemn declaration.

III. THE COUNCIL OF ORANGE (529)

On the occasion of the consecration of the basilica of Orange, with the patrician Liberius and 13 bishops present, St. Caesarius proclaimed the Catholic doctrine of Grace. After citing some of the most probative texts of St. Augustine and of Prosper, St. Caesarius drew the following conclusions:

1) free will, disoriented and weakened by the sin of Adam, is no longer sufficient for man to raise himself up to the love and service of God, unless Grace and mercy impel him; 2) the righteous of the Old Testament owe their merits only to the Grace of God, not to "natural Good"; 3) the Grace of Baptism allows all Christians, with the help and assistance of Christ, to fulfill the duties necessary for salvation, if they have the will to attain it loyally; 4) in every good action the first impulse comes from God: it is this impulse that moves one to ask for Baptism and, always with God's support, to fulfill our duties. The Council explicitly rejected the idea of a "predestination" to evil.

The declarations of Orange, laboriously elaborated, a new redaction and correction of an earlier draft, whose text has been rediscovered (Mansi, VIII, 722), constitute a theological document of high value, ratified by the Pontiff (Boniface II). By them the theories of Pelagian inspiration, founded on the inviolable autonomy of free will and on the substantial merit of our personal actions, are definitively discarded; they proclaimed the anteriority and supremacy of divine Grace in the work of salvation, but at the same time affirmed the efficacy of Baptism for the restoration of free will; they further inculcated the responsibility and personal obligations of each one in the observance of the divine laws. Finally, they opposed both the mystical or desperate fatalism of the predestinarians and the Pelagian or Semi-Pelagian naturalism. It is a veritable abuse that was committed by certain theologians of the 17th century, of basing themselves on the preliminary considerations of the Council of Orange to make of them almost the Magna Charta of Jansenism.

Giorgio de Plinval