Divine Will

VOLONTÀ DIVINA. – It comprises the entire complex of acts and virtues that constitute the affective life of the Supreme Being, Goodness in essence, infinite Love.

I. EXISTENCE

Sacred Scripture offers numerous testimonies concerning this. Genesis reports the repeated divine command that brought the Universe into being: “Let there be light... Let there be a firmament... Let us make man” (Gen. 1): these are acts of divine intelligence that denote, in accordance with the anthropomorphic style of the sacred text, corresponding acts of free will. Divine will, freedom, and omnipotence often appear intertwined in the praises offered to God by the inspired authors (cf. Ps. 115, 3; 135, 5-6; Is. 46, 10; Esth. 13, 9). The New Testament points out to human beings in the V. d. the supreme rule of their conduct—a rule that always guided the human will of Jesus Christ: “Father, not my will, but yours be done” (Lc. 22, 42); “Our Father, who art in heaven... thy will be done, on earth as it is in heaven” (Mt. 6, 9, 10); “Be transformed by the renewal of your spirit, so that you may discern what the will of God is” (Rom. 12, 2).

The Fathers exalt the monotheistic and wholly spiritual conception of God above pagan polytheism and sensualism, and defend the wise and free providence of God. According to s. Tommaso: “In God there is will just as there is intelligence, since the will is intimately connected with the intellect as an inclination toward the good apprehended through an intelligible species... Therefore it is necessary to admit that in God there is will, since there is intellect” (Sum. Theol., 1ª, q. 19, a. 1 c.). Yet in God the will does not exist as an accident inhering in the substance of being, as it does in created spirits, but is really identical with it, although conceptually distinct from II. Nor, strictly speaking, is the V. d. the principle of “appetition,” that is, of an inclination toward a good not possessed and therefore desired; rather, it is the purest love of complacency in the Infinite Good, with which it forms one thing (cf. s. Tommaso, ibid., a. 1, ad 3; Contra Gent., 1, 73).

II. OBJECT

God wills only His Goodness as the primary, necessary, and indispensable motive and object of His own will, the sole object proportionate to the will of the supreme Being. Every other good, therefore, insofar as it is destined to exist outside God, is a secondary and non-necessary term of the divine will: it is the effect of His free love, rather than its object and motive.

Scripture abounds in passages in which, while the inexhaustible expansive power of the Infinite Good is extolled, it is at the same time affirmed that God created all things for His glory (Is. 43, 6-7; Ps. 115, 2-3; I Thess. 4, 3). “Thus, then, God wills Himself and other things. He wills Himself, however, as the end, and other things as means to the end, since it is particularly fitting to divine Goodness that it be communicated to other beings as well” (Sum. Theol., 1ª, q. 19, a. 2). In reality, the act by which God loves His goodness and the goodness of creatures is one, just as its formal motive is one: the supreme lovability of the Highest Good, whether immanent in God or reflected and participated in the created universe. Therefore, God loves us for His own sake, as the motive and ultimate end to which He destines us; yet He wills Himself for us, insofar as in the creation, preservation, and governance of all beings He seeks nothing other than the greater communication of His goodness, in order to impress His image more deeply upon them (Dante, Par., I, 103-108).

III. ATTRIBUTES

These are repeatedly indicated by the Ecclesiastical Magisterium. The Council of Sens (1140) rejected as erroneous Abelard’s assertion: « God can do only what he has done, in the manner and at the time in which he accomplished it » (Denz-U, 374); the Council of Florence (1441) declared it to be the firm faith of the Roman Church that « the one and true God ... when he willed, moved by his goodness, produced all creatures, both spiritual and corporeal » (Denz-U, 706); Pius IX, against the semirationalism of A. Günther (v.), upheld the « Catholic doctrine of God’s supreme freedom, exempt from any necessity in the creation of things » (brief Eximiam tuam, 1857; Denz-U, 1655); the Vatican Council « believes and confesses that there is one true and living God ... Who, by his goodness and almighty power, not to increase his beatitude or to acquire it, but in order to manifest his own perfection through the outpouring of the goods which he bestows upon creatures, by a completely free design produced the universe from nothing » (sess. III, chap. 1; Denz-U, 1782, 1783); and declares anathema anyone who asserts that « God created the world not with a will free from every necessity, but necessarily, just as he necessarily loves himself » (can. 5; Denz-U, 1865). Pius XII saw a dangerous novelty in the assertion of those who « regard the creation of the world as necessary, because it proceeds from the necessary liberality of divine love » (encyclical Humani generis, 12 Aug. 1950; AAS, 4 [1950], p. 570). Fathers and theologians unanimously defended the freedom of God the Creator against resurgent errors of a deterministic or optimistic character, sponsored in the Middle Ages by Eckhart (v.) WYCLIF, JOHN (v.), and more recently by Luther (v.), Calvin (v.), Malebranche (v.), Leibniz (v.), Wolff (v.), Hermes (v.) Günther (v.).

It cannot, however, be asserted that divine freedom, having « a non-necessary relation » to creatures that are mutable and contingent in themselves, is itself a mutable and contingent perfection. In reality, it is identified with the Pure Act and properly consists in the dominative power or active indifference of the d. w. with respect to every good that is not the Infinite Good.

The will of God is moreover « most orderly », because it is always governed by supreme wisdom; « most simple », because it is free from every bond of internal and external dependence or succession of acts; « infallible » in its effect, provided that it concerns a « consequent » or absolute will (v. PREDESTINAZIONE); « irresistible », that is, exceedingly strong and at the same time exceedingly gentle, because it does not impose upon all beings the necessity of acting, but predisposes necessary causes for the production of necessary effects, and contingent or free causes for the production of non-necessary effects, while remaining the first and universal cause of all; « most holy », because it is wholly alien to willing moral evil in any way, which it permits only with a view to a greater good to be drawn from it through its omnipotent wisdom (v. BENE; MALE; PECCATO; PREDESTINAZIONE).

IV. ACTS AND VIRTUES

There are three principal acts of the will of God, conceptually distinct from it alone: love, which is the first and fundamental one; delight and joy. “God properly delights in himself, and then rejoices in himself and in others” (Contra Gent., I, 90). God’s love for his own goodness is neither love of concupiscence nor love of friendship, but a supreme complacency that actualizes whatever perfection is present in both these acts. Hatred, sadness, despair, fear, boldness, and anger are attributed to God in Scripture only metaphorically; corresponding to them in the divine will is an act of perfect turning toward the Good, which rejects every, even the slightest, affection for evil. Justice and mercy (cf. Ps. 36, 11; Is. 56, 1; Ier. 23, 6; Dan. 9; 7; Cor. 1, 3; Eph. 2, 4) belong to God in the proper, formal, and eminent sense, reconciling the apparent antinomy of their concepts in the higher unity of the Godhead. They are, in fact, merely two distinct and coeternal aspects of Infinite Love; in their specific object and in their actual exercise they are independent of the existence of creatures.

Justice in God is nothing other than the most perfectly ordered love he has for his infinite Goodness; mercy, then, is the purest love for his perfection, capable of removing every misery of creatures (cf. Sum. Theol., 1ª, q. 21). Therefore s. Tommaso writes: “Every work of divine justice always presupposes the work of mercy, and is founded upon it ... And thus in every work of God mercy appears as its first root” (ibid., a. 4 c). S. Bernardo had expressed the same concept in sculptural fashion, defining divine mercy as: “Causa causalissima causarum omnium.” In the will of God all creatures have their source, and in conformity to it they find their perfection and beatitude (cf. Par., III, 85-87).
BIBLI. - Holy Scripture: F. Ceuppens, Theol. bibl., 1, 2nd ed., Rome 1949, pp. 168-223; P. Heinisch, Teolog. del V. Test., Italian translation, Turin-Rome 1950, pp. 72-81, 92-109; Holy Fathers: M. J. Rouet de Journel, Enchir. Patr., 9th ed., Freiburg im Breisgau 1932; Theologians and philosophers: s. Tommaso, Summa c. Gent., I, I, chs. 72-96; A. Ciappi, De div. misericordia ut prima causa operum Dei, Rome 1935; F. M. Gaetani, Dio, there 1941; A. Michel, Volonté de Dieu, in DThC, XV, cols. 3322-84; G. M. L. Monsabré, Esposia, del dogma catt., II, 9th conference, Turin 1949; R. Garrigou-Lagrange, Dieu, son existence et sa nature, 2nd ed., Paris 1951; A. Zacchi, Dio, 4th ed., Rome 1952. Luigi Ciappi

Cite this article

“VOLONTÀ DIVINA.” Enciclopedia Cattolica, vol. XII (1954), p. 998. Azione Romana digital edition, https://azioneromana.com/article/volonta-divina.