ULTIMATE END. – It is the supreme good toward which every nature tends in its activity, and above all the spiritual nature, which acts according to intellect and will.
SUMMARY:
I. Notion
II. Historical sketch
III. Catholic doctrine.I. NOTION
Irrational natures present a closed cycle of development which each individual traverses according to determinate laws aimed at the preservation of the species, so that the ultimate end remains immanent in nature itself. The spiritual creature, on the other hand, possesses a certain likeness to the divine nature and, by virtue of its spirituality, has the capacity to know and love God himself, to whom it is therefore «im-mediately» ordered: «Sola creatura rationalis est capax Dei, quia ipsa sola potest ipsum cognoscere et amare explicite» (S. Tommaso, De verit., q. 22, a. 2 ad 5). Whereas, therefore, irrational natures are moved by an innate inclination toward the functions of the species (e.g., in living beings, nourishment, reproduction, etc.), the spiritual creature can know the supreme Good that transcends the species, and possesses the freedom to decide the ultimate end of its action and thereby «chooses» its destiny. Man, therefore, insofar as he is endowed with an intelligent and free soul and attains the dignity of a «person», acquires as an «individual» a transcendent value, that is, an immediate ordering to God which each person can (and must) actualize through the exercise of his freedom: consequently, in the sphere of spiritual beings, the attainment of the ultimate end is not univocally determined by the species, but remains suspended upon the ambiguity of each person’s free decision. The outcome will correspond to the nature of the choice: happiness for the one who has chosen the immutable Good, unhappiness instead for the one who has chosen the apparent and transitory good.
The ultimate end may therefore be considered from the objective point of view, and in this all creatures agree, insofar as it is the glory of God, which each manifests and actualizes in its own way through the unfolding of its activity. Or the ultimate end may be considered from the subjective point of view, that is, according to that operation which makes possible for the agent the possession of, or union with, the supreme Good: this subjective ultimate end evidently belongs properly to spiritual natures and entails the supreme repose of complete and absolute happiness. In the field of Catholic theology, it is debated whether the essential motive of subjective beatitude should be placed in an act of the will, as Scotism maintains, or in the apprehensive function of the intellect, as Thomism holds. An explicit statement by S. Tommaso makes it possible to give the primacy he attributes to the apprehensive moment its precise meaning: it does not exclude the affective moment, but rather summons it as its completion and as likewise a necessary constitutive element of beatitude. Remaining faithful to the Aristotelian principle: ὁρέξω χυτὲ χερὰ τὸν λογισμὸν (De Am., III, 10, 433 a 25), the holy Doctor states: «Quia felicitas est principalissimum bonum hominis, consequens est ut magis consistat in eo quod est rationale per essentiam quam in eo quod est rationale per participationem. Ex quo potest accipi quod felicitas principalissum consistat in vita contemplativa quam activa, et in actu rationis vel intellectus quam in actu appetitus ratione regulati» (In X Eth., I, I, lect. 10, ed. Pirotta, Torino 1934, n. 126).
But it is in the Commentary on the Gospel of S. Matteo that S. Tommaso gives the complete formula, with a precise reference precisely to Aristotle: «Netandum quod secundum Philosophum, ad hoc quod actus contemplativi faciant beatum, duo requiruntur: unum substantialiter, scilicet quod sit actus altissimi intelligibilis, quod est Deus; aliud formaliter scilicet amor et delectatio» (Expositio super Ev. Matthaei, cap. 5, lect. 1, ed. Parm., X, p. 49 b). The unusual formula corresponds to that of S. Agostino: «Beatitudo est gaudium de veritate», which is God himself (Confess., X, 22; cited in 1ᵃ-2ᵃc, q. 4, a. 1, sed contra).
II. HISTORICAL NOTE
It is clear that this determination of the subjective ultimate end, or happiness, presupposes the conception of God, of man, and of the world proper to Christian philosophy, which rests upon the truths 1) of the creation from nothing of the whole world and of spiritual beings themselves, and 2) of the survival or personal immortality of individual souls. These two truths, in their exact metaphysical conception, were lacking in all Greek philosophy and have again receded into the shadows in modern philosophy. The great Socratic systems (Plato and Aristotle) thoroughly criticize hedonism, which located happiness in bodily goods,as, for example, the Cyrenaics did: pleasure certainly belongs to happiness, but as its completion, as beauty is to youth, and in some way pleasure is the highest good: σημεῖον τι τοῦ εἶναι ποιὸν τὸ ἄριστον τὴν ἡθοῦν (Eth. Nic., V, 13, 1153 b 26). For the mature Aristotle, this pleasure springs from living “according to reason” in this world, unlike Plato, who located it in the contemplation of the Ideas, where man arrives as at the island of the blessed (Resp., 519 C) and becomes like the gods: πρὸς οἴσπερ θεὸς ὢν θεῖος ἐστίν (Phoed., 249 C). Epicurus, according to Clement of Alexandria, returns to the materialist hedonism (even if balanced by reason) of the Cyrenaics, because for him too happiness lies in living a long life amid pleasures: τὸ ἡθέας ζῆν, τέλειον δὲ ἀγαθὸν μόνον τὴν ἡθοῦν (Strom., II, cap. 5); ed. O. Stählin, Berlin 1939, p. 182, 6). On the subject of happiness, the Stoics did not depart from the Aristotelian position of τὸ εὖ ζῆν and τὸ εὖ πρᾶττειν, understood as a κατ' ὄρετὴν ἐνέργεια (Eth. Nic., X, 7, 1077 a 12), to which Aristotle nevertheless wished the goods of the body, external life, and good fortune to add their crowns (Eth. Nic., I, 8, 1099 b 2 ff. and V, 13, 1153 b 18): the Stoics specified that happiness lies in “living according to reason,” which is then living according to nature (κατὰ οὐσία), so as to attain perfect tranquillity of soul (ἀταραξία). Clement of Alexandria will oppose to this the impassibility (ἀπαθετία) of the Christian, who must seek “likeness to God” through the “imitation of Christ” (Strom., VII, 12). Nor do the Neoplatonists escape intellectualism: happiness is the perfect life of the perfect being, and hence of God and of the sage, who is inaccessible to bodily pains and the blows of fortune; these bring to its highest degree the τὸ εὖ ζῆν, which consists in living while aspiring to liberation from the body (Plotinus, Eun., I, 4; περὶ εὐδαιμονίας, §§ 1 and 16). Paganism therefore conceived happiness only as a possibility for a few privileged spirits in this life; but it either requires immersion in the goods of this world or a negative attitude toward them, and the outcome of neither position could satisfy its proponents: for in temporal life the life of man cannot reach a worthy conclusion, while recourse to θεία μοῦρα, to θεία τύχη... reinforced this profound skepticism and dismay, and the problem of evil remained unanswered.
In the first rationalism of modern philosophy, happiness lies in the complete development of reason itself, which thus rests in its full possession. In writing to Princess Elisabeth, Descartes refers to this ideal of Stoic ethics set forth by Seneca in De vita beata: “Vivere beste nihil aliud est quam animo perfecto et tranquillo frui” (ed. Adam-Tannery, Paris 1901, Correspondance, IV, p. 263 ff.). This conception of the ontological immanence of the ultimate end entails that man find his happiness in a certain conclusive disposition or perfection (ἔξις, as the Greeks called it) of his being, which refers to no other end than the harmony and fullness of life that it unfolds in and through itself. The formula appears in the final thesis of Spinoza’s Ethica (part 5, prop. 43): “Beatitudo non est virtutis praemium, sed ipsa virtut; nec eadem gaudemus, quia libidines coércemus; sed contra, quia eadem gaudemus, ideo libidines coércem possumus” (2nd ed. G. Gentile, Bari 1933, p. 286). This “vera animi acquiescentia” originates in the “cognitio intuitiva Dei” (part 4, cap. 4, p. 244) and reaches its fulfillment in the “amor Dei intellectualis” (part 5, prop. 33 scholium, p. 278). Kant, while maintaining that virtue is the highest good, observes that it is not yet the whole and perfect good, since happiness is required in order to possess this; one must therefore rise above both the Epicurean and the Stoic criterion. This necessary connection between virtue and happiness, in which the highest practical good consists, cannot be analytic but only synthetic; and for Kant this leads to the primacy of practical reason over speculative reason, which is realized provided that complete conformity between virtue and happiness, or between holiness and possession of the highest Good, is ensured. The realization of this “holiness,” which is an infinite task, requires the “postulate” of the immortality of the soul and that of the existence of God: thus—with the primacy of practical reason—the balance between immanence and transcendence seems to be restored (cf. Kritik d. prakt. Vermuel, part 1, l. 2, cap. 2 § 1 ff.). In transcendental idealism, Schelling and Hegel take up Spinoza’s position; more faithful to Kant, Fichte sees man’s ultimate end in the “participation,” proper to each individual, through the exercise of personal freedom, in the happiness of God (cf. Anweisung zum seligen Leben of 1806; ed. F. Medicus, V, Leipzig 1923, p. 330 ff.).
In Schopenhauer’s pessimism, the impulse toward pleasure and happiness reveals a deficiency and is a source of pain: it must therefore be restrained and suppressed through the annihilation of desire, and the ultimate end of human striving can consequently be nothing other than nothingness, if “pleasure is negativity” and pain the positivity of existence (cf.: Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, I, IV, § 58 in W. W., ed. Bergmann, I, Leipzig n.d., p. 413 ff.). In the more recent and contemporary philosophies, the problem of the ultimate end has been absorbed into that of “value” or of “existence,” and its outcome depends on the metaphysical orientation of their respective solutions: the “formal” neo-Kantian theories of value locate the ultimate end in the perfection of culture, art, natural morality, etc. (W. Windelfand, H. Riebert, N. Hartmann); existentialism, on the other hand, either does not admit an ultimate end of positive significance, insofar as man is “thrown into the world” and prey to finitude (M. Heidegger, J.-F. Sartre), or places human happiness in “fidelity” to the Transcendent (F. Ebner, M. Buber, G. Marcel). In Nietzsche’s atheistic titanism, humanity’s supreme aim is the formation of the “higher man,” who must dominate the “herd,” which serves as an instrument for the realization of his plans for political greatness (cf.: Alte sprach Zavolhestvo, ed. minor, Vorwede). Marxist atheism proclaims the disappearance of social classes (Klassenkampf) as the ultimate end of human society, so that material goods may be distributed equitably and ensure everyone the enjoyment of earthly life.
III. CATHOLIC DOCTRINE
Catholic doctrine considers the ultimate end of man on the twofold plane of nature and Grace. Man consists not only of a body but also of a spiritual soul, which must dominate him: thus man’s supreme happiness belongs to the soul and consists in the highest knowledge and love that man can attain through his spiritual powers. This aspiration to “conformity” or likeness with God was conceived in antiquity as a ὁμοίωσις θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν (Plato, Theaet., 176 B), consisting in the practice of justice and the other moral virtues. Yet men, beset by the necessities of life, distressed by the limits of their own intelligence, and tempted by the passions, made more insolent by original sin, could not by themselves attain the ultimate end even in the form of a sufficient abstract knowledge of God and a basic practice of virtue. Even the best minds, observes s. Tommaso, would reach it only “cum magno labore... vix post longum tempus... [e in tutto questo] plerumque falsitas admiscetur”: hence “salubriter divina providit climentia ut ea quae ratio investigare potest, fide tenenda praeciperet, ut sic omnes de facili possent divinae cognitionis participes esse et absque dubitazione et errore” (C. Gent., I, 4). To the elevation of knowledge through Revelation and Faith there corresponds, for the will, the help and movement of Grace. Through this elevation to the supernatural order, man is offered, as his ultimate end and eternal happiness, participation in the very intimate life of God in the light of glory, according to the declaration of the First Vatican Council: “Deus ex infinita bonitate ordinavit hominem ad finem supernaturalem, ad participanda scilicet bona divina, quae humanae mentis intelligentiam omnino suparant” (Denz-U, n. 1786). The dogma of the final resurrection of bodies provides the final completion, through divine Providence, of man’s perfect happiness in eternal life.A profound mystery must be acknowledged in man’s “natural situation”: he is drawn toward infinite Good, but with the natural powers of his spirit alone he can neither know, nor love, nor enjoy it in the authentic and proper sense. This is so both because of the metaphysical disproportion between a nature that always remains finite and because of a weakness as inexplicable as it is real, which prevents the intelligence from clearly discovering the truth and the will from sincerely aspiring to the good. Thus humanity, even among its greatest thinkers, has not succeeded in definitively clarifying the problem of its ultimate destiny and personal immortality, and has had to stop at precarious and discordant solutions: hence the restlessness and dissatisfaction that pure philosophical inquiry has experienced in every age, and the reason for the multiplicity and instability of its attempts. s. Tommaso expressly recognizes this with regard to Aristotle and all classical thought: “Quia vero Aristoteles vidit (Eth. Nic., X, 10, 1779 a 33 sgg.) quod non est alia cognitio hominis in hac vita quam per scantias speculativas, posuit hominem non consequi felicitatem perfectam sed suo modo. In quo satis apparet quantum angustiam patiebantur hinc inde eorum praeclara ingenta, a quibus angustia liberabimur si ponamus [secondo la Fede] hominem ad veram felicitatem post hanc vitam pervenire posse, anima hominis immortali existente” (C. Gent., III, 38). Consequently, modern philosophy, which abandons the fate of the individual by limiting itself to universal Reason, not only alters the Christian promise of Christianity but also betrays the deepest aspiration of classical thought toward perfect justice and happiness. Thus the “anguish” of the ancient philosophers, who could not have the Faith, becomes the “despair” of modern philosophers who reject the Faith.