DOGMA. - The current technical theological meaning is that of a doctrine revealed by God and proposed as such by the Church with the guarantee of infallibility.
CONTENTS:
I. The concept
II. The evolution of dogma.I. THE CONCEPT
1. The term dogma to precisely express this concept did not prevail definitively until the 18th century. Its earlier meanings are based on the ancient use of classical Greek.Δόγμα, from δοκέω, had the fundamental meaning of τὰ δεξογμένα: that which has seemed either true, good, or fitting. Thus, in the case of theoretical views: a) in general: opinion; b) in particular: philosophical opinion or doctrine, whether theoretical or moral, especially if considered firm and fundamental within a given system (the decreta or placita philosophorum). In the case of a practical volitional stance adopted following a theoretical view: a) in general: determination, decision, will; b) in particular: an officially and authoritatively promulgated decision, ordinance, decree, or edict. This latter meaning, in the profane sense of an imperial decree, is found in the Septuagint (Eth. 3:9; Dan. 2:13; 6:8). In the religious sense of divine ordinances contained in the Mosaic law, it appears in Jewish Hellenism (III Mach. 1:3; Josephus, Apologia, 1:24). In the New Testament, the meaning is that of an ordinance or decree, whether imperial (Lk. 2:1; Act. 17:7), apostolic (Act. 16:4), or Mosaic (Eph. 2:15; Col. 2:14). All these earlier meanings are encountered
in ancient ecclesiastical tradition, which also used the word to denote Christian doctrine, whether orthodox (dogma of the Lord, correct, taught by God, pious, true, ecclesiastical, divine) or even heretical (dogma of heretics, perverse, false). Although some Fathers distinguished between dogma and praxis, usage remained varied throughout the Middle Ages. The modern technical sense is already found in M. Cano (d. 1560), but it was not at all exclusive throughout the 16th and 17th centuries. It became so in V. L. Gotti (d. 1742) and subsequently became common, even with the specification dogma fidei (cf. G. Kittel, in Theologisches Wörterbuch zum neuen Testament, II, pp. 233-35; A. Deneffe, D. Wort und Begriff, in Scholastik, 6 [1931], pp. 381-400).
2. The reality expressed, however, is already clearly visible in the New Testament under the concept of tradition.
Especially in the Pauline epistles, both the Good News in its generality (Rom. 6:17; Gal. 1:9-12; I Tim. 6:20; II Tim. 1:13-14) and, in particular, the precepts of Christian life (Phil. 4:9; I Thess. 4:1; II Thess. 2:15; 3:6), or even individual doctrines such as the Eucharist and the Resurrection of Christ (I Cor. 11:23 ff.), are presented with similar terminology and equivalent expressions. The general idea thus expressed is that the Christian religion is a complex of facts and doctrines that are absolutely objective, not invented by those who preach them, but simply given by God through Jesus Christ, and toward which the propagators of the Gospel have no other task than to receive, preserve intact, and transmit without alteration. The Christian religion is therefore a παραθήκη, a deposit (I Tim. 6:20; II Tim. 1:13-14), a legal term indicating something that the legitimate owner entrusts to another as his procurator, with the task of preserving and returning it intact. Thus, while the faithful receive everything from the Church through its leaders, Apostles and others (II Tim. 2:2), they do not adhere to human doctrines but properly divine ones (I Thess. 2:14). And since it is impossible for this Church to teach a doctrine different from that which it has been commanded and graced to teach by divine mandate and indefectible assistance (Mt. 28:18-20; Mk. 16:15-16; Jn. 14:16 ff.; 15:26; 17:18-20; I Cor. 1:17; II Cor. 5:20; I Tim. 3:14 ff.), every person must fully adhere to it (Mk. 16:16; Rom. 1:5; II Cor. 10:4; I Jn. 2:24), nor ever lend ear to contrary doctrines (Rom. 6:16; Gal. 1:8; II Jn. 1:10) under penalty of shipwreck in the faith (I Tim. 1:19). In these simple propositions—there are truths revealed by God, of which the Church is the sole infallible custodian and interpreter, and to which one must assent in order to be saved—lies the entire essence of the concept of dogma. Subsequent times in this field have done nothing but clarify more precisely: a) what are, in concrete terms, the authentic organs of the Church’s magisterium (v. CONCILIO; PAPA; TRADIZIONE); b) what is precisely the relationship between the Church’s proposition and Revelation; c) what is the nature of the faith that must be given to the truths revealed and proposed by the Church (v. FEDE).
The reflective determination of the concept of dogma is the fruit of the struggle against the rationalism and modernism of the 19th and 20th centuries, which directly rejected every dogma as such, denying its divine origin, substantial immutability, and objective meaning. A definition of dogma that can be considered the result of all previous work is given by the Vatican Council: «Everything contained in the written word of God or handed down by tradition, and proposed by the Church, whether by solemn judgment or by the ordinary and universal magisterium, as divinely revealed, must be believed with divine and Catholic faith» (Denz-U, 1792).
3. The analysis of the Catholic concept of dogma reveals the following elements: a) It is a doctrine, an assertion about a thing, presupposing a judgment and communicated to others in teaching. This judgment about the thing expressed and the concepts involved is understood as having objective value, capable of reaching and expressing the being of things.
Dogma, in its current technical theological meaning, is a doctrine that:
a) Is a doctrine, an assertion about a thing, presupposing a judgment and communicated to others in teaching. This judgment about the thing expressed and the concepts it involves are understood as having objective value, capable, that is, of reaching and expressing the being of things as they are in themselves, independently of us, and in particular independently of our cognitive or affective activity; concepts and judgments regulated by being distinct from them and thus an objective norm of thought, which then becomes an objective norm of life (Denz-U, 2026, 2079, 2145). There is nothing that, under some aspect, cannot be the object of dogma, insofar as everything either is divine or has some relation to it; but the very affirmation about this thing, to constitute dogma, must be one of those in which the infallible judgment of the Church is competent, that is, concerning faith or morals, or rather that aspect of things which, in the judgment of the Church, may affect the religious relations between man and God (Denz-U, 796, 1688, 1839);
b) Is a doctrine revealed by God. This refers to supernatural Revelation, divine speech transcending the natural order essentially, in which God manifests a truth to man; hence, a fully free action of a personal and transcendent God, absolutely distinct from the simple manifestation that God makes of Himself through the natural laws intrinsic to creation, that is, from natural revelation (Denz-U, 2020, 2075). However, it is not necessary, to constitute dogma, that it concern the manifestation of mysteries properly so called, such as the Trinity or the Incarnation; it may also concern truths in themselves accessible to the natural powers of reason, such as the immortality of the soul, or even simple historical facts, such as the Birth, Life, and Passion of Christ. By Revelation is further understood public Revelation, that is, that destined by God for all men and therefore entrusted to the custody and authority of the Church as a public society. Private revelations, on the other hand, are those made by God not with the intent of engaging the faith of the religious society as such, but destined only for individual persons, even if in fact numerous. These never constitute dogma, nor does the Church intervene to propose them as such, but only, at most, to declare that they contain nothing contrary to public Revelation and that it is licit, according to the dictates of human prudence, to adhere to them with spiritual profit. According to Catholic doctrine, public Revelation was definitively closed with the death of the last of the Apostles (Denz-U, 2021). No dogma has therefore been revealed by God since that time. This public Revelation is entirely contained in the canonical Scripture or in the so-called oral tradition, because it was not handed down in the canonical writings but transmitted orally by the Apostles (Denz-U, 1792). However, it may be contained therein in different ways, which, because in their details they give rise to divergent opinions among theologians, will be explained below (v. II. 3);
c) Proposed as such by the Church with the guarantee of infallibility. This proposition by the Church is the formal element of dogma: before it, the revealed truth is dogma only materially, in itself, not formally with respect to us. In dogma, the doctrine is proposed as revealed; this is necessary because the faith to which dogma gives rise is divine faith, in which the thing is believed formally on the authority of God revealing (Denz-U, 1789). It is the Church that proposes dogma; concretely, these are the authentic and infallible organs of the ecclesiastical magisterium: the Catholic episcopate united with the pope and the Roman pontiff himself. There are therefore two kinds of infallible ecclesiastical magisterium by which dogmas can be proposed:
α) The ordinary and universal magisterium of all the bishops united with the pope (Denz-U, 1792) when, although dispersed throughout the world, they teach with moral and conscious unanimity a doctrine as revealed and therefore of universal faith (cf. J. M. A. Vacant, Etudes théologiques sur les constitutions du Concile du Vatican, II, Paris 1895, p. 82 sgg.; id., Le magistère ordinaire de l'Église et ses organes, ibid. 1887). That this is a legitimate way of proposing dogmas necessarily follows from the hierarchical-monarchical nature of the Church and from its infallibility. Otherwise, this infallibility would be ridiculous, since the other kind of infallible ecclesiastical magisterium, the extraordinary one, is by its nature occasional. To those who would see in the solemn definitions of the extraordinary magisterium the goal toward which every dogmatic development must necessarily tend, it may be conceded that for points in some way uncertain even among Catholics themselves, it is practically difficult to arrive, by the sole path of the ordinary magisterium, at apodictically deciding whether such or such a doctrine is or is not sufficiently proposed by the Church as dogma. In such a case, soliciting a decision from the extraordinary magisterium may be justified, among other reasons, by that of eliminating in a clear and even psychologically most effective way this uncertainty.
β) The extraordinary and solemn magisterium, so called because it is occasional and in itself possesses a certain solemnity. It is in turn subdivided into an ecumenical council and a solemn definition of the Roman pontiff speaking ex cathedra (Denz-U, 1839). For dogma to exist, this ecclesiastical magisterium must propose the doctrine with the guarantee of infallibility, engaging in this approval its supreme doctrinal authority. Any other guarantee inferior to this is not sufficient to formally constitute a dogma, but renders the doctrine, from the point of view of absolute supernatural certainty, only more or less probable (Denz-U, 483, 792).
A revealed doctrine, sufficiently proposed as such by the Church, with either ordinary or extraordinary magisterium and with the guarantee of infallibility, is a defined dogma, that is, declared and irreformable. Some, less properly, understand by defined dogma that defined by the extraordinary magisterium. The general rules for interpreting the documents of the magisterium and knowing whether it has defined a dogma or not are the subject of general treatises on the Church (cf. I. De Guibert, De Christi Ecclesia, 2nd ed., Rome 1928, p. 900 sgg.).
To the sufficient proposition of a dogma made by the Church corresponds, on the part of man, the obligation of faith. This faith is divine because the formal motive of assent is the very authority of God revealing. It is divine and Catholic because the obligation extends universally to all. But this very obligation of faith derives from nothing other than the profound nature of things, because adherence to truth sufficiently manifested, even if only indirectly as credible and not as intrinsically evident to us, while remaining free, is the inescapable imperative of the intellect, which does not identify itself with the first Truth but rather in adherence to it finds its end and its beatitude. And indeed, this is nothing other than the end for which God has manifested this truth to us and has endowed the Church with the charism of infallible proposition: so that, adhering to it in faith, we may adhere even in this life to the first beatifying Truth and thus have within us the germ that in the next life will develop into the beatific vision (Denz-U, 1786).
4. Some consequences of this concept are:
a) Dogma is essentially immutable in the sense that the Church proposes only revealed doctrines, and after the death of the Apostles, there has been no new public Revelation: α) the dogmas defined by the Church have not been invented by it but only recognized from the elements handed down by the Apostles, without requiring a new Revelation for this purpose; β) the sense that the infallible Church gives to a dogma at a particular moment cannot have been different in the past nor can it be in the future. All this derives from the concept that the Church is merely a transmitting, not a transforming, means of revealed truth (Denz-U, 1800; cf. also 2022, 2080, 2094). The mutability admitted in dogma is thus described by the same Council in the words of Vincent of Lérins: «Let, therefore... understanding, knowledge, and wisdom, both of individuals and of all, both of one man and of the whole Church, grow and advance strongly with the progress of the ages and centuries; but only in its own kind, that is, in the same dogma, in the same sense, in the same doctrine» (Denz-U, 1800). This concerns, therefore, the progress of our greater knowledge of the same objective dogma. Further determinations of this aspect are not provided by the Magisterium and are the subject of further theological investigation (v. II).
b) Dogma and theology are not identical, theology being, in its entirety, a further human scientific study of dogmas and other truths proposed by the Church, though the results of this further study, insofar as they are additional determinations made with merely human guarantee, are evidently not formally dogma. Thus, many arguments brought forth to prove even a dogma, or at least to defend it from accusations; thus, many deductions made even from dogmas by relating them to truths of a natural order, more or less certain. Dogma is not even identical with what is today called dogmatic theology (v. TEOLOGIA). Even less do dogma and theological systems coincide, that is, dogma and those theological constructions that attempt a further organic explanation of some part of the revealed data, as proposed by the Church, derived from certain key principles, often philosophical, which cannot be theologically demonstrated as the only acceptable one, nor are they, for the most part, the only ones accepted in the history of theology—e.g., Thomism and Scotism in many theological positions, Thomism and Molinism in the question of Grace.
c) Dogma and philosophical systems. Here, the question is examined only whether and in what sense Catholic dogma as such is linked to a particular philosophical system. It certainly implies some philosophy: because Catholic dogma expressly uses concepts of a philosophical order, such as nature, person, substance, consubstantial, transubstantiation, matter, form, instrumental cause, etc. A dogmatic formula is precisely the formulation of a dogma in technical terms, often philosophical. Moreover, the Church presents as dogma a certain number of truths of a philosophical order as well, proposing to these questions its own specific solution and excluding the contradictory one—e.g., on the possibility of knowing objective truth, at least in matters of faith (Denz-U, 2026, 2078 ff., 2145); on the possibility of knowing with certainty the existence of God, ascending from created things (Denz-U, 1785); on the attributes of God (Denz-U, 1782); on the origin of things through creation and the origin of moral evil from a deficiency of created free will (Denz-U, 428); on the existence, origin, nature, and faculties of the human soul; the purpose of creation; the morality or immorality of certain acts, etc. (cf. R. Garrigou-Lagrange, Le sens commun, la philosophie de l'être et les formules dogmatiques, 3rd ed., Paris 1922, p. 374 ff.).
Is this an undue connection with a particular philosophical system, and specifically the canonization of the Aristotelian system? The contact between dogma and philosophy in general is inevitable and legitimate because, even hypothetically speaking, if a true Revelation exists, it cannot be contrary to truths of the natural order but must rather presuppose them. The theory of the two truths does not hold (Denz-U, 738; 1634 f.; 1797; 2109; 2146). What may concern the philosopher, justly jealous of the legitimate autonomy of his science, is solely: α) that the believer, in rejecting philosophical doctrines contrary to dogma and in positively proving those conforming to it, does not use anything other than the philosophical method when reasoning; this does not prevent taking dogma as an extrinsic negative norm; β) that he be capable of demonstrating that philosophical assertions contrary to dogma are either positively false or not necessary; γ) that he be equally capable of demonstrating the possibility of a supernatural Revelation in general and the reasonable credibility of the divine nature of the Catholic Church. As for the connection with the Aristotelian-Scholastic system in particular: the philosophical truths implied by dogma are mostly concepts and principles of common sense and universal experience (e.g., the objectivity of truth, the possibility of attaining it, paternity, filiation, etc.), or else they are more elaborated concepts (nature, person, etc.), but in the immediate extension of common sense (cf. R. Garrigou-Lagrange, op. cit., p. 269 ff.). And it is for this reason that the Church makes use of them—not on the authority of a philosophical school, though they may have been scientifically elaborated in that school, and the Church uses them with the technical expressions of the school because it deems them suitable. Moreover, these concepts do not properly impose a philosophical system but, if anything, certain principles that, according to common sense, should underlie every system. If they are indeed at the foundation of the Aristotelian-Scholastic system, provided they are proven and defended with the pure philosophical method, it is not clear why this factual concordance between dogma and this system should be reprehensible. Finally, let us not forget the distinction between dogma, theology, and theological systems (for the connection of the latter with Aristotelian-Scholastic philosophy, V. TEOLOGIA).
d) The value of dogma for life and piety lies essentially in the fact that it provides an infallible answer regarding the meaning of Revelation and thus its practical implications, illuminating the intellect and directing the will in the face of the deviations of error or the doubts of the mind. Dogma, therefore, does not aim to replace the direct contact in vivifying faith between the believer and the sources of Revelation, especially the Gospels, and even less between the believer and God, but rather to make this contact possible by guiding it according to truth. To wish to preserve the sanctifying mission of the Church in the world without dogma, preaching an adogmatic Christianity in which only morality would be retained, is to wish to preserve the tree by cutting off its roots. In the Catholic Church, dogma effectively remains the foundation of morality, mysticism, and action, according to the constant apostolic tradition (Gal. 2:19 ff.; Rom. 14:15; I John 4:9 ff.; cf. A. Gardeil, Le donné révélé et la théologie, 2nd ed., Paris 1910, p. 319 ff.; E. Krebs, Dogma und Leben, I, 3rd ed., Paderborn 1930; II, 2nd ed., ibid. 1925; A. Rademacher, Religion und Leben, Freiburg im Br. [1926]).
BIBL.:
R. Garrigou-Lagrange, Le sens commun, la philosophie de l'être et les formules dogmatiques, 3ª ed., Parigi 1922; A. Gardeil, Le donné révélé et la théologie, 2ª ed., Parigi 1910; E. Krebs, Dogma und Leben, I, 3ª ed., Paderborn 1930; II, 2ª ed., ivi 1925; A. Rademacher, Religion und Leben, Friburgo in Br. 1926; J. de Guibert, De valore philosophico formularum dogmaticarum, Roma 1921; J. Kleutgen, Die Philosophie der Vorzeit, 2ª ed., Innsbruck 1878; M. Grabmann, Die Geschichte der katholischen Theologie seit dem Ausgang der Väterzeit, Friburgo in Br. 1933; H. Dieckmann, De Ecclesia, I, Friburgo in Br. 1925; J. Rivière, Le dogme de la Rédemption, Parigi 1931; P. Parente, Dizionario di Teologia dommatica, Roma 1943; G. Van Noort, Tractatus de Ecclesia Christi, 3ª ed., Amsterdam 1926; A. Michelitsch, Dogmatik, Graz 1937; L. Lercher, Institutiones Theologiae dogmaticae, I, Innsbruck 1934; M. Schmaus, Katholische Dogmatik, I, Monaco 1938; H. Quilliet, La foi catholique, Parigi 1926; J. Bainvel, De magisterio vivo et traditione, Parigi 1905; A. Tanquerey, Synopsis theologiae dogmaticae, I, 16ª ed., Parigi 1928; D. Palmieri, Praelectiones theologiae dogmaticae, I, Roma 1878; J. Wilhelm, Katholischer Glaube und Wissenschaft, Friburgo in Br. 1908; F. Marin-Sola, L'évolution homogène du dogme catholique, Friburgo 1924; J. de Tonquédec, Questions de cosmologie et de physique chez Aristote et S. Thomas, Parigi 1930; J. de Vries, Denken und Sein, Friburgo in Br. 1937; E. Przywara, Religionsbegründung, Friburgo in Br. 1923; H. Bouillard, Conversion et grâce chez S. Thomas d'Aquin, Parigi 1944; C. Boyer, Cours de théologie dogmatique, I, Roma 1932; J. de Finance, Être et agir dans la philosophie de S. Thomas, Roma 1945.
A. Michelitsch
5. Note on non-Catholic concepts of dogma
The concept of dogma held by Catholic doctrine substantially aligns with that of the Photian schismatic Churches (cf. A. Palmieri, Theologia dogmatica orthodoxa, I, Florence 1911, pp. 7-30). Orthodox Protestantism, however, rejects the Church’s infallible proposition, replacing it with the individual’s free examination of Revelation, restricted solely to Scripture. This position, which assumes that everything a Christian must necessarily believe is clearly and unequivocally contained in the Bible, contradicts New Testament documents and the history of Christianity, reducing dogma from an objective norm of absolute value to a subjective norm relative to each individual. The fruit of this position is the rationalist concept, whose philosophical foundation is Kantian agnosticism: thought, imprisoned within itself, cannot know things outside itself. The logical consequence is absolute immanentism and thus the absolute autonomy of thought, which creates everything. Hence, it becomes impossible to know God and validly express His attributes, impossible to have supernatural Revelation; the fact and doctrine of Christianity must be explained according to the laws by which immanent thought produces religious ideas within itself as expressions of its own mutable state: this is transformative dogmatic evolutionism. On this basis, Schleiermacher explains religion and Revelation as the sentiment of individual experience, of intimate dependence and contact with God. Dogmas are inadequate and mutable attempts to express the momentary state of this experience in one or more individuals of a given era. Harnack, following the same path but with the addition of Gospel criticism and ecclesiastical history, asserts that primitive Christianity consisted entirely in the intimate experience Jesus the man had of His intimate relationship with God as Father. The preaching of this experience, the Gospel, created a religious movement that, upon encountering the Greek world, sought to express itself in the forms habitual to Greek culture, that is, in intellectualistic philosophy. From this arose dogmas, which transformed into irreformable metaphysics, into orthodoxy, into a hierarchical-monarchical and cultic society, what at its origin was merely an experience of love. Dogmas are therefore: «a product of the Greek spirit on the soil of the Gospel... that is, a mental instrument with which in antiquity an attempt was made to make the Gospel intelligible» (Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte, 4th ed., I, p. 18). The attempt, moreover, would have been legitimate had it not been claimed as absolute, thereby suffocating the primordial vital element: the experience of love. Modernists start from Schleiermacher’s presuppositions with fideistic-symbolic determinations: agnosticism (Denz-U, 2072); religion as solely a matter of vital experience, such as religious consciousness or religious sense (Denz-U, 2074), identified with Revelation (Denz-U, 2075). This seeks expression first in popular formulas and symbols, then in more reflective and elaborate forms, appearing more rigid because they arise from a kind of mediation among diverse tendencies within society. Once sanctioned by authority, this mediated formulation constitutes dogma as an approximate symbolic expression of the religious sense, not of absolute value but relative to it (Denz-U, 2078, 2079). Under the influence of W. James’ pragmatism and Bergson (the truth of a concept lies in its practical utility in guiding life), E. Le Roy specifies that dogma is solely a norm of action, not of thought. «God is a person» means that we must behave toward this being as if He were a person, without concern for whether He truly is (Denz-U, 2026). Dogma, like the religious sense, undergoes continuous substantial transformation, which occurs practically as the convergent and balanced result of two opposing forces in society: tradition, under the aegis of authority, a conservative force, and progress, an evolutionary force, proper to individuals with more intense experiences (Denz-U, 2080). The modernist notion of dogma is thus summarized in these words of Loisy: «The dogmas that the Church presents as revealed are not truths fallen from heaven, but an interpretation of religious facts that the human mind has procured through laborious effort» (Denz-U, 2023).That all this has nothing to do not only with the Catholic concept of dogma but with Christianity itself in what is most specific to it hardly needs to be emphasized. The Catholic apologist will instead note: a) how all these theories are the inevitable fruit of the initial Protestant position; b) how all these constructions rest on the postulate of an agnostic-immanentist philosophy, always actively influential, even in works that assume the guise of pure criticism and pure history, such as those of Harnack, Loisy, Turmel, and Buonaiuti; c) how absurd was the modernist pretension of advocating the aforementioned concepts while wishing to remain within the bosom of the Catholic Church to «reform it from within», and how inalienable was the Church’s right and duty to protect its sincere children from a system, «a congeries of all heresies», leading «in manifold ways to atheism and the abolition of all religion» (Denz-U, 2105-2109). d) In defense against the aforementioned positions, the Catholic apologist presses simultaneously in two directions: a) in the philosophical field: to demonstrate the inconsistency of the adversaries’ philosophical presuppositions and to rationally establish the possibility of objective knowledge, and thus of a supernatural Revelation, as well as the credibility of the Catholic Church’s divinity. This is the task of general apologetics (cf. R. Garrigou-Lagrange, De Revelatione, 3rd ed., 2 vols., Rome 1937, which accounts in a special way for the agnostic point of view); b) in the critical and historical field, to demonstrate the arbitrariness, from a purely critical and historical standpoint, of the adversaries’ procedures and conclusions, particularly their general inductions in biblical exegesis and the history of dogmas. In this vast field of particular apologetics, which touches upon the subsequent historical state of dogmas from their appearance to the present day, Catholic scholarship, as regards exegesis, has already made notable progress in a few years. This is the profound significance of the works of Fr. Lagrange and his polemic against Loisy and liberal exegesis.
BIBL.:
In addition to the works already cited in the text, see: J. Rivière, Le modernisme dans l'Église, Paris 1929; A. Houtin, Histoire du modernisme catholique, Paris 1913; A. Loisy, Autour d'un petit livre, Paris 1903; E. Buonaiuti, Le modernisme catholique, Rome 1943; H. Denzinger - A. Schönmetzer, Enchiridion Symbolorum, 32ª ed., Freiburg im Br. 1963; J. de Guibert, Documenta ecclesiastica christianae perfectionis studium spectantia, Rome 1931; M.-J. Congar, Vraie et fausse réforme dans l'Église, Paris 1950; Y. Congar, Chrétiens désunis. Principes d'un «œcuménisme» catholique, Paris 1937.
A. Michel
II. THE EVOLUTION OF DOGMA
The term evolution was applied to dogma by rationalists at the height of Darwinian theories, to indicate its presumed transformative changes. Today, it is also used by Catholics in the legitimate sense of development or progress in general. This does not concern the progress of dogma before the death of the last Apostle. During that period, dogma grew objectively and substantially through new revelations. The discussion here is limited to the subsequent period.1. The question, therefore, is posed as follows: a) Catholic doctrine holds that dogma is substantially and objectively immutable (v. I, 4 a). b) History, however, demonstrates that the Church did not arrive at once at the definition of the complex of dogmas it proposes today but, for some of them, only after a long time and various vicissitudes.
The major epochs of dogmatic development are well-known: even setting aside the period up to the 4th century due to the technical difficulty of distinguishing, in the dogmas then proposed by the Church, what is merely primitive apostolic data from what implies further dogmatic development, such development is evident beginning with Constantine. The period from the 4th to the 8th century is that of the great definitions concerning the Trinity, Christology, anthropology (original sin, Grace and works, predestination), Mariology, the Church and the Sacraments as objective means of salvation essentially independent of the personal holiness of ministers, and the veneration of images. The Middle Ages refined and defined dogmas on the Eucharist, the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son, the Last Things, and the primacy of the Pope. After the 16th century, dogmas on the canonicity of Scripture, justification, the Sacraments in general and in particular, the veneration of saints, indulgences, the Immaculate Conception, faith and its relations with reason, the concept of Revelation, of dogma, and papal infallibility were further refined and defined. These dogmas are expressed in formal dogmatic formulas, often highly elaborated.
c) Nevertheless, all this cannot imply a substantial change in Revelation itself because the Church possesses the charism to interpret it infallibly, not to transform II. It must therefore be said that the Church itself, with the infallible assistance of the Holy Spirit, discerns in Scripture and Tradition the sense intended by God and uniquely true, which, through a normal logical process, allows the passage from Revelation to the definition of the evolved dogma without inducing substantial changes.
2. Historical notes on the question. The ancients focused almost exclusively on the immutable aspect of dogma. The aspect of progress is occasionally affirmed (Origen, Gregory Nazianzen, Augustine). Vincent of Lérins explicitly addressed in his Commonitorium (ed. Jülicher, Leipzig 1895, pp. 23, 28) the question of what kind of dogmatic progress is legitimate, admitting only that of a clearer knowledge with more precise expression and greater practical veneration of the ever-same objective truth (cf. J. Madoz, El concepto de tradición en s. Vicente de Lerins, Rome 1933). In the Middle Ages, the matter was touched upon only in relation to the question of which truths are Catholic, that is, of universal faith. Among these were counted not only those revealed in proper words and summarized in the Apostles' Creed with its articles and what reduces to them, but also those deduced from them by right and necessary consequence (cf. R. M. Schultes, Introductio in historiam dogmatum, Paris 1922, pp. 58-87; J. M. Parent, La notion de dogme au XIIIe siècle, in Études d'histoire littéraire et doctrinale du XIIIe siècle, 1 [1932], pp. 141-62). Post-Tridentine theologians further refined this idea: a) distinguishing between progress in substance and in explanation; b) distinguishing various modes of Revelation and faith: explicit-implicit, immediate-mediated, formal-virtual. There was, at this point, a diversity of terminology among authors that continues to this day; c) explicitly addressing the question of the definability of theological conclusions (cf. Schultes, op. cit., pp. 58-87; F. Marin-Sola, L'évolution homogène du dogme cath., 2nd ed., II, Paris 1924, p. 217 ff.). In the 19th century, the question of dogmatic evolution became acute, first due to the influence of idealist philosophical theories with a Hegelian background. A. Günther, influenced by these, admitted that all dogmas must be the object of rational demonstration; but since this explanation of the meaning of dogmas depends on philosophy, and ancient philosophy was very imperfect, the sense that the Church has attributed to dogmas in the past cannot be absolute but only relatively perfect. With the progress of philosophy, this sense could also change substantially. It was against this error that the Vatican Council expounded Catholic doctrine (v. I, 4 a). Shortly afterward, the question was brought to the forefront by the historical works and transformist evolutionary theories in the Darwinian fashion, which liberal Protestants and then the Modernists applied to dogmas, following their general concept of dogma (v. I, 5). In the Catholic sphere, the question was then on the agenda among the theologians of the Tübingen school in Germany, particularly through the work of J. A. Möhler, who insisted on the idea of vital organic unity and the total Christian life (cf. J. Ranft, Der Ursprung des katholischen Traditionsprinzips, Würzburg 1931, p. 46 ff.; A. Minon, L'attitude de J. A. Möhler dans la question du développement du dogme, in Ephemerides theologicae Lovanienses, 11 [1939], pp. 228-82). Great influence was exerted by the work of J. H. Newman: Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine (London 1845), during the writing of which the author converted from Anglicanism to Catholicism. He developed the concept of organic unity and evolution through vital assimilation, then deduced in particular the distinctive criteria of legitimate dogmatic development from illegitimate (cf. J. Guitton, La notion de développement et l'application à la religion chez J. H. Newman, Paris 1933; J. J. Byrne, Newman's anglican notion of doctrinal development, in Ephemerides theologicae Lovanienses, 14 [1937], pp. 230-86). The heretical Modernist solution to the question, an inevitable consequence of their concept of dogma with its philosophical presuppositions (v. I, 5), gave the ecclesiastical magisterium occasion to reaffirm the fixed points of the Catholic concept (Decree Lamentabili, Denz-U, 2201 ff.; Encyclical Pascendi, Denz-U, 2071 ff.; Antimodernist Oath, Denz-U, 2145), and greatly stimulated theologians to a careful examination of the question, as demonstrated by the numerous works from the end of the 19th century onward (v. the principal bibliography up to 1922 in Schultes, op. cit., pp. 149-52).
3. The traditional solution to the question posed above is as follows: the Church, through its infallible way of understanding Scripture and Tradition, proceeds to the proposition of evolved dogmas without inducing an essential change in Revelation, because it does nothing other than expound in clear terms what is implicitly contained in Revelation thus understood. Up to this point, there is no difficulty, because this way of speaking merely expresses in equivalent terms what the decisions of the magisterium condemning the heretical theories of Günther and the Modernists signify in this regard.
The dissent among theologians (aggravated by a diversity of terminology which, for this reason—while one must attend to the matter more than to the terms—it is not appropriate to report here, see Schultes, op. cit., p. 144 and F. Marin-Sola, op. cit., II, p. 326) begins when it comes to further determining the meaning of the word "implicitly." a) All admit that in the case of dogmas, one cannot speak of an explication of an implicit such that between the subject and the predicate there is only a physical connection (e.g., between human nature and person) separable at least by miracle. Such an explication in theology would induce a substantial change. Thus, in theology, from the revealed fact that Christ has a human nature, one cannot, without essential changes to Revelation, deduce that He also has a human personality, deriving this from the axiom that whoever has a human nature also has a human personality; b) many theologians hold that the Church, from Revelation as it understands it, explicates evolved dogmas only by way of improper deduction, not illative but declarative, such that the evolved dogma is always contained in Revelation as the Church understands it, whether as a definition in the thing defined (he is a man, therefore he is a rational animal), as an essential part in the whole (man, therefore soul), as the particular in the unconditioned universal (all men, therefore Peter), or as the correlative in the correlated (he is a father, therefore he has a son). This way of deducing one thing from an implicit is certainly legitimate and does not induce an essential change in Revelation; c) other theologians, however, admit as legitimate explication also that which is done through proper reasoning, illative, from one concept to another formally distinct, if between them there is a metaphysically necessary connection and such that man can see it with certainty without a new revelation. Thus, if it concerns the property of a thing contained in its essence, or a metaphysical effect contained in the metaphysical cause (e.g., the soul is spiritual, therefore it is immortal), or a physical effect contained in its physical cause in a connate state (it is a human nature in a connate state, therefore it has a human personality). In these cases, they say, if the cause is revealed, the effect is also revealed to anyone capable of having the correct concept of both. It is revealed in its cause, virtually, insofar as it can be deduced from it, therefore analogically, but really. The progress between the principle and the conclusion is real, but not objective in itself (as if the conclusion said something that was not said in the principle), but subjective, relative to our knowledge. The conclusion is homogeneous with the principle; d) this difference of position has its importance in the question of whether the Church can define as revealed, and therefore as dogmas and of divine and Catholic faith, properly theological conclusions, that is, those that involve a proper, illative deduction from a revealed premise and another of reason (e.g., every man is risible: principle of reason; now Christ is a man: revealed principle; therefore Christ is risible: proper theological conclusion). All admit: α) that before the definition of the Church, these conclusions cannot be believed with divine and Catholic faith; the contrary opinion of Vega and Vasquez is considered singular. Since one premise is of reason and not revealed, before the definition of the Church the conclusion cannot be known infallibly as revealed; β) that the Church can define these conclusions with infallible authority, due to their necessary connection with the dogma, which otherwise could not be effectively proposed or safeguarded. But the proponents of the first opinion do not admit that the Church can define them as of divine faith, as proper dogmas, but only as of ecclesiastical faith (v. FEDE), because such conclusions, being only "virtually" revealed to us insofar as we can deduce them from the revealed principle, are not truly revealed for them, nor truly contained in Revelation for our knowledge. The proponents of the second opinion, however, admit that the Church can define as revealed, and therefore as proper dogmas and of divine faith, those properly theological conclusions that are in fact deduced with metaphysical certainty from Revelation, such as properties from essence or the effect from the metaphysical or physical cause in a connate state. They hold that what is revealed to us in the aforementioned way is truly revealed, albeit in its cause, that is, virtually and therefore analogically. It suffices that the Church gives its guarantee of infallibility to the conclusion, and this must be believed with divine faith (v. Marin-Sola).
4. The factors of evolution from the implicit to the explicit state are: the Holy Spirit, as the guiding cause that guarantees the infallible homogeneity of the evolved dogma with that in the implicit state; the human mind as the proper instrumental cause. The occasional causes are: the struggle against heresies; the innate tendency to ever deepen the truths believed, examining all their aspects and consequences; the development of Christian piety, of the social organization of the Church, and of discipline; the deepening or extension of connected human knowledge, philosophical or otherwise. The necessity of dogmatic evolution is a consequence of the vital character of the Church, which must effectively apply dogmas to men of all times and in the most diverse circumstances of culture and concern.
5. The history of dogmas, despite rationalist insinuations, is possible even within the Catholic concept due to the legitimately mutable aspect that dogmas entail. Its essential and primary task is to show the believer from which principles, in what forms, and in what occasional circumstances of time and environment a dogma has been explicated. Its secondary task is apologetic: that is, when possible, to positively demonstrate, using only the historical-critical method, that ancient tradition contains at least the principles from which dogmas were later homogeneously explicated; when this is not possible, due to the intrinsic limitations of the historical-critical method, at least to refute adversarial attacks, showing that their conclusions, in light of pure criticism and pure history, are either positively false or at least not necessary. The supreme methodological rule of the history of dogmas is: a) to fully apply all the methodological rules proper to pure criticism and history; b) to verify their results by means of the superior and definitive dogmatic criterion, which serves as an extrinsic negative control, because, in case of contrast, it warns the historian of the mistake made and invites him to re-examine the investigation process with a more precise application of the rules of pure criticism and history. The reasonableness, indeed the necessity, of this position in relation to reason is manifest, assuming the demonstration made by apologetics of the rationality of Faith. Therefore, the anti-modernist oath rejects modernist errors in this field (Denz-U, 1799 and 2146). The utility and necessity of the history of dogmas derive from its tasks. In particular, the dogmatic theologian today cannot do without it, because one cannot fully understand a thing without knowing its genetic aspect. It is especially necessary to vivify the argument of tradition and to sharpen the theological sense in distinguishing between dogmas, theological explanations, theological systems, theological opinions, and to evaluate each thing at its proper measure from the point of view of Revelation.
6. The historiography of dogmas was initiated in its essential aspects by the founders of positive theology in the 16th–17th centuries, among whom, in the Catholic field, Dionysius Petavius (Theologiorum dogmatum tomi quatuor, Paris 1644–50) and L. Thomassin (Dogmata theologica, Paris 1680). Protestant rationalism in the 18th century made it an independent discipline. Under the influence of Hegelian ideas, this discipline was assigned the task of identifying the general historical-philosophical laws followed in the supposed transformative development of the entire dogmatic complex. Following the incomplete work of S. G. Lange (1796) came that of W. Münscher, Handbuch der christlichen Dogmengeschichte (4 vols., up to Gregory the Great, Marburg 1797–1809). F. Chr. Baur (Lehrbuch der christlichen Dogmengeschichte, Tübingen 1847) and his school based their research on the primitive nucleus, the driving forces, the directives, and the results of development on the Hegelian schema of thesis, antithesis, synthesis. Against this apriorism, A. Ritschl (d. 1880) reacted by substituting the influence of Greek philosophy. This tendency was most fully developed by A. Harnack (Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte, 2 vols., Tübingen 1886–90, and countless monographs. V. I, 5). Within Harnack’s orbit, though often with notable nuances, numerous German Dogmengeschichten written from the beginning of this century move; notable among these are F. Loofs, Leitfaden zum Studium der Dogmengeschichte (Halle 1906), and R. Seeberg, Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte (4 vols., Leipzig 1895–1913). Others, still in the rationalist field, to explain the origin and early period of the history of dogmas, turned more to Hellenistic Oriental religiosity—of which the mystery cults and Gnosticism were the fruit—than to Greek philosophy. Here, the primordial nucleus of the development of Christian dogma would be the idea of the liberation of the spiritual element of man, enclosed in essentially evil matter (dualism), through the work of a savior god descended to earth, whose personal virtue we assimilate principally in the cult. This would already be clear in St. Paul (W. Bousset, Kyrios Christos, Göttingen 1913) or even in Jesus himself, or in John the Baptist (Reitzenstein and others). In the Modernist field, A. Loisy limited himself to exegesis. The origin of Christian dogmas lies in the autosuggestion of one who believed himself to be the Messiah of the apocalyptic Jewish tradition. Convinced of his imminent triumphant return, to be followed soon by the end of the world and the beginning of the Kingdom of God, he thought of nothing but preparing his followers for II. Thus, a religious movement began; but when the expected end did not come, the believers organized themselves into a Church, thereby giving rise to the creation of Christian dogmas, the fruit of the religious consciousness of the community. J. Turmel applied the postulates of the Modernist school to the history of dogmas in the most logical and extreme way, first with a series of monographs on various questions, published largely under the veil of various pseudonyms to better "reform the Church," and then, when the deception was uncovered, openly in Histoire des dogmes (6 vols., Paris 1931–36). In the Catholic field, the first comprehensive histories appeared in Germany. H. Klee wrote a Dogmengeschichte (2 vols., Mainz 1837–38; Italian trans., Milan 1858). This was followed by J. Schwane, Dogmengeschichte (4 vols., Münster 1862–90). Leaving aside works of lesser importance, the best in the Catholic field for the period examined remains J. Tixeront, Histoire des dogmes dans l'antiquité chrétienne (3 vols., Paris 1905 ff.). However, in this field, Catholic work has not yet been synthesized, because synthesis presupposes a patient investigation of details not yet sufficiently completed. It has rather rightly devoted itself to the monographic study of a series of particular questions, in which the problems are rigorously reexamined one by one, and the results of modern criticism are sifted. This is indeed a long path, but the only possible one, and one that will certainly one day yield the desired fruits of synthesis (these monographs are indicated for each dogma in particular).