DOGMA. — The present-day technical theological meaning is that of a doctrine revealed by God and proposed as such by the Church with the guarantee of infallibility.
OUTLINE:
I. The concept
II. The evolution of the d.I. THE CONCEPT
1. The term d. to express precisely this concept does not prevail definitively until the 18th century. The earlier meanings are based on the ancient usage of classical Greek.Δόγμα, from δοκέω, had the fundamental meaning of τὰ δοκοῦντα: what is deemed to be true and good or fitting. Thus, in the case of theoretical views: a) in general: opinion; b) specifically: philosophical doctrine, whether theoretical or moral, especially if considered firm and fundamental within a given system (the decreta or placita philosophorum). In the case of a practical volitional attitude taken in consequence of a theoretical view: a) in general: determination, decision, will; b) specifically: an official decision authoritatively promulgated, ordinance, decree, edict. This latter meaning, in the profane sense of an imperial decree, is found in the Septuagint (Esth. 3, 9; Dan. 2, 13; 6, 8). In the religious sense of divine ordinances contained in the Mosaic law it is found in Hellenistic Judaism (3 Mach. 1, 3; Josephus, Apologia, 1, 42). In the New Testament the sense is of ordinance, decree, whether imperial (Lk. 2, 1; Acts 17, 7), apostolic (Acts 16, 4), or Mosaic (Eph. 2, 15; Col. 2, 14). All these earlier meanings are encountered in the ancient ecclesiastical tradition, which moreover used the word to denote Christian doctrine, whether orthodox (d. of the Lord, right, taught by God, pious, true, ecclesiastical, divine) or even heretical (heretical d., perverse, false). Although some Fathers distinguished between d. and praxis, usage remained varied throughout the Middle Ages. The present-day technical sense is already found in M. Cano (d. 1560), but throughout the 16th–17th centuries it is by no means exclusive. It becomes so, however, in V. L. Gotti (d. 1742) and thereafter becomes customary, even with the specification of d. fidei (cf. G. Kittel, in Theologisches Wörterbuch zum neuen Testament, II, pp. 233–35; A. Denefle, D., Wort und Begriff, in Scholastik, 6 (1931), pp. 381–400).
2. The thing expressed, however, is already clearly visible in the New Testament under the concept of tradition.
Especially in the Pauline epistles, both the Gospel in its entirety (Rom. 6, 17; Gal. 1, 9–12; 1 Tim. 6, 20; 2 Tim. 1, 13–14) and, specifically, precepts of Christian life (Phil. 4, 9; 1 Thess. 4, 1; 2 Thess. 2, 15; 3, 6), or even individual doctrines such as the Eucharist and the Resurrection of Christ (1 Cor. 11, 23–24), are presented with similar terms or equivalent expressions. The general idea thus expressed is that the Christian religion is a complex of facts and doctrines that are absolutely objective, not invented by those who proclaim them, but simply given by God through Jesus Christ, and toward which the promoters of the Gospel have no other task than to receive, preserve intact, and transmit without any alteration. The Christian religion is therefore a παρὰσχεσις, a deposit (1 Tim. 6, 20; 2 Tim. 1, 13–14), a juridical expression indicating a thing that the legitimate owner entrusts to another as his agent, with the task of preserving it and returning it intact. Thus, while the faithful receive everything from the Church through its leaders, the Apostles and others (2 Tim. 2, 2), they adhere not to human doctrines but properly to divine ones (1 Thess. 2, 14). And since it is not possible for this Church to teach a doctrine different from that which it has received by mandate and charism of divine assistance (Mt. 28, 18–20; Mk. 16, 15–16; Jn. 14, 16–17; 15, 26; 17, 18–20; 1 Cor. 1, 17; 2 Cor. 5, 20; 1 Tim. 3, 14–15), every person must fully adhere to it (Mk. 16, 16; Rom. 1, 5; 2 Cor. 10, 4; 1 Jn. 2, 24), nor ever heed contrary doctrines (Rom. 6, 16; Gal. 1, 8; 2 Jn. 1, 10) under penalty of shipwreck in the faith (1 Tim. 1, 19). In these simple propositions—there are truths revealed by God, of which the Church alone is the depository and infallible interpreter, and to which faith must be given for salvation—lies all the essential content of the concept of d. Subsequent ages have done no more than clarify further: a) which are in concreto the authentic organs of the Church’s magisterium (v. CHURCH; COUNCIL; POPE; TRADITION); b) what precisely is the relationship between the Church’s proposition and Revelation; c) what is the nature of the faith that must be given to the revealed truths proposed by the Church (v. FAITH).
The reflective determination of the concept of d. is the fruit of the struggle against the rationalism and modernism of the 19th–20th centuries, which directly rejected every d. as such, denying its divine origin, its substantial immutability, and its objective sense. An equivalent definition of d. that may be considered the result of all preceding work is given by the Vatican Council: “Everything contained in the written word of God or in tradition, and proposed by the Church for belief as divinely revealed, whether by solemn judgment or by the ordinary and universal magisterium, must be believed with divine and Catholic faith” (Denz.-U., 1792).
3. Analysis of the Catholic concept of doctrine reveals the following elements:
a) It is a doctrine, an assertion about a thing, presupposing a judgment and communicated to others in teaching. This judgment about the thing expressed and the concepts involved are understood as having objective value, capable of reaching and expressing the being of things as they are in themselves, independently of us—specifically, independently of our cognitive or affective activity. Concepts and judgments are regulated by being, distinct from them, and thus serve as an objective norm of thought and, subsequently, as an objective norm of life (Denz-U, 2026, 2079, 2145). There is no thing that, in some respect, cannot be the object of doctrine, since everything either is the divine or has some relation to II. However, the very affirmation about this thing, to constitute doctrine, must be of the kind in which the infallible judgment of the Church is competent—namely, those concerning faith or morals, or that aspect of things which, in the Church’s judgment, can affect the religious relationship between man and God (Denz-U, 706, 1688, 1839).
b) It is a doctrine revealed by God. This refers to supernatural revelation, divine locution, essentially transcending the natural order, in which God manifests a truth to man. It is thus a fully free action of a personal and transcendent God, entirely distinct from the mere manifestation of Himself through the intrinsic natural laws of creation—that is, from natural revelation (Denz-U, 2020, 2075). However, it is not necessary, for something to constitute doctrine, that it involve the manifestation of mysteries in the strict sense, such as the Trinity or the Incarnation. It may also pertain to truths naturally accessible to human reason, such as the immortality of the soul, or even to simple historical facts, such as the Nativity, Life, and Passion of Christ.
By revelation is also meant public revelation, that is, the revelation destined by God for all men and entrusted, therefore, to the custody and authority of the Church as a public society. Private revelations, on the other hand, are those made by God not with the intention of binding the faith of the religious society as such, but rather addressed to individuals, even if numerous. These never constitute doctrine, nor does the Church intervene to propose them as such. At most, she declares that they contain nothing contrary to public revelation and that it is permissible, in accordance with the dictates of human prudence, to adhere to them with spiritual profit.
According to Catholic doctrine, public revelation came to a definitive close with the death of the last of the Apostles (Denz-U, 2021). No further doctrine has been revealed by God since that time. This public revelation is entirely contained in canonical Scripture or in what is called oral tradition—tradition not committed to writing but transmitted orally by the Apostles (Denz-U, 1792). However, it may be contained in various ways, which, since they give rise to divergent opinions among theologians in particulars, will be explained below (v. II. 3).
c) Proposed as such by the Church with the guarantee of infallibility. This formal proposition by the Church is the formal element of doctrine: prior to it, revealed truth is doctrine only materially, in itself, not formally with respect to us. In doctrine, the teaching is proposed as revealed. This is necessary because the faith to which doctrine gives rise is divine faith, in which one believes the thing formally on the authority of God revealing (Denz-U, 1789).
It is the Church that proposes doctrine; specifically, the authentic and infallible organs of ecclesiastical magisterium: the Catholic episcopate united with the pope and the Roman pontiff himself. There are thus two kinds of infallible ecclesiastical magisterium by which doctrine may be proposed:
a) The ordinary and universal magisterium of all bishops united with the pope (Denz-U, 1792), when—though dispersed throughout the world—they teach with moral and conscious unanimity a doctrine as revealed and therefore of universal faith (cf. J. M. A. Vacant, *Etudes théologiques sur les constitutions du Concile du Vatican*, II, Paris 1895, pp. 82 ff.; id., *Le magistère ordinaire de l'Église et ses organes*, ibid. 1887). That this is a legitimate way of proposing doctrine necessarily follows from the hierarchical-monarchical nature of the Church and from its infallibility. Otherwise, this infallibility would be meaningless, since the other kind of infallible ecclesiastical magisterium, the extraordinary, is by its nature occasional.
To those who would see in the solemn definitions of the extraordinary magisterium the point toward which all dogmatic development must necessarily tend, it may be conceded that, for points on which even Catholics are uncertain, it may be practically difficult to arrive, by the ordinary magisterium alone, at an apodictic decision as to whether such and such a doctrine has or has not been sufficiently proposed by the Church as doctrine. In such a case, seeking a decision from the extraordinary magisterium may be justified, among other reasons, by the desire to remove this uncertainty in a clear and psychologically effective manner.
b) The extraordinary and solemn magisterium, so called because it occurs on special occasions and possesses a certain solemnity in itself. It is further subdivided into an ecumenical council and a solemn definition of the Roman pontiff speaking *ex cathedra* (Denz-U, 1839). For there to be doctrine, this ecclesiastical magisterium must propose the doctrine with the guarantee of infallibility, invoking in this approval its supreme doctrinal authority. Any lesser guarantee does not suffice to constitute doctrine formally; rather, it renders the doctrine, from the standpoint of absolute supernatural certainty, only more or less probable (Denz-U, 483, 792).
A revealed doctrine sufficiently proposed as such by the Church, through either ordinary or extraordinary magisterium and with the guarantee of infallibility, is a defined doctrine—that is, declared and irreformable. Some, less precisely, use the term "defined doctrine" to mean defined by the extraordinary magisterium. The general rules for interpreting the documents of the magisterium and determining whether it has defined a doctrine or not are treated in general treatises on the Church (cf. I. De Guibert, *De Christi Ecclesia*, 2nd ed., Rome 1928, pp. 300 ff.).
To the sufficient proposition of a doctrine by the Church corresponds, on the part of man, the obligation of faith. This faith is divine because the formal motive of assent is the very authority of God revealing. It is divine and Catholic because the obligation extends universally to all. Yet this very obligation of faith derives from nothing other than the profound nature of things, for adherence to truth sufficiently manifested—even if only indirectly as credible and not as intrinsically evident to us—while remaining free, is the inescapable imperative of the intellect, which, though not identical with the First Truth, finds in adherence to it its end and its beatitude. Indeed, this is the very end for which God has manifested these truths to us and has endowed the Church with the charism of infallible proposition: so that, by adhering to them in faith, we may adhere even now, from this earthly life, to the first beatifying Truth, and thus possess within us the seed that, in the life to come, will unfold into the beatific vision (Denz-U, 1786).
4. Some consequences of this concept should be noted:
a) Dogma is essentially immutable in the sense that the Church proposes only revealed doctrines and, since there is no new public Revelation after the death of the Apostles, it follows that: a) defined dogmas have not been invented by the Church but have merely been recognized from elements handed down by the Apostles, without any new Revelation being necessary for this; b) the sense that the infallible Church gives to a dogma at a given moment cannot have been different in the past nor can it be different in the future. All this derives from the concept that the Church is merely a transmitter, not a transformer, of revealed truth: (Denz-U, 1800, cf. also 2022, 2080, 2094). The mutability that is admitted in dogma is thus described by the same Council in the words of Vincent of Lérins: “Let it therefore grow and progress mightily, in breadth and in length, in height and in depth, both in the individual and in the whole Church; but let it be the same dogma, the same sense, the same understanding” (Denz-U, 1800). This is therefore a matter of progress in our deeper knowledge of the same objective dogma. The Magisterium does not provide further determinations on this aspect, and these remain the object of further theological investigation (see below: II).
b) Dogma and theology are not identical; theology, in its entirety, is a further human and scientific study of dogmas and other truths proposed by the Church. However, the results of this further study, insofar as they are further determinations made with merely human certainty, are not, as such, formally dogma. Thus, many arguments advanced to prove a dogma, or at least to defend it against objections, are not dogma; nor are many deductions made from dogma by relating it to truths of a more or less certain natural order. Dogma is also not identical with what is today called dogmatic theology (v. TEOLOGIA). Still less are dogma and theological systems identical—i.e., those organic explanations of some part of revealed data as proposed by the Church, which are deduced from certain key principles, often philosophical, but which cannot be demonstrated as the only theologically acceptable ones, nor are they usually the only ones accepted in the history of theology. For example, Thomism and Scotism in many theological matters, or Thomism and Molinism in the question of grace.
c) Dogma and philosophical systems. Here we consider only the question of whether and in what sense Catholic dogma as such is connected with a particular philosophical system. It certainly implies some philosophy, because Catholic dogma expressly employs philosophical concepts such as nature, person, substance, consubstantial, transubstantiation, matter, form, instrumental cause, etc. A dogmatic formula is precisely the formulation of a dogma in technical, often philosophical, terms. Moreover, the Church presents as dogma certain truths of a philosophical order, proposing a specific solution to these questions and excluding contradictory solutions—e.g., on the possibility of knowing objective truth, at least regarding matters of faith (Denz-U, 2026, 2078 ff., 2145); on the possibility of knowing with certainty the existence of God through reasoning from created things (Denz-U, 1785); on the attributes of God (Denz-U, 1782); on the origin of things through creation and the origin of moral evil from a defect in created free will (Denz-U, 428); on the existence, origin, nature, and faculties of the human soul; the purpose of creation; the morality or immorality of certain acts, etc. (cf. R. Garrigou-Lagrange, *Le sens commun, la philosophie de l'être et les formules dogmatiques*, 3rd ed., Paris 1922, pp. 374 ff.).
Is this an improper connection with a particular philosophical system, and specifically with the canonization of the Aristotelian system? The contact between dogma and philosophy in general is inevitable and legitimate, because—even hypothetically—if a true Revelation exists, it cannot be contrary to natural truths but must presuppose them. The theory of the two truths does not hold (Denz-U, 738; 1634 ff.; 1797; 2109; 2146). What may legitimately concern the philosopher, who is rightly concerned with the legitimate autonomy of his science, is solely: a) that the believer, in rejecting philosophical doctrines contrary to dogma and in positively proving those conforming to it, should use only the philosophical method when addressing the unbeliever, without thereby preventing dogma from serving as an extrinsic negative norm; b) that he should be able to demonstrate that philosophical assertions contrary to dogma are either positively false or unnecessary; c) that he should be able to demonstrate the possibility of a supernatural Revelation in general and the reasonable credibility of the divine nature of the Catholic Church. As for the connection with the Aristotelian-Scholastic system in particular: the philosophical truths implied by dogma are mostly concepts and principles of common sense and universal experience (e.g., the objectivity of truth, the possibility of attaining it, paternity, filiation, etc.), or more highly developed concepts (nature, person, etc.), but which are an immediate extension of common sense (cf. R. Garrigou-Lagrange, *op. cit.*, pp. 299 ff.). It is for this reason that the Church makes use of them; not on the authority of a philosophical school, although they may have been scientifically developed within such a school, and the Church uses them with the technical expressions of the school because it deems them suitable. Moreover, these concepts do not impose a particular philosophical system as such, but rather certain principles that, according to common sense, should underlie every system. If these principles indeed underlie the Aristotelian-Scholastic system, provided they are proven and defended by purely philosophical methods, there is no reason to regard this factual concordance between dogma and this system as reprehensible. Finally, one should not forget the distinction between dogma, theology, and theological systems (for the connection of these with Aristotelian-Scholastic philosophy, V. TEOLOGIA).
d) The value of dogma for life and piety lies essentially in the fact that it provides an infallible answer concerning the meaning of Revelation and thus its practical implications, illuminating the intellect and directing the will in the face of the fading of error or the doubts of the intellect. Dogma is therefore not intended to replace the direct, life-giving encounter of the believer with the sources of Revelation, especially the Gospels, nor even less the encounter of the believer with God. Rather, its purpose is to make this encounter possible by directing it according to truth. To seek to preserve the sanctifying mission of the Church in the world without dogma, by preaching an adogmatic Christianity in which only morality is retained, is like seeking to preserve a tree while cutting off its roots. In the Catholic Church, dogma remains in fact the foundation of morality, mysticism, and action, in accordance with the constant apostolic tradition (Gal. 2:19 ff.; Rom. 14:15; 1 John 4:9 ff. [cf. A. Gardeil, *Le donné révélé et la théologie*, 2nd ed., Paris 1910, pp. 319 ff.; E. Krebs, *Dogma und Leben*, I, 3rd ed., Paderborn 1930; II, 2nd ed. ibid. 1925; A. Rademacher, *Religion und Leben*, Freiburg im Br. (1926)]).
5. Note on non-Catholic concepts of dogma
Essentially, the Catholic concept of dogma agrees with that of the Fozian schismatic Churches (cf. A. Palmieri, *Theologia dogmatica orthodoxa*, I, Florence 1911, pp. 1-30). Orthodox Protestantism, however, rejects the Church’s infallible teaching office, substituting instead the individual’s free examination of Revelation, restricted solely to the Bible. This position, which assumes that everything a Christian must necessarily believe is clearly and unequivocally contained in Scripture, contradicts both New Testament documents and the history of Christianity. It reduces dogma from an objective norm of absolute value to a subjective norm relative to each individual.From this position springs the rationalist concept, whose philosophical foundation is Kantian agnosticism: the mind, imprisoned within itself, cannot know things outside itself. The inevitable consequence is the absolute immanence and thus the absolute autonomy of thought, which creates everything. Hence, it becomes impossible to know God or to express His attributes validly; supernatural Revelation is denied. The facts and doctrines of Christianity are explained according to the laws by which immanent thought produces religious ideas within itself as expressions of its own mutable state—this is dogmatic transformist evolutionism.
On this basis, Schleiermacher explains religion and Revelation as the individual’s experiential feeling of intimate dependence and contact with God. Dogmas are inadequate and mutable attempts to express the momentary state of this experience in one or more individuals of a given era.
Harnack, following a similar path but adding a critique of the Gospels and ecclesiastical history, asserts that primitive Christianity consisted entirely in the inner experience of Jesus regarding His intimate relationship with God as Father. The preaching of this experience, the Gospel, gave rise to a religious movement that, upon encountering the Greek world, sought to express itself in forms habitual to Greek culture—that is, in intellectualistic philosophy. From this arose dogmas, which transformed into unalterable metaphysics, orthodoxy, and a hierarchical-monarchical and cultic society what had originally been only an experience of love. Dogmas are therefore “a product of the Greek spirit upon the soil of the Gospel... that is, a mental instrument by which, in antiquity, an attempt was made to render the Gospel intelligible” (*Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte*, 4th ed., I, p. 18). This attempt would have been legitimate had it not been claimed as absolute, thereby stifling the original vital element: the experience of love.
The modernists base their views on Schleiermacher’s presuppositions with fideistic-symbolistic determinations: agnosticism (Denz-U, 2072); religion as a matter solely of vital experience, such as religious consciousness or religious sense (Denz-U, 2074); identified with Revelation (Denz-U, 2075). This seeks expression first in vulgar formulas and symbols, then in more reflective and elaborate forms, appearing rigid because they result from a kind of compromise among diverse tendencies in society. Once sanctioned by authority, this compromise constitutes dogma as a symbolic formulation approximating the religious sense, of value not absolute but relative to it (Denz-U, 2078, 2079).
E. Le Roy, under the influence of W. James’s and Bergson’s pragmatism (the truth of a concept lies in its practical utility for directing life), specifies that dogma is solely a norm for action, not for thought. “God is a person” means we must behave toward this being as if it were a person, regardless of whether it actually is (Denz-U, 2026). Dogma, like religious sense, is subject to continual substantial transformation, occurring practically as the convergent and balanced result of two opposing forces in society: tradition, under the aegis of authority—a conservative force—and progress, an evolutionary force inherent in individuals with more intense experiences (Denz-U, 2080).
The modernist notion of dogma is thus summarized in Loisy’s words: “The dogmas that the Church presents as revealed are not truths dropped from heaven, but are interpretations of religious facts that human thought has laboriously attained” (Denz-U, 2022).
That all this has nothing to do not only with the Catholic concept of dogma but with Christianity itself in what is most specific to it need not be emphasized. The Catholic apologist will instead note: a) how all these theories are the inevitable fruit of the initial Protestant position; b) how all these constructions rest on the postulate of an agnostic immanentist philosophy, still actively influential even in works that present themselves as pure criticism and pure history, such as those of Harnack, Loisy, Turmel, and Buonaiuti; c) how absurd was the modernist claim to advocate the above concepts while remaining within the Catholic Church in order “to reform it from within,” and how inalienable was the Church’s right and duty to protect her sincere children from a system “a congeries of all heresies,” leading “in manifold ways to atheism and the abolition of every religion” (Denz-U, 2105-2109).
In defending against the above positions, the Catholic apologist presses simultaneously in two directions:
a) In the philosophical field: to demonstrate the inconsistency of the adversaries’ philosophical presuppositions and to lay a rational foundation for the possibility of objective knowledge, and thus of supernatural Revelation, as well as the credibility of the Catholic Church’s divinity. This is the domain of general apologetics (cf. R. Garrigou-Lagrange, *De Revelatione*, 3rd ed., 2 vols., Rome 1931, which takes special account of the agnostic viewpoint);
b) In the critical and historical field: to demonstrate the arbitrariness, from a purely critical and historical standpoint, of the adversaries’ procedures and conclusions, particularly their general inductions in biblical exegesis and the history of dogma. In this vast field of particular apologetics, which concerns the subsequent historical state of dogma from its appearance to the present day, Catholic scholarship—especially in the field of exegesis—has made remarkable progress in a few years. This is the profound significance of the work of Fr. Lagrange and his controversy with Loisy and liberal exegesis.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF DOGMA
The term “evolution” was applied to dogma by rationalists at the height of Darwinian vogue to indicate its transformative changes. Today it is also used by Catholics in the legitimate sense of development or progress in general. The question here does not concern the progress of dogma before the death of the last Apostle. During that period, dogma grew objectively and substantially through new Revelations. We are concerned only with the subsequent period.1. The question thus arises: a) Is it Catholic doctrine that dogma is substantially and objectively immutable (cf. above, I, 4 a)? b) History, however, shows that the Church did not arrive all at once at the definition of the entire body of dogma it now proposes, but only after a long period and various vicissitudes for some of them.
The major epochs in the development of dogma are well known. Even if we set aside the period up to the fourth century—owing to the technical difficulty of distinguishing, in the dogma then proposed by the Church, what was a simple primitive apostolic datum from what implied further dogmatic development—this is evident from the time of Constantine onwards. The period from the fourth to the eighth century is marked by the great definitions on the Trinity, Christology, anthropology (original sin, grace and works, predestination), Mariology, the Church and the Sacraments as objective means of salvation essentially independent of the personal holiness of ministers, and the cult of images. The Middle Ages further clarified and defined dogma concerning the Eucharist, the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son, the last things, and the primacy of the Pope. After the sixteenth century, further precision and definition were given to dogma on the canonicity of Scripture, justification, the Sacraments in general and in particular, the cult of the saints, indulgences, the Immaculate Conception, faith and its relation to reason, the concept of Revelation, and dogma and papal infallibility. These dogmas are expressed in dogmatic formulas, often highly elaborate.
c) Nevertheless, this does not imply any substantial change in Revelation itself, since the Church possesses the charism to interpret it infallibly, not to transform II. It must therefore be said that the Church, with the infallible assistance of the Holy Spirit, perceives in Scripture and Tradition the meaning intended by God and alone true, which, through a normal logical process, allows it to move from Revelation to the definition of developed dogma without introducing substantial changes.
2. Historical notes on the question. The ancients almost exclusively emphasized the unchanging aspect of dogma. The aspect of progress is sometimes affirmed (Origen, Gregory Nazianzen, Augustine). Vincent of Lérins explicitly raised the question in his *Commonitorium* (ed. Jülicher, Leipzig 1895, pp. 23, 28) regarding what legitimate progress in dogma might be, admitting only that of clearer knowledge with more precise expression and greater practical veneration of the same objective truth (cf. J. Madox, *El concepto de tradición en s. Vicente de Lerins*, Rome 1933). In the Middle Ages, the issue was addressed only in relation to the question of which truths are Catholic, i.e., universally held as matters of faith. These were counted not only among those explicitly stated in the Apostles’ Creed and its articles or reducible to them, but also those deduced from them by right and necessary consequence (cf. R. M. Schultes, *Introduction in historiam dogmatum*, Paris 1922, pp. 58–87; J. M. Parent, *La notion de dogme au XIIIe siècle*, in *Études d'histoire littéraire et doctrinale du XIIIe siècle*, I (1932), pp. 141–64). The post-Tridentine theologians further refined this idea by: a) distinguishing between progress in substance and in explanation; b) distinguishing different modes of Revelation and faith: explicit-implicit, immediate-mediate, formal-virtual. There arose at this point a diversity of terminology among authors that persists to this day; c) explicitly raising the question of the definability of theological conclusions (cf. Schultes, *op. cit.*, pp. 58–87; F. Marin-Sola, *L'évolution homogène du dogme cath.*, 2nd ed., II, Paris 1924, pp. 217ff.). In the nineteenth century, the question of dogmatic development became acute, first under the influence of idealist philosophical theories with Hegelian overtones. A. Günther, influenced by these ideas, held that all dogmas must be subject to rational demonstration; but since the explanation of their meaning depends on philosophy and ancient philosophy was very imperfect, the meaning the Church had hitherto attributed to dogmas could not be absolute but only relatively perfect. With the progress of philosophy, this meaning could even undergo substantial change. It was against this error that Vatican Council I set forth the Catholic doctrine (v. above I, 4 a). Shortly afterward, historical studies and theories of transformative evolution in the Darwinian mode, adopted by liberal Protestants and then by Modernists, brought the question to the fore in accordance with their general concept of dogma (v. above I, 5). Among Catholics, the issue was then vigorously debated by theologians of the Tübingen school in Germany, especially through the work of J. A. Möhler, who emphasized the idea of organic vital unity and the totality of Christian life (cf. J. Ranft, *Der Ursprung des katholischen Traditionsperspitz*, Würzburg 1931, pp. 46ff.; A. Minon, *L'attitude de J. A. Möhler dans la question du développement du dogme*, in *Ephemerides theologicae Lovanienses*, I (1939), pp. 228–82). A major influence was the work of J. H. Newman, *Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine* (London 1845), written during the author’s conversion from Anglicanism to Catholicism. He developed the concept of organic unity and development through vital assimilation, and in particular deduced the distinguishing criteria of legitimate from illegitimate dogmatic development (cf. J. Guitton, *La notion de développement et l'application à la religion chez J. H. Newman*, Paris 1933; J. J. Byrne, *Newman's Anglican Notion of Doctrinal Development*, in *Ephemerides theologicae Lovanienses*, I (1937), pp. 230–86). The heretical Modernist solution to the question, an inevitable consequence of their concept of dogma and its philosophical presuppositions (
V. above I, 5), prompted the Church’s magisterium to reaffirm the fixed points of the Catholic understanding (decree *Lamentabili*, Denz
U. 2201ff.; encyclical *Pascendi*, Denz.-U. 2071ff.; anti-Modernist oath, Denz.-U. 2145), and stimulated Catholic theologians to undertake a thorough examination of the issue, as evidenced by the numerous works produced from the late nineteenth century onward (see the principal bibliography up to 1922 in Schultes, *op. cit.*, pp. 149–52).3. The traditional solution to the question, as framed above, is that the Church, through its infallible manner of understanding Scripture and Tradition, proceeds to the proposition of developed dogmas without introducing essential change into Revelation, since it merely sets forth in clear terms what is implicitly contained in Revelation thus understood. Up to this point, there is no difficulty, for this way of speaking merely restates in equivalent terms what is signified in this regard by the magisterium’s condemnations of the critical theories of Günther and the Modernists.
4. The factors of development from the implicit to the explicit are: the Holy Spirit, as the directing cause guaranteeing the infallible homogeneity of developed dogma with that in its implicit state; and the human mind, as the proper instrumental cause. The occasional causes are: the struggle against heresies; the innate tendency to deepen ever more the truths believed, examining all their aspects and consequences; the development of Christian piety, of the Church’s social organization and discipline; and the deepening or extension of related human knowledge, whether philosophical or otherwise. The necessity of dogmatic development follows from the vital character of the Church, which must effectively apply dogma to people of all ages and in the most diverse cultural and existential circumstances.
5. The history of dogma, despite rationalist insinuations, is possible even within the Catholic concept, given the legitimately mutable aspect that dogmas entail. Its essential and primary task is to show the believer, from which principles, in what forms, and under what occasional circumstances of time and environment, a dogma has been explicitly formulated. Its secondary task is apologetic: namely, when possible, to demonstrate positively, using only the historical-critical method, that ancient tradition contains at least the principles from which dogmas were later homogeneously developed; when this is not possible due to the intrinsic limitations of the historical-critical method, at least to refute opposing attacks by showing that their conclusions, in the face of pure criticism and pure history, are either positively false or at least not necessary. The supreme methodological rule of the history of dogma is: a) to apply fully all the methodological rules proper to pure criticism and history; b) to verify its results through the higher and definitive dogmatic criterion, which serves as a negative extrinsic control, because, in case of conflict, it warns the historian of the mistake made and invites him to re-examine the investigative process with more precise application of the rules of pure criticism and history. The reasonableness—indeed the necessity—of this position in the face of reason is evident, assuming the demonstration made by apologetics of the rationality of Faith. Thus, the anti-Modernist oath rejects modernist errors in this field (Denz.-U., 1799 and 2146). The usefulness and necessity of the history of dogma derive from its tasks. In particular, the dogmatic theologian today cannot do without it, because one cannot fully understand a thing without knowing its genetic aspect. It is especially necessary to enliven the argument from tradition and to sharpen theological judgment in distinguishing between dogma, theological explanations, theological systems, theological opinions, and to evaluate everything in due measure from the perspective of Revelation.
6. The historiography of dogma was initiated in its essential aspects by the founders of positive theology in the 16th–17th centuries, among whom, in the Catholic field, are Dini and Petavio, *Theologorum dogmatum toni quatuor* (Paris 1644–50); L. Thomassin, *Dogmata theologica* (ibid. 1650). Protestant rationalism of the 18th century made it a discipline in its own right. Under the influence of Hegelian ideas, this discipline was assigned the task of revealing the general historical-philosophical laws governing the transformative development of the entire dogmatic complex. Following the incomplete work of S. G. Lange (1796), there appeared that of W. Munscher, *Handbuch der christlichen und hengeschichte* (4 vols., up to Gregory the Great, Marburg 1797–1809). F. Chr. Baur, *Lehrbuch der christlichen und hengeschichte* (Tübingen 1847), and his school, based on research into the primitive nucleus, driving forces, guiding lines, and results of development, imposed the Hegelian schema of thesis, antithesis, synthesis. Against this a priori approach, A. Ritschl (d. 1889) reacted by emphasizing the influence of Greek philosophy. This tendency was most fully developed by A. Harnack (*Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte*, 2 vols., Tübingen 1886–90, and countless monographs. V. above I, 3). Within the orbit of Harnack, though often with notable nuances, numerous German *Dogmengeschichten* were written from the beginning of this century; notable among these are: F. Loofs, *Leitfaden zum Studium der Dogmengeschichte* (Halle 1906); R. Seeberg, *Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte* (4 vols., Leipzig 1895–1913). Others, still within the rationalist camp, to explain the origin and early period of the history of dogma, turned more to Hellenistic oriental religiosity, of which mystery cults and Gnosticism were the fruit. Here, the primordial nucleus of the development of Christian dogma would be the idea of the liberation of the spiritual element of man, trapped in essentially evil matter (dualism), through the work of a savior god who descended to earth and whose personal virtue we assimilate chiefly in worship. This would already be evident in St. Paul (W. Bousset, *Kyrios Christos*, Göttingen 1913) or even in Jesus Himself, or in John the Baptist (Reitzenstein and others). In the Modernist camp, A. Loisy confined himself to exegesis.
7. The unity of God was a universally accepted belief among Christians, and it is therefore rare to see it affirmed on inscriptions such as that of Cassus Vitalio... *qui in una Deum credidit, in pace* (Diehl, no. 1596). Only in Syria and Egypt is the acclamation *εἷς θεός* frequent, often with the addition of "apostles," sometimes with other terms such as *μόνος*, *ὁ ζῶν ἐν σημεῖει* (E. Peterson, *ΕΙΣ ΘΕΟΣ*, Epigraphische Untersuchungen, Göttingen 1926). The context clearly indicates its monotheistic sense, though it is an adaptation of a similar formula used by pagans, especially in honor of Serapis, with a monistic sense. Equally common are professions of faith in the Most Holy Trinity, both in the individual persons and in all three together, for example, the inscription from the little temple of Clitunno, which emphasizes their specific activity: *sanctus deus angelorum qui fecit resurrectionem, sanctus deus prophetarum qui fecit redemptionem, sanctus deus apostolorum qui fecit remissionem* (Diehl, no. 1606), and the beautiful one from Emmaus: *ἐν ὀνόματι Πατρὸς καὶ Υἱοῦ καὶ ἁγίου Πνεύματος, καλή ἡ πόλις χριστιανῶν* (Revue biblique, 10 [1913], p. 100). Of Jesus, His divinity as well as His messianic role and other major attributes are celebrated countless times, as in the famous monogram (Ἰησοῦς Χριστός).
21. The unity of God was a universally accepted belief among Christians, and it is therefore rare to see it affirmed on inscriptions such as that of Cassus Vitalio... *qui in una Deum credidit, in pace* (Diehl, no. 1596). Only in Syria and Egypt is the acclamation *εἷς θεός* frequent, often with the addition of "apostles," sometimes with other terms such as *μόνος*, *ὁ ζῶν ἐν σημεῼ* (E. Peterson, *ΕΙΣ ΘΕΟΣ*, Epigraphische Untersuchungen, Göttingen 1926).
From the same and similar texts, the lively cult shown by the faithful toward holy martyrs and their relics, and also toward angels, is likewise illustrated. In particular, epigraphy attests the use of medals, small crosses, and reliquaries worn on the person. For the cult of angels, highly indicative are a long inscription from the theater of Miletus with prayers to the seven archangels and the clause *ἀρχαγγέλων συλλέξας ἡ πόλις Μιλησίων καὶ πάντες οἱ κατοικοῦντες*, and the many funerary inscriptions from the island of Thera, each dedicated to an angel (A. Ferrara, *Gli angeli di Thera*, in *Orientalia Christiana periodica*, 13 [1943], pp. 149–67).
Countless texts illustrate for us the constitution of the Church. The epitaph of Abercius (v.) attests to its unity in its spread with the same faith and the same Eucharist, and the incomparable preeminence of the Roman See; the divine fruitfulness of the Ecclesia mater is thus expressed in the inscription of the Lateran Baptistery: 'virgine faetu genetrix Ecclesia natos, quos spirante Deo concipit amne parit' (Diehl, nn. 1513 and 1582); it is founded on St. Peter to whom the Lord gives the law, as already to Moses on Sinai, and the supreme power of the keys, thus illustrated in an epigraph by the bishop Spes of Spoleto: solve iubente Deo terrarum Petre catenas/ qui facis ut pateant caelestia regna beatis (G. B. De Rossi, Inscr. Christ., II, Rome 1888, p. 80, n. 12), and in another from the basilica of St. Paul outside the Walls: 'auitor hic caeli est, fidei petra, culmen honoris' (Diehl, n. 1761). The coming and death of St. Peter in Rome has also been recently confirmed by the graffiti uncovered beneath the basilica of St. Sebastian and by Vatican discoveries.
The ecclesiastical hierarchy appears in epigraphy in all its degrees even from the most ancient age, including those unfortunate ones of the minor orders and in some female offices, such as that of deaconesses (Diehl, nn. 951-1326; C. Kaufmann, Handbuch der altchristlichen Epigraphik, Freiburg in Br. 1917, pp. 233-94); the same can be said of male and female monastic institutions, and of the higher degree of consecrated virgins.
But perhaps the dogmas most often professed in inscriptions, after those concerning the novissima, are the Sacraments, in particular that of Baptism. Of the Eucharist there are eloquent testimonies both in the epitaph of Abercius, already cited, as well as in that of Pettorius of Autun (M. Guarducci, L'iscrizione di Pettorio, in Rend. Pont. Acc. di arch., 23 [1947-48]) and even more so in an inscription now affixed to the ceiling of the crypt of St. Lawrence: 'verus in altari cruor est vinu(m)que videtur' (in Nuovo Bull. di arch. christ., 17 [1921], p. 106). Baptism is very often mentioned with the formal expressions accipere, consecutus, percipere Dei gratiam and others most proper to the rite. From these we learn of the practice of baptizing infants at a tender age and that of baptizing adults on their deathbed, coexisting throughout antiquity. Thus Junius Bassus, in his very office as urban prefect, went to God as a neophyte, and the little boy Maurus, aged five... two or three years old, received it (Diehl, nn. 9 and 1527). Baptism was especially considered an illumination, whence those who in Latin were mostly called neophyti, in Greek were called νεοφώστροι. Several inscriptions placed in baptisteries describe admirably the theology and effects of Baptism. That already cited from the Lateran Baptistery (Diehl, n. 1513) is certainly the most eloquent, and it expresses itself thus on original sin: 'insons esse volens isto mundare lavacro/seu patrio premieris crimine seu proprio'. Confirmation is often mentioned together with Baptism, with which it was received, and is called signum Christi, σφραγίς, consignari, σφραγισθέντα. A Picentia Legitima boasts of having been considered under Pope Liberius; of Julius Caterinus ex praefecto praetorio and his wife Severina it is said quos Dei sacerdos Probanus lavit et unxit (Diehl, nn. 965 and 98).
(from Nuovo Bollettino Arch. cristiana, II [1881], p. 883) Dogmatic inscription — Inscription with reference to the Roman Eucharist — Verus in altari cruor est vinu(m)que videtur — (7th century) — Rome, basilica of St. Lawrence outside the Walls.
Rare and late mentions exist of Penance and Extreme Unction; of Holy Orders we have spoken in treating of the hierarchy; Marriage as a sacrament has few but interesting epigraphic testimonies, such as that for the aforementioned spouses Catervius and Severina: quos paribus meritis iunxit matrimonio dulci/ omnipotens do[mi]nus, tumulum custodit in aevum.
A certain dogmatic interest attaches also to inscriptions in which profession of heresy is made. A certain number of these have appeared in Africa (Donatists and Montanists), Rome (Gnostics and Montanists), Asia Minor (Novatianists), Syria (Monophysites).
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**Dolcino, Fra’.** - A heretic native to the Novara region who became the leader of the Apostolic sect after Gerard Segalelli, its recent founder, was burned at the stake in Parma in 1300.
Indeed, a letter or manifesto from him dated August of that year asserted that the Congregation of the Apostolics was entirely spiritual, with its own method of life and no outward but only inward obedience, established by God in the last times for the salvation of souls. Its adversaries and ministers of the devil were the secular clergy, many among the people and the powerful, and with them all religious, especially the Franciscans and Dominicans. He distinguished four ages in the world and four successive states in the Church from Christ to the end of the world. He then prophesied events that were to occur in the next three years, particularly that Frederick of Aragon, King of Sicily, was to become emperor, create new kings, and put Pope Boniface VIII to death. When these prophecies did not come to pass, Fra’ Dolcino, in December 1303, published a new letter in which he proclaimed himself the head of his sect, which numbered more than 4,000 followers from all parts of Italy, united only by an inward bond of obedience.
He spread his doctrines in the valleys of Trent, where Margherita joined him and remained his companion until the end. He then moved into the Valsesia, and taking advantage of the political and religious divisions of the region, fortified himself with his fanatical followers on Mount Revello, resisting the combined forces of the bishops of Vercelli and Novara and even the Marquis of Monferrato. Clement V launched a crusade against him in 1305 and issued three condemnatory bulls in August 1306. Finally, on March 23, 1307, he was captured along with Margherita and six of his most faithful followers, and executed with them. The sect, however, which had absorbed errors from the Cathars and Waldensians—especially the Italian branch with communist tendencies, abhorrence of oaths, and rejection of all ecclesiastical and civil authority—was not immediately extinguished, and traces of it are found here and there even into the first half of the 15th century.
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**Dolci, Carlo.** - A heretic native to the Novara region who became the leader of the Apostolic sect after
In 1906 he was appointed lecturer in the history of dogma at the University of Würzburg. He then continued his studies in Rome as chaplain at the Campo Santo Teutonico from 1908 to 1913. During this period he traveled to Dalmatia, North Africa, and Greece. His first publication from his Roman sojourn was the volume *L’IX°C nell’età paleocristiana*, historical studies on religion and epigraphy (Rome 1909; 2nd ed., Münster 1928). He then published *Sphragis*, a study of the paleo-Christian baptismal denomination in its relation to the Christian culture of antiquity (Paderborn 1911).
In 1912 he obtained the chair of general history of religions and comparative science of religions at Münster. In 1913 he edited the miscellany for the Constantinian centenary, *Konstantin der Grosse und seine Zeit* (Freiburg 1913). In 1918 he became full professor of general history of religions, ancient church history, and Christian archaeology, first collaborator of the *Liturgiegeschichtliche Forschungen*, and published in this series the volume *Die Sonne der Gerechtigkeit und der Schwarze*, a study on the baptismal vow (*Lit. Forsch.*, 2 [Münster 1918]). Two years later there appeared in the same series *Sol saluti*, on prayer and song in early Christian antiquity (*Lit. Forsch.*, 4-5 [Münster 1920; 2nd ed., ibid. 1925]). In 1922 there followed the volume *L’IX°C*, on the sacred fish in ancient religions and Christianity (ibid. 1922), and the third volume of *L’IX°C*, containing plates of monuments from the third volume (ibid. 1922). Four years later he was appointed to the chair of ancient church history, Christian archaeology, and patrology at Breslau, and in 1929 succeeded A. Ehrhard in the same capacity at Bonn. During this period, the plates for the fourth volume of *L’IX°C* were printed, *I monumenti del pesce nella plastica, pittura e nell’arte minore cristiana* (ibid. 1927).
To make known the results of his vast studies, in 1929 he founded the quarterly journal *Antike und Christentum*, which appeared until 1936. In 1932 he added to *L’IX°C* a volume in five installments (Münster 1932; 1937; 1938; 1939; 1940), and in 1935, under his auspices, the preparation of the *Reallexikon für Antike und Christentum* was begun (5 fascicles, Leipzig 1941-43).
On the occasion of his 60th birthday, the miscellany *Pisciculi Fr. Jos. D.* (Münster 1939) was published, listing all his works. He died in the hospital at Schweinfurt and was buried in his native town.
Dolci’s work consists of an immense number of specialized researches, carried out with masterly skill to illustrate the relations between antiquity and Christianity.
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