Incarnation (Σάρκωσις)

INCARNATION (σάρκωσις). — A term of Semitic flavor, derived from the Johannine expression (Io. 1, 14: καὶ ὁ Λόγος σάρξ ἐγένετο), in which the word σάρξ (flesh) simply means human nature, according to biblical usage (cf. Gen. 6, 12; Is. 40, 5; Rom. 3, 20), a usage that has continued in the tradition since the first century. S. Ignatius Martyr (Eph. 7, 2) says that Jesus Christ is God in the flesh (ἐν σαρκὶ γενόμενος θεός); s. Irenaeus was the first to use the term σάρκωσις and writes indifferently that the Word became flesh and became man (Adv. haer., III, 19; V, 18). Origen does likewise (De princ., I; praef., 4). The Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed sanctions the traditional equivalence of the two terms σαρκωθεῖς-ἐνσθρωπήσας (incarnate-made man). Despite the abusive interpretation of the Apollinarians in the fourth century, who reduced Christ’s human nature to flesh animated only by the sensitive soul, the word I. (σάρκωσις) prevailed over others with which Sacred Scripture and the Fathers ordinarily designate the mystery of the union of the Word with human nature, such as ἐφανερώθη ἐν σαρκί (I Tim. 3, 16); ἐκένωσεν (Phil. 2, 7); ἐπιφάνεια (II Tim. 1, 10); λήψις (Hebr. 2, 16); and among the Fathers: οἰκονομία (dispensatio = divine plan for the salvation of human beings; cf. Irenaeus, Adv. haer., III, 17, 4; IV, 26, 1);

ἀνάληψις, ἐσωμάτωσις, σύκδος (cf. Petavius, De Incarn., II, 1).

The real meaning of I. in the active sense is the divine action by which, in the most pure womb of the Virgin Mary, a determinate human nature is formed and hypostatically united to the Word. In the passive sense, I. is a wondrous and unique union of the divine nature and the human nature in the one Person of the Word.

This truth is the central mystery of Christianity; it must be studied under two aspects: first, in its origin, its relations with humanity, its history, its conditions and purposes; and this almost extrinsic aspect will be the subject of the present treatment. Then I. may be considered intrinsically, in its essential constitution and its immediate consequences; for this aspect V. HYPOSTATIC UNION.

CONTENTS: I.

I. in Sacred Scripture

II. Tradition

III. Theology of I

Nel Nuovo Testamento Gesù Cristo è presentato anzitutto come Colui nel quale si realizzano tutte le profezie messianiche; poi è messa in luce la sua costituzione teandrica. Egli è vero Figlio di Dio, proclamato tale dal cielo durante il Battesimo e la Trasfigurazione (Mt. 3, 17 e 17, 5; Mc. 1, 11 e 9, 7; Lc. 3, 22 e 9, 35), da Pietro per divina ispirazione (Mt. 16, 16), perfino dai demoni (ibid. 8, 29; Mc. 5, 7). Gesù stesso si dichiara Figlio di Dio e per questo è condannato a morte (Mt. 26, 63-64; V. FIGLIO DI DIO). La sua Divinità risplende nelle sue parole e nelle sue opere: si proclama più grande di David e di Salomone (ibid. 12, 41 sgg.; Mc. 12, 35), degli Angeli (Mt. 4, 11); si mette alla pari con Dio, integrando la legge antica (ibid. 5, 21 sgg.), dicendo che solo lui conosce il Padre e solo il Padre conosce lui, suo Figlio (ibid. 11, 27). In s. Giovanni e in s. Paolo la divinità di Gesù Cristo è più che evidente: Gesù è il Verbo, che è Dio fin dall'eternità (Io. 1, 1 sgg.); è l'Unigenito del Padre (ibid. 1, 18), esistente da prima di Abramo (ibid. 8, 58), anzi da prima che il mondo fosse fatto (ibid. 17, 5). Il Padre ha mandato il Figlio a salvare il mondo (ibid. 3, 16; Gal. 4, 4); Gesù è il Figlio proprio di Dio (Rom. 8, 32; 18; ibid. 9, 5), immagine del Dio invisibile, primogenito (generato prima) di tutta la creazione, perché tutto è stato creato da lui e per lui (Io. 1, 3 e Col. 1, 15-19).

Questo stesso Gesù, Verbo, Figlio di Dio, è però anche uomo vero, come appare dai Sinottici (nascita, genealogia carnale, progresso nell'età, nella sapienza e nella Grazia, fame, sete, passioni e passibilità). L'umanità di Gesù è non soltanto reale, ma anche ben salda, come risulta dimostrato dalla sua resistenza fisica al lavoro, ai lunghi viaggi a piedi, alle sofferenze. S. Giovanni, pur ponendo l'accento sulla sua divinità, non manca di sottolineare i suoi tratti profondamente umani (episodio della samaritana [cap.

4], della risurrezione di Lazzaro [cap. 11], dell'Ultima Cena [cap. 13, 23]). Parimenti s. Paolo, che ricorda l'origine davidica di Gesù secondo la carne (Rom. 9, 5) e l'assunzione della natura umana (formam servi) perché Cristo fosse in tutto simile ai suoi fratelli e potesse soffrire e immolarsi per loro, fatto sacerdote e vittima insieme (Hebr. 2-5).

Ma il Vangelo, oltre ad affermare esplicitamente la divinità e l'umanità del Salvatore, ne mette in luce l'unità fisica, personale. Basta richiamare qualche testo decisivo: s. Paolo (Phil. 2) ricorda ai fedeli che Cristo (indicato con il pron. 6c nel V. 6), già sussistente nella natura divina, si abbassò fino a prendere la natura umana di servo e apparve così uomo in mezzo agli uomini. Lo stesso Gesù, che discende da David secondo la carne, è Dio benedetto nei secoli (Rom. 9, 5).

Nel Vangelo di s. Giovanni azioni divine e umane vengono attribuite a Gesù come a un solo soggetto operante: Gesù stanco dal viaggio e assetato siede al pozzo di Sichem e chiede da bere, ma subito si rivela per l'aspettato Messia (Io. 4); piange come uomo sulla tomba di Lazzaro, ma invoca il Padre suo ed opera il miracolo. In tutta la Rivelazione non è possibile discriminare in Gesù due soggetti, sebbene vi si distinguano due serie di azioni, una divina, l'altra umana. L'unità personale si esprime nel monosillabo Io, che risuona continuamente sul suo labbro quando parla da uomo e quando parla da Dio, senz'ombra di dualismo.

II. THE TRADITION

Around this mystery, jealously guarded and defended by the Church, the great crises of thought arose, giving origin to the Christological heresies, to which the ecclesiastical magisterium responded with its dogmatic definitions. The history of these controversies is highly significant. In an initial period, the attack on Christ’s Humanity prevailed: once his Divinity was assumed, union with human nature, with matter, seemed impossible, since the Gnostics and Neoplatonists (not without the influence of the Persian religion, which soon prevailed through Manes) declared matter to be a negation of being and the source of every evil. This was Docetism, traces of which are found from the apostolic age onward. St. John insists on faith in the real Humanity of Christ. « Whoever confesses that Jesus Christ has come in the flesh is of God » (I Io. 4, 2). St. Ignatius the Martyr shows the same concern when he writes that « there is one physician alone, carnal and spiritual, begotten and unbegotten, God subsisting in the flesh, true life in death, from Mary and from God, first passible and then impassible, Jesus Christ our Lord » (Eph. 7, 2). This testimony dates from the beginning of the second century, but Docetism continued to spread insidiously for a long time: at the end of that same century Tertullian fought it in De carne Christi, and Irenaeus refuted the Gnostics, who, among other errors, also taught that Christ’s Humanity was not real, truly born of the Virgin Mary, but imaginary.

More threatening, however, was the attack on Christ’s divinity. As early as the apostolic age, the Ebionites and Cerinthus spoke of a Jesus who was merely human, into whom the Word would have descended; the Gnostics, maintaining God’s absolute transcendence, saw in Christ one of the aeons, intermediary beings between God and the world. At the end of the second century, in Rome, Theodotus the Byzantine taught a form of adoptionism (v.), which made Christ merely a man adopted by God as Son. The same error appears in the third century in Paul of Samosata. Arianism (v.), which, proceeding from the concept of God’s unbegottenness, equated the generation of the Word with creation, making him a mere creature, albeit a most noble one, brought into being when God willed to create the world. It followed that the Word-Son was not equal to the Father, of the same substance or nature (ὑμοσύριος = consubstantial). The Church, recognizing the gravity of the error, which undermined Christianity at its foundations, responded with the Council of Nicaea (325), where it was defined that Christ, as the true Son of God, is consubstantial with the Father, that is, possesses the identical nature of the Father. With this definition all the errors concerning the Divinity of Jesus Christ fell (v. CONSOSTANZIALE).

In the second half of the fourth century, Apollinaris, bishop of Laodicea, initiated a series of errors concerning the manner in which the two natures are united in Christ. To demonstrate the depth of the union, Apollinaris maintained that the Word had assumed a nature with a soul lacking intelligence, whose function was supplied superabundantly by the incarnate divine Wisdom. This was a return to the mutilation of Christ’s human nature, but at the same time it encouraged a deeper examination of the Savior’s personal unity despite the duality of the natures.

Thus a delicate crisis opened before the central core of the mystery of Christ, which throughout the centuries has always lent itself to two temptations: either to accentuate natural dualism to the point of compromising the unity of person, or to press personal unity to the point of compromising the distinction of the natures. The two temptations are expressed in two great heresies: Nestorianism and Eutychianism, also called Monophysitism. The struggle lasted throughout the fifth century and had profound repercussions until the seventh century (for it V. UNIONE POSTATICA). Here it is important to note that both heresies pervert the genuine meaning of the I. as it emerges from the sources of divine Revelation. Indeed, Nestorianism, by breaking Christ’s personal unity, regarded in him a man alongside the Son of God, or a God who was the guest of man. But the I. requires a God-Man, that is, a God who became man. Eutychianism or Monophysitism presented a hybrid being, in whom the human and the divine were fused together, losing their respective characteristics: hence there resulted a Christ who was neither true God nor true Man, but a mixture of both.

The I., on the contrary, suggests a theandric being, in whom the Person of the Word subsists and operates in two distinct natures. The union compromises neither the Divinity nor the assumed Humanity, which remain whole and distinct even within the absolute unity of the Person of the Word.

The Church responded to Nestorianism in 431 with the Council of Ephesus (v.), defending the true, real, physical unity of the two natures in the one subject who is Jesus Christ; it responded to Eutychianism in 451 Chalcedon (v.), safeguarding the integrity and distinction of the two natures, while maintaining the unity of the Person.

The expression of orthodox faith concerning the I. is marked, like an echo of the genuine tradition of the Church, in the Athanasian Creed, which was compiled by an unknown author, probably between the Council of Ephesus and that of Chalcedon, to summarize epigraphically its Trinitarian doctrine (for which St. Athanasius had fought so vigorously) and the Christological doctrine then maturing in the embattled climate of the fifth century: « The right faith consists in confessing that our Lord Jesus Christ, the Son of God, is God and Man. He is God, begotten from the substance of the Father before all ages, and he is Man, born from the substance of his Mother in time. Perfect God, perfect Man subsisting in a rational soul and human flesh. Equal to the Father according to divinity, inferior to the Father according to humanity. Although he is God and Man, nevertheless he is not two, but one Christ. One not by the transformation of Divinity into flesh, but by the assumption of humanity into God. Perfectly one not by confusion of substances, but by unity of person. For just as the rational soul and the flesh make one man, so God and man are one Christ ». A clear

exposition that establishes the three terms—Divinity, Humanity, and Person—and explains their mutual relationship, eliminating both the confusion of the two natures and the division of the Person. The emphasis on the union of soul with body as a term of comparison has the value of an example, which must nevertheless be treated with caution, all the more since the Apollinarians and Monophysites were already abusing II.

III. THEOLOGY OF THE I

1. Fittingness. — Every divine action is already fitting and therefore justified in itself, because it proceeds from an infinitely wise nature. But the I. has its fundamental reason of fittingness in divine goodness, which loves to communicate itself to the creature as fully as possible. The act of the I., while bringing immense glory to man, does not detract from the dignity of God, the supreme good and infinite love, nor compromise his immutability, because in the I. a relation is established which is real from human nature to the divine Person, but from the latter to the former is only logical (Sum. Theol., 3ᵃ, q. 1, a. 1). s. Thomas assigns particular reasons for the fittingness of the I. (ibid., a. 2), both with regard to the good that derives from it for man in the natural order and still more in the supernatural order, and with regard to the evil from which man is liberated through the work of the Incarnate Word. But it is interesting to consider the reasons why the Word became incarnate and not the other Persons. In itself, an I. of the Father and of the Holy Spirit is not repugnant, but it was more fitting that the Word become incarnate: 1) because the I. is a restoration of creation; now creation expresses an order, especially toward the Word, «per quem omnia facta sunt» (Io. 1, 3), and therefore it was fitting that it be restored by the Word himself; 2) because man, as a rational creature, reaches his perfection in the wisdom that derives from the Word; 3) because man’s salvation lies in supernatural adoptive sonship, which is an imitation of natural divine sonship, proper to the Word (Sum. Theol., q. 3, a. 8). On the part of human nature, there was no right to the benefit of the I.; nevertheless, according to the principle of obediential potency (v.), it could fittingly be assumed by the Word more than any other nature, because it is rational and needed to be healed of original sin. Therefore it was not fitting that the Word assume a nature inferior to man, nor the angelic nature (ibid., q. 4, a. 1).

2. Necessity. — In his actions ad extra, such as creation, God is fully free (cf. Vatican Council, sess. III, c. 1: Denz-U, 1783 and 1805), and therefore cannot be subject to any necessity, whether physical, metaphysical, or moral. The Church has always firmly upheld this principle against contrary errors and opinions (Eckart, Wyclif, Leibniz, Rosmini). God is all the more free when the matter concerns things belonging to the supernatural order, which is essentially gratuitous, because it transcends the capacity and requirements of created nature.

Now the I., as the restoration of man in relation to his supernatural end, is always presented in the sources of Revelation as a work of divine love and mercy, as a great gift of God: «God so loved the world that he gave his Only-begotten Son» (Io. 3, 16). «But God, who is rich in mercy, because of the immense love with which he loved us, even when we were dead through sin, gave us life in Christ» (Eph. 3, 4). The voice of tradition is found, for example, in Epiphanius (Adv. haer., 69, 52): «God the creative Word, subject to no cause...

through a certain mysterious secret, became incarnate spontaneously... out of overflowing love for man, not driven by necessity, but by voluntary deliberation» (cf. Ireneo, Adv. haer., III, 23, 5; V, 21, 3; Agostino, Sermo 214, 5, 6; Leone Magno, Sermo 22, 3). Even if Adam’s fall is taken into account, the necessity of the I. is not apparent, because the goods lost through original sin were supernatural and therefore gratuitous; moreover, their loss was culpable in Adam and in his descendants, and therefore God, without violating justice, could have abandoned the human race, which had fallen voluntarily, to itself.

Finally, the necessity of the I. does not arise even from the hypothesis that God wished to save man fallen into original sin and personal sins, because for this purpose a simple act of forgiveness could have sufficed (cf. Sum. Theol., 3ᵃ, q. 46, a. 2, ad. 3). S. Anselm (Cur Deus homo, I, 16–18) seems to admit a genuine necessity of the I., on the basis of arguments that are not apodictic; some reduce Anselm’s thought to that of the other scholastics, equating the necessity of which he speaks with a supreme fittingness.

But if it is supposed that God wills the restoration of the human race by way of rigorous justice, through a satisfaction de condigno, then theologians are almost unanimous in recognizing a genuine necessity of the I., because, since sin is an offense against God and therefore, in a certain sense, infinite, a reparation of infinite value was necessary, and this could not have been made by a creature, even an angel. Only God could offer such a reparation to himself, but to accomplish it one had to suffer, and therefore God had to assume a passible nature such as the human. Hence the decree of the I., which is connected with the other decree concerning the requirement of a rigorous and adequate satisfaction for sin. This requirement emerges here and there in Sacred Scripture, especially when Christ speaks of a grave precept (levos.ii) of the Father concerning the bloody sacrifice of Calvary. The matter is clear to anyone who, like s. Thomas (Sum. Theol., 3ᵃ, q. 1, a. 2, ad. 2 and elsewhere), admits that «peccatum contra Deum commissum quamdam infinitatem habet ex infinitate divinae maiestatis». But Scotus (In IV Sent., d. 19, a. 2, q. 1; Ox., III, d. 20, q. unica) weakens this argument by observing that sin is not intrinsically infinite, but only for an extrinsic reason, namely, because it affects God; and, in any event, if the creature can sin in such a way as to perform a morally infinite sinful act, it can also make reparation by performing a morally infinite act of charity, again for the extrinsic reason of the term, which is God. The Thomists reply that there is no parity between the offense and the reparation, because the offense is in direct proportion to the dignity of the person offended, whereas the reparation derives its value from the person of the one who repairs. The question is connected with the other concerning the end, which has a more complex history and is still very much alive today.

3. End. — First of all, it must be recalled that the supreme end of every created thing is God and his glory; yet in his actions ad extra God cannot be moved by any good extrinsic to himself, but only by his goodness, identical with his essence. Nevertheless, there can be a subordination among created things, insofar as God, independent in himself, can subordinate to one another the things freely created by him (the mineral kingdom to the animal kingdom, animals and plants to man, etc.). Moreover, one must bear in mind the finis qui (= the good toward which one tends) and the finis cui (= the subject to whom the intended good is ordered); the primary end (which surpasses every other) and the secondary end (which is subordinate to the primary).

The state of the age-old question is this: is the primary end of the I. the redemption of the human race, so that, in God’s designs concerning the present order of things, Christ exists insofar as Adam sinned? Or is the primary end of the I. Christ in himself, independently of Adam’s sin?

An opinion already proposed by Abbot Ruperto (d. 1135) was adopted by Alessandro di Hales and Alberto Magno, and found in Scoto a fervent advocate, who developed it in the light of Christ’s absolute primacy over all creation (Reportata Parisiensia in III Sent., d. 7 and d. 10). God, he says, in his infinite wisdom must will the good before the evil and therefore the I. before Adam’s sin. Thus, it was not Christ who was ordained to sin, but sin to Christ in the divine mind, so that, even if Adam had not sinned, the I. would nevertheless have taken place. Adam’s sin has influence only in the sense that the Word assumes a passible nature in order to expiate II. The other opinion is that adopted by s. Tommaso and by the Thomists of various schools: the I., according to the present order of things, is ordered to the redemption of the human race, as is clear from divine Revelation, so that, if Adam had not sinned, the I. would not have occurred. Nevertheless, in another order of things the I. could also have taken place without that sin. S. Tommaso defends this opinion with great moderation, relying more on Sacred Scripture than on arguments of reason: «Unde cum in S. Scriptura ubique Incarnationis ratio ex peccato primi hominis assignetur, convenientius dicitur Incarnationis opus ordinatum esse a Deo in remedium contra peccatum, ita quod, peccato non existente, Incarnatio non fuisset; quamvis potentia Dei ad hoc non limitetur, potuisset enim, etiam peccato non existente, Deus incarnari» (Sum. Theol., 3°, q. 1, a. 3). S. Bonaventura (In III Sent., d. 1, a. 2, q. 2) acknowledges that the Thomistic opinion is more consonant with «pietati fidei», whereas the other is more pleasing to reason. The disciples of s. Tommaso and Scoto, especially the modern ones, have intensified the opposition between the two opinions. In truth, the Scotist opinion is more seductive, but it does not possess those firm foundations in the doctrine of faith that the Thomistic opinion can claim. In the New Testament, reference to the redemption of man as the end of the I. of the Word is frequent: «Non enim misit Deus filium suum in mundum, ut iudicet mundum, sed ut salvetur mundus per ipsum» (Io. 3, 17: cf. Lc. 19, 10; Mt. 9, 13; Gal. 4, 4; I Tim. 1, 15). Likewise, the Fathers: Ireneo (Adv. haer., V, 14, 1): «Si enim non haberet caro salvari, neququam Verbum Dei caro factum esset». S. Agostino (Serm. 174, 2): «Si homo non perisset, filius hominis non venisset» (v. anche: Atanasio, Adv. Ariana oratio, 2, 56; s. Giovanni Crisostomo, In Ep. ad Hebr. hom., 5, 1; s. Ambrogio, De Incarnationis Dominicae sacramento, 6, 56; s. Leone Magno, Sermo, 77, 2). The Church receives the same idea in the Creed: «Qui propter nos homines et propter nostram salutem descendit de caelis et incarnatus est». Since this concerns the free will of God, as s. Tommaso warns, one must distrust arguments of reason and adhere to the testimony of divine Revelation. Some have attempted to reconcile the two opinions (cf. F. Suárez, De Incarnatione, disp. 5, sect. 2; recently: I. M. Rocca-G. M. Roschini, De ratione primaria existentiae Christi et Deiparae, Roma 1941).

This is not the place to review all the arguments for the two positions. A few observations will suffice. The Thomistic opinion, being more deeply rooted in Revelation, deserves greater assent also because it highlights the mystery of the Cross, by which every Christian can and must repeat with s. Paolo: «Dilexit me et tradidit semetipsum pro me» (Gal. 2, 20). Redemption does not exclude the other end, Christ’s primacy, if one distinguishes the finis qui (Christ willed for himself) and the finis cui (man to be redeemed). The Scotist opinion exalts Christ’s primacy, but reduces his passion and death to a secondary episode. It is better not to dissect too closely the complex design of God, who willed the world as it is, with Christ at its center, but decisively bound to the wondrous work of human redemption.

4. Efficient causality. — The I. as an action of-

divine ad extra, evidently belongs commonly to the three divine Persons; but terminatively it belongs to the Word in a personal, exclusive sense: «tres enim Personae fecerunt ut humana natura uniretur uni Personae filii» (Sum. Theol., 3°, q. 3 a. 4). Only by appropriation is the I. usually attributed to the Holy Spirit.

It is debated whether a creature could have been assumed as an instrumental cause of the I. The delicate question arises especially with regard to the Most Blessed Virgin and her maternal function. In general, it is safer to exclude an instrumental causality of the I. The instrumental agent in this case would have to exercise a dispositional action, which would terminate in the Word, to whom the humanity is immediately joined, according to the better opinion. Now an action of this kind is incompatible with the nature of the matter. As for the Most Blessed Virgin, one must not speak of an instrumental cause (as the ancients did, owing to their inadequate physiological knowledge concerning conception): Maria, like every other mother, contributes to the conception of the Humanity of Christ as a principal cause in her own order, that is, as a concause together with God, insofar as she presented to the divine, ineffably fecundating power the matter for the formation of Jesus’ body. Since she received, unlike other mothers, no extrinsic element in the fecundation, she is the true Mother of the Incarnate Word, more truly than any other mother is the mother of her own child. Yet Maria’s maternal function does not have the Word as its object, but his Humanity, which is terminated by the subsistence of the Word (v. MATERNITÀ DIVINA).

IV. TRANSCENDENCE OF THE MYSTERY OF THE I

Consequently, the I. has no parallels in other religions. It would be banal to compare the I. with the Greco-Roman myths of demigods; nor do the other comparisons casually proposed in certain manuals of comparative history of religions deserve much consideration, since in them fantasy often fills the void left by documentation, and ignorance distorts Christian dogma. A typical example is the book by E. Schuré, I grandi iniziati (Italian trans., Bari 1932). What might have some interest in this matter is the Indian myth of Krṣṇa, presented as the incarnation of Viṣṇu, or rather of Brahmā himself. But if, on the one hand, poetic legend heaps upon this personage the strangest and most grotesque features (his erotic exploits are famous), on the other hand it is difficult to find a clear concept amid the tangle of theological speculations that developed around him

during the first centuries of the Christian era. Any apparent analogy between his myth and the mystery of Christ can, at most, justify the inference of a Christian influence upon the renewed Indian legend. For this and other comparisons, specialized authors should be consulted. The I. is a genuinely Christian mystery, the fruit of divine Revelation, not of human speculation.

Pietro Parente