Anselm of Aosta, Saint

ANSELM OF AOSTA. -

I. LIFE

He was born at Aosta, in Piedmont, in 1033 or at the beginning of 1034, of a noble family. His father, Gandulf or Gandulfo, of Lombard origin, a man of a somewhat prodigal and somewhat gruff character, although he too was to end up a monk, did not leave a particularly grateful memory in A.'s mind. The boy's first educator was instead his mother Ermenberga, of Aosta, a very pious woman, who then entrusted him as a youth to the Benedictines, who had at Aosta a priory dependent on the abbey of Fruttuaria. Although he was only 15 years old, he asked to become a monk, but his request was not accepted, it seems, because of his father's opposition. A. then gave himself over to a worldly life and, forced to emigrate because of family disagreements and his poor understanding with his father, he wandered for three years in Burgundy and central France. He then passed into Normandy and went to the monastery of Bec, where he was attracted by the fame of Lanfranc of Pavia, prior of the monastery, to whom numerous young men eager for knowledge flocked. His extraordinary intelligence and his passion for study immediately made him noticed in the new environment. In that atmosphere of enthusiasm for things of the spirit and under the beneficial influence of Lanfranc, the desire for the monastic life was reborn in him. After some hesitation about which monastery to choose, he finally decided on that of Bec (1063).

Three years later he succeeded Lanfranc as prior and as director of the school, which he perfected and imbued with a spirit all his own. In 1078 he was elected abbot of the monastery. The keenness of his intelligence, the gentleness of his extraordinarily affable character and the holiness of his life won him an immense ascendancy within the monastery and outside it. His relations with Lanfranc, appointed archbishop of Canterbury, and the organization of monastic life in certain English monasteries, forced him more than once to travel to England, where he was known and appreciated at the London court. In 1093, despite his extreme repugnance, he was raised to the archiepiscopal see of Canterbury as successor of Lanfranc (d. 1089).

The situation of the English Church was tragic at that time: complete decadence of morals and the overbearing domination of lay power over ecclesiastical power. A.'s program was to remedy the two evils: a program, moreover, proper to the Papacy itself. It is therefore no wonder that, shortly afterwards (1095), a bitter conflict broke out between the archbishop and King William the Red over the question of the recognition of Pope Urban II. After many difficulties A. was able to go to Rome to consult the Pope himself, who received him with great demonstrations of esteem. In 1098 he attended the Council of Bari, convened by Urban II to bring back to the unity of the Church the adherents of the schism of Cerularius, then numerous in southern Italy. In the questions discussed with the schismatics, A. was the great spokesman of the Catholic side. He then set out for Lyon, where he had to stay, since the king did not permit him to return to England. But in 1100 Henry, who had succeeded his brother William, insistently begged the archbishop to return to his see. However, the new king had no intention of changing his brother's ecclesiastical policy, and so, shortly thereafter, the conflict with A. broke out again, so much so that the latter, in 1103, had to depart a second time into exile, going again to Rome. But the political situation of England did not allow Henry to remain indefinitely in conflict with the archbishop. After many attempts the reconciliation was made, and A. was able to spend the last years of his life in peace and in intense pastoral work. He died on 21 Apr. 1109; he was venerated from the 13th century onward. Alexander VIII, on 21 Jan. 1690, inserted him into the universal calendar with the semidouble rite, assigning him the Mass of the feast of St. Hilary; Clement XI then, on 8 Feb. 1720, at the request of James III of England, raised his rite to double with the Mass and office De communi Doctorum. From this moment St. A. held the title of "doctor" (cf. Decreto S. R. Congregationis ad an. 1690, foll. 71-73; ad an. 1720, fol. 124; Martyr. Romanum, p. 148). Feast, 21 Apr.

II. WORKS

A) Principal works, in chronological order, according to the research of F. S. Schmitt, Zur Chronologie der Werke des hl. Anselm von Canterbury, in Revue bénédictine, 44 (1932), pp. 322-50; S. Anselmi Cantuariensis Archiep. Opera omnia, critical edition by F. S. Schmitt, vols. I and III, Edinburgh 1946, vol. II, Rome 1940.

1. The Monologion (1076, ed. Schmitt, I, 1-87; Florilegium patristicum of Bonn, fasc. 20, 1929; PL 158, 141-224).

It first appeared anonymously under the title Exemplum meditandi de ratione fidei. It is a vigorous treatise on God as one in nature (chaps. 1-28) and triune in persons (chaps. 29-78). It first demonstrates the existence of God starting from creatures, that is, from the concepts of the good, of greatness or perfection, of being or cause, and of the degrees of being, whence it concludes that there exists "the supremely good, the supremely great, the supreme being or subsistent, that is, the supreme of all things that are" (chaps. 1-4). It then passes to the attributes of God: aseity, which belongs to Him alone (chaps. 5-6), while everything else has its origin only from Him and ex nihilo (chaps. 7-14). There follow the other attributes: first in general (chaps. 15-16), insofar as they all belong to God substantially, so that He is supreme essence, supreme life, etc.; then in particular: simplicity, eternity, immensity, omnipresence, immutability (chaps. 17-28). It then passes to God as triune, treating first of the Son, the creative Word and eternal Word of the Father (chaps. 29-48), then of the Holy Spirit, proceeding from the Father and the Son by way of love (chaps. 49-58), and finally of the three persons together (chaps. 59-63). It then treats of the Trinity as the object of our knowledge (chaps. 64-67), of our love, of our beatitude (chaps. 68-74), of our hope (chap. 75) and of our faith (chaps. 76-78). The last two chapters treat of the manner of speaking of the trinity of persons (chap. 79) and of the unity of nature (chap. 80).

In the whole history of human thought one can hardly find a work so dense with thought and so lucid concerning God.

2. The Proslogion (1077-78; ed. Schmitt, I, 89-122; Florilegium patristicum of Bonn, fasc. 29, 1931; PL 158, 223-42).

Its first title was: Fides quaerens intellectum, and it was conceived as a complement to the Monologion. The latter, in A.'s opinion, had the drawback of being: "mulierum concatenatione contextum argumentorum". He therefore wished to re-treat the same subject, but basing the whole development upon: "unum argumentum, quod nullo alio ad se probandum quam se solo indigere, et solum ad adstruendum quia Deus vere est... et quaccumque de divina credimus substantia, sufficeret" (proem).

This "unum argumentum" is the concept of God as he than whom nothing greater can be thought, and hence the famous "argument of St. A." for proving the existence of God, which the author derives in chap. 2. The whole development, while preserving its character of rational and philosophical deduction, is set within the broader framework of an effort toward mystical elevation to the contemplation and enjoyment of God. This effort, which gives the little work a character of such extraordinary power, has two phases. The first, from chap. 1 to 18 (Adiava me propter homitatem tuum), is the first attempt, which does not reach the goal, at the enjoyment of God, and is composed of: prayer (beginning of chap. 1), logical inquiry (chaps. 1-14), an attempt at enjoyment that does not reach the goal (chaps. 14-18). The second phase likewise consists of a brief prayer (chap. 18: Adiava me Domine...) and of a new logical inquiry (chaps. 18: Certe vita et... - 23), which, reaching the goal, finally generates contemplative joy in God (chaps. 23-26).

The logical inquiry treats first of the existence of God, according to the fact (chap. 2) and the manner, that is, necessary existence (chaps. 3-4), and then of the other attributes of God, in general (chaps. 5-11) and in particular (chaps. 13-22). Chap. 23 treats briefly of the Trinity. The whole development is truly derived with extraordinary power of deduction from the concept: quo nihil maius cogitari possit.

Chap. 2 of the Proslogion, which is the pivot of the whole treatise, has given rise, down to our own days, to the most varied discussions. A.'s first opponent was the monk Gaunilo, who contested the legitimacy of his deduction (Quid ad haec respondeat quidam pro insipiente, ed. Schmitt, I, 125-29; PL 158, 241-48). But A. maintained his point of view (Quid ad haec respondeat editor ipsius libelli, ed. Schmitt, I, 130-39; PL 158, 247-60).

3. To the years 1080-85 belongs a group of opuscules, all in dialogue form and of a strictly philosophical nature, consisting of the De grammatico, De veritate, De libertate arbitrii. They must be considered together, as A. himself wishes (preface to the De veritate).

a) The De grammatico (ed. Schmitt, I, 141-68; PL 158, 561-82), treats the question debated among the dialecticians of the time, whether the grammarian is a substance or a quality. It is an exercise in dialectic or formal logic, conceived as an introduction to the Aristotelian categories, with the chief aim of teaching the pupil to distinguish the meaning of words and to make concepts precise. Not wrongly, although not all share this opinion, the De grammatico can be considered a small model of pedagogical art that irresistibly calls to mind the maieutic method of Socrates in Plato's dialogues, although nothing proves that A. knew these dialogues.

b) The De veritate (ed. Schmitt, I, 169-99; PL 158, 467-86) treats the more substantial question: what truth is and of what it is said. After an introductory chapter on the absolute value of truth, it explains in what sense truth is said of the word and of thought (logical truth), of the will and of actions (moral truth), of the senses, of the essence of things (ontological truth), of God, thus arriving at the definition of truth: "rectitudo sola mente perceptibilis". In chap. 12 it treats of justice because it too is a "rectitudo", that is: "rectitudo voluntatis servata propter se". Although the structure of the dialogue presents some defects, its content is instead of the highest importance for medieval thought.

c) The De libertate arbitrii (ed. Schmitt, I, 201-26; PL 158, 489-506) submits to analysis the concept of freedom, which A. defines as: "potestas servandi rectitudinem voluntatis propter ipsam rectitudinem" (chap. 13). This notion does not include the power to sin (chap. 1).

It is then demonstrated how such freedom belongs to man (and to the angel) both before and after sin, and how it persists even under temptation and in the very servitude to which one is reduced when one obeys sin. Finally the definition and the division of freedom are given.

Here too A. opens wide shafts of light, although he is reproached for not having distinguished with sufficient clarity the free from the merely voluntary.

4. The De casu diaboli (1065-90, ed. Schmitt, I, 227-276; PL 158, 325-60), studies the question how the angels could have fallen and been guilty of sin, although without the gift of perseverance, which they did not receive from God, they somehow could not persevere. There is treated at length and profoundly the question of freedom, of the origin and nature of evil, and in what sense God is its cause.

5. The Epistola de Incarnatione Verbi. (It has come down to us in a double recension: the first, shorter, written before Sept. 1092, ed. Schmitt, I, 277-90; the second, written at the beginning of 1094 ca., ed. Schmitt, II, 1-35; PL 158, 259-84; Florilegium patristicum of Bonn, fasc. 28, I, 1931).

It is a polemical treatise against Roscelin, who, a nominalist in philosophy, taught tritheism in theology, maintaining that otherwise one would have to admit that the Father and the Holy Spirit were incarnated together with the Son.

A. premises his treatise, dedicated to Urban II, with an important declaration of principles on the role of dialectic and reason, as well as of Sacred Scripture and tradition, in theology. He then proceeds to the confutation of Roscelin, clarifying the concepts of nature and person, and distinguishing in God what is absolute and what is relative, whereby he demonstrates to his opponent that his assertions have no value even from the purely dialectical point of view.

It is an important contribution to the theology of the Trinity, while the Incarnation, despite the title, is touched upon there only with regard to the state of the question as it had been posed by Roscelin.

6. Il Cur Deus Homo (finito nel 1098; ed. Schmitt, II, 37-133; Florilegium patristicum di Bonn. fasc. 18, 1929;

PL 158, 359-432). The aim that A. set himself in this work is to prove by "necessary reasons," making a methodological abstraction from what faith teaches us about the Incarnation and the Redemption, that man, since he must necessarily reach the ultimate end assigned to him by God, cannot do so except through the work of a God-Man, and that therefore everything that faith teaches us about the Incarnation and the Redemption has "necessary" value. The whole of A.'s reasoning can be summarized thus: after sin God "could not" leave man to himself, but "had to" raise him up again in order to replace in heaven, as He willed, the fallen angels. Nor "could" God pardon man without worthy satisfaction. Now, sin, being in some way infinite, could not be worthily atoned for except by means of an infinite satisfaction. But this could not be offered by a man, nor even by God, who cannot atone. It was therefore "necessary" that a God-Man should come to accomplish it.

The work is divided into 2 books. In the first, addressing unbelievers, A. wishes to prove to them that man cannot save himself by his own power. Chapters 1-2 are general preambles. Then (chapters 3-10) a series of objections is answered in order to elucidate beforehand certain necessary points, for example: that no angel could save man; that the devil, even after sin, had no right over man (against a theory common among the Fathers). There follows the proof of the necessity of satisfaction for guilt (chapters 11-19), and finally that of man's inability to give such satisfaction to God for sin (chapters 20-25). The second book seeks to prove that, since the end of man must be attained in every way, the satisfaction for his sin must necessarily be paid by a Man-God. Chapters 1-3 deal with the end that man must attain. It is then established that this can be attained only through the Man-God, whose qualities are described, which he necessarily had to possess in order to attain this goal (chapters 6-9). Then the efficacy and the manner of his redemptive work are illustrated (chapters 10-21). Chapter 22 is the conclusion.

The Cur Deus Homo is the first true treatise on the Redemption and, despite its weak points, is rightly regarded, together with the Monologion, as A.'s masterpiece and the most original and profound work, if not indeed definitive, on this subject.

7. The De conceptu virginali et de originali peccato (1099-1100; ed. Schmitt, II, 135-73; PL 158, 431-64), in order to resolve the question of how Christ, being born of a virgin, did not contract original sin, treats of the nature (chaps. 1-6) and the mode of propagation (chaps. 7, 9, 10) of this sin. Then it shows how this sin could not pass into Christ, born of a virgin (chaps. 8, 11-15). Chaps. 18-21 deduce certain consequences of the preceding doctrine. A. then treats of the quantity of original sin (chaps. 22-23); whether and how the sins of the immediate ancestors are transmitted (chaps. 24-26); the effects of original sin in this life (chap. 27) and in the next (chap. 28).

The treatise historically represents a great step forward in the theology of original sin.

8. The De processione Spiritus Sancti (1102; ed. Schmitt, II, 175-219; PL 158, 285-326) deals with the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son, a question on which A. had already dwelt at the Council of Bari. Chapter 1, after an introduction to the subject, establishes the points of faith common to the Greeks and the Latins, from which A. then derives the basic principle in this matter: « quatenus nec unitas amittat aliquando suum consequens ubi non obviat aliqua relationis oppositio, nec elatio perdat quod suum est, nisi ubi obsistat unitas inseparabilis ». Various applications of the principle are then shown, and above all it is demonstrated how the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son as well follows from it. Chapter 2 answers the objections of the Greeks against the aforesaid principle. Chapters 3-7 confirm the Catholic doctrine with the texts of Sacred Scripture, while in chapters 8-13 the various objections of the Greeks against the Catholic doctrine itself are answered, and in chapters 14-16 a summary is made and the mode of being of the three persons is examined, considering one in relation to the other two.

L'opera di A. è il primo grande vero trattato, scritto dai cattolici contro la dottrina foziana. La teologia posteriore vi ebbe ben poco da aggiungere.

9. The Epistola de sacrificio azymi et fermentati and the Epistola de Sacramentis ecclesiae date from 1106-07 (ed. Schmitt, II, 221-32; 239-42; PL 158, 541-48; 551-54).

The first letter touches on two other questions debated between Latins and Greeks: namely that of the use of unleavened bread in the Mass — which A. here defends as legitimate equally with (ch. 1), indeed with greater reason than (ch. 2), leavened bread against the accusations of the Greeks (chs. 3-6) — and that of marriage after the sixth degree of consanguinity (ch. 7). The second letter explains the legitimacy of a reasonable diversity of secondary liturgical usages even in the celebration of the Mass.

10. Il De concordia praescientiae et praedestinationis et gratiae Dei cum libero arbitrio (1107-1108; ed. Schmitt, II, 243-88; PL 158, 507-42).

It is the last work of A. and deals successively with the arduous questions of the relations between free will and divine foreknowledge, free will and predestination, free will and grace. First question: the point of the difficulty is specified (ch. 1); God's foreknowledge does not take away freedom in general (ch. 2), still less the foreknowledge of sin (ch. 3). Confirmation of the two preceding assertions: theological (ch. 4), scriptural (ch. 5). Definition of freedom (ch. 6). God's foreknowledge is the cause of things, with the exception of free will, but it is not the cause of sin (ch. 7).

Seconda questione: la difficoltà (cap. 1). Dio non predestina al male, se non nel senso che lo permette (cap. 2). La predestinazione lascia intatta la libertà (cap. 3).

Third question: apparent difficulties of Scripture against free will (ch. 1). General principles of the solution (chs. 2-4). Answer to the scriptural difficulties (ch. 5). Secondary questions and difficulties (chs. 6-13). General conclusion (ch. 14).

11. Il De potestate et impotentia, possibilitate et impossibilitate, necessitate et libertate è un'opera abbozzata dopo il De concordia e rimasta incompiuta. (Fu scoperta e pubblicata da F. S. Schmitt, Ein neues unsollendetes Werk des hl. Anselm von Canterbury, in Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters, Münster 32 [1936, III]).

The work, which by its subject matter belongs to the group of De grammatico, De veritate, De libertate arbitrii, was meant to be a logical, systematic and complete analysis of the concepts expressed in the title, in that manner which later became so much in vogue among the Scholastics. As it stands, it proves useful for a better understanding of the philosophical foundations of A.'s theology.

B) Prayers and meditations. - Of the Orationes et Meditationes attributed to A. and reproduced in PL 158, 709-1016, only a part is authentic: that published by Schmitt (III, 1-91). For the relevant critical questions, see the studies of Wilmart, especially those he collected in the work: Auteurs spirituels et textes dévots du Moyen âge latin, Paris 1932, and also: La tradition des prières de s. Anselme. Tables et notes, in Revue bénédictine, 36 (1924), pp. 52-71. See also the studies of F. S. Schmitt: Des hl. Anselm v. C. Gebet zum hl. Benedikt. Zur Wesensart der anselmianischen Gebete und Betrachtungen, in Studia Anselmiana, fasc. 18-19 (1947), pp. 297-313, and in Miscellanea Giovanni Mercati, II, Vatican City 1946, pp. 158-78.

C) The letters are reproduced by Migne in 4 books: PL 158, 1059 ff.; books 1 and 2; 159, 9-272; books 3 and 4. Those of the first two books and part of the third are authentic, with few exceptions. Vol. III of Schmitt's edition also contains book I of the letters. (A. Wilmart, La tradition des lettres de s. Anselme. Lettres inédites de s. Anselme et des correspondants, in Revue bénédictine, 43 [1931], pp. 39-54; F. S. Schmitt, Zur Überlieferung der Korrespondenz des Anselm von Canterbury. Neue Briefe, ibid., pp. 224-38; Zur Entstehungsgeschichte der handschriftlichen Sammlungen der Briefe des hl. A. v. C., ibid., 48 [1936], pp. 300-17). D) Works that are doubtful or spurious are to be considered those not listed here. There is no need to review them all. One noted only among the spurious works: De voluntate (PL 158, 487), Hymni et Psalterium Beatae Virginis (Mariale; ibid., 1035-1050), the Homilies (v. A. Wilmart, Les Homélies attribuées à s. Anselme, in Archives d'histoire doctrinale du Moyen âge, 1927, fasc. 2, pp. 5-29). The opuscule De beatitudine coelestis patriae (PL 159, 587-606) is the reconstruction of a conference given by A. at Cluny in 1104 and written up by his disciple and biographer Eadmer. The De similitudinibus or Liber similitudinum (ibid., 605-708) is the work of the monk Alexander of Canterbury. The De Conceptione Beatae Virginis is the work of Eadmer (PL 159, 301-18. B. del Marmol, La Conception immaculée de la V. M. par Eadmer, [Pax, 14], Maredsous 1923, with introduction and translation).

III. SOME POINTS OF DOCTRINE

A. is essentially a theologian. His importance in the history of thought lies even more in the method with which he treated theology than in the profound traces he left concerning the numerous questions he touched upon.

The novelty of A.'s method was not in the use of reason, nor even simply of dialectic, to elucidate the data of faith — for this, without which theological science does not subsist, had already been done by the Fathers, both Greek and Latin — but it was in a certain proportion that he assigned to reason and to dialectic, particularly of the Aristotelian type, in the theological elaboration of the revealed. For A. the matter on which theological work is exercised, that is, the datum of faith, is supplied by the belief of the Church, by Scripture, by the Fathers — especially Augustine, with whom A. is wholly imbued — and is conceived as an unshakable foundation and infallible norm, antecedently to any justifying proof of reason, and against which no dialectical conclusion can ever prevail. Indeed, if the dialectical conclusion were contrary to the datum of faith, it would be an evident sign that it is erroneous. Here A. is in perfect antagonism with Roscelin and with the rationalistic tendency of the dialectic represented by him. But for A. the effort of theological work does not primarily concern this very proposition of the revealed datum. This, contrary to the preceding patristic tradition, is more presupposed than discussed or elucidated in itself. Theological work is concentrated instead almost exclusively on the subsequent metaphysical and dialectical treatment of this presupposed content of revelation. Thus theology becomes in the first place the metaphysical elucidation of the concepts proposed or included in revelation, the logical deduction of the consequences included therein, the systematic connection of its different parts, the dialectical confutation of the objections raised against it, especially in the name of dialectic itself. In all this A. by no means shares the point of view of the more or less absolute anti-dialecticians, of whom Peter Damian was, in the 11th century, the greatest exponent and who showed excessive aversion to the use of philosophy and dialectic in theological questions. He is, if anything, the pupil, but a genial and wholly personal one, of Lanfranc of Pavia, or, better still, the disciple of Augustine, and from him he takes his cue to reach the new equilibrium in the question of the relations between reason and faith. It is for A. the sense of "fides quaerens intellectum," of "credo ut intelligam." Rightly, therefore, A. has been defined as the theologian-philosopher, or even the first metaphysical theologian. One thus understands to what extent he has a concept of theology as a science that is, in substance, already Aristotelian, and how philosophy and theology are in him intimately united, and how likewise the title of "father of scholasticism" is attributed to him. Nor have certain recent attempts to dispute this for him any serious foundation (cf. A. Stolz, Anselm von Cant., Munich 1937, p. 32 ff.). In practice, and notwithstanding the limits he imposed on himself, has A. not sometimes had an exaggerated confidence in the demonstrative force of reason applied even to the mysteries of faith? Although some wish to excuse him, the matter nevertheless seems incontestable. Even more than the expression "rationes necessariae," with which he seeks, for example, to demonstrate the "quia" of the Trinity (Monologion, ch. 64) and the "necessity" of the Incarnation — an expression that some would understand only of a great fittingness or even of convincing reasonings, abstraction made as to whether of a philosophical or theological nature (cf. M. A. Jacquin, Les rations necessaries de s. Anselme, in Mélanges Mandonnet, II, Paris 1930, p. 67 ff.) — that exaggerated confidence seems to result from the whole way in which A. sets up and develops the said questions. The mystical side itself, so notable in him (Proslogion, Meditations) and which cannot be neglected in the fair appreciation of his work, because in him it is a good of a genuinely patristic inheritance, especially Augustinian, does not weaken or change the nature of philosophical and dialectical reasoning; rather it relies on it in large part and feeds on it. A., in a series of monographs, of great completeness and depth, for which even today their beauty is ever fresh, has touched almost all the major theological problems and by reflection many philosophical ones. There has been talk of his "realism" in philosophy: it must, in any case, be understood with many reservations.

A. proves the existence of God in the Monologion following essentially, though with a personal stamp, the old Platonic way of the degrees of being, so dear to Augustine; but in the Proslogion he attempts a new way. It is the so-called "argument of St. A." (sometimes also called: a priori argument, and also, but with very debatable reason, ontological argument) celebrated in the history of philosophy. It consists in wishing to prove the real existence of God by deducing it directly from its very definition, from the concept one has of it. "God is the being, than which nothing greater can be thought; the concept of such a being is in our mind; but such a being must also exist in reality, outside our mind, because, if it existed only in the mind, one could think of another greater, one, that is, which existed not only in the mind, but also in reality outside it" (Proslogion, chs. 2, 3). The value of this reasoning has impassioned many great minds from A. onward, some accepting it with more or less profound nuances and modifications of form and substance (Scotus, Descartes, Leibniz), others rejecting it, because it includes an illicit leap from the ideal order to the real one. From the argument it follows indeed that the being than which nothing greater can be thought must be thought as existing, that is, with the note of existence, but it does not follow, however, that this existence is also really extramental, because real existence adds nothing to the constitutive perfection of the being, but is only the act of this (Gaunilo, St. Thomas, Kant). A. certainly seems to have been deluded about the value of his discovery. Recent attempts to reclaim the strictly theological, or even mystical, nature, and to deny that of a true philosophical argument to chapters 2 and 3 of the Proslogion have no true substance (cf. on this question A. Kolping, Anselms Proslogion-Beweis der Existenz Gottes, Bonn 1939, with the relevant bibliography). Very notable is then, for the depth of thought and logical rigor of deduction, the explanation of the divine attributes both in the Monologion and in the Proslogion. A. thus created the essential features of the later treatises de Deo uno.

On the Trinity of God A. systematizes and perfects the psychological theory of St. Augustine, giving the greatest clarity to the doctrine of relations and to the deductions that derive from it. The later treatises on the Trinity remained, in the West, in A.'s wake.

The major anthropological problems were touched upon by him with effectiveness. Thus in the explanation of the state of original justice. Thus likewise in the way of conceiving original sin as the sin of nature, which came to be infected in Adam and through Adam, and transmitted by him to us all in this state, not only infected but also guilty.

Although some opinions of A. in such matter had to be completed and corrected (for example, a clearer distinction between natural and preternatural and supernatural gifts; a better explanation of the effects of Baptism even in children, etc.), they nevertheless opened great chinks of light for the subsequent theology.

In his explanation of the Redemption, A., by dealing the death blow to the theory of the "rights of the devil," linked his name to that of vicarious satisfaction. This, based on the concept of sin as an offense in some way infinite against God, on the sinner's duty to make reparation for the offense, and on the impossibility in which the latter finds himself of doing so adequately, permits in some way a profound and strongly systematic explanation of Christ's redemptive work, an explanation that became classic in the West.

A.'s influence was very great, but — a curious thing, and one that shows A. to have been a fruit ripened more by his own vigor than by the force of his environment — it was not immediate, but was exercised only from about the 13th century, with the full flowering of scholasticism. If, moreover, it was more of a general nature than detectable in individual questions, this in no way diminishes its importance, because, without him, the history of Western thought, as it unfolded from the Middle Ages onward, would be hardly conceivable. And even today it exerts a powerful attraction on all who come near his personality, so modest without affectation, so full of goodness, so complete and human, for which reason his works, in no way second in depth of thought and vigor of exposition to those of the greatest scholastics of the 13th century, are instead, in many respects, much closer than theirs to our modern taste. In them, in fact, much more than the concern for manualistic-didactic exposition, there appears that vital effort in the search for truth, which today delights us so much.

Cipriano Vagaggini