NOMINALISM. - A philosophical tendency that denies the existence of general concepts, or at least denies that any proper real content corresponds to them. The term (Nominales) is connected with the first assertion, in the 9th century, of the sententia vocum, but appears explicitly only in the 13th century and becomes common, Occam (v.), to designate his school. In modern philosophy it refers chiefly to English empiricism. Historically, nominalism thus embraces diverse positions (including certain expressions of Greek philosophy), whose characteristics must be kept in mind when attempting an essential definition of nominalism. In general, it may be described as the affirmation of the absolute singularity and concreteness of reality: to general ideas, even granting that they exist, there corresponds in actual reality nothing universal (essence, form), but only an aggregate or collectivity of individuals. Once a proper content is denied to the general idea, nominalism, in its rigorous expression, logically reaches the denial of the concept itself: the general idea is in reality an illusion; what is general is only the name, to which there is linked in the mind a more or less determinate sensible representation, and which is referred to an entire collectivity of individuals similar in certain fundamental respects. Consequently, one understands the language (v.), understood not merely as expression and manifestation, but as the basis and instrument of universal human knowledge. What is asserted of the concept is extended to the proposition (judgment): “man is mortal” means “all human individuals are mortal.”
The derivations of nominalism will be indicated below. Here, first of all, its extension to the epistemological field should be noted. “Scientific” nominalism is the tendency to regard science not as objective and universal knowledge, but as a mere conventional or symbolic interpretation of reality, or as an instrument successful in ordering reality toward human practical ends: thus a pragmatic, not theoretical, conception of science (scientific positivism; cf. H. Poincaré, La science et l'hypothèse, Parigi 1902, Introd.).
Nominalism should be understood not as a purely gnoseological position, but also as a definite conception of reality. It is the denial of ontological principles and values that transcend pure experience and are posited in reality as grounds for the intelligibility, universality, and constancy of experience itself. Nominalism, in its rigorous expression, is positivism (v.).
In Greek philosophy, nominalism is implicit in the Heraclitean doctrine of the essential becoming of reality (v. ERACLITO), and in the relativistic sensationalism of the sophists, which resolves reality, for man, into the subjective contents of his sensations; and it is accepted Cynics (v.), who, in contrast to the teaching of Socrate, deny validity to conceptual knowledge. Whereas the doctrine of the Stoics (v. STOICISMO) is properly expressed in conceptualism (“the concept is a mental vision of the rational soul”: N. Testa, I frammenti degli stoici antichi, I, III, Bari 1932, nn. 38-39, pp. 41-42), Epicuro (v.) inclines rather toward nominalism, insofar as it recognizes no source and criterion of true knowledge other than sensation, and regards the concept as a conception of the particular sensible images preserved in memory: “universalem intelligentiam... id est memoriam eius rei quae saepe extrinsecua apparuit” (Diog. Laert., X, 33: cf. 31, 36).
The explicit formulation of nominalism appears in medieval question of universals (v.). Boezio had stated concerning the categories: “praedicatorum tractatus non de rebus sed de vocibus est” (In Categ. Aristotelis, I: PL 64, 162 A-D). The expression
had in Boethius a correct meaning (cf. C. Prantl, Storia della logica in Occidente. Età medievale, part 1, Italian translation by F. Limentani, Florence 1937, p. 19 ff.); nevertheless, it contributed, from the ninth century onward, to the formation of the sententia vocum, which held universals to be nothing other than voces and nomina. This tendency is already announced in Rabanus Maurus (v. cf. Prantl, op. cit., pp. 68–69), and is subsequently attributed explicitly to Roscellinus of Compiègne (v. born ca. 1050) Freising (v.) John of Salisbury (v.): «primus nostris temporibus in logica sententiam vocum instituit» (Otto of Fr., De gestis Priderici I, I, 47, in MGH, Scriptores, XX, p. 376); «Fuerunt et qui voces ipsas genera dicerent esse et species; sed eorum iam explosa sententia est et facile cum auctore suo (Rocelino) evanuit» (John of Salisbury, Polycericus, VII, 12: PL 199, 665; cf. Metalogicus, II, 17: ibid., 874). In turn, St. Anselm condemned «illi utique nostri temporis dialectici, immo dialecticae haeretici, qui nonnisi flatum vocis putant esse universales substantias» (De fide Trin., chap. 2: PL 158, 265). St. Anselm’s condemnation proceeded chiefly from theological reasons, since, once the reality of the universal had been denied, it seemed to him that the possibility of understanding the existence of the three Persons in the one divine essence and the unity of person in Christ was compromised: if it is impossible to conceive man apart from individuality, every real human nature will be a person (ibid.). With regard to Roscellinus’s n., however, De Wulf’s judgment must be kept in mind: Roscellinus is perhaps more an antirealist than a nominalist in the modern sense; he asserts that universals are not res but voces, yet he does not seem to deny the intellect the power to form abstract notions endowed with universality, or universal terms a relation of correspondence with things (M. De Wulf, Storia della filosofia medievale, I, Italian translation by V. Miano, Florence 1944, p. 152). Still less is it possible to speak of genuine n. in Abelard (v. «in hac autem opinione deprehensus est peripateticus palatinus Abaelardus noster: G. di Salisbury, Metalogicus, II, 17: PL 199, 874). The n. of Abelard and his school «ha un senso specialissimo», inasmuch as it limits itself to asserting, against realism (Odo of Tournai, William of Champeaux, Remigius of Auxerre, Gilbert of La Porrée [v.]), that the universal name, since it is predicated of many, cannot be a res or substance. But Abelard admits that a natura rei communis corresponds to the universal nomen, and is therefore very close to moderate realism, as certain of his significant expressions show: Socrates and Plato «conveniunt in eo quod homines sunt: non dico in homine, cum res nulla sit homo nisi discreta» (cf. M. de Wulf, op. cit., I, p. 197). The scholastic n. of the eleventh century may therefore be regarded as a preparation, even if not fully conscious, for moderate realism. A denial of the latter, by contrast, appears in the fourteenth century in the n. Occam (v.). For Occam, genera and species are nuda intellecta. Every individual thing is entirely self-contained, singular in itself («qualibet res singularis seipsa est singularis»: I Sent., dist. 2, q. 6 Q), distinct from every other; and if it resembles other individuals, it resembles them by virtue of its own individual reality, not by virtue of a universal, common form or essence. The realist opinion that one and the same reality is multiplied among many «est simpliciter falsa et absurda» (ibid., q. 4 D). Universals are merely intentiones animae, and the intentio is a Signum, or symbol, which gathers together all individuals and can be referred to them (Summa totius logicae, I, chaps. 12–15); but this sign is nothing more than an abstraction and production of the mind («abstracto quae non est nisi fictio quaedam», II Sent., dist. 2, q. 8 E): it is «natura sua» expressive of individuals (apprehended immediately through the noticia intuitiva), but without significance on the ontological plane of reality: «non sunt universalia de essentia rerum nec partes rerum ad extra» (Summa totius logicae, I, chap. 25; II Sent., dist. 2, q. 8 Q). Occam’s position thus appears, in conclusion, conceptualism (v.), although, because of its radical denial of the metaphysical-real value of the universal, it was designated as n. from as early as the fourteenth century. De Wulf observes here too that Occam’s n., just as it must not be confused with the n. or “verbalism” of the eleventh century, must also be distinguished from modern empiricist n., since Occam preserves the substantial distinction between thought and sensation (De Wulf, op. cit., III, p. 39; cf. I, p. 143). Nevertheless, Occam’s position foreshadowed modern n., inasmuch as it was no longer merely a logical solution to the problem of universals, but tended, through its overvaluation of individual reality and intuitive knowledge, to deny the value of abstract knowledge in general. The cenerabilis Inceptor of the invictissima secta nominalium in reality went beyond the denial of species, the principium individuationis, the “agent intellect,” and other analogous metaphysical values defended by the scholastics of the thirteenth century. For, once concepts had been posited as fictiones, their invalidity and constitutional inability to grasp the structure of the real followed. If the concept of cause is a figmentum, it cannot serve to demonstrate the existence of God (Quod., I, q. 1; II, q. 1 and I Sent., dist. 2, q. 5), nor the freedom and immortality of the soul. And if ethical-legal concepts too are fictiones, it follows that the entire moral order, no longer capable of being grounded in the metaphysical values of being, depends upon the will of God, known through Revelation (voluntarism, fideism). In the strictly theological sphere, the denial of the distinction between “habits,” accidents, and relations and the concrete substantial reality of the individual became particularly dangerous in the doctrine of Grace and in Trinitarian doctrine; and the absolute identity of God’s individuality excluded every possible distinction in him of perfections, attributes, and relations, and consequently also any valid conceptual cognition of the divine being.
Occamism spread, though opposed with varying fortunes, throughout the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. It was particularly combated in Paris, until the Edict of Louis XI (1474), which prohibited the teaching at that University of the philosophy of the Nominales or Terministas; when the Edict was abrogated in 1481, the nominalist school regained new vigor. Among Occam’s followers, mention should be made of an anonymous author of the second half of the fourteenth century who, in the Quaestio de universali secundum vian et doctrinam G. de Ockam, affirmed: « Universalia... sunt tantum quidam termini mentales seu intentiones vel conceptus si sunt in mente, vel sunt termini vocales et prolati si sunt in voce, vel sunt termini scripti si scribantur » (ed. M. Grabmann, Münster 1930, p. 27). Among the other principal representatives of terminism were Giovanni di Mirecourt (first half of the fourteenth century), Adamo Wodham (d. 1358), Gregorio da Rimini (d. 1358), Gualtiero di Bamberga (lecturer at the University of Vienna in 1397), Marsilio d'Inghen (d. 1396), Giovanni Brammart (d. 1407), Pietro di Ailly (1350–1420), Giovanni Buridano (d. ca. 1360), Nicola di Oresme (d. 1382), and Albert di Sassonia (d. 1390; V. a queste voci). The last of the authors listed, however, had predominantly scientific aims and, with their original speculations and physical theories, anticipated some of the most important scientific discoveries of the sixteenth century. In the more strictly theological-religious sphere, Occamism was not without Protestantism (v.). The nominalist tendency, although obedient to the teaching of the Church, was in force, particularly through the doctrines of Gabriel Biel (ca. 1415–1495), at the University of Erfurt, where Luther (v.) was formed, as well as in the general study house of the Augustinian Order (cf. H. Grisar, M. Luther, Freiburg im Br. 1927, chap. 1, § 3; P. Vigneaux, Luther commentateur des Sent., Paris 1935, pp. 45–86).
Occamism was thus connected, in its twofold scientific-philosophical and theological significance, with modern thought, of which the nominalist tendency, strengthened by the new methodology of the sciences (Bacon, Galileo) and by other historical circumstances, became one of the fundamental directives. The first rigorous expression of modern nominalism is found in English empiricism. BERGER, ELIE (v.), « the opinion that the mind has the power of fabricating abstract ideas or notions of things has had a large part in entangling and confusing speculation... and has given rise to innumerable errors and difficulties in almost all parts of knowledge » (Treatise on the principles of human knowledge, Italian trans. by G. Papini, Bari 1925, Introd., p. 7). The idea is always particular and « becomes general when it is made to represent—that is, is placed in the stead of—all the other particular ideas of the same kind » (ibid., p. 13). Consequently, « general ideas are fictions and inventions of the mind » (ibid.), and their source must be sought in language: « if there had been no language or universal signs, abstraction would never have been thought of » (ibid., pp. 16–17). In Berkeley, who protested that he did not absolutely deny general ideas, but only abstract ideas (ibid., p. 12), nominalism was contained, in its logical consequences, by a spiritualistic conception—moreover not critically grounded—of man and God. In Hume, who expressly refers to Berkeley (Treatise on human nature, part 1, section 7), every spiritualistic presupposition having fallen away, nominalism is carried to its skeptical and anti-metaphysical conclusion. The general idea is excluded already by the fundamental assertion of human epistemology that « all ideas are derived from impressions and are nothing but copies and representations of them » (op. cit., part 1, section 7, Italian trans. by A. Carlini, Bari 1926, p. 37). The sensible impression is in fact necessarily individual, « determined in its degrees both of quantity and of quality » (ibid., pp. 36–37). Abstract ideas are therefore in themselves individual and « become general by being joined to a general term, that is, to a term which, by a customary association, stands in relation to many other particular ideas and readily recalls them to the imagination » (ibid., p. 41). The concept is thus, in Hume, completely reduced to the sensible image: there are in the mind only individual representations (the general idea is absurd, just as general reality is absurd: ibid., p. 37), connected extrinsically by a term and by a psychological habit; « the word raises up an individual idea, and, along with it, a certain custom; and this custom produces every other individual idea, according as the occasion requires » (ibid., p. 39). Once the unity and autonomy of the concept had been dissolved in the phenomenal-empirical multiplicity of sensations, every basis of consistency was removed from the theoretical constructions of thought. Hume does not hesitate to conclude that the certainty of human knowledge is restricted within the limits of experience (empiricism).
Empiricist nominalism is taken up again by sensationalism (Condillac) and by the representatives of classical positivism (A. Comte, H. Taine, H. Spencer, J. Stuart Mill). It is defended on psychological grounds by J. F. Fries, H. Helmoltz, W. Wundt, and Th. Ziehen. Feuerbach’s materialism is nominalist in inspiration (only the individual sensible is truly real; the universal, or the Hegelian idea, is instead an illusion: nature in its otherness), as are left-wing existentialism (only the existent and its individual situation in time are real—the concept and universality mean the loss of the individual), neopositivism (v.), which in some of its expressions reduces the value of the concept to a purely verbal meaning. Nominalism is therefore associated with some of the most powerful currents of contemporary thought, being at once an expression and a cause of the heightened crisis to which metaphysics has come.
Nominalism has had, in the history of philosophical thought, a positive significance, as a call for control over the intellect’s abstractive activity and for awareness of its limits and possible deviations, whenever it tends to attribute the meaning of reality to what is merely a form or mode of being of thought. The emphasis placed on the individuality of the real likewise has an evident justification in the conditions of ontological concreteness and singularity that a pluralistic conception cannot fail to recognize in being, person (v.). In this sense nominalism, both that of the fourteenth century and modern nominalism, has contributed, as few other schools of thought have done, to a more valid knowledge of reality, both natural and spiritual. In its reaction against scholastic abstraction, it sought the truth and meaning of the concept, emphasizing the value of intuition and of the immediacy of experience, thereby fostering the new tendencies in mysticism and politics (Giov. Gianduno,
Marsilio da Padova [v.] and in the sciences. The fruitful methodological principles of modern science—particularly of the physical sciences, but also of the spiritual sciences—are in fact due in large part to the theoretical demands of n. At the same time, however, the negative aspect of n. cannot be ignored, evident in its denial of the value of the universal. “N. is evidently a naturalistic and materialistic solution; by resolving reality into individuals, it tends to suppress their intelligibility, denying the absolute value of those universals through which they are intelligible. And it therefore tends to deny all value to thought, which, set over against these individuals, which alone are real, can be nothing other than nothing” (G. Gentile, Teoria generale dello spirito come atto puro, 5th ed., Firenze 1938, chap. 6, p. 69). The actualistic condemnation does indeed proceed from the presupposition of the supreme unity and concreteness of thought, in whose dialectic individual singularities are posited and dissolved. It is possible to set aside that presupposition; but the criticism is equally accurate. The concept and universality are the very condition of thought: n., which suppresses the concept, or, what amounts to the same thing, deprives it of its proper content, ultimately comes to deny thought in what constitutes its essential value: its meaning as reason and expression of being. In n., the intellect is undoubtedly acknowledged to have the function of systematizing the data of experience, ordering individuals into classes and systems; but, since every value transcending their empirical reality is excluded from the individuals themselves, it is likewise impossible for the intellect to understand them on a plane of absolute intelligibility. The individual, as given in human experience, is existence, fact, history; if there are no principles, reasons, or moments of unity within individuals that insert them into the universal and the necessary, it is impossible to assign them a meaning: being is fragmented and dispersed into pure empirical multiplicity, without reason, unity, or end. N., even when it does not explicitly affirm it, precludes a metaphysical conception of the world and of being, and consequently also a conception of man and of life that is not the surrender of thought and action to history as pure fact and becoming in time. It is clear that, from the nominalist perspective, neither soul, nor good, nor finality, nor God is capable of a valid rational foundation: when these values are not simply denied, they are to be abandoned to the sphere of feeling and faith. Agnosticism, fideism, pragmatism (v.) in every order of values tending to transcend experience—religious, ethical, juridical, pedagogical, social, or political—are therefore the logical and historical conclusion of n.
N. is at fault for failing to understand that, if the universal outside the particular is pure abstraction, the individual without the universal is also an abstraction—because it lacks foundation and principle. Reality can only be the concreteness of individuality and universality: individuality, which is reason and bearer of existence and action; universality, which is the reason for the ontological structure of every entity as a degree and participation of Being and intelligibility.