GIOVANNI di MIRECOURT (de Mirecuria). - A Cistercian scholastic (hence the epithet *monacus albus*) of the first half of the fourteenth century. He lectured on the *Sentences* in 1344–45 (or 1345–46) at the College of St Bernard in Paris.
Already in 1346, Clement VI, the Avignonese pope, had drawn the attention of the University of Paris to the reprehensible method then prevalent there of inappropriately mixing philosophy with theology. In 1347, the University denounced as suspect 63 propositions drawn from the *Commentary on the Sentences* (still unpublished) of G. di M. In the same year he prepared an *Apologia* of the 63 propositions, addressed to the papal legate in France. Nevertheless, the University condemned (still in 1347) 41 of the theses previously marked as suspect. G. di M. then composed a second *Apologia*, intended to show that in the condemned theses one could discern, alongside an erroneous sense, a legitimate one. He further requested permission to append to the manuscripts of the *Commentary on the Sentences* the 41 propositions together with his own *Apologia*—a request that appears to have been granted. Both *Apologiae* are now known in their entirety and were edited by F. Stegmüller in *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale*, 7 (1935), fasc. I and II. However, a proper theological and philosophical study of G. di M. has yet to be undertaken.
In truth, G. di M. falls into manifest and grave errors; though not all of these appear in the second *Apologia*, this seems due to the fact that the judges did not wish to involve themselves too deeply in philosophical questions, from which Clement VI had urged the University of Paris to keep its distance. In particular, with regard to the relationship between God and the human creature, G. di M. goes so far in affirming the omnipotence of God as to distort the very concept of omnipotence, thereby implicating God Himself in the sinful actions of man. Naturally, dire consequences follow for the doctrines of grace and predestination. Likewise, concerning Christ, G. di M. employed expressions that in the second *Apologia* could be summarized and condemned under the formula: *“Quod possibile est Christum secundum voluntatem creatam errasse et forte secundum hominem mendacium protulisse”* (no. 12; cf. *Rech. de théol. anec. et méd.*, 5 [1933], p. 196).
To these and other errors were joined philosophical doctrines already current in the Parisian milieu, which he now introduced into the theological sphere. The second *Apologia* (no. 27) reports the condemned proposition: *“Quod est probabile in lumine naturali non esse accidentia, sed omnem rem esse substantiam, et quod nisi esset fides, hoc esset ponendum vel probabiliter posset poni”* (*ibid.*, p. 201).
The same view is reported in the first *Apologia* under no. 43 (*ibid.*, p. 66); under no. 44, another proposition is cited that merits close attention for the developments it later occasioned: *“Non est probatum demonstrative ex propositionibus per se notis et evidentibus, evidentia nobis reducta ad certitudinem, primi principii, quod Deus sit, nec quod perfectissimum sit in entibus, sicut nec aliquid esse causam alterius, nec quin quaelibet res creata habeat causam, et causa illius causam et sic in infinitum, nec quin aliquid possit totaliter producere nobilius se, nec quin quocumque quod est possit produci nobilius.”*
From these grave assertions it emerges that G. di M. cast doubt upon: 1) a demonstration of the existence of God and, more precisely, 2) the principle of causality; 3) its efficacy for ascending to God.