GIOVANNI di MIRECOURT (de Mirecuria). — A Cistercian scholastic (hence the appellation monacus albus) of the first half of the fourteenth century. He lectured on the Sentences in 1344–45 (or 1345–46) at the College of S. Bernardo in Paris.
As early as 1346 Clement VI, the Avignonese pope, had drawn the attention of the University of Paris to the reprehensible method, which had become prevalent there, of indiscriminately mixing philosophy with theology. In 1347, 63 propositions taken from the (still unpublished) Commentary on the Sentences of G. di M. were denounced by the University as suspect. That same year G. di M. prepared an Apology for the 63 propositions, addressing it to the papal legate in France. Nevertheless, the University condemned (also in 1347) 41 of the theses previously indicated as suspect. G. di M. then prepared a second Apology, intended to demonstrate that in the condemned theses, besides an erroneous meaning, a legitimate meaning could also be discerned. He further requested permission to accompany the manuscripts of the Commentary on the Sentences with the 41 propositions and his own Apology; it appears that this was granted him. Both Apologies are now known in their entirety, having been published by F. Stegmüller in Recherches de théol. anc. et méd., 7 (1935), fasc. 1 and 11. Nevertheless, a proper theological and philosophical study of G. di M. does not yet exist.
In fact, G. di M. falls into manifest and serious errors; if these do not all appear in the second Apology, this seems to be due to the fact that the judges did not wish to become too involved in philosophical questions, from which Clement VI had urged the University of Paris to keep its distance. In particular, regarding the relations between God and the human creature, G. di M. goes so far, in affirming God’s omnipotence, as to distort its meaning, involving God himself in the sinful action of man. Naturally, this theory entails disastrous consequences for the doctrine of Grace and Predestination. With regard to Christ as well, G. di M. went so far as to use expressions that in the second Apology could be summarized and condemned under the formula « Quod possibile est Christum secundum voluntatem creatam errasse et forte secundum hominem mendacium protulisse » (no. 12, cf. Rech. de théol. anc. et méd., 5 [1933], p. 196).
These and other errors were accompanied by philosophical doctrines that had already emerged in the Parisian milieu and that he now introduced into the theological field. The second Apology (no. 27) reports the condemned proposition: « Quod est probabile in lumine naturali non esse accidentia, sed omnem rem esse substantiam, et quod nisi esset fides, hoc esset ponendum vel probabiliter posset poni » (ibid., p. 201).
The same thought is reported in the first Apology under no. 43 (ibid., p. 66); under no. 44, another proposition is then given that deserves close attention because of the later developments of the errors contained in it: « Non est probatum demonstrative ex propositionibus per se notis et evidentibus, evidentia nobis reducta ad certitudinem primi principii, quod Deus sit, nec quod perfectissimum sit in entibus, sicut nec aliquid esse causam alterius, nec quin quaclibet res creata habeat causam, et causa illius causam et sic in infinitum, nec quin aliquid possit totaliter producere nobilius se, nec quin quocumque quod est possit produci nobilius ».
These serious assertions show that G. di M. called into question: 1) a demonstration of the existence of God and, more precisely, 2) the principle of causality; 3) its efficacy for the ascent to God.