Spencer, Herbert

SPENCER, HERBERT. - English philosopher, b. at Derby on 27 April 1820, d. at Brighton on 8 December 1903. Belonging to a cultured family, he received his complete education within it. At first a railway engineer, he left this occupation in 1845 to devote himself to study.

He made his debut as a writer on politics and economics (from 1848 to 1853 he was one of the editors of the Economist) and only

(from H. S., Autobiography, London 1901) SPENCER, HERBERT - Portrait.

in 1855 published his first philosophical work, Principles of sociology, which was followed by Progress, its law and cause (1857) and by the prospectus of his System of synthetic philosophy (A system of synthetic philosophy, Program [1860]), of which vol. I, First principles (1862; 6th ed. 1899) remains the fundamental document: the subsequent works (Principles of biology, 2 vols., 1864-67; 2nd ed. 1898; Principles of psychology, 2 vols., 1870-72; 5th ed. 1890; Principles of sociology, 4 vols., 1876-85; Principles of ethics, 4 vols., 1879-93; etc.) are an application of the principal theses contained in it. The Essays (2 vols., 1858-63) and the Autobiography (2 vols., 1904, posthumous) must also be kept in mind. S. is rightly considered the greatest thinker of English positivism (v.); yet, judged in itself, his thought lacks philosophical vigour, critical sense and speculative refinement. S.'s "optimism", his enthusiastic confidence in "progress", his dogmatic acceptance of "evolution" (v.) as a metaphysical principle and his scientism (v.) betray a deficiency of speculative aptitude and a critical naivety that have caused his vast and almost encyclopedic work to age prematurely and irremediably.

Evolution and progress are the two basic principles of Spencerian positivism: whatever the subject may be (the development of the earth or of society, that of industry or of literature, etc.), "the basis of every progress is the same evolution that proceeds from the simple to the complex through successive differentiations". "Metaphysical evolutionism", then, according to which evolution is a cosmic principle and the first cause of every progress. The "law of evolution" is the passage of matter from a state of "dispersion" to one of "integration" or "concentration"; the fundamental determination of the evolutionary process is "differentiation" or the passage "from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous". Evolution is, according to S., "an integration of matter and a concomitant dissipation of motion, during which the matter passes from an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to a definite, coherent heterogeneity and the retained motion undergoes a parallel transformation" (First principles, § 145). When evolution has reached its culmination, that is, the maximum of differentiation and the maximum of concentration, the opposite process of "dissolution" is brought about, which, however, does not trouble S.'s optimism, inasmuch as dissolution is the beginning of another evolution. The human evolutionary process leads to the realization of an ever greater harmony between man's spiritual nature and his conditions of life; and herein lie his perfection and his full happiness. But, for S., the principle of evolution is valid only for knowing and systematizing the phenomena of experience or the domain of the "knowable" or of science, beyond which lies the Unknowable, the domain of religion, the realm of inaccessible mystery, which we "ignore and shall ignore". S. adopts as his own the agnosticism (v.) of Hamilton (v.) and of Mansel (v.), derived from the Scottish school (v.), and uses it to indicate the point of encounter and reconciliation between religion and science. According to this theory, not only science but also religion stops before the mystery (before the Absolute, the Unconditioned); all religious beliefs (including Christianity) concerning the absolute say nothing that can be logically demonstrated and scientifically proved; there is a mysterious force, the cause of all phenomena, absolutely inconceivable to man, unknown alike to science and to religion. This mysterious force man can represent to himself only by means of symbols. These assertions of S. are evidently erroneous and superficial. While he proclaims God unknowable, he identifies Him with a force immanent in nature. The conclusion, moreover, that religion too, like science, comes to a halt before the Unknowable is founded on the presupposition, accepted a priori and dogmatically, of the impossibility of Revelation. Apart from this, the Spencerian doctrine is intrinsically inconsistent: if religion and science meet before the mystery of the Unknowable and both dispose of the same ways and the same means insufficient to penetrate it, the distinction between religious faith and scientific knowledge is annulled, that is, the distinction between the two realms of the "knowable" and the "unknowable". The problem of the encounter of religion with science then no longer has any meaning, given that the ways of the one are natural like those of the other; at most it is a question of two human ways of posing the problem of the Absolute, but in that case we no longer speak of religion, which is identified with a lower degree of human consciousness (that of ignorance), as opposed to the higher one of science, which at least knows the phenomenon. We are thus outside the concept of religion, which, for lack of religious experience, S. was unable to grasp in its authenticity.

Manifestations of the Unknowable are phenomena, the domain of science. The I and the non-I (subject and object) are "persistent" groupings of phenomena, conditioned effects of the unconditioned Cause; that is, although the relation between the Unknowable and phenomena is unknown, one may suppose a hypothetical correspondence (transfigured realism, cf. First princ., § 50). The difference between philosophy and science, for S., is only one of degree of unification: philosophy realizes a completely unified knowledge, science only a partially unified one. Where science stops, philosophy begins, not in the sense that the latter has an object and a method of its own, but in the other sense (which is a negation of the content and autonomy of philosophy) that, since this is knowledge in its highest degree of generality, it posits as its starting point the general principles (indestructibility of matter, continuity of motion, persistence of force) to which science has attained. Now these principles are founded on the law of evolution; therefore philosophy is merely a theory of evolution. At this point, nothing remained for S. but to apply dogmatically (and lumping together spirit and matter, God and nature, etc.) the evolutionary principle to the various sciences: biology, psychology, sociology, ethics, religion. And so the whole system is built on a hypothesis (evolution in Darwin's [v.] sense), which is demonstrated as true neither by science nor by philosophy.

Biology is the study of the evolution of organic phenomena: life consists in an ever more complete "adaptation" (through which the organs are formed and differentiated) of internal to external conditions; heredity preserves and accumulates individual organic changes. In man, consciousness too is a form of adaptation (S. admits an unknowable spiritual substance); reason likewise is a form of the evolutionary process. There are indeed a priori notions (independent of experience), but only for the individual, not for the species; they are the product of accumulated experience, transmitted by heredity. Sociology too is the study or description (and here S. departs from the sociology of Comte [v.]) of the evolutionary development of society; to fix the ideals or the that of fixing the ideals or goals of this development belongs to morality. S. maintains that social development must be left completely free, entrusted only to its spontaneous force, without interventions by the State (which does everything badly), without forcing evolution and anticipating it, which is to disturb and hinder it with grave consequences (social upheavals, wars, etc.). S. is for the defense of all individual liberties. The object of morality is human conduct which, in S.'s biological evolutionism, means the progressive adaptation of man to his conditions of life; therefore the best life is the one most suited to his conditions: the good is identified with pleasure (hedonism, utilitarianism [v.]). However, S. admits a sentiment of moral obligation (v.), which is such for the individual, not for the species; that is, it is the result of the evolutionary process, whereby coercion (which has been experienced as useful) becomes interior (autonomous) and not exterior. With evolution this sentiment of duty or moral obligation will disappear: "the highest actions, required for the harmonious development of life, will be as common as those inferior ones to which simple desire impels us" (The principles of ethics, § 46). At this stage of evolution the coincidence of the well-being of the individual with that of others produces the final accord between egoism and altruism. Pedagogy too (Education, intellectual, moral and physical, 1861; Essays on education, 1911, posthumous) is founded on the same principles. One must teach what is useful for realizing better conditions of life; the importance of knowledge is therefore given by the needs it satisfies according to their degree of urgency, and hence by needs relative to: 1) our preservation; 2) the rearing of children; 3) the maintenance of social order; 4) the leisure to be filled for the satisfaction of our tastes. The biological, psychological and social sciences satisfy the first three degrees of need; the fourth, satisfied by humanistic education, is a luxury and not a necessity. An assertion, this, that confirms S.'s scant sensitivity to the problems of the spirit.

Michele Federico Sciacca