SPENCER, HERBERT. — English philosopher, born in Derby on 27 April 1820, died in Brighton on 8 December 1903. Belonging to a cultivated family, he received his entire education within II. Initially a railway engineer, he abandoned this occupation in 1845 to devote himself to study.
He began as a writer on politics and economics (from 1848 to 1853 he was one of the editors of Economist) and only
(from H. S., Autobiography, London 1901) SPENCER, HERBERT — Portrait.
in 1855 published his first philosophical work, Principles of sociology, followed by Progress, its law and cause (1857) and the prospectus of his System of synthetic philosophy (A system of synthetic philosophy, Program [1860]), of which the first volume, First principles (1862; 6th ed. 1899), remains the fundamental document: the subsequent works (Principles of biology, 2 vols., 1864–67; 2nd ed. 1898; Principles of psychology, 2 vols., 1870–72; 5th ed. 1890; Principles of sociology, 4 vols., 1876–85; Principles of ethics, 4 vols., 1879–93; etc.) are an application of the principal theses contained in II. The Essays (2 vols., 1858–63) and the Autobiography (2 vols., 1904, posthumous) must also be kept in mind. S. is rightly considered positivism (v.); nevertheless, judged in itself, his thought lacks philosophical vigor, critical sense, and speculative refinement. S.’s “optimism,” his enthusiastic confidence in “progress,” his dogmatic acceptance of “evolution” (v.) as a metaphysical principle, scientism (v.) reveal a deficiency in speculative aptitude and a critical naiveté that caused his vast and almost encyclopedic work to age prematurely and irretrievably.
Evolution and progress are the two basic principles of Spencerian positivism: whatever the subject may be (the development of the earth or of society, that of industry or literature, etc.), “the foundation of all progress is the same evolution that proceeds from the simple to the complex through successive differentiations.” “Metaphysical evolutionism,” then, according to which evolution is a cosmic principle and the first cause of all progress. The “law of evolution” is the passage of matter from a state of “dispersion” to one of “integration” or “concentration”; the fundamental determination of the evolutionary process is “differentiation,” or the passage “from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous.” Evolution is, according to S., “an integration of matter and a concomitant dissipation of motion, during which matter passes from an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to a definite, coherent heterogeneity, and the retained motion undergoes a parallel transformation” (First principles, § 145). When evolution has reached its culmination, that is, the maximum of differentiation and the maximum of concentration, the opposite process of “dissolution” takes place; this, however, does not trouble S.’s optimism, since dissolution is the beginning of another evolution. The human evolutionary process leads to the realization of ever greater harmony between man’s spiritual nature and his conditions of life; and here lie its perfection and complete happiness. But, for S., the principle of evolution is valid only for knowing and systematizing the phenomena of experience, or the realm of the “knowable,” or science; beyond this lies the Unknowable, the domain of religion, the realm
of inaccessible mystery, which we “do not know and shall not know.” S. agnosticism (v.) of Hamilton (v.) Mansel (v.), Scottish school (v.), and uses it to indicate the point of encounter and reconciliation between religion and science. According to this theory, not only science but also religion stops before mystery (the Absolute, the Unconditioned); all religious beliefs (including Christianity) concerning the absolute say nothing that can be logically demonstrated or scientifically proved; there is a mysterious force, the cause of all phenomena, utterly inconceivable to man, unknown alike to science and religion. Man can represent this mysterious force only by means of symbols. These assertions of S. are evidently erroneous and superficial. While proclaiming God unknowable, he identifies him with a force immanent in nature. The conclusion, moreover, that religion, like science, stops before the Unknowable is based on the a priori, dogmatically accepted presupposition that Revelation is impossible. Quite apart from this, Spencerian doctrine is intrinsically inconsistent: if religion and science meet before the mystery of the Unknowable, and both possess the same paths and the same means, insufficient for penetrating it, the distinction between religious faith and scientific knowledge is abolished—that is, the distinction between the two realms of the “knowable” and the “unknowable.” The problem of religion’s encounter with science then no longer has any meaning, given that the paths of the one are natural just as those of the other; at most, they are two human ways of posing the problem of the Absolute. But in that case one is no longer speaking of religion, which is identified with a lower degree of human consciousness (that of ignorance), in contrast with the higher degree of science, which at least knows the phenomenon. One is thus outside the concept of religion, which, through lack of religious experience, S. was unable to grasp in its authenticity.
The phenomena, the domain of science, are manifestations of the Unknowable. The I and the non-I (subject and object) are “persistent” groupings of phenomena, conditioned effects of the unconditioned Cause; that is, although the relation between the Unknowable and phenomena is unknown, one may suppose a hypothetical correspondence (transfigured realism, cf. First princ., § 50). The difference between philosophy and science, for S., is merely a difference in the degree of unification: philosophy achieves completely unified knowledge, while science achieves only partial unification. Where science stops, philosophy begins—not in the sense that the latter has an object and method of its own, but in the other sense (which denies the content and autonomy of philosophy): since philosophy is knowledge at its highest degree of generality, it takes as its starting point the general principles (the indestructibility of matter, the continuity of motion, the persistence of force) to which science has arrived. Now these principles are founded on the law of evolution; therefore philosophy is merely the theory of evolution. At this point, S. had no alternative but to apply the evolutionary principle dogmatically (and by lumping together spirit and matter, God and nature, etc.) to the various sciences: biology, psychology, sociology, ethics, and religion. Thus the entire system is constructed upon a hypothesis (evolution in Darwin’s sense [v.]), which is shown to be true neither by science nor by philosophy.
Biology is the study of the evolution of organic phenomena: life consists in an increasingly complete “adaptation” (through which organs are formed and differentiated) of internal conditions to external ones; heredity preserves and accumulates individual organic changes. In man, consciousness too is a form of adaptation (S. admits an unknowable spiritual substance); reason likewise is a form of the evolutionary process. There are indeed a priori notions (independent of experience), but only for the individual, not for the species; they are products of accumulated experience, transmitted through heredity. Sociology too is the study or description (and here S. departs from Comte’s sociology [v.]) of the evolutionary development of society; to establish the ideals or the
the goals of this development belongs to morality. S. maintains that social development must be left completely free, entrusted solely to its spontaneous force, without interventions by the State (which does everything badly), without forcing evolution or anticipating it, which means disturbing and hindering it with serious consequences (social disturbances, wars, etc.). S. stands for the defense of all individual liberties. The object of morality is human conduct, which, in S.’s biological evolutionism, means the progressive adaptation of man to his conditions of life; therefore, the better life is that which is best adapted to his conditions: the good is identified with pleasure (hedonism, utilitarianism [v.]). Yet S. obligation (v.), which is such for the individual, not for the species; that is, it is the result of the evolutionary process, whereby coercion (which has proved useful) becomes internal (autonomous) rather than external. With evolution, this feeling of duty or moral obligation will disappear: «the highest actions, required for the harmonious development of life, will be as common as those lower actions to which mere desire now impels us» (The principles of ethics, § 46). At this stage of evolution, the coincidence of the welfare of the individual with that of others produces the final agreement between egoism and altruism. Education as well (Education, intellectual, moral and physical, 1861; Essays on education, 1911, posthumous) is founded on the same principles. One must teach what is useful for bringing about better conditions of life; the importance of knowledge is therefore determined by the needs it satisfies according to their degree of urgency, and consequently by needs relating: 1) to our preservation; 2) to the upbringing of children; 3) to the maintenance of social order; 4) to leisure to be filled for the satisfaction of our tastes. The biological, psychological, and social sciences satisfy the first three degrees of need; the fourth, satisfied by humanistic education, is a luxury and not a necessity. This assertion confirms S.’s limited sensitivity to the problems of the spirit.