CHRISTIAN SPIRITUALISM. - One of the main currents of contemporary Italian philosophy. It is called "s." because the concept of "spirit" (v.) is essential to it, just as it is essential to the actualism (v.) of Gentile (v.), from which almost all of its representatives come. But precisely the assumption of "spirit," in all its integrality, carries within itself the critique of actualism and of every immanentist idealism, insofar as spiritual activity is constituted by elements that drive its dynamism toward theistic-Christian transcendence (v.). Therefore Christian s. is still idealism, but not subjectivism (v.); it is a transcendentalist or objective idealism, of Platonic-Augustinian inspiration.
Above all it aims to be an integral conception of philosophy and of life, an integral and authentic humanism. A constructive movement, it appeals to traditional Christian philosophy with decided preference for that strand of it which runs from Augustine (v.) to Rosmini (v.). Christian s. therefore claims the original priority of spirit over the external world, of the transcendent and absolute Spirit which is God and of the finite spirit which is every man. Not, then, a movement of "reaction" but of critical deepening of the fundamental demands of modern and contemporary thought, of a critique pushed to the maximum of its possibilities, so as to unveil the authenticity of thought (v.) and the supreme destiny of man. From 1936 to 1943 its organ was the journal Logos; from 1946, the Giornale di metafisica, directed by Sciacca, to which are added the journal Filosofia, directed by A. Guzzo, and scientific collections.
The initiator of Christian s. may be considered Armando Carlini (b. 1898), formerly professor at the University of Pisa, who posed its problems and demands; but precisely because he is the initiator, he represents its initial moment, still too bound to transcendental idealism and above all to Kant (v.) and his concept of transcendentality. Hence Carlini finds himself constrained to be unable to escape the subjective moment of the demand and to resolve the problems of metaphysics (existence of God and immortality of the soul) by an act of faith. The stages of his speculative inquiry are marked by the works La vita dello spirito (Florence 1921); La religiosità dell'arte e della filosofia (ibid. 1934); Il mito del realismo (ibid. 1936); Lineamenti di una concezione realistica dello spirito umano (Rome 1942). Carlini, positing Gentile's act as act in itself, outside the subject-object relation and the logical dialecticism in which the act in itself remains imprisoned as a problem ("what each of us is for himself," La religiosità dell'arte, p. 103), holds that its solution requires, besides the critical attitude (philosophy), also the dogmatic one (religion), besides "thought," "faith." And in Kantian terms: the demand for the transcendence of God arises from the problem of the transcendental, no longer considered in relation to the world of cognitive experience, and therefore turned toward exteriority, but "considered in itself and for itself, in its interior life, as pure interiority. Thus there arises in Kant the spiritualistic problem, which is a moral and religious problem together" (Il mito, etc., p. 19). In the act of pure spirituality, that is, in the act which is consciousness of self, man not only finds the reason of the world of experience and of history, "but also finds the reason of that deeper and more original reality which alone gives value to the world of man, and is therefore transcendent even while immanent in the human act. This immanent transcendence thought can reach only if sustained and integrated by faith; and faith can reach it, respectful as it is of the value of man and his world, only if guided and integrated by thought" (ibid., pp. 49-51). The act of self-consciousness (v.) thus performs a twofold function: as transcendental, whereby it makes possible the world of historical experience, and as itself a problem of pure interiority, which can have a solution in an act of faith. Carlini has committed himself to a problem that has no hope of solution: to draw from Kantian-idealistic transcendentality, which is an a priori form whose validity is limited to experience, transcendence itself. Hence he is forced to renounce metaphysics and to "add" religious faith to his Kantian philosophy.
The "idealism" of Augusto Guzzo (b. 1894), professor at the University of Turin, is of more directly Platonic-Augustinian inspiration. Thought is insurmountable (hence idealism), but it is qualified thought: the thought of a world, the thought that contains or attests that a world is; hence an idealism that is the opposite of that which makes the world be "posited" by thought (Verità e realtà [Turin 1925]; Giudizio e azione [Venice 1928]). Thus three fundamental problems can be identified in Guzzo's s.: 1) nothing exists outside thought, but to know does not mean to nullify the object, rather to realize it; 2) spirit is essentially ethicality, but is guided by a universal and obligatory ideal which it is free to actualize or not; 3) this ideal is the truth in interiore homine, the voice of God that sounds in our conscience, which gives us existence and calls us to itself. Thus the three problems of knowledge, of morality, of religion are three aspects of the single problem which is spiritual reality in its determining itself, in its becoming and in its being (Idealismo e cristianesimo [2 vols., Naples 1936]; Sic vos non vobis [2 vols., ibid. 1939-40]; La filosofia domani [1943]; L'Io e la ragione [Brescia 1947]; Moralità [ibid. 1950]). For Guzzo the universal is in the particular, but does not identify itself with it: duty is in every dutiful action without resolving itself into it; the true "guides" inquiry, but is not "produced" by inquiry (truth is mater and not filia temporis). The true resides in individual true ideas, but none of these is the true, rather a true. This is "that aporia which is thought, which is not such without truth and is thought only if it is not itself the truth" (Idealismo e cristianesimo, I, p. 269). Now, if by idealism is meant that philosophy which resolves all reality into the act of thought and identifies the need for the Absolute with its total immanence in human experience, this idealism, which is anti-idealism and positivism, does not accord with Christianity. "If man is a need for the Absolute that expresses itself in an experience and therefore renews itself, in this need for the Absolute, man is not the Absolute... but is of the Absolute" (ibid., II, p. 255). Yet even in his latest works Guzzo still seems anchored to the principle of transcendentality, and to a moral demand (as well as to a voluntarism of Scotist-Cartesian origin: intelligibles are created by God ex decreto) which leave one perplexed about the possibility of critically grounding a metaphysics.
Felice Battaglia too (b. 1902), professor at the University of Bologna, has recently arrived, through a self-critique of idealism, at his own form of Christian s. (Il valore nella storia [Bologna 1948]; Il problema morale nell'esistenzialismo [2nd ed. ibid. 1949]). Once the idealistic itinerary is concluded, the logicism of spirit (Gentile), retraced in depth, appears to Battaglia as naturalism (La mia prospettiva filosofica [Padua 1950], p. 54). The logical cycle of idealism, like that of every immanentist philosophy, is human and only human, since for it philosophy is only worldliness and consciousness of worldliness.
But the finite and the worldly, absolutized by immanentist philosophies, do not weigh it down: the circle of the microcosm (v.) that compendiates and summarizes the macrocosm, and of the macrocosm that unfolds and displays the microcosm, whereby, in the final analysis, the natural cosmos matches the spirit and the spirit finds in the world its adequation, presents a fracture, an imbalance, that is, the inadequacy of the spirit to nature. Precisely because of this inadequacy one departs from naturalism (v.) and sets out toward the founding of spiritualism. Here then, within the very concept of spirit, the religious claim becomes legitimate. In Battaglia the passage from immanentist idealism to theistic spiritualism is given by the problem of value (v.), or rather of the spiritualistic justification of value, which B. recovers through the critique of the Crocean and Gentilean concept of history (v.). In order for value to escape death, it must flee « the immanence of a whole that is logicized and rationalized, impersonal and transcendental » (Il valore nella storia, cit., p. 149). Duality is internal to the act, which is inseparably consciousness of its own being and of its ought-to-be. Precisely by virtue of value, history acquires a meaning that transcends it: it is no longer for itself but for the other, for the personal and moral consciousness which, though realizing itself in history, refers to a radiating center of values, which is God or absolute Value.
"Christian idealism" and then "Christian spiritualism" and more recently "metaphysics of the person," with idealistic and existentialist (as well as Giobertian) influences, is how Luigi Stefanini (b. 1891), professor at the University of Padua, defined his philosophy. "Being is personal, and everything that is not personal in being falls within the productivity of the person, as a means of the person's manifestation and of communication between persons" (La mia prospettiva, etc., p. 205). Therefore the starting point for every demonstration is the experience I have of myself, insofar as the I is the primordial and central fact of experience. And the I is a person (v.). If one loses the sense of the primacy of spirit in the intimate experience of each individual, one never recovers it. "No metaphysics is constructed if its first chapter is not psychological" (ibid., p. 209). Evidently this is not a matter of subjectivism. In fact the person, who is not exhausted in sensible experience, becomes discourse, mediation, reason (v.). But one must avoid the danger that reason becomes a spectacle to itself, "reasoned reason" (an impersonal and constant logical procedure) that takes the place of "reasoning reason." Far more than "unity," the person is "uniqueness": an unrepeatable, unmistakable reality. But this uniqueness does not mean absoluteness: I persist, despite my finitude, in being, but I am not being. Of this metaphysics of the person Stefanini made extensive applications to aesthetics (v.), to the social problem, etc. (La metafisica dell'arte [Padua 1948]; La metafisica della persona [ibid. 1949]).
Neither Battaglia nor Stefanini, it seems, goes beyond the exigential and psychological motive, which is insufficient to ground a metaphysics (v.) and to give a truly philosophical answer. Therefore Sciacca, having gone beyond the exigential phase and that of transcendentality from which transcendence should be born (Linee di uno spiritualismo critico [Rome 1936]; Problemi di filosofia [ibid. 1940]), in his last theoretical writings (Filosofia e metafisica [Brescia 1949]; Intériorité objective [1951]), has attempted to recover, through a personal elaboration of Augustine and Rosmini and a deepening of Gentilian actualism within Christian spiritualism, the ontological moment (of being) and the intellectualistic one, convinced that anti-intellectualistic positions, purely exigential and fideistic, remain on the margins of the true problematic of Christian spiritualism, which works to constitute itself as a philosophy of spirit and a metaphysics of truth, and therefore on rational foundations, but of a reason grasped in the concreteness of the person and in the totality and integrality of the spiritual life.
Bibliography8 works
Michele Federico Sciacca