CULTURAL EVOLUTION. – A theory that interprets human-social events according to the laws of evolution.
Summary:
I. History
II. The concept of evolution
III. Un-sustainability of extreme e
IV. Origin of man. Mitigated e. – V. Difficulties in deriving man from the animal.I. History
In the course of the 19th century, ethnology developed (and in close connection with it also the history of religions) and became increasingly an independent science. Like the contemporary currents that dominated philosophy, sociology, and the natural sciences (H. Spencer, A. Comte, Ch. Darwin, etc.), it took a predominantly evolutionist direction. Therefore, peoples were a priori considered as primordial among humanity, those among whom there was found (or even simply supposed to exist) a “primordial communism,” “promiscuity,” group marriage, cannibalism, the killing of the old—especially old leaders—by the young, infanticide, human sacrifices and, in general, bloody sacrifices, excesses, and even sexual perversions. This method proved to be even more crude in the search for the origin of religion, origins that some thought to find in obscure feelings of anxiety and dream; others (M. Müller) in the cult of natural phenomena and celestial bodies; others (A. Comte, J. Lubbock) in fetishism; others (A. Spencer) in ancestor worship; others (E. B. Tylor) in animism; others (E. Durkheim, S. Freud, W. Robertson Smith) in totemism; others, finally (more or less K. Th. Preuss, A. Vierkandt, etc., though otherwise deserving), in magic and belief in a universal magical force, the so-called preanimism. This last thesis, which is not yet dead today, was developed especially by the French sociological school of Durkheim. In opposition to all these evolutionist constructions, many representatives of ethnological science, especially from the beginning of the 20th century onward, strove to determine the groups of cultural phenomena both chronologically and, as far as possible, in their reciprocal causal connections, thereby providing the researcher with the means to objectively establish which ethnological data are ancient and which are recent. Primitiveness, external simplicity, and bestial savagery may be secondary elements. Thus, the method—once so favored—of systematizing the phenomena observed among primitive peoples into ascending or descending developmental series according to their degree of perfection, in which series there was no guarantee that the individual parts occupied the position corresponding to their objectively ascertained historical age, collapsed. Thus, it was concluded that evolutionary schemes have become unsustainable.II. THE CONCEPT OF EVOLUTION
The idea of evolution is proper to the historical field; with it, one intends to understand important human-social events in their causal connection. This idea is in opposition to that of regular organic-natural evolution, which dominates especially in the biological field. What is indicated by the idea of evolution in one and the other case is completely different, as, for example, has been clearly recognized even by the biologist and zoologist Adolf Portmann of Basel. In this sense, he rightly says: “Dominated by this idea of evolution, a conception of progress based on biology has been affirmed. The transfer of the concept of evolution from the field of organic evolution to that of historically manifested human activities is an error that has led to the most questionable generalizations and hasty conclusions.” Now, when the idea of evolution is applied not only to the purely organic and natural world but also to that of human history, explicitly or implicitly excluding a higher extramundane Principle, one has the “extreme” form. Opposed to this is the “mitigated” form, which recognizes the human and historical spiritual world as distinct from the organic-natural world, and thus also evolution, insofar as it may be considered possible or already demonstrated in the organic-natural field, but not as independent of the power and will of a higher extramundane creative Principle. The followers of the “mitigated” form, among whom there are also Christians and Catholics, would admit in this sense, for example, the origin of the human body from the animal kingdom. But more on this below.III. UNSUSTAINABILITY OF EXTREME EVOLUTIONISM
1. The psychological foundation for the supposed initial animal-like nature of human spiritual activity was mainly devised by Lévy-Bruhl with his theory of the “prelogical” or “magical” thought of primitive man. By this is meant a stage in which man was not yet capable of conceiving causal relations. But in affirming this, one has not asked how such a man could have invented even the most primitive work tool. Indeed, one may ask how he could have overcome this stage with logical thought, given that psychologically there is no passage from one to the other. On the other hand, “prelogical” or “magical” thought can also be observed today in the superstitious ideas and actions of even the same primitive men, who, however, certainly think logically. The theoretical constructions of the “armchair stage” of Lévy-Bruhl have been rejected by all leading ethnologists and field researchers, such as Boas, von Nordenskiöld, Preuss, Sternberg, Lowie, Kroeber, etc. The most interesting concluding act was finally provided by Lévy-Bruhl himself, who in 1938 entirely retracted his theory of the prelogical mentality of primitives. If, therefore, there is a result of the new ethnology that is established with absolute and universal certainty, it is precisely this: that the present-day primitive man, whatever his racial and physical aspect, is spiritually a perfectly human man. Furthermore, we note here that all the languages spoken by present-day primitives clearly demonstrate in them the existence of full spiritual capacity. Ethnologically, therefore, it is impossible for the “extreme” form to demonstrate the absence of spirit in primordial man. Now the question arises: what can prehistory say in this regard?2. Prehistoric Man
Prehistorians (cf. G. Kraft) emphatically stress the fact that, from a cultural and spiritual standpoint, man and beast are separated from one another by a deep and insurmountable abyss. The indisputable evidence offered to the scholar here consists mainly in the implements of work, which are not—as was once falsely believed and maintained—a mere projection and imitation of organs, but something specifically human-spiritual, lacking in beasts. The capacity of primitive man (as indeed of any man) manifested in this consists in the ability to know causes and to form general ideas. The implements of work created by man on the basis of this capacity have existed from the very beginning, that is, from the start of the Flood. They are perfect in their kind from the very beginning; the recent Paleolithic period has introduced no essential changes. Today we know of no pre-implements, nor pre-language, pre-art, etc., and still less of pre-men. Thus, prehistory, in full agreement with ethnology, acknowledges only fully and truly human beings from the very beginning. It is clear that all forms of the “extreme” are thereby excluded. That even leading scholars of physical anthropology (Fr. Weidenreich, W. E. Le Gros Clark, J. Weninger) are beginning to yield to these compelling arguments is shown by the fact that, in cases where skeletal remains do not permit a clear conclusion as to whether they are human or not, they likewise appeal to cultural objects as the decisive factor, as, for example, in the discovery of the “Australopithecus” of South Africa. This enables the scholar, whether prehistorian or ethnologist, to decide with certainty in individual cases whether he is dealing with a truly and fully human being. On the basis of all this, one may well consider a rather controversial chapter in the study of primitive man as definitively clarified and defined. It is certainly significant that it has concluded by unequivocally and clearly recognizing the spiritual as the criterion of distinction even for the earliest man accessible to scientific investigation.
3. The Origin of the Family
That humanity did not begin with promiscuity or group marriages, but with normal monogamous family unions, has for decades been an almost universally held conviction among experts. Yet every ethnologist knows that, despite this, the ultimate secrets surrounding the beginning and subsequent development of the family and society are by no means fully uncovered or explained. First of all, there is the problem of exogamy, that is, the problem of the individual’s behavior in choosing a spouse, a choice that demands particular attention. Since exogamy, consistently carried through, leads not only beyond the purely natural-human but certainly and clearly also to something above and outside the world—a fact that, of course, cannot be reconciled with mere usage. When one considers the various forms of exogamy found in the life of peoples, one soon perceives that they fall into two main opposing groups. On the one hand, there is that form of exogamy which is based on the principle of kinship, primarily, as is natural, that of direct blood relationship. This is all the more easily comprehensible in that it perfectly corresponds to our European concepts and customs. On the other hand, there are forms of exogamy by virtue of which entire groups (clans, classes, tribes) are obliged not to marry within these groups but to seek a spouse in another clan (totemic), another class, etc. Here too the prohibition of marriage between relatives obtains, but beyond this there is the more or less artificial law of clan, class, or tribal exogamy. Since there is no longer any doubt that these latter forms of exogamy are of later origin and therefore secondary, they do not concern us further in this study.
Naturally, the question arises: How did primitive humanity arrive at this strict prohibition of marriage between blood relatives, so deeply rooted? Was it perhaps from practical experience that marriages between blood relatives (incest) lead to harmful consequences? This is highly unlikely. For all (one need only consider) this in light of the fundamental unitary concept of exogamy? It indicates that humanity, still in its original homogeneity, introduced these marriage prohibitions. If this had occurred at a later period, then the great uniformity of the fundamental exogamic laws would remain unexplained. There would have had to be peoples who knew no marriage prohibitions at all. But it is well known that this is not the case.
The problem thus remains: How did men from the very beginning arrive at these marriage prohibitions? Various scholars have occasionally suggested that among brothers, or indeed among young people who have grown up together from earliest childhood, the impulses leading to passionate love or marriage generally do not develop at all, or at least only with great difficulty. This could explain the custom, usage, and finally the law of not marrying blood relatives, and primarily brothers. This theory is undoubtedly very attractive. But it is uncertain whether it applies only to persons of the same generation. It does not, or does not sufficiently, explain the aversion to marriage between relatives of descending lines, particularly between parents and children, which is everywhere one of the most deeply rooted aversions. Here too the elements brought forward by this theory may be relevant; indeed, the lack of impulse may in general be even stronger because of the difference in age. But one cannot deny that other forces are at work here, namely ethical ones. Precisely the circumstance that parents wish to maintain their authority over their children prevents them from contracting marriages with them; and precisely the reverential fear felt by children toward their parents prevents the thought of such a bond from arising in them. This appeal to the ethical motive is undoubtedly not only correct but also important. Yet one immediately asks: How did the first men arrive at this ethical motive?
Present-day ethnologically primitive peoples, among whom the initial and primordial elements are in any case relatively better preserved, have no doubts on this point. Like many other things, they believe that they have been instructed and obliged (directly or indirectly) by the Supreme Being in this matter as well. Just as they recognize in the Supreme God the origin of their moral duties, so they do in the present case. Clearly and precisely in this sense, for example, among the primitive Semang of the Malay Peninsula, it is said: “The sin of Karè,” that is, sin against (the Supreme God) Karè, whether the sin be for incest or for adultery.
Thus, the law of exogamy, geographically and temporally universal, ultimately leads into fields that certainly have to do with man and the vicissitudes of the human family and community, but that also lead into regions originally extra-human, or rather above man. The ethical motive that has appeared from the beginning in the marriage prohibitions makes visible and tangible a bond with a higher world, before which all attempts at explanation of the “extreme” must fail.
4. That the so-called ethnologically primitive and oldest peoples generally possess a relatively clear and vivid faith in a Supreme Being is demonstrated by W. Schmidt in the first six volumes of his major work: *The Origin of the Idea of God* (*Der Ursprung der Gottesidee*). The primitive peoples in question here are chiefly the Fuegians, certain primitive tribes of California as well as of North America and the Altai, and, in addition, certain groups of peoples from southeastern Australia, and finally the Pygmy peoples of Central Africa and Southeast Asia. The thorough comparative research has led to the conclusion that in the religion of all these primitive peoples a significant number of fundamental concordant elements come to light, such as the unity, the name, the nature, the dwelling, and the attributes of the Supreme Being, etc. The historian, who thinks and works historically, from this state of affairs jointly concludes that these concordant characteristics must already have existed before the separation and dispersion of these primitive peoples into the various parts of the world. For if one were to suppose that the ethnologically primitive and oldest peoples had later acquired and accepted this religious knowledge, such a supposition would run counter to serious difficulties. If they had received it later from neighboring peoples who were culturally more advanced, one would have to suppose that these latter possessed in a corresponding form the knowledge of the Supreme Being; but, as is well known to every expert, this cannot be admitted, because no one gives what they do not have. But if the groups of ethnologically primitive and oldest peoples arrived at the complex of knowledge regarding the Supreme Being only after their separation, and that is, on the basis of an independent mental process, then, since this complex of knowledge is profoundly unitary, it would be difficult or impossible to explain precisely this uniformity. Therefore, nothing remains but to admit, as the only truly satisfactory explanation, that before the separation and dispersion of the primitive and oldest peoples there existed a common spiritual heritage regarding the knowledge of the Supreme Being. It is clear, moreover, that in this way research, first and foremost with regard to this knowledge of the Supreme Being, penetrates ever deeper into time, indeed it extends more or less into the various primordial ages of man.
Here, naturally, the question arises: whence this primitive belief in God? It is clear that these primitives did not create or conceive it themselves. Nor do they say this of their ancestors. Indeed, of these they say that they received from them the tradition of a belief in a Supreme God, as of so many other things. But how did those ancestors arrive at it in their turn? Here recourse to the concept of causality is sufficient, on the basis of which even the most ancient men could arrive at the knowledge of an author of the universe, of a highest Lord. Creator? The currently known state of affairs indeed indicates that among the most primitive and oldest representatives of humanity, alongside the conception of causality and the natural deductions from the totality of the facts of the world to a Supreme and good Being, there may also have been and have influenced something else. What else can this something be, if not some personal revelation of God to men? Research has only recently begun to concern itself with these matters. It cannot be excluded that in this way the fact of a primordial revelation of God to men may be, if not assured, at least rendered plausible. That here the ethical element, already ascertained above for the primordial human family, must be added is clear. And this applies all the more in relation to the complex of the Paradise and original sin, to which attention must now be turned.
3. In close connection with the complex of knowledge about the Supreme Being stands the most ancient and widespread tradition of Paradise and original sin. Here we are dealing with a characteristic account given by humanity of its earliest beginnings and most ancient discoveries, which as such has hitherto been known and evaluated in a wholly insufficient manner. However numerous the variants may be in individual cases, certain fundamental elements are always found. These are chiefly the following: God made men (the first human pair) and placed them in the world (directly or indirectly, i.e., through an intermediary being) as perfect men. God instructed them (directly or indirectly) not only in religious matters but also in secular ones. The nearness of God distinguished the primordial age; justice and peace reigned; men were to live forever and not die. This beautiful "primordial paradisiacal" time (the golden age) came to an end through the transgression of a commandment given by God, which, according to the tradition of some peoples, is sometimes represented as an error, a misunderstanding, or some similar event. All the traditions, considered as a whole, leave no doubt that physical evil in the world is regarded as a consequence of a previous moral evil, of an ethical failing. It is generally admitted that with this event a life of hardship began; death also came upon men, and the Divinity, without entirely abandoning men, withdrew in anger. In a particularly characteristic form this tradition of the primordial condition of man is found among the Pygmy tribes of Central Africa, who certainly represent the oldest human and cultural stratum of Africa. Moreover, this tradition, as has already been said, is truly widespread throughout the world. That these accounts, in their essential points, agree with those of Genesis, as is easy to see, needs no special explanation. The traditional narratives of the other peoples of the earth cannot simply be derived from those of the Bible. It is rather the truth that all the traditions that refer to it, including the biblical ones, essentially go back to a much older common source. Now, what does this datum of the tradition regarding the primordial condition of man, regarding the doctrine of Paradise and original sin, mean for the historian?
Faced with the fact that this complex of knowledge has achieved such universal diffusion, and that, indeed, it is found among ethnologically primitive and oldest peoples mostly with particular characteristics (such as, for example, the prominence given to the pair of first men, their formation by the creating God, moral evil, sin as the effective cause of the origin of physical evil, etc.), there can be no other satisfactory explanation for the historian than to admit that this complex of beliefs actually goes back to the most ancient times of man.
Naturally the historian does not stop here, but poses another question: how did such a complex of beliefs arise among the ancients, indeed the most ancient men? Were these the product of human reflection, of his imagination? Or are they founded on historical facts?
There are no other possible explanations. Human common sense (and the historian is after all only a man, who, because of his methodological training, should be characterized by a double dose of common sense) cannot be satisfied except by the second part of the alternative posed. It is significant in this regard that even those scholars who, like J. Feldmann, F. Hellmich, J. de Vuijpens, have in the past concerned themselves in a particular way with these traditions of the peoples regarding the primordial state of man, could admit no other possible satisfactory explanation than that which sees in them previous historical facts.
IV. ORIGIN OF MANKIND. E. Mitigated. — 1. By far the prevailing idea, especially among ethnologically primitive and ancient peoples, is that a great God, conceived as a person, created humanity (the human pair) and gave it a perfectly human existence. The first men are truly real men, not only in their physical-spiritual aspect, but also in their religious significance. This great God is conceived, both before and after the Fall into sin, as a power at the center of their lives and destiny, one who transcends and dominates all things. Traces or indications of any possible pre-religious or proto-religious phase are entirely absent, especially among the most ancient ethnologically primitive peoples.
2. The derivation of man from animals does not appear in any place, particularly among the most primitive peoples. On the contrary, in several cases it is even said that in those most ancient times (of catastrophe) men became animals. Thus in Africa, a fact already noted by Baumann, men were transformed into monkeys. Hence, if one wishes, a kind of inverted Darwinism.
3. It is clear, therefore, that on the basis of all this, in light of ethnological research on primordial times, the theories of the animal origin of man cannot be admitted. The traditions concerning the earliest times, of which we speak, are unequivocally based on a theistic world-conception (Weltanschauung). The conception of a supreme, personal God reveals itself as both the efficient and final cause, the end being the goal of all history, especially human history. To attempt here to explain the universe and man in an act-materialistic or even pantheistic-monistic sense is absolutely impossible. Whoever, therefore, adopts this sense of the human being in an effort to explain the origin of man cannot in any way appeal to the beliefs and ideas of the most ancient humanity.
4. But how is one to judge the legacy that, as has been said, would admit the origin of the human body from the animal kingdom? We respond that in this regard the materials of ethnological and religious-historical research are neither for nor against. In a negative sense, one might explain the fact that the supreme God among ethnologically primitive and ancient peoples (Baumann refers particularly to the ancient Pygmy stratum of Africa) is often expressly presented as the shaper and fashioner even of the bodies of the first men. But the question remains (as in the corresponding passage of Genesis) whether this is to be understood literally. Certainly, the Creator is not to be imagined as a potter, as St. Augustine rightly emphasized. If, therefore, one admits a personal creator God as the most ancient ethnologically primitive peoples do, then one must also admit, as a consequence, that all things were created ex nihilo by Him. This applies also to the body of man, though it remains entirely indifferent whether the creating God, in creating, made a completely new creation or used an animal body as pre-existent matter (materia praeexistens). In this particular question, ethnological research on primitive times cannot pronounce decisively, nor can the Bible. Indeed, it agrees with the well-known fact that ecclesiastical authority leaves the question open, for, understood in this way, it does not constitute a religious question but a scientific one.
To say that ecclesiastical authority leaves freedom in the question of the origin of the human body from animals does not mean in any way that this origin of the human body from animals is a scientifically demonstrated fact. This, according to the conviction of Koppers, is not the case even today, although some scholars, even Catholics, believe they can or must uphold the contrary view. It can be convincingly demonstrated that, according to the present state of research, even in this special problem a relative reserve of judgment (non licet) is appropriate from a scientific point of view, and not the opposite.
V. DIFFICULTIES OF THE DERIVATION OF MAN FROM ANIMALS
In light of present-day research, there are serious difficulties in admitting that man is bodily derived from animals. From the standpoint of biology, the difficulties are of a twofold nature. It is certainly true that in the geological strata, which succeed one another, the forms of life appear ever new and more perfect. But in general it cannot be observed how the more recent forms depend on the ancient ones. It is true that their genetic dependence is asserted, but generally this is a hypothesis, not yet a scientifically demonstrated truth. The mutations, e.g., of Drosophila, obtained in the laboratory, render evolution understandable to a certain extent. It must not be forgotten, moreover, that these concern exclusively microevolution, i.e., the development of microscopic organisms; whereas macroevolution or the development of large organisms, those which the history of the earth seems to show, are by no means satisfactorily explained. This applies even less to the supposed singular macroevolution from animal to man. A possible derivation of the human body from the animal kingdom encounters, moreover, great difficulties in that man, even in his body, appears from the very beginning to be absolutely characterized by spirit. Biologists who have studied the question more deeply declare that if one were to admit the derivation of the human body from that of animals, a complementary hypothesis would be necessary. One could not arrive at the formation of man simply by infusing a human soul into an animal body, however highly developed, in place of the animal soul. The entry of the human spirit into such a body would absolutely have required fundamental transformations even from a purely corporeal point of view. Likewise, the assertion that paleoanthropological findings speak more or less clearly of a derivation of the human body from that of animals encounters, in light of the most recent research, difficulties that must be taken seriously. Similarly, the anthropological theory of the three stages in the evolution of man, i.e., from *anthropos* to Neanderthal and to *sapiens*, has been strongly shaken by finds of *Homo sapiens* from the early and middle Pleistocene, finds from particular excavations made in the last fifteen years. Indeed, it appears completely called into question if, as seems very plausible, the "historical" explanation proposed by A. Portmann and others represents an essential interpretation.**Fig. 1.** Episcopal mitre (15th century).
**Title.** Episcopal mitre (15th century).
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**Tit