CULTURAL EVOLUTIONISM. — A theory that interprets human and social events according to the laws of evolution.
SUMMARY:
I. History
II. The concept of evolution
III. The untenability of extreme e
IV. The origin of man. Moderate e. — V. animal.I. HISTORY
In the course of the nineteenth century, ethnology developed (and, in close connection with it, the history of religions as well) and became increasingly an independent science. Like the contemporary currents that dominated philosophy, sociology, and the natural sciences (H. Spencer, A. Comte, Ch. Darwin, etc.), it had a predominantly evolutionist orientation. Thus, those peoples among whom “primitive communism,” “promiscuity,” group marriage, cannibalism, the killing of the old—especially elderly chiefs—by the young, infanticide, human sacrifice and, generally, bloody sacrifices, sexual excesses and even sexual perversions were found (or whose existence was simply presumed) were regarded a priori as the primordial peoples of humanity. This method appeared much cruder in the investigation of the origin of religion, an origin that some thought they found in obscure feelings of anguish and dream; others (M. Müller), in the worship of natural phenomena and heavenly bodies; others (A. Comte, J. Lubbock), in fetishism; others (A. Spencer), in the worshipof ancestors; others (E. B. Tylor), in animism; others (E. Durkheim, S. Freud, W. Robertson Smith), in totemism; and finally others (more or less K. Th. Preuss, A. Vierkand, etc., though otherwise deserving of merit), in magic and belief in a universal magical force, in what is called preanimism. This last thesis, which has not yet disappeared even today, was developed especially by the French sociological school of Durkheim. In opposition to all these evolutionist constructions, many representatives of ethnological science, especially from the beginning of the twentieth century onward, endeavored and continue to endeavor to determine the groups of cultural phenomena both chronologically and, insofar as possible, in their reciprocal causal connections, thereby giving the researcher the means to establish objectively which ethnological data are ancient and which recent. Primitiveness, outward simplicity, and bestial savagery may also be secondary elements. Consequently, the method—once so greatly favored—of systematizing the phenomena observed among natural peoples into ascending or descending developmental series according to their degree of perfection falls away; in these series there was no guarantee that their individual parts occupied the place belonging to them according to their objectively established historical age. Thus it became certain that evolutionist schemes had become untenable.
II. THE CONCEPT OF EVOLUTION
The idea of evolution properly belongs to the historical field; through it, important human and social events are and have been understood in their causal interconnection. This idea is opposed to that of regular organic-natural evolution, which predominates especially in the biological field. What is indicated by the idea of evolution in the one case and the other is completely different, as, for example, was also clearly recognized by the Basel biologist and zoologist Adolfo Portmann. In this sense he rightly says: «Under the dominance of this idea of evolution, a conception of progress based on biology was affirmed. Transferring the concept of evolution from the field of the organic evolution of man to that of historically manifested activities was an error that led to the most questionable generalizations and hasty conclusions». Now, when the idea of evolution is taken to include not only the purely organic and natural world but also that of human history, while explicitly or implicitly excluding a superior extramundane Principle, one has extreme e. Opposed to this is mitigated e., which recognizes the spiritual and historical human world as standing on its own in relation to the organic-natural world, and likewise recognizes evolution, insofar as it may be regarded as possible or already actually demonstrated in the organic-natural field, but not as independent of the power and will of an extramundane creative Principle. The followers of mitigated e., among whom there are also Christians and Catholics, would in this sense admit, for example, the origin of the human body from the animal kingdom. On this, see below.III. UNSUSTAINABILITY OF EXTREME E
1. The psychological foundation for the supposed animal-like beginnings of man’s spiritual activity was devised chiefly by Levy-Bruhl with his theory of the “prelogical” or “alogical” thought of primitive man. By this was meant a stage in which man was not yet capable of conceiving causal relationships. But in asserting this, no one asked how such a man could then have invented even the most primitive tool. Indeed, one may ask how he could have overcome this stage through logical thought, given that psychologically there is no transition from one to the other. On the other hand, “prelogical” or “magical” thought can still be observed today in the superstitious ideas and actions of primitive men themselves, who, for the rest, certainly think logically. The theoretical constructions of the “armchair scholar” Levy-Bruhl were rejected by all the principal ethnologists and by the scholarly explorers, such as Boas, von Nordenskiöld, Preuss, Sternberg, Lowie, Kroeber, etc. The most interesting concluding act was finally provided by Levy-Bruhl himself, because in 1938 he entirely retracted his theory of the prelogical mentality of primitive peoples. If, therefore, there is a result of the new ethnology that has been established with absolute and universal certainty, it is precisely this: that present-day primitive man, whatever his racial and physical characteristics, is spiritually a perfectly human being. Moreover, we note here that all the languages spoken by present-day primitive peoples clearly demonstrate in them the existence of a full spiritual capacity. Ethnologically, therefore, it is impossible for extreme e. to demonstrate the “absence of spirit” in primordial man. The question now arises: what can prehistory say about this?2. Prehistorians (cf. G. Kraft) emphasize with all due force the fact that, in every case, from the cultural and spiritual point of view, man and beast are separated from one another by a deep and insurmountable abyss. The indisputable evidence available to the scholar here consists chiefly of tools, which are not, as was once falsely believed and maintained, a mere projection and imitation of organs, but something specifically human and spiritual, lacking in animals. The capacity of primitive man (as of any man generally) manifested in this consists in the possibility of causal knowledge and of conceiving general ideas. The tools created by man on the basis of this capacity have existed from the beginning, that is, from the beginning of the Flood. They were perfect in their kind from the outset; the later Paleolithic changed nothing essential in them. Today we know neither pre-tools, nor, similarly, pre-language, pre-art, etc., and still less pre-men. Thus prehistory too, in full agreement with ethnology, knows only man who is fully and truly human, and this from the beginning. It is clear that all forms of extreme e. are thereby excluded. That even the principal scholars of physical anthropology (Fr. Weidenreich, W. E. Le Gros Clack, J. Weninger) are beginning to yield to these convincing arguments is demonstrated by the fact that, in cases where skeletal remains do not permit a clear conclusion as to whether or not the specimen in question was a man, they likewise appeal to cultural objects as the decisive factor, as, for example, in the discovery of the australopithecine of South Africa. This enables the scholar, whether a prehistorian or an ethnologist, to determine with certainty whether in the individual case the subject was truly and fully human. On the basis of all this, one may certainly regard as definitively clarified and defined a much-discussed chapter in the investigation of primitive man. It is certainly significant that it has ended by unequivocally and clearly recognizing the spiritual as a criterion of distinction also for primordial man accessible to us scientifically.
3. That humanity did not begin with promiscuity or group marriages, but with normal monogamous family unions, has for decades become an almost general conviction among competent scholars. But every ethnosociologist knows that, despite this, the final secrets surrounding the beginning and subsequent development of the family and the community have in no way been fully uncovered and explained. First of all, there is the problem of exogamy, that is, the problem of the individual’s conduct with regard to the choice of a spouse, a choice that requires particular attention. Since this exogamy, when followed and considered to its ultimate consequences, leads not only beyond the-
purely natural-human, but certainly and clearly also leads to something that is above and beyond the world, a fact which, naturally, cannot be reconciled with extreme e. Considering the various forms of exogamy existing in the life of peoples, one immediately realizes that they are divided into two principal, opposing groups. On the one hand there is that form of exogamy based primarily on the principle of kinship, and naturally first of all on direct blood relationship. It is all the more easily understood because it corresponds perfectly to our European conceptions and customs. On the other hand, there are forms of exogamy by virtue of which entire groups (clon, classes, stocks) are required not to marry within these groups, but instead to seek a spouse in another clon (systemic group), another class, and so forth. Here too the prohibition of marriage between relatives exists, but beyond this there applies the more or less artificial law of exogamy by clon, class, or stock. Since it has long been beyond doubt that these latter forms of exogamy are of later and therefore secondary origin, they are of no further interest in the present study. Naturally, the question arises here: “How did primitive humanity arrive at this deeply rooted, strict prohibition of marriage between blood relatives?” Perhaps through practical experience that marriages between blood relatives (incest) lead to harmful consequences? This is very unlikely. For everything (and here one should especially consider the fundamental unitary concept of exogamy) indicates that humanity, still in its original homogeneity, introduced these matrimonial prohibitions. If this had occurred at a later period, the great uniformity of the fundamental exogamous laws would remain unexplained. Indeed, there should also have been peoples who knew no matrimonial prohibitions at all. But it is well known that this is not the case. The problem therefore remains: how did human beings, already at the very beginning, arrive at these matrimonial prohibitions? Various scholars have occasionally pointed out that among siblings, or more generally among young people who have grown up together from the earliest age, the impulses leading to amorous passion or marriage generally do not develop at all, or develop only with great difficulty. This could explain the custom, practice, and finally the law forbidding consanguineous persons—primarily siblings—to marry. This theory is undoubtedly very attractive. But it overlooks the fact that it applies only to persons of the same generation. It does not explain, or does not sufficiently explain, the fear of marriage between relatives in the descending line, particularly between parents and children, which is certainly everywhere one of the most deeply rooted aversions. Here too, the elements advanced by this theory may be operative; indeed, the absence of impulse may generally be even stronger because of the difference in age. But it cannot be denied that other forces also influence the matter, namely forces of an ethical nature. Precisely the circumstance that parents wish to maintain their authority before their children prevents them from forming matrimonial bonds with them; and precisely the reverential fear felt by children toward their parents prevents the thought of a matrimonial bond from arising in them. This appeal to the ethical motive is undoubtedly not only correct but also important. Yet one immediately asks: How did the first human beings arrive at this ethical motive? The present-day ethnolinguistically primitive peoples, among whom the original and primordial elements are in any case relatively better preserved, generally have no doubt on this point. They believe that, as in many other matters, so also in this one, they were instructed and obliged (directly or indirectly) by the Supreme Being. Just as they universally recognize the supreme God as the origin of their moral duties, so they do in the present case as well. Clearly and precisely in this sense, for example, among the primitive Semang, inhabitants of the Malay Peninsula, one says: Lavoid Karè, that is, sin against (the supreme God) Karè, when someone sins both through incest and through adultery. Thus the law of exogamy among blood relatives, a law universally valid geographically and temporally, ultimately leads into fields that certainly concern human beings and the vicissitudes of human families and communities, but that also lead into regions originally extrahuman, or rather above humanity. The ethical motive, present from the beginning in matrimonial prohibitions, makes visible and tangible a connection with a higher world, before which all attempts to explain extreme e. must fail.
4. That peoples called ethnolinguistically primitive and ancient generally possess their own relatively clear and living faith in a Supreme Being is demonstrated by W. Schmidt in the first six volumes of his great work «L'origine dell'idea di Dio» (Der Ursprung der Gottesidee). The primitive peoples in question here are principally the Fucgrini, certain primitive stocks of California as well as of North America and the Arctic, and, moreover, certain groups of peoples of south-eastern Australia, and finally the nazi peoples (the Pigneti) of Central Africa and south-eastern Asia. In-depth comparative research has led to the conclusion that in the religion of all these primitive peoples a significant number of concordant fundamental elements come to light, such as the unity, name, nature, dwelling, and attributes of the Supreme Being, etc. The scholar who thinks and works historically rightly concludes from this state of affairs that these concordant characteristics must already have existed before the separation and dispersal of these primitive peoples throughout the various parts of the world. For if one wished to suppose that the ethnolinguistically primitive and ancient peoples had acquired and accepted these religious notions only later, such a supposition would encounter serious difficulties. If they had received them later from neighboring peoples who were culturally more advanced, one would have to suppose that these possessed knowledge of the Supreme Being in a corresponding form; but, as is known to every competent scholar, this cannot be admitted, because no one gives what he does not have. But if the ethnolinguistically primitive and ancient groups of peoples attained the complex of knowledge concerning the Supreme Being only after their separation, that is, through an independent mental process, then, since this complex of knowledge is profoundly unitary, it would be difficult or impossible to explain precisely this uniformity. Therefore nothing remains except to admit, as the only genuinely satisfactory explanation, that before the separation and dispersal of the primitive and ancient peoples there existed a common spiritual patrimony concerning knowledge of the Supreme Being. It is clear, moreover, that in this way research itself reaches, first of all with regard to this knowledge of the Supreme Being, ever greater depths of time; indeed, it extends more or less into the various primordial periods of humanity.
Here too, naturally, the question arises: whence this primitive belief in God? Clearly, those primitive peoples did not create or conceive it by themselves. Nor do they say this of their ancestors. Indeed, they say of the latter that they received from them the tradition of a belief in a supreme God, as they received so many other things. But how did those ancestors, in their turn, arrive at it? Is it sufficient here to appeal to the concept of causality, on the basis of which even the most ancient men could arrive by themselves at knowledge of an author of the universe, of a most high Lord and Creator? The situation of things as it is currently known indicates, in fact, that among the most primitive and ancient representatives of humanity, alongside the conception of causality and the natural deductions from the totality of the facts of the world to a supreme and good Being, there may also have been some other influence. What else could this have been, if not some personal Revelation of God to men? Research has only recently begun to concern itself with these matters. It cannot be ruled out that in this way the fact of a primordial revelation of God to men may, if not be established,
at least be rendered probable. That the ethical element, already established above for the primordial human family, must be added here is clear. This is even more true in relation to the complex of Paradise and original sin, to which attention must now be directed.
5. Closely connected with the complex of beliefs concerning the Supreme Being is the most ancient and widespread tradition of Paradise and original sin. Here we are dealing with a characteristic account, given by humanity, of its beginnings and earliest events, which as such has until now been known and assessed in a wholly inadequate manner. However numerous the variants may be in individual cases, certain fundamental elements are always found. These are chiefly the following: God made human beings (the first human couple) and placed them in the world (directly or indirectly, that is, through an intermediary being) as perfect men. God instructed them (directly or indirectly) not only in religious matters, but also in secular ones. The nearness of God marked the primordial age; justice and peace reigned; men were to live forever and not die. This beautiful «primordial paradisiacal» time (the golden age) came to an end through the transgression of a commandment given by God, which, according to the tradition of some peoples, sometimes came to be an error, a misunderstanding, or some similar occurrence. All the traditions, considered as a whole, leave no doubt that physical evil in the world is regarded as the consequence of a preceding moral evil, of an ethical failing. It is generally acknowledged that a life of hardship began with this event; death also came upon men, and the Divinity, without wholly abandoning them, withdrew in anger. In a particularly characteristic form, this tradition of man’s primordial condition is found among the Pygmy tribes of Central Africa, which certainly represent the most ancient human and cultural stratum of Africa. Moreover, as has already been said, this tradition is truly widespread throughout the entire world. That these accounts, in their essential points, agree with those of Genesis, as is readily apparent, requires no particular explanation. The traditional narratives of the other peoples of the earth cannot simply be derived from that of the Bible. Rather, the truth is affirmed when all the traditions relating to it, including the biblical ones, are essentially traced back to a more ancient common source. Now, what does this traditional account of man’s primordial condition, of the teaching concerning Paradise and the fall into sin, mean for the historian?
In view of the fact that this complex of beliefs has achieved such universal diffusion, and that it is, moreover, distinguished especially among the ethnologically primitive and ancient peoples by particular characteristics (such as, for example, the emphasis placed on the first human couple, their formation by God the Creator, moral evil, sin as the effective cause of the origin of physical evil, etc.), there can be no other satisfactory explanation for the historian than to admit that this complex of beliefs really goes back to the most ancient times of humanity.
Naturally, the historian does not stop here, but raises another problem: how did such a body of beliefs arise among the ancient, indeed the most ancient, men? Were these the product of human reflection, of his imagination? Or are they founded on historical facts?
There are no other possibilities of explanation. Human common sense (and the historian is, after all, only a man who, owing to his methodological training, ought to be characterized by a double dose of common sense) cannot certainly be satisfied except by the second part of the alternative posed. It is signifi-
cant in this regard that even those scholars who, like J. Feldmann, F. Hellmich, and J. de Vuippens, in the past devoted particular attention to these traditions of the peoples concerning the primordial state of man, could admit no other possible satisfactory explanation than one that recognizes in them preceding historical facts.
IV. ORIGIN OF MAN. E. MITIGATED. — 1. By far the predominant view, especially among the circle of ethnologically primitive and most ancient peoples, is the widespread belief that a great God, conceived as a person, created humanity (the human couple), granting it a perfectly human existence. The first men are true and real human beings, not only in the physical-spiritual aspect, but also in the ethical-religious one. The great God is conceived, both before and after the fall into sin, as a power at the center of their life and destiny, towering above and dominating everything. Memories or indications of any possible areligious or pre-religious phase are entirely lacking, especially among the ethnologically primitive and most ancient peoples.
2. A derivation of man from the animal does not properly appear anywhere, particularly among the most primitive peoples. Conversely, in several cases it is also said that in those most ancient times (of the catastrophe) men became animals. Thus, in Africa—a fact to which Baumann has already drawn attention—men were transformed into apes. Hence, if one wishes, a kind of Darwinism in reverse.
3. It is therefore clear that, on the basis of all this, and in the light of ethnological research into primordial times, the schemes of extreme e. cannot be accepted. The traditions concerning the earliest times here at issue are unequivocally based on a theistic conception of the world (Weltonschnung). The conception of a supreme, personal God reveals Him both as the causa efficiens and as the causa finalis, the end and purpose of the whole of history, especially human history. To give here an explanation of the universe and of man in an atheistic-materialistic or even pantheistic-monistic sense is absolutely impossible. Whoever, therefore, adopts the standpoint of extreme e. and strives in this sense to explain the origin of man cannot in any way appeal to the beliefs and ideas of the most ancient humanity.
4. But how should one judge mitigated e., which, as has been said, would wish to admit the origin of the human body from the animal kingdom? We reply that here the material supplied by ethnology and the history of religions is neither for nor against. In a negative sense, one might perhaps explain the fact that the supreme God among the ethnologically primitive and most ancient peoples (Baumann refers particularly to the ancient Pygmy stratum of Africa) is very often expressly presented as the maker and molder even of the bodies of the first men. But the question is—as in the corresponding passage of Genesis—whether or not this should be understood literally. Certainly, one must not imagine the Creator as a potter, as s. Agostino rightly pointed out long ago. If, then, one admits a personal Creator God, as do the ethnologically primitive and most ancient peoples mentioned above, one must consequently also admit that everything was created and made by Him. This applies also to the body of man, while it remains entirely indifferent whether, in creating it, God the Creator made an entirely new creation, or made use of an animal body as pre-existing matter (materia praeiacens). On this particular question, ethnological research into primitive times cannot pronounce decisively, just as the Bible itself does not. Indeed, finally consistent with this is the well-known fact that the ecclesiastical magisterium leaves the question open, because, understood in this way, it does not constitute a religious question but a scientific one.
In saying that the ecclesiastical magisterium leaves men free on the question of the origin of the human body from the animal, one in no way wishes to assert that this origin of the human body from the animal has been scientifically demonstrated. According to the conviction of the Koppers, this cannot even now be admitted, although certain scholars, including Catholics, believe that they can or must uphold the contrary view. It can be convincingly demonstrated that, according to the present state of research, even in this particular problem, from the scientific point of view a relative reservation of judgment is appropriate (non liceo), and not the contrary.
V. DIFFICULTIES IN THE DERIVATION OF MAN FROM THE ANIMAL
In the light of current research, there are serious difficulties in admitting that man is corporeally derived from the animal. In the light of biology, the difficulties are of a twofold nature. It is certainly correct to say that, in the geological strata that follow one another, the forms of life appear ever new and more perfect. But in general it cannot be established how recent forms depend on ancient ones. It is true that their genetic dependence is asserted, but this is generally a hypothesis, not yet a scientifically demonstrated truth. The mutations, for example, of drosophila, obtained in the laboratory, make evolution comprehensible to a certain extent. Nor should it be forgotten that what is involved here is exclusively microevolution, that is, the development of microscopic organisms; whereas macroevolutions, or the developments of large organisms—those which the history of the earth shows, or rather seems to show—are in no way satisfactorily explained. This is even less true with regard to the supposed singular macroevolution from the animal to man. A possible derivation of the human body from the animal kingdom also encounters great difficulties, insofar as man, considered even in his body, appears to be absolutely—that is, from the very beginning—characterized by spirit. Biologists who have studied the question more deeply declare that, if the derivation of the human body from that of the animal were admitted, a supplementary hypothesis would be necessary. Man could not have come into being simply by infusing a human soul, in place of the animal one, into an animal body at its highest stage of development. The entry of the human spirit into such a body would have made fundamental transformations absolutely necessary, even under the purely corporeal aspect. The assertion, too, that paleoanthropological finds speak, more or less clearly, of a derivation of the human body from that of the animal encounters, in the light of the most recent research, difficulties that must be taken seriously in