FAMILY. – It is the institution that brings together spouses and the children born of their union or those assimilated to them.
SUMMARY: I. Natural and biological foundation of the family. II. Evolutionary theories on the origin of the family and the positive data of ethnology. III. The family in Roman and medieval law. IV. The family in Catholic doctrine. V. The family and education.
I. NATURAL AND BIOLOGICAL FOUNDATION OF THE FAMILY
Theories on the consistency of social forms are varied and of different kinds. In Darwin, one finds only hints of a sociological character that bring the problem back to the essentially naturalistic sphere. Yet he acknowledges that, even in earliest times, man must have lived in family groups, and he maintains that, as soon as marriage became common—whether monogamous or polygamous—jealousy led to the inculcation of feminine virtue, which, being honored, would tend to extend to all unmarried women. Darwin, however, does not go
Family – A Selk’nam family – Tierra del Fuego.
much further, whereas sociologists do extend the evolutionary principle to human social organization. H. Spencer, for instance, posits his famous parallel between organic evolution and the evolution of social forms, which he defines as superorganisms. In this, the sociologist takes an arbitrary step from Darwinian naturalistic conceptions to those of family groups, attempting to discern evolution even in these. Yet Spencer’s followers have distorted the foundations of his analogy even further, conceiving of human society as a veritable organism (J. Novicow, R. Worms, A. Schäffle, P. Lilienfeld). Modern criticism, however, has demonstrated the untenability of these attempts. Nevertheless, a certain merit must be acknowledged to these earlier theories: that of illuminating human social manifestations by considering their naturalistic aspects, deduced from analogies with the behavior of other animals. Some, extending certain behaviors of mammals to the human species, have even affirmed the existence of a primitive stage of promiscuity (or the "primeval promiscuity" of J. Bachofen). Others, conversely, inspired by nature, have advanced the more realistic conception of the stability of the family nucleus from its very origins (E. Westermarck, 1891).
Subsequently, one falls into the opposite error of forgetting nature and focusing solely on currently observable social facts. Only more recently have works oriented themselves toward a more organic and balanced consideration of the problem, while, on the whole, the old theories of evolutionary organism have left their traces. Indeed, for some authors, they have even revived, albeit under a different guise, as in the case of H. Driesch and other supporters of the so-called neo-organismic theory. Human social organization, however, must instead be interpreted according to the principle of objective research into its causes, among which those of a naturalistic order, inherent to the characteristics of the species, must certainly be considered.
Among the biological characteristics most influential on social forms are, first and foremost, the duration of life and the duration of development, though these must not be considered in isolation but in their entirety and simultaneous coexistence.
The duration of human life is best approximated by the normal duration, which is given by the mature age at which the greatest number of deaths occurs.
In Italy, it fluctuated (in 1930–32) around 76 years, and in 1881–82 around 70. The increase observed over time is mainly due to sanitary progress, but in general it is greatly slowed, if not entirely halted, once certain favorable environmental and hygienic conditions for the population have been achieved. Therefore, the apparent immutability that the aforementioned value seems to have reached, in the face of further reductions in mortality, indicates its coincidence with a typical and biological value. The other characteristic given by the duration of development must be clarified by examining the age at which the individual attains full autonomy. This is a vague age, but one that certainly falls between the end of puberty and the end of organic growth. There are racial differences; yet the differences between man and other animal species, in the ratio between normal life span and duration of development, are so pronounced as to in no way diminish the demonstrative value of the conclusions that can now be drawn.
In the strict biological and relative sense, the time that man requires to grow to autonomous life is much longer (three, four, even up to ten times) compared to all other mammals. This difference is even more pronounced when one considers the time required for man to become truly capable of reproduction (not merely physiological) and of defending himself, without which one cannot properly speak of autonomy. Regarding the modalities of growth, it can further be added that, even given equal time, in man it occurs much more slowly than in other mammals. In these, among other things, newborns display much earlier than in man their psychic progress with independent movement and action. This also holds true for anthropoid apes, for which the task of rearing and protecting the young is much lighter, whereas in man the newborn remains for a long time in a state of complete helplessness. If one then considers the succession of multiple births while the burden of the previous one is still not finished, one realizes that for the human species the protection of children constitutes a singular commitment.
Another characteristic of the species that influences the type of association is the long duration of human senescence, understood as the period of inability to work and material uselessness for the family. Conversely, in animals, the capacity for useful labor extends autonomously for a long time relative to the normal duration of life. It is certain that the duration of working life is much shorter in the human species. Moreover, since the age of menopause
marks the maximum limit of procreative ability, one sees how, in women, the duration of the fertile period is relatively very brief compared to the human lifespan. The consequences of this can be seen in the size of domestic nuclei and their continuity and preservation over time. The numerical balance of the sexes, moreover, together with other circumstances, justifies the human bond in its stable monogamous form. For this reason, it must be affirmed that societies have a single origin and cannot have followed a hypothetical general evolutionary process if they are necessarily dependent on the physical constitution of the species from its very appearance. All factors that in any way disturb such biological presuppositions adversely affect the strength of social cohesion, which sometimes finds no other defense than the higher ethical principles. Precisely for this reason, that fundamental harmony must be restored between morality, ethics, and the most intimate nature of the organism. Any imbalance in one sphere normally reverberates in the other, as if by an ineluctable necessity of equilibrium inherent in the profound nature of the human person.
On the whole, even the study of social tendencies in animals leads to the conclusion that there is harmony with a natural law that binds procreators more closely together the weaker their offspring. There are exceptions, but these only demonstrate that we cannot fully control all the determining factors of the phenomenon.
Given the premises on the biological foundation of monogamous family organization, research has been conducted to determine how much the outcome of colonization depends on the form of demographic transplantation in new territories. The serious drawbacks that scholars of colonial matters have repeatedly noted are well known—for example, the numerical excess of males over females: the lack of attachment to the family, the most varied social disorders, the serious increase in crime, immorality, and unrestrained individualism. It is for this reason that such drawbacks were fewer in agricultural colonization (when, that is, the demographic imbalance of the group was less pronounced) and greater instead in cases of industrial, commercial, or merely military colonies. In this sense, colonizations have been veritable scientific experiments which have once again confirmed the human value of the monogamous family institution. The lasting results of many Greek and Roman colonizations are precisely due to their agrarian character and to the balanced stability of their political-demographic settlement for the development of lands. But the most evident proofs of the success of colonization in relation to the demographic structure of the group are provided by modern history. In particular, the grand experiments of colonization carried out in Canada and Australia must be cited. Both have, over time, become true successes and are based on a sound biodemographic structure of the populations, so much so that they record a high birth rate even compared to the countries of origin.
The family bond, however, rests also on other moral, social, and environmental circumstances, which contribute to shaping its characteristics and making it more or less solid. In exceptional cases, these factors can even oppose natural marriage and lead back to polygamy; conversely, normally they contribute to the spiritual cohesion of the couple. On considerations of this question, literature has often been oriented also with the aim of investigating the origins of fiction. In relation to the broader organization of the State (or Civitas in general), opposing theories have been formulated on this point, which either place the State as a subsequent extension, on a larger scale, of the individual families aggregated together, or establish the priority of the State, which would have given rise to the smaller domestic aggregates later. But more certainly biological observations support the view that monogamous family (in a general sense, as a larger aggregate of a political character) has a common foundation in the purposes which are always directed toward the preservation and good reproduction of the species. In a natural sense, therefore, the very question of priority in time should not be posed as a general problem. The two forms of aggregates complement each other for the same end, and one finds the necessary balance in the other, so that from a biological point of view the two institutions are one unit and define the natural order of society. The problem of origins is therefore only a problem of individual cases, but the paleoanthropologist and the ethnologist have a much more general task to undertake, in the light of the above solution, to better understand even the social aspects of human nature.
Within the scope of individual cases, modern life in the Western civilized world has magnified and empowered all the factors of disintegration of the family bond. The consequences of this process are of a spiritual and moral nature, but also of a biological kind, because they undermine the very foundation of social coexistence. Children procreated under such conditions are progressively abandoned, and would be left to themselves to the extreme limit if it were not for those natural, instinctive restraints implanted in human nature which we define in the realm of sentiment. It is for this reason that rampant materialism also combats sentiment, erroneously believing that it is guiding man back to the path of natural laws. On the contrary, the positive historical observation of human society seems increasingly to confirm a natural law according to which the social order of individual groups would also be governed by an internal force of rebalancing, of a demogenetic character, whereby every phenomenon of disintegration has limits to its development, in time
— in space, as well as before a threshold of a biological nature, whose finalism is evident.
Divorce, in particular, as a solution of continuity in the family bond, is a consequence of factors of disintegration which unfortunately exist equally where legislation does not provide for its recognition. Divorce is therefore like a symptom of a social illness in progress whose therapy must trace back to the causes, which consist in a lost biological, spiritual, and moral education. Just as the symptom of altered individual temperature, so the symptom of altered social organism can be measured also in numbers, in the percentage of annual divorces on marriages contracted in the same period. These percentages positively indicate how many out of a hundred marriages celebrated in a year are dissolved. They are painful figures that have been growing everywhere in the last fifty years and unfortunately do not even represent the real gravity of the evil, which is greater, even in many cases in which the legal solution of the bond’s continuity is not realized.
Other means of disintegration of the family have a purely biological character, such as artificial insemination and paradoxical maternity, which is also experimentally possible, whereby a fertilized ovum can be transplanted from one female to another. But these are aspects of human degeneration which exploit the knowledge of biological research for a vile process of falsification of life.
II. EVOLUTIONIST THEORIES ON THE ORIGIN OF THE FAMILY AND THE POSITIVE DATA OF ETHNOLOGY
In 1861 Bachofen drew the attention of ethnologists to the fact that in certain populations succession occurs not in the paternal line but in the maternal line. With the examples he collected and by applying the law formulated by evolutionism—according to which the development of man’s spiritual manifestations would be characterized by a uniform and ascending line (thus by continuous progress)—he constructed the theory that matriarchy, that is, the supremacy of the mother, would have preceded patriarchy and extended it to all peoples.
But the classical construction of the evolutionary theory on the origin of the family was made only later by H. L. Lewis Morgan, who accepted and expanded Bachofen’s theory by constructing other stages of social evolution prior to matriarchy itself: group marriage, its consequence, and sexual promiscuity.
Group marriage would be that social stage in which a group of men jointly marry a group of women; in other words, all the men belonging to one group would have had free access to all the women of another group, and reciprocally all the men of this group to the women of the first.
The stage of consanguineous family would have been characterized by marriage between brothers and sisters and by the sexual relations between parents and children generally among members of different generations. This stage would have been preceded by the so-called “unlimited sexual promiscuity,” in which all men would have access to all women, without any incest taboo.
Morgan constructed the following schema of family evolution:
1. Initial base: the so-called unlimited sexual promiscuity. There is no limit to the sexual instinct.
Intermediate stages:
2. Consanguineous family: only marriages between parents and children are prohibited.
3. Group marriage: within the tribe, all members of the same generation can still have conjugal relations with every member of the opposite sex, but another limitation intervenes: not only are marriages between parents and children prohibited, but also those between brothers and sisters.
Stages 2 and 3 are characterized by the absence of any principle of individual marriage: neither the father nor the mother is yet known.
4. Matriarchal union: individual marriage begins; only the mother is known, while the father is still uncertain.
5. Polygamous patriarchal family: the children live with their wives under the authority of the father or the eldest brother. In this stage there is already a true family in which both father and mother are known.
6. Final stage: monogamy, that is, individual marriage in its fullness.
This scale was built on the tacit assumption—which for Morgan and the evolutionists of his time had the value of a logical postulate that did not need to be demonstrated—that the development of humanity had been a continuous progress unfolding along a uniform and ascending line. In our case, between the starting point (1), characterized by the absolute absence of rules governing sexual instinct, and the opposite endpoint (6), determined by the precise norms on which monogamous family is founded, it was necessary to posit intermediate stages (2, 3, 4, 5), all conceived so that each preceding one was less complex than the following. Moreover, each stage (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6) was conceived as a compulsory passage for all humanity in its development: no people could have reached monogamy (6) without passing through the succession of stages 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.
A few examples taken here and there, even from peoples of very different cultures, sufficed to construct a developmental stage; often, indeed, transitional forms were constructed without any positive documentation simply because they were deemed necessary to provide a basis for a given theory or to link the links of an evolutionary chain built on a purely psychological criterion.
Only on the basis of these a priori assumptions and without the slightest attempt at positive inquiry did Morgan establish the chronological priority of consanguineous family over group marriage: in the former he saw the first and simplest limitation on absolute sexual promiscuity—the prohibition of marrying one’s parents—while in group marriage he found the prohibition extended also to unions between brothers and sisters.
For the same reason, matriarchy—which was seen above all as a social stage in which the child knew for certain only who his mother was, while his father was still unknown or at least uncertain—had to precede polygamous patriarchy, in which the children live with their wives under the authority of the father or the eldest brother. In this stage there is already a true family in which both father and mother are known.
Monogamy was placed at the apex of development because it was founded entirely on individual marriage, governed by very precise norms and therefore entirely opposed to the supposed original stage of sexual promiscuity, characterized by the absolute absence of rules.
The kinship system of the Punulau of the Hawaiian or Sandwich Islands (Polynesia)—who have a single term to designate all relatives of one generation, without any distinction of their degree of greater or lesser consanguinity—was interpreted by Morgan as a remnant of consanguineous family.
Indeed, a Punulau uses the term nakua to refer to his father, his mother, his maternal uncles and aunts—he specifies only the sex with qualifying terms that indicate “man” or “woman.” The same occurs in the descending line: the father calls by the same term his sons and those of his sister, both male and female. A similar system is found among the inhabitants of central New Mecklenburg (Melanesia), as seen in the following summary schema, which, however, reproduces only part of the kinship system of these natives (reported in full in W. Schmidt and W. Koppers, Völker und Kulturen, Regensburg 1924, p. 137):
This simplicity in the kinship system, uncommon among primitive peoples, was interpreted by Morgan and his followers as a remnant of consanguineous family based on marriage between brothers and sisters—leading to the conclusions that:
1) the father is called by the same term as the maternal uncle because in an earlier phase both married their sisters and were therefore truly fathers;
2) the true father is not distinguished from his tribal brothers because, given the lack of rules in sexual relations, he was unknown.
To the two examples provided by the kinship systems of the Punulau and the natives of central New Mecklenburg were later added others taken from different peoples, which were interpreted as new proofs in favor of Morgan’s theory, which, despite strong opposition—including reservations by other evolutionists—was for several decades the most widely accepted by ethnologists and sociologists. And the opponents, since they started from the same postulate as Morgan—that evolution had unfolded along a uniform and ascending line—could not offer any criticism based on positive inquiry, but limited themselves to constructing new unfounded theories like those they sought to demolish. Thus McLennan—who had defined Morgan’s work as entirely unscientific—
KINSHIP SYSTEM OF THE NATIVES OF NEW MECKLENBURG
TAMA (m) Paternal uncle
indicates: Paternal aunt
Husband of maternal aunt
Paternal uncle’s wife
Son or daughter (for both father and mother)
NATI (m) Paternal uncle or maternal aunt
indicates: Nephew or niece Paternal aunt
of or Husband of maternal aunt
maternal uncle’s wife
LAUA Nephew or
indicates: Nephew of the husband of the paternal aunt
niece
H. Morgan and McLennan were closely followed by scholars studying the origins of the family, society, and various manifestations of law. Morgan’s theory was particularly welcomed by Marx, Engels, Simons, and popularized by Bebel. However, even outside the scientific current of socialism, treatises, manuals, and encyclopedia articles—even modern ones—still bear the influence of the theories of Morgan, McLennan, and other evolutionists, which theology, based on positive data, has long since surpassed.
All forms of marriage (polyandry, levirate, sororate) and customs (such as couvade), which the continuous but often forced collection of documentation provided in increasing numbers from diverse peoples, were systematically explained by the postulate of uniform and ascending development and placed, according to the greater or lesser appearance of crudeness they presented, in a stage of evolution more or less low, constructed with the same preconception.
Polyandry is the institution opposite to polygamy: the latter allows a man to have multiple wives, while the former allows a woman to have multiple husbands. Polygamy has sometimes developed widely in human history; conversely, absolutely certain cases of polyandry are very few. Lowie notes them and rightly observes that they can be counted on the fingers. Polyandry presents itself in various cases and aspects, some now clear, others still obscure. However, it can be confidently asserted that polyandrous family life is the least stable of all family institutions found among primitive peoples.
Based solely on this observation, many evolutionists immediately saw in polyandry the first phase of marriage—naturally very ancient—through which humanity passed just after emerging from the chaos of sexual promiscuity, even before reaching the matriarchal family.
Furthermore, the preconception that this phase, like all others, had been universal among all peoples led explorers, ethnologists, and sociologists to see traces of polyandry in every collective sexual disorder and in every unstable family institution. This was the cause of serious errors in reporting and interpreting the social life of primitive peoples—errors that only careful examination of the facts has gradually succeeded in correcting or completely eliminating from ethnological works.
Levirate is the marital institution by which the brother of a deceased man has the duty—often a right—to marry the widow.
Sororate consists of the right of a man, upon becoming a widower, to marry his deceased wife’s sister.
These two institutions are often found together among a considerable group of peoples, but they are by no means universal.
Tylor, like all evolutionists of his time, believed in the historical precedence of matriarchy over patriarchy and posited an intermediate stage between them, which he called the maternal-paternal stage, in which he placed all institutions showing a transitional character. He saw levirate (and sororate) as a custom of substitution belonging to the period when marriage was not so much a contract between two individuals as between two groups. In the maternal stage, it would have reached its peak in the maternal-paternal stage, only to gradually disappear in the paternal stage.
Frazer explains sororate as an innovation of the license found among certain peoples, for whom the husband has the right to have marital relations with all the sisters of his wife, even if she is still alive. He offers a similar interpretation of levirate, seeing in these two forms of marriage the remnants of an earlier stage in which the husband would have had unrestricted relations with all the sisters of his wife, and the wife with all the brothers of her husband. This would essentially be group marriage. However, Frazer’s explanation is entirely a priori, as he does not even investigate whether there is a genetic and historical connection between levirate and sororate—which can only occur when one spouse has died—and the husband’s right to access his sisters-in-law even while his wife is still alive.
Ethnologists call *covade* a set of curious and often very amusing practices performed by the husband, in certain populations, after his wife has given birth. The new mother quickly leaves her bed and resumes her work, while the father of the newborn subjects himself to a series of dietary and other prescriptions, as if he himself had given birth. Hence, this custom is also called "male puerperium."
Evolutionists (Bachofen, Giraud-Teulon, Tylor, and many others) interpreted this custom as a symbolic act to represent the father as a second mother and traced its origin to the transitional period between matriarchy and patriarchy, when the primitive kinship bond, based on maternity, was replaced by the later bond of paternity.
The theories of Bachofen, Morgan, McLennan, Tylor, and Frazer characterize the shift produced by biological evolutionism in philosophy and, more broadly, in all historical and moral disciplines. Followers of this school took it as a logical postulate that humanity had begun its social, moral, and religious evolution from a phase characterized by the complete absence of ethical and religious laws, just as evolutionary philosophers assumed the absence of spontaneous generation.
Positive evidence has demolished all the constructions of classical evolutionism regarding the origins of the family, society, and religion.
1) The theory of sexual promiscuity was abandoned long ago by ethnologists of all persuasions, as no primitive population has ever shown traces that would justify the existence of such a phase.
2) A thorough study of the kinship systems of the Punalua, the natives of central New Mecklenburg, and various other peoples who similarly or analogously include different degrees under the same term has shown that these terms do not indicate blood relationships but rather different age grades, which hold great importance in primitive societies. In these societies, hierarchy is almost exclusively based on age, and elders hold privileges over the young. The common term for "father" is "uncle," which is also given to the chief, indicating respect for seniority and not meaning either "father" or "uncle," but "lord." Some ethnologists have aptly compared this to the respectful form of address once used in our own culture: "Mr. Father."
3) Marriage between brothers and sisters—found only among a very few peoples and always limited to kings or the aristocracy—is an expression of the particular pride of these social classes, who refuse to degrade themselves by uniting with lower classes. It is practiced by the indigenous people of the Hawaiian archipelago (Polynesia), by populations in West Africa, and was common in the great civilizations of Peru and Egypt.
The immense pride of dynasty or caste, even if it does not culminate in incest, can give rise to other customs that undermine the family. For example, the sisters of the king of the Shilluk (Anglo-Egyptian Sudan) cannot marry, because the only person worthy of uniting with them would be the king himself; however, they may have lovers. But these incestuous and disordered forms, which developed gradually, are confined to specific cultural aspects that have nothing primitive about them. The common people consider such behavior natural for the king and aristocracy but incestuous for themselves and do not practice it at all.
4) Genuine cases of polyandry are very few and all belong to populations no longer primitive (the Wahima of East Africa, certain groups of Eskimos, the Toda of India, and certain groups in Tibet).
A Wahima who is so poor that he cannot pay the dowry required to purchase a wife is assisted by his brothers, who in this way acquire the same rights over the wife as the husband. But as soon as the wife becomes pregnant, she belongs exclusively to the husband, and all rights of the others cease.
Certain groups of Eskimos and the Toda often kill female infants shortly after birth and keep the males alive; this form of infanticide, which is entirely absent in the most primitive societies, produces an excess of men over women and causes polyandry.
5) Levirate and sororate are also forms of marriage that arose relatively late, emerging from particular social and economic conditions that determined certain cultures.
6) The couvade is an expression of the extreme consequences to which advanced matriarchy has led. It is closely connected with this cultural cycle, which is ill-suited to human nature, was not universal among humanity, and arose after patriarchy.
7) Patriarchy and matriarchy do not have a chronological relationship; that is, one did not develop from the other, nor vice versa. Patriarchy is characteristic of pastoral peoples, while matriarchy is characteristic of agricultural peoples.
8) Monogamy is the natural state of the family and is recognized as such by the most primitive populations; it is more widespread than polygamy. Careful study of still-primitive populations has shown that polygamy developed later and predominantly in more advanced civilizations. The transition from primitive monogamous family structures to polygamy or polyandry was decisively influenced by the economic structures of more recent cultures (the perfected hunting of totemistic societies, the beginnings of agriculture, and livestock breeding). In turn, polygamy and polyandry have exerted a negative influence on religion (v. ESOCAMIA; ETNOLOGIA; EVOLUZIONISMO CULTURALE).
III. The Family in Roman and International Law
I. In Roman Law
The Roman family consisted of a group of persons united solely by the authority of a head (pater familias). This particular aspect, which made it primarily a political organism, remained evident even after a long historical evolution had largely altered its structure. The function the family had to fulfill, especially in ancient times, was a defensive one, aligning it with other groups of importance in primitive social organization (gentes); naturally, it underwent involution as the authority of the State progressively strengthened. The State, however, while it soon broke down the barrier separating family members in terms of public law, preserved the autonomy of family organization from a private-law perspective, so that Roman private law may truly be considered, as long as it remained free from foreign influences, the law of the heads of families.Alongside this family, whose head is alive (in its own right, *iure proprio*), there exists another (in common right, *iure communi*) composed of those who would be subject to the same authority if the pater familias were not deceased. The bond uniting the members of the family is called *agnation*.
Subject to the authority of the pater familias are: the children (patria potestas); women who have entered the family through marriage and have undergone a special legal act (conventio in manum) to place themselves under the authority of the pater familias (manus); slaves (dominica potestas); and individuals from other families handed over as a penalty for a crime or as security for an obligation (mancipium). The singular nature of this power of the pater familias is that, even with respect to his children and other free members of the family, it does not cease upon their reaching a certain age, but only with the death of the person exercising authority or through his renunciation.
The pater familias is not only the head but also the priest of the family and its judge. However, even in his primitive role and in the exercise of the most severe powers over those subject to him—such as the power to kill, sell, or expose his children—he is bound by the sacred limits of custom (mores). Meanwhile, custom first and later legislation tended to abolish these harsher aspects of patria potestas. Over time, indeed, the potestative bond weakened, and greater importance was given to the bond of blood kinship (cognatio).
The capacity to hold property was originally concentrated entirely in the hands of the pater familias, and acquisitions made by those subject to him took effect for him. However, with regard to children (slaves are not particularly relevant here), the pater familias began to set aside a small patrimony for them (peculium), which was a precursor to a branch of administration. From this developed the concept that children could also have patrimonial capacity (in relation to acquisitions made in military service [peculium castrense] or in public office [peculium quasi castrense]); so that, by the end of this evolution, a son acquired property for the head of the family only if the acquisitions were made with the father’s goods or by his order.
II. In international law
Families were formed within a broader kinship group (fara or sippio) designed to ensure mutual defense and protection that the state could not provide. In Lombard law, the authority of the head of the family was replaced by a mandate as a protective function for individuals not fully capable (women and minors). The father retained powers reminiscent of Roman paternal authority (the right to expose a child, to sell him, to dedicate him to the priesthood, or to compel daughters to marry); but this power, limited on one side by state intervention, ended when the son entered the assembly of armed men. From that moment, the son also took part in the administration of the family patrimony.During the feudal period and in the communes, when the authority of the state was still weak, the family tended to expand its sphere of action, giving rise to other groupings (noble consortia, merchant associations, rural family communions), primarily for defensive purposes and in relation to Germanic customs. These autonomous organizations were opposed by the princes, who, aiming to centralize power, fought against such political groupings. Subsequently, the principle of the temporariness of paternal authority, the patrimonial rights of the child, the right to maintenance, and the frequent practice of emancipation became established; so that the family assumed an organization and aspect very close to those of today.
IV. The family in Catholic doctrine.
I. Concept of the family
For the Catholic Church, the family is the institution that gathers together spouses and their children born of their union or those assimilated to them.Parents and children are thus its members. The relationship between the former is defined by the Christian concept of marriage, that is, by an indissoluble bond freely contracted and, for the baptized, elevated to the dignity of a sacrament (v. MATRIMONIO). The relationship between parents and children is fixed by birth regulated by law. Thus we speak of legitimate children, illegitimate children, natural children, incestuous children, adulterine children, recognized children, legitimate children, etc. (v. PROLE). The relationship between the two groups stems from the purpose of marriage and from the very close bond established through the guarantee and sharing of life.
The purpose of marriage is, in fact, not only to transmit physical life but also intellectual and moral life, that is, not only to generate but also to nourish and educate. This entails (v. EDUCAZIONE) that the means necessary for the child’s development be increasingly placed at his disposal and that he be trained to use them with ever greater independence, until he attains complete autonomy. It is therefore a relationship that tends by its very nature to diminish over time. In the first six months of his existence, the new creature needs his mother without whom he cannot live; in the next six months of eternal life, the mother is already less necessary; when the new creature is born, the mother is still less necessary; after some time the child begins to walk alone; later he learns to speak; still later to think for himself; and then he acquires emotional autonomy until he completely detaches himself from his parents, focusing his attention and concern on a new marital and family unit. The parent-child relationship is therefore by its nature altruistic. Parents must remember this so that they may know when to withdraw, giving way to a line of loving and generous respect for the freedom and autonomy that, through their educational work, they will have secured for their children.
In this way, the fulfillment of the duties that parenthood imposes toward parents will be facilitated for the children. Indeed, as the educational relationship of parents is gradually exhausted through the growing autonomy of the child, a greater duty of affection and assistance from children toward parents is established. It is now the children who must give to their parents, not to introduce them to life, but to preserve them in II.
There is therefore something constant and something mutable in the parent-child relationship: constant is the love that must unite them; variable is the form in which it is expressed. In the time of formation, love must lead parents to give to children (especially advice and correction) and children to receive from parents (especially correction, advice, and guidance); later, love must lead children to give to parents (especially affection and assistance) and parents to receive from them.
In the light of these considerations, the problem of authority and obedience in the figure of the parent must be resolved. The figure of the parent must be understood in such a way that the duty of obedience owed by children derives from their inferiority. But precisely because of this, neither the parents’ right to command nor the children’s duty to obey can be perpetual. Both evolve with the changes that occur in parents and children.
Establishing these developments with precision is not easy and perhaps not even possible. One can only say that the transition to autonomy does not occur in an instant, nor does it occur in the same way or at the same time for everyone. It is therefore impossible to determine with precision and in a general manner when the obligation of obedience for children ceases. Legal determinations in this area (e.g., Article 2 of the Italian Civil Code) arise from statistical-practical considerations and must be applied with great discernment. Care must be taken not to grant children freedom before they are mature enough to use it wisely, nor to deny it when they are sufficiently formed.
This leads to a consideration of deviations in the parent-child relationship. On the part of the parents, these may include:
From the principle now affirmed, it is necessary to carefully distinguish the technical question of how to implement it (family allowances, etc.). For it is one thing to affirm the moral necessity of a family wage, and quite another to ask what is the most appropriate way to ensure it reaches the worker. Here it will suffice to recall the duty to continually study and experiment with ever more perfect forms. In any case, an effort must be made to separate the worker’s family relationships—and thus family responsibilities—from the employment relationship, otherwise an inevitable condition of favoritism would arise in favor of the single worker compared to the married worker, or the worker with fewer children compared to others. Indeed, in hiring and firing, the employer would be inclined to give preference to those who are unmarried, and among the married, to those without children or with fewer children than others.
The very nature of the family wage requires that it be directed to all members of the family, at least to all those who are dependent. For this reason, as well as for general ones, the head of the family—the husband and father—must provide for the sustenance of the wife and children. Should this not occur, the wife and children, by taking their share, commit no theft: they are merely taking what is theirs. For the same reason, whatever remains of the family’s assets at the death of the head must be passed on to the other members. Thus, alongside the family’s internal obligations of support, the institution of inheritance begins to take shape, at least in a minimal form.
Another important question regarding the family and property is that of family assets. Immediately or in the near future, the institution of private property derives its necessity from the historical condition of the human person, that is, from selfish and utilitarian inclinations, which normally make work more strongly motivated by the prospect of gain than by other motives. It is also far more likely to fulfill one’s duties if there is the assurance that no material disadvantage will result. It follows that where altruistic behavior is evident and other motives for action and projections of freedom intervene, the institution of private property tends to give way to communal forms of ownership. This is precisely what happens in marriage and the family. When a man and woman truly love each other, they are instinctively inclined to share everything. The same can be said of parents and children. On the other hand, when love wanes (to say nothing of marital conflicts, or when grown children begin to establish their own families), the tendency to break away from communal forms spontaneously resurges, more or less openly initiating new forms of property. It cannot be emphasized enough how important this second phenomenon is: all members of the family (beginning with the parents) must be convinced of it and take timely action if they wish to avoid sowing the seeds of inevitable and most painful discord. Even spiritual shepherds should be guided in their counsel by a healthy realism, the benefits of which time will make increasingly evident.
The legislator has sought to give more concrete substance to the indications or requirements of natural law thus far outlined. As for the family wage, the provisions for family allowances are well known (v. SALARY). Regarding property regimes in marriage, it is well known that the Italian Civil Code provides for a legal regime (that of separation of property) and for conventional regimes (family assets, dowry, community of profits); it thus admits, albeit with many qualifications, the communal form to which love inclines, without concealing its preference for the non-communal form. The law wisely assumes that love may wane, for otherwise difficulties would not arise or could be resolved without recourse to the legislator. The question of alimony is treated with great delicacy. It is addressed in Title XIII of Book I, specifying the persons obligated (Articles 433 ff.), the measure (Articles 438 ff.), and the forms (Article 443). The legal regulation of the institution of inheritance is equally detailed, occupying nearly the whole of Book II: noteworthy are the institution of the legitimate portion and legal succession, which provide for the continuity of family assets and the rights arising from blood ties or legitimate family life, without entirely suppressing the freedom of disposition that belongs to the holder of the right of property.
Moralists discuss at length the content and limits of the wife’s and children’s right of property (de donario uxorum, de donario filiorum familias), often with excessively casuistic concerns, seeking to define what each may legitimately acquire; consequently, they also address when and to what extent these persons sin by taking something from the household, and where they are bound to make restitution. In general, for the fault of theft by wife or children, they demand a more serious assessment than for others (v. THEFT).
The communal, and therefore transpersonal, exigency of family assets seems to require particularly stable forms. In this line, one may place the affirmation of Pius XII in his Radio Message for the fiftieth anniversary of *Rerum novarum* on the family farm (AAS, 33 [1947], p. 202).
IV. FAMILY AND SCHOOL
It has been noted above that the right and duty to educate originally belong to the family (though one must consider the rights of the Church in forming the life of the spirit). However, the family is not always able to fulfill this directly: “in fact, it is well known that most of the time parents cannot fully assume the overwhelming task of educating and instructing the child” (International Union of Social Studies, *Social Code*, Rovigo 1927, no. 20). First, there is a lack of knowledge and guidance to impart (consider the vast body of knowledge an educator must possess, especially in an advanced society); second, there is a lack of time (consider the average worker who leaves home early in the morning to go to work and returns late in the evening, with little opportunity to spend time with their children); and third, there is a lack of the necessary tranquility (one need only reflect on how much calm and patience are required to truly educate). When the family falls short, it supplements its role by entrusting to others what it cannot do directly: thus the school arises. However, parents are not always able to establish a school themselves. In such cases, society intervenes: thus the state school arises, in which parents retain the freedom of choice and the right of oversight, whether they choose the state school out of necessity or for other reasons (v. EDUCATION; TEACHING, freedom of).V. F. AND SOCIETY. - The relations between the family and society clearly follow from what has been said. Essentially, they reduce to three: 1) the priority of society; 2) society must enable the family to fulfill its great mission; 3) society must compel the family to attend to its task, at least minimally, even substituting itself for the family if necessary.
The priority of the family over society is first of all one of time: the family was the first form of social organization, the first school, the first temple; the head of the family was the first civil superior and the first priest; the first formation of the household and the tribe. The priority of the family over society is also one of value, since society is a means to secure for the family—and through it for the individual—the indispensable conditions for attaining its end. One need only reflect, for example, on what has been said regarding the school. This requires that the State recognize the family as constituted by God; protect it against all its enemies, purging the public environment of every corrupting element and creating a healthy and suitable moral atmosphere; assist it in fulfilling its mission; and urge it to fulfill its duties...” (I.C.A.S., *Per una comunità cristiana*, Rome 1945, no. 22). These concepts have been strongly and repeatedly affirmed by the recent Pontiffs against the totalitarian tendencies of certain governments and the pseudo-mystical conceptions of social life. Worthy of note for their importance are the encyclicals *Divini illius magistri*, *Mit brennender Sorge*, and *Summi Pontificatus* by Pius XI (AAS, 22 [1935], pp. 49-86; 29 [1937], pp. 145-67, 168-88) and the *Christmas Radio Message of 1942* by Pius XII (*ibid.*, 35 [1943], p. 19). The new Italian Constitution is inspired by these concepts, though sometimes with insufficiently clear expressions. Article 29 states in fact that “the Republic recognizes the rights of the family as a natural society founded on marriage”; Article 31: “The Republic facilitates, through economic measures, the providential right to the formation of the family and the fulfillment of its tasks, with particular regard for large families.”
State intervention may extend to coercing the family to fulfill its mission, even substituting itself for the family in extreme cases. The child, in fact, “has the right to physical, intellectual, moral, and religious formation” (Unione int. di studi soc., *Codice sociale*, Rovigo 1927, no. 19). The natural environment for this formation is the family, which should primarily provide II. But if, due to incapacity or ill will, the family fails to do so, State intervention becomes indispensable. Hence, legislation protecting the rights of the child against incapable parents is necessary. As early as 1927-1928, the *Codice sociale* noted: “The legislator must distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate transmission of life” (*op. cit.*, no. 15), while also affirming that “even the child born outside marriage has rights that must be safeguarded” (*op. cit.*, no. 18). The legal treatment of children born outside marriage has always posed a serious problem for sociologists, politicians, and legislators. Two conflicting exigencies are evident. On one hand, one would wish to extend protection to these unfortunate children, granting them the benefits of recognition in filiation as if they were legitimate, since they are innocent and particularly exposed to moral and material hardships. On the other hand, it is necessary to clearly differentiate their position to uphold the prestige and honor of the legitimate family, which is the foundation of social order and from which it is desirable that new generations emerge. One must avoid presenting the phenomenon of filiation as merely a natural fact, when it is also a moral and social issue concerning the upbringing and education of those brought into the world (A. Trabucchi, *Istituzioni di diritto civile*, 3rd ed., Padua 1947, p. 240). From this perspective, the formula adopted in the Constitution (Art. 30) is commendable: “The law ensures every child born outside marriage full legal and social protection, compatible with the rights of the members of the legitimate family.”
VI. F. AND POLITICS. - The importance of the family-society relationship seems to demand a greater presence of the family in the conduct of public affairs. Precisely defining the forms of such presence is difficult at the present stage of studies. Here it will suffice to recall point VIII of the *Déclaration des droits de la famille*, delivered in Lille on December 5, 1920, by General Castelnau, and the position of the *Codice sociale* of the Union of Malines. Point VIII states: “The family, as the true social cell, has the right to elect representatives to the assemblies of the commune, department, region, and nation. The father, in addition to his personal vote, has a number of votes equal or proportional to the number of minor children under his authority. The mother votes in the name of the father if he is deceased, absent, incapacitated, or deprived of rights.” And the *Codice sociale* states: “To guarantee the rights of the family, it is important that it be represented in the assemblies of the commune, region, and nation. Thus, for example, the father could, in addition to his personal vote, cast a number of votes equal or proportional to the size of the household over which he presides” (no. 33).
V. THE FAMILY AND EDUCATION.
I. EDUCATION WITHIN THE FAMILY — The family presents, in logical order, the first environment and the first type of education. This, in fact, rightfully belongs to it, just as procreation does (v. *EDUCATION*); indeed, one might say that education is nothing other than the moral extension of the physical act of procreation, in that the new beings brought into the world are human persons, endowed not only with a body but also with a spiritual soul, both of which require the care and attention necessary for their development and progress.
Moreover, the family presents the first environment and the first type of human education even in historical order; for the school comes later, when society, having grown in number and complexity of functions, will require in its citizens particular physical, cultural, and moral qualities that demand the “supportive” or “integrative” work of others rather than the “substitutive” kind, because nothing can overturn the above-mentioned logical order, and no work of others, as experience shows, can equal that of the family, which is founded upon natural instinct, selflessness, love, and—so to speak—the right of ownership, felt and understood, that parents have over “their” children. Even in deplorable cases where the work of others necessarily becomes “substitutive,” education will be all the more capable of compensating for the absence of others the more closely it can approximate the form, warmth, and affection of the education that the family provides. Witness the common, ever-delicate and delightful phrase uttered in such cases: “I will act as your father; I will act as your mother.”
1. The Value of Family Education — Family education assumes greater or lesser value, greater or lesser completeness, according to the end one intends to achieve and the dignity attributed to the institution of the family. Now Christianity assigns to each individual a totalizing end that embraces natural life in its physical, intellectual, moral, and social aspects, as well as supernatural life, broadened by grace, which culminates in the final goal of eternal salvation; and to the family, through marriage elevated to the dignity of a sacrament, it gives a value and at the same time a strength that it would otherwise lack. Family education, therefore, must aim at all the above-mentioned ends and must know how to enhance the means to achieve them with the salutary principles derived from Christianity and its practice.
2. The Didactics of Family Education — As for the didactic method by which to impart and develop education, it must be observed that it is fundamentally distinct from the didactics of the school. The latter, in fact, requires particular environmental and technical elements; the former, instead, is nothing other than the spontaneous, continuous fruit of that same love which gave children life and now intends to preserve it for them and help it to flourish. Love, therefore, is an art that cannot be learned from the pages of a school; so much so that parents, even those of little education, have proven and still prove in practice to be excellent educators. This does not, however, justify the opposite excess—unfortunately still alive in many families—of thinking that family education requires nothing more than the spontaneous inclination of nature. Nature is not always constant, orderly, timely, or ready to offer a sure hand in all the varying, and ever-changing, situations of character, temperament, age, and environment. Hence the necessity for parents to acquire that specialized culture in the subject which, when combined with nature, will offer them a sure and conscientious criterion. Precisely because the psychological situations of children, even within the same family, are different—sometimes even contrasting—an effective education requires a flexibility of judgment, a breadth of ideas, and a readiness of application that nature does not always provide in full efficacy on its own; hence the need to strengthen it through reading, study, and observation. And if the art of the educator is always difficult, it becomes all the more arduous when it comes to family education.
3. Aspects and Means of Family Education — As with every other kind of education, family education also has two aspects: the negative (preventing evil) and the positive (forming toward good).
Under the negative aspect of preventing evil, the means to be employed are sometimes imposition, sometimes punishment; yet it is better to seek, on the one hand, to prevent evil so as not to have to punish it later, and on the other, to form strong and resolute consciences so as not to have recourse to imposition. This immediately indicates the extraordinary importance of the positive aspect.
a) To form toward good, the first necessary requisite within the family is the assumption of the role of parent-educators by the parents. All imitate one another; children, especially, are more exposed than others to modeling themselves on adults, and preferably on those closest to them, above all their parents, whom they regard as exceptional beings in whom there is nothing to condemn; so much so that example can precede words and produce its effect even before the child can understand an exhortation or grasp the importance of something. To example must follow invitation, exhortation, explanations, and instruction, always adapted to circumstances, types, and ages.
In this regard, however, one must avoid appearing important, burdensome, oppressive, monotonous, or tedious.
b) The second means is to understand youth and one's own children. A brief retrospective reflection on what one would have desired when one was small is of the utmost guiding value. It is also important to understand the times, which can change and bring with them particular demands.
c) The third means is to love one's children. In this regard, several defects must be avoided: excessive indulgence under the pretext that, as they grow, children will understand for themselves; too much pampering, which quickly turns into demands on the part of spoiled children; the separation of severity from indulgence—leaving, for example, severity to the father and indulgence to the mother—whereas the work of both parents must be imbued with love and authority, dosed in their fusion or simultaneously according to circumstances.
d) The fourth means is to respect one's children, avoiding in their presence conversations or displays of acts or visions that, even if understood at that particular moment, easily sink into the subconscious to resurface later and disturb.
e) To watch over the development of children, providing them, according to their age and maturity, with the explanations necessary to guide them, understand life, form relationships, and thus avoid morbid introspections, evil suggestions, and missteps that sooner or later lead to ruin.
f) To consider children from a supernatural perspective: that is, as gifts from God to be guarded and preserved for Him, to be perfected and sanctified for His glory and for the well-being of society. To educate them, therefore, in freedom, purity, obedience, love of sacrifice and renunciation, generosity, and the heroism of daily duty. In this field, the means offered by the Catholic religion will be of inestimable value: its Sacraments (Eucharistic education; formation of conscience through Confession and spiritual direction) and its lofty spirit of brotherhood and love (education in charity, respect for work, the less fortunate, the worker, domestic staff; kindness toward those who suffer; service to one's neighbor in any need; the spirit of sociality that uproots every sense of selfishness and egocentrism to teach the true art of human coexistence: living for one another).