PROLE

PROLE. — From the Latin *proles*, it means offspring, i.e., the aggregate of children, subject to rights and duties within the family. The natural instinct that establishes the relationship between parents and children on a plane of mutual affection is elevated by the positive divine precept which commands: “Honor your father and your mother, that your days may be long upon the land which the Lord your God gives you” (Ex. 20:12; *Deut.* 5:16; Eph. 6:2-3). This commandment lays the foundation for the well-being of the family, which is a sacred institution of God.

The entirety of the relationship between parents and children is governed by the virtue of piety (v.). Under the heading “parents,” the particular duties and rights of parents toward their children are indicated; here, it remains to discuss the specific duties of children toward their parents and the juridical condition of children.

I. DUTIES OF CHILDREN

I. Children owe their parents: a) love, both internal and external. It is therefore a sin, even a grave one, if they hate their parents; if they show hatred toward them in private, and even more so in public; if they fail to assist them in their spiritual and material needs; b) respect, which must be shown through words, gestures, and actions. The gravity of the fault must be assessed not only in light of the act itself but also in consideration of the circumstances; c) obedience in all lawful matters, as long as they remain under their parents’ authority—practically speaking, as long as they live in the paternal home and receive sustenance from their parents.

Regarding the choice of state in life: a) children are not bound to obey their parents in this matter, except in extraordinary cases out of piety toward them; b) they should seek their parents’ counsel when deciding to marry a particular person, but they are not obligated to follow it; c) when it comes to choosing a religious or priestly state, it is not even obligatory to seek counsel, and often it is not advisable. Regarding the choice of profession, relatives cannot impose their will upon children, however beneficial it may be for the latter to heed their advice.

Property relations. According to the law of nature, children, even if minors, are capable of possessing and acquiring goods, which the father has the right and duty, *ex pietate*, to administer in the interest of the children if they, being minors or otherwise legally incapacitated, are subject to his authority. The goods belonging to children may be divided into two categories: a) goods acquired by them through transmission from previous holders, by means of donation, inheritance, or bequest; b) goods derived from their personal exercise of an art, trade, or in general any remunerative work. Over the goods of both categories, children hold dominion, and parents cannot unjustly appropriate them. However, children, in turn, may have obligations toward their parents regarding such goods, obligations which particular law and custom determine in greater detail.

II. JURIDICAL CONDITION OF OFFSPRING

I. Legitimacy

The Catholic doctrine regarding the respective competence of the Church and the State in determining the status of offspring may be summarized in the following points: a) that offspring born of a valid or putative marriage are legitimate is an inseparable effect of marriage and is therefore governed by divine law and canon law, not by civil law; the same applies to legitimation by subsequent marriage; b) when offspring would not be legitimate by reason of birth during marriage, nor legitimated by subsequent marriage, both the Church and the State have the power to grant legitimacy otherwise, with effects that are more or less full, but limited to the scope of their respective competence—namely, the State may grant legitimacy only for civil effects, the Church only for canonical effects (with the exception of extraordinary cases, *propter bonum religionis*); a fortiori, therefore, the State has the power to admit, always limited to civil effects, not true legitimacy, but recognition with limited effects.

2. Canon Law

According to can. 1114 CIC, a legitimate child is: a) one who is conceived (understood to be by the husband of the mother) during a valid or putative marriage, even if born after the dissolution of the marriage or after the marriage has lost its putative character (cf., for this, can. 1015 § 4); b) one who, although conceived outside of marriage (i.e., by a man who was not, at the time of conception, the husband of the mother), is born when the father was united in a valid or putative marriage with the mother (or perhaps even when such a marriage, contracted after conception, was already dissolved and was no longer putative).

An illegitimate child is one who is neither conceived nor born of a valid or putative marriage. A child is also illegitimate if, although conceived during a valid or putative marriage and thus falling under case a, at the time of conception one of the parents was bound by a solemn vow or by sacred Orders, and the use of marriage was therefore illicit (even if the parents were unaware of this).

To determine whether someone was conceived during marriage or not, and whether they were conceived by the husband of the mother or by another, given the almost absolute impossibility of direct proof, recourse is often had to the two presumptions established in can. 1115, both of which are *iuris tantum* and complement each other. The first is that a child born after 180 days from the celebration of marriage (valid or putative) and not more than 300 days from the cessation of conjugal life is presumed to have been conceived by the husband of the mother, i.e., presumed to be his child. This presumption is rebutted only if the contrary is proven by clear evidence, i.e., if it is shown to be impossible that the child was conceived by the husband of the mother (e.g., if there was no conjugal act between the spouses during the period between the 300th and the 180th day prior to the child’s birth). The second presumption is one of legitimacy in favor of the child born after 180 days from the celebration of marriage and not more than 300 days from the cessation of conjugal life: in other words, this child is presumed to have been conceived during marriage and by the husband of the mother, unless proven otherwise.

A child born within the first 180 days from the celebration of marriage is presumed neither to have been conceived during marriage nor to have been conceived by the husband of the mother; however, if it is proven that the child was conceived by the husband of the mother (e.g., if he acknowledges the child as his), the child is equally legitimate, falling under the case b mentioned above. Similarly, a child born more than 300 days after the cessation of conjugal life is not presumed to have been conceived by the husband of the mother; and, since it was not born during marriage, it is to be considered legitimate only if both these facts are proven. If any of the facts upon which these presumptions are based is in doubt (a frequent case, e.g., in cases of abduction), the child cannot be considered illegitimate and must therefore be regarded as legitimate, even if one or both parents are unknown.

An illegitimate child is also called a natural child. But in the strict sense, this second term is applied to those illegitimate children whose parents, either at the time of conception or at the time of birth or at least at some point during the pregnancy, were free from any diriment impediment or other incapacity (e.g., mental infirmity) to marriage. The other illegitimate children are called spurious children: among these are distinguished those born from damnato coitu, namely, adulterine, incestuous, and sacrilegious children, who are those whose parents (or one of them), throughout the period from conception to birth, were respectively impeded by the impediment of prior bond (v. LIGAMEN), or by sacred Order (v.) or religious profession (can. 1072-73), or by consanguinity or affinity (can. 1076-77).

The CIC establishes various prohibitions for illegitimate children: thus they are irregular ex defectu (can. 984 n. 1); they cannot be admitted to the seminary (can. 1363); they are excluded from the dignity of cardinal (can. 232 § 2, n. 1), bishop (can. 331 § 1, n. 1), abbot or prelate nullius (can. 320 § 2); they cannot be elected major superiors of religious Orders or Congregations (can. 504); particular regulations also exclude them from the offices of editor of the S. R. Rota, consistorial advocate, etc. Dispensation is granted from all these prohibitions. For other provisions relating to illegitimates, cf. can. 90 and 777 § 2. An illegitimate child can acquire a legal status similar to that of legitimate children through so-called legitimation, which in canon law occurs: a) if the parents contract a valid or putative marriage between themselves, provided that the child is a natural child in the strict sense, not a spurious child; the celebration of the marriage is equated with its convalidation (can. 1116); b) if the parents are granted a dispensation from a diriment impediment, provided that the child was already born or at least conceived at the time when the dispensation is granted (can. 1051); c) if the Holy See (for Latin rite faithful, normally the Sacred Congregation of the Sacraments) grants legitimation by way of grace.

Children legitimated by the subsequent marriage of their parents are equated, in canon law, with legitimate children; but they remain incapable of being appointed cardinals (can. 232 § 2, n. 1), bishops (can. 331 § 1, n. 1), or abbots or prelates nullius (can. 320 § 2). The effects of legitimation by rescript of the Holy See are regulated in the rescript itself. Legitimation by dispensation from a diriment impediment (which always concerns spurious children) perhaps removes only the irregularity ex defectu, mentioned in can. 984 n. 1.

If the parents' marriage is sanated in radice (v. CONVALIDAZIONE, II), the illegitimate children find themselves in the same position as they would be if, at the time to which the effects of the sanation extend (cf. can. 1038 § 1-2), a valid marriage had been celebrated, and if, in that case, a dispensation from an impediment had been granted; therefore, sanation in radice can make a spurious child considered legitimate (not only legitimated), or it can legitimize him according to can. 1031, even if he was actually born after the dispensation was granted.

3. Italian Law

In Italian law, a child is legitimate only if conceived during the marriage (valid or putative) by the husband of the mother; a child is illegitimate if not conceived during the marriage or if not conceived by the husband of the mother.

To favor, in case of doubt, the legitimacy of the child, the law presumes with absolute presumption (thus not admitting contrary proof) that a child born when 180 days have elapsed since the celebration of the marriage and not more than 300 days have elapsed since its dissolution or annulment was conceived during the marriage (art. 232 of the Civil Code). Moreover, it presumes that the husband is the father of the child conceived during the marriage (art. 231 of the Civil Code), unless the husband disowns him, which can only occur in the following cases (art. 235 of the Civil Code): 1) if during the period from the three hundredth to the one hundred and eightieth day before the birth he was physically unable to cohabit with his wife due to absence or another cause; 2) if during the said period he was affected by impotence, even if it were only generative impotence; 3) if during the same period he was legally separated from his wife even by virtue of a temporary magistrate's order, unless there had been a reunion between the spouses, even if only temporary; 4) if during the said period the wife committed adultery and concealed from her husband her pregnancy and the birth of the child. In this last case, the husband is admitted to prove any other fact tending to exclude paternity. Finally, it also considers legitimate the child born within the first 180 days after the celebration of the marriage, though allowing disownment by the husband; however, disownment cannot take place if the husband was aware of the pregnancy before the marriage, or if it appears from the birth certificate that the declaration of birth was made by him or by his special proxy (art. 233 of the Civil Code). The action of disownment is subject in any case to strict time limits (generally three months from when the husband had knowledge of the birth, or is presumed to have had such knowledge: arts. 244 and 247 of the Civil Code).

The status of legitimate or illegitimate child has no effect in civil law (unlike canon law) outside family and patrimonial relations between parents and children. Within this scope, however, there are notable differences in treatment between the two categories of children. The fundamental norms in this matter are contained in the Constitution, which, after stating in art. 29 that «the Republic recognizes the rights of the family as a natural society founded on marriage», adds: «It is the duty and right of parents to maintain, educate, and instruct their children, even if born out of wedlock... The law ensures to children born out of wedlock every legal and social protection compatible with the rights of the members of the legitimate family. The law shall lay down the norms and limits for the investigation of paternity» (art. 30).

The Civil Code, although prior to the Constitution, can be considered substantially in conformity with the principles therein enunciated. It essentially distinguishes four degrees of treatment, according to the different factual and legal conditions of illegitimate children, namely: a) a child whose paternity or maternity is not established in any of the ways to be mentioned in the following paragraphs: he has neither rights nor duties towards his parents; b) a child whose paternity or maternity is indirectly established by civil or criminal sentence, or by an unequivocal written declaration of the parents, or depends on a marriage declared null: he has the right to alimony and to a life annuity or share in the parent's inheritance (arts. 279, 580, 594 of the Civil Code); c) a child recognized by the father or mother, or whose paternity or maternity has been judicially declared: he has alimentary and succession rights in a manner analogous (but to a lesser extent) to that of legitimate children, and is bound to provide alimony to the parent who recognized him or whose paternity or maternity was judicially declared (arts. 435, 539, 541-43, 545-46, 573-79 of the Civil Code); moreover, the parent has towards him the rights deriving from parental authority, except for legal usufruct (art. 260 of the Civil Code); and must maintain, educate, and instruct him (art. 261 of the Civil Code); the child assumes the father's surname, or, if recognized only by the mother, the mother's surname (art. 262); d) legitimate child: he is fully equated with the legitimate child.

Here are the most important norms regarding the recognition, judicial declaration, and legitimation of children.

Recognition may be made only by the father who has reached the age of eighteen, or by the mother who has reached the age of fourteen, unless it occurs on the occasion of their marriage. It may be made either in the birth record, or by a declaration (made at least after the child’s conception) presented to the civil status officer or to the guardian judge, or in a public deed, or in a will. Children born of an incestuous union (i.e., those whose parents are related by direct line or by affinity in the direct line, or by collateral relationship in the second degree) may be recognized only by the parents who, at the time of conception, were unaware of the existence of such relationship or affinity. Children born of adultery may not be recognized by the parent who, at the time of conception, was bound in marriage, except where that marriage has been dissolved by the death of the other spouse; and if, as a result of that marriage, there are legitimate or legitimated children or legitimate descendants, recognition has no effect unless it is admitted by decree of the President of the Republic, subject to certain safeguards established by law (arts. 250–68).

A judicial declaration of paternity or maternity may be sought by the child (or, if he has died, by his descendants) or by his legal representative. For the judicial declaration of paternity, certain prescription periods are established, and moreover it is not admitted except in the following cases: a) if the mother and the alleged father notoriously cohabited as spouses at the time corresponding to the child’s conception; b) if paternity is indirectly established by a civil or criminal judgment or by an unequivocal written declaration of the alleged father; c) if rape or violence was committed at the time corresponding to the child’s conception; d) if there is possession of status as a natural child. The judicial declaration of paternity or maternity may not be made in the case of an incestuous child; nor may it be made in the case of an adulterous child if the marriage giving rise to the adultery is still in force, or if there are legitimate or legitimated children or their legitimate descendants from that marriage (arts. 269–79; see also PATERNITÀ, ricerca della).

Legitimation, which may apply only to children whose recognition is not prohibited, takes place: a) automatically, by subsequent marriage of the parents to each other, provided that they have recognized the child; b) by decree of the President of the Republic, upon application by at least one of the parents who has no legitimate or legitimated children from a subsequent marriage nor descendants from them, and provided that there is impossibility or at least a very serious obstacle to legitimating the child by subsequent marriage (arts. 280–90).

BIBL.: G. Cavigioli, *Man. di diritto canon.*, 2nd ed., Torino 1939, pp. 158 ff.; P. Cipriotti, *De prole legittima vel illegittima in iure canon. vigenti*, Roma 1940; I. Chelodi – P. Cipriotti, *In canon. de personis*, Vicenza-Trento 1942, pp. 159 ff.; A. Trabucchi, *Istituto. di dir. civile*, 5th ed., Padova 1950, especially pp. 245 ff.