PROCESSIONE

PROCESSION. — From *pro* “before” and *cedere* “to walk,” it is generally the ceremonial proceeding in public, with measured steps, of a group that precedes or follows an image or a distinguished person.

I. IN CATHOLIC LITURGY

A procession is a solemn supplication made in honor and praise of God or the saints, in thanksgiving, in penance, and in expiation, especially in times of calamity. It is an act both of homage toward God and of the exaltation of religious sentiment (CIC, 1200 § 1). Processions are also called *litaniae, rogationes, supplicationes*.

The order of the procession is arranged by the Roman Ritual (tit. IX): the Cross always leads the procession, followed by the people (two by two) and the clergy according to hierarchical rank; psalms and hymns are sung (St. Augustine, *De civ. Dei*, 22, 8) and special prayers are recited; in some regions or occasions these are accompanied by dances and rhythmic gestures (e.g., the famous dancing procession of Echternach in honor of St. Willibrord on the Tuesday after Pentecost). Besides the Cross, other sacred symbols are carried: banners, relics, statues, etc. Processions are distinguished as independent of other liturgical acts, such as litanies, Eucharistic processions, pilgrimages, the reception of a bishop on his entry or pastoral visit, and processions joined to liturgical functions, such as station processions, candle processions, palm processions, and processions to the baptismal font. There are ordinary processions, which recur every year on certain feasts or days (of candles, of palms, litanies, etc.), and extraordinary processions, which are ordered for particular circumstances, such as a calamity or a thanksgiving.

Processions in religion were and are in use among all peoples (see below). Before the Peace of Constantine, Christians had only funeral processions. By the end of the 4th century in Jerusalem, as is narrated in the *Peregrinatio* of Egeria (CSEL, 39, ch. 24 ff., pp. 71-101), processions commemorating events in the life of Christ in Jerusalem, Bethlehem, etc., were already highly developed. St. Ambrose (Ep. 22 ad sor.) and St. Augustine (Conf., IX, 7) describe processions on the occasion of the translation of relics. In Rome the so-called Greater Litanies (see ROGATIONS) were introduced to replace the pagan festival in honor of Robigus (April 25). An integral part of liturgical life are the station processions, revived and reorganized by Gregory I, on the anniversary feasts of martyrs, especially on the greater feast days of the ecclesiastical year and on the ferial days of Lent. On the four most ancient Marian feasts (Nativity, Annunciation, Purification, and Dormition or Assumption) a great procession was made with a torchlight procession from St. Adrian’s to St. Mary Major. In the liturgy of the Mass three ceremonial processions were formed: of the entrance of the celebrant (*Introitus*), of the offerings of the faithful at the Offertory, and of Communion; a procession was also added for the reading of the Gospel. In times of public calamity extraordinary penitential processions were introduced (famous is that of 591 ordered by St. Gregory the Great). To implore heavenly blessing on the fruits of the field, besides the Rogation processions, other processions were made through the fields with four stations for singing the beginnings of the four Gospels, each in the direction of one of the four cardinal points; in some regions they were made on horseback with the Blessed Sacrament or with a relic of the Precious Blood (*Blutritt* of Weingarten in Germany). The most solemn of all is the Eucharistic procession on the feast of *Corpus Domini* and on the occasion of national or international Eucharistic congresses.

Great and picturesque processions are held in Spain, famous, for example, is the one of the Rosary or the one lasting 10-12 hours during Holy Week in Seville and other Spanish cities. In Germany in recent years there have flourished nocturnal penitential processions made by men during Lent.

II. CANON LAW

In the present discipline of the Church processions are distinguished as ordinary and extraordinary; the former are tied to fixed days by the liturgy or local customs, such as those of the feast of the Purification of the Blessed Virgin, Palm Sunday, Corpus Christi, and the Rogations; the latter are ordered in special circumstances of a public character, such as processions of penance to implore the cessation of a scourge, in case of plague, war, famine, drought, etc. (Caeremon. Episc., lib. II, cap. 16, 21, 32, 33 n. 8 ff.; Rituale Romanum, tit. IX, cap. 1, n. 8; CIC, can. 1290 § 2). Processions are further distinguished as public, to which properly belongs the definition given above according to can. 1290 § 1, and private, which either are made in private buildings or by private persons without a true convocation of the entire faithful people. To the latter are assimilated those made by clergy and faithful attached to a particular church or conducted through the streets by religious or confraternities (cf. S. R. Rota, Feb. 3, 1922; AAS, 14 [1922] p. 397). They are also distinguished as theophoric and non-theophoric.

This form of public worship is also disciplinarily regulated by the CIC (can. 1290-95), which treats of processions in general and in particular of the procession of Corpus Christi. Only the Pope has the right to order public processions, both ordinary and extraordinary, for the whole Church; while local Ordinaries may permit in their respective dioceses extraordinary processions and transfer or even abolish ordinary ones, with the exception of the Eucharistic procession permitted by the CIC also to religious during the octave of Corpus Christi.

III. The Roman Ritual (tit. IX, ch. 6-14) indicates the following extraordinary processions for causes of public utility: 1) to ask for rain; 2) for fair weather; 3) to avert a storm; 4) for propitiation in time of famine; 5) of mortality or plague; 6) of war; 7) or of any other calamity; 8) for thanksgiving; 9) for the translation of relics.

Except where they enjoy particular privileges (such as the Dominicans for processions made on the first Sunday of the octave), religious, even exempt ones, are dependent on the bishop for processions conducted outside their churches and monasteries (can. 1293). But if they lack a cloister, they may freely proceed in procession even on the street contiguous to the convent or church (S. Congr. of Rites, July 27, 1628). All the more do Chapters, parish priests, rectors of churches, confraternities, and all other diocesan moral bodies need the license of the Ordinary to conduct processions; they are expressly forbidden to introduce new processions or to transfer or suppress existing ones without the bishop’s permission, with whom they must indeed cooperate to uproot, if necessary, abuses or bad customs. The faculties of the Ordinary in this regard do not cease in the face of customs or immemorial prescriptions to the contrary: for to him alone belongs the disciplinary supervision of worship (S. Congr. of Rites, Tarentum, Feb. 3, 1922). Parish priests have the right to guide and arrange any ordinary public procession within the limits of their respective parishes, even if ordered by religious, except the Eucharistic procession organized by them during the octave of Corpus Christi and conducted outside a church (can. 467, 7; Commission for the Interpretation of the CIC, Nov. 12, 1922; AAS, 14 [1922], p. 395; 17 [1925], p. 582).

Therefore, procedure can be judicial, administrative, or even directed toward the formation of legislative norms; it can be solemn or summary, ordinary or exceptional, oral or written, or predominantly oral, predominantly written, or essentially documentary, etc.

In canon law, however, two fundamental types of procedure must be distinguished: judicial procedure, as outlined in canons 1552 to 1916 and from 1933 to 1998, and administrative procedure. Strictly speaking, there is no such thing as a procedure—or more precisely, a procedure directed toward the drafting of legislative norms—in canon law, since the Supreme Legislator in the Church, by the very nature of the case, is not bound by laws (*legibus solutus*).

**OUTLINE:**

I. Judicial Procedure

II. Canonical Judicial Procedure

III. Special Proceedings

IV. Procedure for Sacred Ordination

V. Procedure *super rato et non consummato*

VI. Procedure for Personal Separation

VII. Pauline Privilege

VIII. Procedure for Beatification and Canonization

IX. Canonical Administrative Procedure.

I. **Judicial Procedure.** — Judicial procedure is the set of norms directed toward the practical realization of an action (see *azione*), that is, the formal framework through which a concrete legal will is ascertained by a judge (see *giudice*), namely, an organ that, through its objective activity, substitutes for the activity of private or public parties (see *parti*). Hence the definition in canon 1552 § 1: “By the term ecclesiastical judgment is understood the resolution of a controversy over which the Church has the right to adjudicate and the definitive decision.”

1. **Historical Notes.** — Originally, canonical judicial procedure derived from three sources—or, more precisely, drew its structure from three sets of norms: Roman law, which was always predominant; Germanic law; and the specifically canonical element, which arose from the very fabric of ecclesiastical society as a perfect society and from the tradition and mentality of Christian philosophical thought. Over the centuries and with the evolution of institutions, this third element developed ever more extensively, so that from the celebrated constitution of Clement V in 1306 (see *Corpus iuris canonici*), which established summary procedure, we arrive at the Tridentine reforms, the jurisprudence of the Sacred Roman Rota (particularly influential in the 17th century; see *Tribunali della S. Sede. III*), the procedural institutions of Benedict XIV (1741–48), and then to the instructions of the Sacred Congregation of 1840 and 1883, and the Pio-Benedictine Reform of 1908.

The current Book IV of the *Codex Iuris Canonici*, in the end, does not depart, as regards the origin of its institutions, from the traditional Roman, Germanic, and specifically canonical sources, while moderately incorporating some elements from the civil laws of states and certain principles of modern procedural doctrine.

2. **Necessity of Procedure.** — The necessity of judicial procedure normally arises from the conflict or disagreement of the parties; precisely because of this conflict, the intervention of the judge’s substituting activity becomes necessary. Less frequently, especially in contentious cases, it happens that a particular legal end cannot be achieved through agreement or the acquisition of the parties, and a formal judgment is obligatory despite any agreement. Indeed, while in the positive law of states there are categories in which judicial authority’s intervention is necessary precisely because a certain effect can only be realized through a regular judgment (for example, in Italian law, the ascertainment of a crime and the imposition of penalties, causes concerning the status of persons, etc.), in canon law it may be doubted whether an analogous principle exists, since in canon law the application of penalties is carried out (and in practice normally) even through administrative channels, and it is not excluded that, *saltern iure extraordinario*, with the prior approval of a pontifical commission, even disputes concerning the status of persons (and especially matrimonial disputes) may be resolved within the framework of an administrative procedure.

II. **Canonical Judicial Procedure.** — 1. **Characteristics.** — It must be admitted: a) that in canonical judicial procedure, the publication of the sentence itself can be made by summoning the parties to a solemn reading of the judgment rendered by the judge sitting in tribunal (can. 1877).

b) That canonical judicial procedure is normally secret with respect to third parties; publication is the rule between the parties in the sense that the parties have the right to be informed of all acts, documents, and evidence in the case, subject to the exception provided in can. 1623 § 3: “If the manner of pleading or the nature of the evidence is such that the revelation of the acts or evidence would endanger the reputation of others, or give rise to dissension, or cause scandal or some other such inconvenience, the judge may bind witnesses, experts, parties, and their advocates or procurators by oath to observe secrecy.” In substance, the judge cannot take account of evidence that has not been communicated, at least under the oath of secrecy, to the advocates of the parties.

c) That in canonical judicial procedure, the inquisitorial principle is realized, in the sense that many activities can and sometimes must be undertaken *ex officio* by the judge (for example, the judge may *ex officio* raise the discussion of an incidental question (can. 1837); retract *ex officio* a sentence affected by nullity (can. 1897 § 2); correct or revoke *ex se*, before the merits of the case are decided, an interlocutory sentence (can. 1841); order *ex officio* the intervention of a third party (can. 1853); declare *ex officio* the closure of the instruction—the so-called *conclusum in causa* (can. 1860 § 2)—while in the field of evidence the ecclesiastical judge is vested with broad inquisitorial powers, both in the examination of the parties, the *ex officio* citation of witnesses not proposed by the parties (can. 1759), the admission and appointment of experts (can. 1792), matters of access and judicial recognition (can. 1860), and in matters of oath, not only supplementary (can. 1829) but also decisive (see *giuramento*).

Nevertheless, although the judge’s initiative in ecclesiastical controversies is predominant, both in abstract theory and especially in practice—inasmuch as today 99% of judgments concern matrimonial matters, that is, controversies concerning the public good or at least the salvation of souls (i.e., cases in which ecclesiastical positive law permits broader powers of *ex officio* initiative)—there are still, particularly in causes involving private interests, activities that are exclusively or at least predominantly reserved to the initiative of the parties.

But above all, the fundamental principle holds that the judge can never initiate a cause *ex officio*; hence the rule *nemo iudex sine parte*, although this party may sometimes be a public party, namely, the Promoter of Justice (see *Promotore di Giustizia*). Moreover, even in matrimonial causes, there exists a practice or at least a tendency whereby it does not seem advisable for the judge, driven by excessive zeal, to compel the parties (when none of them shows diligence) to prosecute, instruct, and discuss the cause. The excessive zeal of some inferior judges directed toward forcing the parties, once a cause has been introduced or even instructed, to discuss it or to renounce it finds no justification in the Code, and above all, no practical grounds of expediency in its favor.

If the parties intend to suspend the prosecution of a matrimonial cause, there is no reason to urge them to proceed. The judge should await the expiration of the peremptory term, and, once this has elapsed, declare the cause abandoned (can. 1736–1739); this is the maximum that he can and must do, without failing in his duty and above all without violating principles of expediency and propriety.

d) In principle, procedural law is replete with preclusive terms: a) preclusions on the submission of claims and exceptions (can. 1628 et seq.); b) preclusion concerning the alteration of the very formula of the joinder of issue (can. 1731, n. 1); c) preclusions regarding evidence for the contumacious party (can. 1842 et seq.) and the intervening party (can. 1852 et seq.); d) preclusions on the admission of new evidence after the publication of testimony and the *conclusum in causa* (can. 1786, 1861 §1) and in appellate proceedings (can. 1891 §1). However, the theoretical rigor of these provisions is practically tempered both by the legislative norm that allows the judge, in each case, to grant exceptions for just, grave, or most grave reasons, and especially in practice (and it must be so) as a result of a liberal application of these norms, particularly in matrimonial causes (to which, as already noted, some 90% of ecclesiastical cases are now attributed). It must also be considered that in such a delicate matter, no obstacles should be placed, at any stage or state of proceedings, in the way of the search for truth. Strictly preclusive, as is obvious, are the terms for the exercise of means of appeal (can. 1851, 1853, 1893, 1895, 1905, 1847).

It must also be noted that the rigor of some of these peremptory terms is mitigated: a) by their length, which is sometimes excessive, such as those for the complaint of irremediable nullity (30 years) and for restitutio in integrum, including the deduction of *evidenter neglectum legis praescriptum* (4 years); b) that in matters concerning the status of persons (practically matrimonial), there are no terms, so that appeal (even if sometimes called *retractatio causae*) is always admissible until there is a double conforming judgment; likewise, according to a certain doctrine accepted even by the total jurisprudence, the appeal of the Defender of the Bond, *pro sua conscientia* (can. 1987), is always admissible; whereas the faculty of the parties to request, even after two contrary judgments, a new instance based on new and grave arguments and documents, is not subject to peremptory terms (can. 1989).

e) In current canon law, the principle of indirect communication prevails, in that the parties do not exchange or notify claims, requests, and even grounds of appeal directly to one another, but indirectly, through the judge; and the proceedings do not commence with a summons served by one party on the other, but with a libellus presented to the judge (can. 1706), which the judge must admit (can. 1709); hence, once admitted, the summons is issued by the judge himself (can. 1712).

2. Principal sources of canon judicial procedure

As has already been noted, the principal source of current canon judicial procedure emanates from the canons ranging from 1552 to 1916 and from 1933 to 1998, which thus comprise the first 21 titles of Book IV, with the exception of: a) Title XVII, which deals with the execution of judgments, an activity recognized in canon law as purely administrative; b) Title XVIII, divided into two chapters: the first of which deals with an institute of a substantive nature, namely compromise (*v.*), while the second deals with arbitration, which is indeed a procedural institute, but one that is regulated by a norm—truly too brief and hasty—such as that of can. 1930, which refers to and canonizes the norms of the respective civil laws (*voi in quo compromissum imitur*). This fundamental core of procedural laws, which might well be called the current common procedural law of the Church, has the undoubted technical merit of regulating a complex matter in a single body of law, which before the Pio-Benedictine codification was contained in a chaotic array of sources scattered over time, in subject matter, and in structure. Before the CIC, procedural law had to take account of: a) various titles of the Decretals of Gregory IX; b) the celebrated *Extravagantes* *Dispendiosa* and *Saepae*, which established the summary process; c) the rules of the Chancery; d) certain provisions of the Council of Trent; e) the celebrated constitutions *Dei miseratione* and *Si datam* of Benedict XIV for processes of matrimonial nullity and Sacred Orders; f) numerous other papal constitutions; g) various instructions of the Roman Sacred Congregations (S. Congr. Ep. et Reg. 26 March 1886; Council 22 Aug. 1940; S. Office 30 June 1883, etc.); h) and finally the procedural norms of the *Sapienti consilio* (20 June 1905), the attached *Leges propriae* of the Sacred Roman Rota and the Apostolic Signatura, and subsequent *Regulae serenae* (4 Aug. 1910; 6 March 1912; 3 Nov. 1915).

Current common procedural law is, however, completely and sometimes derogated by: a) the norms in force at the Tribunal of the Sacred Roman Rota (29 June 1934) and the related supplementary provisions consisting of normative measures, resolutions approved by the Plenary of Auditors, and sometimes confirmed by the Supreme Pontiff, etc. (*V. G. Finna, Praxis iudicialis canonica*, Rome 1952). It seems beyond doubt that the special norms of the Sacred Roman Rota, even if they may sometimes be considered in conflict with the norms of common law, prevail over them; b) the norms in force at the Tribunal of the Apostolic Signatura, which are still those of 29 June 1905 and 6 March 1912, updated in certain particulars not so much by formal provisions as by a constant practice; c) the norms issued by the Sacred Congregation of the Sacraments for causes of nullity of marriage, of 24 July 1936. The validity of some—truly few—of these norms, which appear to conflict with common law, is debated. The most authoritative doctrine, which is supported even by some precedents derived from Rotal jurisprudence, tends rather to consider any norm of the instruction that, hypothetically, proves contrary to the law of the Code as ineffective. Special norms for particular procedural institutes are contained in norms issued by the Sacred Congregation of the Holy Office and the Sacred Congregation of the Sacraments.

It must also be noted that for the faithful of the Eastern rite, a complete procedural regulation is now in force, established by the *motu proprio* of 6 Jan. 1950 (*AAS* 42 [1950], pp. 5–120). This regulation, which in the end constitutes Book IV of the future CIC for the Eastern Church, appears far superior to Book IV of the CIC for the Latin Church, in that it was drafted with due consideration for the inconveniences of a practice spanning more than thirty years and the criticisms that doctrine had raised on the subject.

3. General structure of common judicial procedure

This can be discerned by reference to specific entries in this Encyclopedia: a) regarding the judge and his competence, see the entries: COMPETENZA; GIUDICE ECCLESIASTICO; PRESIDENTE DI TRIBUNALE; TRIBUNALI ECCLESIASTICI; TRIBUNALI DELLA S. SEDE. b) Regarding the judge’s assistants, see DIFENSORE DEL VINCOLO; NOTAIO; PERITO; PROMOTORE DI GIUSTIZIA. c) Regarding the concept of party and defenders, see ATTORE; AVVOCATO; CAPACITÀ; REO. d) Regarding the introduction and initiation of a cause, see CONTESTAZIONE DELLA LITE; DENUNCIA; ISTANZA; LIBELLO. e) Regarding evidence, see CONFESSIONE (mezzo di prova); DOCUMENTO, V. II d. nel diritto canonico; GIURAMENTO; PERITO; PRESUNZIONI; TESTIMONI. f) Regarding the effects of the pendency of a suit, see LITE PENDENTE; regarding the conclusion of a cause, see CONCLUSIO IN CAUSA. h) Regarding the lapse of an instance, see DECADENZA; ISTANZA; PERVENZIONE. i) Regarding what is brought before the court, see AZIONE; DELITTO; ECCEZIONE. l) Regarding the concept of res iudicata, of judgment, and the related means of challenging a judgment, see APPELLO; DECRETO; QUESTIONE DI NULLITÀ; RESTITUTIO IN INTEGRUM; SENTENZA; OPPOSIZIONE DEL TERZO.

Judicial procedure may be resorted to: a) whenever the matter in dispute is of a judicial nature, and it is of a judicial nature

A subjective right or the ascertainment of a legal fact, provided that the action itself is not directed toward the censure or annulment of an administrative act (can. 1601). Truly, this is one of the most serious and obscure points of the current canon law process. While some would wish, and perhaps justly so, to admit judicial action whenever a subjective right exists, even if violated by an administrative act (with the obvious exception of cases in which the norm, by expressly denying judicial action, diminishes the subjective right to a legitimate interest), others, who have in their favor a prevailing trend in Rotal jurisprudence and the constant practice of the Sacred Congregations, interpret the norm of can. 1601 in a most rigorous sense, namely, that the existence of an administrative act truly precludes direct action for the reparation of the violated right, even to the limited extent of compensation for damages.

b) Whenever the judicial path has not been preempted by a recourse that one party has made to a Sacred Congregation, without the other party having expressly raised an objection in this regard: this is the norm contained in no. 10, art. 11, chap. 3 of the *Normae peculiares* of *Sapienti Consilio*. Thus, by this phenomenon of administrative acquisition, any controversy, even if by its nature judicial, may be excluded from strictly judicial proceedings and remain definitively subject to the administrative path.

III. SPECIAL PROCEDURES

The ordinary canon law process, as has already been mentioned, is governed by the aforementioned titles of Book IV of the *Codex Iuris Canonici*. This is the ordinary process, which, however, does not merely encompass the straightforward procedure relating to the initiation, development, and conclusion of a judgment, even in appellate instances; it also governs the prerequisites of the action and the process, and even the configuration of certain special actions such as the sequestration of a thing and the inhibition of the exercise of a right (can. 1672-75, V. SEQUESTRO; new works and feared damage [1676-78]), the nullity (v.) of acts (1679-83); rescissory actions and actions for restitution in integrum (v. can. 1684-89); possessory remedies (can. 1693-1700). In substance, it is not merely a book of formal content, for it regulates certain institutions more closely related to substantive law than to procedural law.

1. CRIMINAL PROCESS. — This body of norms, which has indeed been termed the ordinary canon law process, is applicable to the generality of contentious processes, i.e., those concerning civil rather than criminal matters; this is the general principle. However, the criminal judgment as set forth in can. 1933-59, with the exception of particular norms concerning denunciation (v.), preliminary investigation (inquest, V. INQUISIZIONE GIUDIZIALE), correction (v.) of the offender (which is a means by which criminal process may be avoided if the guilty party confesses promptly and the case does not fall under can. 1948-49), and the accusation by the Promoter of Justice (it should be noted that this accusation is not obligatory, as is the action of the Public Prosecutor in secular criminal procedure codes, but depends on the precept of the Ordinary, can. 1954), the criminal judgment, we say, with the exception of these which are rather supplements than modifications, is regulated in its structure by the same norms that govern the contentious process. While, therefore, especially in the states of continental Europe, one is accustomed to contemplate a criminal process that, due to its characteristics of orality, publicity, and procedural concentration, differs greatly from the contentious process, in canon law the structure of the two processes is substantially identical. That is to say, in it, *servatis servandis*, the same phenomenon of amalgamation of the two procedures occurs that, in a certain sense, is found in English law, except that in English law the principle of orality and publicity prevails, while in canon law the principle of writing and secrecy does.

2. SUMMARY PROCESS. — Canon law process, whether contentious or criminal, as it results from the body of canons that govern it, is undoubtedly a formal, cumbersome procedure. The judge is indeed empowered to render it more expeditious by establishing short deadlines, closing the investigation at a certain point by declaring himself sufficiently informed of the truth of the matter, and deferring to the merits the definition of incidental questions which, if treated separately, would entail great loss of time. But apart from these powers and faculties of the judge, of which the judge cannot be compelled to make use, there does not exist in the current canon law a summary or brief process in contrast to the ordinary or solemn process. The new procedural order for the faithful of the Eastern rite (published Jan. 6, 1950, arts. 1-576; AAS, 42 [1950], pp. 5-120), however, does provide for a process before a single judge which may well be termed a summary process (can. 452-67). The only form of summary process known to the current *Codex Iuris Canonici* is a special type of matrimonial process, namely, the documentary matrimonial process in the so-called excepted cases (can. 1990-92).

3. MATRIMONIAL PROCESS. — It must first be noted that the matrimonial process is also substantially regulated by the norms of the ordinary contentious process. These norms are supplemented by can. 1960 to 1992, which deal with the competent forum for matrimonial causes (can. 1960-65), the formation of the tribunal (which must always be collegial; can. 1966-69), the rights and duties of the Defender of the Bond (v. can. 1968-69), the right to accuse the nullity of marriage (can. 1970-73), witnesses (v.), and especially the so-called *testimoniale septimae manus* in causes of impotence and non-consummation (can. 1974-75), the corporal inspection and expert examinations in causes of impotence, non-consummation, and lack of consent due to mental illness (can. 1976-82), the publication of the process, the conclusion of the cause, and the sentence (can. 1983-85), appeals against sentences rendered in this matter (can. 1986-89), and finally the process in excepted cases (can. 1990-92).

The serious questions that have arisen regarding the capacity of the parties to accuse the nullity of the marriage they have contracted are well known. After many doctrinal and jurisprudential uncertainties, the clear provisions issued by the Commission for the Authentic Interpretation of the *Codex Iuris Canonici* have established the principle that only the spouse who was the direct and culpable cause of the nullity or impediment may be excluded from the right to bring an accusation (Comm. interpr. CIC, Mar. 12, 1929; Feb. 17, 1930; July 17, 1933; Mar. 22, 1939; July 27, 1942; Dec. 6, 1943; May 3, 1945; Jan. 4, 1946). Other controversies have arisen from can. 1872, particularly when it concerns accusing, for certain patrimonial effects, the nullity of a marriage after the death of one or both spouses. It is also well known that there is a broad possibility of requesting a new instance of judgment, even after two conforming but contrary sentences, based on new arguments and documents (*res nova et gravis*, can. 1989, coll. 1903). It is likewise known that, since sentences in matrimonial causes never pass into *res iudicata*, it is possible, even many years after the publication of the first contrary sentence, to freely pursue a second instance of judgment. From this characteristic, peculiar to matrimonial causes of never passing into *res iudicata*, profound modifications to the structure of the ordinary contentious process derive.

Special mention must be made of the matrimonial process in exceptional cases, since, as has been noted, it represents an example of an abbreviated or summary judicial process under the current canonical procedural system.

In the cases strictly indicated in can. 1990, where the existence of the impediment is established by a certain and authentic document, free from contradictions or exceptions, and with equal certainty it is established that no dispensation was granted, the Ordinary, having cited the parties and with the intervention of the Defender of the Bond, may, without observing the other formalities of the process, issue a declaratory sentence of nullity. It is therefore unnecessary to constitute a collegial tribunal, and the Defender of the Bond is not obliged to appeal against this declaratory sentence of nullity, as is required in ordinary cases. However, for his own conscience, the judge of appeal may appeal, and he will either confirm the sentence of the Ordinary of first instance or remit the acts to the tribunal of first instance so that it may proceed according to the ordinary norms (can. 1991-1992). In truth, the nature of this process has been debated among authors, some of whom considered it administrative rather than judicial. Nowadays, however, there is no doubt (also in view of what is prescribed by art. 227 of the Norms of the Sacred Congregation of the Sacraments for matrimonial processes - Ordinarius iudicem agens -) that the procedure in exceptional cases is a true and proper judicial procedure, albeit summary, abbreviated, and predominantly documentary.

IV. PROCESS OF HOLY ORDERS (v. ORDINE E ORDINAZIONE, NULLITÀ di). These are processes sometimes handled judicially, but more frequently administratively, and in any case it is for the Congregation of the Holy Office or of the Sacraments—i.e., an administrative body—to determine which procedure to follow.

V. PROCESS ON A RATIFIED BUT NOT CONSUMPTED MARRIAGE

This is essentially an administrative procedure, regulated in part by cann. 1962-66 and seq., 1973-74 and seq., but above all by the instruction of 7 May 1923 of the Sacred Congregation of the Sacraments. It should be noted, however, that before the Tribunal of the Sacred Roman Rota, the failure to consummate the marriage and the just causes for dispensation may be judicially ascertained when the doubt whether it is advisable to consult the Most Holy Father (an sit consulendum Sanctissimo Domino) has, by prior Pontifical Commission, been subordinated to the doubt regarding the nullity of the marriage (v. MATRIMONIO, VII. M. RATO NON CONSUMATO).

VI. PROCESS OF PERSONAL SEPARATION

While perpetual separation for the cause of adultery must be pronounced following a judicial procedure, temporary separation, whether for a fixed or indefinite period, may be decreed by the Ordinary even through an administrative procedure (can. 1941; V. CONIUGI, II. Separazione personale dei c.).

VII. PAULINE PRIVILEGE

The Pauline privilege (v.), and the special cases referred to in can. 1125, are essentially administrative processes.

VIII. PROCESS OF BEATIFICATION AND CANONIZATION

The process of beatification and canonization (v. BEATIFICAZIONE; CANONIZZAZIONE; CONGREGAZIONI ROMANE, SACRE; PERQUISIZIONE, II. P. degli scritti; FEDE) is an administrative process.

IX. CANONICAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS

Civil jurisprudence recognizes the category of so-called jurisdictional remedies before administrative bodies exercising a special judicial activity (e.g., Council of State, Court of Auditors, etc.). A similar category does not exist in canon law. Civil jurisprudence also recognizes the category of so-called administrative appeals, such as hierarchical appeal, remonstrance, and extraordinary appeal to the Sovereign. Doctrine, however, notes that these remedies, although administrative and not jurisdictional in nature, possess a legal character insofar as the right of an individual to appeal corresponds to an obligation on the part of the public administration to rule on the appeal, an obligation sometimes sanctioned by jurisdictional means.

Now, in canon law, while there are appeals that may be likened to the hierarchical appeal of state administrative law (v. RICORSO), inasmuch as they are based on hierarchical order (appeal from decrees of the Ordinary to the hierarchical superior, exceptionally the archbishop, ordinarily the Holy See and, through it, a Sacred Congregation), and while the possibility of remonstrance exists (i.e., of appealing again to the same superior so that, better informed, he may reconsider the matter), and while the extraordinary appeal to the Sovereign also exists and is widely applied (so that at any stage and in any matter of procedure, and from any administrative—even judicial—provision, the faithful are permitted to appeal directly to the Supreme Pontiff; cf. can. 1569 § 2), it cannot be said that these remedies always possess (with the exception, that is, of certain strictly defined procedures) a legal nature, precisely because there is no strict obligation incumbent upon the superior (already approached) to reconsider the matter on the basis of new information, nor any strict obligation that can always be pursued in the external forum, either on the part of the Sacred Congregations or of the Supreme Pontiff, to examine the appeals directed to them, nor, naturally, are there any jurisdictional sanctions for such obligations. There thus exists in canon law, one might say, a general administrative procedure (lacking a legal character, because it lacks a true obligation on the part of the administrative body to rule on the appeal), which, however, is clothed in forms and even in certain guarantees that practice, more than written law, has established.

The introductory act of this process is a written petition; the party against whom the petition is directed is informed of it, and indeed it is normally communicated or notified to him in full. The arguments and counter-arguments of the parties are generally made known to them; the submission of documents and extrajudicial expert opinions is permitted; the documents and acts produced by one party are normally made known to the other; testimonial evidence, on-site investigations—especially when the procedure is conducted before a Roman Congregation—are truly exceptional. Normally, declarations of witnesses with signatures authenticated by a competent notary are produced. Only in very rare cases does the Congregation conduct direct investigations, sending an inspector to the site. As a rule, it requests information and an opinion from the Ordinary pro informatione et voto, but the opinion and information of the Ordinary are not kept secret from the parties. The provision that upholds or rejects the appeal is normally not reasoned, even though it is the fruit of laborious study and careful reflection. The term for appealing is not of strict right; it is considered, however, that when the appeal is lodged within ten days of notification of the provision, in certain matters (such as, for example, in the case of temporary separation of spouses) it has a suspensive effect. And since, as is well known, in the Roman Congregations there exists the Congress and the Plenary of Cardinals, the interested party may indeed request that a decision of the Congress be reconsidered by the Plenary, but there is no obligation on the part of the Congregation to grant this further petition, which in fact is always left to the prudent discretion of the Prefect or to the superior intervention of the Supreme Pontiff. There is no obligation to employ the services of an advocate or procurator: before certain administrative authorities, the intervention of an advocate or procurator is not welcome, and indeed is prohibited; in others, it is admitted with greater liberality.

These, then, are the general characteristics of administrative procedure, but the CIC regulates certain particular forms of administrative procedure, namely those dealt with in Part 3 of Book IV. Now, if not all of these procedures, at least the most important of them, do indeed have a juridical character, inasmuch as they impose genuine obligations upon the public administration and guarantee certain procedural rights to the interested parties.

These include the procedure for the removal of unsuitable parish priests (cf. XXVIII) and of removable parish priests (cf. XXVIII); the transfer of removable and irremovable parish priests (cf. XXIX; V. AMOVIBILITÀ; AMOZIONE; INAMOVIBILITÀ); the procedure against clerics who fail to observe the obligation of residence (v. tit. XXX), or who are suspected of concubinage (cf. XXXI; V. CONCUBINATO, IV. In canon law, concubinage is a civil matter in Italian law); or against a negligent parish priest (cf. XXXII; V. NEGLIGENZA; PARROCO).

Common characteristics of these procedures are the obligation to state the charges, the right of the interested party to present evidence, justifications, or excuses in his defence, and above all the institution of the intervention—albeit in a consultative capacity—of two synodal examiners (V. or of two consultor parish priests, so that the Ordinary, before issuing a particular decree, must hear their opinion. Above all, there is the right of appeal to the Holy See, coupled with the obligation of the Ordinary not to confer the benefice or parish, of which the appellant has been deprived, upon another on a permanent basis while the appeal is pending.

For the procedure of removal of an irremovable parish priest, V. RIMOZIONE.