RELIGIONS, COMPARATIVE STUDY OF. — Many scholars, especially over the past century, have believed that only a thorough comparison of all religions can lead to convincing conclusions regarding the problems that press upon our time. Hence the two parts of this article.
A. HISTORY OF COMPARATIVE STUDIES
OUTLINE:
I. Before the Christian era
II. From the 1st to the mid-3rd century
III. Manichaean and Neoplatonic controversies
IV. The Middle Ages
V. From the Renaissance to the rationalism of the 18th century
VI. The advent of rationalism
VII. Evolutionism in the 19th century
VIII. The great discoveries
IX. The impetus given to comparative studies.I. BEFORE THE CHRISTIAN ERA
The need for comparisons arose as soon as different peoples, each with their own beliefs and rites, came into contact with one another. The oldest documents, especially from China, Egypt and India, as well as the study of more backward, so-called “primitive” civilizations, allow us to glimpse the solutions generally adopted. It seems that fairly large groups, either through attachment to ancestral traditions, racial pride, or pride in possessing sacred texts such as the Vedas, despised foreign cults, only later to adopt particularly promising magical formulae. After wars, on the one hand the vanquished submitted to the demands of the victors, and on the other the victors tolerated or adopted those ideas, myths and practices of the vanquished that most attracted them.What could the first philosophers of India, for example the authors of the most ancient Upanishads, and perhaps under their influence Lao-tzu (6th century B.C.) in China, have thought of these amalgamations? Both proclaim pantheism: a single, eternal substance; the rest is but illusion. Mahāvīra, founder of Jainism, and Śākyamuni, founder of Buddhism (6th century B.C.), exclude abstruse speculations about God and the gods; acting in this way, they are concerned solely with offering a norm of life suited to ensure liberation and nirvāṇa; yet popular imagination soon divinizes them and transforms their doctrine into unrestrained polytheism.
Upon their arrival in Greece and Italy, the Indo-Europeans had discovered many cults different from their own: Aegean, Pelasgian, Thracian, Etruscan, etc. From the 6th century B.C., the accounts of Cadmus of Miletus, in the 5th those of Charon of Lampsacus, Xanthus of Lydia, Hellanicus of Lesbos and above all those of Herodotus, the “father of history,” revealed to them the cults of Asia Minor, Persia, Assyria-Babylonia and Egypt. Theogonies and cosmologies so disparate invited a search for a somewhat coherent solution. Herodotus already proposed assimilating from country to country the gods who had identical attributes. For their part, the philosophers sought to trace things back to their origin. For the Ionians, all things derive from water (Thales), from indeterminate matter (Anaximander), from air (Anaximenes), from fire (Heraclitus): according to these pantheists, peoples have divinized the forces of nature. Pythagoras (6th century B.C.) is struck by the harmony of the cosmos; the principle of this is therefore the One; but this One, the supreme Zeus, seems to him to be fire, the origin of celestial bodies, through which his action extends to all of nature. Also in the 6th century, Xenophanes and Parmenides, in the 5th Zeno of Elea, profess that God is one, the immutable substratum of all things. Anaxagoras (d. 428 B.C.) and Socrates, his disciple, proclaim that He is intelligence; and Plato (429-347) and Aristotle (384-322) echo them. For Aristotle, however, this Prime Mover, existing in itself, does not intervene in the world; hence there is no Providence. Still in the 6th century, Epicurus and Euhemerus, with less speculative effort, go further; according to the former, concern for earthly things would disturb the happiness of the gods; hence mortals should not, for their part, concern themselves with them; according to the latter, the gods are simply men who lived on earth; but, being illustrious personages, admiration and gratitude have raised them to the highest honors. Pyrrho inaugurates skepticism. A little later, the founder of Stoicism, Zeno (d. 264 B.C.) and his disciples, pantheists and materialists, at least in the sense that they cannot conceive of spirits and souls except as a subtler matter, direct all their activity toward the reform of practical life. Drawing inspiration from both Plato and Zeno, Antiochus of Ascalon (124-79 B.C.) pronounces in favor of eclecticism. Historical-critical concerns appear only in Polybius (c. 210-125 B.C.) and more markedly in Strabo (66-25 B.C.). The compilations of Alexander of Miletus (end of 1st century B.C.) on India, Assyria, Egypt, Asia Minor and Judea show barely a trace of them.
United in condemning the fantasy of popular beliefs and the obscenity of mythology, scholars and philosophers, however, consider belief in the gods justified by universal consent and pronounce, each in his own way, in favor of a hierarchical polytheism. The Stoics, in particular, using an allegorizing exegesis, strive to give myths a more or less profound meaning and, on the basis of the analogy of their character and functions, consider the gods of different peoples identical (theocrasia).
At the end of this period, in a work that shows considerable research, the Roman Varro (116-27 B.C.), taking up a thesis formulated by the pontiff M. Scaevola and presumably by his master Panaetius, distinguishes three kinds of theology: the first “mythical,” overflowing with fictions; the second “physical,” characterized by the naturalist speculations of the philosophical schools; the last “civil,” that is, the one sanctioned by the legislation of each country. He assimilates to the Jupiter of the Stoic pantheon the ineffable God of Jewish monotheism and declares that in the end it makes no difference whether the deity is designated by one name or another, provided there is agreement on its essence and on some essential duties. The Stoic Seneca (2-66 A.D.) would shortly after say: “Honor the deity as one conceives it fittingly... Do you wish to render the gods propitious? Be honest. To imitate them is to offer them sufficient worship,” that is, to imitate them not in the quarrels and obscenities attributed to them by mythology, but in their wisdom and in the regularity demonstrated by the course of the stars and by Fate, the Destiny that even Jupiter himself cannot escape.
The comparison of religions thus greatly preoccupied minds in those distant times; yet one can immediately see to what conclusions it led: the people confuse myths and rites together; the more reflective minds combine in their own way speculations from every source. Allegorical interpretation allows them the widest tolerance and even participation in traditional cults; separated from the crowd by their personal philosophy, they rejoin it in their practice.
II. FROM THE 1ST TO THE MID-3RD CENTURY
Christianity, with a rigor in every way unexpected, poses the problem in new terms.Having appealed to Caesar, the Apostle Paul was taken to Rome, where he preached freely for two years (Acts 25:12; 28:30-31). Peter went there voluntarily, for Rome was the center of the then-known world. As early as 64, the converts were so numerous that, according to Tacitus, Nero had a great multitude of them burned alive, « not so much for the fire [of the city, of which the tyrant made them responsible] as for their hatred of the human race », *odium generis humani* (Annals, XV, 44), that is, for their refusal to associate with cults condemned by their faith. The same historian characterizes the influx of religions into the city in these terms: « thither flock from every quarter all that is atrocious or repulsive, *quo cuncta undique atrocia aut putanda confluunt celebranturque* » (ibid.).
In fact, from 204 B.C. the cult of Cybele and Attis was tolerated, as was that of Isis, proscribed in 58, 53, 50, 48 B.C.; 19 A.D.; those of the Syrian Baals; and that of Mithras, which for a time constituted the most dangerous rival of Christianity. In the 2nd century there arose the Gnostic sects of Marcion (v.), Basilides (v.), Valentinus (v.), Bardesanes (v.), etc., most of which, while adding a few crumbs of the Gospel, also espoused the most arbitrary speculations (v. GNOSIS) and even the worst license (v. CARPOCRATES). No less confused were the various parts of the Empire. To the official cults, especially that of the emperors, were joined national cults and survivals of aboriginal cults.
On their part, scholars made known the results of their researches: Philo of Byblos, a decided Euhemerist, in his *Phoenician History*; Phlegon of Tralles in his *Olympiads* and *Marvelous Deeds*; Pausanias, the most meritorious, in his *Description of Greece*; the pseudo-Apollodorus in his *Library*. The philosophers of earlier ages, more or less transformed by the infusion of Platonic ideas, each found their adherents. To troubled souls, Hermetism offered solutions that seemed more secure: the fruit of mystical experiences and divine revelations. In the 2nd century it enjoyed great vogue (v. HERMETIC BOOKS; HERMETISM).
In short, in this period religious faith was almost universal; it derived from common notions, *xotvxi èvxotai*, according to the Stoics; from relatively innate, or rather connatural, concepts, *ouovroi*, according to the doxographers; from anticipations, *prolepsis*, according to the Epicureans. Still more: the idea of a supreme, transcendent, ineffable God, the principle of order, had imposed itself upon a great number of minds. The traditional gods were regarded either as manifestations of His various perfections or as powers, *dyneis*, or as His intermediaries between heaven and earth, *dyneis oxi*; below them stood the genii or demons, *dyneisovxei*. The Stoics, such as Seneca, the Neopythagoreans, such as Maximus of Tyre, and the Hermetists, such as Apuleius, taught that God takes different names according to the different manifestations of His activity in the universe (*polyonymia divina*). These theses, together with the purification of moral principles, enabled men to avoid some of the gravest objections of the Christians. They also permitted adaptation to the reigning cults. One may indeed see devotees, for greater security, initiated into several Oriental cults, and even the high priests themselves cumulating the highest functions.
Now the disciples of Christ, faithful to His command: « Teach them to observe all that I have commanded you » (Mt. 28:20) and to that of St. Paul: « One God, one Faith, one Baptism » (Eph. 4:5), could certainly not accept such syncretism and such tolerance. Their first writers, Justin, Tatian, Irenaeus, Hippolytus, set themselves to confute the Jews, demonstrating to them the fulfillment of Messianic prophecies, and the Gnostics, denouncing the arbitrariness, or rather the incoherence, of their speculations and their opposition to the Gospel. Justin, moreover, addresses himself directly to the emperors. « Only we », he says, « are able to justify our faith even before the learned, and that with rigorous demonstration, *monoi meta apodexasmon* » (Apol., I, 20). As for the analogies that bring Judaism, the divinely authorized precursor of Christianity, close to other religions, he explains them on the one hand (and this is a very questionable solution) by plagiarisms committed by the philosophers from the sacred books of the Hebrews and by a cunning imitation of the demons (theory of plagiarism), and on the other (and this is a more perspicacious solution) by a divine, altogether provisional, tolerance of imperfect elements, in order to facilitate the acceptance of what is essential (theory of condescension, *synkatabasis*), or, finally, by superficially accommodating the Stoic theory of seminal reasons (*logoi spermatikoi*) through « sciences of the Word » bestowed upon souls of good will.
Soon the pagan controversy flared up through the orator Fronto, the Neopythagorean Celsus, and the sophist Philostratus. Celsus, the « Voltaire » of the 2nd century, in his *True Discourse* (*Alēthēs Logos*), bitter and well-documented, levels against Christianity almost all the objections of modern rationalism and comparativism. Philostratus, at the instigation of the syncretistic court of the Severi, published his *Life of Apollonius* (v.) of Tyana, also a thaumaturge, he says, and a perfect type of piety. To answer these attacks, Minucius Felix, Tertullian, Cyprian, and somewhat later Arnobius, Commodian, Lactantius, Firmicus Maternus, took up many of the theses of St. Justin. Each of these authors provides precious information on the pagan religions. More learned and profound, they show a manifest care to indicate the sound elements in the doctrine of their adversaries. Two Alexandrian doctors, Clement (140/50-before 216) in his *Stromata* and above all Origen (c. 182-c. 251), in his *Contra Celsum*, may be said to have developed clearly most of the principles that should govern truly critical comparisons, and thus they are well equipped to demonstrate the superiority of Christianity.
III. MANICHEAN AND NEOPLATONIC CONTROVERSIES. Toward the middle of the 3rd century there appeared two new religions: one, Manichaeism (v.), dualist in imitation of Persian Mazdaism, amalgamating ideas from every source; the other, Neoplatonism (v.), monist, representing the most powerful effort of pagan thought.
The doctrine of Mani (215/6-c. 276/7) spread as far as China on one side and to Africa on the other. Long seduced by it, St. Augustine fought it later with all his vigor. To him above all we owe its knowledge until the unexpected discoveries of recent years. As for the philosophy of Plotinus (204-70), though rejecting its pantheism, its secondary gods—emanations of the supreme One—its tolerance of ancient cults and magical practices, to which it even gave a certain revival of favor, it was not stinting in praise from Augustine and the Alexandrians: St. Athanasius (d. 373) and St. Cyril (d. 444), nor from the great Syrian scholar Eusebius of Caesarea (d. c. 340), nor from the Antiochenes: St. John Chrysostom (d. 407) and Theodore (d. 457); nor from the Cappadocians: St. Basil (d. 379), his brother St. Gregory of Nyssa (d. 394), and St. Gregory Nazianzen (d. 390). Yet that there were radical differences between the two philosophies and mentalities is shown by the fact that the last and most ardent adversaries of Christianity—Porhyry, Iamblichus, Hierocles, the Emperor Julian the Apostate, Sallustius, Libanius—all sprang from among the Neoplatonists.
In 313 the Edict of Milan proclaimed the freedom of all cults. From 361 to 363 Julian the Apostate made himself the apologist of paganism, the theologian of the supreme god, the Sun, and persecuted Christians. In 410 Rome was devastated by Alaric and his barbarians. Greco-Roman civilization seemed on the verge of ruin forever. The pagans attributed the cause to the wrath of the abandoned gods. To answer them, St. Augustine published from 412 to 426 the second book of *De civitate Dei*, where he demonstrates the impotence of paganism to ensure the prosperity of nations and eternal happiness. Then, with a breadth greater than that of Irenaeus, Eusebius, and Gregory Nazianzen, he sets forth the conduct of Providence in the education of humanity and its condescension toward rites that the law of Christ was later to abolish. The work is therefore a powerful outline of a theology of history.
IV. THE MIDDLE AGES
For several centuries the Church had to apply itself to the instruction and conversion of the barbarians, whose successive invasions upset the Western world. The councils vie with one another in condemning the tenacious survivals of their superstitions.Some missionaries describe, but without arousing great interest, the customs and mores of the peoples of the North. However, from the 7th century onward, great religious controversies revived, first within Islam, due to the rapid multiplication of sects arising from divergent interpretations of the Koran, and then because of the polemics engaged at the same time against “polytheistic” cults, including Christianity as the “worship of the Trinity,” and against the Jews. Abū l-Maʿālī published in 1092 an *Exposition of Religions*; Abū l-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī (d. 935) a kind of *Summa contra gentiles*, more worthy of merit; Ibn Ḥazm (994–1064) a treatise of remarkable erudition and penetration: *Book of Decisive Judgments Concerning Religions, Sects, and Schools*. Ibn Rushd (1126–98), or Averroes (v.), poses as a disciple of Aristotle. With the subtlety and boldness of his theses, later propagated in particular by Sigerius (v.) of Brabant, he provoked among Christian thinkers one of the gravest crises. He induced them, in fact, to interpret the formulas of faith as mere metaphors, to evaluate them according to their degree of practical utility, to hold that they could be true according to faith and false according to philosophy (the thesis of the double truth), that all religions have only a relative value, and that a necessary evolution must bring about the periodic return (v. AVERROES; AVERROISM).
Similar necessities had driven Jewish scholars, especially Saʿadiah (d. 942) and Judah Halevi, c. 1140, to compose comparative treatises. Maimonides (v.), a disciple of the Arab philosopher Avempace (d. 1138), toward the end of his life became acquainted with the writings of Averroes, and, without renouncing belief in divine personality or the possibility of miracles and revelation, accepted several of his solutions. In erudition and vigor of thought he surpasses all his predecessors.
In contact with Muslims, St. John Damascene (c. 675–749) had already set forth in his *Fountain of Knowledge* a very significant sketch of comparative theology. The writings of Averroes and Maimonides compelled Western scholars to deeper studies. Among those who devoted themselves to this were William of Auvergne (d. 1249), Vincent of Beauvais (d. 1254), Roger Bacon (1214–1294), St. Albert the Great (1193–1280), and above all St. Thomas Aquinas (1226–1274) in his *Summa Theologica* and *Summa contra gentiles*, with unsurpassed mastery of the subject. Moreover, the crisis thus provoked brought about considerable progress in religious philosophy.
At the same time, the demands of the apostolate compelled the study of Arabic and Oriental languages; on the other hand, the missionary expeditions of Ascelin, Simon of Saint-Quentin, John of Pian de Carpine (v.), Benedict of Poland, William of Rubruck, MONTE CORVINO (v.), and somewhat later those of Oderic of Pordenone, Jordan of Severac, Ricoldo of Monte Croce, and POLO, MARCO (v.), confidant of the Emperor of China for 17 years, gradually broadened horizons and brought to the West information of the highest interest.
V. FROM THE RENAISSANCE TO THE RATIONALISM OF THE 18TH CENTURY
From the 13th to the 16th century philosophy and theology still produced admirable doctors. Many, however, lingered over idle questions; their syllogistic method became ever more arid, and their Latin ever more barbarous, stuffed with technical terms. Now, after the fall of Constantinople to the Turks (1453), many Greek exiles revealed to the West the masterpieces of their poets, orators, and philosophers; a form of culture more solicitous of art captivated minds: Ficino (v.) published Plotinus (v.), the spurious *Gianbiclo*, Hermes Trismegistus, Proclus (v.), a *Theologia Platonica*, a *Confirmation of Christian Dogmas by Means of the Doctrine of Socrates*. Other scholars rejected the exegesis of Aristotle presented by Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas and aligned themselves with that of Averroes. Some openly professed the thesis of the “two truths.” Greco-Roman mythology was the subject of numerous treatises; the allegorizing exegesis of the Stoics, accepted uncritically, allowed sublime speculations to be discovered there. Marsilio Ficino, Erasmus, Mucian, for example, went so far as to exalt pagan thinkers as inspired by God and often superior to Christian philosophers. Mucian (K. Muth), Bonaventure des Périers, Giovanni Bordon (v.) insinuated in more or less veiled terms the equivalence of all religions. In short, Humanism, initially favored by several popes, gradually developed against the Roman faith.Although arising from different causes, Lutheranism and Calvinism took advantage of these circumstances, as well as of the degeneration of morals and the abuses introduced into the Church. The bitter struggle they waged against it produced at least some happy results. Their claim to regulate faith according to Scripture alone obliged their partisans and adversaries to a deeper study of the original languages and sacred texts: the beginning of biblical criticism and archaeology. The apex of a Gospel Pope, stripped of every addition and superstition, provoked the appearance of a new science: the history of dogmas. In this respect, the *Magdeburg Centuries* of Matthias Vlach (Flacius Illyricus), 8 vols. in-fol. (1559–74), which study century by century the state of Christian beliefs; the celebrated *Controversies* of Cardinal Bellarmine (1st ed., 2 vols. in-fol., 1581–83); and the *Ecclesiastical Annals* of Cardinal Baronius (12 vols., in-fol., 1588–1607), which responded to the Centuriators, mark capital dates (v. BARONIUS; ROBERT BELLARMINE; CENTURIATORS).
To justify the abandonment of certain doctrines or practices, the Reformers had only to present them as survivals or infiltrations of paganism: hence the thesis of “pagan-papism” and its accusations of immorality, superstition, and papal tyranny, sustained in a multitude of writings. It is true that there was more spirit of polemics than of criticism, but at least they stimulated the study of religions.
On the other hand, whether it concerned Judaism or Christianity, a dogmatic prejudice—namely, the radical corruption of human nature due to original sin—led Protestant scholars such as G. Vossius, S. Bochart, and Th. Gale to revive the thesis of plagiarism: everything healthy among the pagans must have been the result of borrowing from the chosen people. The bishop of Avranches, D. Huet (q.v.), an admirer of Bochart, and the Oratorian L. Thomassin (q.v.) erred in following them, whereas the Benedictine Dom Calmet (q.v.) and the Jesuit P. Lescalopier firmly rejected this view. J. Spencer (q.v.), in his work *De legibus Hebraeorum ritualibus* (1685), developed the thesis of "condescension" in a judicious manner: Yahweh would have permitted "rites rendered venerable by their antiquity and the usage of nations, because in them He saw nothing but trifles tolerable or apt to prefigure some mystery." Similar conceptions appear in J. Marsham, W. Warburton, and, with a more refined critical sense, in Dom Calmet.
At the outset of their secession, the Churches derived from the "Reformation" still professed, with few exceptions (q.V. SOCINIANS), the dogmas of the Trinity, the divinity of Jesus Christ, His expiatory sacrifice, His necessary mediation, and retained a large part of Christian morality. It is therefore not surprising to see many of their scholars endeavor to demonstrate the transcendence of Christianity: L. Vives (1543), Duplessis-Mornay (q.v., 1579), Ed. Brerewood (1614), H. Grotius (1622), J. Hoornbeek (1653), J. H. Ursinus (1663), J. Kromayer (1670). Naturally, Catholics such as the canon Jovet (1676) and the Dominican V. Gotti (q.v.) did the same in more developed and learned works.
Meanwhile, following in the footsteps of Hernán Cortés, Francisco Pizarro, Hernando de Soto, Jacques Cartier, and Samuel de Champlain, many zealous missionaries brought important regions of the two Americas into the Roman faith. The *Relations de la Nouvelle-France*, the *Lettres édifiantes et curieuses des Jésuites du Canada*, for example, and the reports of explorers published in various travel collections, brought to amazed Europe a rich treasure of information. At least one work is cited as an almost perfect model of scientific rigor: the *Historia general de las cosas de la Nueva España* by the Franciscan Bernardino de Sahagún (q.v.). The later work of the Jesuit J. Fr. Lafitau (q.v.), *Mœurs des sauvages américains comparées aux mœurs des premiers temps* (1724), compared the rites of the Indians to the mysteries of Bacchus, Cybele, and Isis. For this reason, some modern ethnologists hail him as the initiator of the "anthropological method." From the Far East came, among many others, the valuable reports of Frs. M. Ricci (q.v.) and N. Trigault (q.v.); somewhat later, the *Mémoires concernant l'histoire, les sciences, les mœurs des Chinois*, translations of sacred texts such as the *Five Classics*, and commentaries of great value. Likewise, important studies on Hinduism arrived from India. In 1730–32, the Jesuit J. Calmette (q.v.) discovered the four Vedas; his confrere, Fr. Pons, in 1738, and the celebrated Carmelite Paulinus of St. Bartholomew (J. Ph. Werdin) in 1790, sent the first Sanskrit grammars to Europe. Fr. G. L. Coccodux noted the affinities between Sanskrit and European languages (1767) and thus prepared the way for comparative philology.
The painful controversies that divided missionaries in China and India, and the role played in the West by unqualified enthusiasts, will be treated elsewhere (q.V. RITO, QUESTIONE dei).
VI. THE RISE OF RATIONALISM
Free examination, as initiated by Luther and Calvin, was not precisely rationalism; indeed, they gave it a mystical character, attributing the interpretation of Scripture to a divine illumination, to the "testimony of the Holy Spirit" in the soul of the believer, as Calvin put II. It was not free, because this grace, according to them, was received passively. Both, moreover, neither conceived nor tolerated that this grace could lead to any interpretation other than their own. Nevertheless, the outcome was inevitable, for every controversy had to be regulated according to rational exigencies, and every "formula of concord" had to consecrate a reduction of the evident truths of faith to the evident truths of reason. Furthermore, the method employed in polemics against "paganopapism" was convenient but equally dangerous. It sufficed, in fact, to show—something not initially considered—that more or less close analogies linked not only practices and superstitions but even Christian dogmas to pagan beliefs: analogy proved derivation. Thus, the pastor Souverain, in his book *Le platonisme dévoilé* (1700), soon translated and then exploited by the "deists" and "philosophers," derived the dogma of the Trinity from Neoplatonic speculations. Paganism had claimed oracles and miracles in its favor; many writers, with equal ease, drew arguments from them against any revelation.In this way, the rise of English deism with Herbert of Cherbury, M. Tindal (q.v.), D. Hume (q.v.), T. Hobbes (q.v.), J. Locke (q.v.), J. Toland (q.v.), H. Bolingbroke (q.v.); of French philosophy with Voltaire (q.v.), d'Alembert (q.v.), Diderot (q.v.), d'Holbach (q.v.), N. A. Boulanger (q.v.), Ch. Fr. Dupuis (q.v.), author of *Origine de tous les cultes* (1745); and of the *Aufklärung* (q.v.), ILLUMINISMO (q.v.), with C. H. Wolff, J. S. Semler, H. S. Reimarus, G. E. Lessing (q.v.), J. G. Eichhorn, H. Paulus, and others, is largely explained.
Responses of unequal value were not lacking. Impressive lists can be found in two eminent bibliographers: J. A. Fabricius, *Delectus argumentorum adversus atheos...* (Hamburg, 1725) and J. G. Walch, *Bibliotheca theologica selecta* (Jena, 1757). Abbés Banier, Foucher, de Tressan, explaining mythology through history, gave ample scope to the theses of Evhemerus. Other scholars—J. Leland, D. Waterland, J. Bryant, P. Guérin du Rocher—exploited the theory of "plagiarism." Still others, among whom G. B. Vico (q.v.) in his *Scienza nuova* (1725 and 1730) and A. Court de Gébelin in his *Monde primitif comparé avec le monde moderne* (1773–82), indulged in allegorizing exegesis with a certain complacency. In these last two writers, a new theory appears: the formation of the most archaic religions is to be explained by the infantile mentality, given, as Vico notes, the state of savagery into which humanity had fallen after the Flood. D. Hume was led to similar conceptions by his "association" and his manner of conceiving "the progress of human thought." According to him, the original form of religion would have been polytheism. This is also Rousseau’s opinion (q.v.). Drawing inspiration from Hume’s philosophy, yet claiming to rely not on mere possibilities but on facts, in 1757 the president Charles de Brosses (q.v.) advocated "fetishism" as universal: "I call in general by this name," he says, "every religion that has as its object the worship of animals or inanimate beings" (cf. *Du culte des dieux fétiches*, Paris, 1760, p. 61). Despite the impression made by this definition, the thesis gained popularity and was exploited especially by the Germans Chr. Meiners and Chr. G. Heyne. Abbé Bergier, in two works that show remarkable attention to travel accounts and missionary reports—*L’origine des dieux du paganisme* (Paris, 1767) and *Traité historique et dogmatique de la vraie religion* (ibid., 1780)—attributes to childlike peoples a kind of animism, but avoids any exclusive solution. So too does the admirable scholar J. Brucker in his *Historia critica philosophiae a mundi incunabulis* (2nd ed., 6 vols., Leipzig, 1767). Both of these authors may be considered the most conscientious and prudent writers on sacred matters of that period.
The many publications, dictionaries, or general histories of religion, inspired by diverse viewpoints, prove the interest these questions aroused at the time. The most considerable among them is that of J. Fr. Bernard: *Cérémonies et coutumes de tous les peuples du monde* (7 vols. fol., Amsterdam 1723–37; with several supplements and various editions and translations). Abbé Banier and Lemascrier produced a revised edition purged of attacks against the Roman Church (7 vols. fol., Paris 1741).
In general, it can be said that the study of classical religions has remained more or less stagnant, while knowledge of those of the New World, Africa, India, and the Far East has made considerable progress. However, strictly scientific methods still remain to be found; polemical spirit has hindered their development, though they can be seen taking shape in the works of Frs. R. J. de Tournemine and A. Gaubil, N. Fréret, J. de Guignes, Chr. G. Heyne, J. J. Brucker, and Abbé Bergier.
VII. EVOLUTIONISM IN THE 19TH CENTURY
From the end of the 18th century, many thinkers, weary of controversies among Christian Churches and the assaults of rationalism, endeavored to seek for their faith a foundation other than speculative reason and believed they had found it in inner experience and feeling. This led them to reduce the religion of Christ to what they deemed most appealing in it and to find more or less equivalent forms in all others. Thus did G. E. Lessing (q.v.), J. J. Rousseau (q.v.), Fr. H. Jacobi (q.v.), the Romantic J. G. von Herder (q.v.), each in his own way, anticipate the principle of “Christianity without dogma.” To a large extent, the speculations of Herder were taken up by Benjamin Constant (q.v.), Edgar Quinet, and Chr. von Bunsen (q.v.).Seeking likewise to shield belief in God from the attacks of unbelievers, I. Kant (q.v.) set out to demonstrate the incompetence of speculative reason to know things in themselves and then to justify, through practical reason, those Christian beliefs he deemed acceptable: the imperatives of the moral law. But if this faculty has absolute value, one may conclude that it itself is the Absolute and creates its object. Thus one arrives at idealism. From this, though distinguished by many nuances, come the systems of Fichte (q.v.) and Schelling (q.v.); from this comes Hegel’s (q.v.) pantheism. With complete confidence, this philosopher describes the evolution of God Himself, of the religions of nature up to that of individual spiritual existence or free subjectivity. The profundity of some of his insights and the power of his synthesis won him admirers; among the most recent are G. Gentile (q.v.) and B. Croce (q.V. *FILOSOFIA DELLO SPIRITO*) as neo-idealists. On the other hand, his excessive intellectualism provoked reactions as divergent as the dialectical materialism of C. Marx (q.v.) and the existentialism of S. Kierkegaard (q.v.); in any case, he contributed to establishing the idea of evolution.
An admirer of Schelling (q.v.), Schleiermacher (q.v.) saw the common origin of religions in the absolute feeling of dependence (*das schlechthinnige Abhängigkeitsgefühl*), deriving from a certain experience of the universe of God. According to him, both the religion of Christ and those of the pagans stem from this. Christian theology must limit itself to analyzing the experiences of believers and then coordinating the content into a system for this or that period of time. In his *Christliche Lehre* he strives to reach Christian dogmas; and his disciples—“orthodox,” “mediating theologians,” and “liberals”—likewise attempt this with varying zeal and success. J. Fr. Fries (q.v.) and G. de Wette preferred to speak of “presentiments,” expressing them in symbols more or less conducive to piety; a solution adopted in our own day by French symbolo-fideists such as A. Sabatier and E. Ménégoz and by numerous modernists (q.V. *MODERNISMO*).
At the same time, ardent Catholics likewise sought to secure faith against the boldness and fantasies of individual sentiment. Following in the footsteps of the Viscount de Bonald ([q.v.] 1754–1840), they appealed to “tradition” as the only means, in their view, of attaining certainty, a tradition guaranteed from the earliest times by the authority of the Revealer. Among the leading proponents of these theses are F. de Lamennais (q.v.), Abbé Bautain (q.v.), and A. Bonnet (q.v.); in Italy: G. Brunati and Fr. Ventura (q.v.). They and their partisans, in order to establish the universality and continuity of religious traditions, scoured the records of the peoples. But the Roman Church could not tolerate the disparagement of reason to such an extent and as early as 1834 condemned their principles (q.V. *TRADIZIONALISMO*).
Indeed, the annals of the peoples began to be known more widely in the West. In 1762, Anquetil Duperron (q.v.) deposited in Paris 180 manuscripts—180 Pahlavi, Persian, and Sanskrit texts; in 1771 he published the first translation of the *Zend-Avesta*, and in 1833–35 his commentary on the *Yasna*. The key to Iranian studies had now been found. In 1816, Fr. Bopp, taking up the researches of Fr. Coeurdoux and William Jones, definitively established the kinship of all Indo-European languages: comparative linguistics was thus founded, and the way opened to the critical comparison of a whole series of mythologies and religions. E. Burnouf (1801–52), Chr. Lassen, Abel Rémusat, drawing on a great many texts, inaugurated the study of Buddhism and its sects. In 1822, Champollion (q.v.) succeeded in deciphering hieroglyphs, and Egypt began to reveal the secrets of its distant past. Alexander von Humboldt (q.v.) and Lord Kingsborough uncovered those of Mexico. Nyerup, P. E. Müller, the Brothers Grimm (q.v.), J. J. von Görres, Mone, Augustin and Amédée Thierry exhumed and learned to interpret Irish, Swedish, Finnish, Russian, Norman, and Gallic traditions.
Yet correctly interpreting archaic documents is one of the most delicate tasks. The failure of Catholic traditionalists is proof of this; nor did the Heidelberg school fare better, for under the influence of Romanticism and the theses of Fries and G. de Wette it reverted to allegorizing exegesis and saw symbols everywhere. J. J. von Görres (q.v.) published his *Mythengeschichte der asiatischen Welt* (1810), F. Creuzer (q.v.) his *Symbolik und Mythologie der alten Völker* (1810–12), later expanded in subsequent editions, translated and reworked by D. Guigniaut as *Religions de l'antiquité* (1825–51). With no less erudition but greater critical sense, K. W. Solger, C. H. Welcker, L. Preller, and especially Otfried Müller successfully checked the excessive enthusiasm.
In 1830–42, A. Comte (q.v.) published his *Cours de philosophie positive* and in 1851–54 his *Système de politique positive*. The structure of his works reveals a mathematician; his theses display the ideal of a mind entirely freed from religious concerns. He rejected Lamarck’s (q.v.) transformism but then claimed to discover in history a normal evolution: the “sociological law,” or “law of the three states.” Humanity, he argued, had passed from the theological state, characterized by mythologies, to the metaphysical state, in which it delighted in abstractions, to arrive at the positive state. In this last state, it renounces concern with the Absolute in order to concern itself with what is determined, real, certain, useful, and relative.
The author of *Social Statics* (1850) and *System of Synthetic Philosophy* (10 vols., London 1860–96), Herbert Spencer, depends extensively on Comte; yet he diverges from him on many points. He is led to the theory of evolution through the study of geology and biology. According to him, the action of the environment produces, in both organic and living matter, progressive differentiations until a state of equilibrium, more or less stable, is reached, followed by a process of dissolution, more or less complete, and new adaptations. The thesis of a continuous cultural progress, in its most absolute form, seems to him unsustainable; there have probably been frequent regressions. Religion, necessarily very rudimentary in its beginnings, perfects itself as the mind better grasps the inadequacy of the crude symbols that once sufficed for II. All its historical forms have only relative value; the purest is that which corresponds to the concept of the "Unknowable." By thus granting, against positivism, some satisfaction to religious sentiment and by giving wide scope to the idea of evolution, Spencer ensured his theories an unparalleled success.
The discoveries expounded in 1841 by Boucher de Perthes in his *De l'industrie primitive* had set minds along the same path. In 1859 Darwin (v.), who hailed Spencer as a precursor, published his *Origin of Species*. From that moment, the prehistory of man and of religion captivated public opinion. Anthropologists were led to conclude that the more simian the human fossils, the more archaic they are. Gradually, they came to recognize that one must first prove that they possess some truly specific trait of humanity and then determine their age by historical criteria, namely, the age of the geological strata in which they were found (v. EVOLUZIONE; EVOLUZIONISMO CULTURALE).
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VIII. THE GREAT DISCOVERIES
Little by little, from the 19th century to our own day, excavations undertaken by indefatigable researchers, and in other cases accidental finds, have yielded information of the highest value concerning a good number of religions.
Among others, such were the excavations conducted from the mid-19th century at Halicarnassus, Cnidus, Ephesus, Delphi, Eleusis, Delos, Olympia, etc. In 1861, H. Mouhot discovered the monuments of Cambodia. In 1879, Max Müller was able to launch the magnificent collection of *Sacred Books of the East* (50 vols., Oxford 1879–1910). In 1887, Tell el-’Amarnah provided the correspondence addressed to the Egyptian monarchs Amenophis II (1415–1380 B.C.) and Amenophis IV (1380–1362 B.C.). The excavations at Susa, directed by J. de Morgan (1834–1896), revealed the remains of seven superimposed cities HAMMURABI (HAMMURAPI) (v.). In 1896, H. Winkler discovered at Boghazköy the royal archives of the Hittites (Hetei). In 1898, the first publication of the papyri of Oxyrhynchus in the Faiyum appeared. In 1900, A. J. Evans discovered in Crete the labyrinth of Minos and the ancient vestiges of Aegean civilization. From 1860 to 1900, the missions of A. Stein, A. Grünwedel, and A. von Le Coq discovered treasures in Chinese Turkestan; arriving last, P. Pelliot was still able to acquire 3,000 manuscripts and 30,000 fascicles of Chinese prints. In 1919, other important discoveries were made at Byblos; in 1922–23 at Dura-Europos, in the Faiyum. Beginning in 1922, in the Indus valley, at Mohenjo-Daro, Harappa, and Chanhu-Daro, a hitherto unknown civilization emerged from the earth, dating back to the 4th millennium B.C. In 1929, discoveries began at Ras Shamra in Phoenicia; in 1931, those at Medinet-Madi, still in the Faiyum; in 1941, those at Tura near Cairo; in 1946–47, those at Nag Hammadi in Upper Egypt; in 1947, those in the Judaean Desert (on the latter cf. J. Lambert, in *Nouvelle Revue théologique*, 73 [1951], pp. 385–98).
All these successive discoveries shed new light on the religions of the Assyro-Babylonians, the Elamites, the Hittites, the Phoenicians, the Egyptians, the evolution of Buddhism, the speculations of pre-Christian Judaism, of numerous Gnostic sects, and of Manichaeism. Some of these discoveries restore patristic texts; others, in particular the papyri acquired in Upper Egypt (1930–31) by A. Chester Beatty (v.), contain texts of the Old and New Testaments, which serve to confirm the authenticity of the books received by the Church.
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IX. THE IMPETUS GIVEN TO COMPARATIVE STUDIES
The use of the comparative method, so fruitful in linguistics through the work of Bopp, in biology and anatomy especially through Harvey and K. E. BAYER (v.), but above all through Spencer and, in a particularly distinctive way, through the erudition and talent of Fr. Max Müller (v.), brought about, from the mid-19th century onward, a notable change: the study of religions also became definitively comparative. In 1849, Müller published his memoir crowned by the Institute of France: *On the Comparative Study of the Indo-European Languages*; in 1856, *Essay on Comparative Mythology*; in 1873, *Introduction to the Science of Religion*. The founding of chairs and lectureships, the creation of museums, the publication of specialized journals, encyclopedias, and manuals followed one another with ever-increasing speed. A glance at the various schools will at least give an idea of the theses advanced from time to time and of the technical advances gradually achieved.
a) The Philological School. — Instead of deriving mythology from the weakness of the intelligence and the poverty of language, wrote Müller, one would gain a truer understanding of it by explaining it through the wisdom of the spirit and the richness of language. For him and for a whole group of scholars, mythology would be a disease of language; the multiplicity of words expressing identical beings would have led to the plurality of gods: *nomina numina*. But what phenomena gave rise, in the course of time, to these misunderstandings? According to Ad. Kuhn and C. V. Müllenhof, rain, storms, lightning; according to Max Müller and W. Cox, the rising and setting of the sun (the devotee practically treats as a single god the one to whom he occasionally turns: henotheism); according to J. W. E. Mannhardt, the phases of vegetation; according to Ch. Ploix, the sky in its aspects; according to P. W. Forchhammer, aquatic phenomena... Such notable disagreement betrays the arbitrariness in these constructions. The progress of comparative philology ended by discrediting them (cf. C. de Cara, *Errori mitologici del prof. A. de Gubernatis*, Prato 1883; id., *Esame del sistema filologico e mitologico*, 1884; O. Gruppe, *Die griechischen Culte und Mythen*, Leipzig 1887, pp. 72–184; L. von Schröder, *Arische Religion*, 2 vols., 1914–16; W. Schmidt, *Manuale di storia comparata delle religioni*, Italian trans., 4th ed., Brescia 1949, pp. 23–39).
b) **Anthropological School.** — In their turn, the evolutionist ethnologists began to examine the most ancient civilizations and attempted, through them, to trace back to the earliest forms of religion and from there to its first connections. H. Spencer advocated the cult of ancestors and manism (v.); Ed. B. Tylor, in his *Primitive Culture* (2 vols., London 1871; 5th ed., revised, 1871–83), which enjoyed considerable success, argued for animism (v.); J. M. Guyau for a panentheistic pre-animism, imagining will everywhere; J. H. King, H. Th. Preuss, R. R. Marett, A. Vierkandt, E. S. Hartland for a dynamistic or magical pre-animism (v. MAGIA); R. Otto, going even beyond more or less intellectual notions, assigns as the origin of religion the vague impression of the "sacred" or the "numinous": *Das Heilige* (Breslau 1917; 22nd ed. 1913). In reality, even the most ardent collectors of facts belonging to this school classified and still classify religious phenomena from a psychological standpoint.
c) **Panbabylonian School.** — For the same reason, E. Siecke, J. Hüsing, H. Lehmann, H. Winkler, A. Jeremias sought to rely on historical evidence. Recent discoveries revealed to them the broad influence of Assyria-Babylonia on neighboring peoples and the naturalistic sense of much of its myths. The first gods, they concluded, were the stars, both for Israel and for the entire earth. Hence the name "panbabylonianists," coined by their opponents and on the other hand accepted by the school (cf. A. Jeremias, *Die Panbabylonisten*, 2nd ed., Leipzig 1907, p. 3; id., *Das Alte Testament im Lichte des Alten Orients*, 1914; 3rd ed., revised, 1916). Such an exaggeration could only have a fleeting vogue. The authoritative criticisms of F. X. Kugler (v.), H. Gressmann, G. Maspero, and other assyriologists succeeded in halting II.
d) **Historical Schools.** — Meanwhile, a more judicious critique continued to grow among ethnologists. In France, A. de Quatrefages (1810–92), the most courteous and perhaps the most competent of Darwin’s opponents, reasonably insisted on the role of migrations and the geographical distribution of civilizations as means to determine epochs, etc. But this pioneer remained almost without followers. In England, W. Rivers (1864–1922), following his research among the Melanesians (*The History of Melanesian Society*, 2 vols., Cambridge 1914), firmly adopted the principle of the Cambridge jurist Fr. W. Maitland (1850–1906): “Ethnology will either become history or it will be nothing” (cf. *History and Ethnology*, London 1922, p. 295). A. Lang (1844–1912), initially a fervent disciple of Tylor, had the courage to conduct a counter-investigation and discovered among some of the most backward populations supreme beings, creators, and moral legislators: *The Making of Religion* (London 1898). The controversies aroused by this work are easily imagined. In Germany, Fr. Ratzel, L. Frobenius, B. Ankermann, Fr. Gräbner, W. Foy, concluding with good reason that there were overall correspondences between more or less distant civilizations due to kinship and migrations, applied themselves to determining the diffusion areas of each (Kulturkreise) and then, according to indications provided by race, language, economic system, etc., to determining the chronological order of their appearance: the historical-cultural method (cf. Fr. Gräbner, *Methode der Ethnologie*, Heidelberg 1911). The Vienna school, with Fr. W. Schmidt, W. Koppers, P. Schebesta, M. Schulien, M. Gusinde, P. Schumacher, G. van Bulck, accepted this method but refined it; and especially took up, in the most fruitful manner, A. Lang’s research on “high gods.” Drawing on Fr. Boas, eminent American ethnologists such as A. A. Goldenweiser, A. M. Tozzer, J. R. Swanton, A. L. Kroeber, P. Radin, less favorable to explanations of cultural correspondences deduced from migrations, nevertheless reacted against rigid or unilinear evolutionism, “this solemn non-sense,” as one of them, R. H. Lowie, called it in *Primitive Society* (London 1921, p. 428) (v. ETNOLOGIA).
e) The progressive clarification of critical principles, following the example of E. Bernheim (*Lehrbuch der histor. Methode*, Leipzig 1886; 6th ed. 1910), and the sensational discoveries already noted, achieved no less felicitous results for the religions of more evolved peoples. The manuals cited in the bibliography, particularly those by A. Bertholet – Ed. Lehmann, M. Gorce – R. Mortier, P. Tacchi-Venturi, F. König, will provide proof for each of them. As for the erudition expended by W. BOUSSET, WILHELM (v.), H. Gunkel, and other representatives of the *Religionsgeschichte* School to prove the derivation of fundamental Christian dogmas from paganism, see SINCRETISMO.
f) **Psychologists.** — The evolutionist ethnologists, as we have seen, classified religious phenomena from a psychological standpoint, from the most rudimentary to the most intellectual. W. WUNDT, WILHELM (v.), too inclined, like Comte, to despise the individual and condemn introspection, referred to myths as expressions, in his view, of collective experiences. L. Lévy-Bruhl (v.) introduced the idea of a primitive mentality that was not illogical or alogical, hence entirely different from ours, but only partially dissimilar in this sense and pre-logical. Welcomed with great favor by sociologists such as E. Durkheim’s disciples, this solution was not retracted but loyally attenuated by its author toward the end of his career. Proverbs, riddles, tales recorded by missionaries, and the analysis of primitive techniques—let alone discoveries regarding high gods—should have led him to this point much earlier (cf. *Bull. de la Soc. franç. de philos.*, 18 [1923], pp. 17–48).
Rationalists such as J. Simon, *La religion naturelle* (Paris 1856); A. Franck, *Philosophie et religion* (ibid. 1867); E. Vacherot, *La religion* (ibid. 1869), gave more scope to intelligence. Naturally inclined to claim, as the latter did, that philosophy should supplant religion. The progress of anti-intellectualism, especially within liberal Protestantism (v.) and the symbol-fideism inaugurated by Fries (v.) and de Wette, tended, on the contrary, to relegate religion to the domain of feeling and, in doing so, called for recourse to experimental psychology. The history of this discipline and its inquiries into the subconscious and the unconscious will be summarized elsewhere (v. PSICOLOGIA); here we will only deal, further on, with its application to religious phenomena. For a better synthetic overview, we may already mention the reactions of O. Külpe, K. Girgensohn, and W. Gruhn (Würzburg school), as well as those of numerous Catholics: G. Wunderle, A. Gemelli, J. Maréchal, M. Penido, etc.
g) **Sociologists.** — The history of modern sociology will also be treated separately (v. SOCIOLOGIA). We will later indicate how it can make a significant contribution to the study of religions.
Il positivismo del Comte, frutto molto più della speculazione che non della storia, finiva con sostituire al culto di Dio il culto della umanità. Procedendo invece con monografie, assai particolarmente, e tuttavia limitate agli Oeuvres européens (3a ed., 6 voll., Tours 1877-79) Fr. Le Play (1866-82) era condotto a riconoscere per una parte l'influsso molto forte delle condizioni economiche (alle quali C. Marx e Fr. V. Engels dovevano attribuire una parte esclusiva) e per l'altra l'importanza sociale delle concezioni morali e religiose. La sua scuola gli sopravvisse poco tempo. Un gruppo intero di dotti tedeschi, fondatori della Völkerpsychologie, tornò al Comte. Il più illustre di essi, W. WUNDT, WILHELM (v.), pur accogliendo la religione, prevede per l'avvenire una chiesa libera da ogni regola di fede, e che confessi friche Kircbe. La sua inchiesta è stata spinta fino ai popoli primitivi e la sua erudizione è immensa; tuttavia la sua interpretazione dei fatti è così contestabile, che un teologo protestante, E. W. Mayer, qualificò la sua opera: «un romanzo riccamente illustrato».
E. Durkheim (1858-1917) riprese ciò nonostante una larga parte delle idee di Wundt e della sua scuola, portandole più oltre ancora. totemismo (v.) il perno del suo sistema e giunge a questa scoperta: l'oggetto reale della religione, dalle origini ai nostri giorni, è la società. D'altra parte è chiaro assai il vizio del suo metodo, perché formola queste regole: «Bisogna considerare i fatti sociali come cose», e bisogna cercare la causa determinante di un fatto sociale tra i fatti sociali antecedenti e non fra gli stati della coscienza individuale» (Les règles de la méthode sociologique, 5a ed., Parigi 1895, p. 20 sgg.; 135 sgg.). Queste regole preannunziano di già le conclusioni. Contraddotto dagli etnologi e dai sociologi stranieri più qualificati, il Durkheim ha tuttavia trovato in Francia numerosi partigiani: H. Hubert, G. Belot, A. Fauconnet, G. Bouglé, ecc.; e fino a questi ultimi anni si è in certo modo imposto all'insegnamento laico. Ma il periodo della cieca ammirazione sembra essere passato. Né le presenti conseguenze del marxismo e del suo «materialismo dialettico» sono molto adatte a rianimare tali idee. Sulla questione dei dogmi e su quella dell'autorità religiosa, più ancora che non su quella del culto divino, sociologi e psicologi restano molto divisi, come lo sono e perché lo sono sui problemi più gravi della filosofia. Su questo argomento si ritornerà più oltre.
2. Introduzioni generali
a) E. Burnouf, La science des r., Parigi 1872; M. Müller, Introd. to the science of r., Londra 1873; A. Révillé, Prolegomènes à l'histoire des r., Parigi 1881; 4a ed., 1886; M. Vernes, L'histoire des r., Son esprit, sa méthode, ivi 1887; S. H. Kellog, The genesis and growth of r., Londra 1892; A. Menzies, History of r., ivi 1895; 4a ed., ivi 1914; C. P. Tiele, Elements of the science of r., 2 voll., Edimburgo-Londra 1897-99; id., Inleiding tot de godsdienstetschap, Amsterdam 1897-99; trad. da G. G. Gschichig, Einleitung..., Gotha 1899-1901; M. Jastrow, The study of r., Londra 1901; C. H. Toy, Introd. to the hist. of r., ivi 1913, 2a ed., 1921; R. Dussaud, Introd. à l'hist. des r., Parigi 1914; N. Söderblom, Einführung in die Religionsgeschichte, Lipsia 1920; 2a ed., ivi 1928; K. Beth, Einführung in die vergleichende Religionsgeschichte, Lipsia 1920; A. G. Widgery, The comparative study of r., Londra 1923; b) Cattolici: P. de Broglie, Problemes et conclusions de l'hist. des r., Parigi 1885; 4a ed., ivi 1904; trad. da A. Piochi, Problemi, ecc., Siena 1906; A. Anwander, Einführung in die Religionsgeschichte, Monaco 1930; trad. con appendice da U. A. Padovani, Introduzione..., Brescia 1932; W. Schmidt, Handbuch (citato); K. L. Bellon, Inleiding tot de vergelijkende godsdienstetschap, Anversa-Nimega 1923; 3a ed., Bruxelles 1949; id., Inleiding tot de godsdienstetschap, Anversa 1935; L. Allevi, Religion e religioni, 2a ed., Torino 1948.3. Storia generale delle r
Manuali: a) C. P. Tiele, Geschiedenis van den Godsdienst, Amsterdam 1876; trad. da M. Vernes, Annales de l'hist. des religions, Parigi 1880 e 1885; da N. Söderblom, Kompendium der Religionsgesch., 4a ed., rimaneggiata, Brescia 1912; 5a ed., ivi 1920; ed. rimaneggiata, Geschiedenis..., tot de Alexander der Grootte, 2 voll., Amsterdam 1891-1902; trad. da G. G. Gschichig, Geschichte... bis Alexander, Gotha 1895-1903; Aschenbruckel, Le religioni del mondo, Roma 1908; da W. Cornsavant, Manuel d'hist. des r., Parigi 1925; P. D. Chantepie de la Saussaye, Lehrbuch der Religionsgesch., Friburgo-Lipsia 1887-89; 2a ed., ivi 1896, 1897; 3a ed., ivi 1904; trad. Londra 1891; trad. della 2a ed., Parigi 1904 (cf. infra); 4a ed., internationale rifiatta sotto la direzione di A. Bertholet e di E. Lehmann, 2 voll., Tubingen 1924-25 (di grande valore); C. von Orelli, Allgemeine Religionsgesch., Bonn 1899; 2a ed., ivi 1911-13; S. Reinach, Cultes, mythes et religions, 4 voll., Parigi 1904-12; id., Orpheus, Hist. générale des r., Parigi 1909; 43a migliaio, 1933; trad. ed. di A. Mahler, inglese di F. Simmonds; ital. di A. Della Torre, Orpheus, 2 voll., Palermo 1912; severamente giudicata dagli specialisti più qualificati, confutata specialmente da mons. P. Battifoli, Orpheus et l'Evangile, Parigi 1918, 3a ed., ivi 1912, da M.-J. Lagrange, Quelques remarques sur l'Orpheus, ivi 1910 (Revue bibl., 7 [1910], pp. 129-41), da A. Vaccari, L'Orpheus di S. Reinach (in Civ. Catt., 1911, 1, pp. 54, 331, 384); G. Moore, History of religions, 2 voll., Edimburgo 1914-20; trad. da G. La Piana, Bari 1922; J. A. Montgomery, Religions of the past and present (in collabo.), Filadelfia-Londra 1918 e 1924; C. Clemens, Die nichtchristl. Kulturreligionen in ihrem gegenwärtigen Zustand, Lipsia 1921; J. Leipoldt, Handbuch der Religionsgeschichte, in collabo., 9 fasc., Berlino 1922; R. E. Hume, The world's living religions, Nuova York 1924; ed. riveduta, ivi 1926; C. Clemens, Die Religionen der Erde, in collabo. con F. Bäbinger, L. Baeck, ecc., Monaco 1927; 2a ed., ivi 1949; trad. da M. Marty, Les relig., du monde, Parigi 1930; G. van der Leeuw, Die godsdienstens der Wereld, 2 voll., Amsterdam 1940-41; t. II, 2a ed., 1948 (in collabo.); Collezione Mana, monografie separata molto erudite di J. Vandier, R. Dussaud, Ed. Dhomme, ecc., Parigi 1944 sgg.; M. Gorce, R. Mortier, ecc., Histoire générale des r., 5 voll., Parigi 1944-51, di valore, riccamente illustrata, Cattolici: J. Bricout, Où en est l'histoire des r., 2 voll., Parigi 1911-12 (in collabo.); J. Huby, Christus, ivi 1912 (in collabo.); 5a ed., riveduta ed ampliata, ivi 1916; 38a migliaio 1947; N. Turchi, Manuale di storia delle r., Torino 1912; 2a ed., ivi 1922 (senza giudaismo e crist.), id., Saggi di storia delle r., Foligno 1924; id., Le r. del mondo, 2a ed., Roma 1951 (in collabo.); C. C. Martindale, Lectures on the hist. of r., 5 voll., Londra 1910-11 (in collabo.); Ant. Anwander, Die Religionen der Menschheit,Friburgo in Br. 1927, 2a ed. ivi 1950 (rel. non crist.); E. C. Messenger, Studies in comparative r., Londra 1933-34 (in collab.); P. Tacchi Venturi, Storia delle r., 2 voll., Torino 1934-36 (in collab.); 3a ed. rifatta, 2 voll., ivi 1949 (di grande valore); G. Bardy, Les r. non chrétiennes, Parigi-Tournai 1949 (somma erudito); K. L. Bellon, Christus, Handboeck voor de geschiedenis der godsdiensten, Utrecht-Bruxelles 1950 (ed. rifatta da J. Huy, in collab.); B. A. G. Vroklage, Die godsdiensten der menschheit, Rurmoda 1950 (in collab.); Fr. König, Christus und die R. der Erde, 3 voll., Vienna 1951 (in collab., di grande valore). Per i primitivi, V. ETNOLOGIA.
B. DIVISIONE E METODI DEGLI STUDI COMPARATIVI.
Sommario:
I. Tre stadi: scienze empiriche, filosofia, teologia
II. Storia
III. Fenomenologia
IV. Psicologia normale, psicopatologia, psicanalisi
V. Casi tipici: conversione, mistica, illuminismo
VI. Sociologia
VII. Scienza delle religioni.VIII. Filosofia della religione
IX. Teologia comparata
X. Trascendenza del cristianesimo.I. TRE STADI: SCIENZE EMPIRICHE, FILOSOFIA, TEOLOGIA
I. Distinzioni necessarie
L'estrema diversità di conclusioni a cui conducono tante filosofie così divergenti e l'impossibilità di sperare, in simili condizioni, che i dotti giungano mai un giorno ad intendersi, hanno fatto sempre più sentire la necessità di distinguere nettamente le scienze empiriche da quelle che si regolano su considerazioni di ordine diverso. Scienze empiriche: la storia generale o comparata delle religioni (Religionsgeschichte), la fenomenologia, la psicologia, la scienza delle religioni (Religionswissenschaft); più oltre: la filosofia della religione, la teologia comparata, basata, questa, su principi ritenuti come rivelati.In pratica, questa divisione rigorosa di lavoro è tra le più difficili a osservare. Anche autori stimati, che pure ne riconoscono la fondatezza, non giungono a mantenere (cf. M. Penido, La conscience religieuse, Parigi 1936, cap. 7, pp. 18-27). La sola conclusione legittima sembra questa: più ci si rende conto di questa difficoltà e più conviene adoperarsi a superarla, poiché, dopo tutto, non può raccogliere sufficienti e far progredire la scienza se non quello che è effettivamente e solidamente provato.
a) Una questione preliminare, di interesse capitale è: quali fenomeni devono ritenersi religiosi? Se si risponde: quelli che si distinguono dall'ordine «profano» per il loro carattere in qualche modo «santo» o «sacro», resta da definire il «sacro». Se, d'altra parte, non si riesce a trovare altro equivalente che «l'insolito», «l'inesplicabile», «lo straordinario», ci si trova portati a considerare come religiosi, fenomeni e atti che effettivamente derivano da dalla religione, ora da una scienza riservata o segreta (magia bianca), adoperata senza alcun senso di rilevanza verso esseri superiori, ora dalla stregneria (magia nera) in relazione con esseri più o meno perversi, considerati spesso come rivali di Dio o degli dei, ora infine da quello che diverse religioni consideravano come esagerazioni o abusi condannabili (superstizione). Se poi si pone come caratteristica dell'attitudine religiosa «la ricerca di una virtù intesa o più ricca, in breve, la ricerca di una superiorità, sia che si aspiri a servirsene, sia che la si voglia invocare», ci si espone ad analogie confusioni.
Sono state proposte una cinquantina di definizioni (cf. J. H. Leuba, La psychologie des phénomènes religieux, vers. fr., Parigi 1914, p. 397 sgg.). Quella che segue, non filosofica (o reale), ma nominale (rispondente all'uso più generale) sembra sfuggire ad ogni critica fondata: in senso oggettivo, che interessa particolarmente lo storico, il termine «religione» esprime un insieme di credenze e di pratiche concernenti una realtà oggettiva, o almeno concepita come tale, unica o collettiva, ma, in qualche misura, suprema, e in qualche modo personale, realtà dalla quale l'uomo, in una maniera o nell'altra, si riconosce dipendente e della quale mira a guadagnarsi il favore; in senso soggettivo, che interessa particolarmente lo psico-logico, il termine «religione» esprime la maniera di pensare, di sentire, di agire, cioè la mentalità che risponde alle credenze e alla condotta o ora accennata (cf. H. Pinard, L'étude comparée des religions, II, 3a ed., ivi 1929, pp. 2-10).
b) Quanto al valore delle scienze empiriche, poiché esse professano di attenersi ai soli fenomeni e perciò di ignorare, per principio metodologico, la natura profonda degli esseri in generale, dell'anima umana, di Dio o degli dei, è chiaro che non possono pronunciarsi né sul carattere o preternaturale (o miracoloso) o soprannaturale (o propriamente divino) di alcuni fatti, né formulare giudizi di valore o di trascendenza, né presentare nessuna delle loro conclusioni come normative, tranne il caso in cui riescano a stabilire il carattere morboso o patologico di certe manifestazioni o di certe pratiche.
4. Subjective Conditions
It is superfluous to insist that in this kind of research impartiality and the absence of confessional rivalry, etc., are required. Moreover, a certain competence is indispensable, and consequently a minimum of personal experience. It has been claimed that it is not necessary to be religious in order to study religions any more than it is necessary to be insane in order to study mental alienation (B. Leroy, in Revue de l'hist. des religions, 50 [1909], p. 202; J. H. Leuba, op. cit., pp. 325-26). Likewise, no aesthetic sense would be required to improvise oneself as an art critic! The justification attempted by J. H. Leuba, according to which the sentiments of religion—peace, confidence, abandonment, love, moral obligation—are familiar to all, is of no avail, because, for example, materialists prove themselves to be utterly insensitive to religious motives; others, such as certain existentialists, show themselves incapable of understanding the total self-sacrifice that the canonized mystics of the Church have been able to achieve for the sake of the Infinite of beauty and goodness. “The ideal condition,” the same author adds, following Renan (Études d'hist. religieuse, 4th ed., Paris 1859, pp. 6-7), “would be to have lived, in good faith, religious experiences and then to be liberated from them.” This is true if the subject passes from error to truth; but not in the opposite case, if the subject, that is, is the victim of an illusion or guilty of a defection that he will attempt to justify by fair means or foul.5. Essential Procedures
a) The historical method is evidently essential. Phenomena that appear identical—beliefs, rites, experiences—may be significantly different if they are not indigenous and therefore do not proceed from the same causes, or if, more or less belatedly, they have been inserted into heterogeneous complexes, adapting themselves to them and thus being more or less transformed. It will be said that one adopts only what one already possesses at least in germ, as a tendency, as an imprecise apperception, etc. This is true, but all instincts are in germ in the human soul, from the noblest to the lowest, and the satisfaction of one or the other, either through an imprecise price or through adaptation, can result either in a normal development or in an alteration of the patrimony and original character of each cult. Only the historical method can discern these nuances and allow one to rely on scientifically established facts. The procedures of this method will be set forth shortly.b) The second method, the comparative, may be said to constitute first and foremost a process of discovery. After consulting history and making a complete inventory of a religion, by comparing the different stages of its evolution (internal comparison), variations will be observed that require an explanation; by passing to other cults (external comparison), gaps, differences, anomalies will be noted. Thus prompted to resume investigations, one will often discover what the isolated analysis of each complex had not revealed. In this way, without wishing to reduce all cults to a single type, one can begin to study a particular one in depth. This is the procedure of the sample, recommended, following Max Müller, by G. Foucart (Histoire des religions et méthode comparative, 2nd ed., revised, Paris 1912). On the contrary, one cannot in any way, as E. Goblet d'Alvielle advised, “supply the insufficiency of information about the continuous history of a belief or an institution among a race or society with facts borrowed from other environments and other times” (Croyances, rites, institutions, II, ibid. 1911, p. 192). Such integrations manifestly presuppose a priori the uniformity of evolutions.
Moreover, comparison opens the way to explanations: identical phenomena clarify one another with regard to their meaning, origin, and scope; more or less dissimilar phenomena help to understand the modes of transition from one series to another, or else force one to note very interesting exceptions.
Similarities, in fact, may arise from: a) simple chance encounters, that is, from the independent exploitation of the most natural symbolism, yet with distinct purposes: water purifies; the Hindus purify themselves of their sins in the waters of the Ganges; John the Baptist baptized in the waters of the Jordan as a sign of penance (Mt. 3:5-6); the first Apostles baptized everywhere in the name of Jesus as a sign of regeneration (Acts 8:34-38); same rite, but different spirit (v. Battesimo, II, cols. 1003-45). Pure chance encounters are also those deriving from the almost obligatory evocation of general themes: origin of things, center of the world, distinction of the three regions—heaven, earth, hell—cardinal points, etc.; both religion and magic make use of them. b) As for relationships of kinship, the mere multiplicity of agreements does not prove them at all when this multiplicity is explained either by the identity of socio-economic conditions (in which case only characteristic types or “structures” are discovered) or by convergence or parallel evolution of a similar patrimony; kinship, however, is manifested when very detailed agreements persist across different fields: racial characteristics, languages, techniques, etc. c) In other cases, one must admit the diffusion of ideas, practices—in short, borrowings—while then distinguishing between simple borrowings and borrowings with “acculturation” or more or less profound adaptation... d) Finally, similarities may derive from reciprocal or common influences, for example, a general movement of ideas that leads to the development of certain doctrines or rites dependent on the original patrimony, sometimes even in order to defend it better (v. SINCRETISMO).
In short, if one wishes to be critical and effective, the comparison of religious phenomena must be neither superficial (in every phenomenon, especially the idea, the spirit that inspires it, and the end it aims at modify its meaning and its effects), nor limited (a discordant trait may reveal the secret of origins, disclose a concern for adaptation, explain an evolution or different consequences), nor partial, obviously, by reporting only the traits favorable to a preconceived thesis. Otherwise, no matter how much erudition is displayed, it will remain what it has too often been in the past: a method of confusion. On the contrary, once the phenomena have been duly analyzed and classified, they can be used with the same profit as, in every experimental investigation, the tables of presence, of absence, of concomitant variation, and of residues, which allow one to discern the true causes and the true laws.
II. HISTORY
It has become customary to reserve the study of primitives for ethnology (v.), leaving the study of the great cultures to the history of religions. It would indeed be a childish error to place trust in their mythologies. In reality, among all religious elements, myths are the least stable, owing to the imagination of individuals, magicians, priests, and popular masses. Even in Christian centuries, myths have often been invented to explain formulas or symbols that had become enigmatic. Typical cases include the legends of St. Nicholas, St. Denis, other "cephalophore" martyrs (v. MARTIROLOGIO e Martire), and Pope Joan (v.); hence the "iconographic" method applied to similar cases.
The value of a synthesis depends on preliminary analyses. The general procedure recommended by scholars is therefore the investigation through monographs on this or that divinity, this or that sanctuary, this or that epoch.
Very often, when dealing with theological or cosmogonic myths, or with the marvels performed by the founders of religions or their disciples, the mere examination of the accounts (internal criticism), one might say their very absurdity, suffices to form a judgment: thus for the miracles performed by Buddha, who moreover never appealed to God or gods; and likewise for those of Muhammad, who, according to the Qur'an, presented this book as more than sufficient proof of his mission. The miracles of Christ are of a wholly different kind (cf. the evidence adduced, among others, by Fr. Pinard de la Boullaye, in *Il taumaturgo ed il profeta*, Italian ed., Turin 1932, pp. 87–125).
The appeal to testimonies closest to the facts (external criticism) remains habitually necessary. The principle is certain and secure: *testis unus, testis nullus*; a single witness, unless there are exceptional guarantees, proves nothing. Certainty is acquired only through the convergence of independent testimonies. Convergence, it is said, and not concordance (*Übereinstimmung*). The latter term may suggest that complete agreement is required and that its probative force results from the accumulation of mere probabilities. "Convergence," on the other hand, means that, despite divergences which can be explained by differences of viewpoint, interests, or editorial procedures, one arrives at substantially identical assertions: an agreement whose sufficient reason lies entirely in the reality of the fact in question. "Precisely the points of concordance among these divergent statements are those which constitute the facts scientifically proven" (C. Langlois–C. Seignobos, *Introduction aux études historiques*, Paris 1899, p. 173). To written testimonies and fragments of texts, with which a naïve critic might construct any "house of cards," one must add their context—that is, the pledges of sincerity offered by the lives of the witnesses, their convictions, the reforms determined by their writings or preaching, and so forth.
Convergence may also be found, especially when dealing with relations between two archaic or primitive cultures, as the "historical-cultural" method does (v. ETNOLOGIA, cols. 713–14), by means of clues discovered in independent fields: agreement of myths, of names of gods or spirits, of different words (philological method, particularly in vogue after Max Müller); agreement of place names, clan names, or tribal names (topology and toponymy); technical peculiarities; all, however, with the reservations stated above.
It is well to insist once more on the importance of details, at least in many cases: a name, a date recorded on a single coin among many similar coins worn by time, may provide a definitive solution; likewise a detail of a rite or myth, such as the number fourteen for the fragments of the body of Osiris (J. Capart, in *Revue de l'histoire des religions*, 51 [1905], pp. 255–56).
Finally, it should be noted that the subsequent or parallel-column description of different cults and their vicissitudes alone does not suffice for the program of a composite history of religions. This must derive from the analogies and contrasts observed, laws or at least plausible explanations. To achieve this, it manifestly requires the cooperation of other disciplines.
III. Phenomenology
This science, distinct HUSSERL, EDMUND (v.), has as its proper object the description by categories, the comparison, and the explanation by causes within its competence (impressions, elementary attractions, interpretations of ideas, practices, etc.) of phenomena presented as religious. Such are, in the order of beliefs: concepts relating to divinity (theogonies, etc.), to the origin of the world (cosmogonies), to final ends, to means of salvation, etc.; in the order of rites: forms of individual or collective worship (prayers, sacrifices, initiation ceremonies, etc.); in the order of institutions: the presence or absence of a regulating authority, the forms of priesthood, of confraternities, etc.; in the order of religious experience: the various types of devotion, conversion, mysticism, etc.
Phenomenology cannot pronounce on the origin of religion and its earliest forms. "In religion," writes G. van der Leeuw, "God is a character who came late" (*La religion dans son essence et ses manifestations*, Paris 1948, p. 36). "At present," attests the better-informed M. Eliade, "no religion is known that is reduced to the hierophanies and elementary catechisms of mana, animism, etc. Among primitives, belief in a Supreme Being, creator and omnipotent, appears almost everywhere" (*Traité d'histoire des religions*, Paris 1949, pp. 36–39; cf. A. Jepsen, *Anmerkungen zum Phänomenologie der Religion*, in *Festschrift A. Bertholet*, Tübingen 1950, pp. 271–72; see also EVOLUZIONISMO CULTURALE). The question of the origins of religion belongs to history; while the question of its "essence," at least in the ontological sense of the term, evidently belongs to philosophy.
As for the phenomenological work of description, classification, and explanation, it must be repeated that it would be without critical value if it took account exclusively of partial analyses. Almost all religions admit, to some degree, private inspiration; many possess sacred texts; but this inspiration and the exegesis of canonical books are, in some, rigorously controlled, in others uncontrolled. Magical practices are observed in all religions; but in some they are officially organized, in others at least tolerated, in others still severely prohibited. In many, confession of sins is required; but this is often limited to ritual faults or reduced to a mere formality; in Egypt, identification with the god Osiris ultimately secured impunity in the afterlife (H. Junker, in *Semaine internationale d'ethnologie religieuse*, 4th section, Paris 1926, pp. 276–90; see CONFESSIONE). Such nuances certainly have serious repercussions on the spiritual life of individuals and communities.
Following instead a conscientious critique, phenomenology can bring very valuable contributions to history; among others, these: the proof, quite clear overall, of a distinction between magic and religion, the former aiming only at the utilization of occult forces without any thought of homage, the latter implying, even with interested aims, some commitment of respect and submission; fairly often, given the agreement of identifying traits or the “criteria of form and quantity,” proof of original kinship or borrowing; sometimes the revelation of constant associations between economic system, social organization, mythology, initiation rites, as is found in primitive societies of the matriarchal or patriarchal type, etc. Moreover, it reveals, according to the extent of their diffusion, the power of seduction of certain ideas or rites, whether in the sense of moral rigorism or laxism, as well as the more or less regular consequences of conceptions either pathetic or dualistic, of religious skepticism, of amoralism, etc.
of capital importance. Indeed, unease and dissatisfaction lie at the origin of every religious orientation; peace is the fruit of order. *Pax omnium rerum, tranquillitas ordinis* (St. Augustine, *De civ. Dei*, I, XIX, ch. 13, no. 1; PL 41, 640). Now, neither monism, whether it proceeds from materialism or pantheism, nor the promise of unconditional salvation, nor any religion vitiated by some false principle, can assure it, because then at the bottom of the heart all or at least some causes of disorder remain. Christ has promised it: *Pacem relinquo vobis, pacem meam do vobis; non quomodo mundus dat ego do vobis* (Jn 14:27); and history proves that He actually gives it even to the humblest of His servants, strictly faithful to the practice of His commandments (Jn 14:21; cf. H. Pinard, *Expérience religieuse*, in DThC, V, cols. 1858-60; and the collections of conversions by C. F. Chevé, A. Räss, D. A. Rosenthal, etc., cited in the bibliography).
6. Psychopathology
E. Haeckel used to say: “Our firm monist conviction, that the fundamental cosmological law (of determinism) universally applies to all of nature, negatively achieves the supreme intellectual progress, the definitive downfall of the three central dogmas of metaphysics: God, freedom, and immortality” (*Les énigmes de l’univers*, French ed., Paris 1903, p. 265). For him and his followers, evidently, religious faith and above all mysticism derive from pathological causes... perhaps even their own psychology, that of pessimists like Schopenhauer and Nietzsche and that of extreme atheists. In any case, modern discoveries concerning asthenias, neuroses, psychoses, split personalities, disorders arising from sexuality, etc., help to clarify many psychic phenomena: anxieties, despair, crises of scruples, visual or auditory hallucinations, sometimes wrongly qualified as revelations or possessions, etc.; and this, because morbid traits are also found, in the profane sphere, in various geniuses, even in eminent religious persons, indeed in saints. For its part, the Catholic Church has never ceased to warn its faithful against the numerous “visionaries,” “false prophets,” “false mystics.” Almost alone and for a long time it has possessed rules for the “discernment of spirits” (v.); it can therefore, today, do no more than recommend to spiritual directors to use with prudence the modern medical discoveries mentioned.And it must be added that the ministry of Confession allows the priest to penetrate into the innermost depths of consciences and discover there elements that may escape the simple psychiatrist: pride, spirit of independence, human respect, repugnance to mastering instincts, etc. Therefore P. Janet, author of highly esteemed works, especially *Les méditations psychologiques* (3 vols., Paris 1919), said that religious psychology cannot be written except by ecclesiastics accustomed to dealing with souls and to observing the living and mysterious activity (cf. J.-B. Sauze, in *Revue de philosophie*, 18 [1914], p. 249; R. Wielandt, in *Arch. für Religionspsychologie*, 1 [1914], p. 197). The Catholic Church, to restore and maintain balance in souls, possesses other means besides the psychiatrist. The collections of conversions, already cited, offer experimental proof of this.
7. Psychoanalysis
Since this science is already treated separately, here we shall limit ourselves to its applications to religious life (v. PSICANALISI). The most ardent among its representatives, S. Freud, materialist and atheist, claimed to explain everything by sexual instincts: theory of “pansexualism.” His explanation of dreams, in many cases, and his excursions into the field of history (v. *Totem und Tabu*, Leipzig 1913) are the fruit of pure fantasy (cf. W. Schmidt, *Der Oedipus-Komplex*, in *Nationalwirtschaft*, 2 [1928], pp. 401-36; separately, Berlin 1928).a) Now that psychoanalysis may be indicated for illustrating cases of erotic cults, abundant in paganism, the licentious practices justly reproached in some Christian sects, and, apart from these, some psychological disorders and crises of souls deriving fairly often from defective sexual education, this cannot be denied. But the numerous representatives of this science would gain much if they were to refrain from explaining either by sexuality or by unreflective instincts deriving from our sensitive nature the ascetic practices in general and even more the aspirations and experiences of mystics who are most balanced from the mental point of view, most irreproachable from the moral point of view, most ardent in glorifying with unreserved devotion the Infinite of holiness and goodness by which their heart is inflamed. “By dint of finding under the pen such glaring absurdities,” writes M. Penido, “one ends up asking whether psychiatrists should not treat these psychiatric deliria in the chapter on paranoias” (*La conscience religieuse*, Paris 1936, pp. 133-58; cf. J. Maréchal, *Etudes sur la psychologie des mystiques*, II, 1937, ch. II, pp. 394-99).
b) In the subconscious moreover reside, which Freud did not take into account, moral complexes “more powerful and far more serious” (H. Baruk, *Précis de psychiatrie*, Paris 1950, pp. 380-84), which form in large part spontaneously. Man, in fact, cannot but notice or feel the contradiction he accepts, the distortion he imposes by doing to others what he would not have done to himself (Tob 4:16; Mt 7:12; Lk 6:31). This is certainly sufficient to make even primitives understand certain elementary duties of justice and charity, which family, tribe, and nation ordinarily place, more or less strictly, under the aegis of their god or gods.
c) C. G. Jung, initially a fervent disciple of Freud, later diverged from him on several points. In his study of the collective unconscious—“not individual, or rather supra-individual”—he discovered, among ancestral images (Urbilder), the religious archetype (*L'inconscient dans la vie normale et anormale*, French trans. from the 3rd ed., Paris 1928, pp. 107–32, 155–59). Numerous psychiatrists share his views up to this point. Religious ideas, he continues, are nothing more than projections of these inherited predispositions. While it may be admitted that any religion, to be acceptable, must to some extent conform to these predispositions, when a particular cult imposes more or less painful restrictions on the most fundamental instincts (carnal appetites, tendencies of the spirit and will toward full autonomy), reflection necessarily intervenes. Hence, very often, the regulating motives of choice do not merely determine a “submission” of the subconscious complex but a “transformation”; and a total transformation when these motives lead to the decision to “deny oneself” (Lk. 9:23), that is, to replace the cult of the “self” with love and service to another—in the case of Christianity, love and service to a supremely perfect legislator (J. Nuttin, *Psychologie et conception spiritualiste de l'homme*, Louvain-Paris 1950, pp. 186 ff.).
Concluding, Jung asserts that religious ideas are indispensable to the equilibrium of psychic life, provided they remain suited to each individual’s temperament. Such a solution implies indifference toward positive religions. It is as if to say: to regain health, adapt the treatments you know to your own pleasure!
Moreover, is it really certain that the “religious archetype,” analogous in some respects to the *psyche* of the Epicureans or the *sovvizi* of the Stoics, truly deserves this name and is universal? If it is hereditary, it should, at least in the long run, disappear in both religious and irreligious communities. Yet here is a noteworthy fact: even then, man generally gives himself an ideal—mysticism of art or science, devotion to a cause (the hegemony of a race, universal equality and well-being, etc.). Precisely because he is capable of reason, every individual, in order to find balance, needs to discover a reason for living. The psychiatrist can, of course, employ as remedies—even if different from his own—this or that ideal that his patient is capable of embracing. Even anesthetics and narcotics provide temporary relief, yet none equals true health. The same holds for religions; history proves this: they are far from possessing the same capacity to pacify human unrest, still less to bestow from earthly life the fullness of joy promised by Christ, at the price of full submission to His laws (Jn. 15:11; 1 Jn. 1:4).
8. Psicologia religiosa
a) H. Bois, De la connaissance relig., Parigi 1894; id., La valeur de l'expérience relig., 1898; E. D. Starbuck, The psychol. of r., Nuova York 1899; 2a ed., Londra 1901; W. James, The varieties of relig. experience, 1903; K. Wolf, Ursprung und Verwendung des relig. Erfahrungsbegriffs, Gütersloh 1906; J. B. Pratt, The psychol. of relig. belief, Nuova York 1907; id., The relig. consciousness, 1907; K. Girgensohn, Relig., ihre psychol. Formen und ihre Zentralidee, Lipsia 1908; 2a ed., 1912; specialmente Der seelische Aufbau des relig. 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116a ed. 1919; 116a ed. 1919; 116a ed. 1919; 116a ed. 1918; 116a ed. 1918; 116a ed. 1918; 116a ed. 1918; 117a ed. 1918; 117a ed. 1918; 117a ed. 1918; 117a ed., 1918; 117a edSi tralasciano le «transes» e le pretese rivelazioni provocate, specialmente in Siberia e nell'India, dai movimenti disordinati degli «sciamani» (F. A. Mac Cullen, Shamanisme, in Enc. of Rel. and Ethics, XI, pp. 441-46; G. Nioradze, Der Schamanismus, Stoccarda 1925, bibl. pp. 109-14). Si tralasciano le visioni ottenute, presso diversi Indani di America, mediante l'uso di narcotici (R. Schonle, Peyote, the giver of visions, in American Anthropologist, 27 [1925], pp. 53-75, bibl., pp. 74-75). Si tralasciano pure, per quanto possano essere interessanti per la storia del sentimento religioso, le finzioni letterarie dell'ermetismo greco-romano (A.-J. Festugière, La révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste, I, Parigi 1941, pp. 308-19).
D'altronde, chi vi riguardi da vicino, quanti contrasti si scoprono: a) Contrasti nello scopo inteso: questo è talora, senza alcuna relazione con Dio o gli dèi, come nel Buddha e nel suo rivale Mahāvīra, la regola di vita che permetterà di sfuggire alle sofferenze terrene e alla legge della rinascita; talora, come presso gli yogi più distinti dell'India, la percezione dell'ultima realtà, mediante la necessità e la conquista momentanea di tutto quello che la nasconde, esperienza puramente intellettuale, almeno tra gli yogi estranei alla bhakti o devozione (O. Lacombe, La mystique naturelle dans l'Inde, in Rev. thomiste, 59 [1951], pp. 134-49). In altri casi, Plotino (v.), è la contemplazione del primo tra gli intelligibili, dell'Uno, e l'unione o contatto momentaneo con lui, senza preoccupazione di omaggio (J. Maréchal, Etudes sur la psychologie des mystiques, I, 2a ed., Parigi 1938, pp. 51-87; R. Arnou, Contemplation, in DSP, II [1950], coll. 1727-38). Presso i mistici graditi dalla Chiesa romana, e presso il forte dei sufi musulmani, come al-Gazzāli (v.) e al-Hallāj, è l'unione amorosa con Colui che l'Evangelista ha definito l'Amore stesso: Deus caritas est (I Io. 4, 8; L. Gardet, Mystique naturelle et mystique surnaturelle en Islam, in Rech. de science relig., 37 [1950], pp. 321-365). b) Differenze quanto alla tecnica. Nel buddhismo primitivo uno sforzo, una concentrazione dell'intelligenza per liberarsi dalle illusioni sensibili e dai desideri da cui nasce il dolore; nello yoga, una tecnica fisica più o meno complicata; nel neoplatonismo un'ascesa dialettica che trascende progressivamente tutto il sensibile; presso gli esistenti primitivi, sospensione della respirazione e fissazione dello sguardo sull'ombelico (donde il nome di on-falotropi; V. es. ESCASMO); nei mistici cattolici, normalmente, una preparazione ascetica rigorosa mediante la «rinuncia» perfetta (Lc. 9, 23) e il dono totale del cuore; preparazione, tuttavia, punto efficace di per se stessa, perché questi favori, dicono essi, Dio li concede a chi e quando gli piace, magari durante le occupazioni esteriori più assorbenti. c) Contrasti quanto alle conseguenze. Nell'ordine intellettuale, quando il mistico non ammette come giudice delle sue esperienze altri che se stesso, si ha abitualmente un libero rimaneggiamento delle credenze ricevute, di frequente incoerenza delle concezioni; nei mistici, invece, riconosciuti come tali da Roma, si ha in sostanza pieno accordo con la fede tradizionale. Nell'ordine morale: negli uni, sufficienza, spesso rifiuto di obblighi considerati buoni per il volgo, persino licenza di costumi; nei mistici cattolici, invece, timore di illusione di fronte allo straordinario, quindi ricerca di un controllo, manifesto progresso d'umiltà, di carità, di zelo apostolico. Nell'ordine sociale: Benedetto, Bernardo, Domenico, Francesco, Teresa e i loro pari sono stati e restano sempre, con le loro fondazioni e i loro scritti, mirabili promotori di tutte le virtù cristiane; perciò senza pensare affatto che l'influsso dei loro rivali si sia sempre rivelato nefasto, si preferisce lasciare al lettore la cura di farne il giusto apprezzamento. Ad ogni modo la diversità degli effetti rivela la diversità delle cause. d) Non meno necessario dello studio delle conseguenze è lo studio degli elementi concomitanti. A parte le loro profezie a breve scadenza, le intuizioni dei mistici che la Chiesa romana ritiene favoriti da «grazie di orazione» sono evidentemente incontrollabili in se stesse. In ogni caso la loro concordanza quanto all'essenziale (le perfezioni di Dio, le disposizioni della sua provvidenza riguardo al mondo), costituiscono un fatto Bergson (v.) a pronunciarsi chiaramente in favore del cattolicesimo (A. Sertillanges, H. Bergson et le catholicisme, Parigi 1941, pp. 69-78; J. Chevalier, Comment Bergson a trouvé Dieu, in Revue des deux mondes, 1951, V. pp. 608-15). Davvero, spiegare questa concordanza, come fa H. Delacroix, con la tradizione e il controllo ecclesiastico, accettato o piuttosto ricercato da questi mistici (Les grands mystiques chrétiens, 2a ed., Parigi 1938, pp. 363-64) equivale a non tener conto né della loro originalità a più di un riguardo, né dell'energia e dello spirito d'iniziativa di molti fra di essi, fondatori e riformatori di Ordini, né delle caratteristiche seguenti sicuramente connesse: le loro esperienze si inseriscono in un contesto di fatti anormali: guarigioni straordinarie, previsioni, lettura diretta nelle anime (cardinognosi) ecc. (cf. O. Leroy, Miracles, Parigi 1951). Rigettare a priori tutti questi fatti come leggendari è assai facile, ma ve ne sono alcuni che la critica imparziale più esigente non può contestare. Tocca allo psicologo segnali; al filosofo giudicari e trarne le conclusioni. Quanto ai teologi cattolici, incapaci di restringere l'azione della Grazia alle sole anime aderenti alla loro Chiesa con vincoli visibili, non esitano a concedere che favori mistici, analoghi a quelli goduti dai loro santi, possano essere accordati ad altre anime, quando la loro sincerità è piena e la loro generosità è quale Dio richiede (J. H. Newman, Difficulties felt by Anglicans in catholic teaching, Londra 1850, pp. 57-80; P. Thureau - Dangin, La renaissance, cathol. en Angleterre, II, Parigi 1902, p. 106 sgg.; L. de Grandmaison, Le Sadhu - Sundar Singh et le problème de la sainteté hors de l'Eglise catholique, in Recherche de science religieuse, 12 [1922], pp. 1-29). Va da sé, tuttavia, che la verifica dei fatti sia presso di essi più rigorosa (cf. O. Pfister, Die Legende Sundar Singh's, Bernalipsia 1926; A. Vath, Das Leben Sundar Singh's, in Stimmen der Zeit, 111 [1926], pp. 118-36).
To the comparative study of mysticism must be added, as a complementary proof, that of the formal differences of illuminism. Among rationalist associations, for instance, the "Illuminati of Bavaria" (cf. G. Bareille, Illuminés de Bavière, in DTHC, VII [1921], cols. 756-66) or among the representatives of the Aufklärung, "illuminist" means "free-thinker." Here, only those sects are considered whose leaders, if not each of their followers, make use of either pantheism or ecstasy, revelations, and extraordinary experiences to proclaim manifestly extravagant doctrines, often even to authorize dissolute practices or incite insurrectionary movements. A. Barth, yoga (v.), observed: "These doctrines will provide all sects with a kind of higher theology. Some will draw inspiration from them as an ideal, and from time to time works of incomparable elevation and delicacy will arise; others will seek to debase them to their level... The less religious sects will adopt the external trappings of devotion; the most abject and execrable will clothe themselves in their mysticism and make use of their formulas" (Les religions de l'Inde, in Oeuvres complètes, I, Paris 1914, ch. II, p. 84). Since the formulas are the same on both sides, the only means of accurately discerning the doctrine they conceal will be to examine, in each case, the antecedent, concomitant, and consequent elements. Ultimately, these sects, so ready to appeal to supernatural illuminations, provide psychopathology and psychoanalysis with ample justification for many of their theses. At the same time, they offer the opportunity to observe the frequent culmination in pantheism, the fruits of an uncontrolled theory of individual inspiration, and the simultaneous influence of social and economic causes on uprisings, whose repression, as in the case of the Shepherds in the 13th and 14th centuries, the Anabaptists in the 16th century, and the Taiping in 19th-century China, has cost humanity rivers of blood (cf. L. Wieger, Histoire des croyances en Chine, 3rd ed., Hien-Hien 1927, pp. 728-30).
This follows an extremely incomplete list of such illuminists:
a) in Judaism: the false prophets denounced by the Bible and the false messiahs from the most ancient to the most recent (cf. Revue biblique, new series, 13 [1916], p. 295);
b) in the Catholic Church: the Montanists (2nd century), the Euchites or Messalians (4th century), the Amalricians (12th century), the Brethren of the Free Spirit, the Guglielmites (13th century), the Dulcinists and some Beghards (14th century), the Alumbrados (15th century), the "Guérinots" of Picardy, Molinos and his disciples (17th century)...
c) sects derived from the "Reformation": from the outset the Anabaptists, then the Familists, members of the Family of Love, founded by H. Niclaes; in the 17th century the Camisards, the Quakers or Tremblers, derived from Puritanism, the Muggelonians, the Philadelphians, the Ranters, the Sudcottists; in the 18th century, in Sweden, the Swedenborgians; in America, the Society of True Inspiration (Amana Society), the Invigilators, the Jumpers of Wales, derived from Methodism, as somewhat later were the revivalists of Kennedy; in the 19th century the Mormons, the Shakers (the Tremblers), closely akin to the Quakers, the Beckmanites of the Church of the Redeemed in Illinois, the Wilderness Worshippers of Georgia and the Carolinas, the recruits of Heaven, the Heavenly Returners of Illinois; the Dancing Angels of New Jersey, likewise derived from Methodism; in Protestant missions, the Taiping of China, the adherents of Nguomism and Kibangism in the Congo; those of Ethiopianism, etc.;
d) in the Greek-Russian Church: in the 10th century the Bogomils, in the 14th certain Hesychasts, in the 17th the Priestless of the sect "Bespopovtschina," the Khlysty, "men of God," the Skopsty, "the castrated," etc.; in the 19th century Tolstoy and his disciples, etc.;
e) in Islam: movements derived from Shaikhism and Mahdism, a certain number of Sufis and especially dervishes, the adherents of Babism and Bahá'í, founded by the successor of the Báb (1819-50), Bahá'u'lláh, "Splendor of God"; in India the Qadianis or Ahmadis, founded by M. G. Ahmad (1839-1908), the Murids of Africa, founded in 1889 by Amadu Bamba, etc.;
f) in India, illuminism has long been fostered by the divine character attributed to spiritual initiators or masters, the gurus, as well as by the theory of avatars, incarnations of one or another deity, and by the practice of yoga, especially hatha-yoga. It is no wonder that many modern reformers, whether in favor of Hinduism or of a fantastic syncretism, present themselves as gods or as inspired by some deity; such, among others, were Rámakrishna (1834-86), Vivekânanda, his disciple, Keshab Chandra Sen (d. 1884), the founders of the Rádha Soámi Satsang, etc. They do not belong to any Church: Ant. Bourgignon, the Baroness de Krüdener (ca. 1766-1824), Catherine Théot (1725-94), Saint-Martin, "the Unknown Philosopher" (1743-1803), H. Wronski (1778-1853), Vintras (1807-75), G. Monod (1800-96), G. BARZELLOTTI, GIACOMO (v.), etc.
In meticulous ritual observance, fidelity to rites can become the essential element of religion, and this or that rite (e.g., the soma sacrifice in Brahmanism) will be esteemed efficacious by its own virtue, even over the deity itself. Only a moral and religious teaching in the theological sense could prevent these consequences, especially on the part of the ministers of worship. But where is such teaching to be found? (v. CULTO).
Of no less importance are the questions concerning authority: its democratic, oligarchic, or monarchic form—its task, whether limited to the supervision of rites or extended also to beliefs—its sources of information, whether regular (ancestral traditions or sacred books) or occasional (such as recourse to more or less heterodox oracles, e.g., Delphi, Cumae, Lebadea, or to more or less qualified seers), its mode of election, a more or less effective guarantee of its religious value (cf. various authors, "Priesthood," in Enc. of Relig. and Ethics, X, pp. 278-336); its repressive power (J. Wach, Sociology and Religion, Chicago 1944, ch. 8, bibl., pp. 330-331). The existence of distinct, relatively independent sanctuaries, such as those of Heliopolis, Hermopolis, Memphis, and Thebes in Egypt, suffices by itself to bring about, despite a common origin, the flourishing of markedly dissimilar religions. Hence the law of Deuteronomy (12:1-32), which imposed the unity of the sanctuary (L. Pirot, La Sainte Bible, II, Paris 1946, pp. 388-600).
9. Relations of Religions with Secular Societies
a) As regards the religion of primitives, one is necessarily constrained to rely on the few details given above (v. ETNOLOGIA). b) In more or less hierarchical societies, specialization of functions intervenes: the religious order and the civil order each have their own dignitaries and their own clearly distinct purposes, at least in theory: for the State, welfare, prosperity, the development of human faculties, the unity of its members; for each religion, moreover, and especially in fidelity to tradition, the service of God or the gods, a condition of their favor on earth and in the hereafter.Among religious and civil powers, some conflict is bound to arise. It is well to recall alongside them the power of magicians and sorcerers. The latter, like secret political and economic societies, usually keep themselves apart. Between priests and magicians, however, the distinction is often difficult: when magic is granted an official role, however limited, it tends to expand its influence.
In this struggle for supremacy, except in cases of strong convictions and proven energy on the part of the clergy, victory rests with the authority that commands the most effective resources and means of seduction. Indeed, apart from the theocratic regime of Israel before the period of kings, and later among the Prophets—untiring preachers of strict monotheism and the Decalogue—the history recorded before Christianity is almost entirely one of kingship being capitalized upon. Calculations of self-interest and magical conceptions lead to the revival of kings either as principles of fertility or as gods, only to demand their death at the opportune moment. Many authors, unfortunately with more erudition than critical judgment, have provided abundant examples of this (cf. J. G. Frazer, *The Magical Origin of Kings*, London 1920; G. van der Leeuw, *La religion dans son essence*, Paris 1948, pp. 107–26; cf. various authors, "King," in *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*, VII, pp. 708–32).
For his part, Christ ordered his disciples to render to Caesar what belongs to Caesar and to God what belongs to God (Mt 22:21; cf. Rom 13:1–7). His ministers, it is true, have often favored the designs of the Caesars in exchange for the support they sought from them; emperors and kings have directly interfered in doctrinal disputes and indirectly in the governance of souls through the appointment of bishops of their choosing and the granting of benefices to their favorites (v. ARIANISM; CAESARISM; COMMENDATION). All such phenomena are worthy of study (cf. J. Wach, art. cit. in bibliography, p. 324, n. 184).
c) In nations and religions of mixed composition, spiritual unity among peoples has been lacking. Before the Christian era, state leaders attempted to restore it by adopting the gods of the conquered, identifying them with their own when necessary (theocrasy), introducing new cults such as those of Serapis, the *Sol Invictus*, Rome, and deified emperors—solutions whose consequences must be carefully weighed.
When souls are more stubbornly attached to their beliefs (Christian churches and sects, Islam, etc.), persecution and fratricidal wars erupt; in calmer periods, rivalry among confessions persists. The struggle becomes normal in democratized societies: the state’s attitude toward cults or a particular cult varies according to the tastes of the majority. The situation grows graver when a late fruit of progress appears—atheism—whether in the form of E. Durkheim’s sociologism, K. Marx and F. Engels’ dialectical materialism, or other forms. Morality loses its absolute value and becomes a construct; it is merely a convention subject to reform. One need only consider what then becomes of the "majesty of the law," respect for human dignity, freedom of conscience, and civic unity. Large-scale social experiments are now underway, which already permit cautious conclusions. Consider, too, even from a purely phenomenological standpoint, what would result if Christ’s precepts were better practiced: "Love one another as I have loved you" (Jn 13:34; 15:12); "Whatever you did for one of the least of these brothers of mine, you did for me" (Mt 25:40), and so forth. In this way, humanity would become a family whose members, without distinction of race or class, would treat one another as adopted children of God (v. MYSTICAL BODY, IV, cols. 595–598).
VII. SCIENCE OF RELIGION
This science (*Religionswissenschaft*) coordinates information provided respectively by history, partial studies in phenomenology, psychology, and sociology. It also aims to draw general conclusions. If it is rightly maintained among the empirical disciplines, it constitutes an integral or synthetic phenomenology. Using essentially the comparative method, it remains bound to follow the critical rules already mentioned above. Wach, who has devoted particular attention to defining the method and procedures—though from which we diverge on certain points—calls it the "systematic science of religions" and proposes to divide it into "material systematic" and "formal systematic."
First and foremost, it would be necessary to judiciously establish a vocabulary and secure agreement among specialists on the precise meaning of terms: religion, magic, sorcery, fetishism, grace, mysticism, illumination, etc. Such definitions would prevent, for example, many scholars from classifying Catholic Sacraments among magical rites. Effective *ex opere operato*, sacramental rites, according to Roman Catholic doctrine, require a right intention—that is, the intention to obtain a spiritual benefit, whether the first grace or its increase—and presuppose, under penalty of sacrilege, freedom from grave sin and a firm purpose to avoid it in the future. The measure of grace they confer is proportionate not to the affective fervor of each soul but to the effective generosity with which it intends to fulfill all its duties.
1. Once this agreement on the value of terms is presupposed, the first task of the science of religion is:
a) To classify the different types of phenomena: types of beliefs about the deity, the origin of the world, the afterlife, the conditions of salvation, etc.; types of morality and holiness, of public and private worship, of internal and external organization, of individual and collective experiences;
b) To investigate the relationships that unite or separate them, where they manifest, the regular or quasi-regular associations between elements of a civilization (economic system, social organization, beliefs and myths, forms of worship)—in short, the structures, etc.
That the various types of religion should be cataloged seems questionable, for few religions constitute a coherent whole, and very few remain unchanged over the years. Nevertheless, where possible, it is essential to highlight the relationships between diverse obligations, practices, and experiences and this or that characteristic idea: in Islam, for example, the unity and ineffable majesty of Allah; in Christianity, the holiness and infinite goodness of the Most Holy Trinity. As for classifying religions in evolutionary series, à la Hegel and Comte, it must be said that this is a pastime or game from which science gains nothing.
The final and principal task is to deduce, along with their causes and consequences, laws. It goes without saying that in this field, as in sociology, there are no such rigid laws as to admit no exceptions; the intervention of personalities, whether eminent or at least very powerful, can unpredictably alter the course of events (cf. G. Richard, *La sociologie générale et les lois sociologiques*, Paris 1912, pp. 183-372, bibl. pp. 372-88).
At the conclusion of a very erudite inquiry, M. Eliade writes: “We may record a twofold process in the history of religious facts: on the one hand, an excessive fragmentation in the manifestation of the sacred in the cosmos; on the other, a unification of these hierophanies through their innate tendency to incarnate archetypes as perfectly as possible and thus fully realize their own structure.” It may be observed: no wondrous, inexplicable, or extraordinary phenomenon takes on the character of “hierophany” except through interpretation; the “hierophanies” considered most important owe this partly to their own splendor, but ultimately to the free choice of religious consciences, in proportion to their spiritual or temporal interests: they do not possess any “innate tendencies.” The same scholar adds: “Thus is explained a phenomenon verified from one end of the history of religions to the other: the capacity of every religious form to grow, to purify itself, to ennoble itself—for example, a tribal god becoming, through some new theophany, the God of monotheism; or a rural goddess transforming into the Mother of the Universe” (*Traité d’histoire des religions*, Paris 1949, p. 395). One may content oneself with this observation; the notion of law implies the notions of necessity and regularity; a possibility is something quite different. Moreover, history has yet to establish, on concrete evidence, the transition of any “hierophany” not merely to the highest rank in a hierarchical polytheism, but into a strictly monotheistic system. As for the pantheism of India and China, for example, it clearly arises from philosophical speculation.
Here, then, among many others, are what appear to be some genuine laws: magic (white magic) is invasive, because it finds fuel in ritual formalism and provides, without moral conditions, for the most varied needs; in this way it necessarily becomes demoralizing, one might even say irreligious, for those who believe that God or the gods take some care for morality. Another law: every pantheism leads either to moral indifferentism, as in Chinese Taoism, or to moral subjectivism, as in Greco-Roman Stoicism; God Himself or man, who believes himself to be God or a part of God, finds in himself his rule of conduct, though he may then draw inspiration, when he deems it convenient, from the wondrous order of the cosmos. Similarly, sacred traditions or texts left to private interpretation or inspiration lose their probative force and may serve to authorize either lofty speculations or more or less contestable claims; allegorizing exegesis, as among the Stoics and certain Renaissance humanists, the treatment of dogmatic formulas as mere symbols, as among modern symbolo-fideists, and the tendency to “mythologize” beliefs and traditions among various representatives of liberal Protestantism, provide the means for this.
The method of “concomitant variations” will, in all likelihood, allow other laws to be deduced, given the extreme variety of religions, their sects, and sub-sects. Further study will also be required of the ancient and modern forms of occultism, theosophy, anthroposophy, and certain ephemeral cults, such as those born of the French Revolution; likewise, as a counter-proof, modern collectivities officially atheistic or “without God.”
Extended at least to sufficiently numerous, varied, and even opposing cases, all chosen as the most significant, such an inquiry cannot fail to note, in the words of Bacon and Stuart Mill, certain “residues.” By “residues” are meant more or less disconcerting anomalies. Such, among others, is Hebrew prophecy, not only in its doctrine but in the wondrous events that led Israel to preserve, as sacred texts, only the writings of those “seers” and not those of their rivals. Such is the fulfillment of their predictions in the person of Christ, His character, His teaching, His miracles, which, despite His ignominious death, confirmed the enthusiasm of His Apostles, the survival of His work, and so on.
Restricting itself to the empirical order, the science of religions is not required to pronounce on the miraculous character of these facts. Nor can it, without illogic, pronounce—at least in the metaphysical sense of the term—on the “essence” of religion, nor on the respective value of religions, except insofar as benefits may derive from them, such as social concord, the development of the sciences and arts, or the prosperity of states. Since it is, by principle, ignorant of whether there is a God and whether man is endowed with an immortal soul, it is hard to see how it could be authorized to prophesy about the future of religion. A Christian would add: “above all, about that which has received from its Founder a promise of immortality” (Mt 16:18).
VIII. PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
Strictly speaking, for this discipline to pronounce on the essence of religion, whatever its origins may have been, it suffices that it establish, on the one hand, the existence and nature of God and, on the other, the nature of man and his soul; then the normal relations between the terms Creator and rational creature will follow as consequences. History, however, becomes indispensable for it to judge man concretely, across the different millennia, according to his psychic development and the varied conditions of his existence; only with this aid can it correctly assess the institutions of the past and prudently determine desirable reforms.Now, if one observes the multiplicity of solutions given to the two fundamental problems—the nature of God and the nature of the human soul—one immediately understands the extreme diversity of philosophies of religion. All these are, in a sense, “apologetics,” a term that imposes itself, since their authors, whether speaking or writing, are equally engaged in justifying their choices, on which depend the dignity of their lives and their eternal salvation, and in convincing other minds.
The problem of criteria is a cause of profound disagreement. The boldness of rationalists and their rivalry, more than ever today, have undermined confidence in reason. For a long time, attempts have multiplied to reach the Truth by other paths: supernatural illuminations, impressions considered as “the testimony of the Spirit,” intimate experiences, feeling. The convictions to which these criteria lead, including reason itself, are evidently valid only for those who have preferred them; both thus lead to individualism. If one wishes to judge these facts, one even finds that mere degrees or nuances in arbitrariness and the play of imagination separate the appeal to the testimony of the Spirit, to intimate experience, and to feeling from Enlightenment rationalism. Man himself has recognized this: “I do not stop at the texts of Scripture, even if an infinite number were proposed to me (seventos) in favor of the justice of works against the justice of faith... It is for you to see how to reconcile Scripture; for my part, I remain with its Author” (In Gal., 3, 14; Luthers Werke, ed. Weimar, XL, pp. 458 ff.). Regarding the Anabaptists and Sacramentarians, he observed: “These people are fascinated, convinced that they possess pure truth and perfect understanding of Scripture. Now, whoever lives in this persuasion neither understands nor listens to anyone. I too cannot hear anything contrary to my doctrine” (In Gal., 3, 11; Luthers Werke, p. 323; cf. pp. 316–17, 320). Indeed, the creation of new cults within ancient religions, and the proliferation of Churches and sects after the Christian era, in their founders, stem from this recourse to individual sentiment, whatever term may be used to denote II.
The more passion for the Truth and loyalty are admitted in the institutions of these movements and in the authors of these philosophies of religion, the more their disagreement and the individual and social consequences that follow manifest not only the absolute necessity of a divine Revelation—should it please God, in a manner unforeseeable yet consonant with the present order, to call man to share in His intimate life even now, and later in His happiness (Jn. 1:12–13; 1 Jn. 3:1; Rom. 8:15–17; 2 Pt. 1:4)—but also the supreme moral fitness or necessity of such an intervention, “so that religious notions not in themselves inaccessible to human reason may, in the present condition of humanity, be known by all without difficulty, with firm certainty, and free from all error” (Denz.-U., nos. 1786, 1807–1808; J. Vacant, *Études sur le Concile du Vatican*, I, Paris 1895, pp. 343–56). To demand that an authentically divine revelation impose itself with a force in some way necessitating is simply unreasonable, for no historical fact imposes itself in this way except upon those who have been immediate witnesses to II. For later ages, it suffices that it present itself both as a sensible fact and as a miraculous fact, with characteristics suited, at least in their ensemble, to ground a certain judgment in minds not blinded by any a priori assumption. Such an a priori assumption is that of rationalist deism, which forbids a personal Absolute, immanent in all beings, from allowing any derogation in favor of His creatures from the laws He Himself has established.
Without pronouncing on interventions of this kind, philosophy must at least consider the hypothesis as possible. It is easily seen into what difficulties it falls when it seeks to judge from on high institutions that derive from a wisdom superior to its own. It will in any case have to examine a crucial question: that of authority, especially in matters of belief. A judicious exercise of authority—not to be confused with tyranny—constitutes, in fact, the only means, not to eliminate individualism, but at least to mitigate its fantasies and their consequences. A question so grave cannot be treated in a few lines (v. CHIESA, III). Yet one solution must at least be noted that currently seduces many minds. “Let us cease,” its partisans say, “from disputing about beliefs and unite in charity! Let us abandon the juridical Church and return to the Church of love, to the primitive Church!” Only to neglect, in turn, other texts no less weighty (Mt. 16:16; Jn. 3:18; Lk. 10:16; Mt. 16–19; 2 Jn. 10–11, etc.), some philosophers, more or less familiar with the New Testament, do not fail to cite in this connection the words of Christ and His apostles: “Love one another as I have loved you” (Jn. 15:12). “If anyone says, ‘I love God,’ and yet hates his brother, he is a liar” (1 Jn. 4:16–21). To proclaim such a solution loudly is to forget that freedom of thought carries with it freedom of action: new religions, sects, and sub-sects have always formed separate groups precisely to practice the liturgy, asceticism, and morality corresponding to their dogmas—liturgies, asceticisms, and moralities such that in many cases civil authority could not refrain from intervening. It is also to forget that, while charity, according to Christ’s precept (Mt. 5:43–47; Lk. 6:27–36, etc.), may remain possible for some souls even toward their persecutors, concord in practice ceases to be possible, especially in deeply divided democratic societies with shifting majorities. For His glory, as well as for the pacification and prosperity of the world, can it truly be that God has prepared no remedy for so many evils throughout the centuries? (v. INDIFFERENTISMO; PROTESTANTESIMO LIBERALE).
Without attempting here to analyze even the most noteworthy “philosophies of religion,” we shall limit ourselves to indicating in the bibliography a few works that trace the evolution of ideas in the modern era.
IX. COMPARATIVE THEOLOGY
This last term may denote three different sciences: a) an empirical science that compares, as so many phenomena, beliefs, their repercussions on individual and social religious life, their respective evolution, and then applies itself to explaining these evolutions through the logical expansion of their constitutive elements or through external influences. Understood in this way, this science is nothing other than a section of the phenomenology of religions.b) Philosophical inquiry, which aims to assess the respective value of doctrines and institutions, in order to facilitate, at least for believers, mutual understanding and possible enrichment even for those who already enjoy an undeniable superiority on various points. Examples of this kind include: K. Prümm, *Die christliche Glaube und die altheidische Welt*, Leipzig 1935; A. Vögtle, *Die Tugend-und-Lage-sterkatolog im N. T.*, Münster 1936; O. Lacombe, *L'Absolu dans le Védanta*, Paris 1937; L. Gardet-M. M. Anavati, *Introd. à la philosophie musulmane*, 1938 (cf. *Revue thomiste*, 51 [1951], pp. 457-64).
c) Properly theological treatises, those which, either after demonstrating solely through history and philosophy the reality of divine Revelations (as is done in the Catholic Church by treatises entitled: *Apologetics*, *Of the True Religion*, *Of Revelation*, etc.), or while simultaneously establishing this demonstration of Revelations, proceed to prove the transcendence of Judaism and Christianity, the former preparing for the latter, and to justify the designs of Providence. This second task, occasionally undertaken by St. Irenaeus (d. ca. 202) in his work *Adversus haereses*, was carried out more extensively by St. Augustine in *De civitate Dei*, by Paul Orosius in *Historiae adversus paganos*, by Pascal in various parts of the *Pensées*, and by Bossuet in *Histoire universelle*.
X. TRANSCENDENCE OF CHRISTIANITY
In a broad sense, the term “transcendence” signifies merely superiority. Thus understood, with respect to this or that point of Christian doctrine, to which some even attribute a definitive or absolute value (*Absolutheit*, e.g., the preaching of charity), are several exegetes, philosophers, and sociologists, most of whom belong to liberal Protestantism. For Catholics, Christianity is transcendent because, in the final analysis, it constitutes a moral miracle; its origin and history, in their eyes, cannot be explained without particular interventions of God.Reduced to its essential traits, their solution may be summarized as follows: the multiplicity of religions arises, taken together, from the difficulty of the religious problem, the pursuit of immediate material interests, the allure of passions—especially when wealth increases or when the fusion of peoples accentuates the uncertainty of traditions. Moreover, since man can discover certain truths by himself, there is no religion in which some healthy element cannot be discerned (cf. V. CATHREIN, VIKTOR, *Die Einheit des sittlichen Bewusstseins der Menschheit*, 3 vols., Freiburg in Br. 1914; Th. Ohm, *Die Liebe zu Gott in der nichtchristlichen Religion*, Krailing vor München 1950).
Between the “true religion” and the others, both in good and in evil, certain analogies are therefore inevitable. The most authentically “divine” will necessarily be corrupted by those among its adherents who are less gifted. Is it then legitimate to judge it by these elements?
In fact, God spoke to Israel. Hence the contrasts become all the more remarkable the more extensive and detailed the comparison: namely, its strict monotheism, its Decalogue, the series of its prophets, their reaction against all aberrations, their increasingly precise announcement of the Redeemer, their miracles, which, after almost total apostasies, determined successive conversions of the nation (v. GIUDAISM, VI, cols. 697-703).
Substantially true, the religion of the Old Testament is yet imperfect, for it addressed a rough people, like its neighbors, dependent on their civilization, seduced by their practices and examples. Yahweh governed it, using “condescension,” as He deemed fitting for that stage of general evolution (cf. H. Pinard de la Boullaye, *Etude comparée des religions*, I, 3rd ed., Paris 1929, pp. 552-571).
The promised Messiah has come: “The Word became flesh” (Jn 1:14), and established worship “in spirit and truth” (Jn 4:23). His is therefore a perfect religion, at least in its essential elements; moreover, an unchanging religion, because He presented it as such (Mt 5:17-19; 16:18; 28:18-20). A divine sign that the authentic one is the very character of its founder: “Take the greatest among modern anti-Christians,” wrote Ch. A. de Sainte-Beuve; “whoever has completely misunderstood Jesus Christ, look closely—something is lacking in his spirit or heart” (*Port-Royal*, III, 4th ed., Paris 1878, p. 451). Other divine signs: His prophecies, His miracles, His Resurrection, His teaching, His morality (v. GESÙ CRISTO). That the natural evolution of humanity, or clever borrowings from either religions or sects prior to His, suffice to explain the appearance of such a doctrine—the history of this is still awaiting proof (v. SYNCRETISM). Other divine signs still: the triumph of the Church over paganism, despite such strong opposition and so many persecutions; the survival of the Church in the unity of the same faith, despite the crises provoked by heresies and even though more than once the cancer has gnawed at its heart in the person of unworthy popes (v. CHIESA). Divine sign: the uninterrupted flourishing of its saints and mystics, their social fecundity, etc., its conquering strength, whenever it is allowed to present Him who called Himself “the Way, the Truth, and the Life” (Jn 14:6; V. CRISTIANESIMO).
Without ever having to deny, or, what amounts to the same, to transform according to the taste of the day, any point of its “articles of faith,” received from its first Apostles, the religion of Jesus ceases to be perfectible in the intellectual order through the deepening and coordination of its dogmas; in the moral order, not only with regard to the sanctification of its members, but also with regard to the individual and social application of its principles; in the liturgical order, with regard to piety, the expressive power of its rites, their adaptation to the needs of the times, etc.
Why, one asks, did Christ Himself not regulate everything in the most precise manner? Reflection suggests various very plausible reasons: a regulation pushed to the last details would provoke inertia, stagnation, and suppress an essential quality of every constitution destined for different epochs: flexibility; it would suggest that the Legislator is no longer present to preside over necessary adaptations. Now Christ has promised His Church’s leaders—and not those who would rebel against their authority—that He would continue to assist them without end (Jn 16:7-14; Lk 22:32; Mt 28:19-20).
Common sense demands faith in Him. To appreciate correctly the pedagogy imposed upon him, a child would already have to have attained that degree of wisdom to which it is meant to lead him; likewise, to judge divine designs correctly with regard to the sanctification not of a select group and an epoch, but