Religions, Comparative Study Of

COMPARATIVE STUDY OF RELIGIONS

Many scholars, especially over the past century, believe that only a thorough comparison of all religions can lead to convincing conclusions regarding the problems that arise in this field. Hence the two parts of this entry.

### A. HISTORY OF COMPARATIVE STUDIES

SUMMARY:

I. Before the Christian era

II. From the 1st century to the mid-3rd century

III. Manichaean and Neoplatonic controversies

IV. The Middle Ages

V. From the Renaissance to the rationalism of the 18th century.
XVIII. -

VI. L'avvento del razionalismo

VII. L'evoluzionismo nel sec. XIX. -

VIII. Le grandi scoperte

IX. Lo slancio impresso agli studi comparativi.

I. BEFORE THE CHRISTIAN ERA

The need for comparisons arose as soon as different populations, each with their own beliefs and rites, came into contact with one another. The oldest documents, particularly from China, Egypt, and India, as well as the study of so-called "primitive" civilizations, allow us to glimpse the solutions generally adopted. It seems that fairly large groups, whether out of attachment to ancestral traditions, racial pride, or the pride of possessing sacred texts like the Vedas, despised foreign cults—only to later adopt their most promising magical formulas. After wars, on the one hand, the vanquished submitted to the demands of the victors, while on the other, the victors tolerated or adopted those ideas, myths, and practices of the vanquished that most appealed to them.

What could the earliest philosophers of India—such as the authors of the ancient Upanishads—and, perhaps under their influence, Lao-tze (6th century B.C.) in China, have thought of these amalgamations? Both proclaimed pantheism: a single, eternal substance; the rest was mere illusion. Mahāvīra, founder of Jainism, and Siddhartha Gautama, founder of Buddhism (6th century B.C.), excluded abstruse speculations about God and the gods; atheistic in this regard, they concerned themselves solely with offering a rule of life adapted to ensure liberation and nirvāna. Yet popular imagination soon deified them and transformed their doctrine into an unbridled polytheism.

Upon their arrival in Greece and Italy, the Indo-Europeans encountered many cults different from their own: Aegean, Pelasgian, Thracian, Etruscan, and others. From the 6th century B.C., the accounts of Hecataeus of Miletus, and in the 5th century those of Charon of Lampsacus, Xanthus of Lydia, Hellanicus of Lesbos, and above all Herodotus, the "father of history," revealed to them the cults of Asia Minor, Persia, Assyria-Babylonia, and Egypt. Such disparate theogonies and cosmologies invited the search for a somewhat coherent solution. Herodotus already proposed assimilating gods from different countries who had identical attributes. For their part, philosophers traced things back to their origin. For the Ionians, everything derived from water (Thales), indeterminate matter (Anaximander), air (Anaximenes), or fire (Heraclitus): according to these pantheists, peoples had deified the forces of nature. Pythagoras (6th century B.C.) was struck by the harmony of the cosmos; its principle was therefore Unity; but this Unity, the supreme Zeus, seemed to him to be fire, the origin of celestial bodies, through which his action extended to the whole of nature. Also in the 6th century, Xenophanes and Parmenides, and in the 5th century Zeno of Elea, professed that God is one, the immutable substratum of all things. Anaxagoras (d. 428 B.C.) and his disciple Socrates proclaimed that He is intelligence; Plato (429–347) and Aristotle (384–322) echoed them. For Aristotle, however, this Prime Mover, existing in itself, did not intervene in the world; thus, there was no Providence. Even in the 6th century, Epicurus and Euhemerus, with less speculative effort, went further: according to the former, concern for earthly matters would disturb the happiness of the gods; therefore, mortals should not, for their part, concern themselves with them. For the latter, the gods were simply men who had lived on earth; but, being illustrious figures, admiration and gratitude had elevated them to supreme honors. Pyrrho inaugurated skepticism. A little later, the founder of Stoicism, Zeno (d. 264 B.C.), and his disciples—pantheists and materialists, at least in the sense that they could conceive of spirits and souls only as a subtler form of matter—devoted all their activity to the reform of practical life. Drawing inspiration from both Plato and Zeno, Antiochus of Ascalon (124–79 B.C.) advocated eclecticism. Concerns for historical criticism appeared only in Polybius (ca. 210–125 B.C.) and more distinctly in Strabo (66–25 B.C.). The compilations of Alexander of Miletus (late 1st century B.C.) on India, Assyria, Egypt, Asia Minor, and Judea barely reflected this.

Unanimous in condemning the fantasies of popular beliefs and the obscenity of mythology, scholars and philosophers nevertheless considered faith in the gods justified by universal consensus and advocated, each in their own way, a hierarchical polytheism. The Stoics, in particular, using an allegorizing exegesis, sought to give myths a more or less profound meaning and considered the gods of different peoples identical based on the analogy of their character and functions (theocrasia).

At the end of this period, in a work demonstrating considerable research, the Roman Varro (116–27 B.C.), revisiting a thesis formulated by the pontiff M. Scaevola and likely by his teacher Panaetius, distinguished three kinds of theology: the first, "mythical," overflowing with fictions; the second, "physical," characterized by the naturist speculations of philosophical schools; and the last, "civil," that is, the one sanctioned by the legislation of each country. He assimilated the Jupiter of the Stoic pantheon to the ineffable God of Jewish monotheism and declared that, in essence, it was indifferent whether one designated the divinity by one name or another, provided there was agreement on its essence and certain essential duties. The Stoic Seneca (2–66 A.D.) would soon say: "Honor the divinity whoever conceives it as is fitting... Do you wish to render the gods propitious? Be virtuous. Imitating them is sufficient worship," meaning imitating them not in the quarrels and obscenities attributed to them by mythology, but in their wisdom and in the regularity demonstrated by the course of the stars and by the Fatum, the Destiny that even Jupiter must obey.

The comparison of religions thus preoccupied minds extensively in those distant times; yet it is immediately evident to what conclusions it led: the people confused myths and rites; the more reflective minds combined speculations from every source in their own way. Allegorical interpretation allowed them the broadest tolerance and even participation in traditional cults; separated from the crowd by their personal philosophy, they rejoined it in practice.

II. FROM THE 1ST CENTURY TO THE MID-3RD CENTURY

Christianity, with an rigor unexpected in every respect, poses the problem in new terms.

Having appealed to Caesar, the apostle Paul is brought to Rome, where he preaches freely for two years (Act. 25-12; 28, 30-31). Peter goes there of his own accord, for Rome is the center of the then-known world. As early as 64, converts are so numerous that Nero, according to Tacitus, has a multitudinem ingentem burned alive, "not so much for the fire [of the city, for which the tyrant holds them responsible] as for their hatred of the human race," odio generis humani (Annales, XV, 44), that is, for their refusal to participate in cults condemned by their faith. The same historian characterizes the influx of religions into the city in these terms: everything atrocious and repugnant from anywhere gathers and is celebrated there, "quo cuncta undique atrocia aut pudenda confluunt celebranturque" (ibid.).

Indeed, tolerated since 204 B.C. are the cult of Cybele and Attis, likewise that of Isis, proscribed in 58, 53, 50, 48 B.C.; 19 A.D.); those of the Syrian Baals; that of Mithras, which for a time will constitute the most dangerous rival of Christianity. In the 2nd century, the Gnostic sects of Marcion (v.), Basilides (v.), Valentinus (v.), Bardesanes (v.), and others arrive, most of which associate some crumbs of the Gospel with the most arbitrary speculations (v. GNOSI) and even the worst licentiousness (v. CARPOCRATE). No less confusion reigns in the various parts of the Empire. Alongside the official cults, especially that of the emperors, national cults and survivals of indigenous cults intermingle.

For their part, scholars make known the results of their research: Herennius Philo, a decided Euhemerist, in his Phoenician History; Phlegon of Tralles in his Olympiads and Marvelous Deeds; Pausanias, the most deserving, in his Description of Greece; pseudo-Apollodorus in his Library. The philosophers of previous ages, more or less transformed under the influence of Platonic ideas, each find their adherents. To disoriented souls, Hermeticism offers solutions that appear more secure: the fruit of mystical experiences and divine revelations. In the 2nd century, it enjoyed great vogue (v. ERMETICI, LIBRI, LIBRI; ERMETISMO).

At bottom, in this era, religious faith is almost universal; it derives from common notions, κοιναί ἐννοίαι, according to the Stoics; from relatively innate, more precisely connatural, concepts, σύμφυτοι, according to the doxographers; from anticipations, πρόληψις, according to the Epicureans. Even more: the idea of a supreme, transcendent, ineffable God, principle of order, had imposed itself on a great number of minds. The traditional gods are considered either as manifestations of his various perfections or as powers, δυνάμεις, or as his intermediaries between heaven and earth, δεύτεροι θεοί; below them stand the genii or demons, δαίμονες. For their part, Stoics like Seneca, Neopythagoreans like Maximus of Tyre, and Hermeticists like Apuleius teach that God takes different names according to the various manifestations of his action in the universe (divine polyonymy). These theses, together with the purification of moral principles, allow some of the more serious objections of Christians to be avoided. They also authorize adaptation to the prevailing cults. Indeed, one can see devotees being initiated, for greater security, into several Eastern cults, and even pontiffs cumulating the highest functions of these.

Now the disciples of Christ, faithful to his command: "Teach them to observe all that I have commanded you" (Mt. 28, 20) and to that of St. Paul, "One God, one Faith, one Baptism" (Eph. 4, 5), could certainly not accept such syncretism and similar tolerance. Their earliest writers, Justin, Tatian, Irenaeus, Hippolytus, begin by refuting the Jews, demonstrating to them the fulfillment of messianic prophecies, and the Gnostics, denouncing the arbitrariness—better, the incoherence—of their speculations and their opposition to the Gospel. Justin, then, addresses the emperors directly. Only we, he says, are capable of justifying our faith even before the learned, and this with rigorous demonstration, μόνοι μετά ἀποδείξεως (Apol., I, 20). As for the analogies that link Judaism, the divinely authorized precursor of Christianity, to other religions, he explains them partly (and this is a highly debatable solution) by plagiarism committed by philosophers from the sacred books of the Hebrews and by a cunning imitation by demons (theory of plagiarism), and partly (and this is a more insightful solution) by a divine tolerance, entirely provisional, of imperfect elements, with the aim of facilitating the acceptance of what is essential (theory of condescension, συγκατάβασις), or, finally, by superficially accommodating the Stoic theory of "seminal reasons" (λόγοι σπερματικοί) through "seeds of the Word" bestowed upon souls of good will.

Soon the pagan polemic flares up through the rhetorician Fronto, the Neopythagorean Celsus, and the sophist Philostratus. Celsus, the "Voltaire" of the 2nd century, in his True Discourse (Ἀληθής λόγος), bitter and well-documented, levels against Christianity nearly all the objections of modern rationalism and comparativism. Philostratus, at the instigation of the syncretist court of the Severans, publishes his Life of Apollonius (v.) of Tyana, also a thaumaturge, he says, and a perfect model of piety. To respond to these attacks, Minucius Felix, Tertullian, St. Cyprian, and, somewhat later, Arnobius, Commodian, Lactantius, and Firmicus Maternus take up many of St. Justin's theses. Each of these authors provides valuable information on pagan religions. More erudite and profound, they show a manifest concern to indicate among the doctrines of their adversaries the sound elements that

the two Alexandrian doctors, Clement (140/50-before 216) in his Stromata and especially Origen (ca. 182-ca. 251), develop. The latter, in his Contra Celsum, clearly elaborates most of the principles that should govern truly critical comparisons, and thus finds himself well-positioned to demonstrate the superiority of Christianity.

III. MANICHEAN AND NEOPLATONIC CONTROVERSIES

Around the middle of the 3rd century, two new religions emerged: one, Manichaeism (v.), dualistic in imitation of Persian Mazdaism and amalgamating ideas from every source; the other, Neoplatonism (v.), monistic, representing the most powerful effort of pagan thought.

The doctrine of Mani (215/6 – ca. 276/7) spread as far as China on one side and to Africa on the other. Long seduced by it, St. Augustine later combated it with all his vigor. It was chiefly to him that its knowledge was owed until the unexpected discoveries of recent years. As for the philosophy of Plotinus (204–70), though rejecting its pantheism, its secondary gods as emanations of the supreme One, its tolerance of ancient cults, and the magical practices to which it lent a renewed favor, neither Augustine nor the Alexandrians—St. Athanasius (d. 373) and St. Cyril (d. 444)—nor the great Syrian scholar Eusebius of Caesarea (d. ca. 340), nor the Antiochenes—St. John Chrysostom (d. 407) and Theodoret (d. 457)—nor the Cappadocians—St. Basil (d. 379), his brother St. Gregory of Nyssa (d. 394), and St. Gregory of Nazianzus (d. 390)—were sparing in their praise. Yet that radical differences existed between the two philosophies and mentalities is manifestly proven by the fact that the last and most ardent adversaries of Christianity—Porphyry, Iamblichus, Hierocles, the Emperor Julian the Apostate, Sallustius, and Libanius—arose precisely from among the Neoplatonists.

In 313, the Edict of Milan proclaimed freedom for all cults. From 361 to 363, Julian the Apostate became the apologist of paganism, the theologian of the supreme god, the Sun, and persecuted Christians. In 410, Rome was devastated by Alaric and his barbarians. Greco-Roman civilization seemed on the verge of eternal ruin. The pagans attributed this to the wrath of the abandoned gods. To respond to them, St. Augustine published from 412 to 426 the 22 books of De civitate Dei, in which he demonstrated the impotence of paganism to ensure the prosperity of nations and eternal happiness. Then, with greater breadth than had been used by Irenaeus, Eusebius, and Gregory of Nazianzus, he expounded the conduct of Providence in the education of humanity and its condescension toward rites that the law of Christ was later to abolish. The work is thus a powerful sketch of a theology of history.

IV. THE MIDDLE AGES

For several centuries, the Church had to devote itself to the civilization and conversion of the Barbarians, whose successive invasions disrupted the Western world. Councils vied with one another in condemning the tenacious survivals of their superstitions.

Some missionaries described, though without arousing great interest, the customs and usages of the northern peoples. Nevertheless, from the 7th century onward, great religious controversies reawakened, first within Islam, due to the rapid proliferation of sects arising from divergent interpretations of the Qur'an, and later because of the polemics waged simultaneously against "polytheistic" cults, including Christianity as the "worshipper of the Trinity," and against the Jews. Abū 'l-Ma'ālī published in 1092 an Exposition of Religions, Abū 'l-Hasan al-Aš'arī (d. 935) a kind of Summa against the Gentiles, more worthy of merit; Ibn Hazm (994-1064) a treatise of remarkable erudition and penetration: Book of Decisive Resolutions Regarding Religions, Sects, and Schools. Ibn Rušd (1126-98) Averroë (v.) presented himself as a disciple of Aristotle. With the subtlety and audacity of his theses, later Siger of Brabant (v.), he provoked one of the gravest crises among Christian thinkers. He indeed led them to interpret the formulas of faith as mere metaphors, to evaluate them according to their degree of practical utility, to consider them true according to faith but false according to philosophy (the so-called thesis of the double truth), and to believe that all religions have only a relative value and that a necessary evolution must periodically bring about their return (v. AVERROË; AVERROISMO).

Similar necessities had driven Jewish scholars, particularly Sa'adhjâh (d. 942) and Judah Halevi, ca. 1140, to compose comparative treatises. Maimonides (v.), a disciple of the Arab philosopher Avempace (d. 1138), encountered the writings of Averroë toward the end of his life and, without renouncing the divine personality, the possibility of miracles, or Revelation, accepted several of his solutions. In erudition and vigor of thought, he surpassed all his predecessors.

In contact with Muslims, St. John Damascene (ca. 675-749) had already drafted in his Fountain of Knowledge a highly significant sketch of comparative theology. The writings of Averroë and Maimonides compelled Western scholars to deeper studies. They were undertaken by William of Auvergne (d. 1249), Vincent of Beauvais (d. 1264), Roger Bacon (1214-1294), St. Albert the Great (1193-1280), and above all St. Thomas Aquinas (1226-74) in his Summa Theologica and Summa contra Gentiles, with unmatched mastery of the subject. Moreover, the Averroist crisis brought about considerable progress in religious philosophy.

At the same time, the demands of apostolate compelled the study of Arabic and Oriental languages; on the other hand, the missionary expeditions of Ascelin, Simon of St. Quentin, John of Plano Carpini (v.), Benedict of Poland, William of Rubruck, John of Montecorvino (v.), and, somewhat later, those of Odoric of Pordenone, Jordan of Séverac, Ricoldo of Monte Croce, and POLO, MARCO (v.), confidant of the Emperor of China for 17 years, vastly expanded horizons and brought to the West information of the highest interest.

FROM THE RENAISSANCE TO THE RATIONALISM OF THE 18TH CENTURY

From the 13th to the 16th century, philosophy and theology still produced admirable scholars. However, many lingered over idle questions; their syllogistic method became increasingly arid, and their Latin, stuffed with technical terms, ever more barbarous. After the fall of Constantinople to the Turks (1453), many exiled Greeks revealed to the West the masterpieces of their poets, orators, and philosophers. A form of culture more attentive to art seduced minds: Ficino (v.) Plotinus (v.), pseudo-Jamblichus, Hermes Trismegistus, Proclus (v.), a Theologia platonica, and a Confirmation of Christian Dogmas through the Doctrine of Socrates. Other scholars rejected the exegesis of Aristotle presented by Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas, aligning themselves instead with that of Averroës. Some openly professed the thesis of the "two truths." Greco-Roman mythology became the subject of numerous treatises; the allegorizing exegesis of the Stoics, accepted uncritically, allowed for the discovery of sublime speculations. Marsilio Ficino, Erasmus, and Mutianus Rufus, for example, came to exalt pagan thinkers as divinely inspired and often superior to Christian philosophers. Mutianus (K. Muth), Bonaventure des Périers, BODIN, JEAN (v.) insinuated, in more or less veiled terms, the equivalence of all religions. In short, Humanism, initially favored by several popes, gradually developed in opposition to Roman faith.

Though arising from different causes, Lutheranism and Calvinism took advantage of these circumstances, as well as the degeneration of morals and abuses introduced into the Church. The fierce struggle they waged against it produced at least some positive results. Their claim to regulate faith by Scripture alone compelled both their supporters and adversaries to a deeper study of the original languages and sacred texts: the beginning of biblical criticism and archaeology. The appeal to the pure Gospel, stripped of all additions and superfluities, gave rise to a new science: the history of dogmas. In this regard, the Centuries of Magdeburg by Matthias Vlacich (Flacius Illyricus), 8 folio volumes (1559-74), which examine the state of Christian beliefs century by century, the celebrated Controversies of Cardinal Bellarmine (1st ed., 2 folio vols., 1581-83), and the Ecclesiastical Annals of Cardinal Baronio (12 folio vols., 1588-1607), which respond to the Centuriators, mark pivotal dates (v. ARMONIO; ROBERTO BELLARMINO, SANTO; CENTURIATORI).

To justify the abandonment of certain doctrines or practices, it sufficed for the Reformers to present them as survivals or infiltrations of paganism: hence the thesis of "pagan-papism" and its accusations of mariolatry, staurolatry, papolatry, etc., sustained in a multitude of writings. While polemical spirit outweighed critical spirit, these works at least stimulated the study of religions.

On the other hand, whether dealing with Judaism or Christianity, a dogmatic prejudice—the radical corruption of human nature due to original sin—led Protestant scholars such as G. Vossius, S. Bochart, and Th. Gale to revive the thesis of plagiarism: everything sound in pagan thought must have been borrowed from the chosen people. The Bishop of Avranches, D. Huet (v.), an admirer of Bochart, and the Oratorian L. Thomassin (v.) erred in following them, Calmet (v.) and the Jesuit Fr. Lescalopier firmly refused. J. Spencer (v.), in his work De legibus Hebraeorum ritualibus (1685), developed with considerable judiciousness the thesis of "condescension": Yahweh would have authorized "rites rendered venerable by their antiquity and the usage of nations, seeing in them mere trifles to be tolerated or suited to prefigure some mystery." The same conceptions appear in J. Marsham, W. Warburton, and, with a more refined critical sense, in Dom Calmet.

At the outset of their secession, the Churches stemming from the "Reformation" still professed, with few exceptions (v. SOCINIANI), the dogmas of the Trinity, the divinity of Jesus Christ, his expiatory sacrifice, his necessary mediation, and retained much of his morality. It is therefore unsurprising to see many of their scholars endeavor to demonstrate the transcendence of Christianity: L. Vives (1543), Duplessy-Mornay ([v.] 1579), Ed. Brerewood (1614), H. Grotius (1622), J. Hoornebeck (1653), J. H. Ursin (1663), J. Kromayer (1670). The same was naturally done among Catholics by Canon Jovet (1676) and the Dominican V. GOTI (v.) in a more developed and learned work.

Meanwhile, in the wake of Ferdinand Cortez, Pizarro, Soto, Jacques Cartier, and Champlain, many zealous missionaries brought important regions of the two Americas into the Roman faith. The Relations de la Nouvelle-France, the Lettres édifiantes et curieuses of the Jesuits of Canada, for example, and the accounts of explorers published in various collections of travels brought to a marveling Europe a rich treasure of information. At the very least, L'Histoire générale des choses de la Nouvelle-Espagne by the Franciscan Bernardino de Sahagún (v.) is cited as a nearly perfect model of scientific rigor. The later work of the Jesuit J. Fr. Lafitau (v.), Moeurs des sauvages américains comparés aux moeurs des premiers temps (1724), compares the rites of the Indians to the mysteries of Bacchus, Cybele, and Isis. Some modern ethnologists thus hail him as the initiator of the "anthropological method." From the Far East came, among many others, the valuable reports of Fathers M. Ricci (v.) and N. Trigault (v); a little later, the Mémoires concernant l'histoire, les sciences, les moeurs des Chinois, translations of sacred texts, the King, and commentaries of great value. Similarly, important studies on Hinduism arrived from India. Between 1730 and 1732, the Jesuit J. CALMETTE, JEAN (v.) discovered the four Vedas; his confrere, Fr. Pons, in 1738, and the celebrated Carmelite Paolino di S. Bartolomeo (J. Ph. Verdin) in 1790 sent the first Sanskrit grammars to Europe. Father G. L. Coeurdoux noted the affinities between Sanskrit and European languages (1767), thus paving the way for comparative philology.

The painful controversies that divided missionaries in China and India, and the role played in the West by incompetent yet passionate partisans, will be treated elsewhere (v. dei).

BIBL.:
For the Renaissance and Humanism: E. Gilson, La philosophie au Moyen Âge, Paris 1922; P. O. Kristeller, The Philosophy of Marsilio Ficino, New York 1943; G. Toffanin, Storia dell'Umanesimo, Bologna 1933; L. Thorndike, History of Magic and Experimental Science, New York 1923-58; F. Secret, Les kabbalistes chrétiens de la Renaissance, Paris 1964.
For the Reformation and its impact on religious studies: J. Lortz, Die Reformation in Deutschland, Freiburg 1939-40; H. Jedin, Geschichte des Konzils von Trient, Freiburg 1949-75; P. Tacchi Venturi, Storia della Compagnia di Gesù in Italia, Roma 1910-51; H. Bremond, Histoire littéraire du sentiment religieux en France, Paris 1916-33.
For the missions and the study of non-Christian religions: G. H. Gwilliam, The Work of the Early Jesuit Missionaries in India, London 1905; H. Bernard-Maître, Sagesse chinoise et philosophie chrétienne, Paris 1935; J. Dahlmann, Die Sprachkunde und die Missionen, Freiburg 1891; A. Väth, Geschichte der katholischen Missionen in Indien, Aachen 1920; L. H. Jordan, Comparative Religion: Its Genesis and Growth, Edinburgh 1905.
— G. M.

VI. THE ADVENT OF RATIONALISM

The free examination initiated by Luther and Calvin was not precisely rationalism; in fact, they imbued it with a mystical character, attributing the interpretation of the Scriptures to a divine illumination, to the "testimony of the Holy Spirit" in the soul of the faithful, as Calvin put II. It was not free, because this grace, according to them, was received passively. Neither one nor the other conceived or tolerated that this grace could lead to any interpretation other than their own. Nevertheless, the outcome was inevitable, because every controversy had necessarily to be settled according to rational demands, and every "formula of concord" had to consecrate a reduction of the evidences of faith in favor of rational evidences. Moreover, the method followed in polemics against "pagan-papism" was convenient but equally dangerous. It sufficed, in fact, to show (something initially overlooked) that more or less close analogies linked not only practices and superstitions but even Christian dogmas to pagan beliefs: analogy proved derivation. Thus, the pastor Souverain, in his book Le platonisme dévoilé (1700), immediately translated and later exploited by "deists" and "philosophers," derived the dogma of the Trinity from Neoplatonic speculations. Paganism had claimed oracles and miracles in its favor; many writers, with the same ease, drew arguments against any revelation from them.

This largely explains the rise of English deism with Herbert of Cherbury, M. Tindal (v.), D. Hume (v.), T. HOBBES, THOMAS (v.), J. LOCKE, JOHN (v.), J. Toland (v.), H. Bolingbroke (v.); of French philosophisme Voltaire (v.), d'Alembert (v.), DIDEROT, DENIS (v.), d'Holbach (v.), N. A. Boulanger (v.), Ch. Fr. Dupuis (v.), author of Origine de tous les cultes (1745); of German Aufklärung (v. ILLUMINISMO) with J. Ch. Wolff, J. S. Semler, H. S. Reimarus, G. E. Lessing (v.), J. G. Eichhorn, H. Paulus, and others.

Responses of unequal value were not lacking. Impressive lists can be found in the works of two eminent bibliographers: J. A. Fabricius, Delectus argumentorum... adversus atheos... (Hamburg 1725) and J. G. Walch, Bibliotheca theologica selecta (Jena 1757). The abbots Banier, Foucher, and de Tressant, explaining mythology through history, granted ample space to Euhemerus' theses. Other scholars—J. Leland, D. Waterland, J. Bryant, P. Guérin du Rocher—exploited the theory of "plagiarism." Still others, among whom G. B. Vico (v.) in his Scienza nuova (1725 and 1730) and A. Court de Gébelin in his Monde primitif comparé avec le monde moderne (1773-82) stand out, exploited allegorical exegesis with a certain complacency. In these last two writers, a new theory emerges: the formation of the most archaic religions would be explained by the infantile mentality, given, as Vico notes, the state of savagery into which humanity had fallen after the Flood. D. Hume was led to similar conceptions by his "associationism" and his way of conceiving "the progress of human thought." According to him, the original form of religion had been polytheism. This Rousseau (v.). Inspired by Hume's philosophy, yet claiming to rely not on mere possibilities but on facts, Brosses (v.), in 1757, sided with universal "fetishism": "I generally call by this name," he says, "any religion that has as its object the worship of animals or inanimate beings" (cf. Du culte des dieux fétiches, Paris 1760, p. 61). Despite the imprecision of this definition, the thesis gained favor and was especially exploited by the Germans Chr. Meiners and Chr. G. Heyne. The abbot Bergier, in two works that demonstrate remarkable attention to travel accounts and missionary reports—L'origine des dieux du paganisme (Paris 1767) and Traité historique et dogmatique de la vraie religion (ibid. 1780)—attributes to primitive peoples a kind of animism; but he avoids any exclusive solution. The same is true of the admirable scholar J. Brucker in his Historia critica philosophiae a mundi incunabulis (2nd ed., 6 vols., Leipzig 1767). Both these authors can be considered the most conscientious and prudent writers on sacred matters of that period.

The many publications—dictionaries or general histories of religion, of diverse inspirations—prove the interest these questions aroused at the time. The most considerable is that of J. Fr. Bernard: Cérémonies et coutumes de tous les peuples du monde (7 folio vols., Amsterdam 1723-37; with several supplements and various editions and translations). The abbots Banier and Lemasurier produced an edition purged of attacks against the Roman Church (7 folio vols., Paris 1741).

On the whole, it can be said that the study of classical religions remained nearly stationary, while knowledge of those of the New World, Africa, the Indies, and the Far East made considerable progress. However, strictly scientific methods still needed to be found, which polemical spirit had contributed to hindering in their development, though they can be seen taking shape in the works of Fathers R. J. de Tournemine and A. Gaubil, of N. Fréret, J. de Guignes, Chr. G. Heyne, J. J. Brucker, and the abbot Bergier.

Aiming likewise to shield faith in God from the attacks of unbelievers, E. Kant (v.) set out to demonstrate the incompetence of speculative reason to know things in themselves and then to justify, among Christian beliefs, those he deemed valid through practical reason: the imperatives of the moral law. But if this faculty possesses absolute value, one may conclude that it is itself the Absolute and creates its own object. Thus, one ends in idealism. From this stem, though distinguished by many nuances, the systems of Fichte (v.) Schelling (v.); from this, too, Hegel (v.). With great assurance, this philosopher described the evolution of God Himself, of the religions of nature up to that of "spiritual individuality or free subjectivity." The depth of some of his views and the power of his synthesis won him admirers, among the most recent: G. GENTILI (v.) and B. Croce (v. FILOSOFIA DELLO SPIRITO), neo-idealists. Conversely, his excessive intellectualism provoked opposing reactions, as divergent as dialectical materialism with C. Marx (v.) and existentialism with J. Kirkegaard (v.); in any case, he contributed to establishing the idea of evolution.

Schelling (v.), Schleiermacher (v.) saw the common origin of religions in the absolute feeling of dependence (das schlechthinige Abhängigkeitsgefühl), arising from a certain experience of the Universe or of God. According to him, from this derive both the religion of Christ and those of the pagans. Christian theology must limit itself to analyzing the experiences of believers, then to coordinating their content into a system for this or that period of time. In his Christliche Lehre, he endeavored to reach Christian dogmas; and his disciples—"orthodox," "theologians of the middle way," and "liberals"—attempted the same with varying zeal and success. J. Fr. Fries (v.) and G. de Wette preferred to speak of "presentiments," then expressing themselves in symbols more or less stimulating to piety, a solution adopted in our day by the French symbolo-fideists, A. Sabatier, E. Ménégoz, and by numerous modernists (v. MODERNISMO).

At the same time, ardent Catholics likewise sought to secure faith against the audacities and fantasies of individual sentiment. Following the footsteps of the Viscount de Bonald (v.) 1754-1840, they appealed to "tradition," the only means, in their view, of attaining certainty, a tradition guaranteed from the origin of time by the authority of the Revealer. Among the proponents of these theses, only a few are mentioned: F. de Lamennais (v.), BAUTZEN (v.), A. Bonnety (v.); in Italy: G. Brunati and P. Ventura (v.). They and their partisans, to establish the universality and continuity of religious traditions, searched as best they could through the annals of peoples. But the Roman Church could not tolerate such disdain for reason, and as early as 1834 condemned their principles (v. TRADIZIONALISMO).

Indeed, the annals of peoples began to be more widely known in the West. Anquetil Duperron (v.) in 1762 deposited in Paris 180 Zend, Pehlvi, Persian, and Sanskrit manuscripts; in 1771 he published the first translation of the Zend-Avesta and in 1833-35 the commentary on the Yasna. The key to Iranian studies was thus found. In 1816, Fr. Bopp, resuming the research of P. Coeurdoux and William Jones, definitively established the kinship of all Indo-European languages: comparative linguistics was thus founded, and the way opened for the critical comparison of an entire series of mythologies and religions. E. Burnouf (1801-52), Chr. Lassen, and Abele de Rémusat, relying on numerous texts, inaugurated the study of Buddhism and its sects. In 1822, Champollion (v.) succeeded in deciphering hieroglyphs, and Egypt began to reveal the secrets of its distant past. Alexander von Humboldt (v.) and Lord Kingsborough wrested theirs from Mexico. Niebuhr, P. E. Müller, Grimm (v.), J. J. von Görres, Monc, Augustin and Amédée Thierry exhumed and learned to interpret the traditions of Ireland, Sweden, Finland, Russia, Normandy, and Gaul.

Yet interpreting archaic documents correctly is one of the most delicate tasks. Proof of this is the failure of Catholic traditionalists; nor did the Heidelberg school fare better, for under the influence of Romanticism and the theses of Fries and G. de Wette, it returned to allegorizing exegesis and saw symbols everywhere. J. J. von Görres (v.) published his Mythengeschichte der asiatischen Welt (1810), F. CREAZIONE (v.) his Symbolik und Mythologie der alten Völker (1810-12), later expanded in subsequent editions, translated and revised by D. Guigniaut as Religions de l'antiquité (1825-51). With no less erudition but greater critical sense, K. W. Solger, C. H. Welcker, L. Preller, and especially Otfried Müller succeeded in curbing exaggerated enthusiasm.

Between 1830 and 1842, A. Comte (v.) published his Cours de philosophie positive, and in 1851-54 his Système de politique positive. The structure of his works reveals a mathematician; his theses show the ideal of a mind entirely freed from religious concerns. LAMARCKISMO (v.), but then claimed to discover in history a normal evolution: the "sociological law," or "of the three states." Humanity would have passed from the "theological state," characterized by mythologies, to the "metaphysical state," in which it delighted in abstractions, to emerge into the "positive state." In this last state, it renounces preoccupation with the Absolute to focus on what is determined, real, certain, useful, and relative.

The author of Social Statics (1850) and the System of Synthetic Philosophy (10 vols., London 1860-96), Herbert Spencer, depended largely on Comte but diverged from him on many points. He was led to evolution through the study of geology and biology. According to him, the action of the environment matters everywhere, in organic or living matter, producing progressive differentiations until reaching a state of equilibrium more or less stable, followed by a process of dissolution more or less complete and by new adaptations. The thesis of continuous cultural progress, in its most absolute form, seemed to him untenable; regressions had very likely occurred frequently. Necessarily very rudimentary at its beginnings, religion perfects itself as the mind better grasps the insufficiency of the coarse symbols that once sufficed. Its historical forms all have a relative value; the purest is that which corresponds to the concept of the "Unknowable." By thus conceding, against positivism, some satisfaction to religious sentiment, and giving ample scope to the idea of evolution, Spencer ensured his theories an unparalleled success.

BIBL.:
Per Lessing, Rousseau, Jacobi, Herder, Constant, Bunsen, Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Gentile, Croce, Marx, Kirkegaard, Schleiermacher, Fries, de Wette, Sabatier, Ménégoz, Lamennais, Bautain, Bonnety, Brunati, Ventura, V. le rispettive voci; inoltre: A. Ritschl, Die christliche Lehre von der Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung, Bonn 1870-74; A. Sabatier, Esquisse d'une philosophie de la religion, Parigi 1897; E. Ménégoz, La théologie de l'épître aux Romains, Parigi 1892; F. de Lamennais, Essai sur l'indifférence en matière de religion, Parigi 1817-23; L. Bautain, Philosophie du christianisme, Strasburgo 1835; A. Bonnety, Études sur les traditions populaires, Parigi 1863; G. Brunati, Della tradizione, Milano 1840; P. Ventura, La tradizione, Roma 1851; Anquetil Duperron, Zend-Avesta, Parigi 1771; Fr. Bopp, Über das Conjugationssystem der Sanskritsprache, Francoforte 1816; E. Burnouf, Introduction à l'histoire du bouddhisme indien, Parigi 1844; J.-F. Champollion, Précis du système hiéroglyphique, Parigi 1824; A. von Humboldt, Vues des Cordillères et monuments des peuples indigènes de l'Amérique, Parigi 1810; J. J. von Görres, Mythengeschichte der asiatischen Welt, Heidelberg 1810; F. Creuzer, Symbolik und Mythologie der alten Völker, Lipsia 1810-12; D. Guigniaut, Religions de l'antiquité, Parigi 1825-51; A. Comte, Cours de philosophie positive, Parigi 1830-42; H. Spencer, System of Synthetic Philosophy, Londra 1860-96.

The discoveries presented in 1841 by Boucher de Perthes in his De l'industrie primitive had set minds on the same path. In 1859, Darwin (v.), who hails Spencer as a precursor, publishes his Origin of Species. From that moment, the prehistory of man and that of religion captivate public opinion. Anthropologists are led to conclude that the more apelike human fossils are, the more archaic they must be. Gradually, they come to recognize that it is first necessary to prove that these fossils truly possess some specific human trait and then to determine their age using historical criteria—that is, by the age of the geological strata in which they were found (v. EVOLUZIONE; EVOLUZIONISMO CULTURALE).

VIII. THE GREAT DISCOVERIES

Gradually, from the 19th century to the present day, excavations undertaken by tireless researchers and, in other cases, fortuitous finds, have provided information of the highest value concerning a considerable number of religions.

Among these, the excavations conducted from the mid-19th century at Halicarnassus, Cnidus, Ephesus, Delphi, Eleusis, Delos, Olympia, and others. In 1861, H. Mouhot discovered the monuments of Cambodia. In 1879, Max Müller launched the magnificent collection of the Sacred Books of the East (50 vols., Oxford 1879-1910). In 1887, Tell el-'Amārnah yielded the correspondence addressed to the Egyptian monarchs Amenophis III (1415-1380 B.C.) and Amenophis IV (1380-62 B.C.). The excavations at Susa, directed by J. de Morgan (1894-1899), uncovered the remains of seven superimposed cities HAMMURABI (HAMMURAPI) (v.). In 1896, H. Winkler discovered at Boğazköy the royal archives of the Hittites (Hetei). In 1898, the first publication of the Oxyrhynchus papyri in the Faiyum. In 1900, A. J. Evans discovered in Crete the labyrinth of Minos and the ancient vestiges of Aegean civilization. From 1899 to 1900, the missions of A. Stein, A. Grünwedel, and A. von Le Coq uncovered treasures in Chinese Turkestan; arriving later, P. Pelliot was still able to acquire 2,000 manuscripts and 30,000 fascicles of Chinese prints. In 1919, further important discoveries at Byblos; in 1922-23 at Dura-Europos, in the Faiyum. Beginning in 1922, in the Indus Valley, at Mohenjo-Daro, Harappa, and Chanhu-Daro, a civilization hitherto unknown emerged from the earth, dating back to the 4th millennium B.C. In 1929, the discoveries at Ras Shamra in Phoenicia began; in 1931, those at Medinet Madi, again in the Faiyum; in 1941, those at Tura near Cairo; in 1946-47, those at Nag Hammadi in Upper Egypt; in 1947, those in the Judean Desert (on the latter, cf. J. Lambert, in Nouvelle revue théologique, 73 [1951], pp. 385-98).

All these successive discoveries shed new light on the religions of the Assyro-Babylonians, the Elamites, the Hetei, the Phoenicians, the Egyptians, the evolution of Buddhism, the speculations of pre-Christian Judaism, numerous Gnostic sects, and Manichaeism. Some of these discoveries have restored patristic texts; others, particularly the papyri acquired in Upper Egypt (1930-31) by A. Chester Beatty (v.), provide texts of the Old and New Testaments, which confirm the authenticity of the books accepted by the Church.

a) Philological School. — «Instead of deriving mythology from the weakness of the intellect and the poverty of language,» wrote Müller, «a truer idea of it will be given by explaining it through the wisdom of the spirit and the richness of language.» For him and for a whole group of scholars, mythology would be a «disease of language»; the multiplicity of words expressing identical phenomena would have led to the plurality of gods: nomina numina. But which phenomena, over time, gave rise to these misunderstandings? According to Ad. Kuhn and C. V. Müllenhoff, rain, storm, and lightning; according to Max Müller and W. Cox, the rising and setting of the sun (the faithful practically treat as a single god the one to whom they occasionally turn: henotheism); according to J. W. E. Mannhardt, the phases of vegetation; according to Ch. Ploix, the sky in its aspects; according to P. W. Forchhammer, aquatic phenomena... Such notable disagreement betrays the arbitrariness of these constructions. The progress of comparative philology ultimately discredited them (cf. C. de Cara, Errori mitologici del prof. A. de Gubernatis, Prato 1883; id., Esame del sistema filologico e mitologico, ibid. 1884; O. Gruppe, Die griech. Culte und Mythen, Leipzig 1887, pp. 72-184; L. von Schröder, Arische Religion, 2 vols., ibid. 1914-16; W. Schmidt, Manuale di storia comparata delle religioni, Italian trans., 4th ed., Brescia 1949, pp. 23-39).

b) Anthropological School. — For their part, evolutionist ethnologists began to examine the most ancient civilizations and attempted through them to trace back to the earliest forms of religion and from there to its first connections. H. Spencer advocated manism (v.); Ed. B. Tylor, in his Primitive culture (2 vols., London 1871; 5th ed., revised, ibid. 1813), which enjoyed considerable success, animism (v.); J. M. Guyau proposed a panentheistic pre-animism, imagining will everywhere; J. H. King, H. Th. Preuss, R. R. Marett, A. Vierkandt, E. S. Hartland advocated a dynamistic or magical pre-animism (v. MAGIA); R. Otto, going even beyond more or less intellectual notions, assigned as the origin of religion the vague impression of the «sacred» or the «numinous»: Das Heilige (Breslau 1917; 22nd ed. ibid. 1932). In reality, even the most fervent collectors of facts belonging to this school classified and continued to classify the manifestations of religious life as psychologists.

c) Pan-Babylonian School. — For this very reason, E. Siecke, J. Hüsing, H. Lehmann, H. Winkler, A. Jeremias sought to rely on historical evidence. Recent discoveries revealed to them the broad influence of Assyria-Babylonia on neighboring peoples and the naturist meaning of a large part of its myths. The first gods, they concluded, were the stars both for Israel and for the entire world. Hence the name «pan-Babylonists», coined by their opponents and, moreover, accepted by the school (cf. A. Jeremias, Die Panbabilonisten, 2nd ed., Leipzig 1907, p. 3; id., Das Alte Testament im Lichte des Alten Orients, ibid. 1904; 3rd ed., revised, ibid. 1916). Such an exaggeration could only have an ephemeral vogue. The authoritative criticisms of F. X. Kugler (v.), H. Gressmann, G. Maspero, and other Assyriologists succeeded in halting II.
d) Historical Schools. — Meanwhile, a more judicious critique continued to grow among ethnologists. In France, A. de Quatrefages (1810-92), the most courteous and perhaps the most competent of Darwin’s opponents, reasonably insisted on the role played by migrations, on the geographical distribution of civilizations, as a means of determining their epoch, etc. But this precursor remained almost without posterity. In England, W. Rivers (1864-1922), following his research among the Melanesians (The history of Melanesian Society, 2 vols., Cambridge 1914), resolutely adopted the principle of the Cambridge jurist Fr. W. Maitland (1850-1906): «Ethnology will either become history or it will be nothing» (cf. History and ethnology, London 1922, p. 295). A. Lang (1844-1912), initially a fervent disciple of Tylor, had the courage to conduct a counter-inquiry and discovered among the most backward populations supreme beings, creators, legislators of moral order: The making of religion, London 1898. It is easy to imagine the polemics aroused by this work. In Germany, Fr. Ratzel, L. Frobenius, B. Ankermann, Fr. Gräbner, W. Foy, rightly concluding that overall concordances between more or less distant civilizations implied kinship and migrations, applied themselves to determining the areas of diffusion of each (Kulturkreise) and subsequently, according to indications provided by race, language, economic regime, etc., to determining the chronological order of their appearance: the historical-cultural method (cf. Fr. Gräbner, Methode der Ethnologie, Heidelberg 1911). The Vienna School, with Fathers W. Schmidt, W. Koppers, P. Schebesta, M. Schulien, M. Gusinde, P. Schumacher, G. van Bulck, refined this method but revised it; and in particular resumed, in the most fruitful manner, A. Lang’s research on the «great gods». For their part, relying on Fr. Boas, eminent American ethnologists such as A. A. Goldenweiser, A. M. Tozer, J. R. Swanton, A. L. Kroeber, P. Radin, less favorable to explaining cultural concordances through migrations, nevertheless reacted against rigid or monolinear evolutionism, «this solemn non-sense». So called by one of them, R. H. Lowie, Primitive society, London 1921, p. 428 (v. ETNOLOGIA).

e) The progressive clarification of critical principles, following the example of E. Bernheim (Lehrbuch der histor. Methode, Leipzig 1889; 6th ed. ibid. 1908), and the sensational discoveries already mentioned, achieved no less happy results for the religions of the more advanced peoples. Proof of this will be found in the manuals cited in the bibliography, particularly those by A. Bertholet - Ed. Lehmann, M. Gorce-R. Mörtier, P. Tacchi-Venturi, F. König. As for the erudition expended by W. BOUSSET, WILHELM (v.), H. Gunkel, and other representatives of the Religionsgeschichtliche Schule to prove the derivation of the fundamental dogmas of Christianity from paganism, V. SINCRETISMO.

f) Psychologists. — As has been seen, evolutionist ethnologists classified religious phenomena from the most rudimentary to the most intellectual as psychologists. W. WUNDT, WILHELM (v.), too inclined, like Comte, to despise the individual and to condemn introspection, referred to myths as the expression, in his view, of collective experiences. L. Lévy-Bruhl (v.) introduced the idea of a primitive mentality that was not alogical or illogical, thus entirely different from

The rationalists such as J. Simon, La religion naturelle, Paris 1856; A. Franck, Philosophie et religion, ibid. 1867; E. Vacherot, La religion, ibid. 1869, allowed greater scope to intelligence. They were naturally inclined to claim, as the latter did, that philosophy should supplant religion. The progress of anti-intellectualism, especially within liberal Protestantism (v. PROTESTANTESIMO LIBERALE) and of symbol-fideism, inaugurated by Fries (v.) and de Vette, tended, on the contrary, to relegate religion to the domain of sentiment and, by the same token, called for recourse to experimental psychology. The history of this discipline and its inquiries into the subconscious and the unconscious will be summarized elsewhere (v. PSICOLOGIA); here, we will deal, later on, only with its application to religious phenomena. However, we may already mention, for a better synthetic view, the reactions of O. Külpe, K. Girgensohn, and W. Grühn (Würzburg school) and those of numerous Catholics: G. Wunderle, A. Gemelli, J. Maréchal, M. Penido, etc.

g) Sociologists. — The history of modern sociology will also be presented separately (v. SOCIOLOGIA). We will later indicate how it can contribute significantly to the comparative study of religions.

The positivism of Comte, a product much more of speculation than of history, ended by substituting the cult of God with the cult of humanity. Proceeding instead with highly detailed monographs, though limited to Ouvriers européens (3rd ed., 6 vols., Tours 1877-79), Fr. Le Play (1806-82) was led to recognize, on the one hand, the very strong influence of economic conditions (to which C. Marx and Fr. V. Engels were to attribute an exclusive role) and, on the other, the social importance of moral and religious conceptions. His school survived him for only a short time. An entire group of German scholars, founders of Völkerpsychologie, returned to Comte. The most illustrious among them, W. WUNDT, WILHELM (v.), while accepting religion, foresees for the future a church free from any rule of faith, « eine konfessionsfreie Kirche ». His inquiry extended to primitive peoples, and his erudition is immense; however, his interpretation of the facts is so contestable that a Protestant theologian, E. W. Mayer, described his work as « a richly illustrated novel ».

E. Durkheim (1858-1917) nevertheless took up a large part of Wundt’s and his school’s ideas, carrying them even further. Thus, he made totemism (v. TOTEMISMO) the pivot of his system and arrived at this discovery: the real object of religion, from its origins to our day, is society. On the other hand, the flaw in his method is quite evident, as he formulates these rules: « Social facts must be considered as things », « the determining cause of a social fact must be sought among antecedent social facts and not among the states of individual consciousness » (Les règles de la méthode sociologique, 5th ed., Paris 1895, p. 20 ff.; 135 ff.). These rules already foreshadow the conclusions. Contradicted by the most qualified foreign ethnologists and sociologists, Durkheim nevertheless found numerous supporters in France: H. Hubert, G. Belot, A. Fauconnet, G. Bouglé, etc.; and until recent years, he has in a way imposed himself on secular education. But the period of blind admiration seems to have passed. Nor are the current consequences of Marxism and its « dialectical materialism » well-suited to revive such ideas. On the question of dogmas and that of religious authority, even more than on that of divine worship, sociologists and psychologists remain deeply divided, as they are—and because they are—on the most serious problems of philosophy. This topic will be revisited later.

BIBL.:
1. History of comparative studies: O. Gruppe, Die griechischen Culten und Mythen, Leipzig 1887, pp. 3-278; E. Hardy, Zur Geschichte der vergleichenden Religionsforschung, in Archiv für Religionswissenschaft, 4 (1901), pp. 45-66, 97-135, 193-228; L. H. Jordan, Comparative religion, its genesis and growth, Edinburgh 1905, supplemented by The study of r. in the italian universities, with the collaboration of B. Labanca, London 1909, and The study... in the german univ., in Expos. Times, 22 (1911), pp. 108-201; 23 (1912), pp. 136-39; A. Réville, Les phases successives de l'histoire des r., Paris 1909; Ed. Lehmann, in A. Bertholet (Chantepie de la Saussaye), Lehrbuch der Religionsgeschichte, 1, 4th ed., Tübingen 1925, pp. 1-22; C. A. Padovani, La storia delle r. in Italia, in Scuola Catt., 3 (1922), pp. 401-20; and Settimana interna. di etnologia, 4th sess., Paris 1926, pp. 47-60; G. Mensching, Geschichte der Religionswissenschaft, Bonn 1948; W. Schmidt, Manuale di storia delle r., trans. it., 4th ed., Brescia 1949; more detailed studies: H. Pinard de la Boullaye, L'étude comparée des r., 3rd enlarged ed., Paris 1929.

2. General introduction. — a) E. Burnouf, La science des r., Paris 1872; M. Müller, Intro. to the science of r., London 1873; A. Réville, Prologomènes à l'histoire des r., Paris 1881; 4th ed. ibid. 1886; M. Vernes, L'histoire des r., Son esprit, sa méthode, ibid. 1887; S. H. Kellogg, The genesis and growth of r., London 1892; A. Menzies, History of r., ibid. 1895; 4th ed. ibid. 1914; C. P. Tiele, Elements of the science of r., 2 vols., Edinburgh-London 1897-99; id., Inleiding tot de godsdienstwetenschap, Amsterdam 1897-99, trans. by G. Gehrich, Einleitung..., Gotha 1899-1901; M. Jastrow, The study of r., London 1901; C. H. Toy, Intro. to the hist. of r., ibid. 1913, 2nd ed. 1921; R. Dussau, Intro. à l'hist. des r., Paris 1914; N. Sederblom, Einführung in die Religionsgeschichte, Leipzig 1920; 2nd ed. ibid. 1928; R. Beth, Einführung in die vergleichende Religionsgeschichte, Leipzig 1920; A. G. Widger, The comparative study of r., London 1923; b) Catholics: P. de Broglie, Problèmes et conclusions de l'hist. des r., Paris 1885; 4th ed. ibid. 1904; trans. by A. Piocchi, Problemi, etc., Siena 1906; A. Anwander, Einführung in die Religionsgeschichte, Munich 1930; trans. with appendix by U. A. Padovani, Introduzione..., Brescia 1932; W. Schmidt, Handbuch (cited); K. L. Bellon, Inleiding tot de vergelijkende godsdienstwetenschap, Antwerp-Nijmegen 1932; 3rd ed. Brussels 1949; id., Inleiding tot de godsdienstgeschiedenis, Antwerp 1935; L. Allevi, Religione e religioni, 2nd ed., Turin 1948.

3. General History of Religions — Manuals: a) C. P. Tiele, Geschiedenis van den Godsdienst, Amsterdam 1876; trans. by M. Vernes, Manuel de l'hist. des religions, Paris 1880 and 1885; trans. by N. Sederblom, Kompendium der Religionsgeschichte, 4th ed., revised, Breslau 1912; 5th ed. ibid. 1920; revised ed., Geschiedenis... tot op Alexander der Groote, 2 vols., Amsterdam 1891-1902; trans. by G. Gehrich, Geschichte... bis Alexander, Gotha 1893-1903; trans. by Aschernbrödel, Le religioni del mondo, Rome 1908; trans. by W. Gerswant, Manuel d'hist. des r., Paris 1925; P. D. Chantepie de la Saussaye, Lehrbuch der Religionsgeschichte, Freiburg-Leipzig 1887-89; 2nd ed., 3rd ed., revised, 1897 and 1905; trans. London 1891; trans. of the 2nd ed., Paris 1904 (cf. infra); 3rd ed., entirely reworked under the direction of A. Bertholet and E. Lehmann, 2 vols., Tübingen 1924-25 (of great value); C. von Orelli, Allgemeine Religionsgeschichte, Bonn 1899; 2nd ed. ibid. 1911-13; S. Reinach, Cultes, mythes et religions, 4 vols., Paris 1904-12; id., Orpheus, Hist. générale des r., Paris 1909; 43rd thousand, 1933; trans. ed. by A. Mahler, English by F. Simmonds; Italian by A. Della Torre, Orpheus, 2 vols., Palermo 1912; severely judged by the most qualified specialists, refuted especially by Mons. P. Battifol, Orpheus et l'Evangile, Paris 1910, 3rd ed., ibid. 1912, by M.-J. Lagrange, Quelques remarques sur l'Orpheus, ibid. 1910 (Revue bibl., 7 [1910], pp. 129-41), by A. Vaccari, L'Orpheus de S. Reinach (in Civ. Catt., 1911, 1, pp. 34, 331, 384); G. Moore, History of religions, 2 vols., Edinburgh 1914-20; trans. by G. La Piana, Bari 1922; J. A. Montgomery, Religions of the past and present (in collab.), Philadelphia-London 1918 and 1924; C. Clemen, Die nichtchristl. Kulturreligionen in ihrem gegenwärtigen Zustand, Leipzig 1921; J. Leipoldt, Handbuch der Religionswissenschaft, in collab., 9 fasc., Berlin 1922; R. E. Hume, The world's living religions, New York 1924; revised ed., ibid. 1926; C. Clemen, Die Religionen der Erde, in collab., with F. Babinger, L. Baeck, etc., Munich 1927; 2nd ed. ibid. 1949; trans. by J. Marty, Les religion du monde, Paris 1930; G. van der Leeuw, Die godsdiensten der Wereld, 2 vols., Amsterdam 1940-41; Vol. II, 2nd ed., 1948 (in collab.); Collection Mana, highly erudite separate monographs by J. Vandier, R. Dussau, Ed. Dhorne, etc., Paris 1944 ff.; M. Gorce, R. Mortier, etc., Histoire générale des r., 5 vols., Paris 1944-51, of value, richly illustrated. b) Catholic: J. Bricout, Où en est l'histoire des r.?, 2 vols., Paris 1911-12 (in collab.); J. Huby, Christus, ibid. 1912 (in collab.), 3rd ed., revised and expanded, ibid. 1916; 38th thousand 1947; N. Turchi, Manuale di storia delle r., Turin 1912; 2nd ed. ibid. 1922 (without Judaism and Christianity); id., Saggi di storia delle r., Foligno 1924; id., Le r. del mondo, 2nd ed. Rome 1951 (in collab.); C. C. Martindale, Lectures on the hist. of r., 5 vols., London 1910-11 (in collab.); Ant. Anwander, Die Religionen der Menschheit, Freiburg im Br. 1927, 2nd ed. ibid. 1950 (non-Christian religions); E. C. Messenger, Studies in comparative r., London 1933-34 (in collab.); P. Tacchi Venturi, Storia delle r., 2 vols., Turin 1934-36 (in collab.); 3rd revised ed., 2 vols., ibid. 1949 (of great value); G. Bardy, Les r. non chrétiennes, Paris-Tournai 1949 (erudite summary); K. L. Bellon, Christus, Handboek voor de geschiedenis der godsdiensten, Utrecht-Brussels 1950 (revised ed. by J. Huby, in collab.); B. A. G. Vroklage, Die godsdiensten der menscheid, Roermond 1950 (in collab.); Fr. König, Christus und die R. der Erde, 3 vols., Vienna 1951 (in collab., of great value). For primitives, V. ETNOLOGIA.

B. DIVISION AND METHODS OF COMPARATIVE STUDIES.

SUMMARY:

I. Three stages: empirical sciences, philosophy, theology

II. History

III. Phenomenology

IV. Normal psychology, psychopathology, psychoanalysis

V. Typical cases: conversion, mysticism, enlightenment

VI. Sociology

VII. Science of religions

VIII. Philosophy of religion

IX. Comparative theology

X. Transcendence of Christianity.

I. THREE STAGES: EMPIRICAL SCIENCES, PHILOSOPHY, THEOLOGY

1. Necessary distinctions

The extreme diversity of conclusions reached by so many divergent philosophies and the impossibility of hoping, under such conditions, that scholars will ever one day come to an agreement, have increasingly underscored the necessity of clearly distinguishing empirical sciences from those governed by considerations of a different order. Empirical sciences: the general or comparative history of religions (Religionsgeschichte), phenomenology, psychology, the science of religions (Religionswissenschaft); further on: the philosophy of religion, comparative theology, the latter based on principles regarded as revealed.

In practice, this rigorous division of labor is among the most difficult to observe. Even esteemed authors, who nonetheless recognize its validity, fail to maintain it (cf. M. Penido, La conscience religieuse, Paris 1936, ch. 7, pp. 18-27). The only legitimate conclusion seems to be this: the more one becomes aware of this difficulty, the more one must strive to overcome it, since, after all, only what is effectively and solidly proven can gather support and advance science.

a) A preliminary question, of capital interest, is: which phenomena should be considered religious? If one answers: those that are distinguished from the "profane" order by their character in some way "holy" or "sacred," it remains to define the "sacred." If, on the other hand, one cannot find any equivalent other than "the unusual," "the inexplicable," "the extraordinary," one is led to consider as religious phenomena and acts that in fact derive sometimes from religion, sometimes from a reserved or secret science (white magic), used without any thought of reverence toward superior beings, sometimes from sorcery (black magic) in relation to more or less perverse beings, often regarded as rivals of God or the gods, and finally from what various religions considered as reprehensible excesses or abuses (superstition). If, moreover, one posits as the characteristic of the religious attitude "the search for a more intense or richer life, in short, the search for superiority, whether one aspires to use it or to invoke it," one exposes oneself to similar confusions.

Around fifty definitions have been proposed (cf. J. H. Leuba, La psychologie des phénomènes religieux, Fr. trans., Paris 1914, p. 597 ff.). The following, not philosophical (or real) but nominal (corresponding to the most general usage), seems to escape any well-founded criticism: in an objective sense, which particularly concerns the historian, the term "religion" expresses a set of beliefs and practices concerning an objective reality, or at least conceived as such, unique or collective, but in some measure supreme, and in some way personal, a reality upon which man, in one way or another, recognizes himself as dependent and whose favor he seeks to gain; - in a subjective sense, which particularly concerns the psychologist, the term "religion" expresses the manner of thinking, feeling, and acting, that is, the mentality that corresponds to the aforementioned beliefs and conduct (cf. H. Pinard, L'étude comparée des religions, II, 3rd ed., ibid. 1929, pp. 2-6).

b) As for the value of empirical sciences, since they profess to adhere solely to phenomena and thus, by methodological principle, to ignore the profound nature of beings in general, of the human soul, of God or the gods, it is clear that they cannot pronounce on the preternatural (or miraculous) or supernatural (or properly divine) character of certain facts, nor formulate judgments of value or transcendence, nor present any of their conclusions as normative, except in cases where they succeed in establishing the morbid or pathological character of certain manifestations or practices.

2. Subjective Conditions

That impartiality and the absence of confessional rivalry, etc., are required in this type of research is too obvious to insist upon. Furthermore, a certain competence and, consequently, a minimum of personal experience are indispensable. It has been claimed that one need not be religious to study religions any more than one need be insane to study mental alienation (B. Leroy, in Revue de l'hist. des religions, 50 [1909], p. 202; J. H. Leuba, op. cit., pp. 325-26). Similarly, no aesthetic sense would be necessary to improvise as an art critic! The justification attempted by J. H. Leuba, according to which the sentiments of religion—peace, confidence, abandonment, love, moral obligation—are familiar to all, is of no avail, because, for example, materialists prove entirely insensitive to religious motives; others, such as certain existentialists, show themselves incapable of understanding the total self-sacrifice that the canonized mystics of the Church have known how to realize in favor of the Infinite of beauty and goodness. "The ideal condition," adds the same author, following Renan (Études d'hist. religieuse, 4th ed., Paris 1859, pp. 6-7), "would be to have lived, in good faith, religious experiences and then to be liberated." This is true if the subject passes from error to truth; but not in the contrary case, if the subject is the victim of an illusion or guilty of a defection that he will attempt to justify per fas et nefas.

3. Essential Procedures

a) Evidently, the historical method is essential. Phenomena apparently identical—beliefs, rites, experiences—may differ significantly if they are not autochthonous and thus do not proceed from the same causes, or if, more or less belatedly, they have come to insert themselves into heterogeneous complexes, adapting to them and thus transforming to a greater or lesser degree. It may be said that one adopts only what one already possesses at least in germ, as a tendency, as an imprecise apperception, etc. This is true, but all instincts exist in germ in the human soul, from the noblest to the basest, and the satisfaction of one or the other, whether through pure borrowing or through adaptation, may result now in normal development, now in an alteration of the original patrimony and character of each cult. Only the historical method can discern these nuances and allow reliance on scientifically established facts. The processes of this method will be expounded shortly.

b) The second method, the comparative one, may be said to constitute first of all a process of invention. After duly consulting history and completing the inventory of a religion, by comparing the different stages of its evolution (internal comparison), variations will be observed that demand explanation; passing to other cults (external comparison), gaps, differences, anomalies will be noted. Thus invited to resume inquiries, one will often discover what the isolated analysis of each complex had not revealed. In this way, unless one wishes to reduce all cults to a single type, one may begin to study one in depth. This is "the sample procedure," recommended, following Max Müller, by G. Foucart (Histoire des religions et méthode comparative, 2nd ed., revised, Paris 1912). Conversely, one cannot at all, as E. Goblet d'Alviella advised, "supplement the insufficiency of information regarding the continuous history of a belief or an institution, within a race or society, with facts borrowed from other environments and other times" (Croyances, rites, institutions, II, Paris 1911, p. 192). Such integrations manifestly presuppose a priori the uniformity of evolutions.

Comparison, moreover, opens the way to explanations: identical phenomena mutually clarify one another as to their meaning, origin, and scope; more or less dissimilar phenomena help to understand the modes of transition from one series to another, or compel the observation of highly interesting exceptions.

Similarities, in fact, may derive: a) from simple chance encounters, that is, from the independent exploitation of the most natural symbolism, though with distinct purposes: water purifies; the Hindus purify themselves of their sins in the waters of the Ganges; John the Baptist baptized in the waters of the Jordan as a sign of penitence (Mt. 3:5-6); the first Apostles baptized everywhere in the name of Jesus as a sign of regeneration (Acts 8:34-38); same rite, but different spirit (v. BATTESIMO, II, coll. 1003-45). Pure chance encounters also arise from the almost obligatory recall of general themes: origin of things, center of the world, distinction of the three regions—heaven, earth, hell—cardinal points, etc.; both religion and magic make use of them. b) As for relationships of kinship, their mere multiplicity does not prove them at all when it is explained either by the identity of socio-economic conditions (one then discovers only characteristic types or "structures"), or by convergence or parallel evolution of a similar patrimony; kinship, however, manifests itself when very detailed agreements are maintained in different fields: racial characteristics, languages, techniques, etc. c) In other cases, one will have to admit the diffusion of ideas, practices—in short, borrowings—except then to distinguish between simple borrowings and borrowings with "acculturation" or more or less profound adaptation... d) Finally, similarities may derive from reciprocal or common influences, for example, a general movement of ideas that leads to the development of certain doctrines or rites dependent on the original patrimony, sometimes even to defend it better (v. SINCRITISMO).

In short, to be critical and effective, the comparison of religious phenomena must be neither superficial (in every phenomenon, especially the idea, the spirit that inspires it, the end it aims at, modify its meaning and effects), nor limited (a discordant trait may reveal the secret of origins, disclose a concern for adaptation, explain an evolution or different consequences), nor partial, evidently, by reporting only the traits favorable to a preconceived thesis. Otherwise, however great the erudition displayed, it will remain what it has too often been in the past: a method of confusion. On the contrary, once phenomena are duly analyzed and classified, they can be used with the same profit as in any experimental research the Baconian tables "of presence, of absence, of concomitant variation, and of residues," which allow the discernment of true causes and true laws.

II. HISTORY

It has become customary to reserve the ethnology (v.), leaving the study of great cultures to the history of religions. It would indeed be a childish error to place trust in their mythologies. In reality, myths are, among all religious elements, the least stable due to the imagination of individuals, magicians, poets, and popular masses. Often, even in Christian centuries, myths have been invented to explain formulas or symbols that had become enigmatic. Typical cases include the legends of St. Nicholas, St. Dionysius, other "cephalophoric" martyrs (v. MARTIRIO E MARTIRE), and Pope Joan (v.); hence the "iconographic" method applied to similar cases.

The value of a synthesis depends on preliminary analyses. The general procedure recommended by masters is therefore the inquiry through monographs on this or that deity, this or that sanctuary, this or that epoch.

Very often, when dealing with theological or cosmogonic myths, or the wonders performed by founders of religions or their disciples, the mere examination of the accounts (internal criticism)—one might say their insipidity—suffices to establish judgment: thus for the miracles performed by the Buddha, who, moreover, never appealed to God or gods; likewise for those of Muhammad, who, according to the Qur'an, presented this book as more than sufficient proof of his mission. The miracles of Christ are of an entirely different kind (cf. the proofs adduced, after many others, by Fr. Pinard de la Boullaye, in Il taumaturgo ed il profeta, Italian trans., Turin 1932, pp. 87-125).

The appeal to testimonies closest to the facts (external criticism) remains habitually necessary. Certain and sure is the principle: testis unus, testis nullus; a single witness, barring exceptional guarantees, proves nothing. Certainty is acquired only through the convergence of independent testimonies. Convergence, it is said, and not concordance (Übereinstimmung). The latter term may suggest that complete agreement is required and that its probative force results from the accumulation of mere probabilities. "Convergence," instead, means that, despite divergences explained by the diversity of viewpoints, interests, and editorial procedures, the accounts lead to substantially identical assertions: an agreement whose sufficient reason lies entirely in the reality of the fact in question. "Precisely the points of agreement in these divergent statements are those that constitute scientifically proven facts" (C. Langlois-C. Seignobos, Introduction aux études historiques, Paris 1899, p. 173). To written testimonies and the fragments of texts with which an ingenious critic can construct any "house of cards," one must also add their context, that is, the pledges of sincerity offered by the lives of the witnesses, the convictions, the reforms determined by their publications or preaching, etc.

Convergence may also occur, especially when dealing with relationships between two archaic or primitive cultures, as the "historical-cultural" method does (v. ETNOLOGIA, cols. 713-14), through clues discovered in independent fields: agreement of myths, names of gods or spirits, different words (philological method, particularly in vogue after Max Müller); agreement of place names, clans, tribes (topology and toponymy); technical particularities; all, however, under the reservations outlined above.

It is well to insist once more on the importance of details, at least in many cases: a name, a date reported on a single coin among many similar coins worn by time, can provide a definitive solution; as can a detail of a rite or a myth, such as the number 14 for the fragments of Osiris's body (J. Capart, in Revue de l'hist. des religions, 51 [1905], pp. 255-56).

Finally, it should be noted that the successive description or parallel presentation of different cults and their vicissitudes alone does not suffice for the program of "comparative history of religions." This must derive, from the analogies and contrasts observed, laws or at least plausible explanations. To succeed, it manifestly requires the contribution of other disciplines.

Phenomenology certainly cannot pronounce on its own regarding the origin of religion and its earliest forms. «In religion,» writes G. van der Leeuw, «God is a character who arrived late» (La religion dans son essence et ses manifestations, Paris 1948, p. 36). «Currently,» attests M. Eliade, better informed, «no religion is known that is reduced to the elementary hierophanies and kratophanies of mana, animism, etc. Among primitives, belief in a Supreme Being, creator and omnipotent, appears almost everywhere» (Traité d'histoire des religions, Paris 1949, pp. 36-39; cf. A. Jepsen, Anmerkungen zur Phänomenologie der Religion, in Festschrift A. Bertholet, Tübingen 1950, pp. 271-72; V. EVOLUZIONISMO CULTURALE). The question of the origins of religion belongs to history; whereas the question of its «essence,» at least in the ontological sense of the term, evidently belongs to philosophy.

As for the phenomenological work of description, classification, and explanation, it must be repeated that it would be without critical value if it took into account only partial analyses. Almost all religions admit, at least to some extent, private inspiration; a great number possess sacred texts; but this inspiration and the exegesis of canonical books are, in some, rigorously controlled, in others uncontrolled. Magical practices are observed in all religions; but in some they are officially organized, in others at least tolerated, and in still others severely prohibited. In many, the confession of sins is required; but this is frequently limited to ritual faults alone or reduced to mere formality; in Egypt, identification with the god Osiris ultimately ensured impunity in the afterlife (H. Junker, in Semaine internationale d'ethnologie religieuse, IV sect., Paris 1926, pp. 276-90; V. CONFESSIONE). Such nuances certainly have serious repercussions in the spiritual life of individuals and collectivities.

Following instead a conscientious critique, phenomenology can bring very valuable contributions to history; among others, these: the proof, quite clear on the whole, of a distinction between magic and religion, the former aiming only at the utilization of occult forces without any thought of homage, the latter involving, even with interested purposes, some commitment of respect and submission; quite frequently, given the agreement of identified features or the «criteria of form and quantity,» the proof of original kinship or borrowing; sometimes the revelation of constant associations between economic regime, social organization, mythology, initiation rites, as observed in primitive societies of the matriarchal or patriarchal type, etc. Furthermore, it manifests, according to the extent of their diffusion, the seductive power of certain ideas or rites, whether in the direction of moral rigorism or lassitude, as well as the more or less regular consequences of pantheistic or dualistic conceptions, religious skepticism, amoralism, etc.

a) Through introspection, the psychologist analyzes his own experiences, whether in the course of his religious activity, by recalling his memories and examining their variations consequent to changes in his conceptions and practical conduct, or by observing his reactions to forms of piety presented to him by history (v. PSICOLOGIA SPERIMENTALE).

b) With extrospection, he studies the experiences of others. In this case, statistics offer only mediocre assistance. Indeed, their figures would have no value unless they grouped identical individuals; instead, they commonly group under the same denomination (Hindus, Muslims, Protestants, etc.) highly disparate collectivities; similarly, within the bounds of more homogeneous groups, they gather degrees ranging from intense piety to near indifference. More useful are questionnaires, written and oral, provided they are addressed to a sufficiently large number of informants, each authorized to represent a specific religion or sect, and the sincerity of the responses is trusted.

c) The experiment strictly speaking, that is, the practice of piety or devotion "on trial," simply "to see," can only be illusory. Indeed, a truly religious mentality presupposes conviction and sincerity. If God is holiness, the most revealing religious experiences require in advance such degrees of moral purity and generosity that they are not at one’s disposal, like heat and cold; one might even say that they cannot be imagined unless one at least peruses the writings of St. Bernard, St. Teresa of Avila, St. John of the Cross, and similar figures.

d) There remains, therefore, the recourse to history. Spiritual notes, biographies, and autobiographies of notable persons allow the extraction of characteristic traits of the mentalities and intimate experiences of the materialist, for example, the rationalist, the pantheist, and the adepts of each religion, at least when they can be considered authentic representatives of them. To verify this point, it suffices to refer to creeds, ascetical treatises, and collections of sermons, for in every confessional group one naturally finds what spiritual direction and preaching have instilled. This recourse to history, which is an expanded form of extrospection, is moreover indispensable for judging, in the light of sufficiently numerous examples and, at the same time, the causes that explain them (doctrines and institutions), the respective capacity of religions to foster the development of natural faculties (sound humanism), to promote the progress of virtues, and to pacify souls. This last point is of

capital interest. Indeed, restlessness and dissatisfaction lie at the origin of every religious orientation; peace is the fruit of order. Pax omnium rerum, tranquillitas ordinis (St. Augustine, De civ. Dei, bk. XIX, ch. 13, n. 1; PL 41, 640). Now, neither amoralism, whether proceeding from materialism or pantheism, nor the promise of unconditional salvation, nor any religion vitiated by some false principle, can assure it, for then at the bottom of the heart all or at least some causes of disorder persist. Christ promised it: Pacem relinquo vobis, pacem meam do vobis; non quomodo mundus dat ego do vobis (Jn 14:27); and history proves that He indeed grants it even to the humblest of His servants, strictly faithful to the practice of His commandments (Jn 14:21; cf. H. Pinard, Experience religieuse, in D'ThC, V, cols. 1858-60; and the collections of conversions by C. F. Chevé, A. Räss, D. A. Rosenthal, etc. cit. in bibl.).

2. Psychopathology. — E. Haeckel stated: "Our firm monistic conviction, that the fundamental cosmological law (of determinism) applies universally to all nature, negatively achieves the supreme intellectual progress, the definitive fall of the three central dogmas of metaphysics: God, freedom, and immortality" (Les énigmes de l'univers, French trans., Paris 1903, p. 265). For him and his followers, evidently, religious faith and especially mysticism derive from pathological causes... perhaps even their own psychology, that of pessimists like Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, and that of atheistic existentialists. In any case, modern discoveries concerning asthenias, neuroses, psychoses, the splitting of personality, disorders arising from sexuality, etc., help to clarify many psychic phenomena: anxieties, despairs, crises of scruples, visual or auditory hallucinations, sometimes improperly qualified as revelations or possessions, etc.; and this because morbid traits are also found, in the profane sphere, in various geniuses, even in eminent religious persons, indeed in saints. For its part, the Catholic Church has never ceased to warn its faithful against the numerous "visionaries," "false prophets," "false mystics." Almost alone and for a long time, it has possessed rules for the "discernment of spirits" (v.); it can therefore do nothing today but recommend that spiritual directors make prudent use of the modern medical discoveries mentioned.

Moreover, it should be added that the ministry of Confession allows the priest to penetrate to the innermost recesses of consciences and discover elements that may escape the mere psychiatrist: pride, spirit of independence, human respect, reluctance to master instincts, etc. Thus P. Janet, author of highly esteemed works, especially Les médications psychologiques (3 vols., Paris 1919), said that the psychology of religion can only be written by ecclesiastics accustomed to dealing with souls and observing their living and mysterious activity (cf. J.-B. Sauze, in Revue de philosophie, 18 [1911], p. 249; R. Wielandt, in Arch. für Religionspsychologie, 1 [1914], p. 197). The Catholic Church, to restore and maintain equilibrium in souls, possesses means far beyond those of the psychiatrist. The collections of conversions already cited offer experimental proof of this.

3. Psychoanalysis. — Since this science is already treated separately, here we shall limit ourselves to its applications to religious life (v. PSICANALISI). The most ardent among its representatives, S. Freud, a materialist and atheist, claimed to explain everything through sexual instincts: the theory of "pansexualism." His explanation of dreams, in many cases, and his excursions into the field of history (v. Totem und Tabu, Leipzig 1913) are the fruit of pure fantasy (cf. W. Schmidt, Der Oedipus-Komplex, in Nationalwirtschaft, 2 [1928], pp. 401-36; separately, Berlin 1928).

a) Now, that psychoanalysis may be indicated to illustrate cases of erotic cults, abundant in paganism, the licentious practices justly reproached to some Christian sects, and, apart from these, certain psychological disorders and crises of souls often arising from deficient sexual education, cannot be denied. But the numerous representatives of this science would gain much if they renounced explaining, by means of the

b) Moreover, within the subconscious—something Freud did not account for—reside moral complexes "more powerful and of an entirely different gravity" (H. Baruk, Précis de psychiatrie, Paris 1950, pp. 380-84), which form largely spontaneously. Indeed, man cannot fail to perceive or feel the contradiction he accepts, the distortion he imposes by doing to others what he would not want done to himself (Tob. 4, 16; Mt. 7, 12; Lc. 6, 31). This is certainly sufficient to make even primitives understand certain elementary duties of justice and charity, which the family, tribe, or nation ordinarily place, more or less strictly, under the protection of their god or gods.

c) C. G. Jung, initially a fervent disciple of Freud, later diverged from him on several points. Studying the collective unconscious—"not individual, or rather supra-individual"—he discovered, among ancestral images (Urbilder), the religious archetype (L'inconscient dans la vie normale et anormale, French trans. from the 3rd German ed., Paris 1928, pp. 107-32, 155-59). Many psychiatrists share his views up to this point. Religious ideas, he continues, are merely projections of these hereditary predispositions. That any religion, to be acceptable, must to some extent align with these predispositions can be admitted; but when a particular cult imposes more or less painful restrictions on the most tenacious fundamental instincts (appetites of the flesh, tendencies of the mind and will toward full autonomy), reflection necessarily intervenes. Thus, very often, the regulatory motives of choice do not merely determine a "sublimation" of the subconscious complex, but a "transformation"; and a total transformation when these motives lead to the decision to "renounce oneself" (Lc. 9, 25), that is, to replace the worship of the "I" with the love and service of another—in the case of Christianity, the love and service of a supremely perfect legislator (J. Nuttin, Psychologie et conception spiritualiste de l'homme, Louvain-Paris 1950, pp. 186 ff.).

Indispensable to the equilibrium of psychic life, Jung concludes, religious ideas must remain suited to each individual's temperament. Such a solution implies indifferentism regarding positive religions. It is as if to say: to regain health, adapt the treatments you know to your pleasure!

Moreover, is it truly certain that the "religious archetype," analogous in some respects to the προλήψεις of the Epicureans or the κοινὰ ξυνόιαι of the Stoics, deserves this epithet and is universal? Since it is hereditary, it should, at least in the long run, disappear in irreligious or areligious collectives. Yet here is a noteworthy fact: even then, man generally adopts an ideal—mysticism of art, of science, dedication to a cause (hegemony of a race, universal equality and well-being), etc. The reason is that, precisely because he is capable of reasoning, every individual, to find his equilibrium, needs to find a reason to live. The psychiatrist can evidently use as remedies, even if different from his own, this or that ideal his patient is capable of embracing. Anesthetics and narcotics also provide momentary relief, yet none are equivalent to health. The same applies to religions: history proves it—they are far from possessing the same capacity to pacify human restlessness, and even less to procure, already on earth, the fullness of joy that Christ promised at the price of full submission to His laws (Io. 15, 11; I Io. 1, 4).

DThC, V (1912), coll. 1786-1868, bibl. coll. 1864-68; id., La théorie de l'expér. relig. de Luther à W. James, in Rev. d'hist. acclés., 17 (1921), pp. 63-83, 306-48, 547-74; A. Rademacher, Das Seelenleben der Heiligen, 3ª ed., Paderborn 1920; G. Wunderle, Einführung in die moderne Religionspsychol., Kempten [1923]; id., Das relig. Erleben, Paderborn 1922; id., Über das Irritationale im relig. Erleben, ivi 1930; L. de Grandmaison, La religion personnelle, Parigi 1927; el. Etudes, 84 (1900), pp. 241-53, 594-616; A. dal Convolo, La psicol. dell'incredulo, Milano 1945; F. M. Sciacca, L'esperienza relig. e l'io in Hegel e Kierkegaard, Palermo 1948, p. 60; H. de Lubac, Le drame de l'humanisme athée [Feuerbach, Nietzsche, Comte, etc.], Parigi 1949, 4ª ed., ivi 1950, trad. it., Brescia 1949; J. Maritain, La signification de l'a- théisme contemp., Parigi 1949, p. 42; A. Léonard, Chronique de psychol. de la r., in Vie spirituelle, supplementi a febbr. 1950, pp. 67-83, maggio pp. 212-31, sett. 1951, pp. 319-52; V. BATTESIMO; CONTEMPLAZIONE; CONVERSIONE; ESPERIENZA RELIGIOSA; MISTICISMO.

2. Psicanalisi: esposizione precisa con lista delle opere dei
due psicologi: F. Challaye, Freud, Parigi 1948; J. Jacobi, La
psychol. de C. G. Jung, Neufchâtel-Parigi 1950. - Studi: Ch.
Baudouin, La psychanal., Parigi 1939, bibl., pp. 141-49; G. Richard, La psychanal. et la morale, ivi 1946; su questo libro M.
Th. Calmel, in Rev. thomiste, 46 (1947), pp. 158-68; T. Reik,
Il rito relig., Milano 1949; J. Nuttin, Psychanal. et conception
spiritual. de l'homme, Lovanio 1950, bibl. critica pp. 381-404;
V. PSICANALISI.

V. CASI TIPICI: CONVERSIONE, MISTICA, ILLUMINISMO

D'interesse tutto particolare per ogni psicologo sono le conversioni, le esperienze mistiche, l'illuminismo.

5. Conversioni

« W. James », scriveva G. van der Leeuw, « potrebbe bene aver definito l'essenziale. La con- versione sarebbe l'affiorare repentino di quello che da lungo tempo si è andato ammassando nel subcosciente,

e che finalmente si apre rumorosamente la via » (La re-
ligion dans son essence et ses manifestations, Parigi 1948,
p. 521). Tuttavia W. James e J. H. Leuba confessavano
lualmente che la loro spiegazione, molto plausibile per
le conversioni metodiste, predominanti in America, si
addiceva forse meno ad altri casi. Infatti le conversioni
di tipo emozionale abbondano negli ambienti in cui
sono presentate come normali, anzi le sole normali, perché
si deve cogliere il momento che Dio dà la fede e cambia
il cuore (G. Swarts, Salut par la foi et conversion brusque,
Parigi 1931). Ma vi sono anche conversioni lente, assai
lente, di tipo intellettuale, spesso senza sconvolgimenti o
crisi della sensibilità, caratterizzate da una paziente ri-
cerca della verità. Altre corrispondono al tipo volontario
e vi predomina il desiderio, se non della perfezione, al-
meno di un progresso morale.

Alcune, poi, esigono sacrifici molto penosi (nella
Chiesa romana, ad es., la sottomissione integrale e defi-
nitiva alla sua dottrina ufficiale e alle sue leggi); altre
possono essere determinate in grado diverso da un bi-
sogno di indipendenza intellettuale o pratica; o, trattan-
dosi di sette erotiche, da tendenze ancora meno confes-
sabili. In fondo queste anime cercano più la propria
soddisfazione, che non il servizio di Dio; conversioni
quindi a tinta religiosa quando fanno appello a motivi
di pietà; a tinta filosofica, quando si appoggiano a questo
o a quel sistema o alla pura ragione. Il Renan giustificava
la sua in questi termini: « La base della nostra morale è
l'eccellenza, l'autonomia perfetta della natura umana; il
fondo del nostro sistema filosofico e letterario è l'assolu-
zione di tutto ciò che è umano » (L'avenir de la science,
2ª ed., Parigi 1890, p. 355).

È poi necessario, per completare l'inchiesta, l'esame
della vita ulteriore dei convertiti: stabilità o instabilità
delle decisioni, pace intima o persistente inquietudine,
ascesa o regresso intellettuale e morale, fecondità o ste-
rilità sociale, ecc.

The subconscious, the threshold of consciousness—which James and various psychologists concede—would be the point of insertion of "Grace." An unjustifiable restriction. Why could God not act at the very center of consciousness? According to Catholic theologians, neither Grace in the broad sense of the word (a simple increase of light or energy) nor supernatural Grace properly so called (a gratuitous participation in the divine life: I Jo. 3:2; II Pet. 1:4) alters the normal functioning of the faculties. Except in the case of miracles, recognizable precisely by their extraordinary character, divine interventions could thus be empirically indiscernible, at least in themselves.

Even more inexplicable through the irruption of the subconscious are "second conversions" or transitions, whether from lukewarmness or even from generosity to a heroic pursuit of perfection (M. Lépée, Ste Thérèse d'Avila, Paris 1947, pp. 81-93; V. also Conversion, in DSp, II, cols. 2259-64).

6. Mystical Phenomena

In a broad sense, James speaks of the "mystical feeling of expansion and free development"; thus, he can affirm: "There is no intellectual content proper to it that cannot be invoked as rigorous proof of any determined belief" (The Varieties of Religious Experience, London 1903, p. 425). A simple feeling of euphoria can indeed derive, at least temporarily, from the most diverse causes, even from the exclusion of all religious or moral constraint: the intoxication of a freedom thought to be conquered forever.

In a stricter sense, the term "mysticism" indicates, for many psychologists, certain intense intuitions or illuminations, ordinarily sudden and of short duration, presented as delightful or ineffable. Catholic theology usually reserves it for "graces of prayer," or divine favors outside ordinary psychic laws; the Holy Spirit, then, without violating it, directs the activity of souls. Similarities among various "mystical experiences" are possible; and they are frequently accentuated by the use of a common terminology, inherited, according to the environments, from Hindu yoga, Neoplatonism (even among Catholic mystics), or Christianity.

We omit "trances" and the alleged revelations provoked, especially in Siberia and India, by the disordered movements of "shamans" (F. A. Mac Culloch, Shamanisme, in Enc. of Rel. and Ethics, XI, pp. 441-46; G. Nioradze, Der Schamanismus, Stuttgart 1925, bibl. pp. 109-14). We omit the visions obtained, among various American Indians, through the use of narcotics (R. Schone, Peyote, the giver of visions, in American Anthropologist, 27 [1925], pp. 53-75, bibl., pp. 74-75). We also omit, however interesting they may be for the history of religious sentiment, the literary fictions of Greco-Roman Hermeticism (A.-J. Festugière, La révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste, I, Paris 1941, pp. 308-19).

Moreover, upon closer inspection, how many contrasts are discovered! a) Contrasts in the intended purpose: this is sometimes, without any relation to God or the gods, as in the Buddha and his rival Mahāvīra, the rule of life that will allow escape from earthly sufferings and the law of rebirth; sometimes, as among the most distinguished yogis of India, the perception of ultimate reality, through nescience and the momentary conquest of all that conceals it, an experience purely intellectual, at least among yogis foreign to bhakti or devotion (O. Lacombe, La mystique naturelle dans l'Inde, in Rev. thomiste, 59 [1951], pp. 134-49). In other cases, Plotinus (v.), it is the contemplation of the first among the intelligibles, the One, and the union or momentary contact with Him, without concern for homage (J. Maréchal, Etudes sur la psychologie des mystiques, I, 2nd ed., Paris 1938, pp. 51-87; R. Arnou, Contemplation, in DSp, II [1950], cols. 1727-38). Among the mystics favored by the Roman Church, and among the finest Muslim sūfīs, such as al-Gazzālī (v.) and al-Hallāǧ, it is the loving union with Him whom the Evangelist defined as Love itself: Deus caritas est (I Jo. 4:8; L. Gardet, Mystique naturelle et mystique surnaturelle en Islam, in Rech. de science relig., 37 [1950], pp. 321-365). b) Differences in technique. In primitive Buddhism, an effort, a concentration of the intellect to free oneself from sensory illusions and the desires from which suffering arises; in yoga, a more or less complicated physical technique; in Neoplatonism, a dialectical ascent that progressively transcends all that is sensible; among the early Hesychasts, suspension of breathing and fixation of the gaze on the navel (hence the name omphalopsychoi; V. hesychasm); among Catholic mystics, normally, a rigorous ascetic preparation through perfect "renunciation" (Lk. 9:23) and the total gift of the heart; preparation, however, not effective in itself, for these favors, they say, God grants to whom and when He pleases, even during the most absorbing external occupations. c) Contrasts in consequences. In the intellectual order, when the mystic admits no judge of his experiences other than himself, there is usually a free reworking of received beliefs, often incoherence of conceptions; among mystics, however, recognized as such by Rome, there is essentially full agreement with traditional faith. In the moral order: in some, self-sufficiency, often refusal of obligations considered good for the common people, even license of conduct; among Catholic mystics, instead, fear of illusion in the face of the extraordinary, hence the search for control, manifest progress in humility, charity, and apostolic zeal. In the social order: Benedict, Bernard, Dominic, Francis, Teresa, and their peers have been and remain, through their foundations and writings, admirable promoters of all Christian virtues; therefore, without at all thinking that the influence of their rivals has always been harmful, one prefers to leave to the reader the task of making a just appraisal. In any case, the diversity of effects reveals the diversity of causes. d) No less necessary than the study of consequences is the study of concomitant elements. Apart from their short-term prophecies, the intuitions of mystics whom the Roman Church considers favored by "graces of prayer" are evidently uncontrollable in themselves. In any case, their concordance in essentials (the perfections of God, the dispositions of His providence regarding the world) constitutes Bergson (v.) to pronounce clearly in favor of Catholicism (A. Sertillanges, H. Bergson et le catholicisme, Paris 1941, pp. 69-78; J. Chevalier, Comment Bergson a trouvé Dieu, in Revue des deux mondes, 1951, V. pp. 608-15). Indeed, to explain this concordance, as H. Delacroix does, by tradition and ecclesiastical control, accepted or rather sought by these mystics (Les grands mystiques chrétiennes, 2nd ed., Paris 1938, pp. 363-64), is to ignore both their originality in many respects and the energy and spirit of initiative of many among them, founders and reformers of Orders, as well as the following characteristics surely connected: their experiences are inserted into a context of anomalous facts: extraordinary healings, predictions, direct reading of souls (cardiognosis), etc. (cf. O. Leroy, Miracles, Paris 1951). To reject all these facts a priori as legendary is very easy, but there are some that the most exacting impartial criticism cannot contest. It is for the psychologist to point them out; for the philosopher to judge them and draw conclusions.

BIBL.:
In addition to the works cited in the text: W. James, The Varieties of Religious Experience, London 1903; J. Maréchal, Études sur la psychologie des mystiques, 2 vols., Paris 1924-37; H. Delacroix, Les grands mystiques chrétiens, Paris 1938; A. Poulain, Des grâces d'oraison, 10th ed., Paris 1922; R. Garrigou-Lagrange, Perfection chrétienne et contemplation, 2 vols., Paris 1923; L. de Grandmaison, La religion personnelle, Paris 1913; J. de Guibert, Documenta ecclesiastica christianae perfectionis studium spectantia, Rome 1931; A. Saudreau, Manuel de spiritualité, Paris 1921; P. Pourrat, La spiritualité chrétienne, 4 vols., Paris 1918-28; J. de Tonquédec, Introduction à l'étude du merveilleux et du miracle, Paris 1916; O. Leroy, Miracles, Paris 1951; A. Sertillanges, H. Bergson et le catholicisme, Paris 1941; L. Gardet, Mystique naturelle et mystique surnaturelle en Islam, in Rech. de science relig., 37 (1950), pp. 321-365; O. Lacombe, La mystique naturelle dans l'Inde, in Rev. thomiste, 59 (1951), pp. 134-49.

P. DE LETTER, S.J.

As for Catholic theologians, unable to restrict the action of Grace to only those souls bound to their Church by visible ties, they do not hesitate to concede that mystical favors, analogous to those enjoyed by their saints, may be granted to other souls when their sincerity is complete and their generosity is such as God requires (J. H. Newman, Difficulties felt by Anglicans in catholic teaching, London 1850, pp. 57-80; P. Thureau-Dangin, La renaiss. cathol. en Angleterre, II, Paris 1902, p. 106 ff.; L. de Grandmaison, Le Sadhu-Sundar Singh et le problème de la sainteté hors de l'Église catholique, in Rech. de science religieuse, 12 [1922], pp. 1-29). It goes without saying, however, that the verification of such facts is more rigorous among them (cf. O. Pfister, Die Legende Sundar Singh's, Bern-Leipzig 1926; A. Vāth, Das Leben Sundar Singh's, in Stimmen der Zeit, 111 [1926], pp. 118-36).

3. To the comparative study of mysticism must be added, as complementary evidence, that of the different forms of illuminism. Among rationalist associations, for example, the "Illuminati of Bavaria" (cf. G. Bareille, Illuminés de Bavière, in DThC, VII [1921], coll. 756-66) or among the representatives of the Aufklärung, "illuminist" means "free-thinker." Here, only those sects are considered whose leaders, if not each of their adepts, employ either pantheism, ecstasies, revelations, or extraordinary experiences to proclaim manifestly extravagant doctrines, often also to authorize licentious practices or incite insurrectionary movements. A. Barth, yoga (v.), wrote: "These doctrines will provide all sects with a kind of superior theology. Some will know how to elevate themselves to it as an ideal, and from time to time works of incomparable elevation and delicacy will arise; others will seek to lower it to their level... The least religious sects will take on the outward appearance of devotion; the most abject and execrable will clothe themselves in its mysticism and use its formulas" (Les religions de l'Inde, in Oeuvres complètes, I, Paris 1914, chap. II, p. 84). Since the formulas are the same on both sides, the only means of discerning exactly the doctrine they conceal will therefore consist in examining, for each of them, the antecedent, concomitant, and consequent elements. Ultimately, these sects, so ready to appeal to supernatural illuminations, provide psychopathology and psychoanalysis with ample justification for many of their theses. At the same time, they offer the opportunity to observe the frequent outcome in pantheism, the fruits of a theory of individual inspiration without control, and the simultaneous influence of economic and social causes on uprisings, whose repression—as in the case of the shepherd children in the 13th and 14th centuries, the Anabaptists in the 16th century, or the Taiping of China in the 19th century—has cost humanity rivers of blood (cf. L. Wieger, Histoire des croyances en Chine, 3rd ed., Hien-Hien 1927, pp. 728-30).

The following is a very incomplete list of these illuminists: a) in Judaism: the false prophets denounced by the Bible and the false messiahs from the most ancient to the most recent (cf. Revue biblique, new series, 13 [1916], p. 295); b) in the Catholic Church: the Montanists (2nd century), the Euchites or Messalians (4th century), the Amalricians (12th century), the Brethren of the Free Spirit, the Guglielmites (13th century), the Dolentists and some Beguines (14th century), the Alumbrados (16th century), the "guérinots" of Picardy, Molinos and his disciples (17th century)...; c) sects derived from the "Reformation": from the outset, the Anabaptists, then the Familists, members of the Family of Love founded by H. Nicolai, in the 17th century the Camisards, the Quakers or Shakers, derived from Puritanism, the Muggletonians, the Philadelphians, the "Mirers," the Southcottists; in the 18th century, in Sweden, the Swedenborgians; in America, the Society of True Inspiration (Amann Society), the Irvingians, the Jumpers of Wales, derived from Methodism, as were, somewhat later, the revivalists of Kentucky; in the 19th century, the Mormons, the Shakers (closely related to the Quakers), the Beckmannians of the Church of the Redeemed in Illinois, the Wilderness Worshippers of Georgia and the Carolinas, the Heavenly Recruits of Illinois; the Dancing Angels of New Jersey, also derived from Methodism; in Protestant missions, the Taiping of China, the adepts of Ngounzism and Kibangism in the Congo, those of Etipism, etc.; d) in the Greco-Russian Church: in the 10th century, the Bogomils; in the 14th, certain Hesychasts; in the 17th, the priestless of the "Bezpopovtsy" sect, the Klysty, "Men of God," the Skoptsy, "White Doves," etc.; in the 19th century, Tolstoy and his disciples, etc.; e) in Islam: movements derived from sajjism and mahdism, a certain number of Sūfīs and especially of dervishes, the adepts of Bābism and Bahā'ism, founded by the successor of the Bāb (1819-50), Bahā'ullāh, "Splendor of God"; in India, the Qadianis or Ahmadis, founded by M. G. Ahmad (1839-1908), the Murids of Africa, founded in 1889 by Amadū Bamba, etc.; f) in India, illuminism has long been favored by the divine character attributed to spiritual initiators or masters, the gurū, as well as by the theory of avatāra, incarnations of this or that deity, and by the practice of yoga, especially hatha-yoga. It is no wonder that many modern reformers, whether in favor of Hinduism or of a fantastic syncretism, present themselves as gods or as inspired by some deity; among others, Rāmakrishna (1834-86), Vivekānanda, his disciple, Keshab Chandra Sen (d. 1884), the founders of the Rādhā Sāmi Satsang, etc. Not affiliated with any Church: Ant. Bourignon, Baroness von Krüdener (ca. 1766-1824), Catherine Théot (1725-94), St-Martin, "the Unknown Philosopher" (1743-1803), H. Wronski (1778-1853), Vintras (1807-75), G. Monod (1800-96), G. BARZELLOTTI, GIACOMO (v.), etc.

BIBL.:
In addition to the works cited in the text, see: A. Harnack, Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte, 4th ed., Tübingen 1909-10; E. Troeltsch, Die Soziallehren der christlichen Kirchen und Gruppen, Tübingen 1912; R. Reitzenstein, Die hellenistischen Mysterienreligionen, 3rd ed., Leipzig 1927; M. Eliade, Le Yoga. Immortalité et liberté, Paris 1954; J. Wach, Types of religious experience, Chicago 1951; G. van der Leeuw, La religion dans son essence et ses manifestations, Paris 1948; H. Pinard de la Boullaye, L'étude comparée des religions, 3rd ed., Paris 1929; P. Alphandéry, Les idées morales chez les hétérodoxes latins au début du XIIIe siècle, Paris 1903; A. Viatte, Les sources occultes du romantisme, Paris 1928; E. Benz, Les sources mystiques de la philosophie romantique allemande, Paris 1968; J. Séguy, Christianisme et société, Paris 1980. — A. Michel.

ivi 1932; W. R. Inges, Mystic. in rel., Chicago 1949 (e numerosi studi antecedenti). - b) Cattolici: A. Poulain, Des grâces d'oraison, Parigi 1901, 10ª ed. ivi 1922, e bibl. pp. 630-57, da completare con P. Scheuer, Notre biblique, in Rev. d'anc. et de mystique, 4-5 (1923-24) pp. 1°-32°, 33°-48°; L. Roure, En face du fait religieux, Parigi 1908, pp. 123-203; L. de Grandmusson, L'élément mystiq. dans la religion, in Rech. de sc. relig., 1 (1910), p. 180-208; A. Gemelli, L'origine subconsciente dei fatti mistici, Firenze 1913; S. Loummet, Mystic. true and false, 2ª ed., Londra 1919; J. Howley, Psychol. and myst. experience, ivi 1920; J. Maréchal, Etudes sur la psychol. des myst., 2 voll., Parigi 1924-37, libro capitale; II, 2ª ed., ivi 1938, bibl. pp. 247-98; id., Vraie et fausse myst., in Nouv. rev. théol., 67 (1945), pp. 883-903; A. Fonck, Mystique, in DThC, X (1929), coll. 2599-2670, bibl. 2670-74; J. de Guibert, Etudes du théol. myst., Tolosa 1930; M. T. L. Penido, La conscience relig., Parigi (1935), pp. 139-244; P. Bonnetam, Grâce, in DBs, III (1936), coll. 709-14 (evoluzione delle idee protestanti, ricca bibl.); M. Lépée, Ste Théorie d'Avila, Parigi 1947, bibl. pp. xi-xx; A. Mager, Mystik als seelische Wirklichkeit, Graz 1947; inoltre, serie d'articoli in Etudes carmélit., 6 voll., 1936-38; Contemplation, in DSp, II (1951-52). - c) Illuminismo: J. G. Walch, Biblioth. theol. selecta, Iena 1757-65, II, pp. 3-113; J. Perrone, Il protestante, e la regola di fede, 3 voll., Roma 1853; W. T. Whitley, Enthusiasts, in Enc. of Rel. and Eth., V (1912), pp. 317-21; cf. VIII (1915), p. 871; X (1918), pp. 381-82; A. Leroy-Beaulieu, L'Empire des tsars, 3 voll., Parigi 1881-89, III, pp. 454-551, ecc.; K. K. Gross, Die rassaschen Sektor, 2 voll., Lipsia 1907-1914 (circa bibl.); I. Goldzher, Le dogme et la foi de l'Islam, vers. franc., Parigi 1920, passim; J. N. Farquhar, Modern relig. movements in India, Londra 1924, passim; A. Brou (Ethiopisme), in Etudes, 184 (1925) pp. 736-47; B. G. M. Smokler, Bautu prophets in South Africa, Londra 1948; C. Jaffré (Ngounzisme et Kigangisme), in Etudes, 218 (1934), pp. 651-64; P. O'Reilly, Prophetisme aux Nouvelles-Hébrides, in Le monde non chrétien, Parigi 1940, pp. 192-208; K. G. Grubb, Le messianisme chez les Nurs du Brésil, ivi 1950, pp. 301-308; Mgr R. A. Knox, Enthusiasm, Oxford 1950; K. Hutten, Scher, Grübler, Enthusiasten, Stoccarda 1950; K. Algermissen, Konfessionskunde, 6ª ed., Celle 1950, pp. 600-603 e passim.

VI. SOCIOLOGY

This science is tasked with studying the reciprocal relations between religious life and the forms of social organization realized both within different cults and outside them, in the profane order.

7. The internal organization of religions

a) After recent inquiries, having set aside the two postulates of evolutionism (primitive promiscuity and the uniform origin of all religions), it can be considered certain that, in the most archaic collectivities, the members of the same family, clan, or tribe placed the entirety of their interests concerning both present life and the afterlife under the protection of God or their gods. At this stage, their religion, from which foreigners are generally excluded, strengthens the union of all, just as the influence of the group accredits the beliefs and elementary moral rules required for the maintenance of common understanding. From this perspective, it seems impossible to admit that religion and morality were ever completely separate.

b) More evolved religions frequently subdivide their adherents into different categories: monks and laity, for example, in Buddhism, Jainism, and Christianity; pneumatics, psychics, and hylics in second-century Valentinian Gnosticism; perfects and simple auditors in Manichaeism, Catharism, etc. These distinctions manifestly bring with them, both for religions and for states, very important consequences, depending on whether the obligations—not only ascetic and ritual but above all moral—rather than remaining identical for all, as in Christianity, are attenuated or vanish entirely for this or that class.

In these same religions, collective or public worship develops. The power it has to maintain beliefs and evoke emotions and religious experiences is evident; however, it varies according to the dramaturgy employed. It can thus be "edifying" in the Christian sense of the word, or demoralizing if, for example, it commemorates the amorous adventures or lust of some god. Moreover, grave dangers threaten it everywhere: the regular recurrence of the same liturgies brings with it habituation and desiccation; and since respect for the divinity, along with habit, superstition, and the infiltration of magical conceptions, requires meticulous observance of the ceremonial, fidelity to rites can become the essential element of religion, and this or that rite (e.g., the sacrifice of soma in Brahmanism) will be deemed effective by its own virtue, even for the divinity itself. Only a moral and religious teaching in the theological sense of the word could prevent these consequences, especially on the part of the ministers of worship. But where is it to be found? (v. CULTO).

Of no less importance are the questions concerning authority: its democratic, oligarchic, or monarchical form; its task, whether limited to the supervision of rites or extended also to beliefs; its sources of information, whether regular (ancestral traditions or sacred books) or occasional (such as recourse to more or less heteroclite oracles, e.g., Delphi, Cumae, Lebadea, or to more or less qualified soothsayers); its mode of election, a more or less effective guarantee of its religious value (cf. various authors, Priesthood, in Enc. of Relig. and Ethics, X, pp. 278-336); its repressive power (J. Wach, Sociology and religion, Chicago 1944, ch. 8, bibl., pp. 330-31). The existence of distinct sanctuaries, relatively independent, such as those of Heliopolis, Hermopolis, Memphis, and Thebes in Egypt, is alone sufficient to bring about, despite a common origin, the flourishing of markedly dissimilar religions. Hence the law of Deuteronomy (12, 1-32), which imposed the uniqueness of the sanctuary (L. Pirot, La Ste Bible, II, Paris 1946, pp. 588-600).

2. Relations of religions with profane societies. — a) Regarding the religion of primitives, one is necessarily constrained to adhere to the few remarks made above (v. ETNOLOGIA). b) In more or less hierarchical societies, the specialization of functions intervenes: the religious order and the civil order each have their own dignitaries and their own distinct purposes, at least in the abstract. For the State, these are well-being, prosperity, the development of human faculties, and the union of its members; for every religion, moreover, and above all, fidelity to traditions and the service of God or the gods, a condition of their favor on earth and in the afterlife.

Between religious and civil powers, some conflict cannot fail to arise. It is fitting, moreover, to recall alongside them the power of magicians and sorcerers. The latter, like secret economic-political societies, ordinarily keep to themselves. Between priests and magicians, however, the distinction is often difficult: when magic has been granted a more or less official role, it tends to invade everything.

In this struggle for supremacy, except in cases of vigorous convictions or unyielding energy on the part of the clergy, victory remains in the hands of the authority that disposes of the most effective resources and means of seduction. Indeed, except in the theocratic regime of Israel before the period of the kings, and then among the Prophets—tireless preachers of strict monotheism and the Decalogue—history records nothing before Christianity but capitulations, or nearly so. Calculations of interest and magical conceptions lead to revering kings either as princes of fertility or as gods, only to demand their death at the opportune moment. Many authors, unfortunately with more erudition than critical acumen, have reported abundant examples of this (cf. J. G. Frazer, The magical origin of kings, London 1920; G. van der Leeuw, La religion dans son essence, Paris 1948, pp. 107-26; cf. various authors, King, in Enc. of Relig. and Ethics, VII, pp. 708-32).

Christ, for His part, commanded His disciples: "Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and unto God the things that are God's" (Mt. 22, 21; cf. Rom. 13, 1-7). It is true that His ministers have, on several occasions, favored the game of the Caesars in exchange for the support they sought from them. Emperors and kings have interfered directly in doctrinal controversies and indirectly in the governance of souls through the appointment of bishops of their choosing and the attribution of benefices to their favorites (v. ABIANESIMO; CESARISMO; COMMENDA). All these are phenomena to be studied (cf. J. Wach, art. cit. in bibl., p. 324, n. 184).

c) In nations with mixed religions, the spiritual union of peoples has been lacking. Before the Christian era, heads of state attempted to restore it by adopting the gods of the vanquished, identifying them when necessary with their own (theocrasy), introducing new cults such as those of Serapis, Sol invictus, Rome, and deified emperors—solutions whose consequences must be evaluated.

Quando le anime sono già più ostinatamente attaccate alle loro credenze (chiese e sette cristiane, musulmane, ecc.), si scatenano persecuzioni e guerre fratricide; nei periodi più calmi, sussiste la rivalità delle confessioni; la lotta diventa normale nelle società democratizzate: l'attitudine dello Stato riguardo ai culti o a qualche culto determinato varia secondo il gusto delle maggioranze. La situazione diventa più grave, quando fa la sua comparsa quel frutto tardivo del progresso, che è l'ateismo, sia sotto la forma del sociologismo di E. Durkheim, o sotto quella del materialismo dialettico di K. Marx e di F. Engels, o sotto altri. La morale non ha più un valore assoluto, ma si fa; è semplicemente una convenzione riformabile. Si esamini quello che in queste condizioni diventano la «maestà delle leggi», il rispetto della persona umana, la libertà di coscienza, l'unione dei concittadini. Ora sono in corso esperienze sociali a largo raggio, che già autorizzano conclusioni prudenti. Si consideri, poi, anche solo sotto il punto di vista fenomenico, quello che hanno prodotto e che produrrebbero i precetti di Cristo meglio praticati: «Amatevi, come io vi ho amato» (Jo. 13, 34; 15,12); «quello che fate per l'ultimo dei miei fratelli lo fate a me» (Mt. 25, 40), ecc. In questo modo l'umanità si trasformerebbe in una famiglia, i cui membri, senza distinzione di razza né di classi, si tratterebbero come figli adottivi di Dio (v. CORPO MISTICO, IV, coll. 595-98).

VII. SCIENCE OF RELIGIONS

This latter science (Religionswissenschaft) coordinates the information provided respectively by history, partial studies in phenomenology, psychology, and sociology. It also aims to derive general conclusions from them. If kept, as is proper, within the bounds of empirical disciplines, it constitutes an integral or synthetic phenomenology. Employing essentially the comparative method, it remains obliged to follow the critical rules already mentioned above. J. Wach, who has particularly applied himself to defining its method and procedures—but from whom we differ on some points—calls it the "systematic science of religions" and proposes dividing it into "material systematics" and "formal systematics."

First of all, it would be necessary to judiciously establish the vocabulary and reach an agreement among specialists on the precise meaning of terms: religion, magic, sorcery, fetishism, grace, mysticism, enlightenment, etc. Such definitions would prevent, for example, many scholars from classifying Catholic Sacraments among magical rites. Effective in themselves, ex opere operato, sacramental rites, according to the doctrine of the Roman Church, require a right intention: that is, the intention to obtain a spiritual benefit, the first grace or its increase; they presuppose, under pain of sacrilege, freedom from grave sins and the firm resolve to avoid them in the future; the measure of grace they confer is proportionate not to the affective fervor of each soul but to the effective generosity with which it intends to fulfill all its duties.

1. Once this agreement on the value of terms is presupposed, the first task of the science of religions is: a) to classify the different types of phenomena: types of beliefs concerning the divinity, the origin of the world, the afterlife, the conditions of salvation, etc.; types of morality and sanctity, of public and private worship, of internal and external organization, of individual and collective experiences; b) to investigate the relations that unite them, to separate, where they manifest, the regular or nearly regular associations between the elements of a civilization (economic regime, social organization, beliefs and myths, forms of worship), in short, the structures, etc.

That the various types of religions should be cataloged seems contestable, since few religions constitute a coherent whole, and very few remain unchanged over the years. Nevertheless, it is indispensable, where possible, to highlight the relations of the various obligations, practices, and experiences with this or that characteristic idea: in islām, for example, that of the uniqueness and ineffable majesty of Allah; in Christianity, that of the holiness and infinite goodness of the Most Holy Trinity. As for classifying religions in an evolutionary series, in the manner of Hegel and Comte, it must be said that this is a pastime or a game from which science has nothing to gain.

2. The final and principal task is to deduce, with their causes and consequences, certain laws. It goes without saying that in this field, as in sociology, there are no laws so rigid as to admit no exception; the intervention of eminent or at least very powerful personalities can modify the course of events in unpredictable ways (cf. G. Richard, La sociologie générale et les lois sociologiques, Paris 1912, pp. 183-372, bibl. pp. 372-88).

At the conclusion of a very erudite inquiry, M. Eliade writes: "We can register a double process in the history of religious facts: on the one hand, an excessive fragmentation of the manifestation of the sacred in the cosmos; on the other, a unification of these hierophanies due to their innate tendency to incarnate the archetypes as perfectly as possible and thus fully realize their own structure." One may observe: no marvelous, unexplained, or extraordinary phenomenon takes on the character of a "hierophany" except as a result of an interpretation; the "hierophanies" considered most important owe this in part to their own splendor, but fundamentally to the free choice of religious consciences, according to the degree of their spiritual or temporal interests: they have no "innate tendencies" whatsoever. The same scholar adds: "Thus is explained a phenomenon verified from one end of the history of religions to the other: the possibility that every religious form has to grow, to purify itself, to ennoble itself—for a tribal god, for example, to become, through some new epiphany, the god of monotheism; for a rural goddess to transform into the mother of the Universe" (Traité d'histoire des religions, Paris 1949, p. 395). One may limit oneself to this observation: the notion of law imports the notions of necessity and regularity; a possibility is something quite different. Furthermore, one still awaits history to establish on concrete evidence the passage of any "hierophany" not merely to the supreme degree in a hierarchical polytheism but into a strictly monotheistic system. As for the pantheism of India and China, for example, it manifestly proceeds from philosophical speculation.

Here, then, among many others, are some laws that appear true: magic (white magic) is invasive because it already finds tinder in ritual formalism and because it provides, without moral conditions, for the most varied needs; with this, it necessarily becomes demoralizing—one might even say irreligious—for those who believe that God or the gods have any care for morality. Another law: every pantheism leads either to moral indifferentism, as in Chinese Taoism, or to moral subjectivism, as in Greco-Roman Stoicism; God Himself or man, who believes himself to be God or a part of God, finds within himself his rule of conduct, unless he chooses, for example, to draw inspiration, if he deems it convenient, from the marvelous order of the cosmos. Similarly, sacred traditions or texts left to private interpretation or inspiration lose their probative force and can serve to authorize both ethereal speculations and more or less contestable claims; allegorizing exegesis, as among the Stoics and certain humanists of the Renaissance, the treatment of dogmatic formulas as mere symbols, as among modern symbolo-fideists, the effort to "demythologize" beliefs and traditions among various representatives of liberal Protestantism, provide the means for this.

The method of "concomitant variations" will likely allow the derivation of other laws, given the extreme variety of religions, their sects, and sub-sects. It will also be necessary to study the ancient and modern forms of occultism, theosophy, anthroposophy, certain ephemeral cults such as those born during the French Revolution; likewise, as a counterproof, modern collectivities officially antireligious or "without God."

Extended at least to a sufficiently large number of cases, sufficiently varied and even sufficiently opposed, all chosen among the most significant, such an inquiry cannot fail to note, in the words of Bacon and Stuart Mill, certain "residues." By "residues" are meant more or less disconcerting anomalies. Such, among others, is the Hebrew prophetism, not only in its doctrine but also in the marvelous facts that led Israel to preserve as sacred texts only the writings of those "seers" and not those of their rivals. Such is the fulfillment of their predictions in the person of Christ, His character, His teaching, His miracles, which, despite His ignominious death, confirmed the enthusiasm of His Apostles, the survival of His work, etc.

BIBL.:
J. Wach, Das Verstehen, I-III, Tübingen 1926-33; Id., Sociology of Religion, Chicago 1944; M. Eliade, Traité d'histoire des religions, Paris 1949; G. Richard, La sociologie générale et les lois sociologiques, Paris 1912; F. Bacon, Novum Organum; J. S. Mill, A System of Logic. — A. M.

Confining itself to the empirical order, the science of religions has no authority to decide on the miraculous character of these facts. Nor can it, without falling into illogicality, pronounce—at least in the metaphysical sense of the term—on the "essence" of religion, nor on the respective value of religions, except with regard to the benefits they yield, such as social harmony, the development of sciences and arts, or the prosperity of states. Since, in principle, it ignores whether God exists and whether man is endowed with an immortal soul, it is unclear how it could be authorized to prophesy about the future of religion. A Christian would add: "especially concerning that which has received from its Founder a promise of immortality" (Mt. 16, 18).

Now, if one observes the multiplicity of solutions given to the two fundamental problems—the nature of God and the nature of the human soul—one immediately understands the extreme diversity of "philosophies of religion." They are, in short, as many "apologetics"; and this term is fitting, for their authors speak or write indifferently to justify their choices, on which depend the dignity of their lives and their eternal salvation, and to convince other minds.

A deeper cause of disagreement is the criteriological problem. The audacities of rationalists and their rivalry, now more than ever, have undermined confidence in reason. For a long time, attempts have multiplied to reach Truth by other means: supernatural illuminations, impressions considered as "the testimony of the Holy Spirit," intimate experiences, sentiment. The convictions to which these criteria lead, including reason, are evidently valid only for those who have preferred them; both sides, therefore, lead to individualism. Judging by the facts, one even notes that mere degrees or nuances of arbitrariness and the play of imagination separate illuminism from the appeal to the "testimony of the Spirit," to intimate experience, to sentiment. Luther himself acknowledged this: "I do not stop at the texts of Scripture, even if you were to propose an infinity (saxeretos) of them for the justice of works against the justice of faith... It is for you to see how to reconcile Scripture; as for me, I remain with its author" (In Gal., 3, 14; Luthers Werke, ed. Weimar, XL, p. 458 ff.). Regarding the Anabaptists and Sacramentarians, he observed: "These people are fascinated, convinced they possess pure truth and perfect understanding of Scripture. Now, he who lives in this persuasion hears and listens to no one. I, too, cannot hear anything contrary to my doctrine" (In Gal., 3, 1; Luthers Werke, p. 323; cf. p. 316-17, 320). Indeed, the creation of new cults within ancient religions, the proliferation of Churches and sects ever more numerous after the Christian era, derive in their founders from this recourse to individual sense, whatever term may be used to denote II.
The more passion for Truth and honesty one admits in the founders of these movements and the authors of these "philosophies of religion," the more their disagreement and the individual and social consequences that follow manifest not only the unsolved necessity of a divine Revelation, in the strictly unpredictable case (which, however, corresponds to the current order) that it pleased God to call man to participation in His intimate life even in this world, and later to participation in His happiness (Io. 1, 12-13; I Io. 3, 1; Rom. 8, 15-17; II Pt. 1, 4), but also the supreme fitness or moral necessity of such an intervention, "so that the (religious) notions which are not in themselves inaccessible to human reason may nevertheless, in the present condition of the human race, be known by all without difficulty, with firm certainty, and without admixture of error" (Denz-U, nn. 1786, 1807-1808; J. Vacant, Etudes sur le Concile du Vatican, I, Paris 1895, pp. 343-56). To demand that an authentically divine revelation impose itself with a force in some way necessitating is simply unreasonable, for no historical fact imposes itself in this manner, except upon those who were its immediate witnesses. For later ages, it suffices that it present itself simultaneously as a sensible fact and as a miraculous fact, with characteristics suitable, at least in their entirety, to ground a certain judgment in minds not blinded by any apriorism. Apriorism, however, is that of rationalist deism, which forbids a personal Absolute, immanent in all beings, from permitting any derogation from the laws He Himself established in favor of His creatures.

Without pronouncing on interventions of this kind, philosophy must at least consider the hypothesis as possible. It is easy to see to what poor figures it exposes itself when it presumes to judge from on high institutions that derive from a wisdom superior to its own. In any case, it will have to examine a capital question: that of authority, especially in matters of belief. A judicious exercise of authority—not to be confused with coercion—constitutes, in fact, the only means, not to eliminate individualism, but at least to temper its fantasies and their consequences. A problem so grave cannot be treated in a few lines (v. CHIESA, III).

At least one solution that currently seduces many minds should be noted. "Let us cease," say its proponents, "to argue over beliefs and unite in charity! Let us leave the juridical Church and return to the Church of love, to the primitive Church." Except that they then neglect many other texts (Mt. 16, 16; Io. 3, 18; Lc. 10, 16; Mt. 16-19; II Io. 10-11, etc.), some philosophers, more or less familiar with the New Testament, do not fail to refer, in this regard, to the words of Christ and His apostles: "Love one another as I have loved you" (Io. 15, 12); "If anyone says, 'I love God,' but hates his brother, he is a liar" (I Io. 4, 16-21). To proclaim such a solution loudly is to forget that freedom of thought entails freedom of action: new religions, sects, and sub-sects have always formed separate groups precisely to practice the liturgy, asceticism, and morality corresponding to their dogmas; liturgy, asceticism, and morality such that, in many cases, civil authority could not refrain from intervening. It is also to forget that, while charity, according to Christ's precept (Mt. 5, 43-47; Lc. 6, 27-36, etc.), remains possible for some souls even toward persecutors, concord, on the other hand, practically ceases to be so, especially in democratic societies, deeply divided, with shifting majorities. For His glory, as well as for the pacification and prosperity of the world, can it truly be that God has not, over the centuries, prepared any remedy for so many ills? (v. INDIFFERENTISMO; PROTESTANTESIMO LIBERALE).

Without attempting here to analyze even the most meritorious "philosophies of religion," we shall limit ourselves to indicating in the bibliography some works that expound the evolution of ideas in the modern era.

BIBL.:
Per una visione d'insieme: J. de Tonquédec, Introduction à l'étude du merveilleux et du miracle, Parigi 1916; J. Maritain, De la philosophie chrétienne, Parigi 1933; E. Gilson, L'esprit de la philosophie médiévale, Parigi 1932; J. Hessen, Die Absolutheit des Christentums, Friburgo 1925; H. de Lubac, Surnaturel, Parigi 1946; M. Blondel, L'Action, Parigi 1893; La Pensée, Parigi 1934; L'Être et les êtres, Parigi 1935; R. Guardini, Religione e rivelazione, trad. ital., Brescia 1935; J. Maréchal, Le point de départ de la métaphysique, Parigi 1926; E. Przywara, Religionsphilosophie katholischer Theologie, Monaco 1926; R. Jolivet, Essai sur les rapports entre la pensée grecque et la pensée chrétienne, Parigi 1931; Les sources de l'idéalisme, Parigi 1936; Le problème de la mort, Parigi 1934; Le Dieu des philosophes et des savants, Parigi 1936; Traité de philosophie, Lione 1939-42; A. D. Sertillanges, Le christianisme et les philosophies, Parigi 1939-41; La philosophie des lois, Parigi 1946; J. de Finance, Être et agir dans la philosophie de S. Thomas, Roma 1945; C. Boyer, Cours de philosophie, Roma 1933-36; Christianisme et néoplatonisme dans la formation de S. Augustin, Roma 1953; A. Brunner, La personne incarnée, Parigi 1947; Le problème de Dieu, Parigi 1950; Science et réalité, Parigi 1954; G. Fessard, La dialectique des Exercices spirituels de S. Ignace de Loyola, Parigi 1956; J. Mouroux, L'expérience chrétienne, Parigi 1952; Sens chrétien de l'homme, Parigi 1945; R. Garrigou-Lagrange, Le sens commun, Parigi 1909; Dieu, son existence et sa nature, Parigi 1914-15; La synthèse thomiste, Parigi 1946; Le réalisme du principe de finalité, Parigi 1932; Les principes de la connaissance surnaturelle, Parigi 1946; La prédestination des saints et la grâce, Parigi 1936; De Revelatione, Roma 1945; J. de Vries, Denken und Sein, Friburgo 1937; Philosophie der Endlichkeit, Monaco 1947; E. Coreth, Das dialektische Sein in Hegels Logik, Innsbruck 1952; H. U. von Balthasar, La gloire et la croix, Parigi 1965-69; Herrlichkeit, Einsiedeln 1961-69; Theodramatik, Einsiedeln 1973-83; Theologik, Einsiedeln 1985-87; K. Rahner, Geist in Welt, Innsbruck 1939; Hörer des Wortes, Monaco 1941; Schriften zur Theologie, Einsiedeln 1954-84; Grundkurs des Glaubens, Friburgo 1976; Y. Congar, Vraie et fausse réforme dans l'Église, Parigi 1950; Jalons pour une théologie du laïcat, Parigi 1953; Chrétiens désunis, Parigi 1937; Sainte Église, Parigi 1963; H. Bouillard, Conversion et grâce chez S. Thomas d'Aquin, Parigi 1944; Karl Barth, Parigi 1957; Logique de la foi, Parigi 1964; P. Tillich, Systematic Theology, Chicago 1951-63; Dynamics of Faith, New York 1957; The Courage to Be, New Haven 1952; R. Bultmann, Theologie des Neuen Testaments, Tubinga 1948-53; Jesus, Tubinga 1926; Geschichte und Eschatologie, Tubinga 1958; K. Barth, Kirchliche Dogmatik, Zurigo 1932-67; Der Römerbrief, Monaco 1922; Die christliche Dogmatik im Entwurf, Monaco 1927; E. Brunner, Der Mittler, Tubinga 1927; Die Mystik und das Wort, Tubinga 1924; Das Gebot und die Ordnungen, Zurigo 1932; Wahrheit als Begegnung, Zurigo 1938; Dogmatik, Zurigo 1946-60; F. Gogarten, Ich glaube an den dreieinigen Gott, Jena 1926; Politische Ethik, Jena 1932; Der Mensch zwischen Gott und Welt, Stoccarda 1952; P. Althaus, Die christliche Wahrheit, Gütersloh 1947-48; Die letzten Dinge, Gütersloh 1922; Die Theologie Martin Luthers, Gütersloh 1962; W. Elert, Der christliche Glaube, Amburgo 1940; Morphologie des Luthertums, Monaco 1931-32; R. Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, New York 1941-43; The Self and the Dramas of History, New York 1955; Faith and History, New York 1949; P. Ricoeur, Philosophie de la volonté, Parigi 1950-60; De l'interprétation, Parigi 1965; Le conflit des interprétations, Parigi 1969; La métaphore vive, Parigi 1975; Temps et récit, Parigi 1983-85; Soi-même comme un autre, Parigi 1990; M. Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, Tubinga 1927; Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik, Bonn 1929; Holzwege, Francoforte 1950; Identität und Differenz, Pfullingen 1957; Unterwegs zur Sprache, Pfullingen 1959; Nietzsche, Pfullingen 1961; J.-P. Sartre, L'Être et le Néant, Parigi 1943; L'existentialisme est un humanisme, Parigi 1946; Critique de la raison dialectique, Parigi 1960; G. Marcel, Être et avoir, Parigi 1935; Homo viator, Parigi 1944; Le mystère de l'être, Parigi 1951; Les hommes contre l'humain, Parigi 1951; La dignité humaine, Parigi 1964; N. Berdjaev, De l'esclavage et de la liberté de l'homme, Parigi 1939; Essai de métaphysique eschatologique, Parigi 1946; L'esprit de Dostoïevski, Parigi 1929; De la destination de l'homme, Parigi 1935; S. Kierkegaard, Diario, ed. ital., Brescia 1948-51; Timore e tremore, ed. ital., Firenze 1942; Il concetto dell'angoscia, ed. ital., Firenze 1942; La malattia mortale, ed. ital., Firenze 1947; L. Lavelle, De l'Être, Parigi 1928; De l'Acte, Parigi 1937; Du Temps et de l'Éternité, Parigi 1945; De l'Âme humaine, Parigi 1951; R. Le Senne, Obstacle et valeur, Parigi 1934; Introduction à la philosophie, Parigi 1939; Traité de morale générale, Parigi 1942; La destinée personnelle, Parigi 1951; L. Chestov, La nuit de Gethsémani, Parigi 1923; Sur les confins de la vie, Parigi 1924; Athènes et Jérusalem, Parigi 1938; Kierkegaard et la philosophie existentielle, Parigi 1936; M. de Unamuno, Del sentimiento trágico de la vida, Madrid 1913; La agonía del cristianismo, Madrid 1931; Vida de Don Quijote y Sancho, Madrid 1905; J. Ortega y Gasset, Meditaciones del Quijote, Madrid 1914; El tema de nuestro tiempo, Madrid 1923; Historia como sistema, Madrid 1935; ¿Qué es filosofía?, Madrid 1957; X. Zubiri, Naturaleza, Historia, Dios, Madrid 1944; Sobre la esencia, Madrid 1962; Inteligencia sentiente, Madrid 1980-83.

A. Michel.

ed., Friburgo 1924; M. Nédoncelle, La philos. relig. en Grande-Bretagne depuis 1850, Parigi [1934]; M. Sciacca, Il problema di Dio e d. religione nella filosofia attuale, 2ª ed. aum. Brescia 1946; id., Le problème de Dieu..., Parigi 1950; id., Filosofi ital. contemporanei, Milano 1946; A. G. Bertillanges, Le problème du mal, Parigi 1948; P. Ortegat, La philosophie de la religion, 2 voll., Lovanio-Parigi 1948, notizie sui principali filosofi e bibli., II, pp. 690-828; V. ATTUALISMO; ESISTENZIALISMO; FENOMENOLOGIA; FILOSOFIA DELLO SPIRITO; IDEALISMO; IMMANENTISMO; MODERNISMO; PANTEISMO; PROTESTANTESIMO LIBERALE; NAZIONALISMO.

IX. COMPARATIVE THEOLOGY

This last term may denote three distinct sciences:

a) An empirical science that compares, as so many phenomena, beliefs, their repercussions on individual and social religious life, and their respective evolutions, then applies itself to explaining these evolutions through the logical expansion of their constitutive elements or through external influences. Understood in this way, this science is nothing but a section of the phenomenology of religions.

b) A philosophical inquiry, that which aims to assess the respective value of doctrines and institutions, in order to facilitate, at least for believers, mutual understanding and possible enrichment even for those who already enjoy, on various points, an undeniable superiority. Of this kind are: K. Prüm, Die christliche Glaube und die altheidnische Welt, Leipzig 1935; A. Vögtle, Die Tugend- und Lasterkatalog im N. T., Münster 1936; O. Lacombe, L'Absolu dans le Védénat, Paris 1937; L. Gardet - M. M. Anawati, Introd. à la philosophie musulmane, ibid. 1948 (cf. Revue thomiste, 51 [1951], pp. 457-64).

c) Properly theological treatises, those which, whether after having demonstrated solely through history and philosophy the reality of divine Revelations (as is done in the Catholic Church in treatises called: Apologetics, On the True Religion, On Revelation, etc.), or while simultaneously establishing this demonstration of Revelations, further apply themselves to proving the transcendence of Judaism and Christianity, the one preparatory to the other, and to justifying the designs of Providence. Occasionally undertaken by St. Irenaeus (d. ca. 202) in the work Adversus haereses, this second task was more extensively carried out by St. Augustine in the De civitate Dei, by Paulus Orosius in the Historiae adversus paganos, by Pascal in various parts of the Pensées, and by Bossuet in the Histoire universelle.

X. TRANSCENDENCE OF CHRISTIANITY

In a broad sense, the term "transcendence" signifies merely superiority. This is how it is understood, regarding this or that point of Christian doctrine—some of which they even recognize as having a definitive or absolute value, Absolutheit (e.g., the preaching of charity)—by many exegetes, philosophers, and sociologists, most of whom belong to liberal Protestantism. For Catholics, Christianity is transcendent because it ultimately constitutes a moral miracle; its origin and history cannot be explained in their eyes without particular interventions of God.

Reduced to its essential traits, their solution can be summarized as follows: the multiplicity of religions derives, as from causes, from the difficulty of the religious problem, the pursuit of immediate material interests, the allurement of passions—especially when wealth increases or when the fusion of peoples accentuates the uncertainty of traditions. Furthermore, since man can discover some truths on his own, there is presumably no religion in which some healthy element cannot be discerned (cf. V. CATHREIN, VIKTOR, Die Einheit des sittlichen Bewusstseins der Menschheit, 3 vols., Freiburg im Breisgau 1914; Th. Ohm, Die Liebe zu Gott in den nichtchristlichen Religionen, Krailling vor München 1950).

Between the "true religion" and others, both in good and in evil, some analogies are therefore inevitable. The most authentically "divine" will necessarily be corrupted by those among its adherents who are less gifted. Will it then be legitimate to judge it by these elements?

In fact, God spoke to Israel. Hence, contrasts all the more notable the more extensive and meticulous the comparison becomes; that is: its strict monotheism, its Decalogue, the series of its prophets, their reaction against all aberrations, their ever more precise announcement of the Redeemer, their miracles, which determine, after almost total apostasies, the successive conversions of the nation (v. GIUDAISMO, VI, coll. 697-703).

Substantially true, the religion of the Old Testament is nevertheless imperfect because it addresses a rough people, like their neighbors, dependent on their civilization, seduced by their practices and examples. Yahweh governed it, using "condescension," as He deemed appropriate at that stage of general evolution (cf. H. Pinard de la Boullaye, Étude comparée des religions, I, 3rd ed., Paris 1929, pp. 552-71).

The predicted Messiah has come: "The Word became flesh" (Jn 1:14), establishing worship "in spirit and truth" (Jn 4:23). His is therefore a perfect religion, at least in its essential elements; moreover, an immutable religion, because He presented it as such (Mt 5:17-19; 16:18; 28:18-20). A divine sign that the authentic one is the very character of its founder: "Take the greatest among modern anti-Christians," wrote Ch. A. de Sainte-Beuve; "whoever has completely misunderstood Jesus Christ, look at him closely, something has been lacking in his spirit or heart" (Port-Royal, III, 4th ed., Paris 1878, p. 451). Other divine signs: His prophecies, His miracles, His Resurrection, His teaching, His morality (v. GESÙ CRISTO). That the natural evolution of humanity, or skillful borrowings from earlier religions or sects, suffice to explain the emergence of such a doctrine, history still awaits the proofs (v. SINCRETISMO). Still other divine signs: the triumph of the Church over paganism, despite such strong opposition and so many persecutions, its survival in the unity of the same faith, despite crises stirred by heresies and though more than once corruption has gnawed at its heart in the person of unworthy popes (v. CHIESA). A divine sign: the uninterrupted flourishing of its saints and mystics, their social fruitfulness, etc., its conquering force, as soon as it is allowed to present Him who called Himself "the Way, the Truth, and the Life" (Jn 14:6; V. CRISTIANESIMO).

Without ever having to renounce, or—which amounts to the same—transform according to the taste of the day any point of its "articles of faith," received from its first Apostles, the religion of Jesus does not cease to be perfectible in the intellectual order through the deepening and coordination of its dogmas; in the moral order, not only regarding the sanctification of its members but also the individual and social application of its principles; in the liturgical order, regarding piety, the expressive force of its rites, their adaptation to the needs of the times, etc.

Why, one may ask, did Christ Himself not regulate everything in the most precise manner? Reflection suggests several very plausible reasons: a regulation pushed to the last details would provoke inertia, stagnation, and suppress an essential quality of any constitution destined for different epochs: flexibility; it would suggest that the Legislator does not remain always present to preside over necessary adaptations; now, Christ promised the Heads of His Church—and not those who would rebel against their authority—to continue His assistance to them without end (Jn 16:7-14; Lk 22:32; Mt 28:19-20).

Common sense demands faith in Him. To correctly appreciate the pedagogy imposed upon Him, a child would already have to have reached that degree of wisdom to which it must lead; similarly, to judge accurately the divine designs regarding the sanctification not of a chosen group and an epoch, but
RELIGIONI - RELIGIOSE DI S. GIULIANA

di tutti gli uomini durante la serie intera dei secoli avvenire, bisognerebbe possedere la saggezza dell'Altissimo. Se si ha sufficiente modestia per non pretenderlo, non resta che obbedire integralmente, amorosamente alle sue leggi. Esigere, prima di assoggettarvisi, l'evidenza del loro valore «incomparabile», quando solo la loro osservanza fedele, con una trasformazione progressiva dello spirito e del cuore, può mettere in grado di giudicarne correttamente, equivale a rovesciare l'ordine naturale. Specialmente s. Agostino s'è adoperato a farlo capire (cf. E. Portalié, Augustin, in DThC, I, coll. 2332-34). Le evidenze della fede, nella misura in cui può adoperarsi questo termine, sono la ricompensa sicura di una vita strettamente regolata dalla fede (Io. 7, 17; 8, 31; 14, 21), la prova sperimentale della sua trascendenza.