SINCRETISMO

SYNCRETISM. — A universal phenomenon, connected with the most serious religious problems, especially with regard to Judaism and Christianity.

OUTLINE:

I. Preliminary Notions

II. Syncretism in Pagan Religions

III. Syncretism in Islam

IV. The Problem of Syncretism with Respect to the Religion of Israel and Christianity

V. From Abraham to Moses

VI. Under the Dominion of the Assyrians and Persians

VII. The Hellenistic Period

VIII. Primitive Christianity

IX. From the First Apologists to the Barbarian Invasions

X. The Barbarian Era

XI. The Middle Ages

XII. Renaissance and Reformation

XIII. From the 17th Century to Our Own Day

XIV. Conclusions.

I. PRELIMINARY NOTIONS

1. History of the Word — a) Originally, "syncretism" meant the temporary union of the Cretans in order to resist a common enemy (Plutarch, *Moralia*, ed. Bernardakis, III, 271). b) In the early days of the "Reformation," the term was sometimes used to express the union of humanists and the "Reformed": "You see with what hatred some conspire against the liberal arts," Erasmus wrote to Melanchthon, "it is right that we too should syncretize: *aequum est nos quoque συγκρητίζει*" (*Corpus Reformatorum*, I, 78). c) In the 17th century, the term, as if derived from *κεφανυμία*, denoted the union proclaimed by the Protestant theologian G. Calixt (1586–1656) and his partisans, who maintained that Lutherans, Calvinists, and Catholics should reach an understanding on certain fundamental articles. This led to long controversies that produced no result. d) At present, a philosophy that derives from different authors its initial suggestions and theses is often called "syncretistic": Neo-Stoicism, Neo-Platonism, etc. e) More commonly, the term "syncretism" denotes a religious system composed of elements drawn from differing or even contradictory philosophies. In this article, the term is used in this last sense.

2. Necessary Distinctions

To clarify the issue, it is important to observe that the absorption of foreign elements, in many respects, is the very law not only of physical life, given the task of nourishment, but also of psychic life, given the task of education, study, and the exchange of ideas: the most heated discussions are not for this reason the least useful, at least for minds capable of reflection without passion other than the passion for truth. Some absorptions result only in temporary amalgams (συγκράσεις), often harmful, because the organism refuses to assimilate them; others result in syntheses (συνθήσεις); in this case, they not only repair the wear and tear of body or spirit but also provide the vital principle with the means to develop its latent energies and potentialities. Therefore, in judging "plagiarisms" and "derivations" among philosophies or religions, it is inadmissible to limit oneself to noting vague and superficial analogies on either side; it is also inadmissible to stop at the observation that a religion, for example, may initially deviate toward this or that rite or dogma whose equivalent is found in another, because this may simply have actualized its own potentialities autonomously (explication, not innovation), whence often resemblances that derive from parallel evolutions (pure chance encounters) or under the action of external stimuli (sometimes mutual maturation). In short, it is necessary to distinguish "impresisti" of pure terminology (indispensable for the exchange of ideas in a given era); pure and simple "impresisti" or those that involve more or less profound adaptations; impresisti made out of deference to the taste of the era and concerning essential or accessory points, such as the decorative arts; impresisti made out of competition, with or without modifications, to ensure one's own success, etc. (cf. H. Pinard de la Boullaye, *L'étude comparée des religions*, III, 3rd ed., Paris 1929, pp. 119–34).

II. SYNCRETISM IN PAGAN RELIGIONS

With regard to pagan religions, critics are unanimous in admitting that, however far back one goes in the course of centuries, they have exchanged, in varying degrees, beliefs and rites.

This syncretism presents itself in two forms: one automatic, almost spontaneous and popular, because philosophical reflection plays no appreciable part in it; the other systematic, or reflective, for the opposite reason.

3. Spontaneous Syncretism

It is determined by circumstances; the contact of religions imposes comparisons and gives rise to contaminations: this occurs above all in centers of commercial exchange, in great markets, in ports. It often derives from "mixed marriages"; Solomon offers a typical example (1 Kings 11:1–18). Within the same religion, the rivalry between independent sanctuaries leads them to appropriate to themselves conceptions and practices that find favor with their clients. Wars, especially great invasions, produce considerable repercussions. The vanquished are inclined to regard the gods of the victors as superior, or at least as powers with which to reckon, and these, for reasons of political prudence, are induced to show tolerance and even to adopt, for the benefit of the ruling class, the most splendid functions of the subdued cults (cf. A. Barth, *Les religions de l'Inde*, in *Oeuvres complètes*, I, Paris 1914, p. 142; cf. p. 164; F. Cumont, *Les religions orientales*, 4th ed., ibid. 1929, pp. 189, 298). Hence, an exact history of syncretism cannot be written without knowledge of the contacts, often of successive crossings, that each ethnic group has undergone.

An example: Islam penetrated India ca. 1000 A.D.; the Aryans between 1200–1000 B.C.; now, excavations at Mohenjo-daro and Harappa have shown that they found in the Indus valley a civilization dating at least from the 3rd millennium, contemporary with that of the Assyro-Babylonians and no less evolved. In the immense peninsula there lived, besides the Dravidians and Munda (Austroasiatic), the archaic populations of the Chenchu, Reddi, Baiga, Bhil, etc., among whom, mingled with a jumble of beliefs and rites that bring them close to polytheism, there is still found faith in a Supreme Being, creator and moral legislator. The Brahmins, whose religion was turning toward formalism and magic, maintained their supremacy by instituting the caste system; they did not, however, forbid participation in the cults of the lower castes, even going so far as to act as their ministers. Hence the strange amalgam that is Hinduism.

Another solution allowed traditional hierarchies to be respected; it consisted in assimilating gods of approximately equivalent dignity or function from one people to another (theocrasia) and in explaining the myths concerning them in an allegorical manner (Egyptian, Greek, Roman interpretation; cf. P. Wissowa, *Interpretatio romana*, in *Archiv für Religionswiss.*, 19 [1916–19], pp. 1–49; K. Prümm, *Religionsgesch. Handbuch*, Freiburg im Br. 1943 [indices VI and VIII, *Interpretatio*, pp. 885, 901]).

Finally, it was possible to conceive of the gods—at least the most notable ones—as diverse manifestations of a single divinity, worshipped under different aspects and names (divine polynomia); hence the name “Pantheus” given to some of them according to the preferences of different groups, and the creation of symbols expressing this belief (cf. *Pantheion*, *Pan-theos*, *Pantheus*, in W. H. Roscher, *Ausführliches Lexikon*, III [1884–86], cols. 1555–57; J. Toutain, *Les cultes païens*, II, Paris 1920, pp. 8 ff., 241 ff.; F. Cumont, *Panthea signa*, in Daremberg and Saglio, *Dict. des antiquités*, IV, pp. 314–15). In turn, numerous thinkers of the Hellenistic age—Plutarch, Celsus, Apuleius of Madaura, Maximus of Tyre, Numenius of Apamea, Porphyry, Iamblichus—

Clearly derive from this: Gnosticism (v. GNOSI) in its many forms, some antecedent to and others subsequent to Christianity; Hermetism (v.), Manichaeism (v.) and its substitutes, a multitude of ancient or modern sects, and the fantasies adorned with the names of anthroposophy or theosophy (v.).

III. SYNCRETISM IN ISLAM

On account of its monotheism, this great religion must be classified separately. Its syncretistic character appears from its very origins.

The Bedouins of Arabia still preserved faith in a supreme Being, *Allāh Taʿālā*, the God who has always been (cf. A. Palmieri, *Coran*, in DTHC, III [1908], col. 1732; C. Snouck Hurgronje, in A. Bertholet, *Lehrbuch*, I [1925], p. 632). The great merit of Muḥammad is that he proscribed every idolatrous cult in the face of this supreme Being. That he arrived at this position through acquaintance with the other two “religions of the Book,” as he expressed it, is clearly demonstrated by an analysis of the Qurʾān.

“Muḥammad knew Judaism and Christianity as well as was possible in Mecca at his time, and he is so dependent upon these two religions that it is difficult to find a religious idea in the Qurʾān that is not derived from them” (Fr. Schwally, *Gesch. des Qorâns*, 2nd ed., part 2, Leipzig 1919, p. 121); cf. A. Palmieri, art. cit., in DTHC, III, cols. 1786–91 (with bibliography, col. 1833); D. S. Margoliouth, *Muhammadans*, in *Enc. of Rel. and Eth.*, IX (1917), pp. 480–83; H. Lammens, *Une adaptation arabe du monothéisme sémitique*, in *Rech. de sc. relig.*, 7 (1917), pp. 161–86; W. Rudolph, *Die Abhängigkeit des Qorâns von Jud. und Christent.*, Stuttgart 1923 (bibliography pp. vi–viii); T. Andrae, *Der Ursprung des Islams und des Christentums*, Uppsala 1926.

After the death of the Prophet, difficulties arising from the interpretation of the Qurʾān, divergent traditions invoked especially by the two great parties of Sunnites and Shīʿites, political rivalries, and the diverse religions and philosophies with which Islam came into contact during its expansion—namely, Neoplatonism, later Aristotelianism (v. AVERROISM), Indian yoga, Christian monasticism (v. ṢŪFĪSM), the deep-rooted superstitions of Hinduism and those of Black Africa—could not fail to provoke the most strange compromises. Some more recent ones are due to the general crisis of “modernism.”

IV. THE PROBLEM OF SYNCRETISM IN RELATION TO THE RELIGION OF ISRAEL AND CHRISTIANITY

4. Progressive extension of the debate

From the earliest centuries of the Christian era, some pagans, for example Celsus and the Emperor Julian, claimed to show that Christianity had drawn extensively from earlier religions. In the sixteenth century the accusation was renewed by the Reformation.

Indeed, in order to justify abandoning “papist” beliefs and practices, it sufficed to present them as so many pagan infiltrations that had corrupted the “pure Gospel.” Hence a multitude of publications, most of them devoid of value, especially since the ancient religions were at that time poorly understood. Since

the weapon was easy to wield, it was constantly used to authorize ever more serious departures, until it reached the dogmas of the divinity of Jesus Christ and of the Trinity. All works that deal with the history of religions, wrote the rationalist E. Havet, necessarily arrive at this point (*Le christianisme et ses origines*, I, 3rd ed., Paris 1880, p. XXXII). Indeed, just as every materialist monism must affirm the eternity of the world and spontaneous generation, so every rationalism, by excluding a priori miracles and supernatural revelation in the biblical sense, must strive to explain by means of syncretism both what it rejects and what it approves in religions to which it grants some superior, or even, in certain respects, a definitive or absolute value.

5. Some principles of solution

a) It is obviously necessary to distinguish between official religion and popular religion or practices. Let us suppose, with Newman, that the religion is as pure as can be, but so long as men are men, it is impossible that the less instructed should not lower it in part to their own level (Letter to Pusey, in *Difficulties felt by Anglicans in Catholic Teaching*, 2nd ed., London 1910, p. 81); but what right do they have to be considered as its representatives when it condemns them and seeks to correct them? (cf. St. Augustine, *De moribus Ecclesiae*, ch. 34, nn. 75–76; PL 32, 1342; *Contra Faustum*, bk. 20, ch. 23; ibid. 42, 388).

b) Apparent or real, derivations are by no means of equal value: one must also speak the language of the people to whom one is speaking (as we shall see, identical terms can also express quite different realities); one must also adopt those forms of art that they appreciate, the gestures that they consider expressive of adoration, even some of their rites, which are in themselves blameless; it is the dogmas that determine their meaning.

c) From their very appearance on the scene, Christian apologists have also pointed out that the Most High, while somewhat modifying and giving a new meaning to certain practices, could have sanctioned some customs analogous to those of the pagans, indeed inherited from them, because the chosen people were not capable of tolerating anything more perfect. This thesis, known as the thesis of condescension (συγκαταβασιμός), has the merit of being based on a very sound idea of infinite prudence and goodness and on several very clear facts (institution of kingship [1 Sam. 8 and 10:18-28]; temporary tolerance of polygamy, and of divorce later suppressed [Mt. 19:3-9] and *nisi obfuscatione*, except in the case of an invalid marriage [J. Bonsirven, *Le divorce dans l'A. T.*, Paris 1948], etc.). However, the applications of this principle of condescension should not be multiplied without sound judgment.

V. FROM ABRAHAM TO MOSES

I. The patriarchs

The ancestors of Abraham certainly practiced, like all primitive peoples, the offering of firstfruits, animal sacrifices, probably with offerings of flour and oil, as did their neighbors. God’s intervention in favor of Isaac was meant to make it clear that He disapproved of the sacrifice of children (Gen. 22:1-18). Circumcision did not exist among the Semites, and Abraham may have derived it from the Egyptians during his first stay in their country (Gen. 12); but it became the sign of their covenant with the one true God (Gen. 17:9-14 [V. CIRCUMCISION]). Neither for the one nor for the other is there any reason to speak of totemism (v.).

Called by Joseph, the Hebrews, according to their traditions, remained in the Delta region for 430 years. As nomads, they found themselves in a civilization of sedentary peoples. However, the refined arts of these peoples and their polytheism, not to mention their magic, could not fail to seduce them. Proof of this is the episode of the golden calf (Ex. 32).

6. From the Exodus to the Exile

The covenant of Yahweh with Israel was renewed on Sinai, and Moses proclaimed its conditions. His code of laws, in many points, coincides with that of the Assyrian monarch Hammurabi, certainly earlier and witness to a civilization in some respects more advanced; it forbids, for example, taking vengeance oneself for the killing of a relative (Num. 35:16-21). Such indications suggest that the points of agreement should rather be explained by common traditions than by derivations (v. ARK OF THE COVENANT; HAMMURABI (HAMMURAPI); NEW MOON; SABBATH; TEMPLE). The Hebrew code regains its superiority in the field of religion and morality: strict monotheism, prohibition of images because they fostered idolatry, strict observance of the Decalogue. At the express request of His people, Yahweh instituted prophecy (Deut. 18:15; V. A. Clamer, in loc., in L. Pirot, *La Sainte Bible*, II [1946], pp. 633-35). Again out of condescension, to free them from the temptation to turn to diviners and spirits (1 Sam. 28:5-20; 2 Kings 1:1-14, etc.), He allowed them to consult Him through the *ephod* (1 Sam. 23:6-13; 30:6-8) and the Urim and Thummim (Num. 27:21, etc.; V. A. Clamer, loc. cit., p. 422).

Despite these provisions, the judges and prophets of Israel had to struggle unceasingly against the invasion of foreign gods, the sometimes execrable practices of their cults, and the manifold forms of superstition. In popular religion, syncretism is therefore evident.

VI. Under the dominion of the Assyrians and Persians

1. For about fifty years, the Israelites groaned under the dominion of the kings of Babylon; many of them were deported. Their prophets, especially Ezekiel among the exiles and Jeremiah in Judah, represented these misfortunes to them as the just punishment for their infidelities. The guilty repented and hardened themselves against the seduction of their conquerors. Scholars such as, among many others, Ed. Stucken, H. Winckler, H. Zimmern, and A. Jeremias, have argued the opposite. The so-called “pan-Babylonists” even extended Babylonian influence to the entire world; but authoritative refutations by both non-Catholics and Catholics have now done justice to their theses.

2. Cyrus, king of the Persians, master of Babylon in 538 B.C., allowed the exiles to return to their homeland. Relations between the two peoples remained cordial. In turn, some specialists in Iranian studies appeal to syncretism, even going so far as to claim, as Ed. Meyer did, that “Judaism is a creation of the Persian Empire.” This is an amateur’s exaggeration, “dilettantische Übertreibung,” as R. Smend rightly replied in *Theol. Literaturzeitung*, 37 (1912), cols. 486.

In reality, the final redaction of the sacred books, the two Avestas (v.), the old and the new, took place under Shapur I (241-71 A.D.). Only the Gathas of the old Avesta can be traced back to Zoroaster; but with regard to his monotheistic reform, the new Avesta shows a manifest deviation.

Now, the further back this reform is dated to the 6th and 7th centuries B.C., the less plausible it becomes that Israel found in it anything that had not already been guaranteed to it by its prophets with an entirely different authority. The same applies to the religious and moral ideas, gathered (we do not know by what criterion) and consecrated by the new Avesta: antagonism of the two principles of good and evil, Ahura Mazda and Ahriman (dualism later exploited by Manichaeism [v.]), final victory of good, survival and reward of the just, angelology. At most, the analogy of some doctrines may have favored, on both sides, a certain maturation of ideas. It seems only that the concordance between the Amesha Spentas, very uncertain personifications of divine attributes, and the seven archangels of the Bible makes a dependence very plausible; which, as can be seen, amounts to very little. In short, as one of the most competent judges, W. F. Albright, concludes: “The conceptions of Iran do not begin to influence Judaism before the last two pre-Christian centuries. And even then, they exert their influence only if the ground was fully prepared” (*From the Stone Age to Christianity*, 2nd ed., Baltimore 1946, pp. 276-80).

VII. THE HELLENISTIC PERIOD

The conquests of Alexander the Great upended the ancient world. With the fall of Jerusalem (334 B.C.), Judea was soon subjugated. The prestige of Greek civilization, the persecutions carried out to impose its polytheism and customs, the intrigues of the High Priests, and their constant flattery of civil authority, would certainly have led to the ruin of the ancient faith had it not been for the Maccabean revolts, the tenacity of their forces, and the fierce intransigence of the Pharisees. Neopythagorean and Platonic ideas undoubtedly influenced the Essenes (q.v.); yet, taken as a whole, they proved more opposed to Hellenism than the Pharisees themselves, who were not entirely separated from II. For the sake of brevity, we include among the more recent sapiential books, such as the Book of Wisdom, written in Greek, the more ancient ones as well. That among their maxims of good sense (quite pedestrian in Ecclesiastes), their rules of conduct, and their moral speculations, numerous analogies with those of pagan authors may be observed is not surprising, given that they belong to the same literary genre. These resemblances may be the result of mere coincidence rather than plagiarism. Where the resemblance seems almost certain, namely between the Wisdom of Amen-em-ope and the Book of Proverbs attributed to Solomon, it pertains rather to the mode of presentation, the form, than to the substance: one might say that there was a kind of filtration (cf. A. Mallon, in Biblica 8 [1927], pp. 3-30).

To exalt the author of the world (creator from nothing, god of pantheism, subordinate demiurge, or principle of good within a dualistic system), it was necessary to abandon anthropomorphic images (Gen. 2:7) and instead emphasize his wisdom and the power of his will or his word (“Dixit... et facta sunt”; Gen. 1). Hence, from religion to religion, there arise on these various themes—spirit (intelligence, source of inspiration, etc.), wisdom, and word (both as sovereign and as efficacious in themselves, etc.)—πνεῦμα, σοφία, λόγος, inevitable and therefore manifold analogies; yet there also arise nuances ranging from simple abstract concepts to a personalization that is at times purely literary or poetic, and at others more pronounced, with or without divinization. Now, the thought of the authors of the Old Testament retains its distinctive characteristics, derived from the unique nature of Yahweh himself. If one examines the progressive teachings of the Bible concerning the Spirit, the Wisdom, and the Word of God, one may conclude that the parallel speculations of the pagan world may well have stimulated their own reflections; yet as regards beliefs or dogmas, nothing had to be borrowed from them, while much had to be opposed. Indeed, they resolutely eliminated polytheism, its incoherent mythology, and its corruption. Consequently, one of the most Hellenized Jews, after Philo (q.v.), namely Flavius Josephus (q.v.), felt compelled to justify the intransigence of his compatriots (Against Apion, II, 36, end; cf. 17-22). The exclusivism of these Jews drew upon them the very hatred they were accused of inciting: “Ipsos fides obstinata,” Tacitus writes, “sed adversus alios omnes hostile odium” (Histories, V, ch. 5). Similar expressions are found in Diodorus Siculus, I, XL, ch. 3.

brothers: “in the word of the truth of the gospel which has come to you, as indeed in the whole world it is bearing fruit and growing” (Col. 1:4-7; 1 Thess. 1:7-8). Free as he was to choose his field of apostolate, he forbids preaching the Gospel where others have already done so (Rom. 15:20-21; 16:13-18). This impassioned man, who boasts of having “withstood Peter to his face over a matter already settled by common agreement” (Gal. 2:11-21), would he have accommodated himself to this division of labor if he had believed it necessary to restore what his speculations or alleged visions presented to him as truth, or if he had believed that his rivals in the apostolate were altering the type of catechesis (τύπος διδαχής: Rom. 6:17), accepted by all? How could he have so energetically imposed upon all the injunction never to do so? (Rom. 16:17; Col. 2:6-9; 2 Thess. 3:6; Eph. 4:13-14).

b) Despite his antecedents as a persecutor and his successes, so likely to arouse jealousy, etc., Paul has (since he defends himself only against them) adversaries other than the Jewish Christians, who stubbornly maintained Mosaic practices. Peter covers him with his authority, saying: “Consider the patience of our Lord as salvation, just as our beloved brother Paul also wrote to you according to the wisdom given him, speaking of this as he does in all his letters. There are some things in them hard to understand, which the ignorant and unstable twist to their own destruction, as they do the other scriptures” (2 Pet. 3:15-16). The force of these words and this fact must be weighed carefully: all of Paul’s letters, with the partial exception of the Letter to the Hebrews, were accepted as Scripture by each of the Churches. His preaching, even if more sublime and less probing, did not, in its rudiments of doctrine—“the milk of the children” (Heb. 5:11-14)—depart from the τύπος διδαχής, the catechesis of the Twelve.

2. The Testimony of the Synoptics

Between the death of Christ and the first apostolate of Paul twenty years had elapsed. Could the primitive Church, in so short a span, have evolved to the point of being ready to accept the personal views of the convert? To prove this, the partisans of the *Religionsgeschichtliche Schule* (v. BOUSSET, WILHELMS) and those of the *Formgeschichtliche Methode* (v. FORMA) heap up parallels; according to them, every enlightened believer gives himself what he needs to justify his own faith. Indeed, there are many examples of this kind, but to move from the frequency of certain acts to their universality, without taking account of manifest contrasts, is to transform the comparative method into an arbitrary method of assimilation or leveling.

First of all: the primitive Church, that of Jerusalem, is by no means an amorphous society of devotees or the enlightened; it has instead its undisputed leaders, the *Doci*, and a supreme head who takes the initiative (Acts 1:15-26) and claims the right to settle disputes (Acts 15:7, etc.). He and his brethren share an identical concept of apostleship: according to the order received from Jesus (Lk. 24:48; Acts 1:8), they present themselves as “witnesses of facts not done in a corner, in secret” (Acts 26:26; 1:21-22; 2:32; 3:15; 4:19-20; 5:32; 10:39), not as purveyors of ingeniously invented tales, *doctas fabulas secuti* (2 Pt. 1:16; 1 Pt. 5:1-4; 1 Jn. 1:1-3, etc.). For them, as for Paul, faith—condition of salvation—is not therefore a sentiment or a generic conception of things, but an “obedience” to the law of thought and action imposed upon them and all by the divine Risen One, ὑπακοὴ πίστεως (Rom. 1:5; 16:17-19, 26, etc.). These witnesses went so far as to confirm their faith with their blood. This is a point that distinguishes them from the enthusiasts who appeal either to esoteric, intemporal traditions, like the Gnostics (v. GNOSI) and the Hermetists (v.), or to individual revelations, like the Montanists (v.) and numerous sects.

Other contrasts: the absence in the Synoptics of every speculation; the words and deeds of Christ are related without any gloss that might suggest the influence of Paul, without apparent dependence on his terminology: words and deeds, however, most apt to justify his theology; sobriety in the realm of the marvelous: miracles are indeed related, but how different, in the ensemble of their physical and moral characters, from the prodigies attributed to Buddha, the gods of India, Muhammad, etc.; a morality manifestly superior to that of contemporary Judaism; and finally the character of Jesus, whose charm so few souls escape.

J.-J. Rousseau rightly concluded: “It is not thus that one invents... The Gospel presents characters of truth so grand, so surprising, so inimitable, that the inventor would be more astonishing than the hero” (*Emile*, IV, in *Oeuvres*, VII, Paris 1822, pp. 246-49); V. CRISTIANESIMO, in Enc. cat., IV, cols. 895-99; GESÙ CRISTO, ibid., VI, cols. 247-61.

The Synoptics therefore did not give free rein to their imagination; on the other hand, their Jewish mentality appears happily transformed. Under what influence, if not that of the incomparable Master, in whom they came to recognize the beloved Son of the Father (Mt. 3:17; Mk. 1:11; Lk. 3:22; Mt. 17:5; Mk. 9:6; Lk. 9:35), his equal (Mt. 11:27), the Judge of the last day (Mt. 16:27; Mk. 8:38; Lk. 9:26; Mt. 11:21; Mk. 10:37), the master who imposed upon them the strictest fidelity to his teaching (Mt. 28:19-20; Mk. 15:16, etc.)?

3. The Testimony of John

The fourth Gospel, later in date, is distinguished from the other three by easily explicable characteristics. As the conclusion itself declares, it is a supplementary inquiry into a point hotly contested: the divinity of Jesus (Jn. 20:31). New facts are therefore related, and in part explained; because of the adversaries to whom they are frequently addressed, the discourses take on a different turn and tone. The prologue (1:1-18), moreover, stands out more sharply still from the manner of the Synoptics; but, all things considered, it presents, under the personal responsibility of the Apostle, the synthesis of their doctrine concerning the supreme dignity of the “Son of Man” and his mission. Perhaps John employs the term *Logos*, as Paul does those of *gnosis* and *epigoni*, by reason of the speculations then current; but not in order to adapt himself to them, rather to correct them.

It is not the place here to sketch even the history of the terms γνῶσις, λόγος, πλήρωμα, πνεῦμα, of the antithesis πνευματικῶς, ψυχικός, in St. Paul, etc.; cf. the authors cited here, § 3 and further on, § 4. It need only be recalled that the clearest dependencies of vocabulary do not in any way prove the identity of concepts. The meaning of words must be determined from the context, and the context can reveal notable divergences and in certain cases an intention of opposition.

John abstains from repeating what his predecessors have already related, except to bring in here and there some clarifications to their writings. A sign that he considers their account to be true. Moreover, his charge to the faithful coincides with theirs: he refers them back to the teaching of the early years: *quod fuit ab initio* (1 Jn. 1:1-4; 2:7; 2 Jn. 5); he warns them not to believe every pretended suggestion or revelation of the Holy Spirit: “Believe not every spirit, but try the spirits if they be of God. Hereby know ye the spirit of error” (1 Jn. 4:1-6; 2:22-25; 1 Cor. 12:3). “If any man come unto you and bring not this teaching of Christ, do not receive him into your house, neither bid him God speed” (2 Jn. 7, 11).

One further trait may be noted that disposes him less than his brethren to silence. More than they he insists on this principle: “To love Christ is first of all to remain faithful to his teaching” (Jn. 14:15, 21-24, 31; 15:10, 14); “He who keeps his word, in him verily (and therefore in him alone) the love of God is perfected” (1 Jn. 2:3-6; 2 Jn. 6; cf. Mt. 5:19; 7:21-23; 12:46-50; Lk. 11:27-28). Such recommendations, proportionate to the attraction exercised upon them, prevented those whom Christ had constituted his witnesses from borrowing, especially on capital points, from Hellenism, Gnosticism, etc.

4. The “Fifth Gospel.” — Before being committed to writing, the message of Jesus was preached: an oral gospel, capable of being verified by others, at least as regards the essentials of His earthly life and teaching. Now, a remarkable fact: the other four Gospels, despite the contributions and nuances that distinguish them, were received without contestation by all the Churches of the early days. And this, while the so-called “apocryphal” Gospels (v.), far more seductive in their legends, obtained only the lowest authority and a restricted diffusion; this, moreover, without any official revision or intervention by supreme authority, as happened instead with Buddhist scriptures under King Aśoka, the Avesta of the Persians under Shapur I, the Sibylline Books under Augustus, the Qur’an under the caliph ‘Uthmān, etc. A truly extraordinary fact, a more decisive confirmation from the critical standpoint than any decree issued by Peter or any archaic council. The very first Christian communities had each been founded by an apostle, an evangelist, or some qualified “witness,” and they took pride in this (1 Cor 1:12; 3:1-7). According to the laws that the *Religionsgeschichtliche Schule* is fond of invoking, each should soon have developed its own customs, speculations, and myths and striven to maintain them. Yet they accepted as the expression of true faith only the writings of Paul, the four Evangelists, the few letters of Peter, James, John, and Jude; the Apocalypse is of a different genre. Whence comes this exclusivism if not from the agreement of the Twelve and the first disciples among themselves, from the beginning to the end of their mission, and from the uniform instructions they received? These are the precepts: “Let there be no schisms (σχίσματα) among you!” (1 Cor 1:10-13). “O Timothy, guard what has been entrusted to you; avoid profane and vain babblings, τῇς ψευδωνόμου γνώσεως; some who have professed these have strayed from the faith” (1 Tim 6:20-21; 1:3-4; 4:7; 2 Tim 1:13-14; 4:2-4). “After a first and second admonition, avoid those who cause divisions” (Tit 3:10-11). “If anyone comes to you and does not bring this teaching, do not receive him into your house; do not even greet him!” (2 Jn 7, 11). Peter denounces the choices or heresies of perdition (2 Pt 2:1) and declares that it would have been better for their promoters never to have known the truth than to abandon the holy law received from tradition (ibid., 2:21-22; cf. Jude 3:4; 17:23). Other equally firm directives are found in the *Didachē* (4:13; 6:1; 11:1-2); around 95, in the First Letter of Clement (7:1-2; cf. 42); around 100 in that of Pseudo-Barnabas (19:11); between 107-17 in those of St. Ignatius of Antioch (Eph. 6:2; 9:1; Trall. 9:1); and about the same time in those of St. Polycarp (Phil. 7:2).

That the control exercised by the “fifth Gospel,” the living tradition, was not without effect is shown by the final proof: some sources curiously transmitted alleged “words of Jesus”; yet, as soon as any critic dares to consider one as authentic (J. Jeremias, *Unbekannte Jesussworte*, Zurich 1948; V. AGRAPHON; LOGIA).

7. Conclusion

It is beyond doubt that none of the canonical Gospels can be described as a “historical account” in the strict sense of modern criticism. In Matthew and Mark especially, chronological order is not rigorously observed. Precepts concerning the same class of duties are artificially grouped for catechetical purposes. Moreover, each Evangelist summarizes the facts in his own way, adding this or that detail or miracle drawn from his personal information. These liberties, far from detracting from the value of their testimony, only render it more effective in what is essential: they reveal not their total independence from common sources, but the revision to which those sources were subjected (cf. Ch. Langlois, *Introduction aux études historiques*, 2nd ed., Paris 1899, p. 173; E. Bernheim, *Lehrbuch der historischen Methode*, 6th ed., Leipzig 1908, pp. 80 ff., 195 ff., 524 ff.).

From the publication of his *Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte* (3 vols., Tübingen 1886-90), Harnack acknowledged that the distinctive traits of Catholicism had to be traced much further back than Protestant historians commonly admitted, as he recalled in his review of the important work by Msgr. Batiffol, cited above: *L’Église naissante*; yet he persisted in maintaining that the religion of Jesus, as presented by Catholicism, had become “essentially another.” To Catholicism he particularly objected for having eliminated an element of the utmost importance: subjection to God without any intermediary: *das der unmittelbaren göttlichen Gebundenheit*, and the personal freedom it consecrates: *und der durch sie gesetzten individuellen Freiheit* (*Theologische Literaturzeitung*, 34 [1909], cols. 51-53). The same accusation recurs frequently in other writings. But it is easy to reply that so many divisions among Christian Churches, which they continually deplore, stem from this appeal to an individual freedom entirely removed from the control of the established hierarchy, designed to prevent illusions or at least their consequences, in full fidelity to the type of catechesis fixed from the very origins, τῇς ψευδωνόμου γνώσεως (Rom 6:17), ἐν τῇ δυστυχῇ τοῦ Χριστοῦ (2 Jn 9): tradition (cf. E. Pinard de la Boullaye, lectures given in 1935, Italian trans., *L’eredità di Gesù*, Turin 1937, pp. 185-264; bibliography, p. 253).

IX. FROM THE EARLY APOLOGISTS TO THE BARBARIAN INVASIONS

I. The Dogmas

From the time the Church extended its conquests and its writers began their controversies with intellectuals, the influence of Hellenism became more pronounced: abundant quotations of pagan authors, even a display in Clement of Alexandria, especially in his *Stromata* (or “Miscellanies”), in Eusebius of Caesarea in his *Praeparatio evangelica*, etc.; manifest dependence of thought in Clement on Musonius, in the *Paedagogus*; in St. Ambrose on Cicero’s *De officiis*; in Gregory of Nyssa and Augustine on Neoplatonism, etc. Dionysius the Pseudo-Areopagite even goes so far as to insert entire passages from Proclus into his text. Facts of this kind, of which it would be easy to multiply

The examples do not in any way prove an alteration of the primitive faith; to be convinced of this, it suffices to consider: a) the motives that guided these writers; b) the limits of their concessions; c) the norm that directs their choice and the end they aimed at.

a) Indeed, whatever the reason may be, it cannot be reprehensible to derive benefit from what is true, beautiful, and morally good. Virgil is praised for having known how to extract pearls from Ennius’ dung. Likewise, Seneca claimed, when necessary, the right to cite Epicurus: “What is true is mine... Let all know that the best things are common property” (*Ad Lucil.*, Epist., XII, 10; XVI, 6). St. Justin declares the same: “Whatever good has been said, no matter by whom, belongs to us Christians.” He even goes so far as to claim that the pagans derived their sound ideas from the Holy Scriptures (the thesis of “plagiarism,” derived from Judaism and unfortunately revived by others). More inspired and distorting the Stoic theory of the *λόγος σπερματικοί*, he presents them as “seeds of the Word” (*II Apol.*, nn. 8, 10, 13; PG 6, 380, 457, 460 sgg.); similar conceptions are found in Clement of Alexandria (*Protrept.*, 6, 7; ibid. 8, 173, 184); in Augustine (*De doctrina christ.*, II, 18, 25 sgg.; 40 sgg.; PL 34, 49 sgg., 54 sgg., 63).

Another motive for citing pagan authors is charity, which commands becoming all things to all men, “*omnibus omnis factus sum, ut omnes facerem salvos*” (1 Cor. 9, 19–23), and thus beginning by doing them justice and highlighting points of agreement (Clement of Alexandria, *Strom.*, I, 1, 19; V, 3; PG 8, 705, 805 sgg.; 9, 37; Origen, *Contra Celsum*, VIII, 46; ibid. 11, 1588; St. John Chrysostom, *In epist. ad Timot.*, homilia 3: ibid. 62, 677, etc.).

b) On the other hand, approvals and praises are accompanied, when necessary, by explicit reservations and vigorous refutations. All these apologists, even those who, like Origen, have on this or that point exposed themselves to criticism, declare that the rule they intend to follow is Holy Scripture, and Scripture as understood by the primitive Church (Tertullian, *De praescript.*, chaps. 6, 14, 21; PL 2, 18, 27, 33; Clement of Alexandria, *Strom.*, I, 19; PG 8, 808–13; Origen, *De principiis*, I, nn. 1–4; PG 11, 115–18; *Ep. ad Gregor.*, ibid., 88–92). “As for the philosophers,” writes St. Augustine, “if it happens that they have said something true, in agreement with our faith, especially among the Platonists, there is no cause for alarm, but rather to reclaim those truths from them, as from unjust possessors, and turn them to our use” (*De doctr. christ.*, II, 40; PL 34, 63; St. Jerome, *Ep.*, 119, n. 11: ibid. 22, 978 sgg.; *Ep.*, 62; ibid., 606; *Ep.*, 70: ibid., 664–68; Theodoret, *Graec. affect.*, in *Cat.*, I; PG 83, 821–25, etc.). Moreover, the Church intervened to halt the contagion of Hellenism, *τὰ ἑλληνικὰ νοοῦντες* (St. Basil, *De Spir. Sancto*, 17, 43; PG 32, 148; V. ADOZIANISM; ARIANISM; DOCETISM; GNOSTICISM; ORIGEN AND ORIGENISM; PELAGIUS AND PELAGIANISM).

c) The common aim of the apologists is to exploit points of agreement to lead adversaries to the “true gnosis,” to the “true philosophy,” the only one capable of rigorous demonstration (*μονῷ μετὰ ἀποδεικτικοῦ*; Justin, *I Apol.*, 1, 20; PG 6, 357), an eclecticism, if you will (Clement of Alexandria, *Strom.*, I, 7: ibid. 7, 732), but an eclecticism that can only be realized in the light of faith (Origen, *Contra Celsum*, III, 81: ibid. 11, 1025; Lactantius, *Divin. instit.*, VII, 7; PL 6, 759).

It would nonetheless be extraordinary if these first attempts at theology and religious philosophy had invariably been successful. Indeed, one can, for example, detect in these early writers expressions and explanations that seem to assign the Logos a secondary place in the Trinity (subordinationism; cf. J. Tixeront, *Hist. des dogmes*, 11th ed., Paris 1930, pp. 244–57, 290–403). Yet it remains clear, even if one does not wish to interpret them indulgently, that they intended to defend traditional doctrine, especially the divinity of Christ. It remains true, as Justin (*I Apol.*, n. 60; PG 6, 420) and Irenaeus (*Adv. haer.*, I, 10, 2: ibid., 7, 553) expressed it, that the simple have harshly criticized them. And one should note above all this: none of the oriental gods died to expiate sin, none for love of humanity, none with such moral splendor, none to later prove through his resurrection his equality with the one God, infinite holiness. One may therefore ask whether this recourse to oriental mysteries was not, at least among certain scholars, due to their inability to understand or their reluctance to admit the mystery of Calvary, which appears as folly to the worldly-wise but is in reality the work of transcendent wisdom (1 Cor. 1, 18–25; 2, 12–16, etc.), considering its power to reveal the malice of every revolt against God, the rigor of the punishments it entails, the love of the Creator for his creatures (Rom. 5, 8–11; 8, 32–39), and the fittingness of accepting, as just recompense, the vexations and persecutions to which the most faithful of his servants cannot escape (John 15, 18–21; Rom. 8, 35–39; 1 Pet. 4, 12–19, etc.).

---

b) Catholic scholars, however, agree on this: the Church fixed certain Christian feasts on the same days as pagan festivals to wean its faithful away from them; thus, to the *Ludi Apollinares*, from July 5 to 13, it substituted the feast of the *Colletta* (cf. St. Leo the Great: PL 54, 158–68); to the *Cara cognatio* of February 22 it substituted the feast of the Nativity of Peter’s Chair; and it is said to have chosen December 25 to oppose Christmas to the feast of the *Sol Invictus*. These are matters of fact; in terms of principle, reacting in this way is quite different from capitulating. One might say that the Nazis and the atheistic Russians drew closer to the Christian faith because they replaced their own feasts with those of the Church?

c) But at least would not the cult of the saints be a continuation of the cult of subordinate deities? This is what some pagan polemicists claimed in the early centuries, a great number of Protestants in the 16th century, and many others in our own day with more erudition than critical sense, especially E. Lucius, *Die Anfänge des Heiligenkults*, ed. G. Anrich, Tübingen 1904. In reality, the cult of the saints began with that of the martyrs (v.); the cult of confessors arose later. The glorification of both had the purpose of drawing the faithful to imitate their refusal to participate in the rites and customs of paganism. But this is by no means syncretism, nor caesaropapism. Despite the Church’s protests, excesses, superstitions, and many legends arose; Newman has explained the reason for this.

3. On the exploitation of pagan art, which is a secondary issue, V. ARCHITECTURE, ECCLESIASTICAL; CHURCH, B) The Church as a building. III. Art.

X. THE AGE OF THE BARBARIANS

### a)
The successive invasions of the barbarians threatened to ruin forever the Greco-Roman civilization, already improved by Christianity. The Church had to engage in converting those rough natures. To this end, faithful to the tactic of St. Paul of becoming all things to all men (1 Cor. 9:19–23; cf. St. Thomas, *in h. l.*, *Opere*, Parma ed., XIII, 222–23), it accepted the new political forms and only prohibited usages incompatible with its faith and morality. Characteristic of this approach is the advice given by Gregory the Great to Augustine, the apostle to the English: to change the use of temples rather than destroy them; to forbid sacrifices to false gods, but to tolerate feasts and entertainments customary at certain festivals, *ut dum aliqua exterius gaudia reservantur, ad interiora gaudia consentire facilius velent* (Ep., 76; PL 77, 1215–16; Ep., 64; ibid., 1187; R. Aigrain, in Fliche-Martin-Frutaz, V [1938], cap. 10, § 1, pp. 286–89). The Congregation of Propaganda, recalling a decree of 1659, recently gave similar instructions to missionaries (AAS, 28 [1936], pp. 406–409; cf. 31 [1939], p. 269; J. Schmidlin, *Kath. Missionslehre*, 2nd ed., Münster 1923, pp. 216–38, 352–59, 378–80; P. Charles, *Tactique missionnaire*, in *Nouve. rev. théol.*, 674 [1940], pp. 385–96).

A report presented in 1908 to the Lambeth Conference acknowledged that Christianization had in the past brought with it a certain proportion of syncretism, and that Anglican missionaries had been too inclined to discourage or suppress customs that were not necessarily connected with idolatry or superstition. Therefore, the Mission Committee recalled resolution 19a of the 1897 Conference: to adapt to local circumstances, to encourage people to do things in their own ways, *in their own ways*, even if this was not the best way, *even though it may not be ideally the best way* (Conference of Bishops of the Anglican Communion, London 1908, pp. 114–115; cf. the entire text in H. Pinard de la Boullaye, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 131–32 and bibliography; cf. also *Report of the Commiss. on Christian higher education in India*, London 1931, p. 240; French version in *Etudes*, 215 [1933], p. 476). Confessions of this kind are perhaps, at least in large part, an implicit condemnation of the accusations leveled against pagan-papism? To demonstrate the full injustice of these accusations, it would suffice to recall the decrees of general and regional councils against all survivals of paganism. The mere list is too long to cite here (v. AMULET; DIVINATION; MAGIC; SUPERSTITIONS).

### b)
As regards beliefs and theological speculations, only a few remarks will be made. In the 8th century, Trinitarian, Christological, and Pelagian controversies had largely subsided. Christian schools, far from remaining inactive, applied themselves to justifying and deepening the data of faith. To do so with full success, they would have needed a strictly rational and complete philosophy; yet they had almost nothing but that of St. Augustine, steeped in Neoplatonism. The copyists of the monasteries managed to save precious texts from oblivion, but not the principal works of Plato and Aristotle. Indeed, Aristotle, poorly understood, was ordinarily judged with extreme severity (A.-J. Festugière, *L'idéal religieux des Grecs et l'Evangile*, Paris 1932, Excursus C, pp. 221–63). These philosophers, by the breadth of their inquiry and their profound conceptions, would have stimulated thought; some of their theses, evidently inadmissible, would have compelled a fresh scrutiny of many problems. But the situation was about to change.

XI. THE MIDDLE AGES

The Arabs, in the East—especially al-Fārābī (v.) Avicenna (v.)—and in the West Averroes (v.), and on the other hand the Jews of Spain, AVENCEBROL (v.) and Maimonides (v.), late turned to philosophy. The system to which both groups adhered provoked, especially in Islam and in Western Christendom, one of the gravest crises: Averroism (v.).

From the principles of Aristotle, Averroes deduced the following clear conclusions: no Providence (and hence no Revelation), the eternity of the world, the necessary character of its evolution, the unity of the agent intellect in all humanity; no personal immortality, nor reward, nor punishment in the afterlife. These theses were popularized in Parisian circles by Siger of Brabant (v.) Dacia (v.). A refutation was therefore necessary; to undertake and bring it to a successful conclusion was the work of Albert the Great and above all of Thomas Aquinas (v.). The latter’s philosophy is a corrected and deepened Aristotelianism, hence a system, but in full accord with Scripture and Tradition. His intellectualism, his syllogistic method, his dryness lead some modern minds, for whom faith is sentiment, impulse of the heart, inward experience, to regard it as a distortion of primitive Christianity. But the tone of preaching is one thing, and the tone of pure science another. Philosophical systems and reasons of the same order, upon which conciliar definitions rest, do not constitute one and the same thing with faith: they do not add anything to the “dogmas”; yet they dispose one to accept them and to defend them more effectively. On the other hand, convictions firmly grounded, not sentimental effusions, are the only ones that prepare energies tested in every way.

That, finally, the most reasoned theology does not hinder in any way the mystical impulse is proved by Thomas Aquinas and numerous doctors formed in his school.

**

XII. RENAISSANCE AND “REFORMATION”

### a)
The masterpieces of Greek antiquity revealed to Italy from the 13th century, and more abundantly still after the fall of Constantinople at the hands of the Turks (1453), their diffusion aided by the recent invention of printing, led to the conception of a new ideal of elegance and beauty: Humanism. The enthusiasm was widespread; it was shared by popes and princes of the Church. But quite rapidly many scholars passed from admiration of artistic forms to that of ideas. The allegorizing exegesis, renewed by the Stoics, allowed them to attribute to pagan mythology profound, even sublime speculations. And thus, more or less openly, some pronounced in favor of the ultimate equivalence of religions. Is this perhaps anything other than a return to the solutions of the Hellenistic age?

Erasmus, for example, who was later to recover himself, wrote: “If one wishes to await that peace and concord which are the ideal of our religion, one must, as far as possible, speak little of dogmatic definitions and allow each person, on many points, a free and personal judgment.” He even went so far as to suggest that the ignorant multitude cannot be kept in obedience unless it is deceived by downright falsehoods. Conrad Mutd, a canon of Gotha, declared that “the wisdom of the Father (1 Cor 1, 24) had not been bestowed exclusively upon the Jews, but had shone forth among the Greeks, Italians, and Germans, despite their very different religious customs” (texts cited, along with many others, by J. Janssen, Gesch. des deut. Volks, 13th ed., II, Freiburg im Br. 1886, pp. 1-36; more briefly in H. Pinard de la Boullaye, Etude comparée des relig., 3rd ed., I, Paris 1929, pp. 143-55; cf. Überweg, part 3, 12th ed., §§ 1-22, pp. 1-215, bibl. pp. 621-53; A. Fliche-V. MARTINO G, Hist. de l’Église, XV, Paris 1951, pp. 211-74).

b) The Reformation did not derive from Humanism, but took advantage of its veneration for original texts, its programme for the Middle Ages, the aridity and subtleties of a Scholastic theology that was in fact in decline, as well as the abuses introduced into the Church and the scandals occasioned by part of the clergy. Luther and Calvin claimed to be returning to the “pure Gospel.” To justify the abundance of Christian dogmas—of which they still retained a good number (Trinity, Divinity of Jesus Christ, etc.)—they appealed to the free examination of Scripture, to the “testimony of the Holy Spirit,” as Calvin put it, and presented the Church of Rome as the great prevaricator. J. Gerhard (q.v.) denounced their crimes: “agiolatry, iconolatry, artolatry, angelolatry, stauolatry, skeletolatry, papolatry” (Loci theologici, ed. Preuss, Berlin 1867, De Ecclesia, n. 251, p. 153 ff.). “Between pagan idolatry and the invocation of the saints,” declared M. Chemnitz (q.v.), “there is only a difference of words” (Examen Conc. Trid., Berlin 1861, p. 711). This kind of accusation was within the reach of the most modest talents and served to discredit even those dogmas previously esteemed “essential” or “fundamental.” Every attempt at concord was, moreover, doomed in advance to certain failure, since each dissenter could appeal with equal right to supernatural enlightenment in interpreting Scripture. Hence there followed a progressive reduction of Christian beliefs and, more or less rapidly according to the region, a return to the opinion that all confessions and all religions are equivalent. It is well known how the Roman Church reacted at the Council of Trent, how Cardinal R. Bellarmine in his Controversiae, Father Canisius in his De corruptelis verbi divini, etc.

XIII. FROM THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY TO THE PRESENT DAY

The rapid multiplication of Christian confessions and their common appeal to the free examination of Scripture opened the way to the rise of English deism, German Aufklärung, and French philosophism (q.V. DEISM; ENLIGHTENMENT; RATIONALISM). Since the arbitrariness and disagreement of their conclusions led to the discredit of reason itself, agnosticism (q.v.) appeared in their wake. To salvage at least some religious idea, other groups appealed either to moral conscience and practical reason with Kant (q.v.), or to feeling with J. Fr. Fries, G. de Wette, A. Sabatier, or to the inner experience of consolation with W. James (q.v.), etc. Naturally excluded by the rationalists, the inspiration of Scripture—sacred dogma in the eyes of Luther and Calvin—was equally rejected by liberal Protestants in the name of biblical criticism and the history of religions, both of which were increasingly in favour. E. Troeltsch undertook to explain this with perfect clarity: to rediscover “authentic Christianity,” that is, whatever one wishes to consider as such, it was necessary to strip it of all later accretions; Paul had exercised a manifest influence upon the early Church; it was therefore necessary to separate him from Jesus; it remained to prove that Christ Himself was influenced, in part, by questionable traditions and ideas of His time (Protestant. Christentum und Kirche in der Neuzeit, in Hinneberg, Kultur der Gegenwart, part 1, sect. IV, Berlin-Leipzig 1906, p. 385 ff.). To this task there devoted themselves especially the representatives of the Religionsgeschichtliche Schule (W. Bousset, H. Gunkel, etc.) and those of the Formgeschichtliche Methode (M. Dibelius, P. Wetter, G. Bertram, etc.; q.V. FORM). Their aim was to free Christianity from its “myths” (Entmythologisierung). Particularly representative in this regard are the works of R. Bultmann, Theologie des Neuen Testament, Tübingen 1948-51; Das Urchristentum im Rahmen der antiken Religionen, Zurich 1949. Once the purge was complete, little would remain of the religion of Jesus beyond a more or less lively admiration for certain traits of His character and a few terms derived from the vocabulary of His first companions—magni nominis umbra!—save perhaps what, as religious and moral ideas, was admitted by the philosophers of the Hellenistic age. Some Protestant critics themselves clearly see this and are alarmed: the projected demythologization would lead to a de-Christianization.

Whoever takes note of the variety of opinions within the separated Churches can judge for himself what kind of writing would equally find credence, were suggestions such as these to take hold: “He who loyally, even if mistakenly, employs (the terms of the Bible) as the sacred terminology of Christianity, which could not exclude them even if they had for him a meaning different from that intended by many faithful of past and present times, or even expressed for him something unheard of, something that no one has yet discovered, ... would deserve gratitude for his piety... One may rejoice to see all theologians gathering around the same words” (F. Kattenbusch, Von Schleiermacher zu Ritschl, 3rd ed. revised, Giessen 1903, p. 27). For his part, Pastor M. Boegner declared: “The first condition of all fruitful ecumenism lies in the rejection of every equivocation, in a fidelity to revealed truth such that each Christian, meeting Christians of other confessions, believes that his own Church has received the deposit of that truth” (cf. Foi et vie, 49 [1951], p. 12).

To what depths would the West not descend if it allowed itself to be seduced by the propaganda of neo-Hinduism (B. Allo, Plaies d’Europe et baumes du Gange, Juvisy 1931; P. Fallon, Spiritualité neo-hinduiste, in Vie spirituelle, suppl. of Nov. 1947, pp. 362-67).

As for the Roman Church, it is well known with what firmness it has never ceased to condemn, from the early years of the 19th century to the present day, the excesses of rationalism (Denz-U, nn. 1655-56, 1701-14, 1798-1800; A. Günther, G. Hermes); religious indifferentism (ibid., nn. 1613-1614, 1617, 1646-48, 1715-18; q.V. SYLLABUS; VATICAN COUNCIL); the intemperance of biblical criticism (ibid., nn. 1788, 1942-45; q.V. DIVINO AFFLANTE SPIRITU; PROVIDENTISSIMUS DEUS); the transposition of Christian dogmas (ibid., nn. 201-65, 2071-2109; q.V. LAMENTAZIONI; MODERNISM; PASCENDI) and all theses at variance with Tradition (q.V. HUMANI GENERIS).

XIV. CONCLUSIONS

Given the limits set for this entry, it has not been possible to discuss in detail, as most of the works cited do, the similarities of expression or thought used by so many scholars to explain, through the concept of salvation, the evolution of religions—especially the entirely human origin of the religion they prefer and the illusion of Judaism and Christianity, which claim a supernatural origin. Instead, we have merely recalled principles of criticism and historical facts that are too often forgotten.

In essence, salvation is a universal phenomenon; yet while the fusion of races and peoples has brought evident progress in the material order, it has most often led pagan religions to an ever less strict morality, to a polytheism more or less hierarchized or to a pantheism that tolerates the cults of subordinate deities. Never, however, has it led to a strict and exclusive monotheism. Only a good number of so-called “backward” or “primitive” peoples have thus far maintained their faith in a Supreme Being, distinct by His very nature from all spirits, demons, or gods, as the creator and lawgiver of the moral order. Even the Jews and Muslims profess this fundamental dogma. Among the Christian Churches, only that of Rome has, for twenty centuries, held as an absolute and irreformable rule—concerning everything related to dogma and morality in the original sense of these texts—the Old and New Testaments and the decrees of all ecumenical councils.

Undoubtedly, Catholicism owes much, in the fields of historical and exegetical sciences, to many scholars of other confessions; every truly critical work ultimately redounds to its advantage. It also owes much, one might say, to most of the movements of ideas that have arisen outside it and often against II. “The necessity of defending doctrines that are fiercely attacked,” explained St. Augustine, “leads to more careful study, to clearer ideas, and to more insistent preaching: the debate raised becomes an occasion for progress” (*De civitate Dei*, XVI, 2: PL 41, 477; cf. St. Thomas, *In I Cor.* 11, 19 [Opera, Parma ed., XIII, 240a]). Probably for this reason, and to prevent the most dangerous stagnation, Providence has left some obscurities in Revelation and permitted heresies, *ut vel sic excutiamus pigritiam et divinas Scripturas nosse cupiamus* (St. Augustine, *De Gen. contra Manichaeos*, I, 1, 2: PL 34, 373); the struggle for life is never without benefit.

For living beings, progress is possible only if they maintain their specific type and refrain, in particular, from harmful nourishment. In accordance with the Apostle’s warning—“Test everything; hold fast to what is good” (1 Thess. 5:21)—the Catholic Church has made a selection. It has been guided by external norms: Scripture and Tradition, and by its vital principle, which is the Holy Spirit. Those Churches that claim this assistance of the Spirit for each individual (in a diminished form: for each group) may then deny it precisely to the hierarchical Church, “the Rock upon which it is founded” (Matt. 16:18–19; Luke 22:32; John 21:15–17).

Healthy nourishment, taken daily, is not, properly speaking, added to the organism but transformed by II. From the earliest times to the painful hours of the great schisms and even afterward, the Church has transformed what it accepted from profane speculations. Its power of assimilation is far from exhausted; the expansion of its potentialities is not fully hindered. Therefore, while recalling—with Vincent of Lérins (q.v.) in the 5th century (*Commonitorium*, no. 22: PL 50, 668)—the essential principle of true progress, *in eodem scilicet dogmate, eodem sensu eademque sententia* (Council of Trent, Denz.-U., no. 1800), it takes care, when it must condemn errors or restrain imprudence, to encourage further research by its children. Its docility to the suggestions of the Holy Spirit—so judiciously expounded in particular by J. A. Möehler (q.v.) (*Die Einheit der Kirche*, Tübingen 1825) and by J. H. Newman (*An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine*, London 1845)—has enabled it to preserve, from the most disparate philosophies, whatever was worthy of preservation. Under these same conditions, however ardent and painful the attacks and crises may be, it has the assurance of working *usque ad consummationem saeculi* (Matt. 28:20; 6:18) toward the progress and salvation of humanity (q.V. DOGMA, II). Enrico Pinard de la Boullaye