HERMES, GEORG. - Semi-rationalist philosopher and theologian, b. at Dreyerwalde near Münster on 22 Apr. 1775, d. at Bonn on 26 May 1831. After completing his early studies with the Franciscans at Rheine, he attended the Gymnasium at Münster (1792-94), where he became passionately devoted to the philosophy of Kant and Fichte. At that time, serious doubts arose in his mind regarding the truth of Catholicism, which he sought to overcome with all the energy of his rich intellect. After completing his theological studies at the Academy of Münster and being ordained a priest (1799), he began his teaching career by instructing in philosophy at the Collegio Paulinum in Münster, from which he moved in 1807 to the University as professor of dogmatic theology. In 1820 he was promoted to a full professorship in dogmatics at the University of Bonn, where he remained until his death, idolized by his numerous students. A man of upright life and sincerely desirous of attaining the truth, he sought to neutralize the influence of Kant by overcoming its a priori assumptions, with the intention of establishing a solid scientific foundation for Catholicism. Yet, entangled in the very principles he sought to combat, he fell into grave philosophical and theological errors.
According to H., only the intellect (*Verstand*) cannot attain true certainty regarding the objective reality of things; however, speculative reason (*Vernunft*), by virtue of its innate power of synthesis, adds to any object conceived by the intellect a ground for considering it real, even if it is not: reason in fact necessarily postulates that a ground must correspond to the object conceived. Thus, by virtue of this synthetic judgment, a person holds as real and true an object conceived that in itself might not be so. Practical reason, moreover, having as its supreme principle: “show and preserve in yourself and others human dignity,” indicates what must be admitted as true within the sphere of human action, thereby becoming the supreme source and rule of morality. Since practical reason is autonomous and independent of speculative reason, it can happen that something held to be true by speculative reason is not admitted as such by practical reason. Thus, one arrives at an absolute dual subjectivism: theoretical and practical. Never attaining certainty that what is thought and willed corresponds to an ontological reality, a person can at any moment of life consider himself mistaken: this is the real, positive, and continuous doubt that H. transferred to the supernatural plane, admitting the necessity of suspending assent to the faith in Revelation until all doubts are dispelled, in whose grip anyone who seeks to understand his faith will inevitably be held. Unlike Günther (v.), who carried “into the temple the greedy sails” of reason, H. intended to reach only the threshold, rationalizing all its approaches, with the absolute exclusion, in the act of faith, of the influence of grace and the authority of the revealing God. In a certain sense, if Günther was a rationalist *post fidem* (claiming to bend all revealed mysteries to his will), H. was a rationalist *ante fidem*, considering adherence to revealed truths as the fruit of a purely rational process. It is not to be excluded, however, that H. himself, had his life not been cut short by excessive labor, would have sought a rational explanation of the content of individual dogmas (cf. the article by A. Thouvenin, V. BIBLICA.). His works might have revealed an attempt already underway.
H. developed his ideas in numerous works: *Untersuchung über die Wahrheit des Christenthums* (Münster 1805); *Studierplan der Theologie* (ibid. 1819); *Einleitung in die christkatholische Theologie* (ibid. 1919, 2nd ed. 1831); *Positive Einleitung* (ibid. 1929); *Christkatholische Dogmatik* (ibid. 1834-35; 3 posthumous vols., ed. by J. H. Achterfeld). Through these writings, the Hermesian error spread widely in Germany (about 30 chairs were held by his devoted disciples), especially in the dioceses of Münster, Breslau, and Cologne, in whose territory Bonn is situated. A very compact school formed, led by W. Braun, P. Elvenich (v.), and J. H. Achterfeld. At first, despite protests from Cardinal von Spiegel, Archbishop of Cologne, the school remained undisturbed; but after the deaths of H. and Spiegel (1834), a strong opposing current emerged (Klee, Berlage), which led to violent doctrinal conflicts, soon brought to the attention of the Apostolic See. Gregory XVI, after a long and diligent examination of H.’s works conducted by Fr. Perrone and Cardinal Reisch, then Prefect of Studies at Propaganda Fide, on 26 Sept. 1835 issued the brief *Dum acerbissimas*, in which he condemned the *Einleitung* and the volume of the *Dogmatik* because “they taught positive doubt as the basis of all theological inquiry” and because they established the principle “that reason is the only means by which man can arrive at the knowledge of supernatural truths” (Denz.-U., 1618-21). In January 1836, the Sacred Congregation of the Index also prohibited the other two volumes of the *Dogmatik*. A new struggle flared up for and against the papal brief. In Italy, the Jesuit G. Perrone (v.) distinguished himself as an opponent of H. The matter did not escape H.’s disciples, who responded to it several times: *Dr. Bernhardt* (pseudonym of J. W. J. Braun), *Lekoon oder H. und Perrone* (Cologne 1840, translated into Latin by Braun, Bonn 1848); P. Elvenich, *Der Hermesianismus und Johannes Perrone* (Breslau 1844). There were also writings against Rome’s decisions: W. Braun–P. Elvenich, *Acta Hermesiana* (Göttingen 1836). BAUTZEN (v.) also wrote theological letters in defense of H. against the papal condemnation. The encyclical *Qui pluribus* (9 Nov. 1846), with which Pius IX outlined the relationship between reason and faith (in Denz.-U., 1634-39), seemed to the Hermesians a retraction of Gregory XVI’s condemnation. The Pope, informed by Cardinal Geissel, immediately made it known that he fully confirmed his predecessor’s sentence. After the events of 1848, Hermesianism was completely crushed, also because attention was then directed toward the new system created by Günther, to which some of H.’s disciples, e.g., Baltzer, adhered. In 1860, Achterfeld and Braun submitted.