HERMES, GEORG. — Semi-rationalist philosopher and theologian, born at Dreyervalde, near Münster, on 22 April 1775, died at Bonn on 26 May 1831. Having completed his initial studies with the Franciscans of Rheine, he attended the Gymnasium of Münster (1792–94), where he became passionate about the philosophy of Kant and Fichte. Serious doubts then arose in his mind concerning the truth of Catholicism, and he devoted all the energies of his rich intellect to overcoming them. Having completed his theological studies at the Academy of Münster and been ordained a priest (1799), he began his teaching career by teaching philosophy at the Paulinum College of Münster, from which he moved, in 1807, to the University as professor of dogmatic theology. In 1820 he was promoted to ordinary professor of dogmatics at the University of Bonn, where he remained until his death, idolized by his numerous pupils. A man of upright life and sincerely desirous of attaining the truth, he wished to neutralize the influence of Kant by overcoming his apriorism, with the aim of creating a solid scientific foundation for Catholicism. But, entangled in the very principles he intended to combat, he fell into serious philosophical and theological errors.
The intellect alone (Verstand), H. teaches, cannot attain true certainty concerning the objective reality of things; however, speculative reason (Vernunft), by virtue of its innate power of synthesis, adds to any object thought by the intellect a foundation that is to be regarded as real, even if it is not: reason necessarily postulates, in fact, that a foundation be given to the object thought. Man therefore regards as real and true, by virtue of this synthetic judgment, an object that has been thought, although in itself it might not exist. Practical reason, moreover, having as its supreme principle: “show and preserve in yourself and in others human dignity,” indicates what must be accepted as true within the sphere of human action, thus becoming the source and supreme rule of morality. Since practical reason is also autonomous and independent of speculative reason, it may happen that something held to be true by speculative reason is not admitted as such by practical reason. Thus one arrives at a twofold absolute subjectivism: theoretical and practical. Never attaining certainty that what is thought and willed corresponds to an ontological reality, man may at any moment of his life believe himself to be in error: this is the real, political, and continuous doubt, which H. transferred to the supernatural plane, admitting the necessity of suspending the assent of faith to Revelation until all doubts have been dispelled, in whose grip anyone who wishes to account for his faith will inevitably be caught. Günther (v.), who brought “the covetous sails” of reason “into the temple,” H. intended to reach only its thresholds, rationalizing all its entrances, with the absolute exclusion, in the act of faith, of the influence of Grace and of the authority of the revealing God. In a certain sense, if Günther was a rationalist post fidem (he claimed to explain all revealed mysteries), H. was a rationalist ante fidem, considering adherence to revealed truths as the fruit of a purely rational process. It cannot, however, be ruled out that H. too, had life not been cut short by excessive work, was tending toward a rational explanation of the content of the individual dogmas (cf. in this regard the article by A. Thouvenin, V. BIBLICA.). The posthumous works reveal that the attempt was already under way.
H. developed his ideas in numerous works: Untersuchung über die Wahrheit des Christentums (Münster 1805); Studierplan der Theologie (ibid. 1819); Einleitung in die christethanische Theologie (ibid. 1919, 2nd ed. 1831); Positive Einleitung (ibid. 1920); Christethanische Dogmatik (ibid. 1834–35; 3 posthumous volumes, edited by J. H. Achterfeld). Through these writings, the Hermesian error spread widely in Germany (there were approximately 30 chairs held by his devoted disciples), especially in the dioceses of Münster, Breslau, and Cologne, within whose territory Bonn is situated. A genuine and well-organized school had been formed, headed by W. Braun, P. Elvenich (v.), and J. H. Achterfeld. At first, protected by Cardinal von Spiegel, archbishop of Cologne, the school remained undisturbed; then, after the deaths of H. and Spiegel (1834), a strong opposing movement emerged (Klee, Berlage), which led to violent doctrinal conflicts, of which the Apostolic See was soon informed. Gregory XVI, after a lengthy and diligent examination of H.’s works, conducted by Fr. Perrone and Cardinal Reisach, then prefect of studies at Propaganda Fide, published on 26 September 1835 the brief Dum acerbissimus, in which he condemned the Einleitung and volume I of the Dogmatik, because “positive doubt was taught therein as the basis of all theological inquiry,” and because they established the principle “that reason is the sole means by which man can arrive at knowledge of supernatural truths” (Denz-U, 1618–21). In January 1836 the Sacred Congregation of the Index also prohibited the other two volumes of the Dogmatik. A new struggle broke out for and against the papal brief. In Italy, the Jesuit G. Perrone (v.) distinguished himself as H.’s opponent. This did not escape H.’s disciples, who replied to him several times: Dr. Bernhardt (pseudonym of J. W. J. Braun), Lakson oder H. und Perrone (Cologne 1840, translated into Latin by Braun, Bonn 1848); P. Elvenich, Der Hermesianismus und Johannes Perrone (Breslau 1844). Writings against the decisions of Rome were also published: W. Braun–P. Elvenich,
Acta Hermesiana (Göttingen 1836). BAUTZEN (v.) too wrote theological letters in defense of H., against the papal condemnation. The encyclical Qui pluribus (9 November 1846), with which Pius IX outlined the relationship between reason and faith (in Denz-U, 1634–39), seemed to the Hermesians a retraction of Gregory XVI’s condemnation. The Pope, having been alerted by Cardinal Gessel, immediately made it known that he fully confirmed the judgment of his predecessor. After the events of 1848, Hermesianism was completely weakened, also because attention was then directed toward the new system created by Günther, to which some of H.’s disciples, such as Baltzer, adhered. In 1860 Achterfeld and Braun submitted.