HERMES, GEORG. - Semi-rationalist philosopher and theologian, b. at Dreyervalde, near Münster, on 22 April 1775, d. at Bonn on 26 May 1831. After completing his early studies with the Franciscans of Rheine, he moved to the Gymnasium of Münster (1792-94), where he became passionately devoted to the philosophy of Kant and Fichte. Grave doubts about the truth of Catholicism then arose in his mind, and he devoted all the energies of his rich intellect to overcoming them. Having completed his theological studies at the Academy of Münster and been ordained a priest (1799), he began his teaching career by teaching philosophy at the Paulinum College in Münster, from where he moved, in 1807, to the University as professor of dogmatic theology. In 1820 he was promoted to ordinary professor of dogmatics at the University of Bonn, where he remained until his death, idolized by his numerous students. A man of upright life and sincerely desirous of attaining the truth, he sought to neutralize the influence of Kant by overcoming his apriorism, with the aim of creating a solid scientific foundation for Catholicism. But entangled in the very principles he intended to combat, he fell into grave philosophical and theological errors.
The intellect alone (Verstand), H. teaches, cannot attain a true certainty of the objective reality of things; however, speculative reason (Vernunft), by its innate power of synthesis, adds to any object thought by the intellect a foundation, to be regarded as real, even if it is not: for reason necessarily postulates that a foundation be given to the object thought. Man therefore holds as real and true, by virtue of this synthetic judgment, an object thought, which in itself might not exist. Practical reason, moreover, having as its supreme principle: "show and preserve in yourself and in others human dignity," indicates what must be admitted as true, within the sphere of human action, thus becoming the source and supreme rule of morality. Since practical reason is furthermore autonomous and independent of speculative reason, it can happen that a thing held as true by speculative reason is not admitted as such by practical reason. Thus one arrives at a twofold absolute subjectivism: theoretical and practical. Since certainty is never attained that what is thought and willed corresponds to an ontological reality, man at any moment of his life may believe himself to be in error: this is the real, positive and continuous doubt, which H. transported to the supernatural plane, admitting the necessity of suspending the assent of faith to Revelation until all doubts are dispelled, in whose grip will be inevitably caught anyone who wishes to give an account of his faith. Unlike Günther (v.), who brought "into the temple the greedy sails" of reason, H. intended to arrive only at the threshold, rationalizing all its approaches, with the absolute exclusion, in the act of faith, of the influence of Grace and of the authority of God revealing. In a certain sense, if Günther was a rationalist post fidem (he claimed to explain all the revealed mysteries), H. was a rationalist ante fidem, considering adherence to revealed truths as the fruit of a purely rational process. It is not to be excluded, however, that H. too tended, had his life not been cut short by excessive work, toward a rational explanation of the content of individual dogmas (cf. on this point the article by A. Thouvenin, see bibl.). The posthumous works reveal the attempt already underway.
H. developed his ideas in numerous works: Untersuchung über die Wahrheit des Christentums (Münster 1805); Studierplan der Theologie (ibid. 1819); Einleitung in die christethanische Theologie (ibid. 1919, 2nd ed. 1831); Positive Einleitung (ibid. 1920); Christethanische Dogmatik (ibid. 1834-35; 3 vols. posthumous, edited by J. H. Achterfeld). Through these writings the Hermesian error spread widely in Germany (there were about 30 chairs held by his devoted disciples), especially in the dioceses of Münster, Breslau and Cologne, within whose territory Bonn is situated. A veritable school had formed, well compact, led by W. Braun, P. Elvenich (v.) and J. H. Achterfeld. At first, protected by Card. von Spiegel, archbishop of Cologne, the school remained undisturbed; then, after the deaths of H. and Spiegel (1834), a strong opposing current emerged (Klee, Berlage), which led to violent doctrinal conflicts, of which the Apostolic See was soon informed. Gregory XVI, after a long and diligent examination of H.'s works, carried out by Fr. Perrone and Card. Reisach, then prefect of studies at Propaganda Fide, on 26 Sept. 1835 published the brief Duns acerbissimus, in which he condemned the Einleitung and the first vol. of the Dogmatik because "positive doubt was taught therein as the basis of all theological research" and because the principle was established therein "that reason is the only means by which man can arrive at the knowledge of supernatural truths" (Denz-U, 1618-21). In Jan. 1836 the S. Congregation of the Index also prohibited the other two volumes of the Dogmatik. A new struggle flared up for and against the pontifical brief. In Italy the Jesuit G. Perrone (v.) distinguished himself as an opponent of H. The matter did not escape H.'s disciples, who several times replied to him: Dr. Bernhardt (pseudonym of J. W. J. Braun), Lakson oder H. und Perrone (Cologne 1840, translated into Latin by Braun, Bonn 1848); P. Elvenich, Der Hermesianismus und Johannes Perrone (Breslau 1844). There was no lack of writings against the decisions of Rome: W. Braun-P. Elvenich,
Acta Hermesiana (Göttingen 1836). Baltzer (v.) also wrote theological letters in defense of H., against the papal condemnation. The encyclical Qui pluribus (9 Nov. 1846), with which Pius IX outlined the relations between reason and faith (in Denz-U, 1634-39), seemed to the Hermesians a retraction of the condemnation of Gregory XVI. The Pope, warned by Card. Gessel, immediately made known that he fully confirmed the sentence of his predecessor. After the events of 1848 Hermesianism was fully broken, also because by then attention was turned toward the new system created by Günther, to which some of H.'s disciples, for example Baltzer, adhered. In 1860 Achterfeld and Braun submitted.