INDIFFERENTISM. - Etymologically it means making no account between a thing and its contrary, not determining oneself for either one side or the other. But here it is considered in a special way in the theological field, under the religious aspect, and it is the psychological attitude of one who places no difference among various alternatives concerning religion.
I. NOTIONS
Religious i. is distinguished first of all into practical and theoretical or speculative. Practical i. is that of one who knows the truth of religion, but does not observe its duties; it is the attitude of one who has the faith and appreciates spiritual values, but orients his life solely toward material well-being, as if faith and spiritual values did not exist. There is in this i. the belief in the divinity of Catholicism, but between this belief and the practical conduct of life there exists a deplorable contradiction, which can be explained, but not justified, by the seduction of pleasure, by the tumult of business, by thoughtlessness, by human respect and by other causes. Everyone easily understands how illogical, incoherent and impious this form of i. is. Theoretical or speculative i. designates, in general, both the opinion of one who considers it indifferent to have or not to have a religion, and the opinion of one who considers it necessary to have a religion, but thinks it indifferent to practice this one or that one. Leo XIII in the encyclical
Libertas (June 20, 1888) defined it briefly and clearly as "the doctrinal system which teaches that everyone is free to profess the religion he pleases and even to profess none." There are therefore, as the definition shows, two kinds of indifferentism: speculative, the absolute and the relative.
II. THE ABSOLUTE
It denies the necessity of any religion, not only positive but also natural, and therefore claims that it is a matter of indifference whether one has a religion or not.
It is the error of those who, while admitting the existence of God, arrogate to themselves the right to render Him no homage. God does not care about the world and about men, affirm the supporters of this system, and has no need of their homage. Religion is therefore a thing indifferent and useless; it is rather a flower that blossoms from the fervid and exuberant imagination of man than a solid and seasoned fruit of human reason. Although religion was once necessary for man and even today is for some, the more sentimental, a useful element and a stimulus in life, nevertheless in itself it is opposed to scientific progress. It can only serve when, guided by science, it presents itself as a symbolic conception of the Absolute, whose existence it is impossible to demonstrate; it also serves as a luxury and an ornament for certain souls inclined to mysticism.
Absolute i. is practically irreligious and easily drives one to struggle against religion. Hence its followers often take the names of atheists, unbelievers, irreligious people, freethinkers. Its falsity is a direct corollary of the necessity and the obligation of religion for man (v.). For once the existence of God is admitted, it follows with all clarity that it is a monstrous thing to refuse all gratitude to His immense goodness, all homage to His infinite majesty, all glorification and all love to His supreme lovableness, all the more so since, God being the eternal, infinite Being, the principle of man, He is necessarily also his supreme end and his only beatitude. Absolute i. finds its condemnation in the 3rd proposition of the Syllabus of Pius IX (Denz-U, 1703).
III. THE RELATIVE
Also called "latitudinarianism," it acknowledges the necessity of religion and God's right to be honored, but maintains that all religions are good, because they are all different phases of a progressive movement of spiritualization within humanity, and that they all honor God equally and can make man happy here below and procure for him eternal salvation.
Each individual therefore has full freedom to follow any religion, the religion of his country and his ancestors, the religion that is most in keeping with his tastes. God welcomes homage from whatever source it comes. The essential thing is to honor God, to benefit one's neighbor and to practice morality. This system is not indifferent with regard to religion, but it is indifferent with regard to the different forms of religion, and is therefore called relative.
In the manner of interpreting this system, a certain gradation should be noted, which gives rise to a threefold category of adherents to it.
1. Those who acknowledge only natural religion (Jules Simon) and exclude every positive religion. They are not, however, in agreement in establishing the essential duties of natural religion, whether, for example, the usefulness of prayer and the practice of external worship should be admitted.
2. Those who acknowledge positive religions, but among them, for example, among Christianity, Islam and Buddhism, affirm that it is lawful for each person to choose the one that best corresponds to his aspirations. They then attempt in various ways to justify this assertion. The Modernists in fact maintain, more or less openly, that every religion is true on the basis of religious sentiment, in which they place religion, and which is substantially identical and common in all religions. Others, on the other hand, rely on the supposition that truth is relative and therefore changeable, and consequently conclude that every religion is good, because it corresponds to the state of a particular epoch and to the conditions of a particular people. Others finally concede that religions, considered objectively, are not all equally true and that a false religion must not be assimilated to the true religion and does not merit the same adherence and the same esteem; but they think that practically their authority is equal, because no one can distinguish with certainty the truth of one and the falsity of the other.
3. Those who follow "Christian i." Only Christianity, they say, is the true and necessary religion. But, since several Christian Churches exist, each person will be free to belong to the one he prefers and considers best. The Catholic Church therefore has the same value as the other Churches, and it is not at all necessary to belong to it in order to obtain eternal salvation. The idea of the union of all Christian Churches around the substantial points of the doctrines taught by Jesus Christ is therefore cherished and promoted, especially by the Church established in England.
Relative i. is untenable in any of its ramifications, from whatever point of view. God has manifested to man a religion, with the obligation for man to receive it and to practice it through determined acts of worship. Man is therefore no longer free to refuse this religion that has come from God, in order to have the satisfaction of inventing another according to his whim, and of honoring him with other homage. Jesus Christ founded one Church, with unity of doctrine and of constitution, an infallible Church, which cannot compromise on a single point of its divine teaching, nor admit any doctrinal compromise, and to which it is necessary to belong in order to be saved (v. CHIESA). Man is therefore not permitted the choice of other Churches, in which there are very grave doctrinal disagreements in contrast with Catholic truth. Since every compromise between truth and error, between good and evil, is impossible, and since integral religious truth is found only in the Catholic Church, any form of relative i. must be reproved by every logical mind and every upright heart.
The Church's judgment concerning relative i. is expressed in several pontifical documents. Pius IX condemned it in the encyclical Qui pluribus (Nov. 9, 1846: Denz-U, nn. 1634-1635); in the encyclical Singulari quidem (March 17, 1856: ibid., n. 1646). Similarly, the following propositions are found condemned in the Syllabus: "Everyone is free to embrace and profess that religion which, guided by the light of reason, he shall have judged to be true" (prop. 15); "Men, in the exercise of any religion whatsoever, can find the way of eternal salvation and obtain eternal life" (prop. 16); "Protestantism is nothing other than a different form of the same Christian religion, in which, just as in the Catholic Church, one can please God" (prop. 18; cf. ibid., nn. 1715-18).
IV. INDIFFERENTISM OF THE STATE
It is worth mentioning also the form of social-political indifferentism, which, leaving the religious question to the individual conscience, affirms the full right of the State to take no account of any religion and its duty to grant full freedom and equality of treatment to every kind of worship (v. LAICISM).
This doctrine easily leads to State atheism, with very grave consequences for the Catholic Church and for peoples. State indifferentism will be treated explicitly in connection with the relations between Church and State (v.) and modern liberties (v. LIBERTY). Let it only be recalled that social worship is owed to God, both because God is the author and benefactor of civil society and of public authority as of each man, and because society derives the greatest advantages from rendering to God the homage due to him.