Indifferentism

INDIFFERENTISM. — Etymologically, it means making no distinction between one thing and its opposite, deciding neither for one side nor the other. Here, however, it is considered especially in the theological field, under the religious aspect, and is the psychological attitude of one who makes no distinction among different alternatives concerning religion.

SUMMARY:

I. Notions

II. Absolute I

III. Relative I

IV. I. of the State.

I. NOTIONS

Religious i. is distinguished first of all as practical and theoretical or speculative. Practical i. is that of one who knows the truth of religion but does not observe its duties; it is the attitude of one who has faith and appreciates spiritual values, but directs his life solely toward material well-being, as though faith and spiritual values did not exist. In this i. there is belief in the divinity of Catholicism, but between this belief and the practical conduct of life there exists a deplorable contradiction, which may be explained, though not justified, by the allurements of pleasure, the turmoil of affairs, thoughtlessness, human respect, and other causes. Everyone can easily understand how illogical, incoherent, and impious this form of i. is. Theoretical or speculative i. designates, in general, both the opinion of one who considers it indifferent whether or not one has a religion and the opinion of one who considers it necessary to have a religion but thinks it indifferent whether one practices this or that religion. Leo XIII, in the encyclical

In Libertas (20 June 1888), he defined it briefly and clearly as “the doctrinal system that teaches that each person is free to profess the religion he likes and even to profess none at all.” Thus, as follows from the definition, there are two kinds of speculative i.: absolute and relative.

II. ABSOLUTE I

It denies the necessity of any religion, not only positive but also natural, and therefore maintains that it is indifferent whether one has a religion or not.

It is the error of those who, while admitting the existence of God, arrogate to themselves the right to pay Him no homage. God does not concern Himself with the world and with human beings, assert the proponents of this system, and has no need of their homage. Religion is therefore an indifferent and useless thing; it is rather a flower blossoming from the fervent and exuberant imagination of man than a solid and ripened fruit of human reason. Although religion was once necessary for man and is still today, for some more sentimental people, a useful element and a stimulus in life, nevertheless in itself it is opposed to scientific progress. It can serve only when, guided by science, it presents itself as a symbolic conception of the Absolute, whose existence it is impossible to demonstrate; it also serves as a luxury and an ornament for certain souls inclined to mysticism.

Absolute i. is irreligious in practice and readily incites opposition to religion. Its adherents therefore often take the names of atheists, unbelievers, irreligious persons, and freethinkers. Its falsity is a direct corollary of the necessity and obligation of religion for man (v.). Once the existence of God is admitted, it follows with complete clarity that it is monstrous to refuse every expression of gratitude for His immense goodness, every homage to His infinite majesty, every glorification of and love for His supreme lovableness; all the more so because, since God is the eternal and infinite Being, the principle of man, He is necessarily also his supreme end and his sole beatitude. Absolute i. finds its condemnation in the 3rd proposition of Pius IX’s Sillabo (Denz-U, 1703).

III. RELATIVE I

Also called “latitudinarianism,” it recognizes the necessity of religion and God’s right to be honored, but maintains that all religions are good, because they are all different phases of a progressive movement of spiritualization within humanity, and that all honor God equally and can make man happy here below and procure eternal salvation for him.

Each individual therefore has complete freedom to follow any religion whatsoever: the religion of his country and ancestors, or the religion most in keeping with his inclinations. God is pleased by homage wherever it comes from. The essential thing is to honor God, benefit one’s neighbor, and practice morality. This system is not indifferent with regard to religion, but is indifferent with regard to the different forms of religion, and is therefore called relative.

In interpreting this system, it is useful to note a certain gradation, which gives rise to a threefold category of its adherents.

1. Those who recognize only natural religion (Jules Simon) and exclude every positive religion. They do not, however, agree on establishing the essential duties of natural religion, as, for example, whether the usefulness of prayer and the practice of external worship should be admitted.

2. Those who recognize positive religions but maintain that, among them—for example, Christianity, Islam, and Buddhism—each person is permitted to choose whichever best corresponds to his aspirations. They then attempt in various ways to justify this assertion. The modernists, in fact, maintain, more or less openly, that every religion is true on the basis of religious sentiment, in which they place religion, and which is substantially identical and common to all religions. Others, on the other hand, rely on the supposition that truth is relative and therefore changeable, and consequently conclude that every religion is good because it corresponds to the state of a particular age and to the conditions of a particular people. Finally, others concede that religions, considered objectively, are not all equally true, that a false religion must not be assimilated to the true religion, and that it does not merit the same adherence and esteem; but they think that practically their authority is equal, because no one can distinguish with certainty the truth of one from the falsity of the other.

3. Those who follow “Christian I.” They say that Christianity alone is the true and necessary religion. But, since there are several Christian Churches, each person may freely belong to whichever he prefers and considers best. The Catholic Church therefore has the same value as the other Churches, and it is by no means necessary to belong to it in order to obtain eternal salvation. Thus, especially by the Church established in England, the idea is cherished and promoted of the union of all the Christian Churches around the essential points of the doctrines taught by Jesus Christ.

Relative I. is untenable in any of its branches, from whatever point of view it is considered. God has manifested a religion to man, with the obligation for man to receive it and practice it through specific acts of worship. Man is therefore no longer free to reject this religion that has come from God in order to satisfy himself by inventing another according to his whim and honoring Him with other acts of homage. Jesus Christ founded a Church, with unity of doctrine and constitution, an infallible Church, which cannot compromise on a single point of its divine teaching or admit any doctrinal compromise, and to which it is necessary to belong in order to be saved (v. CHIESA). Man is therefore not permitted to choose other Churches, in which there are extremely serious doctrinal disagreements contrary to Catholic truth. Since every compromise between truth and error, between good and evil, is impossible, and since integral religious truth is found only in the Catholic Church, every form of relative I. must be rejected by every logical mind and every upright heart.

The Church’s judgment concerning relative I. is expressed in several pontifical documents. Pius IX condemned it in the encyclical Qui pluribus (9 November 1846: Denz-U, nos. 1634–1635); and in the encyclical Singulari quidem (17 March 1856: ibid., no. 1646). Likewise, the following propositions are condemned in the Sillabo: “Everyone is free to embrace and profess that religion which, guided by the light of reason, he shall have judged to be true” (prop. 15); “Men, in the practice of any religion whatsoever, can find the way of eternal salvation and attain eternal life” (prop. 16); “Protestantism is nothing other than a different form of the same Christian religion, in which one can please God just as in the Catholic Church” (prop. 18; cf. ibid., nos. 1715–18).
IV.

I. OF THE STATE

It is also worth mentioning the form of socio-political i., which, leaving the religious question to the individual conscience, affirms the State’s full right to take no account of any religion and its duty to grant full freedom and equality of treatment to every kind of worship (v. LAICISMO).

This doctrine easily leads to State atheism, with extremely serious consequences for the Catholic Church and for peoples. State i. will be treated explicitly in connection relations between Church and State (v.) and modern liberties (v. LIBERTÀ). It need only be recalled that social worship is owed to God, both because God is the author and benefactor of civil society and public authority, as of every human being, and because society derives the greatest advantages from rendering God His due homage.