ISLAM. – Religion founded by Muḥammad (q.v.) in Arabia in the 7th century A.D. The name: the meanings in Arabic are “submission” to God. From it derives Islamism, while from the participle muslim “he who professes it,” there derives, through the Persian plural muslimān and the Turkish müslimān, musulmano (“Muslim”).
The spread of Muḥammad’s religion followed upon the military expansion of the state he founded. Islam is therefore a phenomenon not only religious, but also political and juridical. It regulates under the divine law every aspect of the believer’s life, unlike Christianity, which makes a distinction between spiritual power and temporal power. Moreover, the political events that led Islam to great expansion beyond the borders of Arabia gave it a supranational character that distinguishes it historically from Judaism.
As a religion, Islam appears as an adaptation to the Arab people of Jewish and Christian monotheism. An adaptation with partial alterations, both in the ways through which the monotheistic heritage reached Muḥammad, and in the contact with pre-Islamic Arab cults.
ISLAM – Birth of Muḥammad. Miniature from the Arabic ms. Gāmi' at-Tawārīkh – Edinburgh, University Library.
(q.V. ARABIA). In its development, moreover, there intervened, albeit to a limited extent, non-Arab religious and cultural elements, assimilated through conquest.
In its history, the religion of Islam presents an elaborative phase lasting about three centuries, giving rise subsequently to a progressive crystallization of theory. The elaboration proceeds in three parallel directions: legal theology (fiqh), dogmatic theology (kalām), and spiritual theology (taṣawwuf). The ample, ancient development of religious law confers upon Islam a certain formalistic character. The demands of interior life find rather peripheral positions.
OUTLINE
I. Historical expansion.
II. Legal theology.
III. Dogmatic theology.
IV. Spiritual theology.
V. The Koran.
I. HISTORICAL EXPANSION
OUTLINE
I. Limits and characteristics of Muslim history.
II. The “Orthodox” Caliphs (632-661).
III. The Umayyads (661-750).
IV. The ‘Abbāsids (750-1258).
V. Autonomous states until Ottoman hegemony.
VI. The period of Ottoman hegemony.
VII. European colonial expansion and national movements.
I. LIMITS AND CHARACTERISTICS OF MUSLIM HISTORY
The military and political history of Islam a priori includes the events of all peoples and all Muslim states. It thus encompasses both those peoples who were the bearers of Muḥammad’s religion (Arabs) and those who adopted it or to whom it was imposed (Persians, Turks, Indians, Berbers, etc.), from the moment and until the moment when such adoption lasted. Geographically, the historical sphere of action of Islam extends from France and Spain, across Africa and Asia, to China and the Malay archipelago; it touches to the north southern Russia and the Balkans, and to the south East Africa.Moreover, the effective unity of the Muslim world is concretized only in the first phase of the caliphate, until about the 9th century. This is followed by a period of fragmentation which, although fundamentally altered by the rise of great states of Turkish or Mongol origin, is no longer resolved into general unification. It will therefore be legitimate, on ethical and political grounds, to refer for the details of Muslim history to the treatment of individual peoples and regions. Here it will be appropriate to dwell in particular on the events of the unitary caliphate, which comprise approximately the period corresponding to that in which Islam formed and structurally defined itself as a religious phenomenon. Thus there will be a synthesis of the broad outlines of the long historical travail through which the peoples of the Muslim faith arrived at the present political and geographical situation in the world.
II. THE “ORTHODOX” CALIPHS (632-661)
The death of Muḥammad left Arabia almost completely unified under the new state. This union, however, was notably precarious, since outside the zone centered on the cities of Mecca and Medina it was based on agreements between the Prophet and the Arab tribes; the latter, for the most part, considered such agreements dissolved after Muḥammad’s death. Moreover, the absence of testamentary dispositions left open a dynastic question which, at first dormant, was later to resurface and be a determining element of crisis throughout the course of Islamic history.Elected successor of the Prophet, his son-in-law Abū Bakr (632-34) quelled in a bloody war the revolts of the tribes and, thus giving the indispensable firmness to the state, carried out the first thrusts toward the north, which under his successor ‘Umar (634-44) were to become stable conquests. His decade was the period of great conquests: surpassing the borders of the decadent Byzantine and Persian empires, the Arabs occupied with overwhelming invasion Palestine, Syria, Mesopotamia, and Egypt, pushing as far as Tripoli. The new religion, traditionally considered as the driving element of the conquest, was rather the unifying factor that allowed the realization of more complex economic motives, traditional to the arid land of Arabia in the face of the more fertile neighboring regions.
It was the merit of ‘Umar to establish the first administrative organization of the conquest: the Muslims settled in the conquered regions in military nuclei governed by commanders, receiving as fighters a fixed salary and a share of the spoils, one-fifth of which went to the state. The infidels were subjected to a tax, collected for the most part through their own administration and compensated with the protection of the conquerors. This system had a twofold positive effect: it initially preserved the Arabs from assimilation, maintaining their military energies intact, and it satisfied the new subjects, making them tolerate domination willingly.
The caliphate of ‘Uthmān (644-56) marks the progress of the conquest, which extends to Persia and advances into North Africa, while preparing at sea for the struggle against Byzantium; but the nepotism of the caliph toward members of his family (the Umayyads, belonging to the Meccan aristocracy of the tribe of Quraysh) arouses the discontent of the Prophet’s old companions. When ‘Uthmān is killed in Medina, they elect as successor his cousin and son-in-law ‘Alī (656-67).
Around the figure of ‘Alī pivotal events for the political and religious history of Islam arose. After quelling a revolt led by ‘Ā’ishah, the Prophet’s wife, he found himself facing the Umayyad Mu‘āwiyah, governor of Syria. They came to battle at Ṣiffīn, on the Euphrates (657), with uncertain outcome. Mu‘āwiyah proposed and obtained an arbitration. At this point, a part of ‘Alī’s army broke away from him, refusing to adhere to this decision, and formed the dissident group of the Khārijites, who, although bloodily defeated by ‘Alī at Nahrawān (658), survived and developed. The arbitration came to nothing. Meanwhile Mu‘āwiyah secured control, in addition to Syria, of Egypt and Arabia. In the meantime ‘Alī fell by the dagger of a Khārijite. Thus power passed to Mu‘āwiyah and the Umayyad dynasty, while in Islam the principal politico-religious currents—orthodox, Shī‘ah, and Khārijites—began to take shape.
‘Abd Manāf
‘Abd Shams
Umayyah
‘Abd al-Muṭṭalib
‘Abdallāh
Muḥammad
Abū Ṭālib
Abū al-Ḥasan
Muḥammad b. al-Ḥanafiyyah
Abū Hāshim
### III. The Umayyads (661–750)
The Umayyad caliphate marks the emergence in Islamic history of several events of essential importance. First, power passes to a family not bound by close kinship or shared struggle with the Prophet. Moreover, the elective principle in the caliphate is replaced by the dynastic principle: two branches of the same family, first the Sufyanid and then (after the fourth caliph, Marwan) the Marwanid, hold power uninterruptedly. The capital, and with it the center of gravity of the Empire, shifts to Damascus in Syria, the base of the troops loyal to the new dynasty.
These very facts open serious problems that follow and shape the course of events: the legitimacy of the Prophet’s family is reconstituted and strengthened, coupled with religious rigorism in judging the Umayyads as temporal usurpers; the succession crisis recurs periodically, played out in the ambitions within the family.
The Umayyad caliphate inherits other no less grave problems from the preceding historical situation. The Bedouin tribes, the driving force behind the conquest, had indeed found in Islam the impetus for expansion, but they had not thereby become permanently integrated; their rivalry, especially acute between the northern and southern groups, resurfaced at times despite the conciliatory policies of the caliphs, undermining the military solidity of the Empire from within. Moreover, the problem of relations between the conquering Arabs and the subject peoples resurfaced after the establishment of the system of 'Umar: increasingly frequent conversions deprived the Muslims of sources of tribute as the remaining non-Muslim communities dwindled, while the process of Islamization of non-Arab subjects began, culminating in the composite 'Abbasid civilization.
Despite all this, the Umayyad caliphate succeeded in strengthening the internal organization of the state and extending its conquests; it resolved, in the great figures of its sovereigns, the elements of friction into substantial unity; it brought the Arabs to their greatest political expansion, while the elements of the religious system developed in fruitful travail. The negative judgment of later Muslim tradition, which reproached the Umayyads above all for transforming the theocratic state into an empire of essentially political character and aims, must therefore be received with extreme caution. Such indeed was the Umayyad caliphate; it was an “Arab Empire,” as Wellhausen defined it (*das arabische Reich*), but criticism has no grounds to see in this, within the broader framework of Muslim history, any negative elements of judgment.
The first great figure of the Umayyad dynasty is Mu'awiyah (661–80). His agreement with Hasan b. 'Ali and the skillful policy of his governors in Iraq shielded him from the 'Alids. Thus he could continue military expansion, extending the Empire toward India and the Atlantic. He twice besieged Constantinople, though without success. He pursued skillful tribal conciliation while managing to impose, by recognizing his son Yazid as successor, the dynastic principle.
Under Yazid, the 'Alid revolt broke out: the son of 'Ali, Husayn, fell in 680 at Karbala, sowing new seeds of rebellion. More prolonged and militarily far more dangerous was the revolt of 'Abdallah b. al-Zubayr in Mecca. Only the fifth caliph, 'Abd al-Malik (685–705), succeeded in suppressing it (692). At the same time, the insurrection of al-Mukhtar in Kufa was quelled, the Empire returned to peace, and the path to conquest reopened, with a new push in North Africa. It expanded further under his son al-Walid (705–15) with the landing in Spain (711) and the occupation of nearly the entire peninsula, while from the opposite direction Muslim armies invaded Sind and Transoxiana.
The Umayyad Empire thus reached its greatest extent. Of the later caliphs, 'Umar II (717–20) distinguished himself for his religious piety and economic reform, based on extending the land tax to Muslims to address the emerging crisis. Under Hisham (724–43), the Muslims penetrated deeply into Gaul, where they were halted by Charles Martel (Battle of Poitiers, 732); at the same time, a Berber revolt endangered control over North Africa.
The following years marked the beginning of the crisis. Brief and ephemeral caliphates succeeded one another between the Berber uprising and Poitiers. Under the last Umayyad, Marwan II (744–50), he managed for a time to regain control of the situation. Meanwhile, however, the long propaganda of 'Alid legitimacy in the East had matured, into which the line of the descendants of al-Abbas had inserted itself, claiming to have received investiture from Abu Hashim, son of Muhammad b. al-Hanafiyyah, son of 'Ali. The movement drew together the energies of the Iranian peoples, hostile to the Arab rulers, and was invigorated by their internal discord. The revolt overwhelmed the Umayyads. The Abbasids managed to preempt the 'Alids and assumed the caliphate.
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### IV. The 'Abbasids (750–1258)
The beginning of the Abbasid dynasty marks the return of power to the family of the Prophet; not, however, to that branch, the 'Alids, which had the strongest claim by kinship and had most actively participated in the uprising. Their renewed opposition left open, and so to speak perpetuated in its essential lines, the question of dynastic legitimacy: the 'Alids and the Kharijites renewed in the Abbasid period the dangerous agitation of the previous caliphate.
The other grave problem of the Umayyad period, that of tribal dissensions, was significantly mitigated by the revolution. The Abbasids had come to power with predominantly Persian troops: they thus had no ties of dependence on the tribal chiefs; on the contrary, their policy required a supranational levelling in which all subjects, foreign and Arab alike, stood on the same plane before the authority of the caliph. The foundation of the new capital at Baghdad (Mesopotamia) under al-Mansur marks a process of rapprochement with Iran, which would later merge more fully into Islamic civilization.
At the same time, the disappearance of the control exercised over the caliph by the tribal chiefs led to an ever-greater personal absolutism. Tribal militias were replaced by regular mercenary troops, in which Persian and especially Turkish elements increasingly asserted themselves. These praetorians, in a situation analogous to that of the Roman Empire, would progressively strip the sovereign of his power.
This new absolutism is reflected in the splendor of the court, typically Oriental. The Umayyad sovereign, far more democratic and tied to Bedouin tradition, was transformed into an increasingly inaccessible and remote despot. The figure of the vizier appears for the concrete direction of state affairs. Some great figures, such as those of the Barmakid family, gave this office particular prestige. The organization of the state expanded and was refined.
The ancient rudimentary taxation system evolved according to principles of real, not personal, taxation, clearly distinguishing between movable and immovable property. Road networks and postal services expanded, facilitating trade. Thus, at the outset of the Abbasid era, the maximum flourishing of Islam occurred within the vast Empire; economic prosperity was coupled with cultural cosmopolitanism. Greek and Iranian elements penetrated Islamic civilization, of which the Arabic language remained the common denominator.
At this golden age of the Arabs there corresponded a relative stagnation on the frontiers. The driving force, with few exceptions, may be said to have been exhausted, and dangerous raids did not substantially alter the situation. Moreover, the disintegrating forces, which were already taking shape, had not yet assumed large proportions. It was the age of the highest culture and of the greatest sovereigns.
Among others, the work of the second caliph al-Mansūr (754–75) was great. To him is owed the rigid and prudent administration that would enable the grandiose luxury of his successors. A hard and shrewd man, a true symbol of the Machiavellian prince, he rid himself of all those, enemies and friends alike, who might cast a shadow over his power. Thus Abū Muslim, the organizer of the ‘Abbāsid revolt, was assassinated by his order. This act provoked a series of extreme revolts, repressed under him and under his successor al-Mahdī; al-Mansūr also controlled and suppressed dangerous insurrections at Medina and Baghdad (762–63). Under him there also appeared the first signs of the phenomenon of the fragmentation of the Muslim Empire. The Umayyad ‘Abd ar-Rahmān, who had escaped the massacre of his family, took refuge in Spain, thereby withdrawing that region from ‘Abbāsid control. al-Mahdī (775–85), more lavish and liberal, continued his father’s work, also providing for the repression of the zandaqah, a heretical movement of Iranian inspiration. But the apogee of the ‘Abbāsid caliphate was reached under Hārūn ar-Rashīd (786–809), the sovereign immortalized in the Thousand and One Nights.
A succession struggle, as protracted as that of the ‘Abbāsid caliphate and that of the Umayyads, broke out between the two sons of Hārūn ar-Rashīd, al-Amīn and al-Ma’mūn. The latter (813–33), the victor, inaugurated a new period of great flowering in letters and the arts. He also attempted a reconciliation with the ‘Alids, but without success. It was in his time that the greatest prestige of the Mu‘tazilite theological school (v. below) was achieved, whose thesis of the created Qur’ān was declared by al-Ma’mūn to be a dogma of the state. Later, orthodoxy regained the upper hand under the caliph al-Mutawakkil (847–61).
With the successors of al-Ma’mūn the process of decline of the ‘Abbāsid caliphate began. The Turkish praetorians acquired ever greater importance and soon became the arbiters of the caliphs’ fate. Their commanders-in-chief (amīr al-umarā) dominated the government. Meanwhile, the various provinces progressively detached themselves from central authority under local dynasties; only a formal homage, when the states were not hostile, bound them to the sovereign of Baghdad. In 945 the Buwayhids absorbed the last territory remaining to the caliphs, that of Baghdad. The caliphs, however, maintained their court and their nominal authority; after the wave of Seljuk Turks they even recovered some territory. But the Mongols overwhelmed them: in 1258 the last ‘Abbāsid caliph was killed in Baghdad. Some members of the family, it is said, transferred themselves to Egypt under the Mamluks, legitimizing their rule with their title. Finally, in 1517, this branch too came to an end with the Ottoman occupation of Egypt; the last caliph was deported by Selim I to Constantinople.
Long centuries before this, the ‘Abbāsids had ceased their direct action in historical events. These must be taken up again, from the end of the 8th century, with the history of the autonomous states, in which Islamic unity fragmented and to which only the Turkish dynasties would bring periodic unifying impulses.
V. AUTONOMOUS STATES UNTIL OTTOMAN HEGEMONY
The formation of autonomous states, begun after the middle of the 8th century, developed rapidly until the Buwayhid occupation of Baghdad in 945 eliminated every remnant of direct ‘Abbāsid domination. Thus the great empire of the caliphs shattered, as the central authority progressively weakened, while from the periphery there arose local differences and particularisms. Not the least reason for the phenomenon was the very supernationalism of the ‘Abbāsids, which had determined the decline of Arab hegemony over the empire by introducing into the ruling class elements of different nationalities. The religious bond, the only one remaining alongside that of the Arabic language, could not restrain the centrifugal forces that undermined the state.The phenomenon of fragmentation did not generally occur in a rapid or violent form. Rather, it was the governors of the individual provinces who slowly detached themselves from central authority to found their own dynasties, which continued to pay formal homage to the caliph of Baghdad. Exceptions were naturally the ‘Alid dynasties, of which the greatest, that of the Fāṭimids in Egypt, assumed the caliphal title for itself. Another situation obtained in Spain, where the authority of Baghdad was not recognized at all, and the Umayyads likewise proclaimed themselves caliphs (929).
The crisis of the caliphate was also and above all a crisis of Arabism. The ethnically Arab dynasties that formed in various regions had no propulsive efficacy. Great and periodic impulses toward unity instead came from the new converts: on the one hand the Berbers, creators of strong dynasties in North Africa; on the other, above all, the Turks, who, having become Muslim, left their imprint on the history of this period, from the predominance of the Seljuks to that of the Ottomans. It would be these latter, in the 16th century, who would reconstruct under their hegemony the unity of much of the Islamic world.
Since, therefore, the events of this period cannot be treated from a unified perspective, the histories must be grouped by regions or groups of regions that at least in part display a certain historical unity.
1. Spain
Occupied in 755 by the Umayyad ‘Abd ar-Rahmān, Muslim Spain reached great splendor under his dynasty. The greatest sovereign was ‘Abd ar-Rahmān III, who in 929 assumed the title of caliph. At the beginning of the 11th century the caliphate of Spain declined and fragmented into small dynasties, which were succeeded by the rule of the great Berber kingdoms of North Africa, the Almoravids beginning in 1090 and then the Almohads from 1145. On them V. below. The decline of Almohad rule in the 13th century gave rise to local dynasties, which progressively fell under Christian reconquest. The last to fall were the Naṣrids of Granada (1492).2. North Africa
Before the formation of the Almoravid and Almohad kingdoms, in the North African zone from the Atlantic to Egypt there arose several local dynasties. In Morocco the Idrīsids ruled from 788 to 922, after which Berber tribes followed. Algeria and Tunisia became autonomous under the Aghlabids (800–909), who also conquered Sicily, which remained in Muslim hands until the Norman period; they then passed under the Fāṭimids, an ‘Alid dynasty that was to establish itself in Egypt, and from 972 to 1148 under the Zīrids. During this last period Algeria passed to the Hammādids (1007–152).By this time, however, the Berber dynasty of the Almoravids (1056–1147) had already established itself in Morocco, extending its rule from Spain to part of Algeria. Even more extensive was the conquest of the Almohads (1130–1269), also Berbers, who occupied Tunisia as well, reaching Tripoli and thus unifying the entire region from Spain to Egypt under their rule.
After the Almohads, North Africa again fragmented into local dynasties: the Marinids and Wattasids (1195–1350) in Morocco and later also in Algeria; the Zayyanids (1235–1393) in Algeria; the Ḥafṣids (1228–1534) in Tunisia.
To the south of these states, from the 10th century onward, the conversion to Islam of most of the rulers of central Africa took place. The movement developed in the following centuries along two paths: from North Africa toward the interior and from the Arab coast toward the opposite shore of the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean, extending as far as the island of Madagascar in the far south. To this second type belongs the Islamic penetration into Ethiopia, which had already taken concrete form in the 14th century with the establishment of a Muslim state in Ifāt.
3. Egypt and Syria
For much of Muslim history, these two regions shared closely connected events. Egypt gained independence under the Turkish Tulunid dynasty (868–905), then returned briefly to Abbasid control before passing to the Ikhshidids (935–969). These in turn gave way to the great Shiite dynasty of the Fatimids, who had long dominated neighboring North Africa. The Fatimid dynasty lasted overall from 909 to 1171, though they lost North Africa in 972; by the beginning of the following century, Syria too became a center of independent dynasties. It was reunited with Egypt under Saladin (Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn), founder of the Ayyubid dynasty (1171–1250); the two provinces remained united under the Mamluks (1250–1517) until the Ottoman conquest.4. Arabia
This region too was fragmented after the collapse of the caliphate. Local dynasties succeeded one another in Yemen from the 9th century until the Ayyubid occupation (1173–1228), which came from Egypt. They were followed by the Rasulids (1229–1454) and the Tahirids (1446–1517). In the final period of Tahirid rule, the Mamluks temporarily occupied the region, only to be succeeded by the Ottomans. Further north, in Bahrain, the Qarmatian movement (extreme Shiites; see below) became prominent, dominating most of Arabia in the 10th and 11th centuries.5. Mesopotamia, Persia, Transoxiana
The history of these regions was decisively altered by the invasion of the Seljuk Turks, who occupied them completely. Before their arrival, various dynasties held sway. Mesopotamia passed from the Hamdanids (929–1053) to the Buyids of Persia, then broke up into smaller Arab dynasties. In Persia, the Tahirids (820–873) first asserted autonomy in Khurasan, followed by the Saffarids (867–903) and the Samanids, who, originating in Transoxiana, annexed the entire region (874–999). Their power later divided into several dynasties, among which the Buyids (932–1055) prevailed in the west and the Ghaznavids (962–1183) in the east; under the great ruler Mahmud, the Ghaznavids carried out the conquest of Hindustan.The Seljuk Turks, Islamized Turks, effected in the 11th century a vast revolution in Islamic history. Under the leadership of great figures such as Tughril Beg, Alp Arslan, and Malik-Shah, they overran Transoxiana, Persia, and Mesopotamia, reaching Syria and Asia Minor. The unification of these regions under their rule was one of the decisive factors behind the launching of the Crusades (see). In the 12th century, the Seljuks were supplanted by dynasties of their own officers (atabegs), among which the Zangids in Mesopotamia and Syria (1127–1250) and the Buyids under Sāḥ in Persia and Transoxiana (c. 1077–1231) are notable. In Asia Minor, however, the Seljuks survived until 1300, when they gave way to the Ottoman Turks.
In the 13th century, a new great invasion swept in from the east: the Mongols, led by the famous Genghis Khan, occupied all the territory between China and Mesopotamia. The empire was later divided among the conqueror’s sons; of the western regions, Persia and Mesopotamia went to the Ilkhanids (1256–1353), whose leader Hulagu killed the last Abbasid caliph of Baghdad in 1258, while Transoxiana went to the Chagatai Khanate (1227–1358).
As Mongol power declined, independent dynasties emerged in Mesopotamia and Persia. The most important of these was the Jalayirids (1336–1411) in Persia. In Transoxiana, the Mongol Timur Lang (Tamerlane) founded the Timurid dynasty (1369–1500), which rapidly expanded westward into Asia Minor, where it defeated the Ottomans in 1402, and eastward into India. After the 15th century, the Timurids left their mark only in Afghanistan, where their descendant Babur founded a new great Mongol dynasty.
6. Afghanistan and India
Afghanistan was permanently occupied by the Saffarids of Persia. They were succeeded by the Samanids and then by the Ghaznavids, who extended their conquests into Hindustan. The Ghaznavids were followed by the Ghurids (1148–1215) and then by the sultans of Delhi (1206–1554), who also conquered the Deccan in 1322. Toward the end of their rule, they began to fragment into smaller dynasties, until the Mongols under Babur invaded the region in the 16th century. The conquest of the Deccan was completed later.
The Muslim conquest in the East led to the progressive spread of Islam into the Malay Archipelago, reaching as far as the Philippines. It was probably during this period that Muslims first established a significant presence in China (13th–14th centuries).
VI. THE PERIOD OF OTTOMAN HEGEMONY
Turkish predominance in the Islamic world reached its peak with the Ottoman Empire, which, by uniting the vast territory between Morocco and Persia, could rightly claim the political heritage of the caliphate; indeed, advancing decisively into the Balkan Peninsula, it reached the walls of Vienna, renewing and surpassing the aggressive power of earlier caliphates. Islam thus reconstituted itself as a unified entity, though some peripheral provinces remained outside its fold. Within this unity, however, the constituent elements were profoundly altered: Arabism was in crisis, and the center of gravity of the empire had definitively shifted to the seat of the new rulers, Asia Minor. Culture adapted to this new condition.Meanwhile, on the periphery of the Ottoman Empire, several strong national states began to take shape, particularly in Persia and India. In conclusion: overall, the period of Ottoman hegemony represents for the history of Islam a more unified phase than the preceding one, marked by dynasties and peoples deemed “barbarian,” who had long since supplanted the Arab conquerors as the dominant force.
The Ottomans emerged in Bithynia around 1300 and gradually expanded inland. By the 15th century, after the interruption caused by Timur’s invasion in 1402, their empire already included Asia Minor and the Balkan Peninsula. This expansion was largely the work of two rulers: Murad II and Mehmed II. The following century saw further great achievements. Selim I (d. 1519) annexed Syria, Egypt, and Arabia. Suleiman the Magnificent (d. 1566) invaded Hungary and besieged Vienna in 1529; nearly all the North African coast, as far as Morocco, was also brought under Ottoman control. In the 17th century, Murad IV occupied Mesopotamia in 1638. By the end of that century, the Ottoman Empire had reached its greatest territorial extent. The failed siege of Vienna in 1683 marked the beginning of its decline.
Early stages of the crisis included the loss of Hungary, Transylvania, and Podolia in 1699. In 1783, the Crimea and surrounding territories passed to Russia. In 1829, Greece became independent. Algeria, already practically autonomous under its dey, was occupied by France in 1830. By 1878, Romania, Serbia, and Montenegro had gained autonomy; Bosnia and Herzegovina went to Austria; and Bulgaria became an autonomous principality.
Soon after, in 1885, this occurred in Bulgaria with the annexation of Eastern Rumelia. Meanwhile, Tunisia, which had long been autonomous under the dey, passed to France (1881). In 1882 it was Egypt’s turn, occupied by England, although Ottoman sovereignty there remained theoretical until 1914. Italy occupied Libya in 1912. Then came the First World War, which marked the collapse of the Ottoman Empire: Egypt became a British protectorate; Palestine, Iraq, and Transjordan became states under British mandate, the first with a special regime arising from the Zionist question; Syria was divided into states under French mandate. Of the ancient empire, only Turkey remained, which established itself as a national state (1922).
Outside the Ottoman Empire, Morocco remained under local caliphal dynasties until the French conquest, which began with slow penetration at the end of the 19th century and was completed in 1912. Part of the region was ceded to Spain.
In southern Arabia, the expulsion of the Ottoman Turks (1633) led to San‘ā’ becoming the capital of the Zaydī state, which had existed for centuries. In central Arabia, a Wahhābī state (v. below, the religious section) gradually gained strength from the beginning of the 19th century, later becoming the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia under Ibn Sa‘ūd (1932).
Persia established and maintained itself as an autonomous state under various dynasties of shahs, the first and most prosperous of which was that of the Ṣafavids (1502–1736). Shī‘ism became the state religion. There was no lack of expansionist policy, which under Nādir Shāh in 1738 reached Delhi.
Transoxiana, after the Timurids, was governed by the dynasty of the Shaybānids, also of Mongol origin, and by others related to them, until the Russian occupation (1868–72).
Afghanistan and India remained under the Mongol dynasty of Bābur. In the 18th century, decline began with the passing of Afghanistan and the Deccan to autonomous dynasties; meanwhile, the conquest by the English East India Company progressed until, in 1858, India passed under the British crown. Afghanistan, through long struggles with the English, remained independent.
From the perspective of peaceful penetration, India asserted itself from the 15th century onward, and especially toward the end of the 18th century, in Russian Turkestan, leaving behind strong Sunni communities.
VII. EUROPEAN COLONIAL EXPANSION AND NATIONAL MOVEMENTS
The decline of Turkish hegemony over the Islamic world corresponds, from the last century onward, to the progressive rise of European colonialism. Western action, by intensifying contacts and exchanges on a cultural level, brought about a general awakening in the Muslim world, and particularly in the Arab world, from what may well be called its medieval period. This awakening took concrete form on the religious plane in the phenomenon of modernism, while on the historical plane it rekindled the legacy and national aspirations of dormant Arabism against the dominant Turks. It is true that the intrusion of infidels into Muslim lands created unifying and pan-Islamic tendencies, of which the Turks made no small use toward the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries; but ultimately the national and federal currents among the Arabs prevailed.As we have seen, the First World War marked, with the success of the Allies’ nationalist propaganda, the emergence of national states with limited autonomy. The subsequent period was characterized by the progressive consolidation of such autonomy, cemented by the pan-Arab organization (the Arab League was founded in 1945). Western predominance gradually shifted from political forms to privileges of a commercial nature.
Thus, the recent era, an age of crisis and evolution, expresses within the broader framework of Islamic history the resurgence of Arabism after centuries of decline and stagnation.
In North and Central Africa, Muslim populations remain today under colonial rule. Egypt, formally recognized as independent in 1922, gradually loosened its ties with Britain. In Asia, independent states include Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Persia (after having been occupied during the last war by British and Russian troops), and Afghanistan. The British mandate in Iraq ended in 1932, replaced by a treaty of alliance. In 1946, Transjordan was declared an independent kingdom, and France granted independence to Syria and Lebanon. In 1948, the State of Israel was proclaimed in Palestine. In British India, the states of Pakistan and India were established in 1947 as independent dominions. England maintains protectorates in Arabia and Malaya. The Dutch East Indies gained independence on December 27, 1949.
According to the most recent approximate estimates (cf. H. A. R. Gibb, *Mohammedanism: An Historical Survey*, Oxford 1949, p. 22), the number of Muslims in the world today is about 300 million. Of these, about 90 million are in India, 55 in Malaya and Indonesia, 15 in the Arab countries of Asia Minor, 17 in Egypt and the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, 16 in the rest of North Africa, 15 in Persia, 12 in Afghanistan, 18 in Turkey, at least 30 in the Asian territories of the U.S.S.R., Chinese Turkestan, and China, 24 in Black and East Africa, and 3 in the Balkans and southern Russia.
II. LEGAL THEOLOGY.
Outline:
I. Concept and Elements of Legal Theology (fiqh)
II. Formation of Religious Law. The Orthodox Schools. — III. Theory of Sources (uṣūl). Juristic Methodology. —IV. Prescriptions of Worship (ʿibādāt)
V. Other Religious Prescriptions
VI. Festivals.I. Concept and Elements of Legal Theology (fiqh)
The term *fiqh* denotes Islamic legal theology, i.e., canon law. Its object is the study of the divine law (*sharīʿah*), namely, the regulation by God of human actions. On the principle that every action depends on God, *fiqh* encompasses not only prescriptions relating to worship and properly religious life, but also the norms of all law: personal, familial, commercial, penal, administrative, political, and military.The divine origin of the law restricts human reflection and elaboration to a wholly subordinate function: it is not intended to establish ex novo and on rational bases legal norms, but rather to derive as much as possible from revealed and traditional sources. Nor does the supreme political and religious authority, in theory, constitute a source of law: it has an executive, not a normative, role.
Of the various parts of Muslim legal theology, those concerning worship and properly religious life are of particular interest here.
II. FORMATION OF RELIGIOUS LAW. THE ORTHODOX SCHOOLS. — Muḥammad left at his death only the broad outlines of a religious legislation, along with the specific solution of a series of cases, but without any systematic or comprehensive structure.
Immediately following, the religious law was integrated and systematized under the pressure of problems that periodically arose in the life of the community. At the outset, political authority itself exercised juridical functions, essentially inspired by the model and memory of the Prophet, without excluding a greater or lesser degree of personal interpretation. However, the secularization of the caliphate under the Umayyads—and even earlier, the formation of hostile factions to ʿUthmān and ʿAlī—led to a progressive differentiation between political authority and the interpreters of the law, who often rose against it by appealing to tradition. The activity of these jurists was first directed toward deriving from the Qurʾān and the customary practice of the Prophet—later subjected to study and compilation—the norms governing religious and social life. But it soon became necessary for them to resolve new problems through individual reasoning (*raʾy*), whether in its more moderate form, such as analogical reasoning (*qiyās*) applied to cases resolved by tradition, or even in its freest form. It was evident that the dominant Islamic tradition had to react against the followers of *raʾy*; the result was a greater or lesser restriction of this criterion, which, however, took root as a vital ferment in the progressive development of the law.
The intense elaboration of legal material bore fruit as early as the 2nd century of the *hijrah* in the formation of various schools (*madhāhib*), differing in the proportion and manner in which they employed the various legal sources. Many of these schools, which arose around centers of rich tradition and intense cultural life, soon disappeared; only four survived into the orthodox period, coexisting within it with mutual recognition of rights. One was founded in Medina by Mālik ibn Anas (d. 795; *V. MĀLIKITE, RITE*), characterized by a strongly traditionalist tendency that did not, however, reject the criteria of communal consensus (*ijmāʿ*), analogical reasoning, and even the so-called *istiṣlāḥ*, that is, the principle of general utility. Around the same time, Abū Ḥanīfah (d. 767; *v.*) founded another school in Kūfah, distinguished by the broader use of analogy and, in general, reasoning, extending not only to the criterion of general utility but also to that of subjective preference (*istiḥsān*). More respectful of tradition and inclined toward systematic and conciliatory thought, al-Shāfiʿī (d. 820; *V. SHĀFIʿITE, RITE*) rejected *istiḥsān*; he was the first to formulate systematically a doctrine of the roots of *fiqh*: the Qurʾān, *sunnah* (Prophetic tradition), consensus, and analogy. His doctrine, with minor modifications, became the official theory of orthodoxy regarding the foundations of the law. A fourth school was founded in Baghdad by Ibn Ḥanbal (d. 855; *V. ḤANBALITE, RITE*); it carried traditionalist tendencies to their extreme, rejecting the use of *raʾy* and severely limiting *qiyās*.
The great elaborative effort in law lasted, roughly, through the centuries of the *hijrah*. As the forms progressively crystallized, a theory emerged that, from that time onward, direct elaboration (*ijtihād*) could be considered concluded. Subsequent jurists were left only with limited elaboration—namely, the application of the masters’ principles to unresolved questions—beyond which there remained only imitation (*taqlīd*).
The application of this principle, combined with the very nature of legal discipline, led in later centuries to a casuistic stagnation of *fiqh*. Within the schools, direct examination of the sources was increasingly abandoned in favor of reading recent manuals; judges confined themselves to applying the doctrine or prevailing opinion within their school, resorting in new cases to *muftīs*, who issued legal opinions. Moreover, the practical authority of traditional law was repeatedly violated by political power, which, in another way, also addressed the anachronism of much religious legislation by introducing state ordinances and tribunals. This phenomenon intensified in modern times, in connection with European influence and the progressive emergence of new problems and needs.
### III. Theory of the Sources (*Uṣūl*). Legal Methodology.
The cessation, after several centuries, of the direct use of sources in the elaboration of legal material naturally reduced interest in their study. Nevertheless, after al-Shāfiʿī’s initial formulation, many works were devoted to defining the *uṣūl* as well as the rules for their application.
The sources of the law, according to orthodoxy, are:
1. **The Qurʾān (*v.*)**. — It is regarded as the work of God and His eternal Word, communicated to the Arabs through Muḥammad. The present recension, dating to the time of the third caliph ʿUthmān, is arranged by the length of its chapters. It thus presents a chaotic appearance, though criticism can restore an approximate chronological sequence. It consists of 114 chapters, containing over 6,000 verses, of which only about 500 contain legal prescriptions. Most of these belong to the Medinan period of the Prophet.
2. **Tradition (*Sunnah*)**. — The determination to guide the entire life of the Muslim community by the law and example of its founder could not find sufficient material in the Qurʾān alone, since Muḥammad had made no attempt to leave an organic and complete code. It was therefore necessary to seek legal norms, beyond the sacred text, in the manner of acting (*sunnah*) of the Prophet, as evidenced by his deeds, sayings, and tacit approvals. The Qurʾān itself commands the faithful to follow Muḥammad’s example. The *sunnah* is thus a non-explicit revelation, alongside the explicit revelation of the Qurʾān. Its value is not inferior to that of the sacred book; indeed, it completes it and in some cases may abrogate its provisions.
The *sunnah* consists of oral traditions (*ḥadīth*), which are composed of two parts: the chain of transmitters (*isnād*, lit. “support”)—which extends back to the first witness and constitutes, according to Muslims, the essential criterion for evaluating the *ḥadīth*—and its text (*matn*). The corpus of traditions, transmitted orally during the first generations, was progressively codified in several major collections, among which those of al-Bukhārī (d. 870) and Muslim (d. 875), known as “the two *Ṣaḥīḥ* collections” (i.e., “the two genuine”), predominate in the 3rd century of the *hijrah*. In these works, the arrangement is by subject (*musannaf*), whereas in others it follows the order of transmitters (*musnad*).
As for the authenticity of the traditions, Muslims themselves exercised a critique, which will be discussed in connection with the rules for interpreting the sources. It is worth noting here that this critique is essentially external, based primarily on the evaluation of the *isnād*; European scholarship, by contrast, has focused on the content of the *ḥadīth*, revealing how many of them are pious frauds—fabrications made later to defend one or another political or religious ideology. The historical development of Muslim tradition and its content, as crystallized in the major collections, must therefore be approached with great caution if one seeks an objective reconstruction of Islamic religious life, even as it remains a phenomenon of considerable interest for understanding its psychological dimensions.
3. **Consensus (*Ijmāʿ*)**. — The divine assistance granted to the Muslim community cannot permit it to fall unanimously into error. This principle, combined with the Qurʾānic exhortations not to deviate from the path of the faithful, forms the foundation of the third source of legal theology: the general consensus of the community on a given question.
A consenting community, as regards the elementary and fundamental precepts, is understood to mean the entire body of believers. In more difficult and complex matters, however, the community is concretely represented by its particularly competent members. These are, in the first place and in the earliest phase, the companions of the Prophet; then their followers and the followers of the followers. Subsequently, according to the Malikites, consensus belongs to the scholars of Medina; according to the other schools, to scholars in general.
Parallel to the consensus ecclesiae, the *‘ijmā’* constitutes, within the organization and tradition, a source of control and limited evolution. Structurally dynamic, in contrast to the static nature of the Qur’an and the *sunnah*, it is the means by which innovations such as the cult of the Prophet, belief in his miracles, the veneration of saints, and, more recently, practical innovations such as tobacco and printing, have been introduced.
4. *Qiyās* (analogy). — Different in nature from the three preceding sources is the fourth, which consists in the application of analogical reasoning to resolve juridical cases not explicitly provided for. It is thus a source constituted not by divine word or inspiration, but by a human means: this explains the hostility it encountered and the greater or lesser limitations imposed upon its use.
*Qiyās* may consist in assimilating, by affinity, an unresolved case to a resolved one; or in resolving a new case on the basis of the principle underlying an existing law. This second type of *qiyās* is naturally the most contested.
With *qiyās*, the series of sources of *fiqh* is concluded. Muslim treatises therefore examine the methodological rules governing their use. These concern, in the first place, the criticism of such sources, which is naturally not applicable to the Qur’an, but to the *sunnah*. Muslims apply their criticism especially to the *isnād*, studying the reliability of the transmitters, the possibility of their contacts, and the independent chains through which a *ḥadīth* has been transmitted. This gives rise to a classification of traditions into “sound,” “good” (i.e., acceptable), “average,” “weak,” and “false.” A second aspect of juridical methodology is the hermeneutics of the sources. Its primary aim is to establish the exact meaning of the law and, so to speak, its juridical force: on this basis, actions are classified as obligatory, recommended, permitted, disapproved, or prohibited. An obligation may be individual or collective: the latter can be fulfilled only by a part of the community; such is, for example, the holy war against unbelievers. Furthermore, hermeneutics must resolve contradictions that may exist within a single source or between different sources.
IV. PRESCRIPTIONS OF WORSHIP (*‘IBĀDĀT*)
Once the sources of religious law have been established, its practice centers on five fundamental pillars (*arkān*) of worship: the profession of faith, prayer, legal almsgiving, fasting, and the pilgrimage.7. The profession of faith (*shahādah*)
It consists in pronouncing the formula, “There is no god but God, and Muḥammad is His messenger.” The importance of this formula is indicated, among other things, by the fact that it constitutes the means by which non-Muslims are converted to Islam. The rites of admission consist precisely in reciting the *shahādah*, in taking a Muslim name, and in circumcision; Jews must additionally acknowledge Christ as a prophet, and Christians must deny His divinity.8. Prayer (*ṣalāh*)
The ritual prayer, already established in the Qur’an, was defined in detail by the early *sunnah*. All pubescent and sane Muslims are obliged to perform II. The elderly, the sick, travelers, and those in danger are exempted for as long as their condition of impossibility lasts.A preliminary condition for prayer is the state of purity of the place and persons. This is achieved through washing. For persons, it is prescribed to wash the face, hands, forearms, feet, and head. Cases of major impurity require washing the entire body. In the absence of water, sand may be used as a substitute. Another condition for prayer is the modest covering of the body.
Ritual prayers are five daily: at dawn, at midday, in the afternoon, at sunset, and at night. They may be performed privately or publicly in mosques—the latter form being naturally recommended. The call to prayer is announced from the minarets (towers of mosques) by the muezzin (*mu’adhdhin*). Each prayer consists of two, three, or four *rak‘ahs*, a term indicating a set of movements (including standing, bowing, sitting, and prostration with the forehead to the ground), accompanied by the recitation of formulas and Qur’anic passages. These acts are performed by the faithful aligned in the direction of Mecca (*qiblah*), indicated in mosques by a niche called *mihrāb*, under the direction of an *imām* (“leader”), who stands before the others and sets the example of the gestures.
On Friday at midday, a particularly solemn prayer is held in the largest mosque of every city or district. This prayer is preceded by a sermon (*khuṭbah*), a moral discourse accompanied by a blessing upon the political authority; this has, over time, assumed particular importance as a recognition of the ruling sovereign. Alongside ritual prayers, there exist private and extraordinary ones; but the law, as in other points, insists on the external and formal aspect: a typical example in this sense is the regulation of the preliminary intention (*niyyah*), an interesting instance of the psychology of Islamic religious law.
9. Legal almsgiving (*zakāh*)
Frequently recommended in the Qur’an alongside prayer, almsgiving became, already in the time of Muḥammad, a legal prescription, i.e., practically a tax—
Islam — Muslims at prayer in the desert.
—due from those who possess a certain amount of wealth. The *zakāh* is levied annually on gold, silver, merchandise, livestock, and agricultural products. Its rate varies according to the type of goods. The collected funds are distributed to the poor, to debtors, to those engaged in holy war, to travelers in distress, and to other designated categories.
10. Fasting (*ṣawm*)
Prescribed in the Qur’an, fasting consists in abstaining completely from food, drink, tobacco, perfumes, and sexual relations from dawn to sunset during the month of Ramaḍān. At night, all prohibitions are lifted. Those who are unable to fast due to illness, old age, or travel must make up for it later, when possible. The chronically ill and the elderly are required to make a compensatory donation. Breaches of the fast due to culpable acts are expiated by donations of varying amounts according to the gravity of the sin committed. Alongside this fundamental fasting, the law also contemplates other extraordinary or supererogatory fasts on the occasion of certain events or solemnities.11. The pilgrimage (*ḥajj*)
Just as fasting is a characteristic example of the development of Islam in contrast to Judaism, so the pilgrimage exemplifies its relationship with ancient pagan tradition: its rites are largely derived from pre-Islamic paganism, though given a monotheistic significance. Muḥammad owed much of his success to this skillful policy of synthesis. The Ka‘bah, the cubic building in Mecca, an object of pagan worship containing the Black Stone on its eastern side, was regarded by Muḥammad as an ancient sanctuary established by God, restored and purified by Abraham and Ishmael. In the last three years of the Prophet’s life, the first great pilgrimages were performed; in the final year, unbelievers were excluded, and the principal rites were defined.Pilgrimage is obligatory for all Muslims who are sane, free, adults, and who have the means, at least once in their lifetime. Some schools permit the obligation to be fulfilled by proxy for the ḥajj. The pilgrimage begins at Mecca on the 7th of Dhu al-Ḥijjah. The pilgrims arrive either by the great caravans or by sea, and upon reaching the boundary of the sacred territory, they enter a state of consecration (iḥrām), which consists of wearing two seamless garments, usually white, leaving the feet, hands, and head uncovered. The Ka'bah is also draped in a special adornment. The state of consecration obliges them not to shave or cut their nails, to abstain from sexual relations, and from hunting. Upon arrival at Mecca, the pilgrims perform seven circumambulations around the Ka'bah, touching the Black Stone, and then make a ritual run between the hills of Ṣafā and Marwah. After listening to a sermon in the Great Mosque of Mecca (on the 7th), they depart on the 8th for the plain of ʿArafah (a four-hour camel ride); they remain there on the 9th. In the evening, they begin the return journey, and with a torchlit procession, they reach the valley of Muzdalifah. Then, another procession takes them to Minā, where they arrive at dawn on the 10th.
These provisions are mostly only of theoretical value. In practice, taxation in Muslim states has increasingly moved toward modern systems, through the extension of tax obligations to non-Muslim subjects and the generalization of taxable objects. Even regarding the beneficiaries, it is the state that absorbs the taxes, allocating them according to freer criteria.
Alongside legal almsgiving, there is voluntary almsgiving (ṣadaqah), to which every good Muslim is encouraged, and which generally flows toward pious foundations and charitable purposes.
12. Fasting (ṣawm)
A characteristic example of the development of Muslim precepts is fasting, initially established by Muḥammad in Medina in the same form and on the same day as the Jewish fast of ʿĀshūrāʾ. Later, due to the worsening relations with the Jews and the progressive definition of Islam as an independent religion, ʿĀshūrāʾ remained only as a supererogatory practice and was replaced in obligation by the fast of Ramaḍān. Fasting is obligatory for all Muslims who are sane and of legal age; exemptions are granted to the elderly, the sick, travelers, and women in particular conditions. The exemption lasts onlyHere, each pilgrim throws seven stones at a heap (a pagan rite adapted to Islam, as the stoning of Satan) and a solemn animal sacrifice is performed. Then the pilgrims may cut their hair and nails, but complete desacralization occurs only after a return to Mecca, with new circumambulations of the Ka'bah and the run between Ṣafā and Marwah. This is followed by three days of celebration at Minā (11–13), and then departure after further circumambulations of the Ka'bah as a farewell. It is recommended to complete the ḥajj with a visit to the tomb of the Prophet and other illustrious figures in Medina.
A reduced pilgrimage is the ʿumrah, which can be performed at any time and consists of the same ceremonies as the ḥajj, except for those related to the suburban sanctuaries.
V. OTHER RELIGIOUS PRESCRIPTIONS
A sixth pillar is often added to the “Five Pillars”: holy war (jihād). According to Muslim doctrine, all territory not under Islamic rule is dār al-ḥarb, “the abode of war.” It must be conquered through war, which cannot cease until the entire world is subjugated. This theory has had to yield much to the reality of things, though it persists in juridical terms and remains a phenomenon of considerable interest.The obligation of holy war is collective, not individual: in other words, it suffices that part of the community fulfills II.
Among unbelievers, only the possessors of Sacred Scriptures—namely Jews, Christians, and later Zoroastrians—are permitted to live in Islamic lands while retaining their religion. They are subject to a particular statute, being required to pay a tax and to observe certain limitations in public life, in return for which they receive protection and the guarantee of free worship.
Within the limits of religious law, other prescriptions are worth noting. Among them are circumcision, already practiced in pre-Islamic Arabia; abstention from certain foods, such as pork and, in general, animals not ritually slaughtered, and from certain drinks, namely intoxicants. Men are forbidden to wear jewelry or silk garments, as well as to use precious vessels for ablutions. Rigorists also forbid music. Gambling, usury, and interest are prohibited (though legal artifices have been devised to maintain these elements of modern commercial life). Well known is the prohibition of images, which, like dietary laws, reflects the direct influence of Judaism in the formation of Muslim ritual. The imposition of the veil on women, once so strict, has been relaxed since the First World War, especially in Turkey, Egypt, and Lebanon.
VI. FESTIVALS
There are two canonical festivals in Islam (v. BAJRAM): the “minor festival,” at the end of the Ramaḍān fast, lasting three days, and the “major festival,” from the 10th to the 12th of Dhu al-Ḥijjah, coinciding with the culminating ceremonies of the pilgrimage.Custom has introduced other festivals, such as the Prophet’s birthday (12 Rabīʿ al-Awwal); the Miʿrāj, i.e., the fanciful nocturnal ascension of Muḥammad into heaven (between the 26th and 27th of Rajab); the Night of Mid-Shaʿbān, when it is said that God fixes destinies for the following year; and Laylat al-Qadr, the night of the first revelation to Muḥammad (between the 26th and 27th of Ramaḍān).
Friday is the Muslims’ day of rest. However, it does not entail abstention from work, and this practice is only recently being introduced, following the example of Western countries.
III. DOGMATIC THEOLOGY
Outline:
I. The formation of dogma (kalām)
II. Sources
III. God
IV. Prophethood
V. Soteriology and eschatology
VI. Ecclesiology.I. THE FORMATION OF DOGMA (kalām)
The conditions under which dogmatic reflection developed were similar to those of jurisprudence: certain Qur’anic elements were subjected to reflection by the first generations, aimed at resolving the great problems of faith that naturally arose. This reflection was essentially autonomous and original, especially in its origins, while in defining solutions, contact with Christian thought and Iranian religions, as well as with Greek philosophy, could provide some elements of comparison and development. The reflection was typically tied, in its origins, to the political events of the community, in a convergence of elements that was primarily doctrinal and a dialectical force of evolution.The struggle between Muʿāwiyah and ʿAlī and the separation of the Khārijites following the arbitration at Ṣiffīn brought three different groups face to face within less than thirty years after Muḥammad’s death. Their disagreement over the right to the caliphate entailed a first theological problem: must an illegitimate ruler, because he is a sinner, still be respected? More generally: does a sinner remain a Muslim? It is the problem of faith and works. The Khārijites required, in addition to faith, good works, condemning sinful Muslims to eternal punishment as they would unbelievers. The orthodox tendency, however, leaned toward faith alone, deferring (whence the name Murjiʾites) to God’s judgment the guilt or innocence of believers, and thus justifying Muʿāwiyah and the Umayyads.
Alongside the problem of faith and works, the question of free will emerges from the very beginning of the Umayyad era. Its rise was probably not unrelated to the contact and discussions with the Christians of Damascus. Based on opposing Qur’anic passages, two groups emerged: the Qadarites, advocates of free will, and the Jabrites, supporters of predestination. Official doctrine was increasingly inclined toward the latter theory.
Meanwhile, other issues were gaining ground: among them the problem of the divine attributes, which one naturally hesitated to interpret according to the anthropomorphism suggested by the Qur’an; and the problem of the eternity of the Qur’an, which orthodoxy would fix together with its definition as the “Word of God,” thereby giving rise to difficult questions in relation to the Christian doctrine of the Logos. Like the preceding issues, these received great impetus and decisive formulation on the dogmatic plane from the emergence, toward the close of the Umayyad era, of the Muʿtazilite school, with which kalām entered definitively into a phase of systematization.
The name Muʿtazilite (“those who withdraw”) derives from their neutral position in the question of the sinful Muslim mentioned above: between the two extremes they define him as fāsiq (“guilty”), an intermediate state between believer and unbeliever, which entails in the next life eternal punishments, though less severe than those of the unbelievers. This solution is accompanied by a series of others that, taken together, address the principal problems of dogmatic theology. First, the Muʿtazilites were steadfast defenders of the unity and transcendence of God. They denied the distinction between the divine attributes and His essence; the Qur’an was by them considered created. They combated every anthropomorphism through allegorical interpretation (ta’wīl). They affirmed the justice of God, hence their support for the square thesis of free will as a condition for just retribution. It seems established that already among them was formulated that atomistic theory—according to which the laws of nature are the result of successive creations by God in every atom of time and thus nothing more than habits—which later dogmatics would develop extensively.
At the root of Muʿtazilite thought, as can be seen, was a rational exigency. When this exigency became method, the school may be said to be the true founder of kalām. Its historical fortunes were mixed: having come to power under al-Maʾmūn, it fell definitively under al-Mutawakkil (d. 861). Yet its method was to flow into the decisive reform that, though in the name of orthodoxy and against Muʿtazilism, an ancient disciple of the school, al-Ashʿarī, established in kalām at the close of the 3rd century of the Hegira.
Al-Ashʿarī’s reform was carried out by appealing to Ibn Ḥanbal, who, as he had been the head of a conservative juridical school, so too was the head of a parallel tendency in dogmatic matters. Despite some tempering, due perhaps largely to his disciples, traditional theses returned to honor with al-Ashʿarī: the existence of eternal attributes of God, though not identical with human attributes; the eternity of the Qur’an; the rejection of allegorical interpretation, while refraining from comprehending the exact nature of the anthropomorphic expressions of the Qur’an; predeterminism, namely the creation of human acts by God, though with man’s intervention as responsible executor. From the Muʿtazilites al-Ashʿarī accepted and developed occasionalist insights, extending them to a theory that well suited divine omnipotence and the absence of autonomy in man. He also accepted, and above all, the method, advocating the necessity of reason in the elaboration of dogmatics.
The Ashʿarite formulation, to which there corresponded in parallel another analogous one, that of al-Māturīdī (d. 945), marks the crystallization of Muslim dogmatic reflection. The two schools divide the Muslim world: the first establishes itself among the Shāfiʿites (v.) and Mālikites (v.), the second among the Ḥanafites (v. ABU ḤANAFĪ). Here too, for centuries, the door of ijtihād is closed, and dogmatic travail exhausts itself in secondary casuistry. Two facts remain to be examined in this crystallization: the confluence of mystical experience into dogmatics by al-Ghazālī (v.) and the continued autonomous current of Ḥanbalism.
Al-Ghazālī (d. 1111) is certainly the most remarkable figure in Islam after Muḥammad. A scholar renowned in both legal and dogmatic theology, he felt the aridity of both without the intervention of feeling and the heart. He therefore strove to bring together in harmonious synthesis the elements of asceticism and mysticism within the framework of religious theory and practice, achieving forms of eclecticism in which, for the first time after Muḥammad, it may be said that the great currents of Islamic religious thought are reunited in a mature synthesis. Opposed is the position of the Ḥanbalites, rigid traditionalists, whom the introduction of the rational method by al-Ashʿarī kept at a distance. Theological positivists rather than speculative, they have in recent times given rise to the rigorist movement of the Wahhābites (v.), represented politically by the kingdom of Ibn Saʿūd in Arabia.
Wahhābism now brings us to the threshold of the contemporary era: and it is here that one discerns the ferment and phenomena of awakening in the Muslim world, generally indicated under the name of modernism, which invests the progressive intensification of relations with the West. Movements often political in character, they also have dogmatic aspects: thus the so-called neo-Muʿtazilism, founded in India by Aḥmad Khān Bahādur, advocates a rationalistic interpretation of Islamic theology in order to adapt it to recent scientific progress. A similar aim, but of quite different character, is pursued by Egyptian modernism, inspired by the strictest respect for tradition (whence the name salafiyya): in the Qur’an and the sunnah it seeks through rational method the source of the most recent discoveries. Muḥammad ʿAbduh gave prestige to this suggestive reconciliation.
The long history of dogmatic theology, in its evolution from the Qur’anic root through the natural defining of problems and the posing of influences, thus appears to pivot on an antithesis: the confrontation between tradition as embodied by the Ḥanbalites and the original rationalism of the Muʿtazilites. The syntheses of al-Ashʿarī and al-Māturīdī, between the 3rd and 4th centuries, achieve a basic stasis. It is to these, taking into account the enduring Ḥanbalism, that the exposition of dogmatic theology presented below in synthesis should primarily conform. In the order of exposition it is advisable to adhere preferably to Muslim treatises, which, even with variations and alterations, reflect the original Muʿtazilite formulation of the problems.
II. SOURCES
These are the same as those of fiqh, except for the last, qiyās, since the analogical method cannot be adapted to dogmatic norms.III. GOD
The treatment of the doctrine of God is often preceded, in Muslim dogmatic treatises, by an exposition of general notions of metaphysics and philosophy, marked by the distinction between substance and accident and by the principles of atomism. As for the doctrine of God, it consists of three parts: essence, attributes, and works.13. Essence
God, who reveals Himself to men both through His messengers and by direct communication to the heart and reason, is demonstrated essentially by causal proofs, namely as the author of the existence of beings, of their nature, and as the first principle of the becoming of the universe, since for Muslims the concept of the infinite is inconceivable.By its very essence, God is neither a corporeal substance nor an accident, occupies no determinate place, and is invisible except to the blessed in paradise (thus the orthodox position against heterodox beliefs). The unity of God is affirmed with great force, and the denial (šīrāk) of this principle is a mortal sin. In polemic against Christian Trinitarianism, it is affirmed that God has neither wife nor children. To Him belong «the most beautiful names,» as the Qur’anic epithets are called, which are innumerable in themselves and further multiplied by tradition. Their totality reveals a strongly transcendent conception of the deity, in which absolute power and dominion prevail over every other characteristic.
14. Attributes
From these epithets theology has derived the attributes of God, classifying them into two main groups: the first includes existence, being without beginning, being without end, dissimilarity from all that is created, self-subsistence, and unity (the last five called negative attributes); the second group includes life, knowledge, power, will, hearing, sight, and speech. The Maturīdites add creation to this list. These attributes, in opposition to the Muʿtazilite theory, are eternal and distinct, yet not separate from God («neither He, nor other than He, nor a part of Him»). They must be understood, along with the anthropomorphic expressions of the Qur’an, in a real, not figurative, sense; yet in a manner different from the human, which man must admit without being able to define (bilā kayf, «without modality»).If the attributes are eternal, the Qur’an as the word of God is also eternal. Its reproduction and recitation, however, are not.
15. Works
The works of God are His acts of creation, by which He establishes and sustains the universe and its components. On the subject of creation, theology has gathered and elaborated the Qur’anic data, which in turn derive from the Jewish-Christian background. By emphasizing God’s direct authorship of all things, it has given rise to an atomistic and occasionalist cosmology: God creates atoms (substances) with their accidents and recreates them at every instant, thus bringing about their continued existence. This existence is therefore merely a habitual continuity, which can be broken by the mere interruption—even partial—of successive creative acts. A reciprocal causality of natural phenomena, subject to the will of God, is instead admitted by the Ḥanbalites.Among created beings, a category superior to mankind is distinguished, consisting of angels, demons, and jinn. Angels are subtle substances, created from light, normally invisible, without sex or vegetative life. Their function is to serve and exalt God. Among them are distinguished: Gabriel, the bearer of revelation; Azrael, the angel of death; Israfel, who sounds the trumpet on the Day of Judgment. Satan is a fallen angel, for refusing to worship Adam; he is the seducer of Adam and Eve and commands a host of demons. A typical belief of Arab paganism, adopted by Muḥammad, is that of the jinn, invisible and shapeshifting sprites, yet endowed with sex and vegetative life. They are partly good and Muslim, partly evil.
God is the creator of man, from clay, in the most perfect form and for the purpose of serving Him. The conception of original sin is present in Islam, but it has neither developed widely nor organically. Besides man himself, God also creates—at every moment—his acts, in accordance with the cosmology mentioned above. This doctrine automatically raises the problem of predestination, which has been long debated in the history of kalām. As has been said, the ašʿarites incline decisively toward predestination, leaving to man only the execution of acts predetermined by God. The Maturīdites, to a relatively greater extent, grant man the possibility of inclining toward good or evil. And even more so the Ḥanbalites, hostile to philosophical subtleties, consider God the creator of human will and power, yet these are responsible for the direction they choose, albeit within the broadest framework of providence and constant divine assistance. It has also been rightly noted that theologians continually urge human action in accordance with divine prescriptions, thus correcting a superficial yet entrenched idea of Muslim fatalism prevalent in the West.
IV. PROPHETOLOGY
God sends prophets from time to time to individual peoples to admonish and recall them to faith. This sending, according to orthodox dogma, is gratuitous, i.e., not owed by the deity, as the Muʿtazilites claimed on the basis of the criterion of justice. Prophets are mortal men and, as such, can sin; their mission, however, guarantees the truthfulness of the message they transmit: they are responsible for it only insofar as they convey II. The «signs» by which they present themselves to men are the revealed books. Muḥammad mentions as such the Pentateuch, the Psalms, the Gospel, and finally the Qur’an: these are all successive manifestations of the word of God and progressively confirm one another, even though the possibility of some innovations and abrogations remains. Muḥammad accuses Jews and Christians of having falsified their Scriptures, particularly to remove the announcement of his future mission. The Qur’an is the definitive revelation, containing the exact word of God. Other «signs» of the prophets may be miracles.The prophets are innumerable. The Qur’an names twenty-five, giving some of them the additional title of «messengers» (rusul), which, according to some theologians, implies a higher rank connected with the communication of a religious law as well as the admonition of peoples. Most of the Qur’anic prophets are distinguished figures from the Old and New Testaments: Adam, Noah, Lot, Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Ishmael, Joseph, Moses, Aaron, David, Solomon, Elijah, Elisha, Jonah, Job, Zechariah, John the Baptist, Jesus. Others belong to the legendary Arab heritage: Suʿayb, Hūd, Ṣāliḥ. The identification of some is less certain: Idrīs (Enoch), Dū l-Kifl (Ezekiel?). As regards the biblical figures, it is noteworthy that almost none of them are prophets in Scripture, while the principal prophets are missing. Muḥammad’s sources were probably mostly post-biblical and apocryphal, as is evident from the content of many narratives. The stories of the prophets closely follow the example of Muḥammad, with the aim of showing the incredulity of ancient peoples and the punishments they suffered for II.
Among the various figures, that of Jesus is the object of particular veneration. Muḥammad denies that He is God or the Son of God, though he acknowledges Him as the «Word,» and does not accept the dogmas of the Incarnation and Redemption. He narrates, however, His miraculous birth from Mary (though confused with Miriam, sister of Moses), says that He was assisted by the Holy Spirit, and recounts His miracles, some of which clearly derive from apocryphal sources. Notable is the account of the descent from heaven of a table spread with food, a curious adaptation of the Eucharist. The Qur’an denies the death of Jesus on the cross, asserting that one of His enemies was crucified in His place (docetism).
After Jesus, the last great prophet is Muḥammad. He insists in the Qur’an on his human and mortal nature, even claiming that his only miracle is the revealed book he brings to men. Later tradition, however, emphasized the Qur’anic hint of the Night Journey from Mecca to Jerusalem and attributed to Muḥammad the splitting of the moon in two. His preeminence over other prophets consists in being the last and the definitive («Seal»), sent to transmit the exact word of God and to restore His religion, which, after Abraham, Jews and Christians had corrupted.
V. SOTERIOLOGY AND ESCHATOLOGY
Under the heading “God’s promise and threat,” the Muʿtazilites framed, and later dogmatics developed, the problem of the future life (eschatology), for which soteriology provides the necessary introduction.As has been seen, Islamic soteriology crystallized after prolonged debate over the criterion of saving faith. Only the unbeliever, guilty of kufr (“misbelief”) or shirk (“polytheism”), is condemned to eternal punishment. The sinful Muslim (fāsiq) remains a believer so long as he does not openly apostatize and observes the legal precepts; even if he is the head of the community, obedience is still due him, while judgment on his works is reserved to God. Even when found guilty, these Muslims undergo only temporal, not eternal, punishment.
Faith is the subject of various questions: its value in one who accepts it on another’s authority, the possibility of degrees in faith, and other problems. The decisive value of faith for salvation reduced, in orthodox dogmatics, the function of penance; even here, questions arise, such as whether God is free to accept or reject repentance.
Islamic eschatology is almost entirely defined in the Qur’an: the announcement of the universal judgment is a dominant motif from the first preaching, so that dogmatic theology and later tradition have had to elaborate only details. After death, the body is buried and immediately subjected to the interrogation of the two angels Munkar and Nakir concerning faith and works. Unbelievers and sinful Muslims undergo “the torment of the tomb.” Prophets and martyrs, however, go straight to heaven. The fate of the soul until the resurrection is disputed: some theologians say it dies and rises with the body, others that it survives uninterruptedly.
The universal judgment takes place on a day known only to God. Various signs are said to precede it, such as the sun rising in the west, discord in the world, the appearance of a “beast of the earth,” and the coming of the Antichrist. Jesus will reappear and slay him. Popular imagination, more than theologians, dwells on the mahdī, a messianic restorer of justice; his conception was developed and rendered heterodox by sects.
The first blast of the trumpet of Isrāfīl will bring the end of the world; at the second, the dead will rise and gather on the plain of judgment. God will appear among the angels, and Muḥammad will intercede for souls. Each person’s deeds will be weighed on the scales; the righteous will receive the book of their works in their right hand, the wicked in their left. Then souls must cross a bridge as thin as the edge of a sword, stretched over hell (jahannam = gehenna). The wicked will fall; the righteous, through the “prophet’s basin,” will reach paradise (firdaws = παράδεισος).
The representation of the otherworldly realms is notoriously materialistic. Hell is a fiery valley where the damned suffer torment of hunger, smoke, and chains. It has seven gates, and popular tradition assigns it seven concentric circles (cf. E. Cerulli, *Il «Libro della Scala» e la questione delle fonti arabo-spagnole della Divina Commedia*, Vatican City 1949).
Paradise, by contrast, is an expanse of gardens and meadows through which flow streams of water, milk, wine, and honey. Great lotus trees spread their shade. The blessed, clad in rich garments and jewels, recline on sumptuous divans adorned with cushions and carpets. They partake of delicious foods and drinks and are attended by the ḥūr (houris), beautiful maidens whose virginity is ever renewed. The only spiritual note in this picture is the vision of God.
VI. ECCLESIOLOGY
An important chapter of dogmatic theology concerns the community of believers and the imām, that is, its head. The famous decree promulgated at Medina by Muḥammad first defined the new concept of community: it replaced the tribal bond with that of faith, making believers into a family of equals under the direct jurisdiction of Allah.In this organism, teaching authority belongs to God through the Qur’anic revelation. There are no divinely instituted offices intended to preside over dogmatic development or to ratify definitions in this matter; there are no counterparts to the Pope or to Catholic councils. Islam has only interpreters of the divine teaching, the learned men (‘ulamā’, fuqahā’), among whom, moreover, no clerical or caste organization exists.
The ministry reflects a similar situation: there is no organized priesthood, just as there are no sacraments to administer. Moreover, the legalism typical of Islam almost entirely ignores the believer’s internal forum, or at least does not treat it as a subject of this discipline; instead, it translates problems into the external forum, turning them into judicial matters to which judges (qāḍīs) give daily rulings.
A third aspect of community life is the empire, that is, political direction. Here the early polemics were bitter, and sectarian divisions resulted. According to the original orthodox theory, the head, who cannot be lacking and must be one, must meet the following fundamental conditions: be free, male, adult, sound in body and mind, possessed of moral qualities and sufficient knowledge of the law. Naturally, he must be a Muslim and belong to the Quraysh tribe, though not necessarily to the Prophet’s family. He is designated by the most authoritative citizens, possibly on the indication of his predecessor. His prerogatives include directing prayer, the pilgrimage, holy war, and exercising oversight over religious and social life. He may be deposed only for failure to fulfill his obligations.
This theory, fairly democratic and bearing the stamp of pre-Islamic Arab tradition, has almost never been put into practice. The institution of the caliphate, which became hereditary under the Umayyads and the ʿAbbāsids and was progressively stripped of power through ever-greater absolutism, underwent periods of fragmentation and alternation, culminating in its transfer to the Ottoman Turks and its eventual abolition.
IV. SPIRITUAL THEOLOGY
OUTLINE:
I. Origins of spiritual theology (taṣawwuf)
II. Historical elements
III. Doctrinal elements.I. ORIGINS OF SPIRITUAL THEOLOGY (taṣawwuf)
Islam is not, in itself, much inclined toward asceticism or mysticism. It is, in fact, a religion of predominantly legal and formal character; moreover, because of its adequacy to human needs and its balance between earthly and heavenly goods, it lacks that powerful impulse toward worldly renunciation which, in Christianity, arises from the absolute and revolutionary primacy of spiritual values. That said, it is true that the Qur’an contains seeds of ascetic and mystical life. The very absolute transcendence of the deity and His boundless power move one to confide in Him; nor are there lacking passages where God’s presence in the human heart appears, where He teaches through parables, and even where the idea of degrees and higher states in the spiritual life is found. These Qur’anic seeds, moreover, were joined to the powerful impulse of Christian example, whose monasticism Muḥammad himself admired and held up as an example. It is undoubtedly to Christianity that Muslim asceticism and mysticism owe much of their most genuine tradition, even if it is not easy to trace the direct lines of progressive influence; whereas the cultural and philosophical legacy of Neoplatonism and Gnosticism, which entered Islamic spiritual theology later, would be responsible for many of its deviations. The influence of Indian mysticism, occasionally invoked, must be considered slight and peripheral.II. Historical Elements
Louis Massignon has astutely revealed elements of asceticism, and even of mysticism, in the earliest Muslim generations, even before the effective influence of external currents could be determined. Among the companions of the Prophet, especially Abū Qarīr and Hudhayfah are cited, known for their condemnation of sinful rulers and for precepts and sayings of spiritual life. Some of these early ascetics led public and preaching lives; others preferred retreat. In general, the dominant element of the earliest Muslim spiritual life is the fear of God’s threats, rooted in the Qur’anic announcements of the imminent Judgment. The first centers formed in the great cities: prominent in Basrah at the end of the 1st century is the figure of al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī, author of sermons on the intimate life of souls; he is also known for having, in the name of the community’s good, defended the legitimacy of the Umayyad family against both Shi‘ites and Kharijites, while not concealing its defects and faults. In him, an early tendency toward systematizing the ascetic-mystical vein and reconciling it with other parts of theology is discernible, a tendency that would later find ample development.
The 2nd century of the Hijrah marks the progressive definition of asceticism and mysticism. The name *sūfī* appears, whence *taṣawwuf* or *sūfism*, from the woolen mantle (*sūf*) worn by adherents of these currents. From then on, the name *sūfism* would serve to define spiritual theology. The concept of the fear of God is integrated with a clearer sense of love for Him, which finds lofty expression in the mysticism of Rābi‘ah (d. 801–802). Other principal figures are Rabāḥ (d. ca. 800) and ‘Abd al-Wāḥid b. Zayd (d. 793), founder of the first Muslim monastery.
The 3rd century brings Sufism to its highest level, both in practice and in theoretical refinement of the ascetic-mystical path. Al-Muḥāsibī of Basrah (d. 857) and the Egyptian Dhū ’l-Nūn (d. 856) are among the preeminent figures of this period. But the clarification of the ascetic-mystical path already reveals to Sufis its extreme degree. With Abū Yazīd al-Bisṭāmī (d. 874), the concept of union and identification with the Divinity emerges, later inspiring the famous al-Ḥallāj, who died on the cross in Baghdad in 922 for having claimed to be God.
In the definition of the spiritual path, the influence of Christianity, Greek philosophy, and Gnosticism is already evident. This influence, by bringing Sufism more strongly onto the doctrinal plane, accentuates its contrast with orthodoxy, already embryonic in its early phases. Al-Ḥallāj’s affirmation was indeed the final step in a process that could not but offend the guardians of divine transcendence and absolute sovereignty.
Thus, under the impact of philosophical ideas, the ascetic-mystical current begins to fragment: on one side, it receives from them a theorizing force that, inspired by principles of moderation, progressively tends to align it with the dogmatic and legal theory of orthodoxy; on the other, somewhat later, emanatism and Neoplatonic-Gnostic monism carry it ever further from the religion of the community. It is certainly not in this second current, nor perhaps even in the first, that the most genuine and authentic tradition of Sufism is to be found; rather, it must always be recognized in the earliest generations.
In the 4th and 5th centuries, the theorization of asceticism and mysticism is illustrated by the treatises of al-Makkī (d. 996) and al-Qushayrī (d. 1074). Shortly afterward, the work of reconciliation—or rather, of integrating the ascetic-mystical vein into orthodoxy—reaches its most definitive expression in the work of the aforementioned al-Ghazālī. His fundamental writing, *The Revival of the Religious Sciences*, is a constant exhortation to experience and the adherence of the heart to religious life.
Al-Ghazālī’s conciliatory action fostered in the Islamic world the organization of Sufis, manifested in the confraternities (*ṭarīqah*), congregations that hold periodic gatherings for the practice of ascetic and mystical exercises, often accompanied by music, chanting, and dance. These do not imply monastic life and have varying degrees of affiliation. The confraternities saw great development and are now very numerous in the Muslim world. One of the most well-known is that of the Sanūsiyyah. Many of their leaders have received the aura of sanctity, a conception foreign to primitive Islam and developed only later through the specific action of Sufism.
While spiritual theology thus approached orthodoxy through these channels, it simultaneously moved in another direction toward a definitive separation. From Neoplatonism and Gnosticism, it absorbed elements of emanatism and pantheism—or monism, as it is better called. From these arose moral quietism, anonymity, and adogmatism. In its law of love and union with God, the mystic considers himself beyond good and evil, beyond creed and dogma. Esotericism develops, through which these extreme forms connect with the heritage of Gnosticism in a schismatic context, particularly with Isma‘ilism (v. infra). The most celebrated exponents of such currents, within the space of a single century, include the Turk Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī (d. 1273); though they often reach a lofty religious lyricism, they are by then very remote from both orthodoxy and the primitive vein of Muslim spiritual theology.
III. Doctrinal Elements
Sufism possesses a technical terminology that defines the successive elements and degrees of asceticism and, consequently, of mysticism. Notable correspondences with the concepts and terms of Christian spiritual theology are readily discernible.
He who follows the ascetic-mystical path is first a *mubtadi‘* and beginner, or *murīd* and aspirant; then a *sālik* and wayfarer, having attained the ascetic degree; finally a *qā’il* and arrived, or *kāmil* and perfect, having attained the mystical degree.
Asceticism, which serves as a propaedeutic to mysticism, is called *ṭarīq* (the path) or *mujāhadah* (struggle). In it, the initiate is guided by a *murīd* and guide. The successive stages of asceticism are called *maqāmāt* (stations). Their classification varies; however, the first of these is penitence, and the last, through various degrees of renunciation, is conformity to the divine will (*riḍā*).
To the “stations” of asceticism correspond in mysticism the “states” (*aḥwāl*). Their classification is also manifold; at the foundation stands the love (*maḥabbah*) of God, and at the summit, union (*tawḥīd*) with Him. There are three kinds of union, of which only the first is admitted by orthodoxy: *ittiṣāl* and conjunction (cf. *sūqūq*); *ittiḥād* and unification (cf. *ἕνωσις*); *ḥulūl* and infusion (of God into the soul of the mystic; cf. *ἕνωσις* and *ἐνώσεις*). It was this last form for which al-Ḥallāj was accused. To union with God are linked the concepts of *fanā’* and *baqā’*. The former is the *disparitio potentiarum*, the momentary annihilation of the mystic in the Divinity; the latter expresses instead the “permanence” in the state of union and constitutes the highest and exceptional limit of mystical experience (cf. the “transforming union”).
Many mystical schools distinguish union with the actions, the attributes, and the essence of God. Others limit themselves to union with Muḥammad.
V. Islam
### Outline:
I. The Sects
II. Origin and Development of the *Fiqh*
III. Doctrinal Elements of the *Fiqh*
IV. Other Sects
I. THE SHI'A
Heterodox Islam, in its political, dogmatic, and legal elements, is flanked by a series of sects, due to the absence of a hierarchical church and councils and to the religious and philosophical traditions with which it came into historical contact. The essential original element of these heterodox currents lies in the historical events that center around the figure of 'Ali. *Si'at 'Ali* (« party of 'Ali »), or more simply *fi'ah*, is the name given to that complex of sects, by far the most important and numerous (ca. 20 million), which recognizes the right to political and religious government over the Muslim community only for 'Ali and his descendants. Opposed to the *fi'ah* are the *bani rigidi* (ca. half a million), who separated from 'Ali when he accepted arbitration with Mu'awijah and remained against him and his enemies. Finally, if the hypotheses formulated especially by Guidi are correct, the tendencies favorable to the Umayyads were carried to excess, and thus fell into heterodoxy, by sects that deified members of that family and especially Yazid I (Yazidis). The phenomenon of Yazidism is practically severed from the body of Islam, just as many extremist sects historically developed from the *fi'ah*: all these movements will therefore be discussed in greater detail under their respective headings.Some heterodox movements also arose independently of the events centered on 'Ali. Such is the Ahmadiyya in India at the end of the last century.
The theocratic character of the Islamic community automatically transferred political opposition onto the religious plane.
II. ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE *FI'AH*
The origins of the *fi'ah* go back to the very beginnings of Islamic history, to groups of believers who disapproved of the election to the caliphate of Abu Bakr, 'Umar, and 'Uthman, considering the greater rights of 'Ali, the Prophet's cousin and son-in-law, to have been violated. The subsequent government of 'Ali brought this tendency to temporary victory; the rise of the Umayyads definitively pushed it into opposition, beginning a periodic cycle of insurrections and repressions that was to continue for centuries. Of the two sons of 'Ali and Fatimah, al-Hasan and al-Husayn, the former died in private life, probably corrupted by Mu'awijah; the latter fell at Karbala in 680. Thus began the fragmentation of the *fi'ah* into sects, according to the successors to whom the right to the *imamate*, i.e., supreme political and religious authority, was attributed. The *fi'ah* almost always lacked a strong unitary organization and suitable leaders, which was the main cause of their defeats.The history of the *fi'ah* is not merely a periodic political cycle; it is also a history of intense religious evolution, in which, upon the original Islamic foundation, successive elements from the surrounding environment were inserted, among which stand out the philosophical-religious experience of Gnosticism and the Iranian tradition of Manichaean and Mazdakite movements. Elements that, contemporaneous in their tendencies toward greater moralization, ended up instead prevailing in the extremist *fi'ah*, carrying it far from 'Ali.
The development of Shi'ism is extremely intricate and complex. Its successive elements are given by the appearance of various *imams*, often many at the same time and even in conflict with one another. An element of clarification and guidance can be provided by the distinction within the *fi'ah* of three major groups or tendencies, according to the varying degree of assistance or divine nature attributed to the *imam*: moderate, middle, and extreme *fi'ah*.
The descendants of 'Ali
16. Moderate Shi'ism
It is made up of the Zaydis, so called because they are followers of Zayd b. 'Ali, who died in 740 while rising against the Umayyad caliph Hisham. According to the Zaydis, the *imamate* belongs to those descendants of 'Ali who can earn it by merit. The *imam* has no divine prerogatives for them, but is merely assisted by the deity. The Zaydis founded at the beginning of the 10th century a state in Yemen, which still exists today. They number about 1 million.17. Middle Shi'ism
It is represented by the Imamis or Twelvers, so called because they believe in 12 *imams*, namely 'Ali, al-Hasan, al-Husayn, and then in the line of descent 'Ali Zayn al-'Abidin, Muhammad al-Baqir (and not the younger brother Zayd, from whom the Zaydis derive), Ja'far al-Sadiq, Musa al-Kazim (instead of the elder brother Isma'il, who died before his father; to him, instead, the Isma'ilis, extreme Shi'ites, are linked), and then his successors up to Muhammad al-Mahdi. The latter is considered to have disappeared and is awaited as the *mahdi*, the savior at the end of time.The Twelvers affirm the immanence in the *imam* of a particle of divine light, which makes him an infallible interpreter of revelation. Some dynasties adhered to this tendency, the most important of which are those ruling in Persia from the 16th century to the present day. Persian Shi'ites are considered lieutenants of the hidden *imam*.
Groups of Imamis are also found today in India, Mesopotamia, and Syria (Metawali). Altogether, the Twelvers number about 17 million and are by far the largest Shi'ite group.
From the Twelver *fi'ah*, two religious reform movements, strongly influenced by doctrines of an extremist tendency, broke away at the beginning of the last century. The first is Babism, founded by 'Ali Muhammad of Shiraz, who proclaimed himself the *bab*, i.e., the « gate » between the faithful and the twelfth *imam* during his absence, and later also the *nuqta*, i.e., the locus of manifestation of divine revelation. He upheld emanationist doctrines of an Isma'ili type.
18. Extreme Shi'ism
In the framework of Isma'ilism arise—and to it belong—the greatest movements of the extreme *fi'ah*: Qarmatians, Fatimids, Druze, Assassins.The Qarmatian movement, founded in the 9th century by 'Abdallah b. Maymun and developed in Syria and Mesopotamia until the 11th century (remnants still exist in Arabia), brings to explicit definition the Isma'ili doctrine, consisting of a Gnostic type of emanationist monism, based on the number 7. From God emanate the universal intellect, the universal soul, prime matter, space, time, and the terrestrial world. Time has 7 cycles, each with a « speaking » prophet, aided by a series of 7 *imams*, of whom the first is the « silent » one (also called the « base »), who esoterically disseminates the doctrine. The sixth cycle has as its speaking prophet Muhammad, and as its silent *imam* 'Ali; the seventh has as its speaking prophet Muhammad b. Isma'il, and as its *imam* 'Abdallah b. Maymun himself. A marked feature of the Qarmatian movement in the social sphere was communism, through which the Mazdakite influence is evident.
From Qarmatianism, to which a series of bloody revolts against the Abbasids is due, there developed the Fatimid dynasty, which ruled Egypt and Syria from the 10th to the 12th centuries, claiming descent from the seventh *imam* through a series of hidden successors. With the Fatimids, Isma'ilism became the official religion, assuming a more moderate character. The only exception to this was the episode of the sixth caliph al-Hakim (996–1020 A.D.), who proclaimed himself the definitive incarnation of the deity. His followers took the name Druze from the propagandist al-Darazi, who spread the movement in Syria, where it is still present today. The Druze emanationist system, traced back to Hamzah b. 'Ali, is similar to the Isma'ili one, with modifications in favor of al-Hakim and Hamzah.
Further Ismaili groups formed after the death of the Fāṭimid caliph al-Mustanṣir: followers of the son al-Mustaʿlī, who prevailed in the succession, were the Mustʿalites, of whom there remain today remnants in Yemen and in India under the name of Bohorā; whereas a follower of the other son Nizār was a group led by al-Ḥasan b. al-Ṣabbāḥ, who, having moved to Persia and Syria, founded the sect of the Assassins (so called from the intoxicating herb *hašīš*). Remnants of them are found in Persia, in Afghanistan, and especially in India, where they take the name of Ḥōgah. Their leader is the Āghā Khān.
Among the extremist Shīʿite sects not connected with Ismailism, mention must be made, in the earliest phase of Islamic religious history, of the group that rallied around Muḥammad b. al-Ḥanafiyyah, called Kaysānites. Some held that this son of ʿAlī had disappeared and awaited him as the Mahdī. Others transferred the imamate from him to his son Abū Hāshim, and from there they divided in various directions. The most important of these was the ʿAbbāsid branch, which, asserting the testamentary transfer of the imamate from Abū Hāshim to the ʿAbbāsid family, furnished a theoretical justification for their rise to the caliphate.
Today there remain some sects of extreme Shīʿism besides those of Ismaili derivation. Among them are the Nuṣayrīs or ʿAlawites of Syria, originating in the 10th century, who assert a trinity composed of ʿAlī, Muḥammad, and Salmān, the Persian slave who became a companion of the Prophet. Another living sect is that of the ʿAlī-Ilāhīs, who deify ʿAlī, spread since the 17th century in Asia Minor, Mesopotamia, Persia, and Transcaucasia. In Persia there have survived since the 14th century the Hurūfīs, characterized by a complex symbolic system based on the letters of the alphabet. The doctrines of the Hurūfīs influenced the Sufi brotherhood of the Bektāshīs (v. BEKTĀSHIYYAH), in which are found numerous beliefs proper to extremist Shīʿism.
III. DOCTRINAL ELEMENTS OF SHĪʿISM
The doctrinal content of Shīʿism, whose multifaceted development has been traced above, centers on the conception of the imām, decidedly different from that of orthodoxy: the imām must belong to the family of ʿAlī, and the assistance or indwelling of the deity in him, according to the various tendencies, renders him infallible. He thus possesses supreme authority.
(from Ambrosiano, *Scritti di storia archeologica ed arte pubblicati nel 16° centenario della nascita di s. Ambrogio* EUCEL. MCCEL. Milano 1812, fol. II — Procrastinatio of cod. B., the second of the two manuscripts containing the complete recension of the *Corpus Juris* of Zayd b. ʿAlī. Nashk script with vowels)
Given these general characteristics of Shīʿite currents, their dogmatic and legal theology, although differing in some points from the orthodox, is on the whole not greatly dissimilar. In dogmatic theology the moderate Shīʿites essentially follow the Muʿtazilite system, as do the intermediate ones, though the latter do not accept eternal punishment for unrepentant Muslims. The doctrines propounded by the extremists carry them beyond even this dogmatic system.
In legal theology the Zaydites follow the rite of that name, which they trace back to Zayd b. ʿAlī and which closely resembles the orthodox rites. The Imāmīs and also the extremist Shīʿites follow the Jaʿfarite system, so called from the sixth imām Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq. The chief divergence of this rite from the others is the admission of temporary marriage (*mutʿa*).
The Shīʿites have their own cities and shrines, to which they make pilgrimages. The most important center is Karbalāʾ, where the tomb of Ḥusayn is located. The Shīʿites commemorate his death with rites of mourning on the 10th of Muḥarram.
IV. OTHER SECTS
19. The Khārijites
These are the followers of ʿAlī who separated from him when he accepted the arbitration at Ṣiffīn, holding that judgment belonged to God alone. The name is explained as “those who go out from the camp” or, according to a recent hypothesis of Guidi, “those who go out into the field.” The Khārijites opposed both the Shīʿites and Muʿāwiyah, and as such continued the struggle during the Umayyad dynasty and the early period of the ʿAbbāsid. A branch of them, the Ibāḍites, moved to North Africa, where they founded small states and still survive. It is essentially to them that we owe our knowledge of Khārijite dogmatic and legal theology.The essential thesis of Khārijite dogma, linked to the origins of the movement, concerns the problem of faith and works: a Muslim guilty of a grave sin thereby becomes an unbeliever. Hence the Khārijites recognize as caliphs only Abū Bakr, ʿUmar, ʿUthmān up to the seventh year of his reign, and ʿAlī up to the arbitration. Membership in the Quraysh tribe or in the family of the Prophet is not necessary for the caliph: any Muslim may be caliph, provided his works are upright; when he falls into sin, he must be deposed. In the remaining points of dogmatic theology, the Ibāḍite treatises follow the Muʿtazilite theses, except for that of free will, on which they agree with orthodox Ashʿarite doctrine.
In legal theology the Ibāḍites have their own rite, which in general closely resembles the Sunnite one.
20. The Yazīdīs
They number several tens of thousands of people of Kurdish origin and language, with a main nucleus near Mosul and others in Mesopotamia, Syria, Armenia, the Caucasus, and Persia. They believe in a supreme God from whom seven angels emanate. The first is the peacock angel, *malak ṭāʾūs*, a fallen angel who later repented and thus became a principle of good. He is the regent of the world; he is incarnate in Yazīd and then in Shaykh ʿAdī, a mystical Muslim saint who became the central figure of this sect. The other six angels also have incarnations. The doctrine of metempsychosis is present among the Yazīdīs, together with other Gnostic and Iranian elements (traces of dualism). In ritual there are strong Christian and Jewish influences. Their worship centers on the annual pilgrimage to the shrine of Shaykh ʿAdī near Mosul.21. The Ahmadiyyah
A sect founded by Ghulām Aḥmad of Qādiān (d. 1908) in India. He maintained that Christ died in India at the age of 120; declared himself the Messiah and Mahdī; affirmed the spiritual nature of holy war and hence, in the particular case of India, respect for British rule. After his death the sect divided into the Qādiān and Lahore groups. — See pl. XIX.For Islamic art: V. MUSULMANA, ARTE, ARTE.
History. General bibliography: J. Sauvaget, *Introduction à l'histoire de l'Orient musulman. Éléments de bibliographie*, Paris 1946 (most useful).
General works: C. Brockelmann, Geschichte der islamischen Völker und Staaten, Munich and Berlin 1939 (updated English trans.: New York 1947 and 1949; French trans.: Paris 1949); P. K. Hitti, History of the Arabs, 4th ed., London 1949 (up to, but excluding, the period of Ottoman hegemony). Excellent genealogical and chronological tables in E. de Zambaur, Manuel de généalogie et de chronologie pour l'histoire de l’Islam, Hanover 1927. The great analytical works begun by L. Caetani remain incomplete: Annali dell’Islam, 1 vol., Milan 1904–26 (translation or summary of sources with critical analysis, up to the year 40 of the hijra); Chronographia islamica, Paris 1912–22 (collection of sources for each event, up to the years 132 and 133, continued in Cronografia generale del bacino mediterraneo e dell’Oriente musulmano, fasc. I, Rome 1923 (up to 144 and 145).
On the Umayyads: J. Wellhausen, Das arabische Reich und sein Sturz, Berlin 1902. Also a series of studies by H. Lammens and F. Gabrieli (see the references given by J. Sauvaget, op. cit., pp. 119–120).
On the Abbasids: G. van Vloten, De Opkomst der Abbasiden in Chorasan, Leiden 1890; A. Mez, Die Renaissance des Islam, Heidelberg 1922 (on the Abbasid civilization of decline).
For specific bibliography from the period of autonomous states onward, see the relevant entries on individual peoples and regions; also J. Sauvaget, op. cit., p. 129; S. Sugli, Recent events: M. V. Seaton-Williams, Britain and the Arab States. A survey of Anglo-Arab relations, 1920–48, London 1948; cf. also the journal Oriente moderno, 1 (1921) SGR.
Religion. General works: I. Goldziher, Vorlesungen über den Islam, 2nd ed., Heidelberg 1925 (French trans. by J. Arin, Le dogme et la loi de l’Islam, Paris 1920); H. Lammens, L’Islam, croyances et institutions, 3rd ed., Beirut 1944 (Italian trans. by F. Gabrieli, Bari 1940); G. E. von Grunebaum, Medieval Islam, Chicago 1946; M. Guidi, Storia della religione dell’Islam, in P. Tacchi Venturi, Storia delle religioni, II, 3rd ed., Turin 1949, pp. 303–437. Modern Islam: R. Hartmann, Die Krisis des Islam, Leipzig 1928; H. A. R. Gibb, Whither Islam, 2nd ed., London 1932; id., Modern trends in Islam, Chicago 1947. Anthologies of texts: J. Schnadt, Der Islam, mit Ausschluss des Korans, Tübingen 1931; A. J. Wensinck, The Muslim creed: its genesis and historical development, Cambridge 1932.
Legal theology: Th. W. Juynboll, Handleiding tot de kennis van de mohammedaansche wet volgens de leer der sjafi’itische school, 3rd ed., Leiden 1925 (Italian trans. by G. Baviera, Milan 1916); D. Santillana, Istituzioni di diritto musulmano malikita con riguardo anche al sistema sciafita, 2 vols., Rome 1926–43 (fundamental); J. Schacht, G. Bergsträsser’s Grundzüge des islamischen Rechts, Berlin and Leipzig 1935.
Dogmatic theology: A. S. Tritton, Muslim theology, London 1947; L. Gardet and M.-M. Anawati, Introduction à la théologie musulmane. Essai de théologie comparée, Paris 1948 (comparative study with Christian theology).
Spiritual theology: R. A. Nicholson, The mystics of Islam, London 1914 (Italian trans. by V. VEZZOLANO, Turin 1925); id., Studies in Islamic mysticism, Cambridge 1921; L. Massignon, Essai sur les origines du lexique technique de la mystique musulmane, Paris 1922; id., Recueil de textes inédits concernant l’histoire de la mystique en pays d’Islam, 1 vol., Paris 1929; A. J. Wensinck, Oostersche mystiek, Amsterdam 1930; M. Smith, Studies in early mysticism in the Near and Middle East, London 1931.
Heterodox Islam. The best introduction, with bibliography, is in the entries of the cited Handwörterbuch des Islam. Also A. S. Tritton, op. cit. Shi‘ites in general: D. M. Donaldson, The shi‘ite religion, London 1933. Zaydis: R. Strothmann, Der Kultus der Zaiditen, Strasbourg 1912; id., Das Staatsrecht der Zaiditen, 1 vol. Duodecimans: R. Strothmann, Die Zwölfer-Schi‘a, Leipzig 1926. Kharijites: J. Wellhausen, Die religiös-politischen Oppositionsparteien im alten Islam, Berlin 1901; F. Gabrieli, Sulle origini del movimento kharijita, in Rend. R. Accademia d’Italia, Scienze morali e storiche, 7th ser., 3 (1941), pp. 110–117; M. Guidi, Sui Kharijiti, in Riv. degli studi orientali, 21 (1944), pp. 1–14. For other sects, see the relevant entries. Sabatino Moscati