Alms

ELEMOSINA. —

I. CONCEPT

assistance given to one who is in need; it therefore embraces both material and spiritual aid. In common usage it means material assistance to one who needs it; and it is specifically this that is under discussion.

II. OBLIGATION

The Gospel returns to these ideas, not only with its precept of actively loving one’s neighbor, but also with explicit instructions (cf. the parable of the rich man and poor Lazarus, Lc. 16, 19-31, and of the dishonest steward, Lc. 16, 1-13; the Last Judgment, Mt. 25, 41-46), emphasizing that assistance must be given to everyone, including strangers and enemies (the parable of the Good Samaritan, Lc. 10, 30-37), and without ostentation (Mt. 6, 2-19). Above all, Jesus Christ gave this material assistance a powerful new impetus by declaring that he considers as done to himself everything that is done even to the least of his brothers (Mt. 25, 40), and by proposing the surrender of all one’s possessions to the poor as one of the prerequisites of perfection (Lc. 18, 18-23).

In line with the Gospel is the apostolic preaching (cf., for example, I Tim. 6, 17-19; Jac. 2, 13; I Io. 3, 17), as well as the entire preaching of the Fathers and the pontiffs. For the former, see, for example, Hermas, 2, 2; Tertulliano, Apolog., 39: PL 1, 470-78; s. Cipriano De opere et eleemosynis, 1, 30-34; PL 4, 602-22; s. Agostino, Serm., 36, 41, 45, 60, 61, 85, 86: PL 38, 215-21; 217-51; 251-54; 402-409; 409-14; 520-23; 523-30; s. Gregorio Magno, Mor., 21, 16-17: PL 76, 204-205; Clemente Alessandro, Paedag., 3, 6: PG 8, 603-607; Stramata, 2, 18: PG 8, 1015-39; s. Cirillo Gerosolimitano Catech., 15, 26: PG 33, 907; s. Gregorio Nazianzeno, De pauperum amore: Ps. 35, 858-910. For the pontiffs, see above all the encyclicals Rerum Novarum of Leone XIII = Quadragesimo anno of Pio XI.
The reflection of theologians has further deepened the obligation of almsgiving; they dispute its basis and extent. Some maintain that it is solely a duty of charity (cf., for example, Soto, De iustitia et iure, I, V, q. 3, a. 4; L. Lessio, De iustitia et iure ceterisque virtutibus cardinalibus, 2, 12, 12; 16, 1; and among more recent authors M. Zara, Et motivo de la limosna, in Fomento social, 3 [1948], pp. 421-26); others, on the contrary, speak of social justice (cf., for example, Caetano, De eleemosynae praecepta; and among modern authors C. Damen, De recto usu bonorum superfluorum, in Miscellanea Vermeerich, I, Roma 1935, pp. 63-79). Some even go so far as to invoke commutative justice, at least with regard to superfluous goods (for example, A. Horváth, Eigentumsrecht wach dem hl. Thomas von Aquin, Graz 1929).

Theologians make the extent of this duty depend on the resources of the person who must provide assistance and on the degree of need of the person to be assisted. They generally distinguish three degrees of need: ordinary, grave, and extreme (v. BENI SUPERFLUI). To these they correlate three forms of surplus: surplus for the individual, that is, what is not strictly necessary for living; surplus for the person, that is, what is not indispensable for a certain development of one’s faculties; and surplus for one’s state, that is, what is not necessary for the complete development of one’s life according to the requirements of one’s state and person. According to some, one is obliged to give only in cases of extreme need; according to others, also in cases of grave need (for example, L. Lessio, De iustitia et iure, ccc., 2, 12, 12); according to still others, also in cases of ordinary need (for example, Fr. Suarez, De charitate, 7). As regards the basis of the duty, it seems necessary to say that it arises from various sources: a) the duty to love one’s neighbor actively as oneself; b) the universal destination of goods for the benefit of all humanity; c) the duty of every member of society to contribute to the common good according to his abilities. Charity indeed requires us to share with others what we possess, thereby establishing a certain equality of conditions; the universal destination of goods means that genuine surplus must be assigned to the benefit of others; and membership in society finally imposes on each person the duty of placing at its disposal, according to his abilities, what is indispensable for the common good. It is obvious that the different grounds may converge upon the same object, which in certain cases will have to be given both out of charity, because of the universal destination of goods, and out of social solidarity.

As regards the amount of assistance to be given and the gravity of the duty, one should not insist so much on distinctions between the various degrees of need and surplus as on the donor’s general attitude. Rather than precisely determining his surplus and the degree of need of the poor person to be assisted, the person who possesses something should remember that he has before him a brother, not a stranger, and should remember what he would wish to be done for him were he in the condition of the poor person whom he is assisting.

Finally, as regards the manner of conveying material assistance, the forms may be indefinitely varied. Those should be preferred which least encourage improvidence and laziness, which best enable those assisted subsequently to provide for themselves, which least humiliate, and so forth. Only the search for ever more prudent and delicate forms can remove from almsgiving that unpleasant aspect which, unfortunately, many find in it, and can make it possible to overcome many of the difficulties commonly raised against II.

Giovanni Battista Guzzetti
III. E. IN CANON LAW. — The practice of e. played a very extensive part in the life of the Church from its earliest times; and assistance to the poor and the distribution of e. constituted one of the principal and specific functions of special ministers: the deacons. Later, the practice was introduced—and, particularly from about the 9th century onward, spread in many regions—of granting remission of sins through e. or commuting certain canonical penalties into e.; at times, even through assessments of a fixed amount. But because of the frequent abuses to which this practice gave rise, synods and councils did not fail to issue severe prohibitions and restrictions concerning II.
Once the abuses had been removed, the practice of e. remained in the discipline of the Church as satisfactory penance; and even at present the CIC lists e. among the principal penances: can. 2313 § 1: Praecipuae poenitentiae sunt praecepta... 4 Erogandi eleemosynus in pios usus.

E. also constitutes one of the sources of ecclesiastical patrimony. Indeed, it was the first, since during the apostolic period the needs of the Church and its ministers were met essentially through the voluntary offerings of the faithful, whether in the form of offerings in kind or monetary contributions. Although, in the course of the centuries, other sources of patrimonial income under public and private law were subsequently added to provide the Church with the means of attaining its ends, free offerings have always retained an important, and at times predominant, role in the economy of the Church itself. Of these offerings—which, in the broad sense, would include all free and spontaneous gifts of things not owed, made for a supernatural purpose, and therefore also all gratuitous transactions known as ad causas pias, whether inter vivos (donation) or mortis causa (will)—canon law particularly regulates offerings or e. (oblations in the narrower sense), consisting of manual donations made for the benefit of ecclesiastical persons or entities, or for purposes of worship or charity, but which do not give rise to a permanent juridical entity (institution, foundation), and in which the relationship between the offerer and the recipient, exhausted in the delivery of the thing offered, produces no subsequent juridical effects. As a general rule, the CIC, with the exception of religious, for whom special norms are laid down, establishes the principle that every private individual, cleric or layperson, is forbidden to beg or make collections (stipem cogere) for any ecclesiastical institute or pious purpose without apostolic approval, or without the written permission of his own Ordinary and of the Ordinary of the place (can. 1503). It is nevertheless held that local customs may legitimate other forms of begging and collections, in churches or from house to house, on the occasion of particular circumstances or for specified charitable works (Propagation of the Faith, Holy Childhood, etc.).

Pious associations likewise may not collect e. unless their respective statutes permit it and there is the express authorization of the Ordinary (can. 691). Parish priests, on the other hand, are free to collect e., within the limits of their parish, in order to meet the needs of the works entrusted to them, subject to the obligation of administering and distributing the e. according to the wishes of the donors (can. 415 § 2 n. 5; 630 § 4). The administration of offerings is subject to the supervision of the Ordinary of the place, whether the offerings are made for the benefit of a parish, missions, or other churches (can. 1182), or for the benefit of pious associations (can. 691).

As regards religious, only the mendicant Orders (regulares, qui ex instituto mendicantes vocantur; can. 621 § 1; that is, mendicants in the strict sense, such as the Friars Minor and the Capuchins) have the right to beg, that is, to collect e. in the territory of the diocese in which their house is situated. For this purpose, the permission of their respective religious superiors is sufficient. Outside the diocese, that of the local Ordinary is also required (can. 621).

Non-mendicant religious, on the other hand, may not collect e. without a special privilege of the Holy See, if they are religious of pontifical right; for religious of diocesan right, however, the written permission is required of the Ordinary of the place where their house is situated and of that of the place where they intend to beg (can. 622). Special instructions of the Holy See (decree De eleemosynis, 21 June 1908; Singulari quidem, 27 March 1896), to which the CIC refers (cann. 623-24), strictly regulate the procedures to be observed in the begging of religious. Among these, one is particularly noteworthy: they are ordinarily forbidden to beg individually; the exceptions permitted for male religious of an excellent reputation are not allowed for women religious.

A particular kind of e. is that which is given for the celebration or application of Masses. In technical language it is also designated by the term stipendium, which the same code assumes as equivalent to e. (v. LIBIA. III P. I, tit. III, a IV, De Missarum eleemosynis seu stipendiis). This terminology, which is connected with the Latin usage of calling stipendium what was given to each soldier for his maintenance (and likewise s. Paul in the celebrated passage: quis militat suis stipendiis unquam?... Nescitis quoniam qui in sacrario operantur, quae de sacrario sunt, adunt: et qui altari deservium cum altari participant? Ita et Dominus ordinovis iis, qui Evangelium annunciant, de Evangelio vivere: I Cor., 9, 7-14), and from which the designation stipendium was subsequently applied to everything that the ministers of the altar received for their maintenance, already serves in a certain way to highlight the justifying element of the prestation in question. This element consists in the purpose of procuring for the celebrant a means of support, while excluding—as is generally the case with all prestations given to a priest on the occasion of acts of his spiritual ministry (v. STOLA, DIRITTI di)—any notion of payment of a price, and still more of a monetary equivalent for the sacrifice celebrated or applied.

Mass stipends originated in the offerings that, from the earliest times, the faithful made for the celebration of the Eucharistic Sacrifice, and from which whatever remained after the bread and wine necessary for the Eucharistic banquet had been taken was devoted to feeding the poor and supporting the clergy. From this form of general oblation there subsequently developed—whether only at the end of the 15th century and the beginning of the 16th, or earlier is uncertain—the form of a specific offering for a Mass, so that it might be celebrated according to the wishes and intentions requested by the donors. As the practice of the Mass stipend spread, theological controversies concerning it likewise developed extensively. While the doctrine concerning the fruit and application of the Eucharistic Sacrifice was being determined, discussion focused on the nature and liceity of the Mass stipend, and particularly on the fundamental question whether it should not be regarded as the matter of simony. This point was extensively examined, among others, by s. Thomas, who, having raised the question of the liceity of monetary payment pro Sacramentis, replied quod Sacerdes non accipit pecuniam quasi pretium Consecrationis Eucharistiae aut Missae decantantae (hac enim esset simoniacum), sed quasi stipendium suae sustentationis (Sum. Theol., 2a-2bc, q. C. art. 2).

As it spread, especially from the twelfth century onward, the practice of offering stipends for Masses was not without giving rise, through greed for profit and the corruption of the times, to considerable abuses. Such were the generalization of the practice of celebrating a single Mass to satisfy several stipends at once; the celebration of the so-called dry Masses, that is, abbreviated Masses without Consecration or Communion and lacking many prayers, by which an attempt was made to satisfy the various obligations undertaken; the collection of an enormous number of Masses, etc. These abuses provided ample material for attacks by the medieval heresiarchs, above all the Englishman G. Wyclef; but they also provoked repeated and energetic interventions by the popes (Innocent III, c. 3, X, III, 41; Honorius III, c. 12 ibid.) and by the councils (Paris 1215; Ravenna 1311; Toletano 1325), until the ecumenical Council of Constance (1414–18), condemning the Wycliffite heresy with the decree Fidem catholicam, subsequently confirmed by Martin V, consolidated the institution of the Mass stipend within the canonical order. Through the Council of Trent (sess. XXV, Decr. de observandis et evitandis in celebratione Missae) and the subsequent declarations of the Congregation of the Council and of the Pontiffs (in particular, one may recall the constitution Auctorem fidei of Pius VI, 28 August 1794, against the errors of the Synod of Pistoia, which, among other things, had challenged the validity of special applications of the Mass and the possibility of obtaining the fruit of the Mass by making an offering), the discipline in this matter was fully elaborated, and finally received definitive formulation in the CIC (cann. 824–24).

The fundamental norms established by canon law concerning offerings for Masses, whether they are the so-called manual stipends (that is, those paid from time to time by the faithful when requesting the celebration or application of Masses), endowed stipends (that is, those received from the revenues of endowments), or, finally, the intermediate category of stipends ad instar manualium (that is, endowments for Masses that can no longer be applied as stipulated in the foundation documents, and per-
ELEMOSINA - SECRET ALMONER OF HIS HOLINESS

The rules governing the offering of stipends for Masses (whether for the celebration or application of Masses), founded stipends (that is, those drawn from the revenues of foundations), and finally the intermediate category of stipends ad instar manualium (that is, those of founded Masses which can no longer be applied as prescribed by the foundation deeds and must therefore be paid to other priests so that they may fulfill the obligations), are as follows. As a general rule, a priest is forbidden to receive a stipend for more than one Mass per day (except for the three Masses of Christmas), even if he celebrates several times. Moreover, in order to eliminate abuses, it is forbidden: 1) to apply a Mass in accordance with a request for a future application (e.g., an application for stipends in spe), and subsequently to receive an alms offering for a Mass previously applied; 2) to accept an alms offering for a Mass that must be celebrated or applied under another title (e.g., pro populo); 3) to accept a double alms offering for the celebration and application of the same Mass, unless it is certainly established that one offering was made solely for the celebration, without application.

The amount of the alms offering is established by decree of the Ordinary, and in the absence of such a decree by diocesan custom; the priest may, however, receive either a larger sum voluntarily offered to him or a smaller one, provided that the Ordinary has not forbidden II. Other detailed rules govern the manner of fulfilling the obligations of Masses arising from the disbursement and acceptance of alms offerings; supervision of these matters is entrusted to the Ordinary of the place and, for the churches of religious, to their respective superiors. Finally, every form of commerce or negotiation concerning alms offerings for Masses is strictly prohibited, and canonical penalties are prescribed for anyone who violates this prohibition or fails to celebrate or apply the Masses for which he has received an alms offering, however small (cann. 2324, 827, 848).

Much discussion has concerned the juridical nature of the relationship established between the offerer and the accepting priest as a result of the payment of a stipend for Masses, and in particular whether it constitutes an obligatory relationship, by virtue of which performance may be demanded, with the protection of the law, in the event of non-performance. In this regard, a distinction has been made between the case in which the person making the alms offering requests only the application of the special fruit and of the Holy Sacrifice (v. MESSA) according to his intentions, and that in which the offerer requests the celebration, with or without application. In the first case, it is held that no obligatory relationship juridically arises, because the facere requested (the application) cannot be ascertained, since it concerns an interior and secret act, and is therefore legally unenforceable. The offering is consequently reduced to a simple manual donation, from which no action for performance arises. In the second case, however, in which the celebration is requested, since the object of the relationship is the labor extrinsecus, that is, the external activity which the priest must perform in celebrating, a bilateral transaction may be discerned between the offerer and the celebrant. It nevertheless remains uncertain what type of contract this might be. Some authors speak of a contract for the hire of services, or of a do ut facias contract, analogously to what the CIC expressly declares concerning pious foundations (can. 1514 § 2); others hold that it is a contract of mandate; still others (in an opinion that seems preferable) that it is a donation subject to a modus. Recent doctrines, on the other hand, tend to subsume the relationship under the category—analogous to that of stole rights—of an ecclesiastical tribute or tax. It may be objected, however, that no public-law element can be discerned in the relationship between the offerer and the celebrant that would justify its nature as a tax.

In the Italian positive legal order, setting aside what may fall within the general regulation of public assistance and charitable activity (v. ISTITUZIONI ED OPERE DI BENEFICENZA), or may be related to phenomena addressed by provisions repressing conduct deemed socially harmful (v. MENDICITA), and thus limiting ourselves to considering alms offerings insofar as they constitute an activity of religious content, it is worth recalling art. 2 of the Concordat, under which ecclesiastical authorities may, without any interference from the civil authorities, conduct collections inside and at the entrance of churches, as well as in buildings belonging to them. It should be noted, however, that the same permission is also granted to ministers of non-Catholic religions by R. D. 28 Feb. 1930, no. 280, for collections conducted inside and at the entrance of buildings intended for their own worship. - Vedi tav. XV.