SUPERFLUOUS GOODS. — Superfluous goods are those temporal goods that are necessary neither for a person’s life nor for his status.
By life is meant not merely existence but the whole of what is required to avoid a strained and miserable condition: thus food, clothing, housing, instruction, education, and the necessary reserves for coping with possible contingencies such as illness, reverses of fortune, and so forth. The word status, moreover, includes, or adds to the foregoing, everything needed to lead a life with decorum and honest comfort, according to each person’s social condition; nor should reasonable and moderate luxury be excluded from the goods necessary to one’s status, nor, in general, anything that does not degenerate into extravagance. In both cases—that is, with regard to life and to status—one must include not only the individual in question but also, as St. Thomas says (in IV Sent. dist. 15, q. 2, a. 4, qʰ. 1), all those for whom the individual is obliged to care: family, dependents, etc....
I. PURPOSE
The purpose of superfluous goods, no less than that of necessities, is their use and consumption by man. Now, right reason, which presents man not only as an individual but also as a member of society, likewise tells us that, for this society to be ordered, mutual assistance among its various members is necessary; and first of all, that the life of these members should have the means necessary for subsistence, to which man acquires a right by the very fact of being born.This doctrine, accepted and perhaps in certain cases exaggerated beyond what duty requires by modern philanthropy, is rooted in natural and divine law, as is evident from Eccl. 4, 1: « Eleemosynam pauperis ne defraudes, et oculos tuos ne transvertas a pauperis »; and in the Christian economy it becomes a precept. Thus in Lc. 11, 41: « Quod superest, date eleemosynam », Mt. 25, 41-42: « Discedire a me, maledicti, in ignem aeternum... esurivi enim et non dedistis mihi manducare; sitivi, et non dedistis mihi potum ». Here it should be noted: 1° that Christ himself says that he is represented by the poor; 2° the sanction of eternal punishment pronounced by Christ against anyone who does not assist the indigent, which presupposes a precept—and a grave one, at least when it concerns meeting extreme or almost extreme need, of which more will be said below.
Observance of this precept has, throughout the centuries, been inculcated and explained: a) By the Fathers of the Church, as is manifest from the following passages of s. Ambrogio, who in De off., I, 30 says: « Pasce fame morientem; si non paveris, occidisti »; and Serm. 64, de Temp.: « Esurientium panis est, quem tu detines; nudorum indumentum est, quod tu rechudis; miserorum redemptio et absolutio est pecunia, quam tu in terram defodis. The same idea is reaffirmed by s. Basilio, In Lc. 12, 18, « Destruam horren mea ». Cf. Sum. Theol., 2a-2ac, q. 32, a. 5, and q. 66, a. 7. b) By theologians and Doctors, of whom we shall limit ourselves to citing the foremost representative, s. Tommaso d'Aquino, who in the work cited above, q. 32, a. 5, after recalling that love of neighbor is a precept, « Diliges proximum tuum sicut te ipsum » (Mt. 22, 39), goes on to say that everything without which this precept cannot be observed must therefore fall under the same precept: now, love of neighbor consists not only in wishing him well, but also in doing good to him, according to the saying of s. Giovanni (Ep. I, 3, 18): « Non diligamus verbo, neque lingua, sed opere et veritate ». To wish, therefore, and to do good to someone requires that one assist him when he is in need, which is done through the giving of alms; and almsgiving is therefore a precept. c) By the teaching authority of the Church. In this regard, it is well known what the Popes have done, calling the faithful to observe this precept and, according to circumstances and times, approving or promoting religious and secular Orders and institutes devoted to works of charity; above all Leone XIII in the encyclical Rerum novarum, 15 May 1891; and Pio XI in the encyclical Quadragesimo anno, 15 May 1931.
II. AMOUNT TO BE DISTRIBUTED
A distinction must be made: when one’s neighbor is faced with the danger of losing his life or suffering some other truly grave harm which he cannot overcome by himself, either physically or morally, he is said to be in extreme or almost extreme need (almost extreme need is also called most grave need and, for the purpose under discussion, is equated with extreme need); if he can overcome it, but only with considerable hardship, the need is called grave; if, finally, he can do so with some hardship that is neither considerable nor grave, and in all other cases, the need is called ordinary. From this the following principles derive: 1) in cases of extreme or grave need, one must give or permit the taking of whatever is necessary to escape such need; in extreme need, even from goods necessary for one’s state of life, in grave need, only from superfluous goods (v. FURTO, CAUSE SCUSANTI del); 2) in ordinary need or in works of charity, the amount of superfluous goods to be distributed varies according to the possessor’s means. To avoid sin against the precept, it would suffice, according to many, to give 2% of the surplus remaining net of all expenses for wages, taxes, and so forth; nor does it matter to whom it is given in particular. According to others, one should give 5% of the surplus. Perhaps the two opinions can be reconciled in this way: in proportion to the surplus, if one is of ordinary means, the amount should be approximately 2%; for the more affluent, the percentage should gradually increase up to 5%.This concerns the Christian precept regarding the use of superfluous goods, which in any event, apart from extreme need, does not impose an obligation sub gravi, probably not even in grave need, unless it is likely to become extreme. But insofar as it is an act of a cardinal or moral virtue, one should be advised to give even more from all superfluous goods, movable and immovable, so as to achieve an equitable distribution, as required by a well-ordered society, without thereby seeking to destroy or infringe upon legitimately acquired rights.
III. THE MOTIVE OR TITLE
The motive for giving away superfluous goods: 1) insofar as it is a precept, is compassion for one’s neighbor out of love of God, and thus an act of that theological virtue called charity; 2) insofar as it is a virtuous act belonging to natural equity, consists in the goodness that shines forth in such an action, insofar as it tends to assist our fellow human being and thus to promote the good of society, and is included in the moral or cardinal virtue of justice called general, legal, or, by reason of the final aim toward which it tends, social. This must be said when it is a matter of assisting a common or even grave need with what is superfluous; for then the giver gives what is his own, what belongs to him. When, however, it is a matter of responding to extreme need, then the title of strict or commutative justice comes into play; for, once such need exists, all goods, whoever owns them, become common « et fiunt primi occupantis » to whoever finds himself in such need, and he may use them as his own property to the extent required by the circumstances. In other words, the indigent acquires perfect dominion in extreme need, and imperfect dominion in other cases.Those goods acquired from ecclesiastical goods that remain after the beneficiary’s honorable support are also called b. s.; but on this, see another entry (v. BENI ECCLESIASTICI).