BENI SUPERFLUI
Superfluous goods are those temporal goods that are not necessary either for a person’s life or for their state in life.
By “life” is meant not only mere existence but all that is required to avoid a wretched and destitute condition: namely, food, clothing, shelter, instruction, education, and necessary reserves to meet possible contingencies such as illness, reversals, and the like. The term “state,” moreover, includes or adds to the foregoing all that is needed to live with decorum and honest comfort according to one’s social condition; nor should reasonable and moderate luxury, and in general anything that does not degenerate into prodigality, be excluded from the goods necessary for one’s state. In both cases—whether of life or of state—there must be included not only the individual in question but also, as St Thomas says (*In IV Sent.* d. 15, q. 2, a. 4, q. 1), all those for whom the individual is responsible: family, dependents, and so forth.
### I. Purpose
The purpose of superfluous goods, no less than of necessary goods, is their use and consumption by human beings. Now right reason, which presents man not only as an individual but as a member of society, also teaches that for society to be well ordered, mutual assistance among its members is necessary; and above all, that each member’s life must have secured the necessities of subsistence, to which every man has a right by the very fact of being born.
This doctrine, accepted and perhaps in certain cases exaggerated beyond duty by modern philanthropy, is rooted in natural and divine law, as is evident from Deut. 15:4: “Do not defraud the poor of his alms, nor turn your eyes away from the poor.” In Christian economy it becomes a precept. Thus in Luke 11:41: “What is over and above, give as alms”; Matt. 25:41-42: “Depart from me, you cursed, into the eternal fire… For I was hungry and you gave me no food, I was thirsty and you gave me no drink.” Here it is to be noted: 1) that Christ Himself says that He is represented by the poor; 2) the sanction of eternal punishment pronounced by Christ upon those who do not succor the needy, which presupposes a precept, and a grave one at that, at least when it comes to aiding extreme or near-extreme necessity, of which more will be said below.
The observance of this precept has been inculcated and illustrated through the centuries: a) by the holy Fathers, as is manifest from the following passages of St Ambrose, who in *De officiis* I, 30 says: “Feed a man; if you do not feed him, you have killed him”; and in Sermon 64 *de Tempore*: “The bread of the hungry is what you withhold; the garment of the naked is what you lock away; the redemption and deliverance of the wretched is the money you bury in the earth.” The same concept is reiterated by St Basil in his commentary on Luke 12:18, “I will pull down my barns.” Cf. *Summa Theologiae*, II-II, q. 32, a. 5, and q. 66, a. 7. b) By theologians and Doctors, of whom we limit ourselves to citing the foremost, St Thomas Aquinas, who in the work just cited, q. 32, a. 5, after recalling that love of neighbor is a precept—“You shall love your neighbor as yourself” (Matt. 22:39)—goes on to say that therefore everything without which this love cannot be preserved falls under the same precept. Now to love one’s neighbor belongs not only to wishing him well but also to doing good to him, according to the saying of St John (1 John 3:18): “Let us not love in word or speech but in deed and in truth.” Therefore, to will and to do good to someone requires that one succor him when he is in need, which is done by giving alms; and thus almsgiving is a precept. c) By the magisterium of the Church. In this regard it is well known how much the Popes have done to recall the faithful to the observance of this precept, and according to the circumstances of times and places, approving or fostering religious and secular institutes dedicated to works of charity; and above all Leo XIII in the encyclical *Rerum novarum*, 15 May 1891; and Pius XI in the encyclical *Quadragesimo anno*, 15 May 1931.
### II. Quantity to Be Disbursed
A distinction must be made: when a neighbor is in danger of losing his life or is faced with another truly grave evil that he cannot overcome either physically or morally by himself, this is called extreme or near-extreme necessity (the latter is also termed “most grave” and for the purpose at hand is equated with the former); if he can overcome it but only with considerable inconvenience, the necessity is called grave; if finally he can do so with some inconvenience that is not considerable or grave, and in all other cases, the necessity is called common. From this there follow these principles: 1) in cases of extreme or grave necessity, one must give or allow to be taken whatever is necessary to escape such necessity; in extreme necessity even from goods necessary for one’s state, in grave necessity only from superfluous goods (see THEFT, EXCUSING CAUSES OF); 2) in common necessity or in works of charity, the amount of superfluous goods to be disbursed varies according to the owner’s means.
To avoid sin against the precept, according to many it would suffice to give 2% of the superfluous goods remaining after all expenses for salaries, taxes, and the like have been deducted; nor does it matter to whom it is given in particular. According to others, one should give 5% of the superfluous. Perhaps the two opinions can be reconciled in this way: that in proportion to the superfluous goods, if one is of ordinary means, it should be about 2%; if one is more affluent, the percentage should gradually increase up to 5%.
This is the Christian precept regarding the use of superfluous goods, which in any case, outside of extreme necessity, does not oblige under grave sin, and even in grave necessity probably not unless it is to become extreme. But as an act of the cardinal or moral virtue, it should advise giving even more from all superfluous goods, both movable and immovable, so as to achieve an equitable distribution as befits a well-ordered society, without thereby seeking to destroy or encroach upon rights justly acquired.
### III. The Motive or Title
The motive for the disbursement of superfluous goods: 1) insofar as it is a precept, is compassion for one’s neighbor out of love for God, an act therefore of that theological virtue called charity; 2) insofar as it is a virtuous act belonging to natural equity, it consists in the goodness that shines forth in such an action insofar as it tends to succor our neighbor and thus to promote the good of society, and is included in the moral or cardinal virtue of justice that is called general, legal, or, by reason of its final purpose, social. This is to be said when one is aiding common or even grave necessity; for then the giver gives of his own, of what belongs to him. When, however, it comes to meeting extreme necessity, then the title of strict or commutative justice intervenes; because ipso facto such necessity exists, all goods, of whatever kind they may be, become common “and become the first occupant’s,” and the one in such necessity may use them as his own to the extent necessary for the case. In other words, the indigent acquires perfect dominion in extreme necessity, imperfect in other cases.
Superfluous goods are also those acquired from ecclesiastical goods that remain after the honest sustenance of the beneficiary has been provided, but this is treated in another entry (see ECCLESIASTICAL PROPERTY).