Superfluous Goods

SUPERFLUOUS GOODS. - Those temporal goods that are necessary neither for life nor for a person's station are called s. g.

By life is meant not only existence but the whole set of things required to avoid a straitened and miserable condition: therefore food, clothing, housing, instruction, education, and the reserves necessary to meet possible contingencies of illness, reverses, and so on. The word station, moreover, also includes, or adds to the foregoing, everything that serves to lead one's life with decorum and honest comfort, according to each person's social condition; nor from the goods necessary for one's station is a reasonable and moderate luxury to be excluded, and in general everything that does not degenerate into prodigality. In both cases, that is, of life and of station, there must be included not only the individual in question but also, as St. Thomas says (in IV Sent. dist. 15, q. 2, a. 4, qʰ. 1), all those of whom the individual must take care: family, dependents, etc.

I. PURPOSE

The purpose of superfluous goods, no less than that of necessary goods, is their use and consumption by man. Now, right reason, which presents man to us not only as an individual but as a member of society, also tells us that, in order for this society to be well ordered, mutual help among its various members is necessary; and first of all that the life of those members have the means necessary for subsistence, to which by the very fact of being born man acquires a right.

This doctrine, admitted and perhaps in certain cases exaggerated beyond what is proper by present-day philanthropy, is rooted in natural and divine law, as is evident from Eccl. 4:1: "Eleemosynam pauperis ne defraudes, et oculos tuos ne transvertas a paupere"; and in the Christian economy it becomes a precept. Thus in Lk. 11:41: "Quod superest, date eleemosynam"; Mt. 25:41-42: "Discedite a me, maledicti, in ignem aeternum... esurivi enim et non dedistis mihi manducare; sitivi, et non dedistis mihi potum." Where it is to be noted: 1st, that Christ himself says that he is represented by the poor; 2nd, the sanction of eternal punishment pronounced by Christ against those who do not succor the needy, which supposes a precept, and a grave one, at least when it is a matter of relieving extreme or nearly extreme necessity, of which more will be said below.

The observance of this precept is, through the centuries, inculcated and illustrated: a) By the holy Fathers, as appears manifestly from the following passages of St. Ambrose, who in De off., I, 30 says: "Pasce fame morientem; si non paveris, occidisti"; and Serm. 64, de Temp.: "Esurientium panis est, quem tu detines; nudorum indumentum est, quod tu recludis; miserorum redemptio et absolutio est pecunia, quam tu in terram defodis." The same concept is reaffirmed by St. Basil In Lk. 12:18, "Destruam horrea mea." Cf. Sum. Theol., 2a-2ae, q. 32, a. 5, and q. 66, a. 7. b) By the theologians and Doctors, of whom we limit ourselves to citing the greatest exponent, St. Thomas Aquinas, who in the op. cit., q. 32, a. 5, after having recalled that love of neighbor is a precept, "Diliges proximum tuum sicut te ipsum" (Mt. 22:39), adds that therefore it is necessary that everything without which it cannot be preserved fall under the same precept: now to the love of neighbor belongs not only wishing him well, but also doing good to him, according to that saying of St. John (Ep. I, 3:18): "Non diligamus verbo, neque lingua, sed opere et veritate." To wish therefore and to do good to someone requires that he be succored when he is in need, which is done by the giving of alms; which therefore is a precept. c) By the magisterium of the Church. In this regard it is well known how much the Popes have done, calling the faithful back to the observance of this precept, and, according to circumstances and times, approving or promoting religious and secular Orders and institutes dedicated to works of charity; and above all Leo XIII in the encyclical Rerum novarum, 15 May 1891; and Pius XI in the encyclical Quadragesimo anno, 15 May 1931.

II. QUANTITY TO BE DISPENSED

A distinction must be made: when one's neighbor faces the danger of losing his life or of some other truly grave evil which he cannot overcome by himself either physically or morally, he is said to be in extreme or quasi-extreme necessity (the quasi-extreme is also called most grave and, for the effect of which we speak, is equated with the extreme); if he can overcome it, but with considerable inconvenience, the necessity is called grave; if finally he can do so with some inconvenience that is not notable or grave, and in all other cases, the necessity is called common. From this derive these principles: 1) in cases of extreme or grave necessity, as much is to be given or permitted to be taken as is necessary to escape from such necessity; in extreme necessity even from goods necessary to one's state, in grave necessity only from superfluous goods (v. FURTO, CAUSE SCUSANTI del); 2) in common necessity or in works of charity, the superfluous amount to be disbursed varies according to the means of the possessor. To avoid sin against the precept, it would suffice, according to many, to give 2% of the superfluous that remains net after all expenses of wages, taxes and so forth; nor does it matter to whom in particular it is given. According to others, they should give 5% of the superfluous. Perhaps the two opinions can well be reconciled in this way: that in proportion to the superfluous, if it is a question of ordinarily well-to-do persons, it is roughly 2%; if of the more wealthy, the percentage should increase gradually up to 5%.

This much as regards the Christian precept on the use of the superfluous, which in any case, outside of extreme necessity, does not oblige under grave matter, nor, probably, in grave necessity either, unless it is about to become extreme. But as regards an act of the cardinal or moral virtue, all superfluous goods, movable and immovable, should counsel giving even more, in order to have an equitable distribution as a well-ordered society requires, without thereby wishing to destroy or encroach upon rights justly acquired.

III. THE REASON OR TITLE

The motive for the giving of superfluous goods: 1) as a precept, it is compassion for one's neighbor for the love of God, and therefore an act of that theological virtue which is called charity; 2) as a virtuous act belonging to natural equity, it consists in the goodness that shines forth in such an action insofar as it tends to succor our fellow man and therefore to promote the good of society, and it is comprised within the moral or cardinal virtue of justice which is called general, legal, or, because of the final end to which it tends, social. This must be said when the question is one of supplying the common or even grave necessity from one's superfluity; for then whoever gives, gives of his own, of what belongs to him. When, however, the question is one of meeting extreme necessity, then the title of strict or commutative justice comes into play; for once such necessity exists, all goods, whosever they may be, become common « et fiunt primi occupantis » to whoever finds himself in such necessity, and he may use them as his own property to the extent that is necessary in the case. The indigent man, in other words, acquires perfect dominion in extreme necessity, imperfect dominion in other cases.

Those goods are also called superfluous which are acquired from ecclesiastical property remaining after the honest support of the beneficiary, but on this see another entry (v. BENI ECCLESIASTICI).

Tommaso Angelo Iorio