ECclesiastical Property. — By this term are designated temporal goods (whether corporeal, such as movable and immovable property, or incorporeal, such as rights, shares, obligations, servitudes) which belong to the universal Church or to a moral person of ecclesiastical law. These goods are called sacred when dedicated to divine worship through blessing or consecration; they are called precious when they possess notable artistic, historical, or material value (CIC, can. 1498, §§ 1 and 2).
**OUTLINE:** I. History:
1. Ecclesiastical property under the Roman Empire
2. Ecclesiastical property from the barbarian invasions to the end of the Middle Ages
3. Civil legislation in recent centuries
4. Evolution of doctrine regarding the subject of ecclesiastical property
II. Current Law:5. General principles and distinctions
6. Modes of acquisition by private law
7. Modes of acquisition by public law
8. Donations and testamentary dispositions *ad pias causas*
9. Other voluntary contributions
10. Subject of the ownership of ecclesiastical property
11. Administration of ecclesiastical patrimony in canon law
8. Administration of ecclesiastical patrimony in Italian law.I. HISTORY
12. Ecclesiastical property under the Roman Empire
Our knowledge of the economic and juridical life of Christian communities during the first three centuries is very imperfect. The most important among them, and particularly Rome, were from the beginning able to dispose of sums for the benefit of the poor, prisoners, and persecuted, and could assist needy communities. The places where the faithful gathered were perhaps at first rooms made available by private owners or even rented, as we know St. Paul did; and it is possible that they were Church property but entrusted in trust to some private person. By the third century, however, the situation had already changed. The *tituli* that began to arise in Rome were now Church property, as was the case with the residence of the Bishop of Antioch. Moreover, Diocletian’s persecutory edicts contemplated the confiscation of possessions, archives, and books. With Constantine’s edict of 313 and that of 321, Roman legislation recognized the Church’s right to possess and to inherit, and soon ecclesiastical patrimony increased through grants from emperors and private individuals. In particular, the Roman Church succeeded in forming an immense patrimony with properties situated in various regions of the Empire. A similar phenomenon is observed in other episcopal sees.
13. Ecclesiastical property from the barbarian invasions to the end of the Middle Ages
The Germanic invasions and later the disputes between the Roman Church and the Eastern Empire, as well as the occupation of Africa and Sicily by the Arabs, caused enormous damage to these patrimonies. However, once the Germans became Catholic, both sovereigns and private individuals restored vast goods to the Church. Numerous monasteries were founded, both in the Frankish kingdom and in the Lombard kingdom: suffice it to recall, in the latter, the abbeys of Montecassino, Farfa, S. Salvatore on Monte Amiata, La Cava dei Tirreni, Nonantola, Bobbio, and many others richly endowed by kings, dukes, or Lombard nobles. These also generously granted goods to female monasteries they had founded. In Byzantine Italy, after the Byzantine domination extended there (867–1071), many Basilian monasteries flourished, and other monastic institutions were later founded and endowed by the Norman princes after they had expelled the Arabs and Byzantines and established a powerful state in southern Italy.Many donations were then made to such institutions by private individuals, especially after the ancient cause was admitted by Lombard legislation when made for the benefit of the soul. These donations multiplied after the Franks descended into Italy with Charlemagne, thus increasing ecclesiastical patrimonies.
From a patrimonial standpoint, religious institutions founded by kings or princes, or which had come into their possession through donations or confiscations, were in a particular condition. These institutions were considered *regii iuris*, and their goods were in a hybrid state: the protection exercised by the sovereign tended to merge with a right of ownership, while ecclesiastical authors, such as the renowned Archbishop Innocent of Reims, maintained that this was not a right of such a nature as to allow the king to dispose of such institutions and their goods at will and against reason. There were also numerous churches, both in Italy and abroad, that had been founded by private individuals who had endowed them and claimed the right to dispose of them as their own property, appointing the priests, usually chosen from among their own household. For these institutions, there was a constant and patient effort by ecclesiastical authority which, while encouraging such pious foundations, gradually succeeded in bringing them under the authority of the bishops.
The patrimonies of churches that were under the protection of the king enjoyed the same privileges as the goods of the royal patrimony and thus benefited from a special jurisdiction before the king’s tribunal. Later, beginning with the reign of Louis the Pious, they came to possess *emunitas*, which protected them from state tax levies and excluded public officials from their territory, preventing them from exercising any coercive acts there. These privileges, which in earlier times belonged only to ecclesiastical institutions *regii iuris*, gradually extended to those of common law as well. The oldest among these was granted by Charlemagne in 792 to the church of Aquileia; later, all episcopal sees were endowed with extensive immunity privileges for their lands: a typical example is the de facto concession by Emperor Charles the Fat to the church of Arezzo on February 15, 882. The principal monasteries were also granted similar privileges, creating true immunity islands within the territory of the state, since their inhabitants were exempt from ordinary judges, as well as from taxes and military service.
From the earliest times, the holders of ecclesiastical property under common law were the bishops, but later the juridical and economic individuality of individual churches began to assert itself gradually, both due to the liberality of private individuals toward them and because the bishops themselves assigned a portion of the revenues of the episcopal see to the rectors of such churches. Already, they could not interfere in the property donated to these churches when the donors had excluded them, according to the decisions of councils (such as that of Arles in 452); this respect for the donors’ will became an uncontested rule.
On the other hand, according to the provisions given toward the end of the same century by Pope Gelasius I, bishops were to divide the proceeds derived from the faithful into various parts, assigning one to the individual churches of the diocese, one to the clergy, and one to charity. In the end, they also attributed to the churches dependent on them a share of other revenues and the enjoyment of certain goods. This autonomous patrimonial position of the various churches, however, only emerged in the 7th and 8th centuries.
In the feudal age the ecclesiastical patrimony suffered many and serious losses, since the secularizations of these goods began with the grants made of them by the Carolingian kings to their vassals; many of these grants were made in Italy, especially through the agency of Louis, son of Charlemagne, of Lothair his nephew, and of other later descendants of the same house. It is not certain whether these vassals considered themselves as royal, as is the opinion of the French historian Lot, or whether they should be regarded as dependent on the bishops or abbots whose goods had formed their fiefs, as Lese maintains. The first opinion seems today to prevail.
The interference of the Romano-Germanic emperors in the goods of the Church reached its height under the Saxon house (961–1024). During this period they in fact appointed the bishops, though cloaking these appointments in fictitious canonical elections, invested them with the jurisdictions accorded to them, and very often made them docile instruments of their policy. This had wide repercussions on the ecclesiastical patrimony, for the bishops, thus become great lords of the empire, organized a feudalism of their own, endowing it with ecclesiastical goods, and the more powerful abbeys did likewise. From the Carolingian age onward there stood beside every bishop an advocatus who exercised criminal jurisdiction in the name of the prelate, often led his troops in military actions, and for this drew important tributes from the bishop’s dependents.
The mingling of the complex of ecclesiastical goods with feudalism led to very grave consequences. Lay lords invested with ecclesiastical goods made them their hereditary possession and regarded the churches included in them as feudal benefices, appropriating the tithes and other revenues; this led the Lateran Council of 1179 to forbid the infeudation of tithes. On the other hand, a century earlier, at the Council held by Urban II at Clermont (1095), the Fathers had forbidden further grants of fiefs made to the detriment of ecclesiastical patrimony. The evil, however, was already done, and in fact the goods of episcopal churches and powerful abbeys remained largely burdened with feudal obligations; on the other hand, the powerful ecclesiastical advocates continued their machinations to constitute themselves princes at the expense of the bodies they were meant to protect. This happened in the case of the Habsburgs with regard to the churches of Trent and Brixen, and the same would probably have happened to the patriarchate of Aquileia at the hands of the same princes as heirs of the counts of Gorizia, advocates of that church, had not Venice taken possession of Friuli in 1420.
Nevertheless, despite these losses occasioned by encroachments, the ecclesiastical patrimony, continually replenished by the liberality of the faithful, remained always considerable. Worthy of study is its organization, which was of great importance for the economic and juridical evolution of the Middle Ages.
The arrangement of ecclesiastical goods is based on two profoundly distinct types. One consists of those belonging to individual parishes and autonomous churches, the other of the large complexes of goods belonging to wealthy bishoprics and well-endowed monasteries. Between these two extremes there are then infinite varieties.
The first type required a very simple administration, since it usually consisted of a few lands that formed the ecclesiastical mase or mansus, whose revenues, together with the portion of tithes and altar offerings due to the rector of the church, gave him the means to support himself. These were goods that the emperor Louis the Pious had already declared in the ecclesiastical capitulary of 818–19, cap. 10, free from every impost or service. In contrast to this simple structure stands the organization of the large patrimonies. These were ordinarily divided into three parts: one of them was cultivated directly by the owning body through serfs or through the labor of coloni, aldiones, or even livellarii. A steward, called an actor or villicus, presided over such work. The second part was divided into mansi, tracts of land varying in size but such that they could be cultivated by a peasant family. These cultivators were sometimes serfs called castae because they had a dwelling attached to the mase, or semi-free persons like the aldiones, or even free men who had with the religious body a lease contract called a “level” (livello). Sometimes these cultivators were artisans, and instead of being obliged to give a share of the harvest to the owner, they gave a certain number of days of work as carpenters, smiths, or other craftsmen to the estate, which, according to the medieval system, tended to be self-sufficient. The third part consisted of those lands that had no economic ties with the administration, such as those given in fief, or had only very slight ties, as other lands granted to persons who in one way or another had merited the favor of the bishop or abbot and paid the body only a small money census. In general the ecclesiastical administration treated its dependents with great moderation. Even the serfs, within the large estate, could dispose of the goods they enjoyed by inter vivos acts or by last will; leasehold or emphyteutic grants were renewed for generation after generation, with the payment of a light rent, so that after a long time the leaseholder or emphyteuta was considered the true owner, and the rights of the granting body dwindled to a simple census.
The vastness of the properties of the great episcopal churches and rich abbeys provoked here and there in Christian Europe reactions that grew heated in the heretical movements of the 11th–13th centuries. Theories were advanced that denied the Church the right to possess property and would have had clerics earn their livelihood by manual labor. The policy of the communes did not adhere to these doctrines, but often placed limits on the excessive extension of ecclesiastical property, considered harmful to the economy and above all to the finances of the cities, given the tax immunities it enjoyed. A similar policy was adopted also by the kings of Sicily, who forbade the sale or donation to religious bodies of allodial lands or “burgesantia.” Particular importance in this matter had the legislation of Venice, which required religious bodies that had received ecclesiastical goods by donation or testament to sell them, devoting the proceeds to the most varied purposes intended by the benefactors. Such laws served as a model for those of other states and in some ways anticipated the reforms carried out by princes in the 18th century.
14. The civil legislation of recent centuries
It must not be forgotten that while the legislation of the Italian states here and there placed certain limits on ecclesiastical properties, elsewhere the rise of the various Protestant confessions in various states beyond the Alps caused the annihilation of countless ecclesiastical bodies and the confiscation of their patrimonies.As for the French Revolution, it was a whirlwind that for a brief time overwhelmed churches, religious orders, and ecclesiastical patrimonies. The Napoleonic government, which formed its denouement, remedied in some measure the injuries of the preceding legislation, and though it suppressed various religious orders, many parishes, and restricted the number of seminarians, it nevertheless assigned to bishoprics, chapters, seminaries, and curacies a suitable endowment from the national goods and restored to the surviving religious orders the administration of their goods. Later works were undertaken to return to the seminaries from the municipalities their goods up to a certain value. One of the causes of friction with ecclesiastical authority remained, however, as Roberti notes, the system imposed by that legislation for the administration of the goods and revenues belonging to the Church, which was to be entrusted to exclusively lay bodies.
15. Evolution of the doctrine regarding the subject of ecclesiastical goods
What has been said so far provides some indications for investigating which entity was considered the subject of ownership of ecclesiastical goods over time. Some authors believed that a passage from a constitution of Honorius and Theodosius could be interpreted as indicating that they considered the ownership of ecclesiastical goods to belong to the Church as a universal body. However, this is a somewhat vague concept, and it is unclear whether it had practical applications. Subsequent sources, after the fall of the Western Roman Empire, as Imbart de la Tour noted, point to episcopal authority as the owner of ecclesiastical goods within the diocese. For a long time, it was the bishop who, in cases of exchanges or commutations, would transfer the goods of the parish. Later, when, as we have seen, through customary evolution, the patrimony of the parish assumed an autonomous form, acts of disposition would be carried out by the rector, with the assent of the population and the intervention of a representative of the bishop, as can be seen in the formulas of the *Speculum iudiciale* of William Durand in the 13th century. It is understood that this applied to ecclesiastical entities of common law. The theory of the division of dominion into eminent domain and beneficial ownership, developed during the revival of Roman law studies, though erroneous from the perspective of Roman law, helped overcome difficulties that arose in this context. It also served to affirm the ownership of individual ecclesiastical entities in numerous cases where they were encompassed within the sphere of a feudal lordship: gradually, the lord’s ownership asserted itself in the sphere of eminent domain, and the ecclesiastical entity became the true subject of real rights.The way in which this subject was conceived also underwent a long evolution. In the 11th and 12th centuries, ownership was attributed to the building of the church itself or to the relics of the saint venerated there, until finally the concept of the mystical person, an abstract subject—a *nomen iuris*—gained acceptance in the field of law.
II. CURRENT LAW
16. General principles and distinctions
The Church, being a juridically perfect society, has the right to all the means necessary to achieve its end. These means are not only spiritual (Sacraments and Sacramentals) but also temporal; and the right pertaining to these, which belongs to the Church, must be considered as proper, original, and autonomous, that is, entirely independent of civil authority. Canon 1495, §1, reiterating the traditional doctrine and practice of the Church—already solemnly proclaimed by Pius IX in the *Syllabus* (propositions 26–27) and in the allocution of September 7, 1851—states: *“Ecclesia Catholica et Apostolica Sedes nativum ius habent libere et independenter a civili potestate acquirendi, retinendi et administrandi bona temporalia ad fines sibi proprios prosequendos.”*The right to acquire, possess, and administer temporal goods belongs not only to the Catholic Church and the Holy See but also, in accordance with sacred canons, *“ecclesiis singularibus aliisque personis quae ab ecclesiastica auctoritate in iuridicam personam erectae sint”* (can. 1495, §2). Hence, canon 1498 explains that in the canons relating to the acquisition and administration of temporal goods, *“nomine Ecclesiae significatur non solum Ecclesia universalis aut Sedes Apostolica sed etiam quaelibet persona moralis in Ecclesia, nisi ex contextu sermonis vel ex natura rei aliud appareat.”*
Ecclesiastical goods, understood in a broad sense—comprising all things destined to achieve the aims pursued by ecclesiastical society—can be divided into two categories: sacred objects (v. *cose*) and ecclesiastical goods in the strict sense, commonly referred to as *bona Ecclesiae* or *res Ecclesiae*, which have patrimonial utility and exchange value and serve to meet the economic needs of the clergy, to defray the expenses of worship, in short, to achieve the ends of the Church, whether directly or indirectly.
Regarding the modes of acquiring ecclesiastical temporal goods, a distinction must be made between modes of acquisition under natural law and those under positive law (can. 1499, §1), as well as between modes of acquisition under private law and those under public law. These two distinctions are not interchangeable, for, as has been observed, modes of acquisition under natural law have a narrower scope than those under private law, which includes, among others, those known in private law as original modes that are not of natural law.
17. Modes of acquisition under private law
For modes of acquisition under private law, the general principle established with regard to contracts in canon 1529 applies, according to which *“quae ius civile in territorio statuit de contractibus tam in genere, quam in specie, sive nominatis sive innominatis, et de solutionibus, eadem iure canonico in materia ecclesiastica iisdem cum effectibus serventur, nisi iuri divino contraria sint aut aliud iure canonico caveatur.”* By this canon, civil laws in this matter, except where the canon itself makes express reservations, become canon law, that is, they are, as it is said, *canonized* (v. *CANONIZZAZIONE DELLE LEGGI CIVILI*). This principle, in our view, applies not only to all derived modes of acquisition but also to all original modes.The reservation of positive canon law contained in the cited canon is interpreted in the broadest sense, that is, not only for general provisions but also for particular ones incompatible with civil law (as in the case of patrimonial acts of religious and religious institutes), and not only for written law but also for customary law.
Among the norms peculiar to ecclesiastical matters contained in the *Codex*, we recall those regarding prescription, and in particular canon 1512, which concerns the distinctly canonical requirement of continuous good faith throughout the entire period of time required for prescription (v. *PRESCRIZIONE*); the norm regulating the capacity of the subject in acts for pious causes, independently of civil law, based on natural and ecclesiastical law (can. 1513, §1); the one, which we will discuss further below, concerning the value of formalities prescribed by civil law in the case of dispositions for pious causes (can. 1513, §2); and those relating to alienations (can. 1530 ff.) and to settlements (can. 1927, §2).
As to the practical scope of the reservation of divine right—whether natural or positive—it has been observed that, given the foundation on which the reservation is based, canonization must be considered excluded only in those cases in which the application of a civil norm would impose a discipline contrary to precepts of divine right; and the example has been adduced of a civil norm establishing an excessive legal interest, which would therefore be considered contrary to divine right. It has been said that such a norm would nevertheless be applicable in cases in which, by reason of the existence of a just and proportionate title, that interest would not be deemed excessive (P. Cipriotti, Contributo alla teoria della canonizzazione delle leggi civili, Rome 1941, pp. 90–91).
18. Modes of acquisition of public right
Among the modes of acquisition of public right, ecclesiastical taxes (v.) must first be considered, though these now have less importance than they once did.On the other hand, in many countries since the last century, considerable importance has been attached to the contributions that the State makes to certain ecclesiastical bodies, and above all to supplementary congrua allowances (v. CONGRUA).
Another mode of acquisition of public right consists in the law, inasmuch as it declares how, after the division of the territory proper to a given moral person or after its extinction, its goods are to be divided or assigned to others. Canons 1500 and 1501 provide respectively that, unless the founders or donors have otherwise willed, and save for rights legitimately acquired and particular laws relating to the ecclesiastical moral person in question, after the division of its territory “even the common goods which had been destined for the benefit of the whole territory, and the debt contracted for the whole territory, must be divided by the ecclesiastical authority competent to effect the division, with due proportion according to what is right and equitable”; and that, after the extinction of a moral person, “its goods become the property of the ecclesiastical moral person immediately superior.”
4. Donations and testamentary dispositions “ad pias causas.” — At present the most important source of revenue for the Church is not, as in past centuries, ecclesiastical taxes, but rather spontaneous contributions, that is, apart from State endowments, gratuitous dispositions by the faithful. These may be made either by act inter vivos (donation) or by act mortis causa (will).
As regards the capacity of the subject to perform these acts and the form they must take, canon 1513 excludes, as has already been noted above, the limitations on capacity to donate or to make a will imposed by civil laws, and does not consider the formalities prescribed by these laws to be necessary. It has been asked whether, with the provision of canon 1513, § 2, the CIC intended to abrogate the norm of earlier law according to which dispositions in favor of the Church were valid even if lacking those formalities: some hold that the thesis of abrogation is better founded; but there are those who affirm that in canon law the rule is that acts ad pias causas are, in any case, non-formal, that is, independent, for their canonical validity, of the solemn forms established by secular law, maintaining that one who benefits from the invalidity of those acts has not only a moral or conscientious obligation for the execution of the will of the testator, but also a true juridical obligation. In this connection it has been opportunely observed that the CIC uses cautious language when it says “monentur” to signify the obligation incumbent upon the heir, so that excessive insistence may not disturb good faith unnecessarily or provoke conflicts with civil laws.
In the matter of acts of liberality made ad pias causas, canon law contains two important exceptions to civil law, namely, the validity of fiduciary dispositions, whether in acts inter vivos or in those mortis causa (can. 1516), and the impossibility of revoking a donation made to a church on account of ingratitude of its rector (can. 1936, § 4).
As regards a donation made to the rector of a church, even if this be of religious, canon 1536, § 1 establishes the presumption iuris tantum that the donation was made to the church. A donation made to the church cannot be repudiated by its rector without the authorization of the ordinary (can. 1536, § 2).
For the faithful fulfillment of pious wills the CIC establishes appropriate safeguards: it entrusts their execution to Ordinaries, who must supervise their fulfillment, even by means of visitation; it obliges those who have been named by the testator himself as executors to render account to the Ordinaries of their work; it considers as not written those clauses added in wills which would exclude the right of the Ordinaries to supervise (can. 1515); it provides that a cleric or religious who has received goods in trust, whether by acts inter vivos or by will, must inform the ordinary and indicate to him the goods and the obligations involved, and that the ordinary must require that the fiduciary goods be placed in safekeeping and supervise that the pious will of the testator be fulfilled (can. 1516, §§ 1–2); it reserves to the Holy See the reduction, diminution, and commutation of last wills—unless the testator has expressly granted this power to the Ordinary—in cases in which the purpose established by the testator cannot be carried out or would be difficult to carry out (can. 1517, § 1); it grants to Ordinaries the faculty to reduce obligations imposed, in cases of subsequent impossibility of fulfillment without fault of the administrators, save when the obligations consist in the celebration of Masses, in which case their reduction pertains solely to the Holy See (can. 1517, § 2).
19. Other voluntary contributions
Spontaneous contributions, strictly speaking, include manual offerings or donations, whether occasional or made on the occasion of collections in churches or from house to house (can. 1182, § 2; 621 ff.), as well as those which the faithful make spontaneously and those which they make by notarial act. For their regulation the provision of canon 1503 applies, which forbids private persons, whether clerics or laity, to collect alms without written authorization from the Holy See, from their own Ordinary, and, outside the diocese, from the local Ordinary.20. Subject of ownership of ecclesiastical goods
The question of the subject of ecclesiastical patrimony has been one of those which has most divided canonistic and civil doctrine.The various opinions advanced within canon law—holding that ownership of ecclesiastical goods belongs to the Divinity, or to the Pope, or to the clergy taken as a whole, or to the universal Church, while there were those who considered ecclesiastical goods as res nullius—belong now to history, since the ecclesiastical legislator has laid down the provision of canon 1499, § 2, which reads as follows: “Ownership of goods, under the supreme authority of the Apostolic See, belongs to that moral person which has lawfully acquired the same goods.” Therefore, according to the CIC, ecclesiastical temporal goods belong to the individual bodies considered as subjects of rights, not to the Catholic Church as a juridical person. As to the meaning to be attributed to the term “authority” in the cited canon, it is to be noted that it must be excluded that “authority” can in any way eliminate the patrimonial autonomy of the individual ecclesiastical juridical persons; “authority” must be understood not in the sense of a private-law relationship which would be in antithesis to the full dominical right of the individual bodies, but in the sense of a public-law relationship, that is, as a power of supremacy and supervision.
Various opinions have also been expressed regarding the determination of the subject of ecclesiastical property in Italian civil law: some have held that the community of the faithful should be considered the owner of the temporal goods of the Church; others that the municipality should be considered the owner; still others have affirmed the ownership of the State’s demesne; and finally, some have maintained that the various ecclesiastical institutions, insofar as they are recognized by the State as juridical persons, should be considered the owners. Our Civil Code of 1865 adopted this last theory, laying down the provisions of articles 2, 433, and 434; the new Civil Code has substantially conformed to these provisions in article 831.
Thus, on this point, no difference is seen between the law of the Church and the law of the State.
21. Administration of ecclesiastical property in canon law
The right to administer temporal ecclesiastical goods belongs originally to the Catholic Church and the Holy See (can. 1495, § 1); to individual churches and other ecclesiastical juridical persons in accordance with sacred canons (can. 1495, § 2).The Pope is regarded by can. 1518 as the “supremus administrator et dispensator” of ecclesiastical goods; and can. 1499, § 2 refers, as has been seen, to the “suprema auctoritas” of the Holy See. This means, in substance, that the Holy See is the central and general organ of control over the administration of ecclesiastical property. The powers of control are divided among the various Roman Congregations according to their respective competencies.
The local organ of control and oversight over the administration of the goods of individual ecclesiastical entities is the Ordinary, who has the faculty to issue, within the limits established by common law and with due regard for customs and circumstances, particular norms in this regard (can. 1519).
The Ordinary must be assisted, in the exercise of his function of control, oversight, and protection, by an administrative council, which he establishes and presides over. This council is composed of two or more suitable persons, chosen, as far as possible, from among those versed in civil law, after having heard the cathedral chapter, and excluding—unless an apostolic indult is granted—those who are blood relatives or affines of the Ordinary in the first or second degree. The diocesan administrative council must be consulted regarding acts of administration of greater importance; its opinion is consultative and therefore not binding, except in special cases determined by common law or by the statutes of the foundation.
In addition to the diocesan administrative council, the Ordinary, with regard to the administration of goods pertaining to a church or a place that lacks its own administrator, must appoint as administrators “proved, suitable, and upright men,” rotating them every three years, unless local circumstances require otherwise (can. 1521, § 1).
The administrators of ecclesiastical goods must: a) take an oath before the Ordinary to fulfill their duties faithfully and well (can. 1520, § 4; 1522, n. 1); b) draw up a detailed and distinct inventory of all goods, with descriptions or valuations of each, or accept a previous inventory with annotations of changes to the patrimony. The inventory must be prepared in two copies, one of which is kept in the administration’s archive and the other in the curia’s archive, and must always be kept up to date (can. 1522, nn. 2, 3); c) exercise the diligence of a “paterfamilias,” particularly ensuring the preservation of goods, observing the norms of canon law and the civil law in force in the territory, or those established by the founder or donor or by legitimate authority; diligently and punctually collect revenues; keep them secure; employ them according to the founder’s intention or the law; invest, with the Ordinary’s consent, any funds remaining after expenses have been covered; maintain orderly records of income and expenditures; and preserve the administration’s documents and papers in order (can. 1523); d) assign honest and just wages to workers, provide for their religious, moral, social, and family needs, and not require them to work beyond their strength (can. 1524); e) submit an annual report on the administration to the Ordinary or to others (can. 1525).
Particular norms govern the motives, formalities, and controls for acts exceeding ordinary administration (v. ATTI di).
Can. 1527, § 1 contains the general principle that administrators may not perform acts exceeding ordinary administration without the prior written authorization of the Ordinary; and an ecclesiastical entity is not bound to honor contracts entered into by administrators without the authorization of the competent authority, “nisi quando et quatenus in rem suam versum sit” (can. 1527, § 2). In particular, administrators may not initiate a lawsuit without the prior written authorization of the Ordinary, or, in cases of urgent necessity, of the vicar forane, who is obliged to inform the Ordinary immediately of the granting of authorization (can. 1526).
For the strict alienation of ecclesiastical movable and immovable property, the following are required: a) a just cause, which consists in urgent necessity or evident utility for the Church or in the purpose of performing a work of Christian charity; b) authorization from the legitimate superior, which is: the Holy See for the alienation of precious objects or objects whose value exceeds thirty thousand lire; the Ordinary, after hearing the opinion of the administrative council and with the consent of the interested parties (beneficiary, patron), for the alienation of objects whose value does not exceed one thousand lire; the Ordinary without the opinion of the administrative council if the objects are of minimal value; the Ordinary with the consent of the cathedral chapter and the administrative council if the objects’ value ranges from one thousand to thirty thousand lire; c) a prior appraisal of the object, which may not be alienated for a price lower than that indicated in the appraisal; d) a public auction or publicity that allows the object to be sold to the highest bidder; e) reinvestment of the sum obtained from the alienation for the benefit of the Church (can. 1539-32).
Immovable goods of an ecclesiastical entity may not be sold, without the authorization of the Ordinary, to its administrators or to their blood relatives or affines in the first or second degree (can. 1540).
In all cases where authorization is required, its absence renders the alienation invalid (can. 1530, § 1, n. 3); this invalidity may be invoked by the alienator, his superior, their respective successors in office, and any cleric attached to the church that has suffered damage due to the alienation (can. 1534, § 2) against any possessor, for the restitution of the alienated object, save the buyer’s right against the alienator (can. 1534, § 1). The lack of prescribed formalities gives rise to a personal action by the ecclesiastical entity against the alienator and his heirs (can. 1534, § 1).
For the leasing of immovable property, in addition to a public auction or at least a form of publicity that allows the property to be leased to the highest bidder, papal authorization is required if the value of the lease exceeds thirty thousand lire and the lease is ultranational; authorization from the ordinary, with the consent of the cathedral chapter and the administrative council and the interested parties, is required if the lease is of shorter duration, or if the value of the lease ranges from one thousand to thirty thousand lire and the lease is ultranational; authorization from the ordinary, after hearing the opinion of the administrative council, is required if the lease is of shorter duration, or if the value does not exceed one thousand lire and the lease is ultranational, whereas authorization from the ordinary is not required, but it is sufficient for the administrators to inform him, if the lease is of shorter duration (can. 1541).
Immovable property of ecclesiastical entities may not be leased, without the authorization of the ordinary, to their administrators or to blood relatives or in-laws in the first or second degree (can. 1540).
With regard to enfranchisement (v. d) b. e.), the enfranchised party has the right to determine the rent without the authorization of the legitimate ecclesiastical superior; if he redeems it, he must pay the ecclesiastical entity at least a sum corresponding to the rent; the entity must provide adequate security for the payment of the rent and for the fulfillment of the conditions established; it must be stipulated in the enfiteutic instrument that the ecclesiastical judge is competent to resolve any disputes; it must also be expressly declared that improvements belong to the property (can. 1542).
With regard to donations, rectors of churches may not donate movable property belonging to them unless it is of little value—without a “justa causa remuneratoria” of piety or Christian charity; if such a cause is lacking, the donation may be revoked by their successors (can. 1535).
For the granting of pledges and mortgages, as well as for contracting debts in relation to the property of an ecclesiastical entity, the authorization of the legitimate superior is required in accordance with can. 1532 (can. 1538, § 1).
For the conversion of bearer securities into other securities that are at least equally secure and profitable,
the administrators need the consent of the Order, the diocesan administrative council, and the interested parties; no form of trading or negotiation of the securities is permitted (can. 1539, § 2).
With regard to loan contracts, it is not considered illicit to stipulate legal interest, provided it is not excessive, or even higher interest when there exists a just and proportionate title (can. 1543).
22. Administration of ecclesiastical property in Italian law
Regarding the administration of ecclesiastical property in Italian law, the legal regime in force before the Lateran Concordat may be summarized as a set of authorizations and controls by the state authority for the acquisition of immovable property by any means and of movable property by gratuitous title (Sardinian law of 5 June 1850, no. 1037, extended to the provinces of Modena by decree of 11 Nov. 1859, no. 80, to Lombardy by decree of 11 March 1860, no. 4003, to Umbria by decree of 7 Nov. 1860, no. 40, to the Marches by decree of 7 Nov. 1860, no. 359; the procedure was regulated by royal decree of 8 Feb. 1923, no. 278): controls by the economati of vacant benefices and by the prefectures over acts of ordinary and extraordinary administration; royal placet for every act of ecclesiastical authority relating to the destination of ecclesiastical property (art. 16 of the Law of Guarantees of 13 May 1871, no. 214). All this matter was then governed by articles 433 and 434 of the Civil Code, and thus the rules laid down in this regard by canon law were denied any validity under state law.Under the concordatory regime, the provision of Article 30 of the Concordat applies: «The ordinary and extraordinary management of property belonging to any ecclesiastical institute or religious association shall take place under the supervision and control of the competent Church authorities, excluding any intervention by the Italian State...». This provision is subject to a series of limitations in the Concordat and its implementing laws. First, the second paragraph of the aforementioned article makes an exception for institutes of a beneficiary character for which the State is or may be required, under current regulations, to make up for deficiencies in income (*benefici congruiti* or *congruabili*; cf. ministerial circular of 15 July 1929; Article 42, § 2, circular of 20 June 1929 of the Sacred Congregation of the Council; Article 12, circular of 30 June 1934 of the Sacred Consistorial Congregation; cf. also Articles 12–14 of Law No. 845 of 27 May 1929; Articles 23–32 of the implementing regulation No. 845 of 2 December 1929; Articles 23–32 of the implementing regulation No. 846 of 2 December 1929; Articles 23–32 of the implementing regulation No. 847 of 2 December 1929; Articles 23–32 of the implementing regulation No. 848 of 2 December 1929; Articles 23–32 of the implementing regulation No. 849 of 2 December 1929; Articles 23–32 of the implementing regulation No. 850 of 2 December 1929; Articles 23–32 of the implementing regulation No. 851 of 2 December 1929; Articles 23–32 of the implementing regulation No. 852 of 2 December 1929; Articles 23–32 of the implementing regulation No. 853 of 2 December 1929; Articles 23–32 of the implementing regulation No. 854 of 2 December 1929; Articles 23–32 of the implementing regulation No. 855 of 2 December 1929; Articles 23–32 of the implementing regulation No. 856 of 2 December 1929; Articles 23–32 of the implementing regulation No. 857 of 2 December 1929; Articles 23–32 of the implementing regulation No. 858 of 2 December 1929; Articles 23–32 of the implementing regulation No. 859 of 2 December 1929; Articles 23–32 of the implementing regulation No. 860 of 2 December 1929; Articles 23–32 of the implementing regulation No. 861 of 2 December 1929; Articles 23–32 of the implementing regulation No. 862 of 2 December 1929; Articles 23–32 of the implementing regulation No. 863 of 2 December 1929; Articles 23–32 of the implementing regulation No. 864 of 2 December 1929; Articles 23–32 of the implementing regulation No. 865 of 2 December 1929; Articles 23–32 of the implementing regulation No. 866 of 2 December 1929; Articles 23–32 of the implementing regulation No. 867 of 2 December 1929; Articles 23–32 of the implementing regulation No. 868 of 2 December 1929; Articles 23–32 of the implementing regulation No. 869 of 2 December 1929; Articles 23–32 of the implementing regulation No. 870 of 2 December 1929; Articles 23–32 of the implementing regulation No. 871 of 2 December 1929; Articles 23–32 of the implementing regulation No. 872 of 2 December 1929; Articles 23–32 of the implementing regulation No. 873 of 2 December 1929; Articles 23–32 of the implementing regulation No. 874 of 2 December 1929; Articles 23–32 of the implementing regulation No. 875 of 2 December 1929; Articles 23–32 of the implementing regulation No. 876 of 2 December 1929; Articlesart. 23-32 of the regulation of 2 Dec. 1929, no. 1005; art. 23-32 of the regulation of 2 Dec. 1929, no. 1006; art. 23-32 of the regulation of 2 Dec. 1929, no. 1007; art. 23-32 of the regulation of 2 Dec. 1929, no. 1008; art. 23-32 of the regulation of 2 Dec. 1929, no. 1009; art. 23-32 of the regulation of 2 Dec. 1929, no. 1010; art. 23-32 of the regulation of 2 Dec. 1929, no. 1011; art. 23-32 of the regulation of 2 Dec. 1929, no. 1012; art. 23-32 of the regulation of 2 Dec. 1929, no. 1013; art. 23-32 of the regulation of 2 Dec. 1929, no. 1014; art. 23-32 of the regulation of 2 Dec. 1929, no. 1015; art. 23-32 of the regulation of 2 Dec. 1929, no. 1016; art. 23-32 of the regulation of 2 Dec. 1929, no. 1017; art. 23-32 of the regulation of 2 Dec. 1929, no. 1018; art. 23-32 of the regulation of 2 Dec. 1929, no. 1019; art. 23-32 of the regulation of 2 Dec. 1929, no. 1020; art. 23-32 of the regulation of 2 Dec. 1929, no. 1021; art. 23-32 of the regulation of 2 Dec. 1929, no. 1022; art. 23-32 of the regulation of 2 Dec. 1929, no. 1023; art. 23-32 of the regulation of 2 Dec. 1929, no. 1024; art. 23-32 of the regulation of 2 Dec. 1929, no. 1025; art. 23-32 of the regulation of 2 Dec. 1929, no. 1026; art. 23-32 of the regulation of 2 Dec. 1929, no. 1027; art. 23-32 of the regulation of 2 Dec. 1929, no. 1028; art. 23-32 of the regulation of 2 Dec. 1929, no. 1029; art. 23-32 of the regulation of 2 Dec. 1929, no. 1030; art. 23-32 of the regulation of 2 Dec. 1929, no. 1031; art. 23-32 of the regulation of 2 Dec. 1929, no. 1032; art. 23-32 of the regulation of 2 Dec. 1929, no. 1033; art. 23-32 of the regulation of 2 Dec. 1929, no. 1034; art. 23-32 of the regulation of 2 Dec. 1929, no. 1035; art. 23-32 of the regulation of 2 Dec. 1929, no. 1036; art. 23-32 of the regulation of 2 Dec. 1929, no. 1037; art. 23-32 of the regulation of 2 Dec. 1929, no. 1038; art. 23-32 of the regulation of 2 Dec. 1929, no. 1039; art. 23-32 of the regulation of 2 Dec. 1929, no. 1040; art. 23-32 of the regulation of 2 Dec. 1929, no. 1041; art. 23-32 of the regulation of 2 Dec. 1929, no. 1042; art. 23-32 of the regulation of 2 Dec. 1929, no. 1043; art. 23-32 of the regulation of 2 Dec. 1929, no. 1044; art. 23-32 of the regulation of 2 Dec. 1929, no. 1045; art. 23-32 of the regulation of 2 Dec. 1929, no. 1046; art. 23-32 of the regulation of 2 Dec. 1929, no. 1047; art. 23-32 of the regulation of 2 Dec. 1929, no. 1048; art. 23-32 of the regulation of 2 Dec. 1929, no. 1049; art. 23-32 of the regulation of 2 Dec. 1929, no. 1050; art. 23-32 of the regulation of 2 Dec. 1929, no. 1051; art. 23-32 of the regulation of 2 Dec. 1929, no. 1052; art. 23-32 of the regulation of 2 Dec. 1929, no. 1053; art. 23-32 of the regulation of 2 Dec. 1929, no. 1054; art. 23-32 of the regulation of 2 Dec. 1929, no. 1055; art. 23-32 of the regulation of 2 Dec. 1929, no. 1056; art. 23-32 of the regulation of 2 Dec. 1929, no. 1057; art. 23-32 of the regulation of 2 Dec. 1929, no. 1058; art. 23-32 of the regulation of 2 Dec. 1929, no. 1059; art. 23-32 of the regulation of 2 Dec. 1929, no. 1060; art. 23-32 of the regulation of 2 Dec. 1929, no. 1061; art. 23-32 of the regulation of 2 Dec. 1929, no. 1062; art. 23-32 of the regulation of 2 Dec. 1929, no. 1063; art. 23-32 of the regulation of 2 Dec. 1929, no. 1064; art. 23-32 of the regulation of 2 Dec. 1929, no. 1065; art. 23-32 of the regulation of 2 Dec. 1929, no. 1066; art. 23-32 of the regulation of 2 Dec. 1929, no. 1067; art. 23-32 of the regulation of 2 Dec. 1929, no. 1068; art. 23-32 of the regulation of 2 Dec. 1929, no. 1069; art. 23-32 of the regulation of 2 Dec. 1929, no. 1070; art. 23-32 of the regulation of 2 Dec. 1929, no. 1071; art. 23-32 of the regulation of 2 Dec. 1929, no. 1072; art. 23-32 of the regulation of 2 Dec. 1929, no. 1073; art. 23-32 of the regulation of 2 Dec. 1929, no. 1074; art. 23-32 of the regulation of 2 Dec. 1929, no. 1075; art. 23-32 of the regulation of 2 Dec. 1929, no. 1076; art. 23-32 of the regulation of 2 Dec. 1929, no. 1077; art. 23-32 of the regulation of 2 Dec. 1929, no. 1078; art. 23-32 of the regulation of 2 Dec. 1929, no. 1079; art. 23-32 of the regulation of 2 Dec. 1929, no. 1080; art. 23-32 of the regulation of 2 Dec. 1929, no. 1081; art. 23-32 of the regulation of 2 Dec. 1929, no. 1082; art. 23-32 of the regulation of 2 Dec. 1929, no. 1083; art. 23-32 of the regulation of 2 Dec. 1929, no. 1084; art. 23-32 of the regulation of 2 Dec. 1929, no. 1085; art. 23-32 of the regulation of 2 Dec. 1929, no. 1086; art. 23-32 of the regulation of 2 Dec. 1929, no. 1087; art. 23-32 of the regulation of 2 Dec. 1929, no. 1088; art. 23-32 of the regulation of 2 Dec. 1929, no. 1089; art. 23-32 of the regulation of 2 Dec. 1929, no. 1090; art. 23-32 of the regulation of 2 Dec. 1929, no. 1091; art. 23-32 of the regulation of 2 Dec. 1929, no. 1092; art. 23-32 of the regulation of 2 Dec. 1929, no. 1093; art. 23-32 of the regulation of 2 Dec. 1929, no. 1094; art. 23-32 of the regulation of 2 Dec. 1929, no. 1095; art. 23-32 of the regulation of 2 Dec. 1929, no. 1096; art. 23-32 of the regulation of 2 Dec. 1929, no. 1097; art. 23-32 of the regulation of 2 Dec. 1929, no. 1098; art. 23-32 of the regulation of 2 Dec. 1929, no. 1099; art. 23-32 of the regulation of 2 Dec. 1929, no. 1100; art. 23-32 of the regulation of 2 Dec. 1929, no. 1101; art. 23-32 of the regulation of 2 Dec. 1929, no. 1102; art. 23-32 of the regulation of 2 Dec. 1929, no. 1103; art. 23-32 of the regulation of 2 Dec. 1929, no. 1104; art. 23-32 of the regulation of 2 Dec. 1929, no. 1105; art. 23-32 of the regulation of 2 Dec. 1929, no. 1106; art. 23-32 of the regulation of 2 Dec. 1929, no. 1107; art. 23-32 of the regulation of 2 Dec. 1929, no. 1108; art. 23-32 of the regulation of 2 Dec. 1929, no. 1109; art. 23-32 of the regulation of 2 Dec. 1929, no. 1110; art. 23-32 of the regulation of 2 Dec. 1929, no. 1111; art. 23-32 of the regulation of 2 Dec. 1929, no. 1112; art. 23-32 of the regulation of 2 Dec. 1929, no. 1113; art. 23-32 of the regulation of 2 Dec. 1929, no. 1114; art. 23-32 of the regulation of 2 Dec. 1929, no. 1115; art. 23-32 of the regulation of 2 Dec. 1929, no. 1116; art. 23-32 of the regulation of 2 Dec. 1929,
BIBL.:
ivi 1932: M. Calamari, *La legislazione concordataria in materia di donazione agli enti ecclesiastici*, Firenze 1933; E. Allorio, *Il problema delle cose sacre*, in *Riv. di dir. priv.*, 2 (1934), pp. 178 ff.; G. Sabatini, *Del patrimonio ecclesiastico*, Catania 1934; G. Vromant, *De bonis Ecclesiae temporalibus*, Louvain 1934; G. Forchielli, *Il diritto patrimoniale della Chiesa*, Padua 1935, pp. 143 ff.; 282 ff.; M. Petroncelli, *Premessa ad una trattazione del regime patrimoniale ecclesiastico*, in *Annali del seminario giuridico della r. Università di Catania*, 3 (1935), 1); F. X. Wernz–P. Vidal, *Ius canonicum*, IV, 11, Rome 1935, p. 182 ff.; P. Fedele, *L’autorizzazione agli acquisti degli enti ecclesiastici, diritto dello stato, diritto della Chiesa e regime concordatario*, in *Il diritto ecclesiastico*, 47 (1937), pp. 399 ff.; R. Naz, *Biens ecclésiastiques*, in *DDC*, II, cols. 836–41; M. da Coronata, *Institutiones iuris canonici*, II, Turin–Rome 1939, p. 433 ff.; C. Berutti, *Institutiones iuris canonici*, IV, 11, Rome, p. 461 ff.; V. GIUDICE, *Corso di diritto ecclesiastico*, Milan 1941, p. 183. Pio Fedele
23. Computation of value for contracts concerning ecclesiastical goods
According to some canonists, the lire and francs mentioned in cann. 534, 1532 and 1541 (see supra, no. 7) must be understood in gold currency, since at the time the Code was drafted the Italian lira and the Swiss franc maintained parity with each other and with gold. Subsequently, however, the Italian lira has undergone several legal devaluations, while the Swiss franc has undergone only one, in 1936.To determine the relationship between present-day Italian paper money and the gold lira or franc of 1914, it is first necessary to note that the official exchange rate between the Italian lira and the Swiss paper franc on 10 January 1949 was 141 lire to one Swiss franc (*Gazzetta Ufficiale*, 4–5 January 1949).
It must also be borne in mind that by the Swiss federal decree of 27 September 1936, art. 3, the Swiss paper franc underwent a legal devaluation of 30% in relation to the gold Swiss franc. Hence, since 1936, to purchase 1,000 Swiss gold francs officially requires 1,300 Swiss paper francs.
Since the official exchange rate between the Italian paper lira and the Swiss paper franc in Italy on 10 January 1949 was 141 lire, to purchase 1,000 Swiss gold francs on the same date required 1,300 × 141 Italian lire, i.e., L. 183,300.
CARLO E GIULIO PACELLI