Punishment And Reward

PUNISHMENT AND REWARD. — Punishment is the penalty or chastisement inflicted for the violation of a duty. Reward is the recognition of a service rendered or of a duty fulfilled.

Both, when studied with regard to their educational value, display certain characteristics converging toward an intimate harmony. a) They respond, in fact, to a need of human nature itself, which keenly feels the necessity of seeing the concepts of good and evil, law and arbitrariness, virtue and vice, justice and injustice effectively transferred to the practical sphere through the positive or negative sanction that accompanies and represents them. If we give a person what pleases him, we can readily induce him to do our will; if we threaten him with what displeases him, we arouse fear in him, and he will more readily renounce what he would nevertheless like to do, but to his own detriment. b) Punishment and reward, however, must not signify a simple pleasant or unpleasant sensation, as though they were a fine or a wage, for otherwise punishment would stand in relation to evil and reward to good as a mere addition, a chronological succession, and the person would see in them not so much the effect of his conduct and action as the effect of an extraneous will seeking to impose itself. In order for punishment and reward to possess their true educational value, they must be the external expression of the interior state of our spirit when we do evil or accomplish good: punishment becomes a symbol of our inner diminishment or impoverishment; reward, a symbol of our inner enrichment. In this way, punishment and reward guide us toward discovering the values of the spirit, bring the dishonour and dignity of conscience into view, and lead us to an awareness of our inner happiness, arising from good, together with the assent of honour and satisfaction bestowed upon us by others outside ourselves; and, conversely, to an awareness of our inner diminishment or baseness, which bursts forth from evil, together with the disapproval and hostility encountered outside ourselves. c) Reward is a stimulus to goodness and to self-perfection (how often a simple word of understanding or praise brightens the monotony of the day and encourages one to work with greater diligence and inwardness); punishment is a hindrance, a restraint, a reminder (how often a mere stern look from one’s father or a furtive tear caught on one’s mother’s eyelash has set a deviation straight for life); punishment and reward are highly effective means of awakening latent energies and transforming an entire existence. d) Reward, finally, is a kind of glorification that comes from outside to be added to our inner satisfaction and to highlight the effort made; punishment is expiation and purification, a deprivation of what is lawful for having first touched what is unlawful.

These four fundamental characteristics must govern the educational process harmoniously as a whole; it will then be the educator’s prudence, in studying the character of the person being educated, to distribute rewards and punishments in practice according to a certain gradation, now relying on one motive and now on another.

I. PUNISHMENT

1. Why punish. - Punishment is a requirement of justice, which demands that evil receive its penalty and that the pupil himself acknowledge that he deserves it when he transgresses his duty; it is therefore a means serving to correct, amend, and set right. It will consequently

be good in itself when it is inflicted in this spirit and disposes one toward it; when it is devised so as to be morally beneficial without being physically harmful; and when the educator does not allow himself to be dominated by passions of personal resentment. In this way various evils, fairly common in education, will be avoided.

First of all, the sentimental attitude, which, under the specious pretext of a misunderstood delicacy, causes many educators in reality to prove themselves no more than slaves to their love of comfort and to their own laziness. Never or almost never punishing is not always a sign of gentleness, but merely a convenient letting things take their course, in order to avoid trouble or prevent conflicts; an education that wants to be all milk and honey and is content to say, “let this be the last time” or “at the first new offense I shall really punish you,” shows that one does not understand one’s own responsibilities or human nature. Secondly, many think they are good educators only if they know how to punish. But punishment is a medicine, and one cannot live on medicines alone. Thus the issue is not so much punishment as a brute fact, but rather knowing how to punish as an act of an intelligent and reflective soul. It may also happen that one punishes not because of a defect, but with a defect. Indeed, just as one can virtuously punish out of duty, so one can also refrain from punishing out of virtue. In this case, however, the failure to punish must clearly appear as an act of courtesy, forgiveness, and love, which engages the pupil’s heart to make himself better, and not instead as an act of weakness on the educator’s part and of victory on the part of the culprit, who has known how to persist, weave excuses, and whimper, using as a pretext the claim that he would reform (is it not often said: “if I ask forgiveness, I shall avoid punishment”?).

2. How to punish. - Punishments may be physical or moral, according as a corporal or moral punishment is inflicted. Exaggerated physical punishments, which harm the body, must not be used, because they not only humiliate but also irritate, and in the end prove inadequate to the aim of education; they have too little influence on the inner person and base all their force on fear. Nevertheless, some physical punishments are not always and altogether to be condemned: “Qui parcit virgae, odit filium suum” (Prov. 13:24) and “Virga atque correptio tribuit sapientiam” (Prov. 20:15), Scripture observes. The pupil, in fact, has many incitements and impulses of a hedonistic nature: he does many things solely for the pleasant sensation he derives from them, and avoids or neglects many others because of the sensation of pain or effort that he ought to face. It is therefore good to make him understand in a practical way that, by failing in his duty, he exposes himself to the loss of a sensible pleasure or to an unpleasant sensation.

Nevertheless, moral punishments are always to be preferred: admonitions; reproach expressed through words or gestures, through a look, or through silence, etc., because within them lies the living germ of individual improvement—namely, shame, remorse, disappointment, and sorrow for the evil committed. All the more so because punishment must be regarded as a point of departure, not of arrival; it must serve during the early years, when sensitivity and indolence predominate in the pupil, to prevent dangerous habits from being acquired, while awaiting the awakening within him of intelligence and conscience, and of feelings of dignity, self-respect, and altruism, which will provide valuable assistance; indeed, one must seek to awaken these as soon as possible and strengthen them as much as possible.

Several other rules help to establish punishment within its proper limits: a) punish the pupil when he truly deserves it; otherwise a profound aversion to the educator will be aroused in his heart, and the latter’s influence will thereby lose all effectiveness. b) Do not punish in moments of anger, passion, or selfish resentment, because this leads to no improvement (people will merely say, for example: “the teacher is on edge today”; “something has gone wrong for him,” etc.). The pupil, instead, must understand that, if the educator punishes, he does so with regret, out of a consciousness of his own duty, and that it is the pupil himself who compels him to be severe. c) Punishment must be the “ultima ratio,” when the other means prove insufficient; otherwise one becomes accustomed to punishment and receives it with indifference, and sometimes even with a certain pride, which in this case is highly harmful. d) Punishment must be proportionate to the fault, that is, neither too severe nor too light. Just as an undeserved penalty offends the pupil’s conscience, so disproportionate punishment perverts it, leading him to regard a slight offense as serious, or a serious fault as slight. The gravity of the offense must be judged according to the pupil’s age and understanding, and also in light of the examination of conscience that the educator must make regarding himself, to determine whether, through his methods, impulsiveness, and conduct, he may have caused or at least contributed to the offense. e) Punishment that is excessively humiliating, or seasoned with insults and sarcasm, or based on the culprit’s physical defects or hereditary or family deficiencies, also lies outside the sphere of active pedagogical values; on the one hand, this would embitter the punished person’s spirit, and on the other would expose him to the ridicule of his companions, to the detriment of that moral education and that compassion which is the most precious of human affections. f) Punishment must be impartial, and predilections and preferences must be set aside, especially when they are based on the pupil’s high or low family status, on the greater or lesser power of his family, or on the greater or lesser favors that can be obtained; this provokes resentment and envy, and at times even rebellion against the educator. g) The carrying out of the punishment must signify that the matter is closed. Once the punishment has been completed by the pupil, the educator must avoid holding a grudge against him, persecuting him with continual references to the past, or reproaching him more heatedly; otherwise the pupil will repeat the usual phrase: “They have it in for me!” and all the effectiveness of the punishment will be lost, producing instead a pernicious obstinacy.

II. THE PRIZE

1. Why award prizes

The prize too is a requirement of justice and of human nature itself, which demand that, just as evil must correspond to a penalty, so good must correspond to a prize. In the sphere of morality, the prize represents and concretizes the emblem of positive sanction: it stimulates and assists the inclinations of the person being educated, indeed of every person, by arousing emulation, sustaining and renewing effort against the monotony, difficulties, and distractions of daily occupation, awakening hope of a gratifying recompense for the interest one takes in esteem and good reputation, preparing one for struggle and competition, unfolding and intensifying the exercise of one’s own abilities, and driving one to overcome possible failures without allowing oneself to be gripped by paralyzing discouragement and depression.

Against the beneficial effects of prizes, some insist that they can stimulate a sense of vanity, egoism, and self-sufficiency; provoke an insatiable desire to appear, for publicity and honors, with the consequent almost inevitable abuses and deceptions, merely to obtain primacy, secure success, and make one’s way even by walking over the bodies of victims. But this picture, though rich in psychological evidence and unfortunately confirmed by experience, is not at odds with the reasons recommending the use of prizes; indeed, it is in perfect harmony with them. Moreover, among the various subjects forming part of the individual’s total education are also the rules capable of restraining those tendencies and impulses that may lead to deviations. Thus even the passion for vanity must be educated to remain within the proper mean and not cross over into the sphere of injustice. Abuse must not prejudice or destroy proper use, and victory must learn that the greatest merit lies in knowing how to bear it with naturalness and simplicity, without ridiculous inflation or offensive exhibitionism.

Still others define the prize as unjustified because it amounts to a falsification of the ethical ends immanent in spiritual activity and therefore to a true and proper corruption... To accustom young people to look outside themselves toward an end whose attainment does not depend entirely upon them... is to substitute in their souls, for the certainty of the present and indefectible worth of life, the doubt of the prize, in view of which life may have worth” (G. Gentile, op. cit. in bibl., pp. 56–57). Leaving to philosophy and theology the solution of the question of interested morality to which these lines refer, one must obser-

ve: a) Christian doctrine does not grant the individual this self-sufficiency, whereby he encloses himself within himself as within the absolute and regards himself as the absolute; rather, it coordinates him with God, a being distinct from him, transcendent and most perfect, and therefore just, who consequently rewards good and punishes evil “not arbitrarily or capriciously, through a childish extrinsicism, but rather as a consequence linked to the spiritual state in which, by either furthering or paralyzing divine action, the subject has voluntarily placed and voluntarily formed himself... Man’s placing himself within the order and harmony willed by God cannot and must not be frustrated by a final lack of success; rather, as a logical providential consequence, it will have its reward, and in the contrary case its punishment” (D. Bassi, op. cit. in bibl., p. 203).

b) Education, which is not only theory but also practice, cannot disregard the inclinations of human nature. Now, interest is an instinctive tendency which, although it can easily degenerate, can also lead, and in fact does lead, to works of goodness and to personal and social effectiveness. Morality cannot be isolated, within the wondrous human whole, from the variety of forces, motives, and tones that operate within II. Motives extrinsic to the human act, including interest in a prize, can and must prepare the formation of conscience; they provide a way of initiating a movement that little by little may be directed toward ever nobler and higher ends, which may be called moral and spiritual interests. Yet at bottom the question of happiness will always remain, and whether one wishes it or not, this is the supreme interest of every individual.

2. How to award prizes

For the prize to possess all the educational value proper to it, it must be used according to the following guiding principles: a) the mere recognition of the result achieved must not be regarded as the purpose of the prize; more than the result achieved, one must consider the energy expended and the individual effort of good will. b) Nor is the purpose of the prize merely to reward the person being educated for the good he has done, but rather to keep him on the path of good and strengthen him in goodness ever more and ever better. c) To reinforce in the person being educated the conviction that the best of prizes, the noblest and most consoling, must always be the approval and contentment of his conscience. d) The prize must not be distributed too frequently, for then it will be received with indifference and lose its motivating force. e) Praise too, which in a certain respect represents the most perfect prize, must be used sparingly, carefully measured, and proportionate to the merit that occasions it, especially when given in the presence of others. Excessive facility or indiscriminate use of praise empties it of all its efficacy, gives educational work an unctuous, saccharine tone that can easily foster insincerity, hypocrisy, and pride. f) Above all, care must be taken that the person being educated does not regard the prize as the principal motive for the effort required to act well. One may enjoy the prize as recognition and support for progress in one’s own perfection; consequently, one may aspire to

II. At the same time, however, the spirit must be tempered to duty and the will strengthened, so as to behave well even if, for whatever reason, the prize should be lacking

g) Those who are not awarded prizes must not develop feelings of envy, but of emulation; everyone should always sincerely and wholeheartedly rejoice in the triumph of others, and in their prize consider not so much the effect as the cause that produced it: namely, application, study, and effort. Thus the prize will become an object of noble emulation, and demoralizing and paralyzing envy will cease.

IBBL.: R. Lambruschini, Della educazione e della istruzione, 1ª ed., Firenze 1849, pp. 110–238; H. Mosapp, Strafe in Lexik der Pädagogik, Friburgo in Br., IV (1915), coll. 1291–97; H. Bruck, Belohnung, ibid., I (1913), coll. 414–17; A. Autin, Autorité et discipline en matière d'éducation, Parigi 1920; L. de Sluetter, Selfgovernment, discipline, education, Bruxelles 1925; D. Bassi, La saggezza nell'educazione, Firenze 1928, pp. 125–241; A. Franchi, Pedagogia, ed. a cura di M. Cordovani, 2ª ed., Firenze 1941, pp. 244–48; G. Calò, Educazione e scuola, ivi 1942, pp. 117–132; G. Gentile, Sommario di Pedagogia come scienza filosofica, II, 5ª ed., ivi 1942, pp. 27–58.

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